Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: Risk Management
Committee: Joint Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Reports
Question reference number: 1 and 2
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

1. According to the ANAO, weaknesses in controls within Predict!, identified in the 2022–23 MPR, have not yet been addressed by Defence and continue to impact the effectiveness of the system and data quality.
    a) What activities, specifically, is Defence undertaking to address the weaknesses in controls within Predict! identified in the 2022–23 MPR?
2. In 2025, Defence stated it was taking a number of steps to address governance issues around risks and issues logs in general. The following issues were identified by the ANAO in 2024–25:
    - variable compliance with corporate guidance; all 21 projects had an approved Risk Management Plan, however, three projects (AIR555 MC–55A Peregrine, AIR7001 MQ–4C Triton and SEA9100 Phase 1 IE Logistics Support Helicopter) were unable to demonstrate a review of their risk management plan as required by Defence policy
    - lack of visibility of risks and issues when a project is transitioning to sustainment
    - risks and issues logs are not reviewed and updated in a timely manner to ensure accurate, complete and up-to-date record of risks and issues
    - lack of quality control resulting in inconsistent approaches in the recording of issues within Predict!.

    a) What activities, specifically, is Defence undertaking to rectify each of these shortcomings?

Answer:

On 21 November 2025, subsequent to the release of the 2022-23 Major Projects Report, Defence updated the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Risk Management Manual from Version 1.0 to Version 2.0 to address the weaknesses in controls. This internal guidance strengthens risk governance and controls, including timely review and updating of risk and issues logs through a variety of new and improved mechanisms.

Since April 2025, assurance activities undertaken by Predict! administrators proactively identify risks with insufficient/missing data, as well as risks and issues overdue for review. The relevant risk owners and project delivery teams are then notified. These activities include maintaining updates to the Major Projects Report and supporting risk owners through professionalised reporting, ongoing risk management training, and engagement in Risk Management Working Groups and Communities of Practice.

The Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group is in the process of adopting the latest release of the Predict! risk register software (version 6.5.0) with a planned ‘go live’ in May 2026. This update will bring additional new functionality which will allow projects to capture controls that can be directly

linked to risk causes and consequences. In turn this is expected to improve both the quality of risks captured in the system as well as the management of those risks.

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: Contingency and risk logs
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Reports
Question reference number: 3
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

3. All MPRs since 2011–12 have made an observation about the clarity of the relationship between contingency allocation and identified risks. Defence has previously told the Committee the issue was being addressed as part of the risk management processes. In 2023, Defence told the Committee it was seeing positive signs that contingency funding policies were being adhered to across the MPR projects and would continue to assess compliance across all major projects. Defence also told the Committee it has taken a 'multi-faceted approach' to address the use of contingency and risks for major projects including training for staff and updated instructions.
   In 2023–24, two projects (Overlander, ANZAC Air Search Radar Replacement) had not fully aligned their contingency log to their risk log as required. Again in 2024–25, there was a lack of clarity in the relationship between contingency allocation and identified risks in LAND5403 Phase 1 Apache Attack Helicopter, and SEA1448 Phase 4B ANZAC Air Search Radar Replacement.
   a) For what reasons are projects failing to align their contingency log to their risk log as required?
   b) What steps is Defence taking to rectify this issue?
   c) How is Defence monitoring compliance?

Answer:

Defence continues to prioritise the appropriate management of acquisition projects, including the documentation and management of risk and contingency. As previously advised, Defence uses Predict! as the management information system to document risks, risk mitigation activities and risk management solutions. Contingency is managed as a risk throughout the entire project.

Defence acknowledges the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit's observations regarding a small number of MPR projects where contingency logs and risk logs were not fully aligned. These instances likely reflect updates occurring at different times, legacy documentation from earlier policy frameworks not been fully reconciled in Predict!.

Defence is continually updating policy manuals and instructions, and has delivered 'Risk Management Principles' training to strengthen the risk management skills in Defence. This course trained over 260 participants in 2025 and is forecast to deliver training to a similar sized cohort in 2026 and beyond.

Independent Assurance Reviews (IARs) assess the ongoing viability of capability investment decisions, and provide senior leadership with an assessment of the health and outlook of programs, acquisition projects and sustainment products, including risk and contingency considerations.

