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## **Chapter One. Regional Governance and Regionalism in Australia**

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### **1. Introduction**

Since the mid-1990s Australia has gone a long way towards embracing – in many cases, reinventing – a trend toward increased citizen, community and business participation in development decision-making at a regional level. International arguments that regional identity, agency and autonomy have a direct relationship with regional economic ‘success’ in this age of ‘glocalisation’, usually derived from North American and European experience (e.g. Courchene 1995; Hill and Roberts 1995), have in many quarters fallen on fertile ground. However these subtle qualifiers – ‘a long way’ and ‘in many quarters’ – are reminders that Australia’s embrace of these principles is by no means uniform across all public policy actors, and that open examination of their governance implications is frequently resisted or ignored.

On one hand we see widespread in-principle commitment to agency and participation as drivers of economic innovation and community renovation. Many regional communities, community-oriented businesses, social scientists, local governments and regional development practitioners are eagerly embracing these principles to the maximum extent. Yet at the levels of state and federal governments, where the bulk of political power and public financial resources are held, the in-principle commitment translates into a very different reality.

The new/renewed regional development theory readily supports a ‘do-it-yourself’ approach, as recently outlined by Beer *et al* (2003: 248-264). With little likelihood of a reversion to an interventionist, Keynesian or high investment national-regional planning approach, but widespread dissatisfaction with the free-market approach that until recently saw Australian governments leaving regional development entirely to market forces, the present path is an entrepreneurial ‘compromise’. Here, regions must find their own solutions, relying fundamentally on initiative and cooperation from within, and only strategic or minimal government assistance. Hence, while state and federal regional programs abound, the total resources allocated to them remain relatively small. More

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importantly, development of the institutional structures needed to harness and maintain ‘bottom-up’ regional energies raises a nest of complex problems that, experience suggests, most Australian governments would prefer to avoid.

This chapter uses Australian political and administrative history to explain why, in this context, there remains such a frequent mismatch between rhetorical (and usually genuine) commitment to increased community-driven regional development, and the lack of significant development in the governance frameworks needed to sustain it on the ground. We argue that until a considered debate revives about how Australia’s political system *as a whole* should develop to better accommodate regionalism and long-term regional policy-making needs, the prospects for maintaining and sustaining new community-based approaches are quite uncertain.

This argument has two parts. First, regionalism, regional policy and regional participation are clearly not new topics, but ones with a previous history. Concepts of regions and regionalism have featured prominently in Australian political, institutional and constitutional design ever since European colonisation in 1788. Australia is a federal country founded on a compromise between regionalism and nationalism, in which one might expect regional policies to have a coherent ‘fit’ with broader public policy structures – and yet the truth is a more contorted history, in which concepts of regional governance have been pulled in at least three different directions. This interplay of possibilities remains fundamentally unresolved. Unless the governance challenges associated with ‘bottom-up’ participation are approached with greater understanding of this past experience, we stand to learn little from, and possibly to repeat, past policy mistakes.

The second part of the chapter demonstrates in more detail where current policy trends fit into this complex history. The present trend toward greater participation creates governance challenges for institutions through which participation is organised. These challenges include two of the most important qualities of such institutions: their capacity and their legitimacy. Continuing debates over reform of key regional institutional frameworks – notably, regional economic development agencies, and local government finance – show questions of institutional capacity and legitimacy to be key. Despite international recognition of the need for substantial devolution of resources and power to durable regional institutions, in Australia the lack of regional institutional capacity and legitimacy remains quite stark. The inevitable conclusion is that there is a high risk of past mistakes being repeated, and of the current expansion in regional governance capacity being lost, if Australia’s political system is unable to better accommodate long-term regionally based policy-making.

## 2. Regional Governance and Australian Federalism

Participation in regional development – whether by individual citizens, businesses or communities – represents the heart of the challenge of modern regional governance. Much of the recent revival in regional policy stems from political instability in many rural and semi-rural electorates from the late-1990s, with a resultant focus on regionalism as a primarily non-urban phenomenon related to ‘Rural and Regional Australia’ (or ‘RaRA’), but in fact, in public policy Australia’s regions are both rural and urban in character (Pritchard & McManus 2000; Gray & Lawrence 2001; Gray 2004). The ‘region’ is now widely accepted as a spatial scale at which the subnational social and economic life of Australia might be effectively understood, either in addition or as an alternative to the ‘local’ and ‘state’ scales at which government is formally organised.

