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Security Risk Assessment

Manus Island Offshore Processing Centre



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1.0	Re-write to reflect up to date plan
1.1	Minor changes to reflect comment from DIBP (formerly DIAC)
1.2	Changes from DIBP (formerly DIAC)
1.3	Amendments from new centre
1.4	DIBP Manus Island Feedback
1.5	January 2014 Update



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


1. Introduction

This Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is a holistic assessment of the Manus Island Offshore Processing Centre's (MIOPC). The aim of this document is to support the identification, assessment and management of security risks relating to the physical environment, personnel, sensitive information and incident management.

Security risk assessments also provide opportunities for education and awareness raising amongst personnel.

The following diagram depicts the risk assessment and risk management process.



1.1 Process

A risk is the chance of something happening that has an impact on the objective, in this case the safety and security of the OPC. Security risks may be identified by looking at potential sources of risk and when, where, why and how the risks may occur. Risks may be determined through consultation with stakeholders, persons or organisations with previous experience in operation of the OPC.

Once the security risks are identified, they should be analysed by determining the likely consequences of the risk occurring, the likelihood of that event and determining what controls or mitigation strategies are already in place. From this, the initial level of risk can be determined and the entity can then decide if:

- the risks are controlled at a level where no further management is required; or
- additional controls need to be developed to reduce the risk.



In treating risks, the options for further control of the risk need to be identified and assessed. From this, treatment and implementation plans are prepared. The risk is analysed and assessed with these new treatment options in place, and a decision made on if the risk is:

- now controlled by the elimination or minimisation of the risk to acceptable levels; or
- not controlled and it is therefore not secure to proceed.

2. Context

2.1 External Context

Manus Island, also called Great Admiralty Island, of the Admiralty Islands, Papua New Guinea, southwestern Pacific Ocean lies about 200 miles (320 km) north of the island of New Guinea. The volcanic island has an area of 633 square miles (1,639 square km) and is an extension of the Bismarck Archipelago. From a coast that alternates between steep slopes and bays that are fringed with mangrove swamp, it rises to a ridged and hilly interior reaching 2,356 feet (718 meters) at Mount Dremmel.

“The previous Australian Prime Minister (Julia Gillard) and the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, announced on 28 June 2012, that the government had engaged an expert panel led by retired Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston to provide a report on the best way to prevent asylum seekers risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys to Australia. The expert panel released its report on 13 August 2012. The Government has accepted, in-principle, all 22 recommendations of the report. Adoption of these recommendations has led to the development of a RPC on Manus Island” (Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, 2013). The original temporary RPC established on Manus Island was intended to accommodate up to 500 transferees.

On 19th July 2013, the PM of Australia announced the PNG Solution, under which all boat arrivals would be sent to PNG and if found to be genuine refugees would be resettled there. From that date on, boat arrivals would not be settled in Australia. In order to facilitate this, the plan, which is still under development, is to dramatically expand the original 500 bed site to 1,400 beds.

The provision of services to transferees requires G4S to take a collaborative approach with the Australian and Papua New Guinea governments, their departments and any other service providers engaged by them, in particular, an integrated approach needs to be taken to security, safety, incident and risk management if these are to be handled in a transparent and effective manner.

The current Government has established Operation Sovereign Borders, which support the offshore processing model.

2.2 Internal Context

At the time of this assessment the MIOPC accommodates 1,229 (as at 09/01/2014) Single Adult Males (SAM's) across 7 compounds.

The OPC is a SAM's transferee facility. The facility operates 24 hours each day, seven days per week, and 365 days per year. Safety and security officers operate on 12 hour shifts. Shifts operate from 0700hrs to 1900hrs and 1900hrs to 0700hrs.

Officer teams are comprised of inexperienced PNG national officer's and highly experienced expatriates. There is a mix of male and female officers. Nationals are rostered to work 5 days



on shift and 2 days off shift. Expatriates complete 28 day on shift and 14 days off shift. Both nationals and expatriates do approximately 50% of their shift on day roster and 50% on night roster during each rotation.

The MIOPC transferees are predominately physically fit and physically strong, with a large percentage under 35. They have a variety of backgrounds ranging from Military personnel to professors. Many are educated, highly intelligent, articulate and bi-lingual. They are consistently motivated to be relocated to the Australian mainland and become residents of Australia. Individual risk level averages are LOW, however there are groups throughout the centre that when consolidated increase the conflict and aggression, while reducing the stability and harmony of compounds and the Centre.

