Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security

Inquiry into the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017

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Preface

This submission details and explains certain foreign interference activities carried out by agencies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), activities that are aimed at influencing political processes and the exercise of democratic rights in Australia. It focusses on the CCP’s United Front (UF) work in Australia. Although its endeavours extend beyond them, UF work is at the heart of the influence operations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Therefore, the most important test of the new foreign interference legislation will be how effectively it suppresses UF activity in this country.

It is most important to stress that UF work is directed at both ethic Chinese and non-ethnic Chinese people in Australia, with more emphasis on the latter in recent years. In both cases it aims to ‘influence the choices, direction and loyalties’ of its targets by overcoming negative perceptions of CCP rule in China and promoting favourable perceptions. UF work relies on psychological techniques of manipulation and behavioural control that have been carefully developed and tested over many years and that are disguised as ‘benign, benevolent and helpful’.

Part 1 of the submission explains the origins, objectives, modus operandi and organisational structure of UF work. Part 2 describes the more important UF groups operating in Australia.2

To help assess the likely effectiveness of the Bill’s provisions aimed at countering foreign interference operations, Part 1 puts forward some stylized cases based on actual UF operations in Australia and asks whether they would be rendered unlawful under the proposed act.

Although UF work is necessarily secretive, we now have access to enough internal party documents and well-informed expert opinion to be able to paint a fairly clear picture of what has been happening in Australia. In addition to extensive primary research on UF organisations in Australia, the submission draws on the work of specialists, notably James Jiann Hua To, Gerry Groot and Anne-Marie Brady. In particular, New Zealand CCP analyst James To managed to gain access to a trove of

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2 Part 1 has been prepared by Clive Hamilton and Part 2 by Alex Joske.
confidential Party documents that provide an extraordinarily detailed picture of the objectives and methods of UF work in countries like Australia.³

**Part 1 Origins, objectives, modus operandi and organisational structure of UF work**

**1.1 Origins and objectives**

The inspiration for the CCP’s United Front strategy was Leninist theory. It was put to effective use during the civil war in the 1930s and 1940s to win over smaller parties and ethnic minorities in the battle with the nationalists of the KMT.⁴ Mao Zedong described United Front work as one of the three ‘magic weapons’ of the Chinese Communist Party.⁵ After the revolution, the united front strategy, and United Front agencies within the Party structure, continued to be used to co-opt and subdue ethnic minorities and to retain the support of independent and marginalised groups.

In more recent years, UF work has also focussed heavily on overseas Chinese populations in countries like Australia, including businessmen, professionals, community leaders and students.

Earlier immigrants from China are known within Chinese society as *huaren* while more recent arrivals are referred to as *xinqiao* if migrants or *huaqiao* if PRC nationals living abroad.⁶ The latter two groups are more likely to retain their links to the ‘motherland’ and ‘have an emotional and psychological need to participate in activities associated with their ancestral homeland’.⁷ These links to China, including family and business connections, provide great leverage for the CCP to influence their activities and political stance.

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⁴ Charlotte Gao, ‘The 19th Party Congress: A Rare Glimpse of the United Front Work Department’, *The Diplomat*, 24 October 2017
⁶ To, *Qiaowu*, 184
⁷ To, *Qiaowu*, 115
James To details the variety of Beijing’s programs directed at overseas Chinese, known collectively as *qiaowu* work. Their essential purpose is to mobilise sympathetic or potentially sympathetic Chinese community groups to serve the interests of the CCP while at the same time supressing or marginalising organisations hostile to the Party. *Qiaowu* work also aims to disseminate Party policy among overseas Chinese and prevent the spread in diaspora communities of ‘poisonous western ideas’ (including representative democracy, human rights and academic freedom) that might in turn infect the Chinese mainland. A teaching manual for UF cadres notes: ‘The unity of Chinese at home requires the unity of the sons and daughters of Chinese abroad’.  

China’s rapid rise to global prominence has helped the CCP propagate a version of ‘Chineseness’ aimed at binding overseas Chinese to the ‘ancestral homeland’. In doing so it mobilises for its own purposes national pride in China’s achievements. In the face of western criticism of human rights violations, for instance, the Party often defends its authoritarian governing style as the ‘Chinese’ or ‘Confucian’ way. (By implication, Taiwan’s democracy and respect for human rights are somehow un-Chinese.)

Over the last 20 years the PRC has succeeded, perhaps beyond expectations, in suppressing voices critical of the CCP (primarily those organisations campaigning for democracy, Tibetan autonomy, Taiwanese independence, and rights for Falun Gong practitioners). They are barely heard today in either mainstream or Chinese-language media.

In the 2000s, trusted individuals sympathetic to the CCP, encouraged by the Canberra Embassy and PRC consulates, took over most of the established Chinese community and professional associations in Australia. Earlier generations of Chinese-Australians tell of meetings at which long-standing social and professional associations were taken over by new members with pro-Beijing sympathies. Those unsympathetic to the CCP were forced out.

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8 James Kynge, Lucy Hornby, and Jamil Anderlini, ‘Inside China’s secret “magic weapon” for worldwide influence’, *Financial Times*, 26 October 2017
UNITED FRONT ACTIVITIES IN AUSTRALIA

Many new organisations have been established that also take a pro-Beijing position. They include, from the 1980s, the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations on campuses across Australia, various business organisations and a number of professional organisations for ethnic Chinese scholars in Australia.

The effect has been that pro-Beijing elements are now seen as representing ‘the Chinese community’ in Australia, and are often reported that way by the mainstream media, and because of that political representatives have been happy to associate with them.

The Embassy and consulates typically aim to guide ethnic Chinese organisations rather than directly control them. In the words of a secret party document, the aim is to ‘infiltrate their inner workings without overtly intervening; and to influence through guidance, rather than openly leading them’. This means that most pro-Beijing associations in Australia are not overt front organisations for the CCP and, since they also engage in innocuous social, cultural and business activities, it may be misleading to label them as solely ‘United Front organisations’. Nevertheless, consistent with previous analyses, in 2017 a Financial Times investigation into UF operations in several countries found ‘a movement directed from the pinnacle of Chinese power to charm, co-opt and attack well-defined groups and individuals. Its broad aims are to win support for China’s political agenda, accumulate influence overseas and gather key information’.

United Front activities intensified when Xi Jinping became Communist Party general-secretary in 2012. In 2014 he declared: ‘As long as the overseas Chinese are united, they can play an irreplaceable role in realising the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation as they are patriotic and rich in capital, talent, resources and business

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9 A recent example occurred during the Bennelong by-election in December 2017. ABC Radio current affairs programs presented Helen Sham-Ho as a representative voice of the Chinese community without mentioning her long involvement in UF activities including those of the ACPPRC. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/chinese-interference-in-australian-politics/9254020
10 To, Qiaowu, 188
11 Kynge et al., ‘Inside China’s secret “magic weapon” for worldwide influence’
connections’. Xi designated Chinese students studying abroad as a new and important focus for UF work. He created a new Leading Small Group dedicated to extending and better managing UF work and giving it higher status in the Party hierarchy. Elevated to ‘a new level of ambition’, in the words of Anne-Marie Brady’s ground-breaking study of influence operations in New Zealand, UF activity has been shaped into a more potent ‘magic weapon’ than Mao imagined, notably in countries where the ethnic Chinese population is relatively large and successful.

1.2 New objective

The foremost objective of UF work has been winning over Chinese-Australians to the CCP cause, mainly through suppression of dissident voices, the capture of established organisations and encouraging the creation of new ones. Control of Chinese-language media in Australia has been vital to this process of silencing critical voices and amplifying friendly ones.

Yet there is a second objective, more recent in its development and emphasis, one growing in importance, that may be more relevant to the proposed foreign interference legislation.

United Front work has increasingly been oriented towards promoting a more favourable view of the PRC in the Australian mainstream. Although the PRC engages in traditional forms of espionage in Australia, and UF activities are deployed to gather low-level intelligence, their foremost objective is to shape thinking and attitudes. Most of the efforts have been directed at non-Chinese Australian elites, countering negative perceptions of CCP rule and high-lighting the positives through co-opting and cultivating them. The strongly pro-Beijing views of much elite opinion testifies to the success of this campaign.

Political leaders are a natural target. One favoured avenue is to draw them into engagement with Chinese community organisations, like the Australian Council for

15 Kynge et al., ‘Inside China’s secret “magic weapon” for worldwide influence’
the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (ACPPRC) and cultural activities like Chinese New Year celebrations where personal relationships are fostered and feelings of reciprocity are established. Through these contacts a Chinese view of the world is absorbed and becomes accepted, where ‘Chinese’ is in fact Beijing’s view of the world. The leaders of these organisations appear to reflect and represent the views and outlook of the Chinese-Australian community. They may have legitimacy in some parts of the Chinese-Australian community, but because of the degree to which their opinions and actions are shaped by the PRC Embassy and ultimately the CCP, they might be better characterised as United Front operatives.

