

Electoral Commissioner

Our reference: 17/319

Sophie Dunstone
Committee Secretary
Senate Select Committee on a National Integrity Commission
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Ms Dunstone

Senate Select Committee on a National Integrity Commission: Australian Electoral Commission responses to Questions on Notice

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Senate Select Committee on a National Integrity Commission at a public hearing on 16 June 2017. At the hearing the AEC advised it would provide responses to two questions on notice. These responses are provided below.

1. Senator Watt asked what penalties apply for offences of obstructing a Commonwealth officer in the performance of their duties. [Proof Hansard page 42]

AEC response

The *Criminal Code Act 1995* contains a number of offences relating to menacing or obstructing a Commonwealth officer. Section 139 of this Act deals with the offence of unwarranted demands of a Commonwealth public official. Section 147 of this Act deals with the offence of causing harm to Commonwealth public officials. However, in the context of the question asked by Senator Watt, section 149 is probably the most relevant section that deals with the offence of obstruction of a Commonwealth public official.

Section 149 provides that:

149.1 Obstruction of Commonwealth public officials

(1) A person commits an offence if:

- (a) the person knows that another person is a public official; and
- (b) the first-mentioned person obstructs, hinders, intimidates or resists the official in the performance of the official's functions; and
- (c) the official is a Commonwealth public official; and
- (d) the functions are functions as a Commonwealth public official.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years.

(2) In a prosecution for an offence against subsection (1), it is not necessary to prove that the defendant knew:

- (a) that the official was a Commonwealth public official; or
- (b) that the functions were functions as a Commonwealth public official.

(3) For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether the defendant was aware that the public official was performing the official's functions.

(4) Section 15.3 (extended geographical jurisdiction—category C) applies to an offence against subsection (1).

(5) The definition of duty in section 130.1 does not apply to this section.

(6) In this section:

“function”:

(a) in relation to a person who is a public official—means any authority, duty, function or power that is conferred on the person as a public official; or

(b) in relation to a person who is a Commonwealth public official—means any authority, duty, function or power that is conferred on the person as a Commonwealth public official.

2. Senator Collins asked whether the Electoral Integrity Project reported on disclosure of political donations and assessments of corrupt electoral behaviour. [Proof Hansard page 43]

AEC response

Information relating to the assessments made by the Electoral Integrity Project, including assessments about disclosure of political donations, is available at the Electoral Integrity Project website <https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/the-year-in-elections-2016>.

A copy of the Electoral Integrity Project's report, Populist threats to electoral integrity: The year in elections, 2016-17 is attached.

Yours sincerely

Tom Rogers

30 June 2017



HARVARD Kennedy School
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Populist Threats to Electoral Integrity: The Year in Elections, 2016-2017

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THE ELECTORAL INTEGRITY PROJECT

WHY ELECTIONS FAIL AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT



POPULIST THREATS TO ELECTORAL INTEGRITY: THE YEAR IN ELECTIONS, 2016-2017

PIPPA NORRIS AND MAX GRÖMPING

PEI 5.0

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MAY 2017

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Cover photo: VLADIVOSTOK, RUSSIA SEPTEMBER 18, 2016: A Makarov Pacific Naval School student holds his ballot at a polling station during the 2016 Russian parliamentary election. Yuri Smityuk/TASS (Photo by Yuri Smityuk/TASS via Getty Images)

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I: INTRODUCTION:

National elections for the legislature and/or the executive are held in almost all countries around the globe. This development has the potential to strengthen democracy. Yet, numerous contests suffer from electoral malpractice, whether from unfair laws, gerrymandered boundaries, restrictions on the free press, maladministration, election-related violence, ballot box fraud, or the abuse of money in politics.¹

How widespread are these problems? For updated evidence, this report draws upon the fifth release of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity dataset (PEI 5.0), in May 2017. This dataset compares the views of 2,709 experts who have evaluated electoral integrity in 158 countries holding 241 national elections from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2016.


Part II of the report summarizes the latest results by global region and highlights selected cases to go beyond the numbers, contrasting positive and negative practices. We focus on several elections held in 2015 and 2016 -- including the UK and Iceland in Western Europe, the United States in the Americas, Australia and the Philippines in Asia Pacific, Russia and Lithuania in Central and Eastern Europe, Iran and Syria in the MENA region, and The Gambia and Gabon in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Part III examines two major challenges – electoral corruption and coercion. The EIP project has developed new measures to monitor the extent of these problems – where they occur and what conditions these malpractices commonly undermine electoral integrity. Are these techniques of carrots and sticks deployed separately – or are they combined? More systematic evidence about these problems can provide insights about how best to target reforms and what policies have proved most effective.

Part IV focuses on populist threats to electoral integrity. We first compare several recent European elections to see whether contemporary support for populist parties is rising or stalled, including in the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. We then identify three mechanisms whereby populism threatens free and fair contests including through damaging public confidence in elections, actively undermining international standards of electoral integrity and violating electoral laws, and colluding from Russian attempts to interfere with democracy abroad.

Parts V and VI provide additional reference and technical information. With this update, PEI 5.0 covers 91% of all independent nation states holding national parliamentary and presidential elections around the world, excluding micro-states (with a population below 100,000). The study provides independent assessments utilizing a rolling survey where experts assess the quality of national elections one month after the close of the polls. Based on the views of 2,709 experts, the average response rate for PEI 5.0 is 28%. The technical appendix provides full details about the reliability and validity of the dataset.

Figure 1: The Global Map of Electoral Integrity



Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.0), country-level

Figure 2: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-5.0)

N&W Europe		Americas		C&E Europe		Asia-Pacific		Middle East & North Africa		Africa	
Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index
Denmark	86	Costa Rica	81	Estonia	79	New Zealand	76	Israel	74	Cape Verde*	70
Finland	86	Uruguay	75	Lithuania*	78	Korea, Rep.*	74	Tunisia	67	Benin*	69
Norway	83	Canada	75	Slovenia	77	Taiwan*	73	Oman	61	Ghana*	65
Iceland*	83	Brazil	68	Czech Rep.	76	Australia*	70	Morocco*	56	Mauritius	64
Sweden	81	Jamaica*	67	Slovak Rep.*	75	Japan*	68	Kuwait*	54	Rwanda	64
Germany	80	Chile	66	Poland	74	Tonga	68	Iran*	49	South Africa	63
Netherlands	79	Grenada	66	Latvia	72	Mongolia*	64	Jordan*	49	Lesotho	63
Switzerland	78	Argentina	64	Croatia*	65	Vanuatu*	63	Turkey*	48	Namibia	60
Austria*	77	Barbados	63	Georgia*	59	Micronesia	62	Iraq	44	Botswana	58
Portugal*	75	Peru*	62	Bulgaria*	57	Butan	61	Algeria	43	Sierra Leone	56
Belgium	71	United States*	61	Moldova*	57	India	59	Egypt	43	Cote d'Ivoire*	56
Ireland*	71	Panama	61	Hungary	56	Solomon Islands	57	Bahrain	38	Guinea-Bissau	54
Cyprus*	70	Colombia	59	Romania*	56	Maldives	57	Syria*	25	Burkina Faso	53
Spain*	69	Mexico	57	Albania	54	Indonesia	57			Nigeria	53
Italy	67	Cuba	56	Kyrgyzstan	54	Samoa*	55			Central African Rep.*	53
Greece	66	Bolivia	56	Bosnia	53	Myanmar	54			Mali	53
Malta	65	Paraguay	55	Serbia*	52	Nepal	53			Sao Tome & Principe*	53
UK	65	Ecuador	55	Montenegro*	51	Fiji	53			Niger*	52
		El Salvador	54	Ukraine	51	Singapore	53			The Gambia*	48
		Belize	54	Macedonia*	48	Thailand	52			Malawi	48
		Guyana	53	Kazakhstan*	45	Sri Lanka	52			Cameroon	46
		Suriname	51	Russia*	44	Philippines*	52			Swaziland	46
		Guatemala	48	Armenia	44	Pakistan	49			Comoros*	45
		Venezuela	45	Belarus*	39	Laos*	48			Zambia*	44
		Honduras	45	Uzbekistan*	39	Bangladesh	48			Mauritania	44
		Dominican Rep.*	44	Turkmenistan	38	Malaysia	35			Tanzania	44
		Nicaragua*	36	Tajikistan	36	Vietnam*	34			Sudan	43
		Haiti*	31	Azerbaijan	35	Cambodia	32			Guinea	42
						Afghanistan	32			Kenya	41
										Madagascar	39
										Togo	38
										Uganda*	37
										Zimbabwe	35
										Angola	35
										Mozambique	35
										Gabon*	34
										Chad*	30
										Djibouti*	30
										Congo, Rep.*	28
										Eq. Guinea*	25
										Burundi	24
										Ethiopia	23
Regional mean	75		57		56		55		50		47

* = election in 2016
Source: PEI 5.0

Key:

Very High / High (60+)

Moderate (50-59)

Low / Very Low (less than 50)

II: OVERVIEW OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY BY GLOBAL REGION

Figure 1 presents the updated global map of electoral integrity. Figure 2 shows the comparisons of countries ranked by the PEI Index by global region. More detailed breakdowns by each of the eleven dimensions of the electoral cycle and country rankings are given in Table 9. Overall Northern and Western Europe and the Americas emerge as the regions with the most positive scores in electoral integrity, with Sub-Saharan Africa the most challenging area.

Northern and Western Europe: Iceland and the UK

N&W Europe

■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low



In the worldwide comparisons, out of 18 states in Western and Northern Europe, 13 (72%) were rated very highly in electoral integrity, with the remainder classified as high.

Countries in Northern Europe generally performed well in electoral integrity; the top four states worldwide were Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Iceland, with Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland also featured in the top ten. These are all affluent post-industrial societies and long-established parliamentary democracies with moderate multiparty competition and proportional representation or mixed electoral systems. The PEI ratings reflect independent indicators of the quality of liberal democracy, like the Varieties of Democracy project and Freedom House, which also consistently give these states positive scores.²

By contrast, however, several long-standing democracies in West European countries were rated only moderately in electoral integrity, including the UK, Malta, Italy, Greece, and Spain. The cases of Iceland and the UK illustrate the contrasts within the region.

Iceland:

Parliamentary elections were held in Iceland on 29 October 2016. The 63 members of the Althing were elected using closed list proportional representation in six multi-member constituencies of 8 to 13 seats. Of the 63 seats, 54 were elected using constituency results and determined using the d'Hondt method. The remaining nine supplementary seats were awarded to parties that crossed the 5% national electoral threshold in order to give them a total number of seats equivalent to their national share of the vote. The National Election Commission administers contests and reports to parliament.

Iceland has a competitive multiparty system where the outcome requires a coalition with a parliamentary majority of 32 seats or more to form a government. The result saw the center-right Independence Party emerging as the largest in the Althing, winning 21 of the 63 seats; the populist Progressive Party, which had won the most seats in 2013, lost more than half its seats as it was overtaken by the Left-Green Movement and the Pirate Party. Of the 63 elected MPs, 30 were female, giving Iceland the highest proportion of female MPs in Europe. Overall voting turnout was 79.2 percent, the lowest in the history of the country and a steady slide over successive elections since 2009, according to the official statistical office, dropping to 66% among 20-24 year olds.³

Neither of the two main blocs — the outgoing coalition of the Independence Party and the Progressives, or the centre-left opposition (Left-Greens, Pirates, Bright Future and Social Democrats) — secured an overall majority, but in the end, after negotiations, a new governing coalition was formed on 10 January 2017, consisting of the Independence Party, the Reform Party and Bright Future, with Bjarni Benediktsson becoming Prime Minister on 11 January 2017. Four female ministers sat in the 11 member Cabinet.


The Icelandic elections were rated 4th best worldwide with positive scores across all PEI dimensions, although, like many countries, district boundaries, the campaign media and finance were slightly weaker areas.

UK 2015 general election

In the UK, for example, the 7th May 2015 general election scored the worst of all Western European states in PEI-5.0. Westminster elections use the plurality 'First-past-the-Post' system with 650 single member constituencies, generating high hurdles for minor parties with scattered support. The police recorded almost 500 allegations of electoral fraud following the contest.⁴ The Conservative government has introduced individual voter register, replacing household registration. The reform was justified by ministers as a more secure system guarding against alleged voter fraud but critics charge that this may discourage participation by several sectors of the electorate, such as students and ethnic minorities.⁵ Around thirty Conservative MPs campaigning in the June 8th 2017 general election face the threat of prosecution by the Crown Prosecution Services for breaking election spending rules in the previous general election.⁶

All these flaws pull down the UK's PEI score, which experts rated as 43rd worldwide. As the detailed breakdown in Table 7 shows, the UK scored particularly poorly in terms of electoral laws, district boundaries and campaign media. The snap general election called on June 8th 2017 will see whether these problems continue.

