

Administration of the Age Pension

Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit

Submitter:

Michael Sanderson

Introduction

I welcome the opportunity to make this submission to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit inquiry into the administration of the Age Pension.

This inquiry concerns one of the Commonwealth's most important public entitlements. The Age Pension is not a minor administrative program. It is the public income floor for millions of older Australians. It determines whether many people can meet the basic costs of rent, food, medicine, energy, transport, communication, health care and daily life. The way it is administered is therefore not a narrow technical question. It is a question of public capability, institutional accountability and whether Parliament is prepared to ensure that older Australians can access what Parliament has already determined they are entitled to receive.

The Committee is examining the Department of Social Services (DSS) and Services Australia's administration of the Age Pension with reference to the effectiveness of oversight arrangements, processes for assessing applicant and recipient eligibility, arrangements to communicate and manage engagement with applicants and recipients, and any matters contained in and associated with Auditor General Report No. 20 of 2025 to 2026, Administration of the Age Pension.

The Auditor General's report should not be treated as a routine performance audit identifying minor service defects. It points to a deeper problem. The system has underpaid eligible recipients, overpaid others, delayed claims, produced long telephone wait times, relied on complex processes, pushed older Australians toward digital channels, and failed to properly evaluate whether the Age Pension is achieving its real purpose for recipients.

I make this submission not only as a member of the public, but as an Age Pension recipient. This is not an abstract issue for me. I have personally experienced the administrative burden of applying for the pension. Although my application occurred some time ago, it was slow enough that I contacted the responsible Minister, and only then did the process move forward. That should not be necessary in a properly functioning system. Older Australians should not need ministerial escalation to obtain progress on a basic public entitlement.

My personal experience is not offered as a substitute for the Auditor General's evidence. It is offered as a lived example of the kind of administrative failure that the report now identifies in systemic form.

The Age Pension is a public income floor, not a grudging fiscal concession

The Age Pension should be assessed as essential public income infrastructure. It is not a minor payment, a discretionary benefit, or a residual welfare afterthought. It is the main public income floor for older Australians who lack sufficient income and assets to support themselves in retirement.

The Age Pension is also a major Commonwealth program. In 2024 to 2025, Age Pension expenditure was 62.2 billion dollars, representing 8.4 per cent of the Federal Budget and 42.5 per cent of social security payments. There were 2.67 million Age Pension recipients as at June 2025.

That scale should not cause Parliament to treat the Age Pension as a fiscal problem to be contained. It should cause Parliament to insist that the program be administered properly, promptly, lawfully, humanely and with full attention to its real impact on recipients. The administrative capacity of the system should be proportionate to the real requirements of the program, including claim volumes, recipient vulnerability, complexity, telephone demand, face to face need, digital exclusion, review activity and the practical consequences of delay, underpayment or error.

The Commonwealth is not financially constrained in the same way as a household, business, council or state government. The Commonwealth issues the Australian dollar. Its real constraint is not whether it has dollars to spend, but whether the economy has the real resources, labour, housing, health services, care capacity, food, energy and infrastructure needed to meet public purpose without creating avoidable inflationary pressure.

That distinction matters in this inquiry. If the Age Pension is treated primarily as a budget cost, administrative design will tend to follow that assumption. The system will be built around restriction, delay, complexity, narrow verification and payment minimisation. If it is treated as a public income floor, administrative design must start from adequacy, accessibility, dignity, timeliness and real-life impact.

The Age Pension is not a serious inflation risk in the ordinary sense where payments are directed to basic needs. Pensioners on low incomes are not driving speculative demand or luxury consumption. Many live hand to mouth. Additional income is likely to be spent on food, rent, energy, medicine, transport, communication and care. The relevant question is not whether the Commonwealth can afford to administer and pay the Age Pension properly. The relevant question is whether Parliament is willing to use the Commonwealth's monetary authority and administrative machinery for good public purpose.

The Auditor General's report shows systemic administrative weakness

The Auditor General concluded that the administration of the Age Pension is only partly effective. The report found that effectiveness could be improved by tightening processes to verify eligibility and pension rates, simplifying and expediting access for applicants and recipients, and reporting on program effectiveness. Between 2021 to 2022 and 2023 to 2024, process deficiencies led to an estimated 5 billion dollars in incorrect payments, including 1.33 billion dollars in underpayments to recipients eligible for higher benefits and 3.67 billion dollars in overpayments.