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: Australian Industry Capability Plans
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Reports
Question reference number: 3
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

4. AIC plans are intended to inform industry of forward opportunities to participate in Defence projects. Defence advised the ANAO in August 2023 that there are no arrangements in place to ensure that Australian Industry Capability plans are published on the Defence website as required. Defence accepted an ANAO recommendation in early 2025 that AIC plans are prepared and published where required.
   In January 2026, Defence stated its publication of an AIC Plan for the Hunter Class Frigate (six months late) 'aligned with internal resource prioritisation'.
   a) What processes and procedures has Defence put in place to ensure AIC plans are published as required in a timely manner, given the intent of an AIC Plan is to inform industry of forward opportunities?

Answer:

Defence is employing various strategies to ensure Australian Industry Capability (AIC) Plans, are published in a timely manner.

To support consistent practice across Defence, an internal fact sheet on publishing AIC Plans was updated on the Defence intranet.

Course material for the Defence Australian Industry Capability Practitioner training course, delivered to Defence and industry participants, covers the requirement for AIC Plans to be published.

Defence is also reviewing its standard contracting templates to determine suitable adjustments for guidance, to ensure the preparation, approval and publication of AIC Plans.

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: Schedule management
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Reports
Question reference number: 5 and 6
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

5. Defence acknowledges it needs to improve its capacity to forecast and manage schedules and this is hampered in part by optimistic assessments from Defence and industry.
   a) What practical steps is Defence taking to improve its ability to forecast and manage schedules?
   b) Provide some practical examples of how these steps have improved project forecasting.

6. Defence states the evolution of technology and integration requirements are significant driving factors in the complexity of Defence major projects. Projects at ACAT I and ACAT II are characterised by high acquisition cost, project management complexity, schedule complexity, technical difficulty, operational and support challenges, and sophisticated commercial factors. Managing project schedules, according to Defence, remains a 'perennial challenge.' Nevertheless, Defence sets ambitious timelines to encourage performance, efficiency, and ensure rapid delivery of capability. The demand for faster delivery will grow commensurately, requiring a greater tolerance for risk.
   a) How is Defence reconciling growing technical complexity, an inability to meet current schedules, a determination to set tighter schedules, and a willingness to embrace risk in achieving schedules?
   b) When Defence states it will require a greater tolerance for risk, what risk is Defence tolerating and how will it improve schedule performance?

Answer:

Question 5

a) What practical steps is Defence taking to improve its ability to forecast and manage schedules?

Defence is tackling the ability to forecast and manage schedules through both workforce competence and the tools and techniques at their disposal.

Defence is leveraging recognised standards and best practice from across Australia to design, develop and implement a professionalisation program that equips Defence with a sustainable and fit-for-purpose workforce and builds business acumen across the organisation.

Defence has been working to provide project managers with a more efficient and effective means of forecasting project expenditure.

b) Provide some practical examples of how these steps have improved project forecasting.

The professionalisation program places emphasis on knowledge sharing. Where this has been occurring amongst project schedulers there has been measurable improvement in raising 'schedule health' scores. In the past six months participating delivery branches have demonstrated measurable improvement in schedule health.

Question 6

a) How is Defence reconciling growing technical complexity, an inability to meet current schedules, a determination to set tighter schedules, and a willingness to embrace risk in achieving schedules?

Defence is reconciling growing technical complexity, and embracing risk with the implementation of a number of initiatives including conducting Schedule Confidence Risk Reviews (SC2R) and the requirement for Implementation Risk Assessments.

The One Defence Capability System mandates the conduct of a SC2R before consideration by the Investment Committee at Gate 2. An SC2R is a Commonwealth led event, undertaken during the tender evaluation process, which provides a structured method to achieve a higher level of confidence in the achievability of the proposed acquisition scope, schedule and resource planning.

b) When Defence states it will require a greater tolerance for risk, what risk is Defence tolerating and how will it improve schedule performance?

This refers to delivery risks such as schedule delay, cost uncertainty and integration challenges. These risks are managed through the Defence Risk Management Framework.

Defence is addressing growing technical complexity and persistent schedule pressures following its adoption of the integrated One Defence Capability System (ODCS).

To tighten schedules while managing complexity, Defence uses Minimum Viable Capability (MVC) definitions within Integrated Capability Directives (ICDs), focusing delivery on the minimum acceptable operational effect achievable within required timeframes.

