



# **RESPONSE FOR THE INQUIRY INTO AIRPORT AND AVIATION SECURITY**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

The Australian Security Industry Association Limited (ASIAL) welcomes the opportunity to provide a response for the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport inquiry into Airport and Aviation Security.

ASIAL is the peak national body for the security industry representing 2,700 member organisations equating to approximately 85% of the industry in Australia. ASIAL is also a Registered Organisation of Employers under the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009, an Accredited Cabling Registrar under the Australian Communications Media Authority's Cabling Provider Rules and an Approved Security Industry Organisation within the legislative framework in the ACT, Victoria and Queensland.

ASIAL member companies participate in varying degrees in providing services to the aviation industry. The commercial services provided include guarding, electronic monitoring, CCTV surveillance, access control, emergency response and communication, passenger screening, baggage screening, cargo screening, plane security, vehicle inspections, barrier protection, perimeter protection and consulting services.

The relationship between each security provider and client (Airports and Aviation Service Providers) varies according to the contracted services, the service point location and the client site requirements and assessed risks.

ASIAL recognises the reported increase in security related incidents at airports however utopia in the security world where stakeholder commercial interest and where the interest of a travelling public are paramount is rarely achieved. Within this framework it is recognised that Airports have service level agreements with the major airlines and customer satisfaction is a commercial driver. Security, public safety, commercial reality and security perceptions are a balancing act. Additional investment in technology and

resources could tightly manage aviation security however the degree of safety may not be a proportionate improvement and the passenger travel experience would be significantly decreased.

The recent capturing of many regional airports into the requirement to undertake security screening has increased costs to regional airports although legislative changes have permitted screening to be undertaken by non-security personnel or more particular screening personnel who do not need to hold a security licence. The additional costs of the required security technology may impact on the viability of many regional airports although regional areas need to maintain the benefits provided by the offered air services.

The selected aircraft weight classifications pertaining to airports have created inequalities with regional airports. Reviewing the classifications to a minor degree would create a distinct separation of regional airports with regards security measures. The change would identify smaller aircraft with low passenger carrying capacity, leaving regional airports with what would be considered reduced security measures, however arrival at a higher security graded airport would demand that passengers and baggage would require appropriate security measures before the passengers and/or baggage/cargo were permitted into the larger airport secure area.

The following identifies areas effecting aviation security and provides comment for the continual improvement to ensure security measures are effective, efficient and sustainable.

## **COMMENTS**

### **1. The Security Environment**

The operational success of Australia's air services is measured by the public confidence in the safety and security undertakings at airports. With continued screening procedures that create passenger throughput delays at peak periods, the passenger experience is diminished. In general, passenger throughput delays continue during peak periods even with all available screening point lanes open for use.

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has indicated that on average security checkpoint passenger processing per hour has decreased 50% since 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001. Strategies to increase checkpoint throughput rates are required to enhance operational efficiencies without degrading security measures.

The cost of aviation security is recognised as a high percentage of airport/aviation costs. Strategies including more appropriate passenger targeting, passenger behavioural risk management and passenger education

coupled with a more customer service screening officer approach could increase passenger throughput rates without diminishing security.

Security equipment upgrading is a constant commercial factor, however screening authorities require funding mechanisms to enable best practice to be the priority for the Australian aviation industry. The standardisation of airport security protocols, equipment and procedures would enhance both security and the passenger experience. When we have one airport screening point permitting belts, shoes and other small items containing metallic components to pass and another airport rejecting the items, the self-management of those security items by passengers is confusing and ultimately delays passenger throughput and requires security resources to manage repeat inspections or manual checking procedures.

With a projected increase in passenger numbers, screening efficiencies and passenger behaviour changes are needed. Passenger behaviour falls into the area of human failing and a lack of or appreciation for aviation security coupled with difficulties with time management. Passengers arrive at airports late and then expect the smooth management of checked baggage and movement through screening checkpoints.

Major domestic airlines have improved their checked bag lodgement procedures resulting in improved passenger movement. Unfortunately queuing for bag drop procedures continues with many carriers and the support procedures for late arrivals frustrates a system that pressures security screening points with passengers with limited time to attend departure gates. Anecdotal evidence suggests some passengers have a preposition to arrive 'just on time' for fast tract carrier support for bag lodgement and to avoid queuing.

Screening officer management, training and passenger/visitor education will play an important part in maintaining airport and aviation security.

Regional airport security classification should be reconsidered. Regional airports with a lower classification should not be permitted to disembark passengers and/or cargo at higher classified airports without the passengers/baggage/cargo being subject to inbound security clearance before entering the higher classified airports secure area.

