



**Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security review  
into the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018**

**Contact:** Dr Zoe Bedford  
Executive Officer, Australia Tibet Council  
PO Box 395, Narrabeen NSW 2101  
[REDACTED]

**Prepared by:** [REDACTED]  
Campaigns and Research  
PO Box 395, Narrabeen NSW 2101  
[REDACTED]

**Contents:**

Introduction.....	2
Summary.....	2
Consolidated Recommendations.....	4
Short History of China’s Actions in Tibet.....	5
What is Tibet?.....	6
Human Rights in Tibet.....	6
Freedom to impart or receive information.....	6
Freedom of Religion.....	7
Freedom to language and culture.....	8
Economic marginalisation and environmental destruction.....	8
Foreign influence.....	9
Fake Diaspora Organisations.....	9
Surveillance and Monitoring Diaspora Communities.....	12
Economic influence on business.....	13
Areas under State control falling between the cracks.....	14
Appendix 1.....	18
References.....	22

## **Introduction**

The Australia Tibet Council (ATC) welcomes the opportunity to make a submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security review into the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018.

ATC is a membership-based community organisation which campaigns for the freedom and human rights of Tibetans. ATC is the largest community of Australians standing in solidarity with the people of Tibet. Our vision is a free Tibet in which Tibetans can determine their own future and freely pursue their cultural, political and economic developments.

Australia is home to more than 2,500 Tibetans, most of whom are former political prisoners and their families from Tibet and have arrived under the humanitarian stream of Australia's migration program. This population has increased steadily by an intake of around 100 new Tibetans a year migrating to Australia. Having left their homeland to seek safety elsewhere, Tibetan-Australians make a positive contribution to Australia's multicultural society. Now in a free and democratic country, they hope to use their newfound freedom to advocate for an end of China's ongoing oppression in Tibet without the fear of repercussions.

Tibetans have sincere gratitude for Australia for the opportunity it affords; however, they remain increasingly concerned about Chinese influence in Australia.

The terms of reference of the Inquiry relate to the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 and the operation, effectiveness and implications of the scheme.

This submission deals with matters that primarily go the lack of effectiveness of the scheme:

- Previously identified gap relating to fake diaspora groups
- Previously identified gap relating to surveillance and monitoring of diaspora communities
- An identified gap, being undue economic pressure used to influence business leading to the stifling of political debate in Australia
- Areas under State control falling between the cracks

Our approach to this submission is that if one part of Australia's foreign influence regime is failing the whole regime is at risk of failure.

## **Summary**

Why have we included so much on the treatment of Tibetan human rights by the CCP in the body of our submission? We believe it is important for the inquiry to understand the history and human rights abuses that creates fear in the Tibetan-Australia community. This fear allows the CCP to attempt to pressure and control the Tibetan-Australia community and influence political discourse in Australia. This is a common experience for Australian diaspora communities from China.

Australia's Foreign Influence Regime has grown. Since the commencement of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (FITS) it has subsequently been complimented by the Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020 (FRSTA). There are still gaps and problems with implementation.

FRSTA is still to have a major impact, for example reviews are still underway of Confucius Institutes and other agreements between Australian Universities and China. Many months after the new legislation was passed and enacted only limited decisions on university agreements have been made and no decisions have been made in relation to one of the most concerning are those agreements that relate to Confucius Institutes.

We believe that if one arm of Australia's foreign influence regime is failing to function the entire system is undermined. It appears that the taskforce created to implement the FRSTA is at best under resourced and unable to complete its tasks or at worst unable or unwilling to implement the requirements of the Act.

The websites administering both schemes make no provision for notifications by a third party such as non-government organisations. Both websites are set-up for the self-reporting by an effected organisation or individual. If a Tibetan community organization, or any other NGO or individual, needed to report an organisation or individual that should be registered under FITS or raise concerns about an agreement by a state government or university under FRSTA there is no clear or available pathway to do so. This needs to be corrected and third-party reporting processes made more transparent.

Our submission shows that gaps remain under Australia's foreign influence laws that allow foreign actors to unduly influence political and social discourse in Australia, in particular discourse relating to human rights abuses. Our submission highlights several areas that are not captured by legislation or where the legislation is not working.

These include:

- Fake Diaspora Organisations
- Surveillance and Monitoring Diaspora Communities and related visa issues
- Economic influence on business
- Areas under State control falling between the cracks

The creation of fake diaspora groups has been a long-used tactic by the CCP. They split diaspora communities, deceive local politicians, provide fake cover for CCP policies and their implementation by pushing CCP propaganda. Fake diaspora groups continue to operate in Australia and do not appear to be registered as agents of foreign influence.

Whilst the extent of surveillance and monitoring of Tibetan-Australians is unknown, it has occurred to some extent in Australia, including of the then elected representative of the Australia-Tibet community to the Tibetan Parliament in exile. Even a limited amount of surveillance and monitoring of the Tibetan-Australian community feeds pre-existing fears which severely limits the ability of Tibetan-Australians to participate in the political process.

The CCP also utilise the process surrounding visa applications to also intimidate and restrict the political engagement of Australian-Tibetans. Whilst it is effectively impossible to obtain a visa to visit Tibet, if Australian-Tibetans do apply for a visa part of the process involves them agreeing not to be politically active in Australia and not to raise Tibetan human rights issues. They are also asked to sign a declaration that they accept the CCP version of history that "Tibet was always a part of China" which is counter to the beliefs of the Tibetan community. This component of the visa process plays on the minds of Tibetan-Australians who hold out

hope of returning to visit Tibet and restricts their ability to participate in the democratic process if they want to visit Tibet in the future should visas become available.

A fast growing and insidious form of China's influence is its growing dominance in supply chains, particularly those relating to technology. As outlined in our submission ATC recently was prevented from undertaking advocacy for Australian-Tibetan human rights when suppliers withdrew at the last moment out of fear of the CCP. The ability of companies based in China, operating under the imprimatur of the CCP, to strike fear in the business operations of an Australian company providing a service to NGOs or political entities engaged in the political process relating to Australia-China relations or issues in China will have a chilling effect on political discourse surrounding China in Australia.