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: Lessons Learnt
Committee: Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Report
Question reference number: 7
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

7. A lesson becomes a 'lesson learned' once recommendations from the lessons information have been implemented and outcomes validated.
   a) How many of the Lessons in the MPR have become 'Lessons Learned'?
   b) How many lessons in the PDSSs have been used as case studies and shared more broadly through lessons panels?

Answer:

The process of declaring a lesson learned is rigorous, as the validation of benefits being realised is critical to achieving genuine improvement. Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group undertakes analysis of the information presented in the Project Data Summary Sheet for each Major Projects Report project. This analysis includes the identification of consistent and systemic occurrences of patterns across projects, as these contribute to understanding how a lesson could potentially improve the way Defence's delivery business is structured or executed.

This analysis is tabled at the annual Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Lessons Boards in the form of change recommendations that would be necessary in order to transform the lessons identified into whole-of-organisation lessons learned. As at the most recent Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Lessons Board, held in November 2025, nine action items relating to the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Reports have been identified and closed.

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: Workforce professionalisation
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Report
Question reference number: 8
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

8. Defence states it is pursuing an ambitious agenda that leverages recognised standards and best practice from across the Australian Government, tertiary, vocational education, and private sectors to design, develop and implement a professionalisation program that equips Defence with a sustainable and fit-for-purpose workforce and builds business acumen across the organisation.
   a) What are the specific elements/courses of Defence's professionalism program launched in July 2025 with the pilot release of the Defence Learning Academy?
   b) What future elements/courses are being planned?
   c) How many staff have commenced and completed training through the Defence Learning Academy and in which elements/courses?

Answer:

In December 2025 Defence completed the pilot for the key capability delivery job families comprising commercial, project and program management, engineering and technology, and materiel logistics.

Defence's professionalism program, delivered through the pilot since July 2025, includes:

- comprehensive competency frameworks for all key roles within each job family profile, including mapping existing training opportunities to the workforce;
- a career pathway tool to enable our workforce to understand required role competencies and easily determine training requirements and future career pathway; and
- a comprehensive gap analysis of current training options compared to required competencies, with procurement approaches for new training courses and streamlining of existing course offerings underway.

Future activities planned for 2026 include:

- implementation of a reciprocal Defence Industry Secondment program;
- targeted cohort uplift programs;
- ongoing promotion of Defence and Australian Public Service Commission programs; and
- continual development of the Defence Learning Academy into an enterprise wide ecosystem to enable continuous growth that supports the Defence APS capability and agility to meet future needs.

Since 1 July 2025, 13,846 Defence staff have commenced and completed training through the Defence Learning Academy across the following courses:

- Three courses in Program and Project Management provided by the Australian Public Service Commission
- Procurements for SES Delegates course
- Five Engineering and Technical courses, including Defence Reliability Management and Cyber Security courses.
- Six Program and Project Management courses, including Diploma of Project Management, Fundamentals of Project Management and Project Controls courses
- 10 Materiel Logistics courses, including Materiel Logistics Practitioners and Logistics Support Analysis Foundation Course
- Commercial masterclass offerings addressing Speed in Procurements, Foreign Military Sales and Strategic Partners
- 13 Procurement and Contracting courses, including Certificate IV in Procurement and Contracting, Performance Based Contracting Practitioners, Australian Standard for Defence Contracting, Tender Evaluation Skills and Negotiation Skills.
- 25 courses in Procurement and Contracting provided by the Australian Public Service Commission.
- 12 sessions of a masterclasses focusing on procurement, contract and project management across Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Group and Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Group.
- Commercial Learning Week (November 2025 Pilot) that offered range of foundational and masterclass offerings
- Commercial Learning Week (February 2025 Pilot).

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: Minimum Viable Capability
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Reports
Question reference number: 9-14
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:
9. In the MPR, Defence states minimum viable capability involves a range of complex, inter-related processes.
a) What are these processes?
b) How do these processes bear on the timeliness of capability delivery?