Against this backdrop, however, regional governance itself is a less well-understood concept. Regional governance is the combination of institutions, processes and relationships that govern economic, social and environmental decision-making at the regional scale. Since the mid-1990s, Australia has seen an explosion of regional governance arrangements, much of it seeking enhanced participation from chambers of commerce, industry organisations, professional groups, unions, community organisations of all shapes and sizes (including Aboriginal and Islander ones), individual businesses and citizens, who have now rejoined local, state and federal governments as major policy actors. In addition to an infinite variety of place-based and industry-based community development projects, the regional governance tapestry is made up of a diversity of intersecting institutions providing mechanisms for participation, including:

- (1) elected local governments (councils);
- (2) voluntary Regional Organisations of Councils (ROCs);
- (3) the traditional regional operations of state and federal agencies,
- (4) local/regional economic development agencies, often involving state and federal officials;
- (5) local/regional natural resource management bodies, likewise;
- (6) other portfolio-specific state and federal regional bodies e.g. Area Health boards;
- (7) other cross-portfolio quasi-governmental bodies, especially Aboriginal and Islander councils, corporations and service organisations;
- (8) whole-of-government (WOG) initiatives in a region, such as Regional Managers Forums, operated by both state and federal governments as internal government initiatives;
- (9) community-based WOG consultative mechanisms by state and federal governments, such as federal Area Consultative Councils, and;
- (10) political representations by individual politicians (local, state and federal).

The history of this tapestry of regional governance initiatives and arrangements can be tracked in two ways. Conventionally, the origins of regional policy and hence also regional governance are traced to economic reconstruction following the Great Depression, including its wartime and postwar reconstruction phases (1941-1949). This was the period in which the New South Wales and then federal Labor governments first took up the idea of statewide and national blueprints for regional economic planning, with joint state-federal Regional Development Committees as their primary participative strategy.

*Figure 1. Australia's regions, Cth Department of Postwar Reconstruction (1949)*




Figure 1 presents the first-ever national map of Australia divided into 97 “regions for development and decentralisation” (see ALP 1943: 16; Harris 1948; Cth Dept of Post-War Reconstruction 1949: 44; Larcombe 1961: 84-6; Chapman & Wood 1984: 171; Beer 2000: 173). In fact although ‘regional ideas’ gained national traction at this time, they had been circulating since at least the 1920s in response to problems of Australian metropolitan planning and economic geography (see Holmes 1932; Harris 1978; Freestone 1988). Regional policies and associated governance strategies have ebbed and flowed ever since, usually without controversy save, perhaps, the last precursor to the present explosion of arrangements – the regional initiatives of the Whitlam government from 1972-1975 (Dollery & Marshall 1997: 11; Beer 2000: 173; Beer et al. 2003: 23).

While this is an accurate history of regional governance in Australia, it is still also only a slice of the full story. The economic, social and political issues to which regional development policies have been addressed had their equivalents long before the 1920s-1940s. Even if we reluctantly put aside Australia's many millennia of pre-European governance, in which economic, social and political activity naturally also took place against a backdrop of recognisable spatial territories and boundaries, we can still date European choices in spatial policies of development back at least as far as the commencement of serious colonial expansion in the early 1820s. For present purposes, this broader history has involved a struggle between three main choices for managing public involvement in the development of Australia's regions – previously termed 'settlements', 'districts', 'colonies', 'provinces' and/or 'states' before the term 'region' came into usage. These choices have been: management at the state scale (federalism), at the 'regional government' scale (via district, provincial, or local government), or via bureaucratic regional administrative organisations.


### ***Regionalism and Australian federalism***

The first post-colonisation approach to regional development assumed a spatial logic, in which decentralisation and economic development was to be progressed by the subdivision of the original territory of New South Wales (NSW) into constituent 'colonies' like Van Diemen's Land in 1823-25, or 'provinces' like South Australia in 1834-36. It was this strategy that arguably put Australia on a path to federal nationhood, and according to recent revision, it appears to have been largely planned that way from the start (Brown 2004). These early colonial blueprints were premised on the link between territorial subdivision and the organization of public resources and institutions (such as they were) to promote colonisation, harness investment, manage the population and plan (or at least allow) economic development. In other words the first governance strategy for promoting and managing participation in regional development was the creation of separate colonial administrations, or general-purpose governments, for the region concerned.

Therefore, for most of Australian post-colonial history, and consistently with federal theory, the primary institutional life given to 'regions' has been as states. However with this realisation comes a first major tension in the history of Australian regional governance. The trend to colonial subdivision slowed, and then ceased with the creation of only six jurisdictions by 1860, but regional movements for colonial separation remained ongoing, continuing to the late 1960s, as depicted by Prescott in Figure 2. For many regional communities for many decades, 'regionalism' has meant a continuing political campaign for statehood or some equivalent, encouraged by at least four influences: Australia's initial colonial history, related U.S. and Canadian precedents for subdivision of territory, Australia's own federal constitutional design of 1901 (which

expressly allowed for creation of new states), and economic theories in which the full political development of regions, into states, continued to be seen as fundamental to their economic development (see e.g. Clark 1952; 1955). Pressure for reconstruction of the federal system to make its constituent states more genuinely ‘regional’ was a significant feature of 20<sup>th</sup> century politics (see also Ellis 1933; Brown 2001; Blainey 2004).