Glimpses are emerging of the wide-ranging reach of the CCP into policy areas controlled by State governments but not subject to scrutiny under the Commonwealth's Foreign Influence Regime. Venue hire policies are one example of an area not covered by either the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 or the Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Bill 2020. Another example relates to community festivals participation policies despite partnerships and sponsorships from foreign entities, our submission shows these policies have been influenced by the CCP, they fall outside of the remit of both pieces of legislation.

### **Consolidated Recommendations:**

- We recommend that the inquiry pursue mechanisms to eliminate the gaps identified in this submission.
- We recommend that the committee recommends to government that the websites administering both schemes be revised to make provision for notifications by a third party such as non-government organisations.
- We recommend that the committee recommend to the government that it provide increased resources to the taskforce created to implement the Foreign Influence (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020.
- We recommend that the committee initiate a review into the foreign influence registration process with a view to ensuring fake diaspora organisations are registered as agents of foreign influence with built-in appeals process to ensure equity.
- We recommend that the committee requests that the Attorney General immediately undertake the process to declare the Australian Tibetan Friendship Association (澳大利亚亚藏族同胞联谊会社团) linked to the Chinese state.
- We recommend that the committee requests that the Attorney General initiate the process to declare the ACPPRC linked to the Chinese State.
- We recommend that the committee recommend that government implement a new piece of legislation called "The Tibet Reciprocal Access Act". The Act to be modelled on existing legislation from our 2 closest allies, the UK and US. Its aim would be to reduce or eliminate the roadblocks for Australian-Tibetans seeking to visit Tibet through placing pressure on the CCP to provide reciprocity. Attached at Appendix 1 is the UK legislation.
- We recommend that the inquiry recommend to government that it utilise international immigration forums to advance calls to end the type of actions undertaken by China in its visa practices.
- We recommend that the committee setup a broad ranging inquiry to specifically identify the extent of CCP surveillance and monitoring of diaspora communities from China.

- We recommend that the committee recommend to the government that it design, and initiate programs aimed at diversifying technology supply chains, particularly in the media and advertising sector, to ensure Australian businesses have alternatives to obtaining supplies from China and lessen the CCP's ability to apply pressure to businesses.
- We recommend that the committee recommend to government that an industry round table be called with a view to finding ways to ensure that venue and festival policies are not influenced by foreign actors and do not stifle the democratic process
- We recommend that the committee recommends to government that alternate funding streams should be made available to festivals at risk of being influenced by foreign actors.

### **A Short history and background of China's actions in Tibet**

Tibet, an independent Buddhist nation, was invaded by China in 1950.

In 1951 Tibetan Government representatives signed the controversial 17 Point Agreement codifying self-governance if Tibet became part of the People's Republic of China. This document is disputed by Tibetans as it was signed under significant duress.

In 1959 an uprising of Tibetans was brutally suppressed by the Chinese Army (PLA) leading to the flight into exile of the Dalai Lama and approximately 100, 000 Tibetans. In addition, at least 87, 000 Tibetans were killed because of the uprising<sup>1</sup>.

During the 1960s and 1970s Tibetans suffered badly during the Cultural Revolution. Many monasteries were destroyed, with some estimates at more than 6,000<sup>2</sup>.

In this period many Tibetans were made destitute. Between 1960 and 1962 an estimated 340,000 Tibetans died during famines caused by economic reforms introduced by China<sup>3</sup>.

During a brief period under Deng Xiaoping there was a relaxing of the very tight controls however after the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 tighter restrictions were again imposed.

Significant uprising of Tibetans occurred from 1987-1989 and preceding the Beijing Olympics in 2008.

In the years since 2008 thousands of political prisoners have been sent to prison, faced torture and many the ultimate price, death. Restrictions on the movement of Tibetans have been

---

<sup>1</sup> University of Central Arkansas, Political Science Department, China/Tibet (1950-present), available at <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/chinatibet-1950-present/>

<sup>2</sup> University of Massachusetts, Official Students for a Free Tibet Website, available at: <http://www.umass.edu/rso/fretibet/education.html>

<sup>3</sup> Imperialism and Capitalism, Volume II: Normative Perspectives. Volume 2., D.R. Basu and V. Miroshnil=k, Available at: <https://books.google.com.au/books?id=WCf4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144&dq=340000+tibetans+died+in+famine&source=bl&ots=LFybM9WgJU&sig=ACfU3U1MjexHhOCe4gnQROPHihylB3pCbA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjpo06UtsfuAhUCjuYKHcekCAIQ6AEwEXoECAwQAg#v=onepage&q=340000%20tibetans%20died%20in%20famine&f=false>

tightened as have religious restrictions and repression. Monitoring and surveillance has become all pervasive and forced labour continues. Separation of families and isolation of children from their culture is obliterating Tibetan culture.

The Dalai Lama<sup>4</sup> and Central Tibetan Administration (Tibet's Government in Exile)<sup>5</sup> estimate that at least 1.2 Million Tibetans have been killed since the invasion.

### **What is Tibet?**

To Tibetans, Tibet includes all three traditional provinces of U-Tsang, Amdo and Kham.

When China refers to Tibet, it means Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) which includes only a part of historic Tibet.

Shortly after the Chinese occupation of Tibet in the 1950s, China carved up Tibet into various administrative regions. U-Tsang and part of Kham came under the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and Amdo and the remaining part of Kham were incorporated into Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan.

Tibetan regions in the Chinese provinces are labelled as Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures. Many Tibetan towns incorporated into the Chinese provinces are today widely known by their Chinese names. For instance, Yushu Tibet Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai province is to the Tibetans Jyekundo in Kham province.

### **Human Rights in Tibet:**

According to the Freedom House, in its Freedom in the World 2021 ranking, Tibet is the least free place in the world for the sixth consecutive year, next to Syria<sup>6</sup>.