Large donations to political parties oil the process of engagement. Unlike donations from corporations, nothing immediate is expected in return. But access and influence are used to advance Beijing’s strategic and political interests. The reported demand by former ACPPRC president Huang Xiangmo that the Labor Party change its policy on the South China Sea if it wanted to receive a promised $400,000 donation was clumsily direct, and the publicity it attracted may have been frowned upon by the Embassy.17

UF organisations also encourage their members to enter politics by joining mainstream parties, running for election to federal and state parliaments. Local councils too can provide experience and contacts. Members are also encouraged to seek positions in politicians’ offices.18 ASIO has reportedly identified about 10 political candidates at state and local government elections whom it believes have close ties to Chinese intelligence services.19

UF organisations are particularly active in the business community, where influence operations have been supercharged by the rapid growth in trade and investment flows between China and Australia. Australian business executives welcome the

17 Nick McKenzie, Chris Uhlmann, Richard Baker, Daniel Flitton and Sashka Koloff, ‘ASIO investigation targets Communist Party links to Australian political system’, Four Corners, Transcript, ABC online, 6 June 2017
18 Some UF operatives working in political offices have been named in the media (see, for example, Clive Hamilton and Alex Joske, ‘Political networking the Chinese way - a Sydney MP and his ‘community adviser’, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 2017). Others have been identified but have not yet been exposed in the media.
19 Paul Maley and Nicola Berkovic, ‘Security agencies flag Chinese Manchurian candidates’, The Australian, 9 December 2017
opportunities presented to get to know and work with Chinese-Australian and Chinese business people. While the Australians may be thinking only of the commercial value of these relationships, their partners often have political and strategic goals as well.

UF operatives in the Australian business community gather information to feed to the consulates and cultivate relationships with a view to promoting opinion sympathetic to the PRC. Many leading figures in the Australian business community now serve as megaphones for Beijing’s messaging to the Australian government and the wider public, not least in warnings about ‘damaging the relationship’ and the risks of retaliation when statements are made that Beijing does not like.

Other mainstream elites, notably in the media, universities and the military, are also targeted by UF programs, as well as specific CCP influence programs. They are not described here for lack of time.

1.3 Modus operandi

James To writes that, as part of broader qiaowu work, United Front work engages in ‘a continuous and evolving effort to influence the choices, direction and loyalties of the OC [overseas Chinese] by dispelling their negative suspicions and misunderstandings concerning China, and replacing those thoughts with a positive understanding instead’.20

The work appeals to overseas Chinese patriotism and sentiment, and routinely associates criticism of the CCP with ‘anti-China’ sentiment. But the motives are material too. As Professor Gerry Groot writes: ‘United Front work often takes the form of co-optation: by advocating for the Party’s views to their circles of influence and reporting the views of their circles back to the Party, targets are rewarded with enhanced status and in some cases material advantages as well’.21

Although coercive and threatening methods are used in Australia on members of the Chinese and Chinese-Australian community who refuse to toe the party line, they are not typically used by UF organisations and are left to the Ministry of State Security

20 James To, ‘Beijing’s policies for managing Han and ethnic-minority Chinese communities abroad’, *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 2012, no. 4, 186-7
and consulate staff.\footnote{For example, companies are threatened with loss of business in China and official displeasure unless they withdraw advertising from Chinese-language media in Australia that do not bend to Beijing’s will.} Those with stronger family and business links to mainland China are more vulnerable.

The psychological techniques applied in UF work have been developed and refined by the CCP over decades and are taught to cadres with the help of (classified) manuals. James To observes that the techniques are effective tools for ‘intensive behavioural control and manipulation’ while appearing to be ‘benign, benevolent and helpful’.\footnote{To, \textit{Qiaowu}, 189}

This is relevant to assessing the likely effectiveness of the legislation under review. Compared to the influence activities of other nations, the activities of the PRC have some unique features. UF methods have the following characteristics.

- Overseas Chinese who act in the interests of the PRC may do so voluntarily because they hold genuinely patriotic feelings towards the motherland. More often, they expect to receive some kind of benefit, such as contacts and official favour useful for business and employment proposes. (In the United States, those convicted of spying have almost always received money.)

- Influence activities may not have a specific objective in mind, that is, to persuade a target to make a decision that favours the PRC. By cultivating warm personal relationships, they aim to shape thinking and attitudes so that they are more favourably disposed to the PRC’s interests when expressing an opinion or taking an action. They therefore have a high level of deniability. When a wealthy donor to an Australian political party says he does not expect anything from Australian politicians in return, he may mean it, although he may well expect to be rewarded by the PRC.

- Little is written in English, although the website of the United Front Work Department (discussed in the next section) provides general descriptions of its activities in Chinese.\footnote{http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/index.shtml} Its covert modes of operations are spelled out only in classified party documents and communications. This will make the new laws difficult to enforce because evidence of the intention to interfere in Australia’s

\footnote{For example, companies are threatened with loss of business in China and official displeasure unless they withdraw advertising from Chinese-language media in Australia that do not bend to Beijing’s will.}
political processes or the exercise of democratic rights (Section 92.2) will be hard to obtain.

- The CCP thinks over the long term. It’s content to gradually build organisations, networks and friendships across years and decades. It is not unusual for the Embassy or consulates to identify potential leaders in Australian politics, business, the military, intelligence agencies and universities when they are at the start of their careers and cultivate them over years. Not all of these investments will pay off, but a few will.

United Front organisations, with consulate assistance, are in the process of cultivating and training a new cohort of young community leaders who will be suited to moving into positions of influence in 10 or 20 year’s time. The next generation leaders have better English and are more at ease with Australian culture and ways. Most will also hold Australian citizenship.

1.4 The structure of UF activity in Australia

An organisational chart of United Front influence activities in Australia is shown in Figure 1. It has been adapted from one compiled by James To.\(^{25}\) Note first that United Front work falls under the aegis of the CCP rather than state agencies, although state agencies are controlled by the CCP and feed into UF work. At the centre is the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a large department under the authority of the Party’s Central Committee.

The Third Bureau of the UFWD is tasked with carrying out influence operations among ethnic Chinese communities abroad. These are conducted by four agencies of the UFWD—the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), the China Overseas Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese and the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPNR).

\(^{25}\) To, *Qiaowu*, Figure 1, p. 74. Some non-UF organisations and others less important to Australia have been omitted. One is the Zhigong Party, which draws in returned overseas Chinese—experts and scholars with overseas links that can be exploited. It is one of the officially recognised non-Communist parties in China but is controlled by the UFWD’s first bureau. It’s a member party of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Figure 1 Organisational structure of United Front operations in Australia

Source: Adapted from James To, Qiaowu, Figure 1, 74
The OCAO is an agency of the State Council, which gives it direction. However, the UFWD also appears to oversee its activities. The OCAO is responsible for developing OC policy and laws and supervising all OC affairs activities. James To writes:

The OCAO also has a clear soft power agenda through guidance, coordination, solidarity, and friendship with the OC mass media, cultural societies, and schools to carry out cultural communications.26

Importantly, the OCAO and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese have provincial, city and county counterparts throughout China, and these have a direct role in maintaining and cultivating links with provincial and hometown associations of overseas Chinese in Australia. Examples include the Australian Guangdong Chamber of Commerce (of which Huang Xiangmo is president), the Australia-Hubei Association, the Australia Fujian Association and the Australia Jiangxi Association. Scores of such organisations exist in Australia at the national, state and city levels and all maintain links with the PRC Embassy or local consulates.

The China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPNR) was established to counter Taiwanese independence but its activities among overseas Chinese have broadened into ones aimed at wider political influence abroad. As a sign of its importance in the CCP hierarchy, the chair of the CCPPNR is Yu Zhengsheng, until recently a member of the Politburo’s supreme Standing Committee. The CCPPNR’s vice-chairperson is the head of the UFWD. The CCPPNR has established 170 branches in 80 countries around the world.27 The main branch in Australia is the Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (ACPPRC).

In addition to the UFWD, the PRC has a number of other Party and state agencies undertaking influence operations in Australia. They include the Propaganda Department and the International Department. Certain arms of the People’s Liberation Army also engage in influence operations. The activities of these agencies sometimes overlap and require coordination.