Those figures should trouble the Committee. Underpayment to eligible older Australians is not a mere accounting discrepancy. For an Age Pension recipient, underpayment can mean missed rent, skipped medicine, reduced food, debt, stress and social isolation. Overpayment is also harmful because it can later create debt, anxiety and contested recovery action.

The report also found that complex procedures and limited staffing resulted in seniors waiting an average of 48 days for claims to be processed, and that maximum wait times for phone calls to be answered exceeded one hour on 435 days, or 57.3 per cent of total days during the period examined.

Those are not acceptable service outcomes for an essential public entitlement. A person applying for the Age Pension is often at a vulnerable transition point. Delay at that point can be financially and emotionally damaging.

DSS must evaluate impact, not merely coverage and payment mechanics

The most important finding in the Auditor General's report is that DSS does not evaluate the program's impact on recipients as required by the Social Security Administration Act 1999. DSS evaluates payment accuracy and the proportion of senior Australians receiving income support, but it does not properly evaluate whether the program actually maintains financial wellbeing or provides an acceptable standard of living.

That is the core failure. It is not enough to know how many people receive the Age Pension. It is not enough to know whether payment accuracy sits near a target.

Parliament needs to know whether older Australians can live on the payment after rent,

energy, food, medicine, transport, communication, insurance, home maintenance, disability related costs and care related costs.

The Age Pension is administered in a real economy. Cost of living pressure, lack of social housing, high private rents, gaps in health services, inadequate home care packages and aged care pressures all affect how older Australians interact with the pension system. These are not separate topics raised to distract from the inquiry. They are directly relevant because they increase administrative burden, hardship, phone calls, complaints, reassessments, disputes, review requests and the consequences of delay or underpayment.

An Age Pension system that ignores housing costs, health costs and care costs cannot properly measure its own impact. A pension paid correctly on paper may still fail in reality if the recipient cannot meet unavoidable living costs.

The Age Pension is superior to compulsory superannuation as a retirement income floor

This submission does not ask the Committee to conduct a general inquiry into superannuation. That would be outside the central purpose of this inquiry. However, the public understanding of the Age Pension is often distorted by the claim that compulsory superannuation is the real retirement income system and that the Age Pension is merely a fiscal burden.

That frame should be rejected. Compulsory superannuation may assist some people, particularly those with stable employment, higher incomes and asset accumulation over their working lives. But it cannot perform the same public function as the Age Pension. It cannot guarantee poverty relief, universal coverage, adequate income, or protection for people whose working lives were interrupted by illness, disability, caring responsibilities, insecure work, low wages, unemployment, family breakdown or housing insecurity.

Dr Cameron Murray's paper, *Scrap superannuation*, is useful in this context because it identifies the Age Pension as the more effective retirement income system when assessed against the standards that matter most. Murray argues that superannuation is costly, inefficient, unnecessary and unfair, and that the Age Pension substantially outperforms compulsory superannuation across microeconomic cost, macroeconomic efficiency and fairness. He also argues that the Age Pension is the real retirement income system because it directly allocates purchasing power to retirees who lack sufficient non work income, while compulsory superannuation operates largely as a tax advantaged asset purchase system.

The Committee does not need to accept every conclusion in Murray's report to accept the point relevant to this inquiry. Despite its shortcomings, the Age Pension is superior

to compulsory superannuation in the respects that matter to a public retirement income floor. It is more direct. It is more universal. It is better targeted to need. It is better able to relieve poverty. It is less dependent on a person having had a continuous and well-paid working life. It is less exposed to asset market outcomes. It is administratively leaner. It is more capable of being adjusted by Parliament to meet public purpose.

Murray's administrative comparison is also relevant. His analysis estimated that the publicly subsidised private superannuation system employed around 55,000 people at a cost of about 36 billion dollars a year while providing about 40.1 billion dollars in retirement income. By comparison, he estimated that the Age Pension used fewer than 7,000 staff and less than 1.7 billion dollars in administrative cost while providing about 44.6 billion dollars in retirement income to 2.5 million pensioners. On that analysis, the Age Pension delivered retirement income at about 4 per cent of the cost of the publicly subsidised private superannuation system and with about 12 per cent of the workforce. Those figures should be treated as historical estimates, but the policy point remains important. A public pension system can be administratively efficient without being starved of the staff needed to serve people properly.