Human Rights Watch 2021 report identifies ongoing Human Rights abuses by China in Tibet noting that new plans, which include the vocational training and labour transfer policies, involve "...a new milestone for the coercive assimilationist policies of the current leadership"<sup>7</sup>.

While human rights are limited across China, the situation is far worse in Tibet. Arrests, disappearance and torture are common means of suppressing dissent. Prisons in Tibet are filled with Tibetans detained for acts deemed by the Chinese government as threats to its authority. This could be participating in a protest, carrying a picture of the Dalai Lama or leading a community initiative for environmental protection.

---

<sup>4</sup> BBC Tibet Profile, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16689779>

<sup>5</sup> Central Tibetan Administration, available at <https://tibet.net/about-tibet/glimpses-on-history-of-tibet/>

<sup>6</sup> Freedom House 2021 World Report: Tibet: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2021>

<sup>7</sup> Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021, available from [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media\\_2021/01/2021\\_hrw\\_world\\_report.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf)

Tibetans face intense surveillance in their daily lives. Tibetan towns and cities are dotted with security cameras, police checkpoints, security personnel and CCP informants closely monitoring the daily lives of Tibetans.

Tibet has been the laboratory for China's repressive policies, including those now being practised against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

#### Lack of Freedom to impart or receive Information:

China controls the spread of information in Tibet through strict monitoring and censorship over social media, emails and telephone conversations. It also restricts the flow of information out of Tibet. Foreign journalists, tourists and diplomats are rarely allowed entry into Tibet and even they are, they are part of government-sponsored or controlled tours. Recently China has placed an effective ban on tourists and others from travelling to Tibet claiming the environment is too hostile for private tours. The only break of this ban was an organised tour by journalists to a media conference in the Tibetan Capital of Lhasa on 15<sup>th</sup> October 2020 to deny reports of forced labour<sup>8</sup>.

Tibetans send information to organisations and friends and families overseas at great risk of arrest and imprisonment. With increased surveillance particularly electronic surveillance it has become even more difficult for Tibetans to get information out.

#### Lack of Freedom of Religion:

Tibetan Buddhism has flourished in various parts of the world. But sadly it is under severe attack in Chinese-occupied Tibet. Tibetans do not have the freedom to practice their religion meaningfully. They are arrested for merely keeping a photo of the Dalai Lama. Tibetans are told to put portraits of CCP leaders in their homes and also in monasteries, temples and public halls and in certain areas, officials go house to house to check that they are on the altar.

Monks and nuns are routinely forced to undergo 'patriotic education' which involves declaring their loyalty to the Chinese government instead of the Dalai Lama. The number of monks and nuns are also dictated by the Chinese government. In 2016 Chinese authorities demolished most of Larung Gar, Tibet's largest centre for Buddhist studies, banishing about half the population, allowing only 5000 monks and nuns to remain. Similarly, in 2019, around 3500 monks and nuns were forcibly evicted from the Yachen Gar Tibetan Buddhist Institute.

Human Rights watch identified that this repression is still persisting and just earlier this year reported on January 21<sup>st</sup>, 2021, the death of a young Monk from a beating in a police station<sup>9</sup>. There have been many other incidents of monks and lay people being arrested and detained this year, including several monks in October 2021<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>8</sup> Channel News Asia, P. Thomas, "China defends Tibet labour programme, urges against overdoing religion", available from: <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/china-defends-tibet-labour-programme-urges-against-overdoing-13286464>

<sup>9</sup> Human Rights Watch, Report January 21 2021, available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/china-tibetan-monk-dies-beating-custody#>

<sup>10</sup> Tibet Post Report <https://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/132-tibet/7135-several-tibetan-buddhist-monks-detained-by-chinese-authorities-in-occupied-tibet>

The atheist Chinese government tries to control the ancient Tibetan Buddhist system of reincarnation. In 1995, the Chinese government kidnapped Tibet's 11th Panchen Lama (Tibet's second-highest religious figure after the Dalai Lama) when he was just six years old. China saw the young Panchen Lama as a future threat to its authority given the popularity of the previous Panchen Lama, a vocal critic of Chinese policies, among Tibetans. Six months after the abduction of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the Chinese government appointed its own Panchen Lama in a mockery of the ancient Tibetan Buddhist tradition of reincarnation. Tibetans refer to the Chinese Government's appointee as Panchen Zuma (meaning the fake Panchen). Having kept the Panchen Lama in captivity for the last 25 years, China now plans to interfere in the reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama.

### **Attack on Tibetan language and culture:**

Tibetans have maintained a unique culture and language before China's invasion in 1950. China's policies ever since have been designed to wipe out Tibet's unique cultural identity. The Tibetan language is the bedrock of Tibetan culture. But it is threatened by China's policy of promoting Mandarin as the primary language in education, government and business. There has been a concerted effort by the Chinese authorities to lessen the use of Tibetan, with the Chinese language being the medium of instruction in middle and high schools in Tibet and more recently this has been extended to kindergartens and primary schools. It is currently estimated that over 900,000 Tibetan children are in CCP run boarding schools across Tibet (the population of Tibet is estimated at around 6 million), ranging in ages from 5 - 18 these schools, they are in these schools because of the forced closure of local Tibetan run independent schools - this coercion into CCP run schools has been likened to the residential schools in the colonial past of North American and Australia. This has led to many young Tibetans losing their knowledge of Tibetan language and culture and this policy is part of an overarching program of cultural genocide. Human Rights Watch reports on the impacts of these policies<sup>11</sup>.

### **Socio-economic marginalisation and environmental destruction:**

Tibet is governed directly by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The nominal head (Chairman) of the Tibet Autonomous Region is Tibetan, but the Party Secretary, the most senior government post with the real power, has always been Han Chinese. China's exploitation of Tibet's rich natural resources and the massive infrastructure development, including the construction of dams on Tibetan rivers, roads, railways and airports, are a threat to both the people and environment of Tibet. Chinese industrialisation has displaced millions of Tibetan nomads from their ancestral land, opening the land for extraction of resources and ending a traditional way of life that has sustained the Tibetan environment for centuries.