*Figure 2. Australian New State Movements 1860s-1960s, Victor Prescott (1987)*



### ***Regionalism and district, provincial or local government***

The second post-colonisation approach to regional governance was introduced somewhat in parallel, and then increasingly as an alternative to the first. Like the federal approach of creating new colonies or states, it revolved around the creation of general-purpose governments at a more regional scale, but presented different political and institutional options for achieving this result. The first and most persistent of these options was local government, which British authorities hoped from the 1830s-1840s could begin to shoulder much of the colonial development burden, devolve control away from existing elites and into the areas where colonisation was needed, and also more efficiently defray its costs. Most early proposals conceived of political units significantly larger and more powerful than local government as it came to be known through the 20<sup>th</sup> century, based instead on comprehensive systems of ‘district’ or ‘provincial’ councils. Such proposals were also more consistent with British unitary political theory, and seen as replacing the need for further colonial subdivision once this became unpopular in British

policy circles. Colonial support for these more powerful ‘provincial’-style local governments has also been strong at times, particularly in NSW and Queensland (Ellis 1933: 87; Frappell 1977: 13, 23; Harris 1978: 10-38, 168-70; McDonald 1981: 542-4).


However, from an early stage, the history of local government exposes significant tensions. On one hand, local government did eventually evolve into comprehensive and well-entrenched institutions, boosted by national funding from the 1970s, which today provide much of the backbone and continuity to regional governance. At the same time, the development of local, district or provincial government was retarded from an early stage, partly by British policy mistakes but chiefly by resistance from colonial elites who saw local government as a threat to their own influence and succeeded in instead entrenching it as a subservient form of state agency (Melbourne 1963: 181-90, 231-346; Larcombe 1961: 7-35, 49, 94; McMinn 1979: 42; Chapman & Wood 1984: 22-4; Aulich & Peitsch 2002; Brown 2002b). Despite federal funding and rapid development over the last 30 years, Australian local government remains formally, financially and politically weak by most comparative standards (McNaughtan 1955: 109; Bowman 1983: 166-82; Finn 1987: 2-14, 118; Walmsley & Sorensen 1993: 27; McNeill 1997: 18-19). Local government’s share of own-purpose public sector expenditure is around 6% of total government spending – as against about 18% in Canada, and 24% in the United States (see Brown 2002b). Despite being positioned as a natural agent for public engagement in regional development, local government is afflicted by problems of resources, geography, function and skills that commonly leave it as “the lame duck of Australian politics, limping along in a battle for survival... in many cases not being able to do much for those injured by the shifting foci of economic activity and wealth creation” (Daly 2000: 216).

Consequently, in parallel to the suppression of new state movements, the ongoing struggle of Australian local government remains the most visible reminder of a range of alternative proposals for regional-level political reform. The history of local government has remained interwoven with proposals for how local government could and should be grown out of its limited institutional mould, into more powerful ‘regional’ forms. Since before the Federation period, these have extended to arguments that the new national system of government should perhaps render state governments entirely redundant, if only local government was commensurately strengthened. Continuing to draw on British unitary constitutional traditions, these ideas have surfaced in proposals for Unification rather than Federation, including an Australian Labor Party platform to that effect adopted in 1918, as well as rural campaigns for “a return to British ideals and the welding of Australia into a genuine Nation” through use of Greater Local Government (e.g. Lorimer 1931: 60-3; Mainerd 1945; Larcombe 1961: 83-94, 101; Crisp 1978: 245ff; Galligan 1995: 91ff). Ideas about the creation of regional governments through significant constitutional overhaul remain prominent amongst senior former politicians (e.g. Macphee 1994; Hurford 2004) and in business forecasts of where Australia could

ultimately end up (such as the Business Council of Australia’s *Aspire Australia 2025* report, BCA 2004: 14-20; see also BCA 1991). Such scenarios also retain particular currency among non-metropolitan communities and local government itself, according to empirical evidence from Queensland (Figure 3 below). Ongoing arguments for federal constitutional recognition of local government, despite failed attempts to achieve it in 1973 and 1988, should also rightly be seen as symbolic of this larger political history (Constitutional Centenary Foundation 1999; Jaensch 2004).