The individual compounds have little in common. Structure, facilities, layout and security / safety risks vary greatly between each one. This results in very different safety and security tactics being required across the camp. Compounds also have constantly fluctuating levels of tension. These fluctuating factors make incidents difficult to predict or interdict.

It is highly probable that transferees have the ability to physically breach the vast majority of established security infrastructure should they find the motivation to do so. Fencing across established and even the newly completed "Mike" compound is currently not built for purpose and is generally inadequate for population control and group separation tasks. It is assessed that the primary reason the transferees are not breaching the substandard fencing is because at present they are not motivated to do so. Current fencing could not be relied upon to control the movement of transferees if they are determined to breach it.

Poor fencing includes single, low, loose, and no stand-off fencing to provide a barrier between the external camp, non-transferee vehicle and pedestrian movement and the transferees themselves. This specific issue has resulted in too many opportunities for uncontrolled interaction between transferees and external to camp personnel. There is no sterile zone area restricting communication with persons inside and outside the Centre. Most compound gates are single access / egress gates. Some have no airlocks to isolate transferees or stakeholders during their movements into and out of the compounds. This complicates the dispatch and recovery of individuals and groups. Transferee movement corridors are incomplete with unsafe ground surfaces and no all-weather protection. Some emergency control gates are also makeshift. The extant fencing system at the MIOPC is due to be upgraded early in 2014

Adding to the control inadequacies of MIOPC fencing is the absence of an automated access control and movement management system. Transferee, staff and visitor movement is totally manually recorded and accounted for. With 1,229 transferees (today) and up to 600 support staff in the Camp at any one time, tracking individual movement is very difficult. Accounting for people during an emergency would be extremely difficult and the assessment is that it may not be physically possible to do so in a reasonable time period.

G4S recommends that a fit for purpose access control and movement tracking system is adopted to assist with personal tracking, access control, and incident / emergency management including evacuation. However, for an access / movement control system to operate successfully there will need to be an aligned upgrade of fencing related infrastructure.



3. Risk Definitions

In assessing risk two broad parameters are considered. These are:-

1. The threat potential or probability of an incident taking place. This is dependent upon a number of factors, for example:
 - The likelihood of the OPC being targeted by a particular group, local population, demonstrators, miscreants amongst the transferees, etc.
 - The likelihood of a particular type of incident, demonstration, assault, arson, etc.
2. The consequences or impact of an incident
 - What are the hazards associated with a particular method, e.g. breaching of the compound barrier, OPC barrier, staff quarters, etc.
 - Having estimated the likely level of risk associated with the threats their method of management is recommended. The Resilience Review will assess the ability of the current facility design and associated systems and procedures to mitigate the likelihood of a successful incident and/or its impact.

4. Risk Assessment and Reduction Methodology

The methodology used to quantify risk in the assessment uses a product of the following:-

- Level of Risk = Probability x Consequences

Probability of threat being carried out

- **Rare** – Low level of undesirable or criminal activity. Although chance of an isolated incident cannot be discounted, there is virtually no likelihood of a credible threat to OPC operations
- **Unlikely** – Random, infrequent acts of undesirable or criminal activity. Slight likelihood of credible threat to OPC operations
- **Moderate** – Infrequent act of undesirable or criminal activity but with documented evidence of incidents targeted at OPC operations. Moderate likelihood of credible threat to OPC operations
- **Likely** – Frequent acts of undesirable or criminal activity with well documented evidence of incidents targeted at the OPC operations. High likelihood of credible threat to OPC operations
- **Almost Certain** – Continuous, daily act of undesirable or criminal activity with an almost certain likelihood of a credible threat to OPC operations

Consequence of threat being carried out

- **Insignificant** – Insignificant likelihood of personal injury, damage to building or financial loss to occupants of OPC
- **Minor** – Minor level of personal injury and/or damage to building or financial loss to occupants of OPC
- **Moderate** – Moderate level of personal injury or death and/or damage to building or financial loss to occupants of OPC
- **Major** – Major level of personal injury or death and/or severe damage to building or financial loss to occupants of OPC
- **Catastrophic** – Almost certain loss of life or severe injury and/or threatens the existence of the OPC



LIKLIHOOD	
Descriptor	Description
A – Certain	Is expected to occur in all circumstances.
B – Almost Certain	Is expected to occur in most circumstances.
C – Likely	Will probably occur in most circumstances.
D – Possible	Might occur in some circumstances.
E – Unlikely	Could occur at some time, but less possible.
F - Rare	May occur only in exceptional circumstances.