The Americas: the United States



Among countries in the Americas, three ranked as very high in electoral integrity (Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Canada), while 9 rated as high, 10 as moderate, 4 as low, and 2 as very low, with contests in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti rated worst in the region. The case of the US Presidential election was selected due to the challenges which arose in this contest and the immense amount of attention surrounding the campaign and outcome.

United States – presidential election, 8 November 2016

In the United States, the 2016 elections ranked 55th worldwide, due to a series of problems. Ever since Florida in 2000, America has seen growing partisan polarization over basic electoral procedures and rights.⁷ A long series of vulnerabilities in the conduct of U.S. elections has been widely documented, for example in the 2014 report of the bipartisan [Presidential Commission on Election Administration](#). The [Pew Center's Election Performance Index](#) has highlighted uneven standards across U.S. states.

Like its predecessors, the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign saw concern about many issues in American elections. During the campaign, problems focused on the prevalence of negative reporting, disinformation campaigns, and fake

news. Republicans continued to express concern about the potential risks of voter fraud, and both during and even after the campaign Trump raised doubts over the integrity of the election.⁸ By contrast, Democrats highlighted the dangers of the suppression of voting rights on polling day and concern about gerrymandering. The election campaign was characterized by overwhelmingly negative news coverage.⁹ The aftermath of the election saw further questions raised by issues of cybersecurity and vulnerability to Russian hacking.¹⁰ The contests also revived concern about several long-standing issues associated with gerrymandered boundaries in several states, and disparities between the popular vote and the Electoral College vote.

The outcome saw Donald Trump elected with 306 out of 538 Electoral College votes, although Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by nearly three million votes.¹¹

After the election, Green party candidate Jill Stein requested a recount in Wisconsin, however minimal discrepancies were noted.¹²

The Organization of the American States (OAS) conducted an observation mission.¹³ The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also fielded a mission with over 400 observers. In their final report, the OSCE mentioned concerns about voting district boundaries, which they considered to be a subject of political interference. The report also recommended methods to reduce the number of unregistered voters and concerns with the aging of existing voting and counting systems.¹⁴

The PEI experts gave the US election an overall PEI score of 59 out of 100, the lowest score in an established Western democracy. This is similar to the evaluation of the 2012 presidential elections (PEI Index of 63) and the mid-term 2014 elections (PEI Index: 62).

To explore this further, EIP conducted a more detailed survey among 726 experts asked to assess the performance of the 2016 elections in their own state, allowing comparisons across fifty US states and the District of Columbia (PEI-US 2016).¹⁵ The results in figure 3 show that the U.S. states which experts rated most highly in electoral integrity were Vermont, Idaho, New Hampshire, and Iowa. By contrast, states scoring as worst in the perceptions of electoral integrity index in this election were Arizona (ranked last), followed by Wisconsin, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Mississippi. Several of these states had also been poorly rated previously in the [2014 Pew Election Performance Index](#). It is also important to be cautious when interpreting absolute rankings, however, since the differences between states were often relatively modest.

District Boundaries


The area which experts judged the most problematic concerned district boundaries. The issue of gerrymandered has been consistently regarded by experts as the worst aspect of U.S. voting procedures in the global Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index since the 2012 election. In global comparison, the US received the second lowest score on this issue out of countries covered in the PEI - only Malaysia is scored lower.¹⁶ Within the US context, redistricting has been recognized as a potentially contentious political issue for decades.¹⁷ Gerrymandering ensures that representatives are returned time and again based on mobilizing the party faithful, without having to appeal more broadly to constituents across the aisle, thus exacerbating the bitter partisanship which plagues American politics. In the PEI sub-dimension of 'district boundaries' - consisting of items such as 'Boundaries favored incumbents', or 'Boundaries were impartial' - North Carolina and Wisconsin rank lowest, with scores of seven and eight, respectively. On the other hand, even the top-ranked states (New Mexico, Maine, and Hawai'i) received scores not exceeding the low 60s. The only outlier is Iowa, which was rated by the surveyed experts with a 73 out of 100 in the dimension of district boundaries.

Election Laws

The issue of voter suppression has been a major complaint among some civil rights organizations and Democrats, framing some new laws, focusing on voter identification and polling facilities, for example, as suppressing the right of legitimate citizen voters to participate. Commentators on the right, on the other hand, suggest that election laws are in place to eliminate voter fraud, a key term used particularly in the rhetoric of Republican candidate Donald Trump. Indeed, allegations of voter fraud received massive attention and the reform of state electoral laws was also widely discussed in the campaign, following the passage of several restrictive voting and registration procedures which were

subsequently struck down by the courts, such as in North Carolina. These issues remain particularly heated in the American context. The score in the 'election laws' sub-dimension ranged between 17 (Wisconsin) and 68 (Washington), with the average score across all US states being 47. This means that the laws dimension was evaluated by the surveyed experts as the second-worst aspect of election conduct in the US.

Figure 3: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index by U.S. State, 2016



Source: The Electoral Integrity Project PEI-US 2016 (1.0)

Media Coverage

Deliberate negative campaigning and its consequences have long been studied in the US and comparatively.¹⁸ The 2016 US election showcased an overwhelmingly negative tone of news coverage.¹⁹ In addition, the impact of fake news emerged as a major issue of bipartisan concern after November 8th. By contrast there are other broader issues about campaign media which should raise serious worry, including the lack of substantive policy discussion during the campaign, and the false equivalency standards of journalism.²⁰ It is no surprise, then, that media coverage ranked among the poor dimensions of electoral integrity in the 2016 American election. Survey items in this dimension addressed the fair gatekeeping role of the media, including 'Newspapers provided balanced election news', 'TV news favored the governing party' or 'Parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising'.

Campaign finance

The need to reform the role of money in politics was highlighted during the 2016 American presidential campaign, including playing a big part of Bernie Sanders' campaign. Donald Trump's rhetoric also railed against corruption in politics, including the nefarious role of beltway lobbyists and self-interested members of Congress. There is no

consensus in the United States or around the world about the best way to address the uneven role of money in politics, however, particularly disagreement about the degree of state regulation of campaign financing.²¹




"Donald Trump Rally 10/21/16" (CC BY 2.0) by Michael Candelori Photography

Overall, therefore, American elections continue to face many challenges and party polarization means that there is no consensus over the reforms which should be implemented to strengthen electoral integrity. Persistent claims of massive voter fraud, fake news and Russian interference are likely to further damage public confidence in the electoral process and faith in American democracy.

Central and Eastern Europe: Russia and Lithuania

C&E Europe

■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low



Of the 28 nation states in Central and Eastern Europe, 8 were rated highly in electoral integrity, 11 were moderate and 9 were rated as low. The major contrasts in the region can be illustrated by comparing the cases of Russia, ranked 120th worldwide, and Lithuania, ranked 11th.

Russia – parliamentary election, 8 September 2016²²

The election to the Duma in September marked a number of firsts in post-Soviet Russian electoral history. It was the first time turnout had fallen below 50% (it was 47.88%) and the ruling United Russia party received the largest ever majority in terms of seats (343, with the next largest in 2007 when it received 315 seats). This election also saw the reduction of the threshold for proportional representation back to 5%, and the re-introduction of single member constituencies (SMD) following their abolition for the 2007 election; there were to

be 225 SMD and 225 seats decided by party list on the basis of proportional representation. This was also the first election after the protests about electoral fraud in the 2011 election. In the election 14 parties received votes, but only four – United Russia (UR), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and A Just Russia – exceeded the 5% threshold and therefore gained representation in the Duma.

The election was keenly watched in the light of the 2011-12 protests to see whether a popular perception of electoral fraud would lead to mass demonstrations. In the event, the streets remained quiet. But this was not because of agreement that the election had been free and fair. Golos, the independent election monitoring agency that has come under significant government pressure in the last few years, argued that the elections had been “far from being truly free and fair”, with the widespread use of “illegal techniques” on election day, although it acknowledged that this was on a smaller scale than in 2011.²³ The Central Elections Committee (CEC), headed by the respected liberal human rights activist Ella Pamfilova, acknowledged violations of voting procedures in parts of the country, but that in 62 of the 85 federal regions, there had been practically no violations.

The violations pointed to by Golos and the CEC included ballot box stuffing, carousel voting, coercion of voters, breach of the secret ballot provisions, and the exclusion of voters from the rolls. However these sorts of violations are not the principal reasons for the question mark over the integrity of the election. This relates far more to questions about the misuse of administrative state resources to boost the vote of UR and depress that of the other parties, and electoral disproportionality.

The use of administrative resources has been a common practice in Russian elections since the first post-Soviet poll in 1993, and much of this is organized at the local level by local officials, including the governor and his people. The principal incentive for this has been expectations that these officials would get out the vote for the Kremlin’s party or candidate. Failure to do so often had serious career ramifications, as some governors found, following their perceived failure in 2011. Local officials were able to use their political machines, including the administrative resources of the state, to support UR candidates and disrupt the campaigns of their challengers. Even though the governors may have been less important this time around, local officials were important to how the election was conducted in their regions.

This sort of distortion was exacerbated by the absence of fairness in the way in which the media covered party campaigns. In the past, the media has been heavily pro-UR and this was the case again in 2016. The ability of opposition parties to get their message across was severely impaired by the way that much of the media acted as a direct support for UR rather than providing balanced campaign coverage.²⁴

Disproportionality is also a significant problem. In this election, UR got 54.2% of the vote and some 62% of party list seats and 90% of SMD seats, giving an overall total of 76.22% of the seats. The high proportion of seats won in the SMD constituencies is clearly at variance with what one would expect, but may reflect the role of the local officials noted above. In addition, constituency boundaries were heavily gerrymandered to dilute the vote in the large cities, where support for UR was lower, and enhance that in the rural and semi-rural regions. It also reflects the fact that the SMD system favours the larger parties with organizational structures spread widely throughout the country. In the party list part of the ballot, UR’s number of seats was increased by the fact that as the largest party it was entitled to the lion’s share of the “wasted votes” of those parties that did not reach the 5% threshold.

All of these factors – use of administrative resources, media imbalance and disproportionality – increased UR’s vote, but we should not assume that its result was wholly fraudulent. Opinion polls consistently show that it is the most popular party in Russia. In part this is because it is seen as being “Putin’s party” and the president remains very popular among his citizens, according to opinion polls. In this election the party’s support may have been boosted by the surge of patriotism following the incorporation of Crimea into Russia in 2014, and the hostile Western response to it. The vision of a strong Russia under attack constituted a form of rallying around the flag within which Putin and UR have wrapped themselves.

So while there was some electoral fraud in polling places, and the campaign arena was heavily weighted against the opposition parties, it is probable that UR would still have won, however its majority would have been considerably reduced had these problems not been present.

The PEI experts evaluated the Russian Duma elections with an overall PEI Index of 45 (out of 100), which puts it in the ‘low’ category of electoral integrity in global comparison. The voting process itself scored exactly the same as the

global average (54), suggesting no extraordinary election-day fraud. Yet, the work of the electoral authorities was seen critically (Russia: 40, global mean: 61), as were the dimensions of electoral laws (Russia: 35; global mean: 53) and electoral procedures (Russia: 43; global mean: 65). The election was furthermore evaluated negatively in specific survey items relating to the access of electoral observers. On the item 'domestic election monitors were restricted' for instance, the experts assigned the contest an average score of 3.7 (out of 5), which puts the election in the worst 10% of all elections in regards to observer access. The same is true for the responses to the survey item 'some state resources were improperly used for campaigning'. Here, the Russian election received an average score of 4.5 (out of 5) from the PEI experts, suggesting deep entrenchment of problematic campaign financing practices.