Figure 3. Queensland adults' preferred future system of governance, by region (September 2001; see Brown 2002a, b)

**Q:** ‘Australia currently has a three-tiered system of federal, state & local government. Thinking forward, which of the following best reflects how you think our system should look 100 years from now?’  
(See below for scenarios A, B, C, D, Other)





### ***Regional programs as an administrative strategy***

The third approach to regional governance has proved dominant since the Second World War. As we have seen, both the first strategy of a federalist subdivision into colonies or states, and the second strategy of local (or district, or provincial) government, presumed that regional development was best achieved through establishment of general-purpose government at a regional level. In the end neither the majority of states nor most local governments achieved this ‘regional’ scale, but both paths offered to satisfy public participation in development through processes of political representation and policy-making based on strong regional autonomy, identification and community cohesion. From the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century however, state and then national governments developed a third tradition, in which administrative strategies were deployed to support economic growth through development of powerful agencies from Mains Road Departments to Mines to Railways. It was this administrative tradition that capitalised on the arrival of ‘the region’ as a new conceptual unit for national planning in the 1930s-1940s, and developed ‘regionalism’ as a top-down administrative strategy in the context of post-Depression and postwar reconstruction described earlier.

The tension obvious in this third approach is that while it resulted in strong bureaucratic capacity for obtaining the finance and delivering the infrastructure crucial to development, it has remained politically centralised and not strongly tailored towards community participation or empowerment. In this approach, participation is cast primarily in terms of consultation and ad-hoc institutional arrangements that provide agencies and political leaders with advice, but not devolution of responsibility or decision-making power.

This tension was a major reason for the lack of traction achieved by the original framework of Regional Development Committees in the 1940s (Logan 1978: 16, cited by Beer 2000: 173; cf Coombs 1996: 33), whose political legitimacy was repeatedly attacked from community and local government perspectives (Tamworth 1944; Mainerd 1945; Cth Dept of Post-War Reconstruction 1949: 16-7; Larcombe 1961: 83-94, 101). Through the 1950s and 1960s, regional development nevertheless continued to be pursued through powerful central agencies rather than devolutionary strategies (e.g. Drane 1966; Davies 1968; Bolton 1995: 57). In the 1970s, the federal Labor government under Whitlam revived rhetoric about the creation of a new “regional framework for participation in all those decisions which most directly determine the quality of our lives” (Whitlam 1971: 17; 1985: 714; cf ALP 1963: 91; Galligan 1995: 102). Direct federal funding to local government proved a lasting reform, but with this exception, the noise and controversy translated into a group of largely uncoordinated regional programs formulated on a “top-down” presumption of bureaucratic and technocratic wisdom, producing regional bodies “quite incapable” of providing any “stable new element” in the long-term political system (Sawer 1976: 325-6; Power & Wettenhall 1976).

This brief tour of three different approaches to regional governance provides only a snapshot of the history of Australian spatial development politics (see Brown 2003). It nevertheless identifies that the present wave of commitment to “bottom-up” participation and self-determination has arrived, after a brief 1980s-1990s regional policy vacuum, on the back of unresolved debates over how, politically and institutionally, regions are best to be defined and managed. One significant symbol of this confusion is Australia’s particular fondness for using the term “regionalism” to describe the top-down regional strategies of state and federal bureaucracies that dominate since the 1940s (e.g. Spate 1955; Paddison 1978: 3-6; Harris 1978: 136-7; Dollery & Marshall 1997: 11). Today most social scientists are finally recognising these approaches as exercises in “regionalisation”, based on a “synthetic/convenient” concept of regions created largely from the outside for central policy purposes (Ford 2001: 204-8). In contrast, “regionalism” is seen as connoting the more “organic/authentic” indicators of political, cultural and economic association that define area-based communities from the bottom-up or inside-out (see also Chapman & Wood 1984: 171-2, 202; Jennings & Moore 2000: 178; Bellamy et al 2003; Gray 2004).

This distinction between regionalism and regionalisation is important because it helps identify a potentially serious problem. Today’s policies, typified by new strategies for participation in regional development, are clearly designed to harness the benefits of regionalism as a political and cultural phenomenon. Yet regionalism as we now know it has a poor record of recognition in Australian public policy, and indeed has often been the outright enemy of state and federal regionalisation strategies – given that these have been frequently shaped by the imperative of forestalling the types of regional autonomy demands outlined earlier. Thanks to this history of short-term policy responses to regional dissatisfaction, state and federal regional policy capacity is often very sophisticated, but it offers more expertise in top-down, short-term strategies of regional governance than in bottom-up, long-term ones.

At the very least, the result in Australia is that new regional policies have to contend with a strong and understandable vein of public cynicism. Since the 1970s, state governments have been assessed as paying no more than “lip service” to decentralisation goals (Parker 1978), and at both state and federal level, regional development policies have frequently proven to be “palliatives... entertained for political consumption rather than for substantive outcomes” (Wanna & Withers 2000: 85; see also Beer et al. 2003: 263). Cynicism also often comes mixed with exhaustion, as a response to the multiplicity of short-term, fragmented consultation and participation strategies rolled out by different federal and state agencies. The eagerness with which state and federal governments have embraced the “do-it-yourself” approach to regional development since the late 1980s provides only limited hope. Despite the welcome refrain that neither “Canberra” nor “Macquarie Street” nor “Collins Street” will be determining what works best for regions,

it is also apparent that governments have been making a devolutionary virtue of their own inability and/or lack of interest to know what is in regions' best interests.