Chinese propaganda emphasises the developments that the government brought to Tibet. However, the economic progress in Tibet is primarily intended to consolidate China's grip over Tibet and enhance its ability to exploit Tibet's natural resources. The real beneficiaries are mostly Chinese migrants and businesses, who have a competitive advantage in urban areas

---

<sup>11</sup> Human Rights Watch, 'China's "Bilingual Education" Policy in Tibet', available from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/03/04/chinas-bilingual-education-policy-tibet/tibetan-medium-schooling-under-threat>

where Mandarin is widely used. The vast majority of Tibetans are left socially and economically marginalised in their own country.

### **Foreign Influence still happening in Australia**

A member of Sydney's Tibetan community sums up his dilemma:

“I have left Tibet, but I continue to live in fear. If I speak out for my people inside Tibet, I am afraid of the consequences on my family. If I do not speak out, I feel guilty of not using my democratic rights in a free country.”

### **Fake Diaspora Organisations – undue influence**

Fake diaspora organisations have the potential to directly influence politicians through misrepresentation of their true status, they disrupt genuine diaspora groups, and they create wider social dislocation.

Such organisations that purport to represent the Chinese diaspora are truly cheer squads of the CCP and its policies. These organisations deny the trail of documented human rights abuses by the CCP and promote Chinese Government propaganda.

The November 2021 Lowy Institute Report ‘Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia’ reminds us that existing research has “established the connections between some Chinese community organisations in Australia and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front, a sprawling network of groups and individuals that aims to shape discourse and decision-making at home and abroad in Beijing’s favour”<sup>12</sup>.

In its report the Lowy Institute found “that many newer Chinese community organisations in Australia have clear links to the Party-state, primarily for economic reasons, more so than the older organisations. In some cases, recent migrants have taken over the leadership of older organisations, drawing them closer to the Party-state”<sup>13</sup>.

Whilst playing down the effectiveness and impact of CCP influence in their own diaspora community organisations most of the Chinese-Australian leaders taking part in the Lowy Institute study “acknowledge China’s efforts to control and interfere with the Tibetan and Uyghur communities in Australia”<sup>14</sup>.

The Chinese Communist Party strengthens its influence by co-opting representatives of “ethnic minority” groups who claim the right to speak on behalf of that community and uses

---

<sup>12</sup> Lowy Institute Analysis Report ‘Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia, available from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lines-blurred-chinese-community-organisations-in-australia>

<sup>13</sup> Lowy Institute Analysis Report ‘Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia, available from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lines-blurred-chinese-community-organisations-in-australia>, p2.

<sup>14</sup> Lowy Institute Analysis Report ‘Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia, available from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lines-blurred-chinese-community-organisations-in-australia>, p4.

them to claim legitimacy. A so-called Australian Tibetan Friendship Association (澳大利亚藏族同胞联谊会社团) was established in November 2013 with the backing of businesses tied to the Chinese Government.

The group, which purportedly builds friendship between Tibetans and Chinese, is designed to create disunity in the local Tibetan community and support the Chinese Government's narrative on Tibet. The group acts as a proxy representative of the Tibetan community for the Chinese Embassy by hosting Tibetan cultural events and welcoming visiting Chinese officials to Australia, among others<sup>15</sup>.

This group ferments division within the Tibetan-Australian community and falls under the umbrella of United front. It uses its closeness to the embassy to offer claims of facilitation of the visa process and use that to try to split the community, visa facilitation is something no legitimate Tibetan-Australian organisation can offer. The Australian Tibetan Community Association, the umbrella group for Tibetan Community organisations in Australia, do not recognise the Australian Tibetan Friendship Association as a legitimate representative of the community.

Perhaps the best known of these groups is the Australian Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China (ACPPRC), it remains active and has many organisations under its umbrella, all of which are connected to United Front. It has entangled Australian politicians for example the patrons of the ACPPRC have included senior leaders from both sides of politics. From Labor, they include former foreign minister Bob Carr, treasury spokesman Chris Bowen and Senator Sam Dastyari. Former Labor defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon was also a member of the council. From the Liberal party, they include former immigration minister Philip Ruddock, former NSW Premier Barry O'Farrell, and former prime ministers Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser and Bob Hawke, who had all served as patrons in the past. Its past President Xiangmo Huang has been recognised as an agent of influence and his citizenship has been revoked.

The recent Lowy Institute report on Chinese Diaspora organisations and the influence of the CCP provided more recent examples of the work undertaken by the ACPPRC and the large number of community organisations under its umbrella.

“The various public statements made by the ACPPRC are usually accompanied by a list of supporting member organisations. In 2017, Sydney-based Chinese newspaper Australia China Weekend (澳中周末报) published a list of 81 “member organisations” of ACPPRC. However, the actual number is probably far higher. Leaders of a number of Chinese community organisations are also on the board, or hold honorary positions with ACPPRC.<sup>16</sup>”

And

---

<sup>15</sup> ATC Submission to Diaspora Inquiry - <https://www.atc.org.au/submission-diaspora-communities-australia/>, p4

<sup>16</sup> Lowy Institute Analysis Report 'Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia, available from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lines-blurred-chinese-community-organisations-in-australia>, p11.

“...have explicit ties to the PRC and the ruling CCP, and have promoted their agenda on Taiwan and the East and South China Seas. For example, more than 100 community organisations came together in Melbourne under the banner of the Melbourne Chinese Alliance for the Safeguard of the South China Sea — the participation of so many organisations suggests active united front work — to protest an international tribunal ruling against China’s actions in the South China Sea in 2016.<sup>17</sup>”

According to several media reports about the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China:

“The Australian parliament and US Congress have been warned that the councils try to influence foreign democracies, and they share close links with the Chinese Communist party, answering to the Beijing-based Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China. Academics say it is in turn subordinate to the united front work department of the party’s central committee.<sup>18</sup>”

Despite the strong evidence and the long recognition that ACPPRC is essentially an arm of United front and an agent of influence for the Chinese Government, it remains unregistered under the FITS Register claiming to be a non-government organisation. The tools available to the Minister have not been used, the mechanism that exists under the legislation to force the registration of ACPPRC has not been used.