Lithuania – parliamentary election, 23 October 2016

In sharp contrast, Lithuania exemplifies the successful transition of a Baltic state from communism to one where elections are well rated by PEI experts, with the 2016 contests ranked 11th best in the PEI index worldwide. The country is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament and where the president is the head of the state and is elected for a period of five years. Lithuania has a mixed electoral system with a total of 141 members in the Lithuanian parliament (Seimas). Out of those seats, 71 members are directly elected by absolute majority in single-seat constituencies, while the other 70 members are directly elected by proportional representation vote (5% for political parties and 7% for multi-party electoral lists).²⁵ The 2012 parliamentary elections saw the formation of a governing coalition comprising of the Social Democratic Party, who obtained 40 seats, Labour with 28 seats, and the Order and Justice party, who obtained 8 seats.²⁶

Prior to the 2016 legislative election, investigations took place against the political parties of the Liberal Movement who faced allegations of a corruption scandal, as the political party was accused of accepting bribes from private businesses to further pursue their interests with the government.²⁷ This corruption scandal affected the campaign of the Liberal Movement party.²⁸ The main topic of the election campaign was the prevention of high emigration and economic growth.²⁹ This is because the country has suffered an increase in 'brain drain' as more than 500,000 people have left the country since 2004.³⁰ The main push factors for Lithuanians to emigrate are professional attraction to foreign countries; improved socio-economic conditions overseas and overall dissatisfaction with the general economic situation in Lithuania.³¹



"plastic election" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by antanask

The election saw the triumph of the centrist agrarian party the Lithuanian Peasants and Green Union (LPGU) who obtained almost 40% of the seats in parliament. The political party aims to maintain the alliance with NATO and


maintain membership in the European Union.³² The conservative party the Homeland Union obtained 30 seats and the ruling Social Democrats obtained only 17 seats. The decline in the popularity of the Social Democratic party is due to corruption allegations and proposed measures that allow for the hiring and firing of employees more easily.³³

International observation missions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) suggested several ways to improve the electoral system in Lithuania. In their report they note that several of the previous OSCE recommendations have been addressed, such as campaign finance regulation and timeframe for the appointment of the Lithuanian Central Election Commission (CEC), however the country still needs to increase women's participation, review defamation laws, and allow for full access by mission observers throughout the entire electoral process. Other concerns include media coverage, which they believe should be reviewed in order to distinguish paid political advertisements from other forms of election coverage. Also, the OSCE noted that the country should consider reviewing campaign finance laws to prevent future corruption cases and they recommended reviewing restrictions on voters with prior criminal convictions, as well as introducing more minorities into political life. It is worth noting that the turnout was 48.5%³⁴ during the first round and 36.6%³⁵ during the second round. The mission report by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung noted that Lithuania's turnout has averaged around 50% since 1992.³⁶

Nevertheless, despite these flaws, overall the 2016 election was described by the OSCE international observation mission as pluralistic and competitive.³⁷ The PEI experts rated the election as very high in electoral integrity overall and across most dimensions, with campaign finance and media the areas of greatest concern.

Asia Pacific: Australia and the Philippines

Asia-Pacific
 ■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low



In Asia-Pacific, out of 29 countries, 4 were rated as very high in electoral integrity, (including contests during 2016 in the Republic of Korea and Australia), 6 were scored as high, 12 as moderate, 2 as low, while 5 were given very low ratings (including Vietnam in 2016). In the region, nine countries held national elections in 2016. The July 2016 federal elections in Australia illustrate one of the positive cases while the election in the Philippines is chosen to show more problematic practices.

Australia – federal elections, 2 July 2016

The Australian federal elections on 2 July 2016 was the first "double dissolution" since 1987, with simultaneous contests for the 150 House of Representatives members and all 76 senators.³⁸

The Alternative Vote (AV) system is used to elect members of the House of Representatives. This majoritarian system requires a candidate to receive at least 50 percent of the vote. Voters are required to rank order every House candidate on the ballot. If, on the

basis of first preferences, no candidate received a majority, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the second preferences are transferred to the remaining candidates until a majority is reached. The Australian Senate uses the Single Transferable Vote (STV), with multi-member districts. The quota is determined by the number of candidates elected within a state (usually six). The outcomes are usually more proportional than for the House, depending on the district magnitude.


The major parties campaigned on issues of healthcare, childcare, tax cuts, and climate change. Election day saw the lowest voter turnout since 1922, despite compulsory voting.³⁹ Over 1.4 million Australians failed to cast their votes for the House of Representatives, representing 9 percent of the 15.7 million eligible voters.⁴⁰

Once the polls closed, after a week of counting, many close seats remained in doubt.⁴¹ Many predicted the possibility of a hung parliament.⁴² The final outcome of the 2016 election was not announced until four weeks after polling day. Finally, the Electoral Commission announced that the Liberal National coalition had secured the 76 seats required to form a government under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Their main opposition, the Australian Labor Party, won 69 seats.

The PEI experts evaluated the election as having 'very high' integrity (PEI Index of 70 out of 100), on par with the previous federal election. The country ranks 28th in electoral integrity worldwide although with lower scores on campaign media and finance.

Despite considerable public trust in the work of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), an EIP panel survey of a representative sample of the Australian electorate conducted during and after the election found that a substantial minority of the public expressed doubts about the integrity of the electoral process and outcome.⁴³ In particular, about one in four Australians believe that fraud occurs 'usually' or 'always' during Australian elections, with this proportion rising among supporters of minor parties, the less educated, women, and the younger generation. Moreover, four out of ten Australians believe that fraud is likely to affect the outcome of elections. These perceptions give cause for concern, because this coincides with mistrust in the Australian parliament, political parties, and politicians, more political cynicism, and dissatisfaction with the overall performance of Australian democracy.⁴⁴ Further analysis found that political knowledge (measured by political knowledge, formal education, and awareness of the voting system), were linked to trust in elections; those who were more informed about politics had higher trust in the electoral process.⁴⁵

Therefore, while PEI experts suggest that Australian elections perform relatively well, a substantial minority of the public believe that fraud is common. It is important to consider how to restore public confidence, for example through strengthening transparency, complaints mediation mechanisms, targeted information campaigns, and/or the use of secure digital registration and balloting processes.



"Victoria Senate and House of Reps Ballot" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by John Enslart Takver

The Philippines general election – 9 May 2016

Since the 1986 revolution that ended the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos, the sixth general election took place on May 9th 2016. Filipinos voted for the president and vice president, both the Senate and the House of Representatives in the national congress, and for provincial/city/municipal office.⁴⁶

The president is elected through a simple plurality popular vote for a period of six years and she/he cannot be reelected, as there are constitutional term limits.⁴⁷ The president and vice president are elected separately.⁴⁸ The House of Representatives uses a mixed member system: 230 members are directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 57 members are directly elected by proportional representation. The Senate and local contests use a block vote electoral system (plurality at large), like that already described for the Syrian case.

The Philippines use automated voting technology.⁴⁹ Considerable worries remain about the reliability of the digital software and the potential manipulation of results.⁵⁰ Previous elections in the Philippines have often been violent and corrupt, for example, in 2009, in an attempt to block gubernatorial candidate Esmail Mangundatu, 58 followers and family members were slaughtered.⁵¹ Since 2001, the Philippine National Police has reported a total of 1,036 violent poll-related incidents, which claimed the lives of more than 600 Filipinos. The bloodiest period occurred with 155 casualties and injuries in 2010.⁵²

Under President Benigno Aquino III, GDP reached the highest levels in four decades but poverty, corruption, and crime still remain substantial, along with unemployment and income inequality.⁵³ Aquino named Manuel “Mar” Roxas II as his successor for the Liberal Party of the Philippines. The populist Rodrigo Duterte rose in the polls from January to May, a colourful and outspoken figure. His hardline policies seek to stamp out illegal drugs through tolerating extrajudicial killings, raising major questions of human rights. Another prominent candidate was Vice President Jejomar Binay, for the United Nationalist Alliance, although he has faced trial for alleged corruption.⁵⁴ Another prominent potential candidate was Mary “Grace Poe” Llamanzares, an Independent. In December 2015 she was temporarily disqualified by the electoral commission on the grounds that she was not a “natural born Filipino”.⁵⁵ She also failed to satisfy a 10-year residency requirement in the Philippines. She appealed the Comelec’s decision at the Supreme Court and in March she was listed on the ballot.



"Election posters" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Roberto Verzo

The result saw a substantial victory for President Rodrigo Duterte, with almost 16 million votes (39% of the vote), compared with almost 10 million cast for Roxas, his nearest rival. Turnout was reported at 78%. Overall, 87 women were elected out of 292 members (29.8%).


A number of civil society organizations monitored the polls. The National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) noted increases in voter confidence in the election system compared to the past and attested a "generally perceived credible and orderly conduct of the May 9 elections".⁵⁶ More than 100 international observers monitored the polls from the Commission on Elections headquarters and local precinct office, including the multinational Compact of Peaceful and Democratic Elections (COMPACT).⁵⁷ Several problems were noted. At least ten people died and three were wounded on polling day from election-related violence, as gunmen attacked polling stations ambushed vehicles and stole vote counting machines, according to police reports, although these incidents were sporadic.⁵⁸ There were also reports of poll vote count machine malfunctions and over-heating, vote-buying through gifts of cash and food, lack of ballot secrecy, harassment, and party worker ballot stuffing, shortage of ballots, lack of special facilities for persons with disabilities, complaints of voter disenfranchisement after names were missing from the register.⁵⁹

Thus the Philippines is relatively open in party competition and ballot access, but contests are often flawed by procedural short-comings. In the PEI study, the Philippines is scored as 52 out of the standardized 100-point PEI Index, ranking 101 out of 158 countries worldwide. The weakest areas are campaign finance, the voter register, and the voting process, respectively.

Middle East and North Africa: Syria and Iran

Middle East & North Africa

■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low



The Middle East and North Africa is a region where elections have spread in recent decades but nevertheless the quality of these contests face many challenges. 2016 saw new national elections in Morocco, Kuwait, Iran, Jordan and Syria. In the region, only three cases were rated very high or high in electoral integrity (Israel, Tunisia, Oman), and 8 were rated low or very low.

The Syrian contest in April 2016, in particular, is rated 3rd worst worldwide (after Burundi and Ethiopia). This is selected for illustration in this region, along with the case of the Iranian election in February 2016.

Syria – 13 April 2016

In Syria, more than 270,000 people have died in almost five years of civil war armed conflict.⁶⁰ Conflict has destabilized the Middle East and has forced more than 11 million Syrians away from their homes, fueling the refugee crisis in Europe.⁶¹ The conflict, which began as an anti-government protest in 2011, has also facilitated the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in the country.⁶²

Three elections have been held since the uprising against Assad; in 2012 and 2016 for Syrian People's Council (Majlis al-Sha'ab), and in 2014 for the presidency. The latter saw Bashar al-Assad win by a landslide victory with 88.7 percent of the vote⁶³, allowing him to rule until 2021. Opponents of the regime regard the contest as fraudulent, as voting did not take place in areas controlled by the opposition, effectively excluding millions of citizens.⁶⁴ In October 2015, Assad stated that he was willing to hold early presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as discuss constitutional changes, but only if terrorist groups were defeated beforehand.⁶⁵

The parliamentary election to the Syrian People's Council on 13 April 2016 was the second held in the midst of the civil war. The 250 members of parliament were elected by plurality vote from 15 multi-member districts. Several seats are assigned to each constituency. Under the block voting electoral system (also known as plurality at large), each citizen has as many votes as seats are available. Candidates with the most votes in each district (but not necessarily a majority) are returned to office.⁶⁶ This gives an advantage to the more developed and established parties - in Syria's case, the Ba'ath party. The block vote system works against the opposition if it is fragmented, as in this country. It gives the party that has even a slight lead in the popular vote an overwhelming number of seats.⁶⁷ About 3,500 candidates ran for office and non-Ba'athist candidates were eligible, although all went through a careful screening process. Half of Syria's parliamentary seats are reserved for laborers and farmers who have no party affiliation. Various committees, whose members are appointed by either Assad himself or provincial governors, determine who is a non-affiliated farmer or laborer. 7,300 polling centers were established in government-controlled areas of the country, but large parts of the country controlled by insurgent groups did not participate. State employees were warned that they must show up to vote, with fears of retaliation and punishment if they failed to comply.⁶⁸

The Ba'ath Party-led National Progressive Front coalition, including Syria's ruling Baath party and its allies, won 200 of the 250 seats (80%), gaining 32 members. The Syrian electoral commission announced that 50 other candidates were elected but not the underlying share of the vote. The media widely reported the number of seats but gave no indication of the vote share. The major opposition coalition inside and outside the country boycotted the elections. In total, 33 women were elected (13.2%).⁶⁹ Voter turnout was estimated as 57.6% (up from 51.2% on the previous 2012 elections).

The results were widely denounced by opposition forces as illegitimate and sham political theatre. The UN and Western powers also condemned the elections, including official spokespersons from the US, the UK, France, and Germany, since it was impossible to hold free, fair and transparent contests meeting international standards across the whole country in the context of the on-going civil war.⁷⁰ The Council is also largely a symbolic and powerless body.

In the PEI study, experts scored the Syrian election as 25 out of 100-points on the standardized PEI index, ranking Syria 156th out of 158 countries worldwide. The fraudulent contests were a façade serving to prop up the Assad regime, rather than providing a genuine choice allowing all Syrians to exercise their voice over the future of the country. No international observers were allowed to monitor the contests, with Assad claiming that foreign interference would undermine Syrian sovereignty.⁷¹

Iran – 26 February 2016

On 26 February 2016 Iran held elections for the 290-seat bicameral parliament, known as the Islamic Consultative Assembly (also called Iranian Majlis, or People's House). Members are directly elected for four year terms in single and multi-seat constituencies by a two-round plurality vote electoral system where winners need at least 25% of the vote. There are also reserved seats for several minority communities. The Ministry of Interior, including the Central Executive Elections Board and the Election District Executive Committees, administers all election-related activities. The main cleavage is between moderate reformists and fundamentalist conservatives.