Even if one is less cynical, this predicament raises a fundamental issue for contemporary questions of governance and participation. The pedigree of centrally-controlled strategies for participation sits very uneasily with the new "bottom-up" orientation of regional development policy. If the contemporary consensus is that economic renewal, community development and environmental sustainability now hinge at least partly on unleashing the true potential of regional communities as storehouses of innovation and social capital, then questions about regional institutional capacity to do this leap back to the fore. Past traditions and debates over regional governance are important to acknowledge – but how much are current Australian debates learning from their own history? To what extent are we simply risking another cycle of regional policy innovation followed by contraction? How might new options be developed for sustaining the type of participative, bottom-up regional development strategies so critical to the long term?

### **3. Regional Development Agencies and Local Government: Reviewing Current Debate on the Capacity & Legitimacy of Regional Institutions**

At least partial answers to the above questions can be gleaned from two important current debates: on the role, nature and future of regional economic development agencies as players in the new policy era; and on the role, nature and future of local government. Both types of institution feature prominently in the list of governance actors provided earlier, and both are key institutional products of two of the three major regional governance traditions above.

My focus is on institutions, because it is important to understand the frameworks by which regional development decisions are made, resources gathered and allocated, and solutions implemented over the long haul. A vital question thrown up by the increasing diversity and plurality in approaches to regional policy engagement is how these are to be sustained: hence, the need for viable regional institutions. Two recent federal inquiries touching the future of regional economic development agencies and local government further emphasise two key issues in policy debate – regional institutional capacity, and regional institutional legitimacy. For convenience we frame regional economic development agencies as raising particular problems of capacity, and the evolution of local government as raising problems of legitimacy, but as we will quickly see these issues are actually closely intertwined.

#### ***Regional economic development agencies***

Consistently with international theories of 'new regionalism', in Australia regional development agencies are now seen as a vital link in the matrix of institutions needed for

more participative, entrepreneurial and collaborative styles of development. Regional economic coordination bodies are seen to have the necessary capacities to deliver this kind of development. These include: the capacity to promote shared business, community and political leadership in potential industry growth areas, including recognition of the economic benefits of social capital (Wanna & Withers 2000: 86; Cavaye et al. 2002); to encourage better networking of businesses, and between business and the public sector, including new public-private partnerships; and to provide the technical expertise needed to ensure initiatives will meet multiple sustainability objectives (economic, social and environmental). In theory, they should also have the capacity to catalyse actual implementation of the new initiatives, with sufficient control over public resources to coordinate infrastructure and other services; and in a position to accept and exercise devolved responsibility for key decisions to proceed; to monitor and evaluate progress; and to do all this in a manner that has some democratic or politically legitimate basis.

Against this theory, however, the Australian reality in practice can be compared with international models such as Britain's 1990s devolution program. Whether or not it works (Lovering 1999; 2001; cf Storper 1997; Scott 1998), that program rests on strong administrative Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), constituted with legislative authority and with substantial public resources at their disposal (£2.8 billion in 2003) to build strategic leadership, foster regional partnerships and identify opportunities for competitive advantage. Moreover, one-third of their membership is taken from local government, and their establishment was accompanied by political devolution in the form of reconstituted Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish parliaments, to whom the Regional Development Agencies are accountable. This robust institutional framework is now being extended across English regions more generally (Hill and Roberts 1995; DETR 2000).

Immediately, severe contrasts with Australia begin to become apparent. Australia's framework of regional development agencies was examined through a federal government inquiry appointed in 2001, the national Regional Business Development Analysis (RBDA). The final report (RBDA 2003) confirmed elements of the cynicism and exhaustion afflicting many past efforts at regional participation. It identified major barriers to sustainable regional development as including the basic configuration of Australia's political institutions: the Australian federal system is out-of-date in a global world; local governments are too small; state governments are too large; regional planning is poor; and coordination between the three levels of government is characterised by inadequacy, duplication and wastage (RBDA 2003: 5, 30). Concluding that it was "not practical" to expect fundamental change, the RBDA panel nevertheless appealed for rationalisation of the current plethora of local and regional development bodies into a stronger, nationally coherent framework, with just one common agency for each "self-identified" region.