In March 2019 the Guardian reported that then attorney general Christian Porter said that, initially at least, it was up to individual groups whether they believe they were required to register. The government could later compel registration. “If an entity or individual hasn’t registered and there’s a reasonable belief that their activities require registration, there’s a range of actions through the secretary of the attorney-general’s department which can be taken,” Porter said. Such action included issuing a “transparency notice”, which declares an individual or organisation to be linked to a foreign state. Further reporting had the attorney general stating that, “Of course now that the grace period has come to a close, a range of organisations are being considered in this regard”<sup>19</sup>.

Now, some 20 months after the grace period has ended, there is still no action to compel the ACPPRC to register as an agent of foreign influence. It can only be concluded that the system is either broken and unable to work or there has been a deliberate unconscionable decision taken not to require ACPPRC and other fake diaspora organisations to register. Allowing the ACPPRC to remain unchallenged sends a chilling message to diaspora groups from China living in Australia.

---

<sup>17</sup> Lowy Institute Analysis Report ‘Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia, available from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lines-blurred-chinese-community-organisations-in-australia>, p9.

<sup>18</sup> Guardian article, Chinese Communist party-linked group not listed on foreign influence register, available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/mar/29/chinese-communist-party-linked-group-not-listed-on-foreign-influence-register>

<sup>19</sup> Guardian article, Chinese Communist party-linked group not listed on foreign influence register, available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/mar/29/chinese-communist-party-linked-group-not-listed-on-foreign-influence-register>

So long as the CCP's fake diaspora organisations are allowed to exist, flourish, and operate with impunity there will continue to be increases in tensions within diaspora communities, allows them to unduly influence political discourse and politics in Australia, and promote CCP propaganda in Australia.

**Recommendation:**

- The committee initiate a review into the foreign influence registration process with a view to ensuring a sensitive process where fake diaspora organisations are registered as agents of foreign influence with built-in appeals process to ensure equity.
- The committee requests that the Attorney General immediately undertake the process to declare the Australian Tibetan Friendship Association (澳大利亚藏族同胞联谊会社团) linked to the Chinese state.
- The committee requests that the Attorney General immediately undertake the process to declare the ACPPRC linked to the Chinese State.

**Surveillance and Monitoring Diaspora Communities – stifling discourse**

Although the extent of China's espionage in the Tibetan community is unclear, Tibetan-Australians fear the Chinese Embassy monitors their political activities.

Furthermore, the Tibetan community and the Australia Tibet Council have been targeted by other espionage operations that use malware to attempt to infiltrate their online communications and monitor their activities. Twice in 2017, the Member of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile representing Australia received emails which contained repurposed legitimate information with the aim of enticing recipients to open malicious documents containing malware viruses. Research by the Citizen Lab on the attempt to infiltrate the communication of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile validates long-held concerns of Australia Tibet Council and other Tibet support groups around the world, for whom cyberattacks are a regular occurrence.

An activist who enrolled to participate in a previous Tibet Lobby Day, an annual lobbying program by ATC, received a phone call from the Chinese embassy warning him against taking part in the lobbying day in Canberra.

ATC's 'Australia's Silence on Tibet Report' (2017) highlighted the issues surrounding applications for visas and their impact on political participation and discourse in Australia.

“Some of the Tibetans interviewed for this report have revealed that they are required to sign a contentious document to obtain a visa. The Tibetans are forced to admit that leaving Tibet was a mistake and that they had been led astray by the “overseas separatist forces” and to commit that they will refrain from joining political activities and the Tibetan community associations in exile.

One Tibetan activist was granted a visa only after his family in Tibet paid a hefty bond to the local Chinese authorities and promised that he would not undertake any political activity during his visit. Another member of Sydney's Tibetan community was denied a visa because he works as a volunteer teacher at their weekend Tibetan language school. A Tibetan woman was denied a visa because she attended the Dalai Lama's

teachings in Sydney, while the visa application of her husband, a caucasian Australian, was approved.<sup>20</sup>”

The very strong implication from the visa process is that the CCP has the ability to closely monitor the activities of diaspora communities in Australia. It reinforces the understanding by the community that surveillance and monitoring of Tibetan-Australians by the CCP is occurring and impacting on the ability of Tibetan-Australians to participate in Australia’s political system.

### **Recommendation:**

- That the inquiry recommend that government implement a new piece of legislation called “The Tibet Reciprocal Access Act”. The Act can be modelled on existing legislation from our two closest allies, the UK and US. Its aim would be to reduce or eliminate the roadblocks for Australian-Tibetans seeking to visit Tibet through placing pressure on the CCP to provide reciprocity. It would help eliminate one of the CCP pressure points facing Tibetan-Australians and preventing them from participating fully in the political discourse of Australia. Attached at Appendix 1 is the UK legislation.
- That the inquiry recommend to government that it utilise international immigration forums to advance calls to end the type of actions undertaken by China in its visa practices.
- We recommend that a broad ranging inquiry be set up to specifically identify the extent of CCP surveillance and monitoring of Australian diaspora communities from China.

### **Economic influence on business – political discourse influenced**

Currently Australia’s foreign influence regime does not have the ability to identify and intervene in undue economic influence on business that could impact Australia’s political discourse.

ATC this year experienced this insidious form of foreign influence firsthand. A major event which was planned to initiate conversations, about the CCP’s treatment of Tibetans and others, in various parts of Sydney had to be cancelled and was transformed into a smaller event with no opportunity to start conversations about the issue.

ATC’s event was cancelled less than 24 hours before it occurred when we were informed that a supplier was withdrawing due to their fear that they were monitored by the CCP, and they were fearful for family and the ability to travel. This supplier and a second, who was sort to replace the first, feared for their businesses as the technology required was solely available from China and they feared having those supplies cut off due to the ‘political nature’ of the event. This would devastate their businesses.