Simultaneous elections were held on the same day for the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the 88 member body with the authority to appoint the Islamic Republic's Supreme Leader.⁷² All members are Islamic scholars and jurists. Districts are divided among 31 provinces based on population size. Members are elected using a single round plurality electoral system, with no minimum threshold.⁷³

The fairness of the ballot access process was thrown into doubt by questions arising over the exclusion of many potential candidates in both contests.⁷⁴ The Guardian Council (a 12-member panel of Islamic jurists⁷⁵) vetted and disqualified all but around 4,700 out of more than 12,000 potential parliamentary candidates.⁷⁶ They also approved only 166 of the 801 candidates who applied to run for the 88-member Assembly of Experts, excluding all 16 women.⁷⁷ There has never been a female representative elected to the Assembly of Experts. The vetoing of

candidates in 2012 led to a parliamentary election boycott by reformist parties⁷⁸; however, one prominent moderate ruled out this tactic for the 2016 elections.⁷⁹

The election was seen by some commentators as a referendum on the future direction of the revolution.⁸⁰ A win by moderates was thought to give President Hassan Rouhani more scope to push through reforms, such as the codification of political crimes and a prohibition on the policing of religious adherence, which have been blocked by his more conservative political opponents.⁸¹

Rouhani has achieved a lot in the international sphere since wresting the presidency away from hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He secured a groundbreaking nuclear deal with world powers, an achievement that may have had hardliners sensing the winds of change.⁸² The agreement seeks to improve Iran's economic situation through a lifting of crippling economic sanctions.⁸³ In the wake of the nuclear deal, Rouhani toured Europe to sign multi-million dollar trade deals and met with the Pope, a sign of increasing international engagement.⁸⁴

The result saw a historical victory for the moderates led by President Hassan Rouhani and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, along with their allies, who secured 59% of the seats in the assembly, up from 20 seats before. Turnout was officially declared at 62%, out of 55 million eligible voters, although Iran does not have a voter registration system. Iran does not permit domestic or international observers to monitor the contest. There were no reports of post-election protests and demonstrations.


In the PEI 4.5 study, experts scored the Iranian elections on the standardized PEI Index as 50 out of 100; ranking Iran 105th out of 158 countries. Experts rated the electoral laws, candidate access to the ballot, and campaign finance as the weakest stages in the Iranian electoral process.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Gabon and Gambia

Of the 42 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, only one (Cape Verde) was rated very highly in electoral integrity, while 7 (including the 2016 elections in Benin and Ghana) were rated highly. 10 were moderate, and two dozen were rated low or very low in integrity. The illustrative cases of Gabon and the Gambia show the problems which commonly destabilize contests in the region.

Sub-Saharan Africa

■ Very High/High ■ Moderate ■ Low/Very Low



Gabon – presidential election, 27 August 2016

The Gabonese presidential election on 27 August 2016 exemplifies the challenges of establishing peaceful and legitimate outcomes in close contests.

Gabon, a country bordering the Atlantic in West Africa, achieved its independence from France in 1960. An oil-rich country, as well as reserves of timber and manganese, there is a relatively high \$19,300 per capita GDP, compared with the regional average, but also great economic inequality and poverty.

The presidency is directly elected by simple majority popular vote for a 7-year term, without any term limits. The Senate is indirectly elected and the 120 seat National Assembly is elected in single-seat

constituencies by absolute majority vote using the second ballot system inherited from France.

By 2005, President Omar Bongo Ondimba had become Africa's longest-reigning ruler.⁸⁵ After his passing in 2009, his son Ali Bongo Ondimba took office as leader of the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG).⁸⁶ The 2016 presidential

election saw incumbent President Ali Bongo Ondimba run for a second term against Jean Ping, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs and leader of the Gabon Progress Party.

During the 2016 election campaign, opponents insisted that President Ondimba was unfit to run for office amidst rumors that he was an adopted and born in Nigeria.⁸⁷ Election Day saw President Ondimba narrowly win with a wafer-thin margin of under 6000 ballots, achieving 49.8% of the vote, while his main opponent, Jean Ping, obtained 48.2%.⁸⁸

The narrow outcome encouraged Ping to lodge a formal complaint with the Constitutional Court challenging the election results. The opposition leader asked the court to authorize a recount in the southwestern province of Haut-Ogooue, where President Bongo appeared to have won 95.5% of the vote.⁸⁹ This providence also showed a turnout of 99%, compared to the 59.4% throughout the country.⁹⁰ The EU observation mission reported that anomalies occurred during the vote count and that “the number of abstentions, blank ballots and spoilt ballots in just one of this province’s 15 local elections committees was higher than the figure for the whole province.”⁹¹ The EU Observation mission also accused Gabonese intelligence members of wiretapping.⁹² Furthermore, the EU mission lamented limited access to the Court review process to check the legitimacy of the elections. The court eventually rejected the appeal of Jean Ping to recount votes, declaring President Ali Bongo the winner, thereby extending one of Africa’s longest political dynasties.⁹³

The outcome, and the slim margin of victory, sparked two days of riots and protests in the country. Thousands of protesters took the streets of Libreville after the election and the parliament was set on fire.⁹⁴ The government stated that at least three people were killed during the protests, while the opposition claimed that there were 26 casualties.⁹⁵ President Bongo Ondimba took office on the 27th September 2016 for a second seven-year term.⁹⁶ He promised to form an inclusive government designed to reconcile the nation, but few opposition members were included in the final team of cabinet members.⁹⁷

The Gabon contest was assessed by EPI experts as having ‘very low’ electoral integrity, with a PEI Index of only 34 (out of 100). Areas of gravest concern related to campaign financing and the performance of the electoral authorities. In both areas, PEI experts suggested a severely flawed playing field and management of elections.



"Giving the finger" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by Brice Blondel

The Gambia – presidential election, 1 December 2016

The 2016 presidential election in Gambia illustrated an important example of a transition in power in Sub-Saharan Africa, although one fraught with tensions and conflict. The outcome marked a historic watershed: the defeat of President Yahya Jammeh, who had ruled the Gambia since 1994. Jammeh's presidency was characterized by restrictions to freedom of speech, with independent journalists subjected to harassment and violence.⁹⁸ In 2013, an amendment to the Information and Communications Act enforced penalties for those who spoke out on the Internet against the government, resulting in up to 15 years in jail and up to \$82,000 in fines.⁹⁹ The president claimed to have eliminated AIDS/HIV from the country, an argument disputed by many opposition leaders and international media outlets.¹⁰⁰ Jammeh won the last presidential election in 2011 with 72% of the vote amidst allegations of the intimidation of voters and the opposition.¹⁰¹

The two-week campaign started in November 2016. Eight opposition parties backed the main opposition leader, Adama Barrow, for the Gambia Democratic Congress.¹⁰² This was the first time in the country's history that the opposition formed a coalition.¹⁰³ During the campaign the opposition enjoyed relative freedom of expression.¹⁰⁴ The European Union (EU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were prevented from observing the polls, however, and the African Union (AU) was the only agency allowed to send observers to the election.¹⁰⁵

The election result saw opposition leader Adam Barrow winning with 227,708 votes or 43.3% of the vote, surpassing the incumbent Jammeh's 39.6%.¹⁰⁶ On December 2nd, before the election results were released, President Jammeh accepted defeat and congratulated Barrow.¹⁰⁷ However, on December 9th only a week after conceding defeat, Jammeh appeared on national television to announce that he rejected the election results, denouncing voter irregularities, and refusing to leave office.¹⁰⁸ A number of international organizations and neighboring African countries condemned this statement. President Jammeh declared state of emergency on the 17th of January, which was accompanied by mass evacuations of tourists.¹⁰⁹ In a remarkable show of strength, West African nations threatened military operations if Jammeh was to oppose stepping down by the 22nd of January. Before the end of the ultimatum, he left the country for an ECOWAS-brokered exile in Guinea. This made him the first president to hand over power peacefully in The Gambia since its independence in 1965.¹¹⁰

According to the PEI experts, the Gambian election had 'low' integrity (PEI Index: 48). Overall, this placed the country slightly above the African average (see Figure 1). Electoral procedures were seen as robust (Gambia: 76; global mean: 65). Nevertheless, the electoral laws were singled out as a particularly problematic dimension (Gambia: 25; global mean: 53). In July 2015 the dominant political party, Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), had imposed new legislation, which raised registration fees for those candidates who wanted to run for any position in government. This was seen as an act to prevent opposition candidates from running and a method used by the incumbent president to maintain power.¹¹¹



"Biometric Voter Registration Machine" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Commonwealth Secretariat


III: DEMOCRACY, CORRUPTION AND COERCION

EIP and liberal democracy

Turning to some of the broader lessons arising from the data, how is the quality of free and fair elections related to general levels of democratization? A strong correlation is expected, not least because elections are at the heart of the mechanisms of accountability and representation in liberal democracy. But many other institutions also need to be effective for democracy to work well, including checks and balances arising from the national and local legislative bodies and the courts, as well as vertical channels of accountability through the independent press and civil society organizations. The PEI does not seek to measure democracy per se, but rather whether contests meet international standards of electoral rights and practices.

Figure 4 compares the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI 5.0) by country and the Varieties of Democracy measure of liberal democracy. The correlation is not expected to be perfect; elections are only one part of liberal democracy, the measure of electoral integrity is one derived from international standards not from democratic theory, there is often room for legitimate differences of judgments among experts, and the measurement years in both studies do not match precisely.

Figure 4: Electoral integrity (PEI) and liberal democracy




Source: The perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.0); The Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem 6.2)

There are some cases located above the regression line, like Finland, Denmark, Cuba and Egypt, where the PEI index of electoral integrity is more positive than the V-Dem measure of democracy. There are also several other cases like Haiti and Uganda which fall below the line, suggesting that V-Dem experts rate these more highly in the quality of their democracy than the PEI study assesses the quality of their elections. Nevertheless, as the figure shows, it is apparent that there is a strong correlation ($R=.867$ *** $N=125$) between these two independent measures.

EIP by stages of the electoral cycle

Which are the most common problems which undermine free and fair contests? In particular, how does electoral integrity vary across different stages of the electoral cycle? Popular commentary commonly highlights claims of fraud occurring during the balloting and vote count, and research has also tended to focus on this stage, for example by examining whether these types of problems are deterred by the deployment of electoral observers to monitor polling stations. Yet the PEI evidence suggests that, in fact, these stages are usually less problematic than the campaign where money and media are often challenges to maintaining a level playing field among contestants.

Figure 5: Sub-dimensions of electoral integrity



Source: The perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.0)


Problems of corruption and coercion

Concern about electoral malpractices often focuses on problems of corruption and coercion. These are some of the most serious flaws with the capacity to eviscerate public confidence in the electoral process, to weaken the legitimacy of the outcome, and to undermine regime stability. Many international organizations support programs designed to prevent electoral violence, emphasizing early warning systems, risk assessments, and the provision of training.¹¹² There have also been numerous attempts to clean up money in politics, reducing the risks of clientalism and corruption, as ways to strengthen legitimate and peaceful contests leading to stable and accountable governance.¹¹³ But case-studies suggest that the success of these attempts remains limited. Which types of contests are most commonly plagued by these problems? Where are they most prevalent? And what can be done to prevent them?

To explore these issues, the 2016 questionnaire introduced a new rotating battery of items, expanding the core questions, designed to capture different aspects of these problems. This includes acts of corruption and clientelism designed to exert undue influence, such as through the direct bribery of voters, the offer of cash, gifts or personal favors, and the use of patronage politics in exchange for support. Acts of coercion were also monitored such as those involving intimidation, threats of violence at the polls, and violent protests. The survey items did not specify who instigated these malpractices, since multiple actors may be engaged in contentious elections, including the ruling party, the security forces, opposition movements, armed thugs and militant warlords, criminal drug cartels, and the leaders of ethnic communities, and it often remains difficult to establish the key actors in divided societies, in cases of tit-for-tat conflict, and in countries with a deep legacy of civil war.