26 To, Qiaowu, 76. Qiaowu work is a subset of UFWD work because it is limited to influencing ethnic Chinese while united front work has a much broader audience. Officially, qiaowu policies and directives come from the OCAO of the State Council.
27 To, Qiaowu, 200. These are 2014 figures.
On the bottom row of Figure 1, showing kinds of UF organisations in Australia, the second and third boxes from the left are of primary interest in this submission. They may be grouped into the following seven categories (the first category in the second box and the rest in the third):

- ‘Peaceful unification’ or anti-independence groups (the ACPPRC and related associations)
- Hometown associations
- Business associations, such as chambers of commerce
- Ethnic Chinese professional and scientific associations
- Cultural and heritage groups, such as dance troupes and writers’ organisations
- Friendship associations and exchange associations
- Alumni associations

The Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) are an eighth category. They are an integral component of UF work, aimed primarily at monitoring the thoughts and behaviours of the 130,000 Chinese students on campuses across Australia. These are included in the box fourth from the left and are guided by education attachés in the consulates (where their leaders often meet). They are discussed in Part 2.

Brief descriptions of the seven categories of UF organisations named above are provided next, with more detailed descriptions in Part 2.

‘Peaceful reunification’ groups

The Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (ACPPRC) is the peak United Front organisation in Australia, and is considered at more length in Section 2.1. It is guided and supervised by the CCPPNR in Beijing, as are the sister organisations around the world. The ACPPRC has branches in each Australian state and the Northern Territory. Dozens of ethnic Chinese associations are affiliated with it (see Section 2.2) and it wields the most power within the overseas Chinese community. Its president can be seen as the most important organiser and facilitator of United Front work in Australia. Those holding vice presidencies and other offices often preside over other UF organisations in Australia.
Hometown associations

Hometown associations draw together Chinese-Australians on the basis of their city or province of birth with the aim of mutual aid and social networking. Not all of them are United Front organisations, although the larger ones are certainly of interest to the Embassy and consulates. There are over 100 of them in Australia. Some of the larger ones are the Australian Federation of Guangdong Overseas Chinese Associations, Australian Federation of Shenzhen Association, Australia-Ningbo Association, Australia Hubei Association, Australian Shanghai Hometown Association, Australian Yangzhou Overseas Friendship Association, Australian Council of Shanghai Organizations, Australian Zhejiang United Association, Australian Guangxi Friendship Association, Australian Hangzhou Hometown Association, and the Federation of Australian Shenzhen Community.

These have been a primary target for UF work both for their access into the diaspora and as a venue to win hearts and minds to the Party’s standpoint. Many hometown associations have affiliated themselves with the ACPPRC. Hometown associations are believed to have been active in the 2017 Bennelong by-election.28

Business associations

In the business world, there has been a proliferation of front organisations whose purpose is to deepen personal relationships between the Australian business community and the Chinese and Chinese-Australian business community and subtly shift the perspective of the former to an understanding that suits the CCP’s interests. Through this work, the ‘Chinese perspective’—the PRC’s peaceful intentions, the benefits of closer economic ties, the economic damage from a fall-out—is communicated by Anglo-Australian faces and voices, giving it greater legitimacy. Three worth noting are the Australia China Economic, Trade and Cultural Association (ACETCA), the China Chamber of Commerce in Australia and the Australian-China Belt & Road Initiative (partly funded by DFAT and linked to Andrew Robb).

28 Nick O’Malley and Alex Joske, ‘Mysterious Bennelong letter urges Chinese Australians to “take down” the Turnbull government’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 December 2017

The Australia-China Business Council is not directed or guided by the PRC, although it is an important channel of influence.

**Professional and scientific associations**

In addition to hometown associations, some migrants to Australia socialise and support one another through professional organisations. These too have mostly been sponsored and supported as new United Front organisations, although they are also supervised by the Ministry of Education. In Australia, they are guided by the consulates or the Embassy. They are described in Part 2. Some notable UF scholarly organisations include: the Federation of Chinese Scholars in Australia (FOCSA), Australian Chinese Engineering and Technology Experts Network, Australian Chinese ICT Professional Society, Canberra Society of Chinese Scholars, Queensland Chinese Association of Scientists and Engineers, South Australia Chinese Professionals Association, Western Australia Chinese Scientists Association, Society of Chinese-Australian Academics, Australian Chinese Engineers Association, and the Society of Chinese-Australian Academics (SCAA).

**Cultural and heritage groups**

Almost all cultural activities sent to the west (dance troupes, art exhibitions and so on) are now guided by United Front organisations operating from Beijing via local proxies. Within Australia, ethnic Chinese cultural organisations, including veterans’ associations, Chinese New Year celebrations, writers’ associations and Chinese Christian churches, attract the attention of the Embassy and the consulates with a

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view to infiltrating and guiding them. CCP influence in these groups has been subtle and hard to discern, although attention has now turned to them.\(^\text{30}\)

**Friendship associations and exchange associations**

The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), through its Overseas Committee, controls the China Overseas Friendship Association which works to develop links and promote understand with overseas Chinese and through them mainstream society in countries like Australia. It’s discussed in Section 1.6.

**Alumni associations**

These bring together graduates of universities in China for the purpose of social exchanges and professional cooperation and advancement. They have frequent contacts and exchanges with their alma maters back in the PRC. Scientists at Australian universities often collaborate in their research with their counterparts at Chinese universities. Some of this research has military applications and has been funded by the ARC or is carried out in partnership with Chinese corporations with close links to the PLA.\(^\text{31}\)

**1.5 The importance of media**

Almost all Chinese-language newspapers and radio stations in Australia are now controlled by pro-Beijing elements.\(^\text{32}\) As Figure 1 indicates, these media are important to UF activity in Australia as they communicate to the diaspora the CCP view of the world. They also foment ‘patriotic feelings’ and amplify official messages. At times, they help promote nationalistic gatherings, like demonstrations against The Hague Tribunal’s ruling on the South China Sea,\(^\text{33}\) and stir up Chinese students to complain about any ‘anti-China’ comments made by their lecturers. The media therefore influence the activities and political stances of UF organisations in Australia, including CSSAs. Responsibility for media in Australia lies with the Propaganda

\(^{30}\) Clive Hamilton, *Silent Invasion*, forthcoming

\(^{31}\) Clive Hamilton and Alex Joske, ‘Australian universities are helping China's military surpass the United States, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 October 2017; Clive Hamilton and Alex Joske, ‘Australian taxes may help finance Chinese military capability’, *The Australian*, 10 June 2017

\(^{32}\) Eva O’Dea, ‘Chinese language media in Australia increasingly dominated by the PRC’, *The Interpreter*, Lowy Institute, 18 January 2016

\(^{33}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jSeaPFxRyxA
Department of the CCP Central Committee, which works through the official news agency Xinhua as well as other party media. The Canberra Embassy too guides the Chinese-language media in Australia.

The mainstream (English-language) media is also a target of the Propaganda Department. The agreements in 2016 between Australian media and the Propaganda Department to include inserts from the China Daily have been described by John Fitzgerald, perhaps Australia’s leading Sinologist, as ‘a landmark victory’ for the CCP. Xinhua wrote that as an agreement it signed with the Australia China Relations Institute (ACRI) at UTS ‘myths will be dispelled and cross-cultural understanding is set to grow’.

The Propaganda Department, through its front organisation the All-China Journalists Association, works with ACRI in arranging carefully orchestrated visits to China by Australian journalists. ACRI, initially funded by Huang Xiangmo, is committed to providing a ‘a positive and optimistic view of Australia-China relations’.

1.6 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

One of the more important institutions of United Front work is the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a high-level advisory body formed as a means of integrating non-Party elements into the national decision-making process. It is akin to an upper house that rubber stamps decisions; but it also allows the Party to canvass a broader range of views. Some years ago, it was opened up to business leaders and professionals such as lawyers, including prominent individuals who settled abroad, and has since become a highly effective tool for co-opting wealthy and influential Chinese at home and abroad into the Party’s sphere. Those invited onto the Conference gain invaluable access to China’s power centres. It was reported that the 2013 National Conference included 52 billionaires among its delegates.

A network of provincial and prefectural congresses operating on the same principles allows the net to be spread more widely. The CPPCC openly states its involvement in

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34 John Fitzgerald, ‘Australian media deals are a victory for Chinese propaganda’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 31 May 2016
35 Cary Huang, ‘83 Chinese billionaires members of NPC and CPPCC: Hurun’, South China Morning Post, 8 March 2013
United Front work. Any person who becomes a member of one of the congresses can be regarded as a person trusted by the Communist Party to advance its interests and respond to its instructions. Chau Chak Wing, an Australian citizen who lives in China, is a member of the Tianhe (Guangdong) CPPCC. Huang Xiangmo was in 2012 a standing committee member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Jieyang.

1.7 The scope of foreign interference

The proposed new offence of foreign interference (defined in section 92.2) outlaws conduct that is:

a) directed, funded or supervised by a foreign principal or someone acting on its behalf, and
b) is intended to influence a political or governmental process or the exercise of a democratic or political right in Australia (or prejudice national security), and
c) is covert or involves deception, or follows threats or menaces.

An offence is also committed if a person, on behalf of a foreign principal, intends to influence another person to act in the ways set out in b) and c) above.