		CONSEQUENCES				
		5	4	3	2	1
LIKLIHOOD	A	M	H	E	E	E
	B	M	H	H	E	E
	C	L	M	H	E	E
	D	L	L	M	H	E
	E	L	L	M	H	H
	F	L	L	M	M	H

RISK RATING LEGEND	
Description	
E	Extreme risk, immediate action required.
H	Significant risk, senior management attention needed.
M	Moderate risk, management responsibility must be specified.
L	Low risk, manage by routine procedures.

5. Risk Identification

AS/NZS 4360:2004 defines risk as: 'The chance of something happens that will have an impact on objectives'. With that in mind a comprehensive review of the Centre Operations has been performed. The following list identifies each risk identified as a consequence of the risk assessment;

- **Riot or serious transferee unrest** – Uncertainty combined with challenging climatic circumstances may lead to an escalation in tension. Tension can often manifest itself in transferees lashing out and overtly demonstrating acts of violence. Further details on the *Risk Analysis Table serial 1*.
- **Arson** – History shows that a form of transferee's demonstration or illustrating violence can come in the way of arson. Arson is a destructive and life threatening risk, which provides a litany of post incident measures. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 2*.
- **Response to externals threats to security**- disgruntled landowners and others impacted by Centre operations have become another aspect of the law and order problem, the Manus Island RPC has been subject to threats of disruption by external parties, namely land owners. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 3*.
- **Serious assault or murder** – Accommodation, due to the numbers contained and climatic conditions creates a stressful environment. Coupled with transferees from different cultural



background can compound minor issues causing a rapid escalation in violence. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 4.*

- **Unauthorised egress / abscond** – Inadequate fencing provides almost no barrier to an unauthorised egress or transferee/s absconding. Security patrols and dynamic security is the leading deterrent to an unauthorised egress. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 5.*
- **Hostage situation** – Adverse determination or an increase in tension can lead to resentment, representing an increase in the risk of transferees taking a service provider staff member or visitor hostage. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 6.*
- **Sexual assault** – Dormitory style accommodation and shared ablutions may increase the risk associated with inappropriate sexual conduct or in extreme cases, sexual assault. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 7.*
- **Self-harm** – The current transferee living quarter design presents many opportunities for self-harm. That combined with tension and uncertainty increases the risk of self-harm at the Centre. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 8.*
- **Earthquakes** - PNG is located on the margins of the Australian and Pacific tectonic plates. The country regularly experiences earthquakes of 5-7 magnitudes. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 10.*
- **Inundation** -Tropical cyclones affect southern PNG between November and May; however Manus Island is protected from tropical cyclones by virtue of its proximity to the equator. Nevertheless in 1998 a tsunami caused numerous deaths and widespread devastation near Aitape on the northern mainland. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 11.*
- **Physical Perimeter** - The physical perimeter requires immediate attention as it is the facility's first line of defence against unlawful intrusion. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 12.*
- **Critical Infrastructure** - e.g. generators, water, sewage; are critical to the OPC's operation, particularly those that are housed within or adjacent to the perimeter. *Further details on the Risk Analysis Table serial 13 – 16*
- **Transition of Garison Services, Security and Support Services** – Plans are being developed for the transfer of these services to a single service provider. There is currently an Extreme risk that this transition will impacton the levels of support, security and support services provided to transferees. *Risk Analysis Table serial 17*



6. Risk Analysis

RISK TREATMENT										
No	Category	Risk What Can Happen?	Source How can this Happen?	Consequence What is the Consequence on entity if it does happen?	Controls What is currently in place to stop it happening or reduce the level of consequence?	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/ unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
1	Failure to prevent a riot	Riot occurs in one or more compounds following period of growing tension.	Failure to manage escalating situation	Disruption to the Centre and possible injury	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensure robust Intelligence gathering process in place. ▪ Ensure RSD processing seen to be moving. ▪ Improve welfare facilities (Infrastructure) over time. ▪ Engage positively with Transferees, engender trust. ▪ Manage minor incidents effectively and firmly but not too heavy-handedly ▪ Regular rock/ stick clearing. 	Require further mitigation	Unlikely	Major	High	Acceptable with further mitigation
2	Failure to prevent arson.	Transferees set fires in within Compound	Combination of contraband and rising tension within the centre.	Major disruption to the centre, property damage and possible casualties.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Develop, train, and equip first response team in firefighting. ▪ Ongoing fire risk review ▪ Equip site with additional fire tender. ▪ Relocate fuel and lubricants to logistics hub. 	Require further mitigation	Unlikely	Major	High	Acceptable with further mitigation