The comparison also raises a broader accountability issue. If the Age Pension is subjected to detailed public audit because it is a major retirement income program, then the compulsory and publicly subsidised private superannuation system should be exposed to comparable public scrutiny. Compulsory superannuation is not a purely private savings arrangement. It is mandated by law, supported by large tax concessions, and embedded in national retirement income policy. It therefore warrants scrutiny not only as a financial services product, but as a publicly mandated retirement income architecture.

The Committee does not need to resolve that wider issue in this inquiry. However, it should recognise the asymmetry. The public Age Pension is audited for timeliness, accuracy, staffing, service quality, system weakness and impact on recipients. The Commonwealth's oversight of the compulsory and publicly subsidised private superannuation system should also be examined against comparable public purpose tests, including administrative cost, fees, workforce absorption, tax expenditure, distributional fairness, adequacy, poverty prevention, retirement income delivery, exposure to market risk, sequencing risk and investment volatility.

Those risks are not incidental. They are built into a system that makes retirement outcomes depend partly on asset markets. The Age Pension is not exposed to that kind of market risk. It is a public entitlement set by law and capable of being adjusted by Parliament according to need and public purpose.

The point relevant to this inquiry is therefore clear. The Age Pension is not an inferior backup system for those who failed to accumulate enough private wealth. It is the public retirement income floor. It must be administered as such. Its administrative defects should not be tolerated merely because some Australians also hold private savings through the compulsory and publicly subsidised superannuation system.

A person who depends on the Age Pension is not a failed private saver. Many Age Pension recipients spent their working lives building, caring, producing, servicing, educating, repairing, farming, transporting, administering and sustaining the real economy. They are among the productive contributors who helped create the national wealth that others now enjoy, often disproportionately. They should not be treated as residual claimants on a system designed around private accumulation. They are citizens relying on a public entitlement created by Parliament. The administration of that entitlement should be timely, accessible, accurate, humane and adequate to the real conditions in which older Australians live.

Digital access must not become digital exclusion

The Committee should give particular attention to digital service delivery. Digital access may be convenient for some recipients and may assist Services Australia to manage workload. But digital convenience for the agency is not the same thing as accessibility for older Australians.

The Auditor General's report records that Services Australia prefers social security applicants and recipients, including Age Pension applicants and recipients, to manage claims and payments online rather than by telephone or face to face engagement. The same report also records that older Australians have lower levels of self-service usage, that most older Australians do not engage digitally because of privacy or security concerns, that digital literacy declines with age, and that older Australians require support to confidently use digital services.

The report also records that some older Australians had not checked or updated their Centrelink details because they were not computer literate, did not have access to a computer, had difficulties accessing or using online services, or preferred to speak to someone in person at a service centre. Stakeholders also raised concerns about older Australians who are isolated and non-digital, application processes that are too complicated, claim delays and phone wait times.

This is not a minor service preference. It goes to access, fairness, delay, payment accuracy, debt risk and administrative dignity. A mistake in income, assets, relationship status, residence, claim lodgement, document upload or online communication can affect whether a person receives the pension, how much they receive, whether they are underpaid, whether they are overpaid, or whether they are later pursued for a debt.

For an older person living hand to mouth, administrative friction is not merely inconvenient. It can be the difference between stability and hardship.

Digital systems also create safety and cyber risk

The shift to digital must also be assessed against the modern cyber risk environment. Recent public material about Anthropic's Claude Mythos Preview shows that advanced artificial intelligence can accelerate the discovery and exploitation of software vulnerabilities. Anthropic's own material describes Mythos Preview testing against real open-source codebases and its ability to find and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities.

The United Kingdom AI Security Institute reported continued improvement in Claude Mythos Preview's performance on cyber tasks, including significant improvement on multi step cyber-attack simulations.