It is not clear that the legislation as currently framed would capture some of the more important foreign interference operations that are being undertaken by the PRC in Australia, including United Front work.

Before giving some examples, it’s worth noting that not all foreign principals are equal. A one-party state that accepts and propagates anti-democratic values and practices—where little diversity of opinion is permitted, where the judiciary serves the ruling party, and where neither a free press nor a vibrant civil society are permitted—represents a far greater threat to Australia’s interests than a nation whose values and political structure are similar to our own. As long as the PRC remains as it

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36 Rebecca Trigger, ‘Chinese businessman subject of ASIO warning donated $200,000 to WA Liberals’, ABC News online, 10 June 2017
37 Alex Joske, ‘Bennelong byelection: The influential network targeting the Turnbull government in Bennelong’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 December 2017;
http://zwgk.gd.gov.cn/007026190/201201/t20120110_300146.html
is, claims that Australia should treat it the same as other countries create a false equivalence.

Some of the difficulty in applying the proposed new laws to United Front activity lies in the notion of ‘influence’, that is, the intention to influence a political or government process or the exercise of a democratic right. Some recent, more blatant cases ought to be captured. An example might be an organisation acting on behalf of the PRC mobilising its members to disrupt a legitimate demonstration, such as those by Falun Gong or Tibet autonomy supporters. The 2008 Olympic Torch relay protest in Canberra, organised by the Embassy through CSSAs, and with the assistance of UF groups, businessmen linked to UF groups and pro-Beijing newspapers, is a striking example. Other, more recent protests organised by UF activists in Sydney and Melbourne could be named.

Another obvious reported case is the donor with demonstrable links to CCP agencies threatening to withdraw a promised large donation to a political party unless it changed its policy on the South China Sea. If the offences defined by the new legislation do not encompass such activities, then the legislation will fail in its objective.

However, most influence activities are subtler. They may have no specific outcome expected. Instead, the objective is to change minds so that the targeted individuals, and those they can influence, adopt and advocate a point of view that suits the interests of a foreign power, here the PRC. It will help to give some stylized examples of what would naturally be thought of as foreign interference operations but which may not be successfully prosecuted under the new laws.

1. A person directed, funded or supervised by the Chinese government through the consulate or a UF group promises to make a donation to the electoral fund of an influential member of a political party if that member tacitly agrees to make efforts to persuade her party to change a policy position in a way that is more favourable to the interests of the PRC, such as a trade and investment agreement.

2. In the midst of an election campaign, a person aligned to a UF group in Australia, and in consultation with a PRC consulate, circulates within the
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ethnic Chinese community a letter, prepared by the UF organisation, denouncing one candidate or party as ‘anti-China’ and urging them to vote for the other candidate.

3. A consulate official complains to a university Deputy Vice-Chancellor about a lecturer who referred to Taiwan as an independent country. The DVC reminds the lecturer (perhaps through the Dean) that, while she is free to say what she likes, the university derives hundreds of millions of dollars from Chinese students. The lecturer feels pressured by her employer and changes what she says in lectures. Her academic freedom, a democratic right, has been curtailed.

4. A university publisher rejects a manuscript, written by an academic, critical of the CCP because, after private discussions with the university, it fears the university will lose revenue from Chinese students and from research collaborations with Chinese universities. Nothing is written down and the publisher provides a defensible reason for its decision. The author’s freedom to write is not compromised but his ability to communicate his views to others is. Who in this scenario would be the guilty party under the proposed laws?

5. A wealthy individual with close but hidden links to the PRC funds the establishment of a think tank at an Australian university and chooses its director. The founding principles, expectations and structure of the think tank are all oriented towards generating comment and output that is sympathetic to the PRC.

6. A former prime minister is invited onto the board of an important institution in the PRC. He soon begins to see the world through ‘Chinese’ eyes. An influential opinion maker at home, he argues the foreign government’s case consistently, often reproducing propaganda points from official state media. There is no influence on a specific political or government process as such, although the former prime minister intervenes in important policy debates arguing the case of the foreign government.

7. A member of the overseas Chinese diaspora runs for election to the local council. She has close links with UF organisations whose members, with the covert support of the PRC consulate, provide assistance in her campaign and she is elected. She gains authority in the Chinese-Australian community. She is able to sponsor visits by delegations from the PRC. Senior members of UF
organisations aim to help her make her way to higher political positions in state or federal government.

8. A wealthy businessman with close links to the PRC buys up ethnic newspapers and changes the editorial orientation of the newspapers so that they consistently promote the interests of the PRC, including where they conflict with Australia’s official position. The Chinese-Australian community is denied access to a diversity of opinion, which might be regarded as one of its democratic rights.
PART 2 United Front organisations active in Australia

2.1 Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China

The role of the Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (ACPPRC) in influencing Australian politics has attracted considerable media attention mainly because of revelations about its president Huang Xiangmo (who stepped down in November 2017). The Council is one of a global network of some 150 similarly-named councils in 89 countries around the world, each answering to the parent body, the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPNR). This body is subordinate to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP’s Central Committee—see Figure 1. The CCPPNR is headed by Yu Zhengsheng who was one of the seven members of the supreme CCP Politburo’s Standing Committee until the recent 19th Party Congress.

When delegations from reunification councils around the world met for their 15th annual gathering in Beijing in September 2017 they were welcomed by Politburo member Sun Chunlan, who heads the UFWD and is deputy head of the CCPPNC. Despite Huang Xiangmo’s protestations that he and ACPPRC are not connected with Beijing or the CCP, four ACPPRC officer bearers participated in the 14th Conference of Overseas Peaceful Reunification Promotion Committees, convened in Beijing by the CCPPNC in September 2016, at which the ACPPRC’s Tian Fei (Victor Tian), an Executive Vice President of the Council, gave a speech on behalf of Mr Huang. (Tian Fei is also a non-voting member of China’s National CPPCC.)

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38 This section was drafted by a well-informed observer of United Front activity in Australia and is included with his permission.
40 http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/zt/hwhzh/tchjs/201308/t20130806_4555537.html
42 http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/bhjs/
43 http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/ttfl/201709/424403a3e3b045e98cc9cd24fed2fa24.shtml
In March 2017, Mr Huang hosted and fêted a CCPPNC delegation to Australia led by Sun Lingyan, the deputy secretary of the organisation. In the same month, Mr Huang hosted Qiu Yuanping, the Director of the PRC’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. The ACPPRC also organised public displays of support during the 2017 visit to Australia of PRC Premier Li Keqiang.

While these foreign-based organisations are nominally engaged in promoting the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, their remit extends well beyond that. The unification councils are generally the most influential “non-government” agencies of the Chinese state abroad, and Australia is no exception. Their role is to aid the Chinese state in mobilising and controlling ethnic Chinese people in their respective countries, a task shared with the PRC’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. They also promote PRC policies abroad. For example, in April 2016, when Prime Minister Turnbull was about to travel to China, a group of 60 “Chinese community leaders” with links to the ACPPRC and the Chinese Embassy issued a warning to the Prime Minister not to resist the PRC’s ambitions in the South China Sea.

The ACPPRC was founded in the early 2000s by the long-time CCP activist William Chiu, who remained chairman of the body until 2014. During this period, Mr Chiu also served as a member of the 10th, 11th and 12th committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). On his death in 2015, the People’s Daily lauded Mr Chiu as a patriot of China, and cited him for his efforts with the ACPPRC.

For three years until November 2017, the president of the ACPPRC was Sydney-based Chinese citizen Huang Xiangmo. When he stepped down he was replaced by Qun Shao. Mr Huang has removed his name from the list of officers of the ACPPRC.

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48 Kelsie Munro, ‘Huang Xiangmo's pro-China group denies organising Premier Li rent-a-crowd’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 2017
49 http://www.gqb.gov.cn
50 Philip Wen, ‘China’s patriots among us: Beijing pulls new lever of influence in Australia’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 April 2016
51 Kirsty Needham, ‘NSW Liberals defy foreign policy on Taiwan by supporting Beijing's man’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 2016
52 http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0527/c157278-27066031.html
Some observers have attributed this change to the incoming security laws. In November 2017, *The Australian* noted: “Chinese community groups closely affiliated with Beijing’s Communist Party have begun lowering their profile ahead of new foreign interference laws aimed at cracking down on China’s growing involvement in Australian political affairs.”

Some prominent Australians have been wholly misled by the public face of the ACPPRC. In particular, Bob Carr, director of a think tank established with funding from Huang Xiangmo (and reportedly chosen for the role by Mr Huang), has recently written:

> For Coalition and Labor politicians who have attended [ACPPRC] annual dinners, [the Council] has functioned as a charitable organisation (raising funds to send Australian eye surgeons into Tibet, for example) and an umbrella organisation for the Chinese community. Whether its links with China’s United Front Work Department are vestigial or active, they are now a distraction.