RISK TREATMENT										
No	Category	Risk	Source	Consequence	Controls	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
3	Incorrect response to external threat to Safety and Security of Centre	Fight breaks out between elements of PNG Authorities or Landowners mount a violent protest resulting in threat to Centre.	Ethnic tension or financially motivated protests	May restrict access to the site. Blockade may prevent vital resources getting to site.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contraband list ▪ Searching ▪ Dedicated fire team ▪ Ongoing fire risk assessments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PNGDF advises G4S if any clash likely. ▪ G4S regularly conduct exercises to practice response to external threat. ▪ G4S Managers follow Graduated Response Process in Site Safety and Security Plan. 	Require further mitigation	Unlikely	Major	High	Acceptable with further mitigation
4	Failure to prevent serious assault or murder.	A serious assault and or murder occurs within the OPC.	Tension between transferees may occur for a number of reasons. This tension can manifest into violence and in extreme circumstances	Serious assault or death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tight entry controls to ensure no contraband enters site. ▪ Robust intelligence gathering to ensure plots or vendettas identified. ▪ Security presence in accommodation areas. ▪ All assaults no matter how minor are visibly investigated by police to 	Require further mitigation	Rare	Catastrophic	High	Acceptable with further mitigation



RISK TREATMENT										
No	Category	Risk What Can Happen?	Source How can this Happen?	Consequence What is the Consequence on entity if it does happen?	Controls What is currently in place to stop it happening or reduce the level of consequence?	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/ unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
5	Failure to prevent Transferee from absconding.	Transferee exits the Centre without appropriate authorisation	Perimeter fence is inadequate.	Risk to the community,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Permanent, substantial perimeter presence. ▪ Regular inspections of security infrastructure. ▪ Twice daily welfare checks. ▪ Police mobile squad posted outside the facility. ▪ IRT responds to fence incursion to search for 	Require further mitigation	Rare	Major	High	Acceptable with further mitigation



RISK TREATMENT										
No	Category	Risk What Can Happen?	Source How can this Happen?	Consequence What is the Consequence on entity if it does happen?	Controls What is currently in place to stop it happening or reduce the level of consequence?	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
6	Hostage situation	A service provider staff member or visitor is taken hostage by a transferee	The focus of frustration and anger is directed to staff and other service provider personnel. Transferees are not taught coping mechanisms.	Risk of injury or in extreme cases a death.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Staffing levels maintained at a high level. ▪ Expat officers twinned with PNG staff. ▪ Staff response to incidents of low level violence immediate and decisive. ▪ All criminal matters referred to the Police and acted on. ▪ IRT established trained in this scenario. ▪ Return other parts of the centre to business as usual. ▪ Staff offered counselling 	Require further mitigation	Rare	Catastrophic	High	Acceptable with further mitigation
7	Sexual assault	A sexual assault occurs within the OPC.	Dormitory accommodation and shared ablutions may contribute to the opportunity and means.	Serious consequence for the victim and perpetrator. Police involvement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strong Security Presence in the compounds with regular checks of accommodation. ▪ Strong messaging during induction. ▪ Robust intelligence gathering. 	Require further mitigation	Rare	Catastrophic	High	Acceptable with further mitigation



RISK TREATMENT										
No	Category	Risk What Can Happen?	Source How can this Happen?	Consequence What is the Consequence on entity if it does happen?	Controls What is currently in place to stop it happening or reduce the level of consequence?	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Train SP staff in professional boundaries. ▪ All allegations are treated seriously and immediate and appropriate action taken. ▪ All alleged sexual assault matters are reported to the Police. ▪ All alleged sexual assault matters are reported in accordance with SOP 10.0. ▪ Sexual assault victims receive medical care. ▪ Sexual assault victims receive counselling. ▪ Alleged perpetrators are separated from the alleged victim. 					
8	Self-Harm	A Transferee self-harms and or suicides	Transferee depressed due to uncertainties. Mental health issues.	Serious injury or death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Training of PPS policy for all service provider staff. ▪ Mental health training for all SP staff in identification and management of PSP transferees. 	Require further mitigation	Medium	Catastrophic	Extreme	Acceptable with further mitigation