ASIAL supports a national approach for licensed security personnel to be able to work cross border without the need for multiple jurisdictional licenses. Recent change to the Aviation Transport Security Act provides a pathway for aviation security screeners not to hold a jurisdictional security licence. The changes have pros and cons for resource management and some concern over ongoing probity.

### **Considerations:**

- Continue to enhance security measures in a cost effective and operational efficient manner.
- Increase security screener training in the area of passenger behavioural issues, passenger targeting, and customer service.
- Educate and reinforce passenger knowledge in aviation security and airport security.
- Standardisation and programming of security screening equipment on a national basis.
- Consider relocation of screening points to manage passenger only access to secure areas.
- Review regional airport security classification.
- Establish inbound regional aircraft passenger/baggage/cargo security screening points before entering an airport secure area.

## **2. Probity**

ASIAL recognises that all persons working at airports and in the broader aviation industry do not have to have a security check/background check. All persons that have a need or are required to enter a secure area at a security-controlled airport (unescorted) do require a security check and wear appropriate identification. The background check is provided through the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) process.

It is considered that following recent changes to the Aviation Transport Security Act where aviation screeners are not required to hold a jurisdictional security licence, the ASIC check has the potential to weaken security measures. In the main the difference is that an ASIC probity check is only undertaken once every two years whereas holders of security licences are under a constant monitored program. If a licensed security officer were charged with an identified offence the security Regulator would be advised. If an ASIC holder commits an identified offence, there is no formalised notification to the aviation Regulator. The recognition of the offence would only be identified in the bi-annual ASIC check. In the world of organised security braches/organised crime, the system could be inappropriately manipulated.

### **Considerations:**

- Introduce a constant monitoring program for criminal activity for designated offences that could identify an aviation worker whose conduct would warrant the person to have an adverse aviation security status.
- Undertake risk assessment to review and broaden as required security checks for other aviation workers.

## **3. Training**

Training for aviation screeners has been reviewed with the introduction of a Certificate II in Aviation Transport Protection in addition to the existing Certificate

II in Security Operations. It has been implied that the Certificate II in Security Operations may be removed from the available legislated certificates. The removal of the security certificate training option decreases resource management options of security screeners and potentially removes a valuable resource of qualified personnel.

It is also a concern that legislative change has limited the Registered Training Organisations (RTO's) that have approval to provide training in the Certificate II in Aviation Transport Protection. The selected few RTO's are required to have access to security controlled airport facilities. The airport screening authority will only provide the approval and in addition the RTO must be approved to have access to and deliver the Departments national assessment tools.

Several security providers have recognised the need for security screeners to be more customer focused which enhances the passengers experience and supports a smooth flow of passengers through screening points. Tom Roche from SNP has voiced his organisation position of thinking outside of the box in delivering a more customer focused service whilst maintaining required security levels.

ASIAL has concern over the 'reduced options' model with regard RTO selection, training requirements and the reduction of available qualified resources to enhance aviation security.

**Considerations:**

- Maintain an open training environment for security screening to enhance options, resource management and system transparency.
- Analyse risks associated with limiting training providers.
- Review customer service training options for security screeners.

#### **4. Technology**

Technology plays a significant role in the broad position of aviation security. With this come the associated costs for not only the major airports but also a disproportionate cost burden for regional airports. Governments have provided aviation security funding over many years however as we see a tightening of the public purse strings the aviation industry needs to investigate other funding options to maintain security services and technology options.

Technology has and can continue to mould the security attitudes at airports. It is not the situation that every passenger is a threat and technology can assist in increasing throughput of passengers at screening points whilst assisting and maintaining security.

Existing screening points are labour intensive with technology support. The current technology needs program system and management upgrades to ensure the appropriate identification of articles of concern, banned articles or dangerous goods from being taken into airport secured areas.

At a cost we see security screening options being available and in particular the IATA's 'checkpoint of the future' a possibility. The new age technology will require greater liaison with regards passenger intelligence to assist in passenger profiles and associated risk levels.

**Considerations:**

- Review funding model for aviation security measures and maintenance.
- Develop risk based screening with technology assistance to reduce waiting times and naturally passenger throughput.
- National operational standards.

ASIAL encourages the Committee to recognise the importance of bringing the industry, government and other interested stakeholders together to ensure the travelling public can have a quality and secure aviation security environment.

The recent security incidents raised should not cause knee jerk reactions but a thoughtful approach in gaining advantage in improved equipment operation, staff training, national standards, recognition of commercial reality and public education.

ASIAL is positioned to support improved security measures and strategies in aviation security and further assist the Committee as required.

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