This represents a complete misunderstanding of the function and operations of the ACPPRC; its charitable activities have always been a cover for its political role. The ACPPRC is a creature of the UFWD and the involvement of senior Australian politicians has always been a means of gaining influence for the PRC.

The ACPPRC has a number of state branches that also promote the PRC’s political agenda. The recently-appointed head of the Queensland branch, William Yan Min, for example, also heads the Australia Jiangxi Fellowship Association and has been widely promoting the linkage of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative with the development of Northern Australia, activities which have been featured in the *People’s Daily*.

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53 Paul Maley, ‘China’s agents of influence run for cover’, *The Australian*, 17 November 2017
54 Bob Carr, ‘Seven steps to tame fears over China’, *The Australian*, 12 December 2017
2.2 The ACPPRC network

As one of the most active and visible arms of the Chinese Communist Party’s interference operations in Australian social and political life, the ACPPRC has worked to establish itself as the peak body of the Chinese community. Its officially stated goals are to:

Hold high the flag of peaceful growth and peaceful reunification, unite Chinese in Australia and overseas ethnic Chinese, promote person-to-person exchange across both sides of the Taiwan strait, promote the growth of peaceful relations between Australia and China and promote peaceful growth in Asia and the world.56

In reality, the group demonstrates the CCP’s efforts at undermining and manipulating China-Australia friendship by expanding its often-coercive influence overseas.

Two days after the ACPPRC’s November 25, 2017 annual general meeting, at which Huang Xiangmo resigned as president, Sydney-based Chinese newspaper A China Media (澳中周末报), published an account of the event that included a list of 81 “member organisations” of the ACPPRC. A China Media is owned by Shi Mingxing (施明星), a member of the ACPPRC, and edited by Yang Dongdong (杨东东), a former associate of Liberal MP Craig Laundy, who admitted to being part of what he called the “united front system” (统战系统).57 The list of ACPPRC member organisations provides an up-to-date and authoritative insight into the ACPPRC’s network in Australia.

Media coverage of scandals surrounding Huang Xiangmo and the ACPPRC surged in 2016 and 2017, leading to a number of names being removed from the ACPPRC’s list of officeholders, including those of NSW Labor politician Ernest Wong 王国忠, independent Ryde Councillor Simon Zhou (周硕) and James Zhou (周建), an advisor

57 Clive Hamilton and Alex Joske, ‘Political networking the Chinese way - a Sydney MP and his “community adviser”’, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 2017
to NSW Labor MP Chris Minns. However, it’s unclear whether these individuals have truly cut ties with the ACPPRC and Huang Xiangmo. Ernest Wong, until recently listed as an honorary advisor to the ACPPRC, is still an honorary advisor to the Oceanic Alliance of the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China, a similar body chaired by Huang Xiangmo that operates in the Pacific, including Australia.58

Similarly, it is likely that some groups have ended official ties with the ACPPRC and are therefore not included in the recent list of 81 member organisations, although they may still be counted as part of its network. The Australia China Economics, Trade and Culture Association (ACETCA), for example, has maintained close ties with the ACPPRC and the Chinese government for over a decade, but is not currently listed as a member organisation. Many of ACETCA’s executives, including founder Lam Fai-yuen (林輝源) and current chairman Xue Shuihe (薛水和), hold honorary positions in the ACPPRC. Huang Xiangmo is patron of ACETCA. As no earlier lists of ACPPRC member organisations have come to light, it is difficult to establish whether ACETCA was once an official member organisation, but it is nonetheless closely associated with the ACPPRC.

The 81 member organisations constitute a significant proportion of Chinese community groups in Australia and particularly in Sydney, the ACPPRC’s base. Most if not all of the member organisations appear subordinate to the ACPPRC, with their leaders often holding positions as vice presidents or councillors in the ACPPRC that establish them as subordinate to the Council’s president.

Many executives of the 81 organisations are prominent members of the Chinese-Australian community, including some who are active in Australian politics. Huang Kun (黄堃), a newly elected member of the Cumberland Council, for example, is an executive of the Fuzhou Community Alliance and founded the Macquarie University Chinese Students and Scholars Association (see the section below on Chinese

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Students and Scholars Associations), both member organisations. Huang Kun is also listed as a member of the ACPPRC itself.

Yan Zehua (燕泽华), another example, is a vice president of the ACPPRC. He also runs the Australian Shanghai Industry and Commerce Association and is honorary president of the Australian Shanghainese Association, both ACPPRC member organisations. Representatives of Huang Xiangmo and the ACPPRC were guests at a 2015 banquet celebrating 20 years since the Australian Shanghainese Association’s founding. At least eleven state and federal politicians, local councillors or their representatives were present at the event. Mr Yan himself appears to work closely with the United Front Work Department, having met with officials from the Department on at least three occasions. Not long after one such meeting in October 2017, in an attempt to influence the Bennelong by-election, Mr Yan began circulating an anonymously authored letter accusing the Turnbull government of being anti-Chinese and urging Chinese to “take down the Liberal government”.

Ly Quoc Hung (李国兴) (aka Hung Ly), another ACPPRC vice president, is president of the Australian Chinese Teochew Association, a group claiming to have 2,800 members. Mr Ly received a Medal of the Order of Australia in 2016, but also serves

http://www.fjsen.com/2016-06/16/content_17994032.htm

Nick O’Malley and Alex Joske, ‘Mysterious Bennelong letter urges Chinese Australians to “take down” the Turnbull government’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 December 2017

61代表是黄相茂和ACPPRC的嘉宾在一个2015年庆祝澳华会成立20周年的晚宴上。至少有11名州、联邦议员、地方议员或他们的代表出席了活动。马言本人似乎与统战工作部关系密切，曾与该部官员至少三次会面。不久之后，他开始 circulation an anonymously authored letter accusing the Turnbull government of being anti-Chinese and urging Chinese to “take down the Liberal government”. 63

Ly Quoc Hung (李国兴) (aka Hung Ly), another ACPPRC vice president, is president of the Australian Chinese Teochew Association, a group claiming to have 2,800 members. Mr Ly received a Medal of the Order of Australia in 2016, but also serves

http://www.fjsen.com/2016-06/16/content_17994032.htm

Nick O’Malley and Alex Joske, ‘Mysterious Bennelong letter urges Chinese Australians to “take down” the Turnbull government’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 December 2017

http://www.acpprc.org.au/2017/08/%E7%AC%AC%E5%8D%B1%E5%B1%8A%E9%A1%BE%E9%97%AE%E5%A7%94%E5%91%98%E4%BC%9A%E5%BF%8A%E7%90%B6%E4%BA%8B%E4%BC%9A/

http://www.fjsen.com/2016-06/16/content_17994032.htm
on the council of the China Overseas Exchange Association, a front group for Chinese Communist Party agencies tasked with united front work.65

Rather than taking up ACPPRC vice presidencies, some leaders of member organisations with particular prominence and standing within the Chinese community, like Lam Fai-yuen, founder of ACETCA, are instead given honorary presidencies or advisory positions in the Council, allowing them to partner with the ACPPRC rather than become subordinate to it.

Other Chinese community groups that are close to the Chinese government may have chosen not to join the ACPPRC, for a number of reasons. In the case of the Association of Australia China Friendship and Exchange, the group is run by CCP-linked billionaire Chau Chak Wing, who, given his extraordinary wealth and deep connections to the Chinese government, may be unwilling to take anything but a pre-eminent position in community groups. Victorian groups, like the Federation of Chinese Associations Victoria (FCAV), may not be members because the Sydney-focused ACPPRC has failed to develop close ties with them. Scientific and academic groups, like the Federation of Chinese Scholars in Australia (FOCSA), may not be members because of a lack of overlap in the two groups’ membership and interests.

The ACPPRC has also established a number of regional branches covering NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Northern Territory, West Australia, Tasmania and West Sydney, giving a further eight Australian organisations subordinate to the ACPPRC.

The 81 member organisations can be divided into several categories (more or less matching those defined in Part 1):

- hometown associations, groups built around shared heritage from a particular region or city in China;

- cultural associations, such as musical groups;

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- Chinese Students and Scholars Associations, present at nearly every university in Australia;
- business associations;
- university alumni associations;
- youth groups;
- China-Australia friendship associations; and
- general Chinese associations, such as the Australian Chinese Association (澳大利亚华人协会).