RISK TREATMENT										
No	Category	Risk What Can Happen?	Source How can this Happen?	Consequence What is the Consequence on entity if it does happen?	Controls What is currently in place to stop it happening or reduce the level of consequence?	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/ unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
9	Earthquake	Site subject to the consequences of an earthquake.	Natural disaster	Site damage and or injury to a person on the site. In worst case, death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Observe high risk individuals. ▪ 24 hour medical intervention ▪ Counselling offered to staff who witness/respond to self-harm. ▪ Post incident debrief. ▪ Detailed Emergency Operating Procedures. 	Require further mitigation	Rare	Catastrophic	High	Acceptable with further mitigation
10	Inundation	Site subject to the consequences	Natural disaster	Site damage and or injury to a person on the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ G4S subscribe to Tsunami Alert System. ▪ Detailed emergency evacuation plans. ▪ Emergency evacuation drills. ▪ Table top exercises. ▪ Robust evacuation plan. ▪ Detailed Emergency Operating Procedures. ▪ PPC online to provide telephone counselling if required. 	Require further mitigation	Rare	Catastrophic	High	Acceptable with further mitigation



RISK TREATMENT

No	Category	Risk What Can Happen?	Source How can this Happen?	Consequence What is the Consequence on entity if it does happen?	Controls What is currently in place to stop it happening or reduce the level of consequence?	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ evacuation plans. ▪ Emergency evacuation drills. ▪ Table top exercises. ▪ Robust evacuation plan. ▪ Detailed Emergency Operating Procedures. ▪ PPC online to provide telephone counselling if required. 					
11	Perimeter Security	Perimeter security is inadequate to withstand and external or internal incursion.	Unauthorised access or unauthorised egress.	Risk to the security of the centre or the community.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Perimeter patrols; ▪ Dynamic security ▪ 24 hour security presence ▪ Police Mobile Squad presence ▪ Programs and activities 	Require further mitigation	Rare	Catastrophic	High	Acceptable with further mitigation
12	Power Infrastructure	Failure of main services.	Failure of generators	Failure of power and to the site would cause major issues. Power is used for powering the site kitchen and security lighting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Two backup generators on site. ▪ Additional backup generator leased to compliment current generators. 	Require further mitigation	Rare	Catastrophic	High	Acceptable with further mitigation
13	Water	Failure of main	Failure of	Failure of	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Additional ROWPU to 	Require	Rare	Catastrophic	High	Acceptable



RISK TREATMENT

No	Category	Risk What Can Happen?	Source How can this Happen?	Consequence What is the Consequence on entity if it does happen?	Controls What is currently in place to stop it happening or reduce the level of consequence?	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
	production Infrastructure	services.	ROWPU's	potable water to the site would cause major issues. Water is used for showering and toilets.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ increase capacity. ▪ PALL staff member on site to maintain and operate ROWPU. ▪ Bottled water supplied for drinking. ▪ Use water from the creek not sea water, increasing production levels. 	further mitigation				with further mitigation
14	Failure of Fuel Hygiene Management	Fuel contamination causes multiple failure of generators and vehicles.	Storing fuel in dirty drums and or other contaminated containers	Failure of ROWPU's, Generators and vehicles.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dedicated Fuel Manager on Manus Island. ▪ Fuel testing in place. ▪ Unpolluted storage 	Require further mitigation	Moderate	Moderate	High	Acceptable with further mitigation
15	Failure of Mobile Tele-communications Network	3G Mobile network on the island fails for 6 hours or more	Satellite failure of weather interruption.	No mobile comms will put additional strain on the Sat Com system.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Satphone's purchased and working ▪ VSAT system includes voice communication outlets. 	Require further mitigation	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Acceptable with further mitigation
16	Partial or complete destruction of Transferee Accommodation	Substantial Damage Occurs to Accommodation requiring partial	Natural Disaster, Fire and or building failure due to climatic	Transferees will need to be relocated to a safe area. Large scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dedicated fire response team and managers ▪ Fire appliances on site ▪ Signed up to Tsunami alert 	Require further mitigation	Moderate	Moderate	High	Acceptable with further mitigation



RISK TREATMENT										
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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
17	Rushed and incoherent transition to new Garrison Services, Security and Transferee Support Provider	Disjointed, uncoordinated or failed transition from extant providers to new service delivery arrangements causing interruption or failure of essential services, lapses in security or inadequate levels of transferee support services	Unplanned, rushed or impractical plans and processes adopted. Interruption to security, supply, catering, R&M, utilities and social support staff and systems. Widespread industrial action resulting from local resistance to change by staff or local	Unrest within transferee population causing increasing tension. Increased antisocial and illegal behavior. Increased incidence of self harm. Rioting, assault, hostage taking, arson, self harm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transferees informed of plan to transition services to new contractor Staff informed of transition but no information on continuity or conditions of possible employment Plans/options being developed by prime for approval by DIBP 	Requires further mitigation	Possible	Catastrophic	Extreme	Requires immediate additional mitigation strategies



RISK TREATMENT										
No	Category	Risk What Can Happen?	Source How can this Happen?	Consequence What is the Consequence on entity if it does happen?	Controls What is currently in place to stop it happening or reduce the level of consequence?	Effectiveness of controls	Likelihood	Consequence	Current risk rating	Acceptable/ unacceptable
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d) populace.	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)



7. Risk Treatment and Further Mitigation

The previous Risk Assessment Table detailed in section 7 of this document details the identified risks in their current status. The difference between the Risk Assessment Table and the table detailed below is the inclusion of additional and essential planned mitigation. In simple terms, additional mitigation which will further reduce the identified risks to a more acceptable level.

RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION											
No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional essential planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
1.	Failure to prevent a riot	Riot occurs in one or more compounds following period of growing tension.	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensure robust Intelligence gathering process in place. ▪ Ensure RSD processing seen to be moving. ▪ Improve welfare facilities (Infrastructure) over time. ▪ Engage positively with Transferees, engender trust. ▪ Manage minor incidents effectively and firmly but not too heavy-handedly ▪ Regular rock/stick clearing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regular test exercises for responding to unrest ▪ Continuous training of IRT ▪ Detailed Emergency Operating Procedures. ▪ Effective measures for hand-over/take-over by PNGRPC 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide effective Welfare Services ▪ All staff trained and fitted for PPE. Therefore able to stand ground under hail of missiles. ▪ DIBP Approve CAPEX proposal for Logistic Hub enabling G4S to extract all critical strategic logistic assets from the OPC. ▪ Procure additional 50 PPE sets 	TSA G4S DIBP/G4S PNGICSA/ G4S	31/1/2014 31/2/2014 31/3/2014	Low



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION

No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
2.	Failure to prevent arson.	Transferees set fires in temporary Marquees in Oscar Compound and in Dongas	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Develop, train, and equip first response team in firefighting. ▪ Ongoing fire risk review ▪ Equip site with additional fire tender. ▪ Relocate fuel and lubricants to logistics hub. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sufficient Fire Tenders on site. ▪ Daily Fire Section drills on how to respond to fire. ▪ Centre/ stakeholder table top exercises. ▪ Clearly signed Evacuation areas. ▪ Clearly signed muster points. ▪ Detailed Emergency Operating Procedures. ▪ Dedicated Fire 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensure PNG Police Cooperation and assistance. (PNGISCA) ▪ Empower GSP along lines of Migration Act 1958. ▪ Finalize agreements and processes with PNGRPC 	DIBP / PNGISCA	31/2/2014	Low
								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contingency accommodation in the event that a compound is lost. ▪ Electronic access control system that can emergency muster/account for staff and transferees. ▪ Ring main system to allow easy access to 	DIBP Infra	31/1/2014	Low
									G4S/DIBP (approve CAPEX)	31/1/2014	
									DIBP Infra	31/2/2014	



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION											
No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
3.	Incorrect response to external threat to Safety and Security of Centre	Fight breaks out between elements of PNG Authorities or Landowners mount a violent protest resulting in threat to Centre.	G4S RGM	High	<p>PNGDF advises G4S if any clash likely.</p> <p>G4S regularly conduct exercises to practice response to external threat</p>	<p>Section Managers. (G4S)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dedicated Fire Section Team. (G4S) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> G4S Managers follow Graduated Response Process in Site Safety and Security Plan. 	Moderate	<p>firefighting stocks of water.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procure missing items from Fire Tender <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Further training to be carried out with ECO, and other SP leaders and staff. Strengthen relationship with the base Executive. Hold meetings on a weekly basis. External threat contingency plan. 	G4S	31/1/2014	Low
4.	Failure to prevent serious assault or murder.	A serious assault and or murder occurs within the OPC.	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tight entry controls to ensure no contraband enters site. Robust intelligence gathering to ensure plots or 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SOPs in place and understood to manage incident. All staff trained to intervene to prevent serious injury or death. All staff trained in 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Person charged with serious assault / murder relocated to police custody. (PNGISCA). Transferee education 	<p>PNG ICSA</p> <p>TSA</p>	<p>31/01/2014</p> <p>31/01/2014</p>	Low