The selected items were subject to principle component factor analysis. The results, presented in the Technical Appendix and illustrated in Figure 6, suggest that these items form two scales. Thus countries located in the top right quadrant are characterized by contentious elections where violence and intimidation are perceived by experts to be widespread – but where corruption is also regarded as common, including the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Syria and Equatorial Guinea. Regimes like Syria use the combination of both ‘carrots’ (patronage for loyal supporters) and ‘sticks’ (military action against opposition forces seeking to overthrow the regime). Using cross-national data it is not possible to sort out the interaction of these factors, but the previous research literature suggests it most likely that corruption feeds conflict, for example the exchange of blood diamonds and state-capture of oil can fuel greed and provide the resources needed for the arms trade and mercenary armies.¹¹⁴ By contrast, several states located in the bottom right corner are seen as plagued more by voting corruption, bribery, patronage and clientelism rather than coercion per se, exemplified by Kuwait, Vanuatu and Bulgaria. Finally in the bottom left quadrant, many long-standing and newer democracies are regarded as relatively free of these problems. Further research is needed to determine the underlying factors behind these patterns although it seems likely that issues of greed and grievance generally associated with corruption and violence will probably be at work here as well, such as oil-rich economies and state capture of resources, economic inequality and poverty, majoritarian institutions, and historical legacies of civil and ethnic conflict.

Figure 6: Electoral corruption and coercion



Source: The perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.0)

IV: DOES POPULISM HEIGHTEN RISKS TO ELECTORAL INTEGRITY?

This section considers two separate but related questions: Is populism on the rise? If so, is this likely to heighten risks of electoral malpractice?

The electoral fortunes of populist parties and candidates

Recent concern about populism was triggered by the shock of the Brexit referenda in the UK in June 2016, followed by the election of president Trump in November 2016. Trump's angry nativist rhetoric and dark fear-mongering also echoes xenophobic political discourse among strongman leaders in many states worldwide, from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey to Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines.¹¹⁵ The U.S. election was followed by the rerun Austrian presidential election in December 2016 where the FPÖ candidate, Norbert Hofer, doubled the FPÖ share of the vote in the previous 2012 contest and came within almost 350,000 votes of winning.

During the last two decades, although patterns differ across states, populist parties of diverse stripes and persuasions have grown in many countries, enjoying greater success in gaining legislative seats, reaching ministerial office, and holding the balance of power. In Western Europe, this includes Albert Rösti's Swiss People's Party (SVP), Geert Wilder's Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Heinz-Christian Strache's Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Matteo Salvini's Lega Nord in Italy, Jimmie Åkesson's Swedish Democrats, Timo Soini's True Finns, Marine Le Pen's Front National (FN), Tom Van Grieken's Flemish Vlaams Belang, Nigel Farage's UK Independence Party, and Kristian Thulesen Dahl's Danish People's Party (DF), among many others.¹¹⁶

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the success of the neo-fascist Jobbik party in Hungary pushed the ruling Fidesz party even further towards authoritarianism, leading them to build a wall against the wave of migrants flooding across Europe. Bulgaria's Ataka and the Slovakia's SNS also fall into the populist mold.¹¹⁷ Europe has seen growing support for several populist progressive parties as well, include Spain's Podemos, Greece's Syriza, and Italy's Five Star Movement.¹¹⁸

Across Europe, the average share of the vote for populist parties in national and European parliamentary elections has more than doubled since the 1960s, from around 5.1% to 13.2%.¹¹⁹ During the same era, their share of seats has tripled, from 3.8% to 12.8%.

A series of recent and forthcoming elections provide signs about the current electoral fortunes of populist forces in Europe, including whether their support continues to rise or whether it has peaked.

The Netherlands: parliamentary elections, 15 March 2017



The Netherlands went to the polls on 15 March 2017 to elect all 150 members of the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer). The Netherlands uses a system of Proportional Representation where all members are elected from a single nation-wide constituency using the d'Hondt system and a low legal threshold of one seat (0.67% of the vote). This generates a highly fragmented multiparty system. Experts rated the Netherlands highly in electoral integrity, ranking 9th worldwide in PEI.


In 2012 parliamentary elections had resulted in a ruling coalition of Prime Minister Mark Rutte's People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), a conservative liberal party, and the Labour Party (PvdA). Because the government lacked a majority in the Senate, it relied on the support of Democrats 66 (D66), the Christian Union (CU) and the Reformed Political Party (SGP).

The 2017 election posed a major test for the populist, nationalist, and anti-immigrant Freedom Party (PVV) led by Geert Wilders. He had pledged to take the Netherlands out of the EU, close all mosques, and ban the Koran. The party had made considerable gains in the opinion polls in 2013. The PVV saw a sustained period when they led in the polls from September 2015 until late-February 2017 but the last 10 days of the campaign saw a late swing where VVD regained its projected poll lead.¹²⁰ This was attributed in part to Wilder's refusal to take part in two TV debates and to the prime Minister's strong stance directed against Turkish President Erdoğan.

The final result on 15 March 2017 saw Mark Rutte's VVD win in first place with 21.3% of the vote (-5.3%) and 33 seats (down 8). By contrast, PVV come second with 13.1% of the vote (+3.0%) and 20 seats (up 5). This share of the vote was a worse performance for the Freedom Party than in the European Parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2009. The Christian Democrats (CDA) and the liberal D66 party were close behind with 19 seats each. Labour was badly squeezed by the fragmentation of the left. The negotiator tasked with exploring government coalition negotiations after the election immediately set about forming a coalition with four other parties, to achieve a parliamentary majority of at least 76 seats, led by the VVD and including centre-right CDA and liberal D66. The talks were subsequently expended to include Wilders. A new government is expected to be in place before summer.

The Dutch election therefore saw a check on the success of Freedom Party which prevented it from becoming the largest parliamentary party and gaining government office, with European leaders welcoming the result. Nevertheless, the outcome still saw growing voting support and seat gains for the PVV. Moreover by adopting some a milder form of Geert Wilder's rhetoric and policies towards stricter restrictions on migrants, the populist surge shaped Mark Rutte's positions on these issues, such as his January 2017 speech warning migrants to 'be normal or be gone'. Resurgent populist parties thereby influence center parties, even if failing to gain government office.

French presidential elections, 23 April - 7 May 2017



The French presidential elections provide further indications of the state of populism in Europe. Brexit was a shock to the European Union, but it was widely predicted that a Frexit referendum, if held and passed, as promised by Marine Le Pen, would trigger the collapse of the EU.

The 2017 presidential elections shattered the grip of the mainstream socialist and center-right parties. The electoral system introduced by de Gaulle in the constitution establishing the 5th French Republic aimed to reduce extreme party system fragmentation and government instability. All parties can stand in the first ballot. But the need to secure an absolute majority of the vote (50%+) to win is a high hurdle favoring larger moderate parties. The run-off ballot provides incentives for party coalitions to cluster around the two major party candidates of the center left and right. Under this system, the Socialists and center-right have rotated in office and won the presidency since 1958.

2017 broke the mold. The unpopularity of President Francois Holland's government dragged down the Socialist candidate, Benoit Hamon, who attracted just 6.4% of the vote in the first round, the worst result for PS since 1969. On the center right, the Republican candidate, Francois Fillon, came third with 20% of the vote, damaged by accusations of corruption. By contrast, Emmanuel Macron led the field by winning 24% of the vote in the first round and a decisive 65% in the final runoff. A youthful newcomer who held ministerial office under Holland, and who founded his own party (En Marche!) in April 2016, Macron has never been elected before. Pro-EU, he appealed to moderates and to tactical voters.

The National Front (FN) has 24 members in the European parliament, as well as local councilors and mayors. Her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, was convicted of hate speech and described the Holocaust as a 'detail of history'. His greatest success came in the 2002 presidential elections, where he came second with 16.8% of the vote in the 1st round and 17.8% in the run-off. Marine Le Pen has beat this record. The leader of the populist and nationalistic Front National (FN), Marine Le Pen, followed close behind in second place, with 21.3% of the vote in the first ballot and 34.5% in the runoff contest. The party She has long sought to moderate some the extreme xenophobia

associated with her father although she continues to stand on a nationalist platform against the European Union, immigration, and globalization.

United Kingdom general election, 8 June 2017



What does the outcome of Brexit, the role of UKIP in influencing Britain's withdrawal from the EU, and the forthcoming UK general election, indicate about the state of populism? This is another case, like the Netherlands, where populist clothes have been stolen by center-right parties. This has profoundly influenced the Conservative government's policies towards immigration and Europe but thereby prevented a substantial breakthrough for the populist United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).

In 2013, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union if reelected in the next general election. This decision had been taken by in an attempt to stem surging support for the Euro-skeptic populist UKIP, who had been achieving 18% in the opinion polls, largely at the expense of the Tories. A referendum could also help to silence the euro-skeptic wing within his own party, in the expectation that the pro-EU forces would win.¹²¹ The Remain side, which focused on the economic risks of withdrawal, had a modest but consistent lead in the telephone polls and the betting markets during the May campaign, although online polls showed greater uncertainty.¹²² On 23 June 2016, the outcome of the Brexit referendum upended UK politics as usual, with 52% voting to leave the EU while 48% voted to remain, a close result but one with decisive consequences for the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union.¹²³ Cameron immediately resigned after the result was declared to be replaced by Theresa May who promised to lead the withdrawal negotiations on the grounds that "Brexit meant Brexit".

In the UK, in April 2017 Prime Minister Theresa May called a snap general election to be held on 8 June. She argued that this timing would strengthen the government's position in the lengthy negotiations with the EU. The Conservatives hope to capitalize on their substantial and consistent 20-point lead in the opinion polls, thereby making gains over Jeremy Corbyn's Labour party, as well as the Liberal Democrats, UKIP and the SNP in Scotland.

During the campaign, the Prime Minister Theresa May has promised to provide 'strong and stable' leadership and to be tough with the EU to achieve the best deal in the Brexit negotiations. The Conservatives have also prioritized immigration reform and May has adopted populist nationalist language. This stance has eroded UKIP support; they are currently around 7-8% in the polls and they lost heavily in the May 4th local elections. Labor fared very badly in the 4 May 2017 local election, losing many seats and councils, suggesting that they face an electoral drubbing at Westminster in June. Labour performed particularly badly in the Scottish local elections, for example losing control of Glasgow council, and the Scottish Conservatives see prospects of a recovery in the region. The Scottish National Party seeks a special status to remain in the single market and their party leader Nicola Sturgeon has insisted on a second independence referendum for Scotland before all Brexit negotiations are settled.¹²⁴

German parliamentary elections 24 September 2017



Germany will elect the 598 members of the Bundestag (German Federal Diet) on 24 September 2017 to serve for 4 years. The country's mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system allocates 299 seats through plurality vote in single member constituencies, while the other 299 members are allocated by popular vote from state party lists. The Bundestag majority in turn elects the Chancellor, head of the executive, for a four-year term.¹²⁵

The 2017 election provides a test to see whether the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a right-wing populist party, can break through into office. Previous extremist parties have been banned from organizing and contesting elections by the Federal Constitutional Court. Article 21 of the Basic Law specifies that political parties which seek to impair German democratic principles shall be declared unconstitutional. The Court outlawed the Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) in 1952, a successor party of the Nazi NSDAP. However, several attempts to disband the far-right Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) failed in the Court, as recently as January 2017. The Court has also outlawed many xenophobic skinhead groups, ultra-nationalist organizations, and neo-Nazi movements which were actively engaged in violent acts of intimidation and hate crimes against asylum-seekers, Turkish migrants, foreigners, and the Jewish community, for example the German branch of an international white supremacist group, Blood and Honor.¹²⁶

AfD was founded in 2013, originally with a platform calling for an end of the Euro. In reaction to the upsurge in migrants arriving in mid-to late 2015, and in opposition to Merkel's open door refugee policy, the party shifted its focus to an anti-immigrant and nationalist platform. Regarded as the "most successful newly founded parties in Germany since the 1950s,"¹²⁷ the AfD has managed to gain entry to eleven state parliaments. Polls in early-2017 suggested that it was expected to cross the 5% threshold for the Federal Diet with ease. In the late-spring, however, the AfD popularity appears to have diminished in the polls, hovering around 10%.¹²⁸ A leadership change in April 2017 brought Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel to the party's helm. Gauland, known for racist remarks directed against Afro-German soccer players in the national team, is part of the party's rightist, anti-Islam wing.¹²⁹ Weidel has accused Chancellor Merkel of "being personally responsible for the rape and murder of a young woman by an Afghan refugee."¹³⁰

Among the mainstream parties, Chancellor Angela Merkel's CDU was challenged during spring 2017 by the upswing in polling support for the Social Democrats. With the nomination of the widely popular former President of the European Parliament, Martin Schultz, the SPD managed to close the gap with the CDU, with both parties briefly reaching around 30% in opinion polls, before subsequent surveys saw the CDU back in the lead.¹³¹ It remains to be seen how party fortunes shift in the run up to the September 2017 Bundestag elections.

In the past, German elections have scored highly in the PEI Index, ranking 7th worldwide. Nevertheless there are concerns about foreign meddling in the election through hacking and denial-of-service attacks, as well as the manipulation of public opinion via 'social bots' in online social media.¹³² The contest will provide further signs of whether populism continues to expand in Europe, with support for the AfD, or whether the upsurge has peaked.