The complete list of 81 member organisations is shown below, with translations of the groups’ names included:

- 澳洲广东侨团联合总会 (Australian Fellowship of China Guangdong Associations)
- 澳洲潮州同乡会 (Australian Chinese Teo-Chew Association)
- 澳洲福建会馆 (Australia Hokkien Huaykuan Association)
- 澳洲深圳社团总会 (Federation of Australian Shenzhen Community)
- 澳洲华裔相济会 (Australian Chinese & Descendants Mutual Association)
- 澳洲侨青社 (Chinese Youth League of Australia)
- 澳洲华人服务社 (Chinese Australian Services Society)
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- 澳洲广东侨商会 [澳洲广东总商会?] (Australian Guangdong Chamber of Commerce)
- 澳洲洪门致公总会 (Chinese Masonic Society)
- 澳洲中国各民族同胞联谊会 (Australian Association of all Nationalities of Chinese)
- 澳中文化艺术中心 [now known as the 澳中文化艺术中心] (Australia China Culture and Arts Center) http://www.accac.org.au/
- 澳洲华人友好协会 (Australian Chinese Friendship Association, official translation unknown)
- 澳洲亚太经贸文化促进会 (Australia Asia-Pacific Economics, Trade and Culture Association, official translation unknown)
- 澳洲柔功门总会 (Australian Yau Kung Mun Association)
- [悉尼]西区华人协会 (Sydney West Region Chinese Association)
- 澳洲永春同乡会 (Australian Wing Chun Hometown Association, official translation unknown)
- 澳洲福建会馆高龄会 (Australia Hokkien Huaykuan Association Seniors Association, official translation unknown)
- [澳洲]福州十邑同乡会 (Foochow Association of Australia)
- 澳大利亚华人协会 (Australian Chinese Association)
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- 澳大利亚中人民友好交流协会 (Australia China People’s Friendship and Exchange Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚国际文化产业协会 (Australian International Cultural Industry Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚华人音乐家协会 (Australian Chinese Musicians Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳洲华人慈善总会 (Chinese Beneficence Federation of Australia)

- 澳大利亚江西同乡会 (Australia Jiangxi Fellowship Association)

- 澳大利亚江西总商会 (Australian Jiangxi Chamber of Commerce, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚内蒙古同乡会 (Australian Inner Mongolian Association)

- 澳大利亚藏族同胞联谊会 (Australian Tibetan Countrymen Association, official translation unknown)\(^{66}\)

- 澳大利亚上海工商联合会总 (Australian Shanghai Industry and Commerce Association, official translation unknown) headed by Yan Zehua (严泽华)

http://www.vot.org/cn%E8%97%8F%E4%BA%BA%E8%A1%8C%E6%94%BF%E4%B8%AD%E5%A4%AE%E5%BC%9A%E4%B8%8D%E6%89%BF%E8%AE%A4%E6%BE%B3%E5%A4%A7%E5%88%A9%E4%BA%9A%E8%97%8F%E6%97%8F%E5%90%8C%E8%83%9E%E8%81%94%E8%B0%8A%E4%BC%9A/
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- 澳洲医学交流会 (Sino Australia Medical Exchange)

- 澳大利亚扬州同乡会 (Australian Yangzhou Hometown Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚江苏华人华侨总会 (Jiangsu Community Association of Australia)

- 澳大利亚杭州同乡会 (Hangzhou Chinese Association of Australia)
  http://au.fjsen.com/2016-09/13/content_18454236.htm

- 澳大利亚河南同乡会 (Australia Henanese Association)
  http://www.yesee.org/yimin_info.asp?id=461

- 澳大利亚中华文化之友 (Australian Friends of Chinese Culture, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚潮汕商会 (Chao Shan Association of Commerce)

- 澳大利亚华宜社 (Australia China Friendship Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚广州会 (Australian Guangzhou Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳洲广府人珠联谊总会 (Global Cantonese Association of Australia)
  http://sydney.chineseconsulate.org/chn/lsqw/t1190139.htm
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- 澳大利亚华人联谊会 (Australian Chinese Society, official translation unknown)

- 澳洲深圳同乡会 (Australia Shenzhen Townsmen) http://sz.org.au/

- 澳中文化经济促进会 (Australia China Culture and Economics Association, official translation unknown but not to be confused with the Australia China Economics Trade and Culture Association)

- 澳大利亚福建乡情联谊会 (Australian Fujian Association)

- 澳中文化友好协会 (Australia China Cultural Exchange & Friendship Association)

- 澳洲潮青会 (Australian Chaozhou Youth Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚华人文化团体联合会 (Federation of Australia Chinese Cultural Associations)

- 澳大利亚中国京剧艺术院 (Australia Beijing Opera Institute)

- 澳大利亚福州同乡会 (Australia Fuzhou Community Alliance)

- 悉尼北区华人商会 (Sydney Northern Region Chinese Business Association)

- 澳大利亚上海同乡会 (Australian Shanghainese Association)
UNITED FRONT ACTIVITIES IN AUSTRALIA

- 澳大利亚东方歌舞团 (Australia Oriental Dance Group)


- 澳洲南悉尼华人商会 (NSW Southern Region Chinese Business Association)

- 郑大澳洲校友会 (Zhengzhou University Australian Alumni Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳洲东莞同乡会公义堂 (Australia Dongguan Goon Yee Tong)

- 澳洲中山同乡会 (Australian Zhongshan Hometown Association, official translation unknown)

- 麦考瑞中国学生学者联谊会 (Macquarie University Chinese Students and Scholars Association)

- 悉尼大学中国学联 (Sydney University Chinese Students Association)

- 澳大利亚中国书法家协会 (Australian Chinese Calligraphers Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚中国艺术品收藏鉴赏协会 (Australian Chinese Art Collection and Appreciation Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚江西青年会 (Australian Jiangxi Youth Association)
  https://www.sydneytoday.com/content-1664524
UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY CHECKS INQUIRER

UNITED FRONT ACTIVITIES IN AUSTRALIA

- 上海师范大学澳大利亚校友会 (Shanghai Normal University Australian Alumni Association, official translation unknown)
- 澳大利亚华声合唱团 (Hwa Sheng Chorus)
- 澳洲雪梨中华佛学会明月居士林 (Australian Chinese Buddhist Society)
- 澳大利亚江西青年商会 (Australian Jiangxi Youth Chamber of Commerce, official translation unknown) https://www.sydneytoday.com/content-1664524
- 澳洲广东友好协会 (Australia-Guangdong Friendship Association, official translation unknown)
- 卧龙岗[大学?]中国校友会 (University of Wollongong Chinese Alumni Association, official translation unknown)
- 悉尼科技大学中国学联 (University of Technology Sydney Chinese Students and Scholars Association)
- 澳大利亚志愿者协会 (Volunteers Australia – its nature is unclear)
- 澳洲澳门联谊会 (Australian Macau Association, official translation unknown)
- 澳大利亚河北商会 (Australia Hebei Business Association)
- 澳大利亚天津总商会 (Australia Tianjin Chamber of Commerce)
UNITED FRONT ACTIVITIES IN AUSTRALIA

- 澳洲中国新疆联谊会 (Australian Xinjiang Chinese Association)

- 澳大利亚江苏工商联合总会 (Australian Jiangsu Industry and Commerce Federation)

- 澳洲中国知青协会 (Australia Chinese Zhi-Qing Association) Note: Zhi-Qing is short for 知识青年 zhishi qingnian, often translated as “educated youth”, a Communist Party term referring to teenagers and young adults from urban regions sent to the country side for education in rural life during the Cultural Revolution. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_514fcc6e0100vcg6.html

- 澳大利亚天津同乡联谊会 (Australian Tianjin Chinese Association)

- 澳大利亚战友歌舞团 (Australian Comrades-in-Arms Song and Dance Troupe) https://www.meipian.cn/p9iqx7v

- 澳洲南海同乡会 (Australia Nanhai Townsmen)

- 辛亥百年植树协会 (Xinhai Centenary Tree Planting Association, official translation unknown)

- 澳大利亚马鞍山同乡会 (Australian Ma’anshan Hometown Association, official translation unknown)

- 广州市执信中学澳洲校友会 (Guangzhou Zhixin High School Australian Alumni Association, official translation unknown)

2.3 Chinese Students and Scholars Associations

The United Front is making those of new social classes, overseas students and other communities a new focus of united front work, ceaselessly expanding the
Forming the core of Beijing’s presence on university campuses, there are at least 37 CSSAs in Australia, covering nearly all Australian universities, including all Group of Eight universities, as well as the CSIRO. Most if not all CSSAs were established under the direction of the Chinese government and are the largest Chinese student associations at most universities. Found at universities around the world, CSSAs play a central role in the Chinese government’s efforts to monitor, control and intervene in the lives of Chinese students in Australia and to limit academic freedom on universities.

CSSAs often attempt to downplay or hide the fact that they are guided by the Chinese government, but Murdoch University’s CSSA openly states that it was established by the Chinese Embassy. Similarly, Adelaide University CSSA’s constitution describes the group as being under the direction of the Chinese Embassy’s Education Office.