The contrast between European notions of “new regionalism” and the problems identified by the RBDA in Australia is heightened by empirical evidence of the fragmented and unstable nature of Australian regional development bodies. The last major effort to develop a nationally coherent framework was in 1994, but was cancelled in 1996, then replaced from 1998-2000 with a variety of new, portfolio-specific state and federal programs. As in Europe the resulting bodies involve major business leadership and significant local government interpenetration, but practitioners and local governments alike confirm a pattern of inadequate organisational size, low (usually non-existent) recurrent funding, “Third World”-style organisational birth-and-death rates, poorly directed and insufficiently tailored central funding, and duplication and coordination problems between and within governments (Beer & Maude 1996; Beer & Maude 2002: 5.1; Beer et al. 2003: 147; Lennon et al. 2003: 40-41; see also Beer and Maude this volume). While there is a relative trend towards some stabilisation, increased technical competence and increased hope, the institutional framework is coming off a very low base.

Even if all other factors were equal, little conviction could accompany any claim that the present framework of regional economic development bodies could ever develop the capacities needed to help regional economies survive and thrive in the new policy environment. First, at the time of writing there was still no major action to deliver even the minimalist rationalisation recommended by the RBDA. Second, there is so far little sign of practical movement by the state and federal agencies to coordinate their own regional policies and activities to an extent that would allow consolidated RDAs to exert any real influence or control over regional decision-making. Third, the responses to date – including the RBDA recommendation itself – remain confined to the bureaucratic, administrative approach to regional governance identified in the previous section. The nature of devolution/decentralisation as not just an administrative but also a political process remains unrecognised.

Overseas, Australian experts report that the appearance of “a greater devolution of power” to Australia’s regions would be misleading even if RDAs could be taken seriously, because the regions continue to be defined as “organisational and operating” rather than “traditional administrative [i.e. political] units” (Roberts et al. 1996: 448). Even if consolidated RDAs came about, who would oversee them politically and act as their political defenders at their own regional level, in the way that British RDAs are clearly accountable to the regional population through their new regional parliaments? Not even the RBDA acknowledges this question, even though *not* to acknowledge it is to guarantee continuing duplicatory accountabilities to multiple governments, as much to bureaucracies as to political representatives and least of all directly to the communities concerned. In other words, not just the capacity but the legitimacy of such institutions

remains a suppressed topic – one whose criticality to long-term improvement is clearly demonstrated by the next example.

***Local government, cost-shifting and sustainable finance***

Almost in parallel to the Regional Business Development Analysis discussed above, the federal government initiated an inquiry into the financial resources available to local government in Australia, with particular focus on the degree of cost-shifting by state governments onto local governments. Prominent examples of cost-shifting include unfunded or under-funded state mandates to undertake local and/or regional environmental regulation, planning, and delivery of infrastructure or other services; and reductions in state funding to local government where federal funding is known to exist. Undertaken by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration (Commonwealth 2003), the inquiry also delved deep into issues of regional institutional capacity, for reasons that are not hard to discern. Given the plight of RDAs and like regional bodies, the only fixed institutional constant that tends to survive each regional policy wave is local government. However weak, the simple fact is that local governments are the only *enduring* institutions with unswerving interest in their own regions' socio-economic development (Commonwealth 2003: 57-97).

Despite openness to attack as a federal Conservative government weapon against seven Labor state/territory governments, the unanimous multi-party report was one of the most significant reviews undertaken of local government's evolution in Australia's federal system. Its primary recommendation was for ongoing debate, through a national Summit on Intergovernmental Relations, aimed at achieving the goal originally set out by the Whitlam government in 1972-75 – a tripartite system of public finance in which local government would receive federal funding directly, rather than via the states (Commonwealth 2003: 134-145). This approach would enable the federal government to stabilize local/regional funding by deducting from state payments those costs actually being borne by local governments, and directing them to the local level. Further, should local and federal governments be able to agree on suitable new frameworks for regional participation or other regional strategies, these could be more easily, and directly, funded.

Given local government's cornerstone role in regional planning and participation, this recommendation flagged a serious, structural way of devolving the resources needed to build regional institutional capacity. Increased local government funding is an incontrovertible "first step" to solving many of the problems confronting regions (Beer et al. 2003: 263), and in this sense the Cost-Shifting Inquiry's recommendation was just as tangible as that of the RBDA. Like the RBDA, the Inquiry was also unabashed in its acknowledgement that local and regional funding was not a stand-alone problem. The entire federal system was acknowledged as deficient if, as reported (Drummond 2002), its current duplication and transaction costs stood at least \$20 billion per annum.

Importantly, if savings could be made, they should be redirected to the local/regional “coalface”.

Another crucial lesson of the Inquiry, therefore, was its express and implied conclusions about the legitimacy of the institutions operating at different spatial levels. In contrast to the RBDA and most “regional planning” initiatives since the 1940s, regional bodies were not described as an antidote to the well-known incapacities of local governments, nor as rendering redundant any need for local government’s development. Instead, the Inquiry affirmed the importance of local government as a vital, permanent and rapidly evolving general-purpose sphere of government, still subject to state power but increasingly unlimited in the diversity and significance of its responsibilities (Commonwealth 2003: 9-24). Constraints on its capacity were primarily structural, legal and financial; its political legitimacy was now much less in question. The Inquiry thus presented some of the clearest affirmations of the institutional legitimacy of local government, in a national sense, since the 1970s – and possibly, since the mid-1800s.