There has also been reporting that Anthropic investigated alleged unauthorised access to the unreleased Mythos model through a third-party vendor environment. That does not prove that Services Australia systems are unsafe. It does show that even sophisticated digital ecosystems face access control, vendor and cyber governance risks.

This matters because older Australians are often less able to manage complex authentication, account recovery, digital warnings, scams, myGov issues, document upload systems and automated communication pathways. Essential public entitlements should not be designed on the assumption that vulnerable users can safely and confidently navigate complex digital environments.

Digital should be an option, not a gate.

This is not mainly a privatisation problem, but public capability must be protected

The material before the Committee does not show the core Age Pension process being outsourced wholesale to private entities. The formal architecture is public sector. DSS is the policy and program owner. Services Australia administers the Age Pension for DSS. DVA administers a small number of Age Pension payments for veterans and partners under an arrangement with DSS.

My own circumstances also show that Age Pension administration is not always a simple domestic payment process. Part of my pension is paid by New Zealand because I lived and worked there for a number of years. That is not outsourcing to a private entity. It is a legitimate consequence of international social security arrangements. But it does demonstrate that Age Pension administration often involves complexity across jurisdictions, overseas pension entitlements, income assessment, residence history and specialist processing. A system of that kind cannot be administered safely through

delay, under staffing, poor communication, digital pressure or poorly documented processes.

The more serious issue is public capability failure inside a public system. The report identifies fragmented governance, weak oversight, inadequate verification, legacy IT risk, unclear assurance, poor use of information, insufficient impact evaluation and service delivery channels that do not meet the needs of many older Australians.

That public capability failure should not become an excuse for further privatisation. The drift toward privatising or outsourcing public services should be resisted in Age Pension administration. The answer to weak public capability is to rebuild public capability, not to transfer more public functions into private hands.

The compulsory and publicly subsidised private superannuation system provides a warning. It is large, costly, complex, dependent on financial markets, supported by public policy, and justified as part of retirement income architecture. Yet it cannot perform the basic public function of the Age Pension. It cannot guarantee a retirement income floor. It cannot remove market risk. It cannot ensure poverty prevention. It cannot protect those whose working lives were interrupted by illness, caring responsibilities, low wages, insecure work, unemployment or family breakdown.

That example should make the Committee cautious about any future argument that Age Pension administration can be improved by private delivery, market mechanisms or further fragmentation. A public entitlement should remain publicly controlled, publicly accountable and publicly staffed to the extent necessary to meet real need.

The Committee should therefore focus not merely on who formally administers the payment, but whether the Commonwealth has retained and strengthened the public capability needed to administer a basic public entitlement safely, promptly and humanely. This is especially important where a recipient's circumstances involve overseas residence, overseas pension income, international agreements or other matters that require trained staff and clear human communication rather than a purely digital or automated pathway.

Oversight must be active, not nominal

DSS remains accountable for the Age Pension as policy owner. It cannot avoid responsibility by pointing to Services Australia's delivery role. The Auditor General found that DSS oversight was only partly effective and that DSS had not promptly addressed issues to ensure performance standards are met, IT systems operate as intended and DVA is set up to administer the program consistently with legislation.

That is a serious governance failure. Oversight is not satisfied by meetings, agreements and assurance statements if those arrangements do not identify and fix real delivery

problems. A public entitlement of this importance requires active stewardship, not passive contract style monitoring between public agencies.

The comparison with compulsory and publicly subsidised private superannuation reinforces the point. Compulsory superannuation operates through a large and costly private administrative, investment, compliance and disclosure structure. The Age Pension, by contrast, is a direct public income system. Murray's analysis suggests that it delivers retirement income with far lower administrative cost and a far smaller workforce than compulsory superannuation. That should strengthen, not weaken, the case for proper public oversight.

Parliament should not tolerate weaker accountability for the Age Pension than it expects from compulsory superannuation, a publicly mandated and publicly subsidised private retirement savings system. If the Commonwealth can impose detailed governance, disclosure, compliance and reporting expectations on superannuation, then DSS should be required to provide clear public reporting on whether the Age Pension is working for the people who rely on it.

DSS should therefore be required to report to Parliament on the real-world performance of the system, including delay, underpayment, overpayment, debt notices, complaints, review outcomes, digital exclusion, call wait times, application abandonment and the impact of the pension on recipients after unavoidable living costs.