Each year, executives from major CSSAs are flown to Canberra for meetings with officials at the Chinese Embassy Education Office in the Canberra suburb of O’Malley. A report uploaded to a social media account of the ACT CSSA details one such meeting held on 21 March 2016. According to the report, over fifty CSSA representatives from thirteen universities in the ACT, SA, WA and NT attended the “Australian CSSA Work Cadres Meeting” (全澳学联工作干部会议) which was run by Embassy’s Education Office Minister Counsellor Xu Xiao (徐孝). Students were briefed on Australia-China relations and student safety. Representatives from each CSSA then reported back to the Embassy on their work. Students were advised by officials of the Embassy’s requirements for the structure, finances, personnel.

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69 http://www.adelaidecssa.org/?page_id=13
organisation and media coverage of CSSAs and told to “maintain close contact” with other Chinese students.

CSSA representatives in NSW and Victoria attend similar annual meetings at the consulates in Sydney and Melbourne, respectively. The NSW CSSA’s 2017 annual general meeting was held at the Sydney Consulate’s Education Office,70 and two consuls at the Sydney Education Office are listed on its website as responsible for work relating to CSSAs.71

CSSAs are tasked with ensuring Chinese students remain patriotic and supportive of the CCP’s rule. They organise events celebrating the foundation of the People’s Republic of China and promoting Marxist ideology. In the words of one 2012 Embassy report, CSSA work cadres “focus on patriotic education”.72 Speaking at the 2012 annual meeting at the Embassy’s Education Office, the president of the newly reorganised ACT CSSA, Zhu Runbang (朱润邦), recounted that the new CSSA’s first undertaking was to propose a series of events promoting Marxist theory, later held with the Embassy’s help.73 The ACT CSSA forms a parent body for the CSSAs at the Australian Defence Force Academy and the CSIRO. Zhu said the Marxism events “let we Chinese students arm themselves with Marxist theory and establish correct values systems and worldviews while study the West’s advanced science and technology.” A few months later, Zhu won the annual “Outstanding CSSA Cadre Award” from the Education Office.74 At its heart, united front work is guided by the Leninist ideology that inspired its creation and it is important to view many CSSA events, particularly national day celebrations that emphasise love of the motherland, with that in mind.

Chinese students are also mobilised through CSSAs to oppose activities on campuses that might embarrass Beijing. In November 2015, the president of the ANU CSSA

70 http://www.edusyd.org/publish/portal117/tab5815/info133487.htm
intimidated staff at the University’s pharmacy and threatened a boycott unless it stopped stocking copies of the *Epoch Times*, a newspaper run by Falun Gong that frequently publishes content critical of the Chinese government.\(^75\) Similarly, the CSSA at the University of California San Diego was active in efforts to prevent the Dalai Lama from speaking on campus.\(^76\) While protests are an important part of our free society, these incidents should instead be seen as foreign interference, given the Chinese government’s role in supervising and directing CSSAs.

The ANU CSSA also organised training sessions for students attending welcoming rallies for Premier Li Keqiang in March 2017. The training sessions were held in classrooms at ANU and were attended by hundreds of students. Participants were divided into groups of approximately fifty and then briefed on the welcoming rallies by CSSA executives and officials from the Chinese Embassy Education Office. The groups of fifty were then further divided into squads, including so-called security squads, which were told that “male comrades must protect female comrades”. Students were warned to watch out for the “five poisons”: activists for Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Falun Gong and democracy.

Astonishingly, participants in these training sessions were only told that they would be welcoming a “senior leader”, and when one group of fifty was asked whether they knew who they would be welcoming, only one student raised their hand – a testament to the CSSA’s rallying power. It was this same rallying power that drew thousands of Chinese students to Canberra for the notorious 2008 Olympic Torch relay. Ten years later, the ability of CSSAs to mobilise Chinese students as tools of the Chinese government can only have grown.

As the Chinese government’s ears and eyes on university campuses, CSSAs are likely behind many of the incidents of students and lecturers being reported to Chinese authorities for comments that run contrary to the Party line. The president of the University of Canberra CSSA, for example, told ABC and Fairfax that she would tell the Embassy if a student were organising a human rights protest. The University of


Newcastle CSSA may have been involved in a high-profile incident where a lecturer showed a table that listed Taiwan and Hong Kong as separate countries.\textsuperscript{77}

Examples from other western nations confirm that CSSAs engage in espionage, such as the case of Qu Yongjie, a member of a Canadian CSSA who was in 2000 denied permanent residency “because there were reasonable grounds to believe that Qu had engaged in acts of espionage and subversion against democratic governments … based on Qu’s activities in the Chinese Students and Scholars Association.”\textsuperscript{78} In particular, the responsible visa officer’s letter of refusal to Qu pointed out that he admitted that he identified and reported on pro-democracy students to Chinese diplomats and “sought to change the direction of the CSSA using funds provided by the Embassy in support of certain activities, to make it ‘sensitive to the Chinese Government and Chinese officials’”.

CSSAs also promote the Chinese government’s positions to the broader university community. The ANU CSSA, for example, organised a forum on China’s One Belt One Road initiative in 2015, believed to be the first time then ambassador Ma Zhaoxu publicly promoted the idea of Australia’s inclusion in the initiative.\textsuperscript{79}

Furthermore, the presence of CSSAs at Australia’s top scientific research institutions, including CSIRO, raise serious concerns about the potential for their networks to be used for industrial espionage. Overseas CSSAs have been accused of such activities in Belgium, where a CSSA was using its network to coordinate industrial espionage activities across Europe.\textsuperscript{80}

In Australia, 37 CSSAs have been identified. They are grouped below by state or territory.

\textbf{ACT}

- ACT CSSA 澳大利亚首都地区中国学生学者联谊总会

\textsuperscript{78} https://ca.vlex.com/vid/qu-v-can-m-680590453
\textsuperscript{79} https://www.woroni.com.au/words/a-proactive-china-at-the-anu/
\textsuperscript{80} http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1493301/China-aims-spy-network-at-trade-secrets-in-Europe.html
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- Australian National University CSSA 澳国立大学学生学者联谊会
- University of Canberra CSSA 堪培拉大学学生学者联谊会
- Australian Defence Force Academy CSSA 澳国防大学学生学者联谊会
- CSIRO CSSA 澳联邦科工组织研究院学生学者联谊会

NSW
- NSW CSSA 新南威尔士州中国学生学者联谊会 www.nswcssa.org
- University of Technology Sydney CSSA 悉尼科技大学中国学联
  http://utscssa.org/?lang=zh
- Sydney University Chinese Students Association 悉尼大学中国学生学者联合会
- Macquarie University CSSA 麦考瑞大学中国学生学者联谊会
- University of New England CSSA 新英格兰大学中国学生学者联谊会
- University of NSW CSSA 新南威尔士大学学生学者联谊会
- University of Newcastle CSSA 纽卡索大学学生学者联谊会
- Southern Cross University CSSA 南十字星大学华人学生学者联合会
  https://www.facebook.com/scu.cssa
- Western Sydney University CSSA 西悉尼大学学生学者联谊会
  http://studentinvolvement.orgsync.com/org/wsucssa
- Wollongong CSSA 卧龙岗中国学生学者联合会

Victoria
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- Victoria CSSA 维多利亚州中国学生学者联络总会
  http://www.edumel.org/publish/portal54/tab3578/info131597.htm

- University of Melbourne CSSA 墨尔本大学中国学生会
  http://www.cssaunimelb.com/

- Monash Chinese Student Association 蒙纳士中国学生会
  https://www.facebook.com/monashcsa/?hc_ref=ARTp-zUccxrwEHXoA0Nbv58haufZ9ye8Ce8PAWNZtGoq3KfHvex1M73VVbVAVL3qeP8

- RMIT CSSA 墨尔本皇家理工大学中国学生会/墨尔本皇家理工大学中国学生学者联合会 https://weibo.com/rmitessa?is_hot=1

- Swinburne University of Technology CSSA 斯文本科技大学中国学生学者联合会 https://xliuswin.wordpress.com/

- Deakin University CSSA 迪肯大学中国学生学者联络会

- Federation University CSSA 澳大利亚巴拉瑞特联邦大学学联
  https://www.aoweibang.com/view/3387552/

- Victoria University CSSA 维多利亚大学中国学生学者联络会

  Queensland

- Gold Coast Chinese Students and Scholars Association 黄金海岸华人学生学者联络会 https://www.facebook.com/GCCSSA?fref=ts

- Griffith University CSSA 格里菲斯华人学生会 https://m.weibo.cn/u/2127897345
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- Queensland University of Technology CSSA 昆士兰科技大学中国学生学者联谊会
  http://qutguild.com/clubs-international/qutcssa/

- University of Queensland CSSA https://www.facebook.com/UQCSSA-UQ-Chinese-Student-and-Scholar-Association-10150101085905788/

South Australia

- Adelaide CSSA 阿德莱德大学中国学生学者联谊会 http://www.adelaidecssa.org/

- University of South Australia CSSA 南澳大学中国学联
  https://usasa.sa.edu.au/Clubs/cssa

- Flinders University CSSA 弗林德斯大学中国学生学者联谊会
  http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_eb3e5f640101fjsz.html

Tasmania


Western Australia

- CSSA Western Australia 西澳洲学生学者联谊会
  https://weibo.com/u/5829996753?refer_flag=1005050010_

- Curtin University CSSA 科廷大学中国学联

- Edith Cowan University CSSA 埃迪斯科文学联

- University of Western Australia CSSA 西澳大学学生学者联合会
  https://weibo.com/cssauwa
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- Murdoch CSSA 莫道克大学中国学联
  

Northern Territory

- Charles Darwin University CSSA 达尔文大学学联

2.4 Scientific associations

With China eager to achieve military and economic dominance over the United States, it is deeply invested in scientific development. To see its remarkable success in this area, one need only look at the changing face of supercomputer technology. Ten years ago, the US had over half of the world’s 500 fastest supercomputers, while China could only muster 10. Now China leads the world in supercomputer technology and quantum radar, and may soon overtake the US in artificial intelligence.