10. MVC has been applied to AIR6500 Integrated Air and Missile Defence Command and Control. Second pass approval was based on an MVC milestone, rather than traditional IOC and FOC milestones. MVC in this project is defined as 'Tranche 2A will deliver an MVC that addresses obsolescence issues of deployable elements of the current Air Battle Management System and integrates priority IAMD [Integrated Air Missile Defence] capabilities.' Neither IOC nor FOC are defined for this project. The MPR definition of IOC is: The capability state relating to the in-service realisation of the first subset of a capability system that can be employed operationally. Declaration of IOC is made by the Capability Manager, supported by the results of operational test and evaluation and declaration by the Delivery Group(s) that the fundamental inputs to capability have been delivered.
a) How is MVC different to IOC?
b) In what specific ways has the application of MVC to this project distinguished its project management and capability delivery from other projects?
c) What policy and guidance documents have been developed to guide the application of MVC to this particular project?

11. AIR6500 is delivering JABMS [Joint Air Battle Management System] MVC through an agile delivery method. This is explained in the PDSS as 'system development and delivery occurs on a fixed cadence of incremental releases and scope is planned and adjusted within the releases as the project progresses.' This method is said to allow for quicker delivery of incremental capability while at the same time managing the major risks associated with high complexity integration and rapidly evolving technology and threats. A common sense interpretation of this statement would be: • the dates for the delivery of outputs (incremental releases) are established in advance
• the scope of what is delivered on those dates is adjusted as the project progresses.
a) Is this an accurate interpretation of this statement? If not, please provide a plain language definition.

12. The PDSS states the agile delivery method is used to manage scope amongst the fixed schedule releases. This ensures the highest value capability is delivered to Defence as a priority.
a) How exactly does the agile method ensure the highest value capability is delivered to Defence as a priority?
b) What evidence does Defence have to support this statement?

13. AIR6500 is managing a number of high or very high emergent risks relating to insufficient expertise and workforce capacity; integration across project elements; and supply chain issues.

a) How does the MVC approach manage these risks in a way that differs from the more traditional waterfall or other approaches?

14. Full capability and ongoing upgrades for JABMS will be progressively considered for approval as a 'series of future "capability target states"'.
a) How does Defence define IOC and FOC within these parameters?

Answer:

Question 9

a) What are these processes?

The complex, inter-related processes referred to in the Major Projects Report relate to strategic needs analysis, force design, capability requirements development, capability delivery, and preparedness systems and processes.

b) How do these processes bear on the timeliness of capability delivery?

Defence has implemented reform to approval pathways, to aid in speed to capability through the development process into delivery.

Question 10

a) How is MVC different to IOC?

AIR6500 Tranche 2A Minimum Viable Capability is intended as the initial capability baseline that Initial Operational Capability would traditionally represent.

b) In what specific ways has the application of Minimum Viable Capability to this project distinguished its project management and capability delivery from other projects?

This has not materially altered the project's agile delivery approach or application of agile delivery approach.

c) What policy and guidance documents have been developed to guide the application of Minimum Viable Capability to this particular project?

The standard suite of One Defence Capability Systems policy and guidance documents are applied to this project. In addition, the project has applied contemporary industry guidance to achieve Minimum Viable Capability.

Question 11

a) Is this an accurate interpretation of this statement? If not, please provide a plain language definition.

Yes.

Question 12

a) How exactly does the agile method ensure the highest value capability is delivered to Defence as a priority?

AIR6500's agile delivery approach ensures the highest-value operational capability is delivered to Defence as a priority by regular assessment and re-prioritisation of scope.

b) What evidence does Defence have to support this statement?

The agile delivery approach for AIR6500 focusses on the delivery of meaningful and prioritised capability incrementally, as opposed to more traditional 'waterfall' delivery processes. This approach includes the ability to respond more rapidly to technological advancements. This aligns with Defence vision to deliver capability and is consistent with the contemporary industry approach of delivering minimum viable products.

Question 13

a) How does the Minimum Viable Capability approach manage these risks in a way that differs from the more traditional waterfall or other approaches?

It is an agile delivery approach (not Minimum Viable Capability approach), that enables the ability to rapidly respond to technological advancements and evolving threat environment.

Question 14

a) How does Defence define Initial Operational Capability and Final Operational Capability within these parameters?

The project is in the process of updating and seeking Government approvals for revised Minimum Viable Capability, Initial Operational Capability and Final Operational Capability milestones.

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: Projects of Interest, Projects of Concern
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Report
Question reference number: 15
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

15. The PoI and PoC processes provide for greater monitoring and oversight of underperforming Defence acquisitions.
a) What is the process for designating a foreign military sales acquisition a project of concern?
b) Is the manner of managing a foreign military sales PoC the same as other acquisition methods?
c) Since 2014, identify projects placed on the PoI and PoC lists, along with their primary acquisition methods (as defined in the MPR - foreign military sale, government-to-government, other).