Staffing is a public capability issue

Subject to the availability of real resources, the Age Pension system can and should be properly staffed. Long wait times, delayed claims and poor telephone access should not be treated as unavoidable facts of life. They are administrative choices, funding choices, workforce choices and capability choices.

The ANAO material shows that long wait times are not rare events. They are a known and acknowledged feature of the present system. The issue is therefore not merely that an individual applicant may occasionally have a bad experience. The issue is that the system has been allowed to operate with insufficient practical capacity to meet the needs of older Australians who rely on it.

That is unacceptable for an essential public entitlement. If a person is eligible for the Age Pension, the Commonwealth has already accepted that the person is entitled to support. The administrative system should not then ration that entitlement through delay, unanswered calls, complex forms, digital pressure or insufficient staffing.

The Commonwealth is not monetarily constrained in the same way as a household, business, council or state government. Subject to real resource availability, it can employ and train the staff needed to administer the Age Pension properly. Australia has unemployed people, under employed people, people seeking more secure work, people

with relevant community service experience, and Age Pension recipients who may wish to work part time on proper terms. Where labour is unemployed or under used, the market is already failing to put that capacity to productive use. Employing that labour for public purpose is not the same as bidding scarce labour away from existing essential services. Properly designed, properly paid and properly trained public employment of unused or under used labour is among the least inflationary ways to increase public capacity. There is no serious public purpose in leaving people without work or under used while older Australians wait in long queues for essential income support.

There is also a strong case for recruiting and training older workers, including Age Pension recipients who choose to participate, to assist with Age Pension service delivery. This should never be framed as an obligation on pensioners to work. It should be framed as an option for people who want paid work and who may bring lived experience, patience, practical understanding and trust to the system. Older Australians applying for the pension may be better served by staff who understand the realities of retirement, digital exclusion, limited income, housing insecurity, health costs and administrative anxiety.

A properly staffed Age Pension system would reduce delay, reduce repeated contacts, reduce errors, improve communication, support people who cannot use digital systems, and prevent hardship before it escalates into complaints, reviews, debts or ministerial escalation. That is not waste. It is public administration doing its job.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The Committee should recommend that DSS and Services Australia administer the Age Pension as an essential public income floor for older Australians, not as a residual fiscal burden. Administrative design should be judged by whether it delivers timely, accessible, accurate and adequate support to recipients in real life.

Recommendation 2

The Committee should recommend that DSS revise its Age Pension program logic so that it measures impact on recipients, not merely coverage and payment mechanics. That evaluation should include poverty prevention, adequacy after housing costs, rental stress, health costs, energy costs, food security, care costs, digital exclusion, claim delays, underpayments, overpayments, debt notices, complaints and review outcomes.

Recommendation 3

The Committee should recommend that DSS provide annual public reporting to Parliament on whether the Age Pension is maintaining financial wellbeing and an acceptable standard of living for recipients, including separate reporting for renters,

single recipients, people with disability, people in regional and remote areas, people with limited digital access and recipients relying almost entirely on the pension.

Recommendation 4

The Committee should recommend that Services Australia treat digital service as an optional channel for Age Pension applicants and recipients, not as the default gateway to an essential entitlement. Services Australia should maintain properly staffed face to face services, telephone services, paper-based forms, assisted application pathways and human support for older Australians who cannot safely or confidently use digital systems.

Recommendation 5

The Committee should recommend that DSS and Services Australia report specifically on digital exclusion and digital risk in Age Pension administration, including failed online claims, abandoned applications, account access problems, document upload problems, myGov access issues, scam exposure, cyber risk and the relationship between digital service design and delay, underpayment, overpayment, debt and complaints.

Recommendation 6

The Committee should recommend that Services Australia review the Age Pension claim process from the perspective of older Australians, not merely from the perspective of administrative convenience. The process should be simplified, written in plain language, available in paper and assisted formats, and supported by trained officers who understand the needs of older Australians.

Recommendation 7

The Committee should recommend that DSS and Services Australia address underpayment as a central integrity issue. Payment integrity should not be treated as synonymous with preventing overpayment. A system that underpays eligible pensioners is also failing integrity, legality and public purpose.