As an organisation representing those with firsthand experience of what these two suppliers were going through, we refuse to put them at risk. Like Tibetan Australians these suppliers should not have to feel these fears and influence. We are prepared to provide more detail in a closed hearing to protect the individuals and businesses involved.

---

<sup>20</sup> ATC Report: Australia’s Silence on Tibet – How China is shaping our agenda (2017)  
<https://www.atc.org.au/read-and-share-our-report-australias-silence-on-tibet/>

With technology increasingly concentrated in China this issue of economic influence will become an increasing problem. It does not matter if it is a private or government company, as we have seen this year with the treatment of private businesses in China the CCP controls both realms in China.

The impact of having to cancel a significant event covering a wide area of Sydney denying us the ability to raise the issues facing Tibetan Australians and their families both here and in Tibet is devastating. It has impacted our fundraising. It has impacted Australia's political discourse, Tibetan voices were silenced.

Should measures not be found to counter this problem diaspora groups and their supporters will find it more and more difficult to have visibility and be less able to engage the services they need to be involved in the political process and have their voices heard.

It will be chilling on any project that the CCP deems to be "anti-China" regardless of where it comes from on the Australian political spectrum or whether it is from a diaspora group or not. This is not just an Australian issue, in the last month an electronic billboard meant to carry the climate change message of Tibetans in Glasgow to COP26 was canceled by the supplier at the last minute. It carried echoes of ATC's own experience.

As one of many non-government organisations already impacted by this issue, we cannot wait for action to happen until this directly impacts Australian political parties and one or other of the major parties is denied access to project their message.

At some point this issue will impact political parties in Australia during an election campaign, it is only a matter of time. Action is needed urgently in this area before it impacts an election outcome.

### **Recommendation:**

- That the committee recommend to the government that it design, and initiate programs aimed at diversifying technology supply chains, particularly in the media and advertising sector, to ensure Australian businesses have alternatives to obtaining supplies from China and lessen the CCP's ability to apply pressure to businesses.

### **Areas under State control falling between the cracks**

Increasingly policies and events under the control of state governments are being influenced by the CCP, or more accurately the fear of retaliation from the CCP. In previous submissions ATC has highlighted a visit by His Holiness the Dalai Lama which was almost cancelled due to undue influence by the CCP on Sydney University's administration. Here we provide two recent examples of that influence one in Perth and the other in Adelaide.

This year a furore erupted over the venue hiring policies of the Perth Theatre Trust (PTT) which made headlines around the world and led to a close examination of the policy when it denied a booking by the Australian Christian Lobby (ACL). It had previously provided a

groveling apology to the Chinese embassy for allowing a performance by a Taiwanese group and display of their flag in 2019 and PTT has subsequently denied them use of venues<sup>21</sup>.

PTT is wholly owned and operated by the Western Australian State government and manages many venues in and around Perth.

PTT venue hiring policy, has several issues that relate to the operation of democracy and alternative viewpoints, any reading of the policy leaves no doubt that despite not being mentioned the policy refers to issues that the Chinese government would prefer not to be brought to the light of day. Very few, if any, countries other than China may have an issue with a “country of unclear status” and none who would have a strong enough influence to influence policy from the Western Australian government other than China.

The SMH reported that “Foreign policy academics, as well as representatives for Tibetan and Uyghur people, believed the policy was a move to appease the Chinese government.”<sup>22</sup>

The Western Australian Premier has made it clear that Australia should not upset China, even reprimanding the Prime Minister, in this venue hire policy he has made it much harder to criticise the Chinese government in Western Australia or advance the human rights of those currently being oppressed by the Chinese government.

"On 24 October 2017, the Premier [Mark McGowan] advised "that government-owned facilities not be used where the views of certain individuals do not represent the views of the West Australian Government or the vast majority of Western Australians", " it said<sup>23</sup>.

The policy requires venue managers to refer proposed hires to the PTT General Manager for review if they are:

"Proposed bookings by organisations identifying with countries whose political status is unclear or in dispute – this includes countries which have been annexed, occupied or have otherwise declared their independence<sup>24</sup>”

The policy states that in cases related to countries whose "political status is unclear or in dispute," the PTT would consult the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) prior to deciding on venue hire. The default position of DFAT is to not upset the CCP if possible. This is the same position used by DFAT to advise against debates referring to Tibet, Tibetans, Uyghurs and others in parliament and has been used to block Tibetan issues being raised.

This policy means that Australian-Tibetans, Australian-Uyghurs, Australian-Inner Mongolians, and others cannot hire these venues without DFAT agreeing to the event, this is

---

<sup>21</sup> SMH article, WA Government’s venue policy the wrong lever to stop discrimination free speech scholar says, available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/national/wa-government-s-venue-hire-policy-the-wrong-lever-to-stop-discrimination-free-speech-scholar-says-20210714-p589s2.html>

<sup>22</sup> ABC story, Perth Theatre Trust accused of censorship, available from: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-16/perth-theatre-trust-accused-of-censorship/100297804>

<sup>23</sup> ABC story, Perth Theatre Trust accused of censorship, available from: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-16/perth-theatre-trust-accused-of-censorship/100297804>

<sup>24</sup> Perth Theatre Trust Venue Hire Policy <https://www.ptt.wa.gov.au/media/6742/ptt-venue-hire-policy-corp-01-21-1.pdf>

unacceptable and undermines democracy in Australia. These groups are not able to dispute such a denial. This policy effectively locks these diaspora communities out of public venues across Perth and diaspora communities have little faith that DFAT would side with them and not the CCP.

There are indications that local government areas in Western Australia are considering similar policies, neither Act captures these activities of local governments in this sector.

A second very recent example occurred at this year's OzAsia Festival in Adelaide. A stall of the Hong Kong Cultural Association of South Australia had its plans interrupted. The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) reported:

Its team of five had planned an interactive workshop that would take spectators through Hong Kong's food and cultural scene, then through a century of transformation from a fishing village to an international financial hub.