Answer:

There are no current or former Projects of Concern involving Foreign Military Sales as a primary acquisition method. Designation of any project as a Project of Concern is a decision made at the discretion of the Minister for Defence Industry based on advice from Defence.

The manner of managing a Foreign Military Sales Project of Concern is the same as other acquisition methods.

Table 1 reflects a breakdown of Projects of Concern and Projects of Interest, captured in the Major Projects Report with primary acquisition methods consistent with Defence terminology – Foreign Military Sale, Direct Commercial Sales and Cooperative (government-to-government) arrangements. For non-Major Project Report projects, acquisition methods have been selected from performance reporting or internal records. The years cited for Major Project Report inclusion reflect the start of the first financial year reported, and end of the latest financial year reported.

Table 1. List of Projects of Interest and Concern since 2014 and their Primary Acquisition Method

Project Name	Project Number	Primary Acquisition Method	POC/POI	Elevated	MPR Project
Civil Military Air Traffic Management System (CMATS)	AIR 5431 Phase 3	Direct Commercial Sale	POC and POI	POI Dec 2015-Sep 2017 POC Sep 2017-May 2018 POI May 2018-Oct 2022 POC Oct 2022-Current	Yes (2016-2025)
Offshore Patrol Vessel	SEA 1180 Phase 1	Direct Commercial Sale	POC and POI	POI Aug 2023-Oct 2023 POC Oct 2023-Current	Yes (2018-2025)
F-35A Lightning II Acquisition	AIR 6000 Phase 2A/B	Cooperative	POI	Jun 2017-Current	Yes (2013-2025)
Hunter Class Frigates	SEA 5000	Direct Commercial Sale	POI	Mar 2020-Current	Yes (2019-2025)
Protected Mobility Vehicle—Light (PMV–L) 'Hawkei'	LAND 121 Phase 4	Direct Commercial Sale	POI	Dec 2018–May 2021 Jul 2023-Current	Yes (2016-2025)
MC-55A Peregrine	AIR 555	Foreign Military Sale	POI	Sep 2023-Current	Yes (2021-2025)
Mounted Combat Reconnaissance Capability	LAND 400 Phase 2	Direct Commercial Sale	POI	Jun 2024-Current	Yes (2019-2025)
Supply Class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment Vessels	SEA 1654 Phase 3	Direct Commercial Sale	POI	Dec 2018-Jun 2022 Feb 2025-Current	Yes (2017-2022)
Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN)	AIR 2025 Phase 6	Direct Commercial Sale	POI	Sep 2019-Aug 2024	Yes (2020-2025)
Air to Air Refuelling Capability	AIR 5402	Direct Commercial Sale	POC	Feb 2010–Dec 2015	Yes (2013-2017)
Multi-Role Helicopter (MRH 90)	AIR 9000 Phases 2/4/6	Direct Commercial Sale	POC	Nov 2011- Nov 2023	Yes (2013-2023)

Project Name	Project Number	Primary Acquisition Method	POC/POI	Elevated	MPR Project
MQ-4C Triton Remotely Piloted Aircraft System	AIR 7000 Phase 1B	Cooperative	POI	Mar 2020-Aug 2022	Yes (2019-2024)
Battlefield Airlift-Caribou Replacement	AIR 8000 Phase 2	Foreign Military Sale initially and then Direct Commercial Sale	POI	May 2020-Jun 2022	Yes (2013-2022)
Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications	JOINT 2008 Phase 5A	Cooperative	POI	Mar 2017-May 2021	Yes (2013-2021)
Amphibious Ships	JOINT 2048 Phase 4A/B	Direct Commercial Sale	POI	Mar 2017-Dec 2019	Yes (2013-2019)
Battlespace Communication Systems (Land)	JOINT 2072 Phase 2A	Direct Commercial Sale	POI	Mar 2017-Jun 2018	Yes (2013-2019)
Air Warfare Destroyer Program	SEA 4000 Phase 3	Direct Commercial Sale	POC	Jun 2014-Dec 2017	Yes (2013-2020)
Extreme High Frequency (EHF) Covert Communications for a Single Collins class Submarine	SEA01439 Phase RCE3 (SEA 1439 Phase 3)	Cooperative	POI	Sep 2016-Dec 2016	Yes (2013-2020)
Battlefield Command System	LAND 200 Phase 2 (LAND 200 Tranche 2)	Direct Commercial Sale	POI	Sep-2018-Jun 2025	Yes (2019-2025)