Comparing populist support in European contests

To summarize, Figure 7 compares populist fortunes in several recent and forthcoming European contests.

Figure 7: Populist performance in recent European elections

Performance of populists in recent key national elections in Europe					
Country	Populist Party	Type of contest	Date	Candidate/Leader	Vote % Outcome
Austria	FPO	Presidential 1st round	25 Apr 16	Barbara Rosenkranz	15.2% Defeated in 1st round
	FPO	Presidential rerun	4 Dec 16	Norbert Hofer	46.2% Hofer defeated in close rerun contest
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	Tweede Kamer	12 Sep 12	Geert Wilders	10.1% 15 members elected
	Party for Freedom	Tweede Kamer	15 Mar 17	Geert Wilders	13.1% 2nd place in votes; 20 members elected (+5)
France	Front National	Presidential 1st round	22 Apr 12	Marine Le Pen	17.9% Defeated in 3rd place
	Front National	Presidential 1st round	23 Apr 17	Marine Le Pen	34.5% 2nd ballot vote
UK	UKIP	House of Commons	7 May 15	Nigel Farage	12.6% 1 MP elected
	UKIP	House of Commons	8 Jun 17	Paul Nuttall	7.0%* Some slippage in latest polls
Germany	Alternative for Germany	Bundestag	22 Sep 13	Bernd Lucke	4.7% Fell below threshold
	Alternative for Germany	Bundestag	24 Sep 17	Alice Weidel/Alexander Gauland	8.0%* Some slippage in latest polls

Note: * Latest estimate from opinion polls, 7 May 2017 **Source:** Compiled from IFES Election Guide <http://www.electionguide.org/>

Therefore, in three European cases -- Austria, the Netherlands, and France -- populists have strengthened their electoral support but failed to break through into government office. In part this is because center right parties, like the British Conservatives and the Dutch People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, have adopted more populist policies and nationalist rhetoric. In France, the presidential elections saw further growth in FN support – with Marine Le Pen almost doubling the share of the vote which her father won in 2002 - although failing to achieve the Élysée Palace. As a moderate outsider, Macron providing an alternative to Le Pen while still breaking the old party dualism. Across the Channel, UKIP's policies and rhetoric have been absorbed by the Conservatives. In Germany, it remains far too early at this stage to make any assessment about prospects for AfD. In a series of recent European elections, therefore, populism has generally been a growing force in politics, reshaping the policy agenda along a cultural cleavage dividing populist nationalists from cosmopolitan liberals, and with long-term gains in support, even in cases where populist leaders and parties have failed to make substantial breakthroughs in votes and seats.¹³³

Does populism exacerbate risks of electoral malpractice?

In the light of these developments, populism heightens the risks of damaging free and fair contests through their rhetoric and actions weakening trust in political institutions, violating international standards of electoral integrity, and condoning interference in Western elections by their authoritarian allies.

Damaging trust in democratic institutions

Firstly, in terms of the consequences for democratic cultures, populism is likely to erode public faith and confidence in the fairness and integrity of the electoral process. Populists typically attack 'the establishment' and fuel mistrust in many of the core institutions of liberal democracy, including elections as well as mainstream parties, parliaments, the media, and the judiciary.¹³⁴ In the US, for example, during and even after the campaign, President Trump repeatedly alleged that the contest was rigged and there was massive voter fraud, claiming 3-5 million people voted illegally, and calling for a 'major investigation'.¹³⁵ Trump supporters, especially if hostile towards immigrants and anti-government, are particularly prone to believe in rampant electoral fraud.¹³⁶ Populist leaders like Trump typically benefit from mistrust of elites and they seek to further undermine faith in the legitimate role of the media ('enemy of the people'), the independence of the courts ('so-called judges'), and the legislative procedures in Congress. This does not imply that popular support for liberal democracy has been greatly weakened by populists – since there is not good evidence of this claim in Western societies, but rather that institutional mistrust of politicians, parties and parliaments, already high, is likely to be reinforced by their rhetoric.¹³⁷

There are other ways that public confidence in government can be damaged if populists are elected to office. When campaigning, populist rhetoric frequently raises exaggerated expectations which are hard to meet, potentially deepening disillusionment among their followers, as well as advocating extreme policies, dividing the electorate and strengthening social intolerance. Populist leaders characteristically use rhetoric making vague and sweeping promises through simplistic sound-bite slogans with broad appeal ('Make America Great Again', 'Build a Wall', 'Choose France', 'Take Back Control'). Demagogic campaign speeches emphasize potential threats from 'outsiders' and criticizing elites, but avoid presenting detailed and positive policy platforms.¹³⁸ If elected to power, as neophytes, populist leaders may lack the political skills and experience to implement their promises and make government work effectively.¹³⁹ Extreme policy positions hamper building working coalitions across multiple parliamentary parties, or require major compromise to get things done. All of these characteristics are likely to have a diffuse long-term impact upon the political culture and faith in representative democracy although it remains to be seen how public opinion responds.

Violating international standards of electoral integrity

Secondly, populists also use practices which directly violate international standards of electoral integrity. In hybrid regimes, populist authoritarians often reinforce their power through fraud and corruption, undermining human rights, and restricting party competition.

For example, as previous EIP reports have demonstrated, under Hugo Chavez and Victor Madura Venezuelan elections have been plagued by corruption, misuse of state resources, and widespread violence, triggering massive demonstrations, some fatal.¹⁴⁰ Venezuela ranks 118th worldwide in the PEI index and ranks near the bottom of

Transparency International Corruption Index.¹⁴¹ In the Philippines, as discussed earlier, the 2016 campaign of the populist Rodrigo Duterte saw accusations of corruption, harassment, and election-related violence. Under President Erdogan, Turkey's constitutional referendum on 16 April 2017 was strongly criticized by OSCE observers due to the imprisonment of thousands of citizens, state control of the media, and limits on civil society organizations.¹⁴²

The EIP has also documented malpractices in Viktor Orban's Hungary, especially problems of electoral laws, gerrymandering, and lack of a level playing field in the 2014 parliamentary elections. These processes often generate contentious elections marked by opposition appeals against the results, mass protests, legitimacy challenges, and problems of unstable governance, especially in polarized party systems with Presidential executives.¹⁴³ Since the election of populists, both Turkey and Hungary have declined in Transparency International's corruption perceptions index.

In Western democracies, as well, when campaigning, several populist leaders have violated specific electoral laws. In Britain, for example, the first-ever UKIP Member of Parliament was charged with electoral fraud (submitting false signatures on nomination papers).¹⁴⁴ In Australia, the leader of One Nation, Pauline Hanson, and the party co-founder, David Ettridge, were jailed in 2003 for dishonestly taking electoral reimbursements.¹⁴⁵ The French National Front party was sanctioned for misuse of 340,000 euros in 2011 and Le Pen is currently under investigation for spending 5 million euros in EU funds on fake jobs. Problems of public ethics have plagued Trump's White House, from lack of transparency with the president's tax returns, breaking decades of tradition, to conflicts of interest over Trump's business interests at home and abroad, and the resignation of Michael Flynn over his Russian contacts and speaking fees.¹⁴⁶

Of course, problems of corruption, crony capitalism, and malfeasance occur with many other types of parties and politicians. But a report by Transparency International suggests that populists are particular prone to stepping over the line by engaging in unethical behavior.¹⁴⁷ In speeches, populists commonly rail against 'corrupt elites' ('Drain the Swamp') but in practice they are willing to transgress the law to gain power and enrich themselves and their supporters, rolling back anti-corruption laws and flagrantly violating standards of public life.

Russian interference tipping the scales

Finally, authoritarian regimes (black knights) have actively sought both to undermine democratic forces abroad and also to tip the electoral scales in favor of populists. The clearest evidence concerns Russia which uses several techniques to put its thumb on the electoral scale.

One is to supply resources: Russia has helped to fund populist parties; for example, Marine Le Pen borrowed 9 million euros from a Russian bank in the party's 2014 campaign, and she visited Putin during the 2017 election. The Dutch Freedom Party signed a "cooperation agreement" with Putin's United Russia party.¹⁴⁸

Another is to use the techniques of propaganda, misinformation, and cyberattacks. Russian interference has long been suspected in elections in post-Soviet states, notably in attempts to disrupt contests and undermine democratic forces in Ukraine.¹⁴⁹


The intelligence and cyber security communities also report active Russian interference in the U.S. and European elections, using misinformation through media campaigns designed to undermine support for moderate parties and bolster populist candidates, as well as hacking party and electoral records, like the security breaches of the DNC computers.¹⁵⁰ Persistent questions about Russian interference in the election, under investigation, continues to plague the Trump administration, as discussed earlier. In France, as well, Emmanuel Macron has been the victim of a massive hacking attack, with fake and genuine documents leaked, two days before ballots are cast.

Western governments have sought to counter these efforts; in the Netherlands, for example, in the run up to the general election, the government decided that all paper ballots in the Netherlands would be counted by hand, ditching its counting software as vulnerable to hacking.¹⁵¹ Similarly the head of German intelligence has warned that they are on the alert for Russian cyber espionage, disinformation campaigns and fake news, including repeated phishing attacks on the CDU/CSU.¹⁵² But it remains difficult to maintain cyber-security against increasingly-sophisticated attacks.

Therefore, further systematic evidence needs to be gathered to determine the impact of each of these practices but there are good reasons to believe that populism has the capacity to pose serious risks to free and fair elections, including by further eroding public confidence in the electoral process and democratic institutions, using practices violating international standards of electoral integrity, and associating with authoritarian allies seeking to interfere in democratic contests by tipping the balance in their favor. It remains to be seen whether and how these challenges can be addressed most effectively to restore public trust, strengthen electoral integrity, and thereby safeguard democracy.

V: REFERENCE INFORMATION

Figure 8: The PEI world map



Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.0), country-level

Figure 9: Sub-dimensions of electoral integrity by country

Rank	Country	Type	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District bound.	Voter registr.	Party registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
1	Denmark	Leg	86	91	98	84	94	90	72	72	79	97	93	93
2	Finland	Leg	86	80	98	72	95	93	70	70	83	99	96	96
3	Norway	Leg	83	80	92	72	86	84	67	73	81	97	92	91
4	Iceland	Both	83	79	88	68	92	85	67	71	84	96	91	90
5	Sweden	Leg	81	79	90	80	88	79	61	66	80	93	88	94
6	Costa Rica	Pres	81	80	97	59	75	79	57	65	81	99	94	97
7	Germany	Leg	80	77	89	74	82	83	67	70	78	94	88	84
8	Estonia	Leg	79	75	84	71	89	76	69	58	89	87	86	82
9	Netherlands	Leg	79	91	91	69	85	78	61	62	75	88	88	88
10	Switzerland	Leg	78	77	89	73	88	81	63	40	82	93	92	91
11	Lithuania	Both	78	87	82	76	77	85	67	64	73	87	84	79
12	Austria	Both	77	83	81	73	79	75	63	68	80	90	77	82
13	Slovenia	Both	77	74	83	65	90	74	59	63	80	93	78	86
14	Czech Rep.	Both	76	81	85	71	87	78	57	59	69	93	85	83
15	New Zealand	Leg	76	71	95	66	54	83	55	56	78	87	89	88
16	Uruguay	Pres	75	91	94	73	78	72	65	58	56	92	94	84
17	Canada	Leg	75	51	90	78	55	74	63	68	73	89	87	89
18	Slovak Rep.	Both	75	72	84	68	79	81	65	56	71	87	85	80
19	Portugal	Both	75	77	89	67	49	79	57	62	73	92	88	85
20	Poland	Both	74	79	85	74	77	75	54	61	74	85	82	81
21	Rep. of Korea	Both	74	53	87	63	85	71	55	63	76	92	83	83
22	Israel	Leg	74	76	92	65	78	76	58	61	57	91	88	86
23	Taiwan	Pres	73	65	94	65	84	83	61	51	54	94	86	88
24	Latvia	Leg	72	72	83	71	66	72	61	56	69	88	77	78
25	Belgium	Leg	71	66	81	60	77	73	64	64	67	79	79	77
26	Ireland	Leg	71	77	90	70	31	82	61	57	60	89	87	77
27	Cape Verde	Both	70	80	87	54	59	73	68	55	63	80	81	78
28	Australia	Leg	70	65	89	72	58	74	46	53	72	82	74	88
29	Cyprus	Both	70	71	85	66	71	66	53	49	67	87	87	78
30	Benin	Both	69	85	82	74	53	70	66	38	58	90	78	87
31	Spain	Leg	69	40	84	58	75	74	50	54	63	91	92	81
32	Japan	Leg	68	55	84	54	75	68	54	58	64	82	78	75
33	Tonga	Leg	68	74	67	71	58	76	56	46	69	86	65	77
34	Brazil	Pres	68	74	87	69	76	62	48	38	66	92	64	82
35	Tunisia	Both	67	77	81	73	48	73	56	45	63	83	71	78
36	Jamaica	Leg	67	72	87	68	60	73	61	44	46	85	76	82
37	Italy	Leg	67	44	86	66	74	66	53	49	63	80	76	79
38	Greece	Leg	66	47	90	54	67	65	51	44	60	87	87	80
39	Chile	Pres	66	54	89	53	54	65	53	48	53	89	90	88
40	Grenada	Leg	66	62	93	55	55	81	41	20	56	92	92	88
41	Malta	Leg	65	50	86	53	63	68	45	39	66	89	79	78
42	Ghana	Pres	65	80	70	65	53	80	62	38	54	84	64	73
43	United Kingdom	Leg	65	37	85	43	61	65	39	57	71	86	73	79
44	Croatia	Both	65	62	75	50	54	63	50	56	62	83	84	72
45	Mongolia	Both	64	53	73	57	66	64	55	43	65	88	73	71
46	Mauritius	Leg	64	64	90	54	72	60	47	32	58	87	78	78
47	Argentina	Leg	64	69	78	59	65	70	55	38	61	74	76	67