While not couched in the international terms of “new regionalism”, the Inquiry’s approach was therefore potentially more consistent with it than the RBDA. Fundamental in contemporary international rhetoric about regional development, is a recognition of the political legitimacy of regional institutions both as an asset in rebuilding political cohesion, and a prerequisite for the meaningful, long-term community and business engagement needed to buoy regional economic prospects. Australia has followed other Western countries in experiencing declining “trust” in government, at least in so far as government is perceived as dominated by elite adversarial party-politics, bureaucracies aloof to the “real” world, and intergovernmental conflict, wastage and overlap (Keating 2000: 18-28; Keating et al. 2000). The Inquiry’s affirmation of local government appears to reflect a strong intuition that even if public respect for Australian local government has had historical challenges, it at least appears to be on the rise, which is more difficult to suggest for either state or federal government – a fact empirically verified in the United States and Europe even if not yet in Australia (see Jennings 1998; Keating 1998).

Why is this newfound respect for local political institutions so important? The answer lies in the fact that, like capacity, legitimacy is once again becoming fundamental to the ability of regional governance frameworks to even exist, let alone function. Under the conceptions of regional participation that dominated from the 1940s-1990s, “bottom-up” trust and confidence in government was less crucial. Regional development could still occur even in the presence of local cynicism and community exhaustion, where central bureaucracies were prepared to plan, drive and fund it to the necessary degree. This reality provides a key reminder that while all governance frameworks need to achieve political legitimacy in order to function, legitimate authority is achieved in different ways. According to Jurgen Habermas there are three main bases for legitimate authority: “belief... by those affected” in the decision-making processes governing their

life; “fear of, and submission to, indirectly threatened sanctions” if one does not participate or honour those process; and “simple compliance engendered by the individual’s perception of his own powerlessness and the lack of alternatives open to him” (Habermas 1976: 96).

Either of the last two bases can be used to explain the political basis of regional policies driven by “top-down” administrative imperatives in the decades leading up to the 1990s. Under Australia’s “do-it-yourself” version of the “new regionalism”, however, regional economic renewal simply becomes impossible without a governance framework supported by Habermas’ first basis: legitimacy derived from public awareness and confidence in the processes of regional decision-making themselves. This need for greater public confidence is well recognised in Australian regional development debate, given its importance to questions of economic leadership (which after all does not exist without “followership”); the financial feasibility of economic opportunities and solutions; trust in the technical or practical feasibility of proposals, including “triple bottom line” ecological and social considerations (Cavaye et al. 2002: 31; Lane *et al* 2004: 107; Jennings & Moore 2000: 185-6; Brown 2002c: 23-6); business and citizen belief that participation in regional planning will be worth the effort (cf. past unrealistic faith in the “participatory culture” of recipient communities: Jennings & Moore 2000: 182); and confidence that the results of participation will be durable and enforceable (RBDA 2003: 30; Dovers 1999: 8; Beer et al. 2003: 235). Conversely, at the same time as community trust in regional governance has become more important, the type of cynicism and exhaustion that have long characterised regional participation in Australian development questions become more problematic. While *distrust* is not unnatural, where pervasive it is known to “paralyse all capacity for cooperative agency” and “crush political energy and creativity in a sense of overwhelming futility” (Dunn 1988/2000: 85; Hudson 2004) – insurmountable barriers to any regional economic development framework based on “bottom-up” initiative and enthusiasm.

The increasing legitimacy now claimed by Australian local government thus appears to reflect growing consciousness that community understanding of and proximity to the real loci of decision-making control are regaining importance, since local/regional communities must not only participate in and accept decisions – they must carry them out for themselves. Of course the glues that bind local government to its constituent communities are not just immediacy and proximity, but the durability of local government, the fact it has some resources – even if comparatively not many – and that whatever its political imperfections, local democracy provides an intelligible and relatively transparent form of accountability in which most can follow what is going on. Two lessons can be drawn from this changing regard for local government. First, even though the full significance of the local government struggle remains unacknowledged in policy debate, growing recognition of local government’s relative legitimacy suggests the



re-emergence of at least one of the two pre-1940s traditions of regional governance. While superficially, the unimpressed responses of most state governments to the Cost-Shifting Inquiry hold out little prospect of reform, its bipartisan federal acceptance and the fact that the federal government holds ultimate sway in the current financial system may tell a different story. Thus, there are signs that regionalism (or at least localism) *is* receiving some greater recognition than before. Indeed, there is a breadth of policy reasons for revisiting local government's functional and financial position. Not only economic development, but also environmental and natural resource management and social policy, now depend on local and regional strategies. The recognition of local government as an existing institutional cornerstone (however imperfect) for all these, its potential for improvement, and the fact local government is a general-purpose sphere with at least some democratic legitimacy, all combine to offer some genuine hope for development in regional institutional frameworks.