"And lastly, we told them we will have a yellow umbrella as decoration because it has always been our signature," said Leung<sup>25</sup>.

Festival organisers objected to the yellow umbrellas, they are a symbol of the Hong Kong democracy movement, the group agreed not to use them as they wanted to perform. The group was then told the festival couldn't supply them with audio equipment and the group said they could bring their own. Next, they were told that all workshops and performances were cancelled due to Covid only to find out shortly after that other performances and workshops were going ahead.

The SMH reported:

One official said to Leung if the "Chinese group or other people are not happy with your yellow umbrella display, we will be in trouble"<sup>26</sup>.

The OzAsia Festival is branded by the South Australian government, the executive partners include the Australian Government's Office for the Arts and the National Foundation for Australia-China Relations and the City of Adelaide. The final executive partner is the Hong Kong Economic & Trade Office, a Chinese government entity, it seems it held sway to stop this performance, despite three levels of Australian government being involved.

This is a clear gap in the foreign influence laws in Australia as they relate to states, state entities and local government despite the commencement of FRSTA. These policy areas do not meet the triggers of either act yet have to some extent a greater chilling effect and influence on the Australian political process as those occurring at a State and Commonwealth level.

In our first example of PTT the policy itself is flawed and anti-democratic in its overall nature with provisions to stop views not supported by the majority from being heard or cause

---

<sup>25</sup> SMH article, The Long Tentacles of Hong Kong's National Security Laws, available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/the-long-tentacles-of-hong-kong-s-national-security-laws-reach-australia-20211027-p593hc.html>

<sup>26</sup> SMH article, The Long Tentacles of Hong Kong's National Security Laws, available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/the-long-tentacles-of-hong-kong-s-national-security-laws-reach-australia-20211027-p593hc.html>

disruption and in our example to stop diaspora communities from expressing their political viewpoints and significant issues. This policy could have been written by and for the CCP. Other than appealing to the Western Australian government to change the policy there are currently no options to challenge the obvious influence of the CCP in the creation of this discriminatory policy.

In the case of our second example, the OzAsia festival, it appears a lack of policy requiring that all be treated equally with equal access could have contributed. The festival organisers, whilst not stating it outright, were clearly concerned about future funding partnerships with the CCP appointed Hong Kong government.

**Recommendations:**

- We recommend that the committee recommend to government that an industry round table be called with a view to ensure that venue and festival policies are not influenced by foreign actors and do not stifle the democratic process
- We recommend that the committee recommends to government that alternate funding streams should be made available to festivals at risk of being influenced by foreign actors.

**Appendix 1 – UK Bill ‘Tibet (Reciprocal Access) Bill’**

Bill 154 58/1

## **Tibet (Reciprocal Access) Bill**

### CONTENTS

- 1 Reports on access to Tibetan areas
- 2 Immigration restrictions
- 3 Duty to consider reciprocal access
- 4 Interpretation
- 5 Extent, commencement and short title

A

### **BILL**

TO

Require the Secretary of State to report annually on restrictions on access by UK nationals to Tibet in comparison with other regions of China; to make provision to deny persons involved in imposing such restrictions permission to enter the UK; and for connected purposes.

BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: –

#### **1 Reports on access to Tibetan areas**

- (1) The Secretary of State must prepare reports assessing the level of access granted to United Kingdom nationals to Tibetan areas by Chinese authorities.
- (2) Those reports must consider United Kingdom nationals who are –
  - (a) diplomats and other officials,
  - (b) journalists, and
  - (c) tourists.
- (3) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament the first report prepared under subsection (1) no later than 90 days after the day on which this Act comes into force.
- (4) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a further report under subsection (1) in each of the five calendar years after the year in which the report under subsection (3) is laid.
- (5) Any report laid under subsection (1) must include –
  - (a) a comparison with the level of access granted to other areas of China;

- (b) a comparison between the levels of access granted to Tibetan areas and to other parts of the provinces containing those areas; and
- (c) a description of any permit requirements or other measures impeding the freedom to travel in Tibetan areas.

(6) Any report laid under subsection (4) must include a comparison of the relative levels of access identified under subsections (5)(a) and (5)(b) with those identified in the report most recently laid under subsection (3) or (4).

(7) The Secretary of State must report to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization the findings of the report prepared under subsection (3) within one year of this Act coming into force.

## **2 Immigration restrictions**

(1) This section applies if, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, any of the groups of United Kingdom nationals listed in subsection (2) are granted lower levels of access to Tibetan areas than to other areas of China.

- (2) Those groups are –
- (a) diplomats and other officials, or
  - (b) journalists, or
  - (c) tourists.

(3) The Secretary of State must maintain a list of persons substantially involved in the formulation or execution of policies related to access by United Kingdom nationals to Tibetan areas.

(4) Any person on the list maintained under subsection (3) must be refused leave to enter the United Kingdom.

(5) Any visa or other permission for any person on the list maintained under subsection (3) to enter or remain in the United Kingdom is revoked immediately.

- (6) The Secretary of State must prepare reports identifying the individuals –
- (a) listed under subsection (3);
  - (b) refused leave to enter under subsection (4); and
  - (c) who had a visa or other permission revoked under subsection (5).

(7) The Secretary of State must provide the first report under subsection (6) to the appropriate Parliamentary committees within one year of this Act coming into force.

(8) The Secretary of State must provide a further report under subsection (6) to the appropriate Parliamentary committees in each of the five calendar years after the year in which the report under subsection (7) is laid.

(9) The Secretary of State may waive subsection (4) or (5) if he or she deems it necessary to do so in the national interest of the United Kingdom.

(10) If the power under subsection (9) is exercised, the Secretary of State must provide an explanatory memorandum to the appropriate Parliamentary committees setting out –

- (a) the justification for the waiver;
- (b) how it relates to the national interest of the United Kingdom; and
- (c) supporting evidence.