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION

No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)	(m)
5.	Failure to prevent Transferee from absconding.	Transferee exits the Centre without appropriate authorisation	G4S RGM	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> vendettas identified. Security presence in accommodation areas. All assaults no matter how minor are visibly investigated by police to deter assailants. Strong messaging during induction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First Aid to prevent further consequences of injury sustained in assault. Transferees / staff offered counselling. 	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> sessions informing all of consequences of illegal behavior. G4S, IHMS, TSA mandatory reporting of illegal behavior. Transferee care plan / management plan. 	G4S, IHMS, and TSA TSA and IHMS	31/01/2014 31/01/2014	Low
6.	Hostage situation	A service provider staff member or visitor is taken hostage by a transferee	G4S RGM	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Permanent, substantial perimeter presence. Regular inspections of security infrastructure. Twice daily welfare checks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Police mobile squad posted outside the facility IRT responds to fence incursion to search for missing person. 	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance perimeter security by installing palisade fence and sterile zone. 	DIBP DIBP/PNG ICSA	31/03/2014 31/12/2013	Low



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION

No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional essential planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)	(m)
7.	Sexual assault	A sexual assault occurs within the OPC.	G4S RGM	Mod	<p>staff.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Staff response to incidents of low level violence immediate and decisive. All criminal matters referred to the Police and acted on. 	<p>business as usual.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Staff offered counselling 	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transferee education sessions informing all of consequences of illegal behavior. G4S, IHMS, TSA mandatory reporting of illegal behavior. Transferee care plan / management plan. 	TSA	31/12/2013	Low
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong Security Presence in the compounds with regular checks of accommodation Strong messaging during induction. Robust intelligence gathering. Train SP staff in professional boundaries. All allegations are treated seriously and immediate and appropriate action taken. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All alleged sexual assault matters are reported to the Police. All alleged sexual assault matters are reported in accordance with SOP 10.0. Sexual assault victims receive medical care. Sexual assault victims receive counselling. Alleged perpetrators are separated from the alleged victim. 			G4S, IHMS, and TSA	31/02/2013	
									TSA and IHMS	31/02/2013	



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION											
No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional essential planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
8.	Suicide / attempted Self-harm	A Transferee self-harms and or suicides	G4S RGM	Extreme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training of PPS policy for all service provider staff. Mental health training for all SP staff in identification and management of PSP transferees. Observe high risk individuals. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 24 hour medical intervention Counselling offered to staff who witness/respond to self-harm. Post incident debrief. Detailed Emergency Operating Procedures. 	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All at risk transferees who are on watch are relocated to the care centre for monitoring and support. G4S Suicide and Self Harm Mitigation SOP Transferee education sessions informing all of consequences of illegal behavior. G4S, IHMS, TSA mandatory reporting of illegal behavior. Transferee care plan / management plan. 	IHMS	31/02/2013	Mod
9.	Earthquake	Site damage and or injury to site occupants.	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detailed emergency evacuation plans. Emergency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Robust evacuation plan. Detailed Emergency Operating 	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quarterly contingency test on 21/03/2014. 	G4S	21/03/2014	Low



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION											
No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional essential planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
10.	Cyclone	Site damage and or injury to site occupants.	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> evacuation drills. Table to exercises. G4S subscribe to Tsunami Alert System. Emergency evacuation drills. Table to exercises. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procedures. PPC online to provide telephone counselling of required. Robust evacuation plan. Detailed Emergency Operating Procedures. PPC online to provide telephone counselling of required. 	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quarterly contingency test on 21/03/2014. 	G4S	21/03/2014	Low
11.	Perimeter Security	Perimeter security is inadequate to withstand and external or internal incursion.	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perimeter patrols; Dynamic security 24 hour security presence Police Mobile Squad presence Programs and activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Police mobile squad on site Immediate notification of PNGDF Dedicated IRT 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Erection of palisade fencing in accordance to Australian Standards Antic limb sterile zone CCTV on fence line and sterile zone 	DIBP Infrastructure	01/03/2014	Low
12.	Power Infrastructure	Failure of main power services	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two backup generators on 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 24 hour maintenance 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relocate all critical infrastructure to 	DIBP Infrastructure DIBP (to approve CAPEX) G4S / DIBP (to approve CAPEX)	01/03/2014 01/03/2014 01/03/2014	Low



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION

No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)	(m)
13.	Water Infrastructure	Failure water production services	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ site. ▪ Additional backup generator leased to compliment current generators. ▪ Additional ROWPU to increase capacity. ▪ PALL staff member on site to maintain and operate ROWPU. ▪ Bottled water supplied for drinking. ▪ Use water from the creek not sea water, increasing production levels. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Supply of bottled water ▪ 24 hour maintenance presence on site ▪ Back up supply of critical parts. 	Moderate	Relocate all critical infrastructure to Logistics hub.	G4S / DIBP(to approve CAPEX)	01/03/2014	Low
14.	Failure of Fuel Hygiene Management	Fuel contamination causes multiple failure of generators and vehicles.	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dedicated Fuel Manager on Manus Island. ▪ Fuel testing in place. ▪ Unpolluted storage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ On site mechanic 24/7 ▪ Surplus fuel filters 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leasing dedicated fuel storage vehicle for a month ▪ Relocate fuel storage to a dedicated area 	G4S DIBP(to approve CAPEX)	15/12/2013 31/03/2014	Low