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: SEA1180 Phase 1 Offshore Patrol Vessel
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Reports
Question reference number: 16 and 17
Type of question: Written, 05 March 2026

Question:

16. The SEA1180 Phase 1 Offshore Patrol Vessel project was brought forward two years to provide for the continuous naval shipbuilding program. Initially it was to provide 12 vessels; this was later reduced to 6 and its role amended. One lesson was that an inadequate timeframe to conduct a procurement can diminish the opportunity for due diligence during tender evaluations, which is crucial to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the procurement process.
a) What were the practical consequences of the inadequate timeframe to conduct the procurement?
17. One lesson was that stakeholders were not being regularly informed about, and being a part of, project developments and decisions.
a) Which stakeholders were not receiving communication?
b) What impact has this lack of communication had on the delivery of capability?

Answer:

16) a. What were the practical consequences of the inadequate timeframe to conduct the procurement?

The shortened timeframe limited the ability to fully explore all aspects of the reference ship design. As a result, some elements of the design, planning, and supporting arrangements could not be examined in detail, which contributed to broader project uncertainty and increased schedule and technical risk.

17) a. Which stakeholders were not receiving communication?

In the early stages, there was inconsistent communication with several key internal and external stakeholders who had an interest in the project's progress. Work has been undertaken to remediate how Defence approach communication moving forward.

b. What impact has this lack of communication had on delivery of capability?

The reduced visibility of the risk of delayed delivery limited opportunities for earlier intervention or adjustments. This contributed to challenges that affected broader planning and put pressure on the existing capabilities to deliver on Government requirements.

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: LAND 200 Battlefield Command System
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Report
Question reference number: 18
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

18. The LAND200 capability was identified as a critical enabler for land force operations in the Defence White Paper 2009. In 2017, the Chief of Army described LAND200 as the 'highest-priority project in the Army'. It was intended to transition Army's command and control from a paper-based system to a modern digital system.
The MPR states LAND200 Tranche 2 was intended to deliver the core of Army's digital command, control and communications capability. Aspects of the tactical communications network were descoped. Defence stated it made a decision in early 2020 to cease the ongoing work of the battle management system, because it had 'effectively hit a technological cul-de-sac. We couldn't integrate it onto our platforms, it was becoming more and more expensive and we knew that the way technology was going was in a different direction, with open architecture and standardised compute with applications mounted onto the systems.'
The PDSS states the project will not deliver the weapon integrated BMS capability.
a) Aside from the number of vehicles into which the BCS has been installed, how much of the original intent for the LAND200 tranche 2 capability/scope has Defence delivered?
b) What has been the impact on the capability of the Battlefield Command System of the decision to descope the tactical communications network, and cease ongoing work on the battle management system in early 2020?

Answer:

LAND 200 Tranche 2 achieved Final Operating Capability in June 2025 and achieved 76.1 per cent of the original scope.

The decision to cease use of the legacy Battle Management System in 2021 is being mitigated through an interim command and control capability, which enabled continued functionality and informed the requirements for LAND 200 Tranche 3 (now LAND 4140). LAND 4140 is on track to commence delivery in FY 2026-27.

Inquiry Question

Department/Agency: Department of Defence
Topic: AIR555 MC-55A PEREGRINE
Committee: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Inquiry: Inquiry into the 2023-24 and 2024-25 Major Projects Report
Question reference number: 19
Type of question: Written, 5 March 2026

Question:

19. The PDSS for AIR555 states further schedule delays are possible as engineering, integration and flight test activities are yet to be completed and have the potential to result in delays in initial product delivery. There is a high likelihood that scope reduction or contingency will be required.
a) What scope reduction is being considered?
b) Provide an update on the progress of this project?

Answer:

No scope reductions are being considered for AIR555.

AIR555 MC-55A Peregrine flight test activities are complete. The first aircraft arrived in Australia on 22 January 2026. As announced by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence Industry, the entire fleet is expected to arrive this calendar year.