Against this positive conclusion, however, a second lesson is more sobering. The contrasts between the administrative regionalisation strategies that continue to dominate the policy landscape, such as those assumed by the RBDA, and this possible resurgence in the legitimacy of local/regional government, point to continuing potential for conflict between these approaches. For example, we saw above that the RBDA criticised local government just as much as other spheres for the duplication, overlap and buck-passing, and gave it no special recognition. The Australian Local Government Association, for its part, had little positive to say about the usefulness of current state and federal concepts of “regions” as used by the RBDA:

Australia's Regions... have no organised structure apart from loose knit associations of Regional Organisations of Councils (which are not legal entities) and these vary in effectiveness.... ‘Regions’ cannot order and structure their economies. At best they may provide a promotional and marketing role however they cannot act as a leader of overall private sector aspirations.... Regions have no ability to raise funding and are beholden to higher authorities. Therefore government policy which talks about *regions taking responsibility* for their future and regional businesses somehow doing the same, have little basis in reality (ALGA 2002: 19).

Local government also appears conscious that continued presentation of “the region” as an environment in which state and federal agencies can simply “capitalise on the strengths of local rural communities by fostering greater community involvement” runs serious risks, due to the problems of institutional capacity and legitimacy outlined:

Local rural communities are represented by local government. Many communities expect Local Government to undertake that role [of capitalising on local strengths through greater involvement] yet local government has no real access to the funding or power needed to fulfil that role. It cannot direct either individuals or ‘regional

business' to do anything, but may have very minor promotional and awareness roles (ALGA 2003: 23; see also Lennon et al. 2003: 38).

These are not new observations, but almost carbon-copies of the types of complaints made by local government and others against previous waves of administratively-created regional bodies including those of the 1940s and 1970s. Therefore, while there is evidence on one hand of a new recognition of the importance of institutional legitimacy in regional governance (in political practice and not just in rhetoric) for the first time in some decades, on the other hand, there remains a clear risk of recycling political conflicts and institutional failures, unless careful consideration is given to implications of capacity and legitimacy in the latest “bottom-up” policy wave. On this evidence, the future of regional governance is standing at something of a cusp, with considerable potential for reinvention and innovation in institutional design if capacity and legitimacy are taken seriously, but equal potential for a repeat of past frustrations if the longer history of federal-regional debate is forgotten.

#### **4. Conclusions: Regional Participation and the Reconnection of Regional & Political Development**

In this chapter I have shown that the question of the best political, institutional and administrative strategies to support public participation in regional governance is not a new issue, but rather one of the most enduring and difficult questions of Australian public policy. Alongside the perennial issue of “how much public intervention”, the geographic scale and institutional framework of publicly supported governance strategies are important policy dilemmas in their own right. Participation in, and governance of, regional development have a contorted history. Their complexity is often hidden beneath a superficial consensus that “of course” sustainable regional development is a priority, beneath which lie intractable questions about the roles of different institutions in a federal system, and the importance of facing up to the historical challenges of regional governance.

This analysis shows some of the risks of failing to recognise that, at least until very recently (and so far only partially), the rhetoric and reality of regional devolution in Australia have been poles apart. This lesson supports our most significant overall conclusion, which is the need for a more considered debate about the range of institutional options worth considering if genuine participation in regional development is to be sustained long-term, and local and regional agency seriously generated or unlocked. Some policymakers will always consider discussion of substantial reform to the Australian federal system as an empty theoretical exercise, beyond their own interest or capacity. However there is substantial evidence that others – in particular regional communities themselves, both rural and urban – may well have the interest and capacity in reengaging with these questions.

Rather than foreclosing on possibilities or burying past debates as if they never occurred, the national polity stands to make healthier institutional choices with an open consciousness of all the major governance traditions on offer. What mix of strategies and institutions might ultimately emerge is not the key question – more important is that the debate is rich in ideas and understandings of the real roots of regional dissatisfaction, as well as the real institutional capacities and legitimacies needed to achieve sustainable regional aspirations. The fundamental lesson is that sustainable regional development is not just an economic or social process, but a political and institutional one. The options canvassed in current debate – strong and consolidated regional development agencies, and strong and consolidated local government – are both potentially valid and need not be mutually exclusive, if significant will exists to see them through. However, the viability of either option, let alone a framework that creates the necessary interface between these and other options within Australia's political traditions, depends on a more ambitious public discussion about the full implications of any development theories based on regional participation and agency.

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