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION

No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
15.	Failure of Mobile Telecommunications Network	3G Mobile network on the island fails for 6 hours or more	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> VSAT system includes voice communication outlets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satphone's purchased and working Email comms via VSAT 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> in the logistics hub Establish fueling station in Log hub Fuel filters 	DIBP (to approve CAPEX) Eurest	31/03/2014 31/02/2014	Moderate
16.	Partial or complete destruction of Transferee Accommodation on	Substantial Damage Occurs to Accommodation requiring partial or complete evacuation, as a result of Fire, Riot and Affray, Tsunami or Tidal Surge.	G4S RGM	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Signed up to Tsunami alert 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dedicated fire response team and managers Fire appliances on site 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish emergency accommodation Robust contingency plan Detailed Emergency Management Plan 	DIBP G4S G4S	31/04/2014 15/12/2014 15/12/2014	Low
17.	Rushed and incoherent transition to new Garrison Services, Security and	Unrest within transferee population causing increasing tension. Increased	DIBP/G4SR GM	Extreme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continual engagement with Transferees to assure them of continuity of service. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All alleged sexual assault matters are reported to the Police. All alleged sexual assault matters are 	Extreme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalization and announcement of plans and schedules to ensure continuity of all 	DIBP/Transfield	31/1/14	High



RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION											
No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)	(m)
	Transferee Support Provider	antisocial and illegal behavior. Increased incidence of self harm. Rioting, assault, hostage taking, arson, self harm. Failure of critical services due to inadequate understanding of water, power and sewerage systems. Failure of supply chain because Transfield have no business arrangements in PNG (e.g. currently G4S procures 80% of food from PNG – Transfield has no supply contracts in place in PNG				reported in accordance with SOP 10.0. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sexual assault victims receive medical care. Sexual assault victims receive counselling. Alleged perpetrators are separated from the alleged victim. 24 hour medical intervention Counselling offered to staff who witness/respond to self-harm. Post incident debrief. Detailed Emergency Operating Procedures. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transition plan to include gradual transfer of services to allow transferees time to adapt to new arrangements, security and support personnel and potentially variation in the level or manner of service provision Avoidance of hard changeovers of staff or services caused by the imposition of arbitrary dates on a transition plan Early communication 			




RISK TREATMENT AND FURTHER MITIGATION

No	Risk	Consequence of Eventuation of Risk	Overall Risk Owner	Risk pre-mitigation	Likelihood Mitigations	Impact Mitigations	Risk post-mitigation	Additional essential planned mitigations	Action Owner	Deadline to reach Target Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
(a)	(b)	(c) currently. Landowner protests due to inadequate community liaison and local employment opportunities by new service provider.	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j) to all staff on employment options and any changed T&Cs ▪ Engagement with local stakeholders and plan to minimize impact to local populace employment and economic benefit	(k)	(l)	(m)



8. Mitigation through Monitoring

The key elements of monitor and review are based upon the three considerations of: 'understanding', 'performance', and 'assurance'.



The monitor and review step has the objectives of achieving improved:

- Understanding, through:
 - continuing awareness of changing contexts,
 - continuing awareness of changing demands,
 - learning from experience,
 - learning from others;
- Performance, through:
 - managing stakeholder expectations,
 - measurement/review of effectiveness of process elements,
 - measurement/review of effectiveness of management of risks,
 - identifying and implementing improvements,
 - enhancing integration with interdependencies; and
- Assurance, through ensuring and confirming compliance with:
 - strategic requirements,
 - policy requirements,
 - operational requirements,
 - regulatory requirements.

The action items identified in the Risk Treatment and Mitigation table will for part of the agenda for the Weekly Departmental Review (WDR). Each week the action owner will provide an update against their allocated task. Once the task has been completed to the satisfaction of the WDR board, the item will be closed.



9. Conclusion

It is impossible to fully mitigate the risk represented by some of the threats discussed in this report. A combination of physical security, procedural security, vetting and training should close the circle and provide a layered security umbrella without hindering the OPC's core function. This site is considered High Risk.