### **3 Duty to consider reciprocal access**

The Secretary of State must take into account the extent to which the Chinese authorities grant United Kingdom diplomats and other officials access to Tibetan areas and other parts of China when deciding whether to grant Chinese diplomats and other officials access (including consular access) to parts of the United Kingdom.

### **4 Interpretation**

In this Act –

- (a) “appropriate Parliamentary committees” means –
  - (i) the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, and
  - (ii) any other Committee of the House of Commons or House of Lords that the Secretary of State considers appropriate;
- (b) if the name of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons is changed, any reference in this Act to that Committee is to be treated as a reference to that Committee by its new name;
- (c) “Chinese authorities” means the Government of the People’s Republic of China or persons acting on its behalf;
- (d) “Tibetan areas” means –
  - (i) the Tibet Autonomous Region,
  - (ii) Kanlho (Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and Pari (Tianzhu) Tibetan Autonomous County located in Gansu Province,
  - (iii) Golog (Guoluo) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Malho (Huangnan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Tsojang (Haibei) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Tsolho (Hainan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Tsonub (Haixi) Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and Yulshul (Yushu) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, located in Qinghai Province,

- (iv) Garze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Ngawa (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, and Muli (Mili) Tibetan Autonomous County, located in Sichuan Province,
- (v) Dechen (Diqing) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, located in Yunnan Province, and
- (vi) any other area designated as Tibetan Autonomous by the Government of the People’s Republic of China;

- (e) “United Kingdom national” means an individual who is –
  - (i) a British citizen, a British overseas territories citizen, a British National (Overseas) or a British Overseas citizen,
  - (ii) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 is a British subject, or
  - (iii) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act.

## **5 Extent, commencement and short title**

- (1) This Act extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
- (2) This Act comes into force 90 days after the day on which it is passed.
- (3) This Act may be cited as the Tibet (Reciprocal Access) Act 2020.

Bill 154 58/1

## **Tibet (Reciprocal Access) Bill**

© Parliamentary copyright House of Commons 2020

*This publication may be reproduced under the terms of the Open Parliament Licence, which is published at [www.parliament.uk/site-information/copyright](http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/copyright)*

PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

A

# **B I L L**

To require the Secretary of State to report annually on restrictions on access by UK nationals to Tibet in comparison with other regions of China; to make provision to deny persons involved in imposing such restrictions permission to enter the UK; and for connected purposes.

*Ordered to be brought in by Tim Loughton  
supported by  
Chris Law, Sir Peter Bottomley,  
Jim Shannon, Christine Jardine,  
Fiona Bruce, Marion Fellows,  
Chris Bryant, Mr Alistair Carmichael,  
Damian Green, Henry Smith  
and Dame Diana Johnson.  
Ordered, by The House of Commons,*

*to be Printed, 6th July 2020.*

**References:**

ABC story, 'Perth Theatre Trust accused of censorship', available from:  
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-16/perth-theatre-trust-accused-of-censorship/100297804>

ATC Submission to Diaspora Inquiry - available at, <https://www.atc.org.au/submission-diaspora-communities-australia/>

ATC Report: 'Australia's Silence on Tibet – How China is shaping our agenda' (2017), available at <https://www.atc.org.au/read-and-share-our-report-australias-silence-on-tibet/>

Basu, D.R., and Mirosznik, V., 'Imperialism and Capitalism', Volume II: Normative Perspectives. Volume 2., Available at:  
<https://books.google.com.au/books?id=WCf4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144&dq=340000+tibetans+died+in+famine&source=bl&ots=LFybM9WgJU&sig=ACfU3U1MJexHhOCe4gnQROPHihylB3pCbA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjpo06UtsfuAhUCjuYKHcekCAIQ6AEwEXoECAwQAQ#v=onepage&q=340000%20tibetans%20died%20in%20famine&f=false>

BBC, 'Tibet Profile', available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16689779>

Central Tibetan Administration, 'Glimpses on History of Tibet', available at <https://tibet.net/about-tibet/glimpses-on-history-of-tibet/>

Channel News Asia, P. Thomas, "China defends Tibet labour programme, urges against overdoing religion", available from: <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/china-defends-tibet-labour-programme-urges-against-overdoing-13286464>

Freedom House, '2021 World Report: Tibet':  
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2021>

Guardian article, 'Chinese Communist party-linked group not listed on foreign influence register', available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/mar/29/chinese-communist-party-linked-group-not-listed-on-foreign-influence-register>

Human Rights Watch, 'China's "Bilingual Education" Policy in Tibet', available from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/03/04/chinas-bilingual-education-policy-tibet/tibetan-medium-schooling-under-threat>

Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2021', available from [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media\\_2021/01/2021\\_hrw\\_world\\_report.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf)

Lowy Institute Analysis Report 'Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia', available from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lines-blurred-chinese-community-organisations-in-australia>

Perth Theatre Trust Venue Hire Policy, available at, <https://www.ptt.wa.gov.au/media/6742/ptt-venue-hire-policy-corp-01-21-1.pdf>

SMH article, 'The Long Tentacles of Hong Kong's National Security Laws', available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/the-long-tentacles-of-hong-kong-s-national-security-laws-reach-australia-20211027-p593hc.html>

SMH article, 'WA Government's venue policy the wrong lever to stop discrimination free speech scholar says', available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/national/wa-government-s-venue-hire-policy-the-wrong-lever-to-stop-discrimination-free-speech-scholar-says-20210714-p589s2.html>

Tibet Post Report, 'Several Tibetan Buddhist Monks Detained by Chinese Authorities in Occupied Tibet', available at <https://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/132-tibet/7135-several-tibetan-buddhist-monks-detained-by-chinese-authorities-in-occupied-tibet>

University of Central Arkansas, Political Science Department, 'China/Tibet (1950-present)', available at <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/chinatibet-1950-present/>

University of Massachusetts, 'Official Students for a Free Tibet Website', available at: <http://www.umass.edu/rso/fretibet/education.html>