Rank	Country	Type	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District bound.	Voter registr.	Party registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral author.
48	Rwanda	Leg	64	62	71	59	70	60	54	58	60	71	77	65
49	South Africa	Leg	63	74	78	67	52	60	57	35	62	76	72	71
50	Vanuatu	Leg	63	75	69	60	25	72	68	41	58	73	72	78
51	Lesotho	Leg	63	80	82	71	48	59	47	38	55	77	75	75
52	Barbados	Leg	63	67	70	65	54	58	63	32	57	81	79	71
53	Peru	Both	62	64	50	58	74	59	53	44	63	84	75	63
54	Micronesia	Leg	62	64	68	65	45	69	60	36	63	71	69	68
55	United States	Both	61	36	72	14	40	78	59	48	68	79	69	72
56	Panama	Pres	61	55	77	53	68	65	54	24	64	76	64	71
57	Oman	Leg	61	56	80	49	61	58	53	41	61	74	77	59
58	Bhutan	Leg	61	52	75	61	45	46	66	57	57	66	69	74
59	Namibia	Pres	60	67	62	69	55	70	53	34	56	64	80	68
60	Colombia	Both	60	65	75	60	41	65	50	38	48	79	73	77
61	Georgia	Both	60	61	70	52	55	55	52	42	57	76	73	66
62	India	Leg	59	72	72	58	39	57	55	33	53	72	67	77
63	Botswana	Leg	58	37	83	48	57	67	36	16	61	76	77	74
64	Bulgaria	Both	57	63	63	61	42	66	47	39	54	74	64	64
65	Mexico	Both	57	54	71	62	69	53	50	38	50	79	50	64
66	Solomon Isl.	Leg	57	74	66	72	42	59	62	30	41	72	63	69
67	Maldives	Both	57	59	69	53	48	60	52	40	56	66	71	52
68	Indonesia	Both	57	60	62	64	40	65	53	34	56	68	54	67
69	Moldova	Both	57	51	64	63	52	57	43	34	59	79	59	60
70	Morocco	Leg	56	73	70	65	40	50	59	39	42	72	72	57
71	Hungary	Leg	56	30	69	30	68	58	33	38	65	81	73	59
72	Cuba	Leg	56	28	76	42	73	61	38	42	50	67	88	56
73	Sierra Leone	Pres	56	67	79	40	66	63	30	32	55	62	63	72
74	Ivory Coast	Both	56	66	73	38	51	62	44	32	50	74	66	64
75	Romania	Both	56	49	64	51	34	61	41	44	52	76	74	61
76	Bolivia	Pres	56	55	64	54	45	61	55	33	58	62	70	52
77	Samoa	Leg	55	33	67	63	36	54	59	35	53	74	61	66
78	Paraguay	Pres	55	63	70	59	45	54	40	24	51	74	79	57
79	Ecuador	Pres	55	42	65	38	59	57	43	37	63	68	67	52
80	Albania	Leg	54	52	65	57	60	49	47	27	46	76	78	56
81	Guinea-Bissau	Pres	54	63	67	53	50	55	55	31	49	65	58	60
82	Kyrgyzstan	Leg	54	54	64	54	44	43	52	38	53	71	65	59
83	Myanmar	Leg	54	42	72	54	30	40	49	34	56	74	70	69
84	El Salvador	Both	54	56	62	60	50	60	46	35	55	67	48	58
85	Kuwait	Leg	54	38	69	48	60	57	52	26	55	72	53	59
86	Belize	Leg	54	43	64	39	43	59	53	29	51	68	64	69
87	Nepal	Leg	53	73	63	58	45	57	52	35	42	66	46	66
88	Fiji	Leg	53	31	73	50	60	49	37	32	63	65	59	62
89	Burkina Faso	Both	53	63	71	41	47	52	61	26	40	70	60	65
90	Nigeria	Leg	53	75	66	62	42	60	49	20	30	73	68	70
91	Guyana	Leg	53	43	77	49	61	63	36	30	48	66	44	74
92	Central Afr. Rep.	Pres	53	65	52	46	34	43	58	49	46	66	69	55
93	Bosnia	Pres	53	39	68	40	50	42	46	35	52	66	73	66
94	Singapore	Leg	53	27	77	14	77	46	33	35	60	68	75	58
95	Mali	Pres	53	61	62	49	26	51	54	39	45	69	66	58
96	S. Tome & Princ.	Both	53	64	72	51	46	58	41	27	46	64	61	61

Rank	Country	Type	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District bound.	Voter registr.	Party registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral author.
97	Thailand	Leg	52	79	44	71	60	55	47	49	49	64	38	36
98	Serbia	Leg	52	48	64	57	36	55	36	37	54	66	62	55
99	Niger	Pres	52	75	56	69	34	45	44	28	49	74	43	66
100	Sri Lanka	Both	52	58	70	50	47	48	38	24	48	69	58	68
101	Philippines	Both	52	56	64	54	34	62	54	23	45	68	52	61
102	Montenegro	Both	51	64	58	60	38	60	44	25	51	67	55	46
103	Ukraine	Both	51	56	59	53	40	52	48	33	50	58	61	56
104	Suriname	Leg	51	48	66	49	49	62	39	27	48	56	65	52
105	Iran	Both	50	31	68	50	63	25	46	34	52	58	75	52
106	Pakistan	Leg	50	68	57	51	53	38	59	36	37	62	45	60
107	Jordan	Leg	49	38	68	35	46	57	50	32	46	56	47	64
108	Gambia	Pres	48	25	76	54	40	53	30	28	45	67	42	69
109	Guatemala	Pres	48	46	62	60	33	38	41	20	37	76	63	67
110	Macedonia	Both	48	46	56	50	28	56	33	32	50	66	52	51
111	Malawi	Pres	48	70	49	61	31	69	49	17	42	50	44	55
112	Turkey	Both	48	31	63	46	53	48	27	26	47	67	68	50
113	Laos	Leg	48	16	67	58	56	40	23	43	45	57	86	38
114	Cameroon	Leg	46	47	59	33	43	49	39	23	37	67	52	63
115	Swaziland	Leg	46	24	64	29	48	33	47	38	45	63	56	49
116	Kazakhstan	Both	45	32	53	48	51	37	33	34	51	55	64	42
117	Comoros	Both	45	68	47	51	27	55	51	26	32	66	45	46
118	Venezuela	Both	45	38	49	42	48	59	31	23	51	53	60	40
119	Honduras	Pres	45	38	51	45	41	59	36	29	47	67	30	45
120	Russia	Leg	44	35	43	49	53	43	33	34	54	39	64	40
121	Zambia	Pres	44	57	52	59	36	52	31	27	38	53	44	53
122	Dominican Rep.	Pres	44	42	50	56	54	49	39	17	46	55	40	45
123	Iraq	Leg	44	43	53	40	38	45	46	19	48	50	54	47
124	Mauritania	Both	44	51	47	44	25	42	50	30	45	50	41	52
125	Armenia	Pres	44	54	49	47	28	51	50	31	38	60	30	41
126	Tanzania	Pres	44	33	60	44	32	54	43	23	43	56	39	46
127	Algeria	Pres	43	25	48	41	43	36	44	26	51	60	49	35
128	Sudan	Pres	43	27	49	42	38	47	37	26	44	55	58	42
129	Egypt	Both	43	28	55	39	42	40	31	23	48	56	57	43
130	Guinea	Both	42	45	37	35	23	56	47	22	41	57	48	40
131	Kenya	Pres	41	70	31	52	17	58	63	19	33	36	55	26
132	Madagascar	Pres	40	36	42	33	18	48	44	20	36	58	45	49
133	Belarus	Both	40	27	44	58	44	41	29	28	47	34	56	31
134	Uzbekistan	Both	39	26	54	50	37	27	23	23	42	48	75	29
135	Bangladesh	Leg	39	42	46	42	45	39	49	23	27	49	40	36
136	Togo	Both	38	34	41	28	24	47	49	28	42	39	37	40
137	Turkmenistan	Leg	38	20	55	47	42	30	20	24	37	46	71	34
138	Bahrain	Leg	38	18	44	21	32	39	35	26	46	51	55	31
139	Uganda	Pres	37	33	35	32	33	52	42	14	32	55	41	41
140	Nicaragua	Pres	36	31	40	49	41	36	47	28	32	35	43	26
141	Tajikistan	Both	36	18	44	42	25	27	31	23	39	49	57	35
142	Malaysia	Leg	35	15	43	10	21	48	22	21	56	44	42	32
143	Zimbabwe	Leg	35	27	29	31	15	50	33	26	36	46	49	32
144	Azerbaijan	Both	35	35	31	42	42	38	24	19	40	40	51	26
145	Angola	Leg	35	28	37	45	22	46	31	22	36	36	44	35

Rank	Country	Type	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District bound.	Voter registr.	Party registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
146	Mozambique	Pres	35	37	38	46	26	42	34	20	38	32	37	33
147	Vietnam	Leg	34	14	41	39	36	27	20	26	41	40	55	35
148	Gabon	Pres	34	33	34	33	49	62	26	18	38	34	21	19
149	Cambodia	Leg	32	29	38	33	13	38	28	18	35	57	25	28
150	Afghanistan	Pres	32	48	24	43	20	32	60	22	29	23	26	26
151	Haiti	Both	31	41	26	42	23	39	51	17	21	38	24	30
152	Chad	Pres	30	42	19	35	33	33	27	10	37	35	35	31
153	Djibouti	Both	30	22	36	41	26	24	29	17	31	33	39	28
154	Congo, Rep.	Both	28	22	26	36	17	39	25	11	37	32	34	19
155	Eq. Guinea	Both	25	16	23	36	27	28	13	14	26	29	54	19
156	Syria	Both	25	9	25	35	17	22	16	9	26	30	63	22
157	Burundi	Both	24	28	15	34	16	29	25	11	25	38	23	21
158	Ethiopia	Leg	23	14	21	35	30	28	21	19	23	17	40	12

Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.0), country-level



"Locals queueing to vote in national elec" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Andrew Neild, UK

Figure 10: Trends in electoral integrity over time

Country	Office	Most recent election				Previous election				Trend
		Date	PEI Index	PEI Index, CI	PEI Index, CI	Date	PEI Index	PEI Index, CI	PEI Index, CI	
Ghana	Pres	07-Dec-16	73	70	76	07-Dec-12	57	52	62	↑
Romania	Leg	11-Dec-16	65	61	70	09-Dec-12	48	41	55	↑
Bulgaria	Leg	05-Oct-14	63	56	70	12-May-13	50	45	55	↑
Ukraine	Leg	26-Oct-14	54	48	59	28-Oct-12	40	37	42	↑
Belarus	Leg	11-Sep-16	47	37	57	23-Sep-12	32	27	37	↑
Iceland	Leg	29-Oct-16	84	80	89	27-Apr-13	78	74	83	→
Austria	Pres	04-Dec-16	79	76	83	22-May-16	76	74	78	→
Lithuania	Leg	09-Oct-16	78	74	82	28-Oct-12	72	69	76	→
Czech Rep.	Leg	25-Oct-13	77	75	79	13-Oct-12	76	73	79	→
Israel	Leg	17-Mar-15	73	68	77	22-Jan-13	75	68	81	→
Australia	Leg	02-Jul-16	70	67	73	07-Sep-13	70	66	74	→
Spain	Leg	26-Jun-16	70	64	75	20-Dec-15	69	66	71	→
Japan	Leg	10-Jul-16	67	60	73	10-Jul-16	71	65	76	→
Argentina	Leg	22-Nov-15	63	60	66	27-Oct-13	66	63	68	→
Georgia	Leg	08-Oct-16	61	55	68	01-Oct-12	53	48	59	→
Micronesia	Leg	03-Mar-15	61	57	66	05-Mar-13	63	59	66	→
Croatia	Leg	11-Sep-16	61	55	67	08-Nov-15	68	63	73	→
United States	Pres	08-Nov-16	59	56	61	06-Nov-12	63	59	67	→
Jordan	Leg	20-Sep-16	53	41	65	23-Jan-13	46	41	51	→
Kuwait	Leg	26-Nov-16	53	46	59	27-Jul-13	58	53	64	→
Montenegro	Leg	16-Oct-16	51	45	57	14-Oct-12	61	47	75	→
Serbia	Leg	24-Apr-16	47	40	54	16-Mar-14	58	52	63	→
Zambia	Pres	11-Aug-16	45	38	52	20-Jan-15	44	39	48	→
Turkey	Leg	01-Nov-15	45	40	49	07-Jun-15	47	42	53	→
Venezuela	Pres	14-Apr-13	40	30	49	07-Oct-12	54	45	63	→
Uzbekistan	Pres	04-Dec-16	38	33	43	29-Mar-15	40	28	52	→
Greece	Leg	20-Sep-15	62	58	66	25-Jan-15	71	67	75	↓

Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 5.0), election-level

Note: Depicts trend in electoral integrity, compared to the previous election for the same office held in the same country. 'Increase' and 'decrease' occurs if confidence intervals of contemporaneous and previous election do not overlap.