Overseas scientists and returned scientists from abroad have played a central role in China’s science and technology program. Qian Xuesen (钱学森), the father of China’s missile program and one of China’s most revered scientists, studied and worked in America in the 1930s and 1940s before returning to China following mistreatment by US authorities after he was accused of being a communist. Having brought back crucial ideas and technologies that, when combined with his genius, gave birth to some of China’s most powerful weapons, Qian’s name is now evoked by the United Front Work Department as a model for overseas Chinese.81 While Australia must avoid the anti-communist fervour of the 1950s, it should also be aware of the strategies still employed by China to exploit our advanced scientific research and institutions.

A number of Chinese scientific associations in Australia are actively engaged in aiding China’s scientific development, with the largest, the Federation of Chinese Scholars in Australia (FOCSA), established under the guidance of the Chinese Embassy. The People’s Daily celebrated FOCSA’s founding in October 2004, noting

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that it was formed “with the energetic support and aid of the Chinese Embassy in
Australia’s education office.” At the group’s founding, then ambassador Fu Ying
said she “hoped that experts and scholars would be able to transfer (转让) advanced
technological achievements back to China.” Officials from the Embassy’s Education
Office often attend its meetings, which have been held at the Education Office’s
headquarters.

Such groups foster and encourage ties between Chinese-Australian scientists and the
Chinese government, help recruit scientists for Chinese universities and organise for
China’s talent recruitment plans.

Looking back on its first five years, an article published by FOCSA in China Scholars
Abroad, published by China’s Ministry of Education, boasts that it had

frequently through various methods encouraged members to participate in
projects and events in service of the nation [China], actively organising and
participating in the Ministry of Education’s ‘Spring Sunshine Plan’, constantly
expanding opportunities [for Chinese scholars in Australia] to collaborate and
exchange with Chinese colleagues – many of the group’s members maintain
long-term stable cooperation with domestic research institutions and
universities.

Talent recruitment plans like the Spring Sunshine Plan (春晖计划) and the Thousand
Talents Plan (千人计划), while little known outside China specialist circles, form a
key part of China’s strategy to draw in overseas scientists and technology. Offering
lucrative appointments, research funding and free trips to China, they facilitate
information theft, whether deliberate or inadvertent. A 2015 FBI report concluded that

talent recruitment plans, while not illegal, “pose a serious threat to US businesses and universities through economic espionage and theft of IP”.\textsuperscript{86}

Another aspect of talent recruitment programs is their role in determining the direction of overseas research, aligning it with China’s economic and scientific interests. Scientists are encouraged by such programs to work in collaboration with Chinese scientist and to work on areas valued by China. Once scientists working in such areas prove their worth while working and studying overseas, they may then be enticed to return to China through talent recruitment programs.

FOCSA executives and members rank among Australia’s most senior scientists.

FOCSA’s founder, Max Lu (呂嘉清), is one of the world’s leading nanotechnology experts. Until recently, he was Deputy Vice Chancellor and Vice President of Research at the University of Queensland. In 2011, he won a prize from the Ministry of Science and Technology in Beijing. He had been a core member of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) Overseas Innovators Team – Shenyang Interface Materials Research Centre. CAS credits him with advancing their work in solar energy catalysis, energy storage and hydrogen storage.\textsuperscript{87} While advising the Chinese government, Professor Lu was also serving on a number Australian government advisory bodies.

In 2017 Professor Lu was made an Officer of the Order of Australia for “distinguished service to education, to national and international research in the fields of materials chemistry and nanotechnology, to engineering, and to Australia-China relations”. The citation lists his close connections with the Chinese State including his membership of an Expert Consultative Committee of the ruling State Council.\textsuperscript{88}

According to a 2015 article by the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, an agency of the United Front Work Department, “[Max] Lu Gaoqing after so many years has never stopped following China and his hometown. Having worked for 28 years in foreign nations, Lu Gaoqing said that his feelings towards the ancestral nation and his native land have ‘never changed’.”\textsuperscript{89} Lu has been quoted by \textit{Xinhua}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotesize
\item[86] https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-ChineseTalentPrograms.pdf
\item[87] http://www.most.gov.cn/cxfw/kjjl/jl/2011/201202/t20120217_92526.htm
\item[89] http://www.chinaql.org/c/2015-12-14/485805.shtml
\end{thebibliography}
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News Agency speaking strongly in support of China’s foreign policy. These facts are not in themselves damning, but should be viewed in light of the Chinese government’s history of using ancestral ties and groups like the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese for subversive purposes.

One of FOCSA’s vice presidents is Professor Yu Xinghuo (余星火). He manages RMIT’s scientific research programs and has been a member of Australian government bodies overseeing photonics and advanced manufacturing research. The current president of FOCSA is Professor Ye Lin (叶林), a professor at the University of Sydney’s Centre for Advanced Materials Technology where he works on nanotechnology. The CSIRO’s Director of China Engagement, Wei Gang (卫钢), is also a member of the group.

FOCSA has established itself as the peak body for Chinese-Australian scientific and professional associations, with a likely membership of over 1000, much like the ACPPRC has done with respect to Chinese-Australia community associations. Its website states that it consists of 13 Chinese professional associations in Australia, 12 of which are listed on its website. They are:

- Australia Chinese Association for Biomedical Sciences (ACABS)
- The Australian Chinese Engineering and Technology Experts Network (ACETEN)
- Australian Chinese ICT Professional Society (ACICT)
- Canberra Society of Chinese Scholars (CSCS)
- Queensland Chinese Association of Scientists and Engineers (QCASE)
- South Australia Chinese Professionals Association (SACPA)
- Western Australia Chinese Scientists Association (WACSA)
- Society of Chinese-Australian Academics (SCAA)
- Australian Chinese Engineers Association (ACEA)

90 http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-09/14/c_12551099.htm
91 http://www1.rmit.edu.au/staff/xinghuo-yu
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- Aus-Sino Science and Technology Society (ASTS)
- Association of Chinese PhD Students and Young Scholars
- Australian Chinese Finance Organization (ACFO)

The Western Australia Chinese Scientists Association (WACSA) is very active. Founded in 2003 it is open to “professionals of Chinese ethnic background and with postgraduate qualifications”. The members are among the best scientists in their fields. Some work at senior levels in government. (Also active in the west are the Western Australia Chinese Engineers Association and the Western Australia Chinese Petroleum Association.) The president of WACSA is Ma Guowei, a professor of engineering at the University of Western Australia. In 2015 WACSA welcomed the Perth Consul-general who spoke about China’s One Belt One Road strategy. The PRC’s Perth Consulate reported that the audience was “full of confidence about the future of China’s development and full of expectation about China-Australia cooperation”. In February 2017 it held a major conference in Perth, opened by Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and China’s Consul-general.

Another prominent organisation is the Queensland Chinese Association of Scientists and Engineers (QCASE), which seems to have a close relationship with the Brisbane consulate and with institutions in China. Brisbane Consul-general Sun Dali’s address to a QCASE general meeting was reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing in the following way: “In this enthusiastic atmosphere, Consul General Sun used the Beijing spirit of ‘patriotism, innovation, inclusivity and virtue’ to exhort everyone, and moreover wished the scientists a happy Chinese New Year.”

Among the many professional associations for Chinese-Australians and Chinese in Australia, the Canberra Society of Chinese Scholars (CSCS) is of particular interest. The Society has very close ties to the Chinese Embassy, with its 2016 council and executive committee meetings held at the Embassy’s Education Office. The
meeting’s agenda included a speech by education attaché Xu Xiao. The members of CSCS are drawn from the ANU, CSIRO, the Australian Defence Force Academy and a number of federal government departments.\textsuperscript{97} In early 2017 CSCS held a workshop titled “Back to China to startup your new professional career”. Of the 21 on the attendance list, six were from the CSIRO.\textsuperscript{98}

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http://www.cscs.org.au/?page_id=10