VI: TECHNICAL APPENDIX: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, METHODS AND DATA

Aims: To start to gather new evidence, on 1st July 2012 the project launched an expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. The design was developed in consultation with Professor Jorgen Elklit (Aarhus University) and Professor Andrew Reynolds (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). The method of pooling expert knowledge has been used for years for measuring complex issues, such as to assess the risks of building nuclear plants, levels of corruption, and processes of democratization.

Global Coverage: The PEI survey of electoral integrity focuses upon independent nation-states around the world which have held direct (popular) elections for the national parliament or presidential elections. The criteria for inclusion are listed below. The elections analyzed in this report cover the period from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2016. In total, PEI 5.0 covers 241 elections in 158 nations.¹⁵³

A1: Country coverage

Criteria for inclusion in the survey	#	Description
Membership of the United Nations (plus Taiwan)	194	Total number of independent nation-states
Excluded categories		
Micro-states	12	Population less than 100,000 as of 2013: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu.
Without de jure direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature	5	Brunei Darussalam, China, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia
State has constitutional provisions for direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature, but none have been held since independence or within the last 30 years (<i>de facto</i>)	3	Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan
Sub-total of nation-states included in the survey	174	
Covered to date in the PEI 5.0 dataset (from mid-2012 to 2016)	158	91% of all nation-states included in the survey

Because of the selection rules, elections contained in each cumulative release of the PEI survey can be treated as a representative cross-section of *all* national presidential and legislative elections around the world (with the exception of the exclusion of micro-states). The countries in PEI 5.0 are broadly similar in political and socio-economic characteristics to those countries holding national elections which are not yet covered in the survey, with the exception of being slightly larger in population size.

Respondents: For each country, the project identified around forty election experts, defined as a political scientist (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country (such as through publications, membership of a relevant research group or network, or university employment). The selection sought a roughly 50:50 balance between international and domestic experts, the latter defined by location or citizenship. Experts were asked to complete an online survey. In total, 2,709 completed responses were received in the survey, representing just under one third of the experts that the project contacted (28%).

Concepts: The idea of electoral integrity is defined by the project to refer to agreed international conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide through the election cycle, including during the pre-election period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath.¹⁵⁴

Measurement: To measure this concept, the PEI survey questionnaire includes 49 items on electoral integrity (see Table A1) ranging over the whole electoral cycle. These items fell into eleven sequential sub-dimensions, as shown. Most attention in detecting fraud focuses upon the final stages of the voting process, such as the role of observers in preventing ballot-stuffing, vote-rigging and manipulated results. Drawing upon the notion of a 'menu of manipulation',¹⁵⁵ however, the concept of an electoral cycle suggests that failure in even one step in the sequence,

or one link in the chain, can undermine electoral integrity. The PEI 5.0 Codebook provides detailed description of all variables and imputation procedures. A copy and all the data can be downloaded from <https://thedata.harvard.edu/dataverse/PEI>

The electoral integrity items in the survey were recoded, where a higher score consistently represents a more positive evaluation. Missing data was estimated based on multiple imputation of chained equations in groups composing of the eleven sub-dimensions. The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index is then an additive function of the 49 imputed variables, standardized to 100-points. Sub-indices of the eleven sub-dimensions in the electoral cycle are summations of the imputed individual variables.¹⁵⁶

Validity and reliability tests: The results of the pilot study, from the elections held in 2012, were tested for external validity (with independent sources of evidence), internal validity (consistency within the group of experts), and legitimacy (how far the results can be regarded as authoritative by stakeholders). The analysis, presented elsewhere, demonstrates substantial external validity when the PEI data is compared with many other expert datasets, as well as internal validity across the experts within the survey, and legitimacy as measured by levels of congruence between mass and expert opinions within each country.¹⁵⁷

For *external* validity tests, the PEI Index was significantly correlated with other standard independent indicators contained in the 2016 version of the Quality of Government cross-national dataset. This includes the combined Freedom House/imputed Polity IV measure of democratization ($R=.76^{**}$, $N=133$), and the Varieties of Democracy measures of electoral democracy (polyarchy) ($R=.82^{**}$, $N=125$) and Liberal Democracy ($.87^{***}$, $N=125$).¹⁵⁸

For *internal* validity purposes, tests were run using OLS regression models to predict whether the PEI index varied significantly by several socio-demographic, political and experiential characteristics of the experts, including sex, age, education, their level of expertise, and their self-reported ideological position. The sample was broken down by type of regime in the country (using Freedom House's classification), since a higher proportion of international experts were surveyed in autocracies, where fewer political scientists study elections. The results in Table A2 below show three main findings: (i) few significant differences were evident among experts by demographics. (ii) Those located on the left, however, were significantly more critical in their evaluations, especially in autocratic states. It may be that left-wing experts give higher priority to human rights and international standards. Finally (iii) international experts were also significantly more critical of the quality of elections than domestic experts. In autocracies, in particular, domestic experts may not feel free to express criticisms of the regime and they may not share international standards of electoral integrity. Other characteristics were not consistently significant predictors of evaluations.

A2. Predicting expert perceptions of electoral integrity scores

Factors predicting expert's perceptions of electoral integrity score

			Model A				Model B				Model C			
			Autocracies (Not free)				Hybrid (Part. free)				Democracies (Free)			
Var			B	SE	Beta	P	B	SE	Beta	P	B	SE	Beta	P
Demo- graphics	sex	Sex (1=female; 0=male)	2.9	2.00	1.44		-0.1	1.17	-0.11		-3.0	0.79	-3.80	***
	education	Highest level of education	-2.5	4.33	-0.57		0.1	3.70	0.03		3.3	2.87	1.14	
	agegroup	Age groups by decade	0.5	0.67	0.75		0.6	0.43	1.35		-0.1	0.30	-0.30	
Expertise	familiar	How familiar are you with elections in this country?	0.9	0.52	1.76		0.4	0.41	0.99		2.1	0.35	5.98	***
	expert- domestic	Int'l (0) or domestic (1) expert by institutional location	-7.7	2.12	3.65	***	-2.4	1.42	1.68		-3.0	0.99	3.04	***
	lived	# years lived in the country	-1.9	1.04	-1.84		-0.6	0.73	0.89		-0.8	0.57	-1.34	
	born	Were you born in this country?	-1.2	2.95	-0.39		-0.6	1.91	0.31		-0.5	1.20	-0.39	
Political views	leftright- scale	Political views on Left (1) / Right (10) scale	2.9	0.55	5.27	***	0.7	0.32	2.29	*	0.7	0.23	3.14	***
	(Constant)		6.26	55.06			20.06	69.08			76.34	21.77		***
Adjusted R2			0.13				0.01				0.06			
N.			322				707				1,217			

Notes: OLS Regression models: Dependent Variable: PEI Index Of Electoral Integrity, (0-100), imputed. Regimes classified by Freedom House categories. **Source:** PEI 5.0 Expert level

Scales on corruption and coercion: Nine selected items included the 2016 PEI survey were recoded into a consistent negative direction (see Table A3), and factor analysis and reliability tests (Cronbach's Alpha) were used to generate two scales measuring electoral corruption and coercion. The component items were summed into two scales and the results were standardized to 100-point for ease of interpretation.

A3. PEI Scales of electoral corruption and coercion

Variable	Items	Corruption	Coercion
cashfor0 17-6B.	Some people received cash, gifts or personal favors in exchange for their vote (n)	0.716	
resourc0 7-5B.	Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning (n)	0.709	
patrona0 17-7B.	Politicians offered patronage to their supporters (n)	0.677	
bribed2 17-1B.	Voters were bribed (n)	0.651	0.531
rich2 7-4B.	Rich people buy elections (n)	0.628	
freetovo 17-2.	People were (not) free to vote without feeling pressured (n)		0.899
protest2 10-3B.	The election triggered violent protests (n)		0.800
violenc0 8-1B.	Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls (n)		0.707
fearvio0 17-3A	Some voters feared becoming victims of political violence (n)		0.638
Cronbach Alpha	Reliability tests	.890	.793

Notes: Rotated principal component factor analysis with Kaiser normalization. Coefficients below 0.50 were dropped. Reliability tests (Cronbach's alpha) were also used in scale construction.

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The full report is available for download from www.electoralintegrityproject.com and the PEI 5.0 dataset and codebook can be downloaded from <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI>

A4: PEI Survey Questions

	Sections	Performance indicators	Direction
PRE-ELECTION	1. Electoral laws	1-1 Electoral laws were unfair to smaller parties 1-2 Electoral laws favored the governing party or parties 1-3 Election laws restricted citizens' rights	N N N
	2. Electoral procedures	2-1 Elections were well managed 2-2 Information about voting procedures was widely available 2-3 Election officials were fair 2-4 Elections were conducted in accordance with the law	P P P P
	3. Boundaries	3-1 Boundaries discriminated against some parties 3-2 Boundaries favored incumbents 3-3 Boundaries were impartial	N N P
	4. Voter registration	4-1 Some citizens were not listed in the register 4-2 The electoral register was inaccurate 4-3 Some ineligible electors were registered	N N N
	5. Party registration	5-1 Some opposition candidates were prevented from running 5-2 Women had equal opportunities to run for office 5-3 Ethnic and national minorities had equal opportunities to run for office 5-4 Only top party leaders selected candidates 5-5 Some parties/candidates were restricted from holding campaign rallies	N P P N N
CAMPAIGN	6. Campaign media	6-1 Newspapers provided balanced election news 6-2 TV news favored the governing party 6-3 Parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising 6-4 Journalists provided fair coverage of the elections 6-5 Social media were used to expose electoral fraud	P N P P P
	7. Campaign finance	7-1 Parties/candidates had equitable access to public subsidies 7-2 Parties/candidates had equitable access to political donations 7-3 Parties/candidates publish transparent financial accounts 7-4 Rich people buy elections 7-5 Some states resources were improperly used for campaigning	P P P N N
ELECTION DAY	8. Voting process	8-1 Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls 8-2 Some fraudulent votes were cast 8-3 The process of voting was easy 8-4 Voters were offered a genuine choice at the ballot box 8-5 Postal ballots were available 8-6 Special voting facilities were available for the disabled 8-7 National citizens living abroad could vote 8-8 Some form of internet voting was available	N N P P P P P P
POST-ELECTION	9. Vote count	9-1 Ballot boxes were secure 9-2 The results were announced without undue delay 9-3 Votes were counted fairly 9-4 International election monitors were restricted 9-5 Domestic election monitors were restricted	P P P N N
	10. Post-election	10-1 Parties/candidates challenged the results 10-2 The election led to peaceful protests 10-3 The election triggered violent protests 10-4 Any disputes were resolved through legal channels	N N N P
	11. Electoral authorities	11-1 The election authorities were impartial 11-2 The authorities distributed information to citizens 11-3 The authorities allowed public scrutiny of their performance 11-4 The election authorities performed well	P P P P
2016 ROTATING BATTERY		12-1 Voters were bribed 12-2 People were free to vote without feeling pressured 12-3 Some voters feared becoming victims of political violence 12-4 The process kept the ballot confidential 12-5 Elections were free and fair 12-6 Some people received cash, gifts or personal favors in exchange for votes 12-7 Politicians offered patronage to their supporters	N P N P P N N

Note: Direction of the original items P=positive, N=negative. Source: PEI 5.0








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