Recommendation 8

The Committee should recommend that Services Australia improve verification of income and assets in a way that does not simply transfer more administrative burden to older Australians. Verification should use lawful and proportionate data sources, clear communication and human assistance, while ensuring that recipients are not penalised for complexity they cannot reasonably navigate.

Recommendation 9

The Committee should recommend that Services Australia review all Age Pension debt notices to ensure that they clearly explain the basis for the alleged debt, the information relied upon, the calculation used, the recipient's review rights and the practical steps available to challenge or clarify the decision.

Recommendation 10

The Committee should recommend that DSS and Services Australia publish a specific implementation plan responding to the Auditor General's findings, with measurable timeframes, public milestones and reporting to the Committee. The plan should not be limited to internal process improvement. It should show how the recipient experience will change.

Recommendation 11

The Committee should recommend that DSS and Services Australia prepare a workforce capability plan for Age Pension administration. That plan should identify the staffing required to meet claim timeliness, telephone access, face to face service, paper-based processing, review and complaint handling standards. It should also examine the recruitment and training of unemployed people, under employed people, older workers and Age Pension recipients who voluntarily seek paid part time work, so that the system is staffed to meet public need rather than allowed to ration access through delay.

Recommendation 12

The Committee should recommend that the Auditor General be requested to consider a separate performance audit of Commonwealth oversight of the compulsory and publicly subsidised private superannuation system as a component of Australia's retirement income architecture. Such an audit should examine administrative cost, fees, workforce requirements, public subsidy through tax concessions, distributional fairness, adequacy, retirement income delivery, poverty prevention, exposure to market risk, sequencing risk, investment volatility and overall value for public purpose when compared with the Age Pension.

Recommendation 13

The Committee should recommend that core Age Pension administration remain publicly controlled, publicly accountable and publicly staffed to the extent required to meet real need. Public capability failures should be addressed by rebuilding public capability, not by privatising, outsourcing or further fragmenting the administration of a basic public entitlement.

Conclusion

The Auditor General's report should be treated as a warning. The Age Pension system is not merely experiencing isolated administrative defects. It is showing signs of a deeper public capability failure in the administration of one of the Commonwealth's most important public entitlements. That failure is made worse when the Age Pension is viewed through the constructed myth that the Federal Government is financially or capital constrained like a household, business, council or state government. The Commonwealth issues the Australian dollar. Debt and deficit are not household funding constraints on the currency issuing Commonwealth. They are public policy settings that should be judged by whether they serve good public purpose. Older Australians should not be made to endure delay, underpayment, digital exclusion or administrative rationing because Parliament mistakes accounting mythology for real economic constraint.

The Age Pension is the public income floor for older Australians. It is relied upon by people who have spent their lives building, caring, producing, servicing, educating, repairing, farming, transporting, administering and sustaining the real economy. Many of those people helped create the national wealth that others now enjoy, often disproportionately. They should not be treated as residual claimants on a system designed around private accumulation.

A system that pays late, underpays eligible recipients, overpays others, sends unclear debt notices, pushes older Australians toward digital channels they may not be able to use, relies on legacy IT, and fails to evaluate whether recipients can actually live on the payment has lost sight of its public purpose.

The problem is not only technical. It is institutional. Long phone queues, delayed claims, complex forms, digital pressure and insufficient human support operate as practical rationing devices. They make access harder for the very people the system is supposed to serve. Older Australians should not need ministerial intervention, digital confidence, legal knowledge, accounting skill, overseas pension expertise or persistence through long phone queues to obtain what Parliament has already determined they are entitled to receive.

The Committee should also reject any suggestion that proper staffing is beyond public capacity. Subject to available real resources, the Commonwealth can train and employ the people required to administer the Age Pension properly. There is no good public purpose in leaving unemployed people, under employed people, older workers and willing Age Pension recipients under used while older Australians wait in long queues for essential income support.

The administration of the Age Pension should be judged by its effect on real people in real conditions. A pension paid correctly on paper may still fail in practice if the

recipient cannot meet rent, food, medicine, energy, transport, communication, health and care costs. DSS must therefore evaluate impact, not merely coverage, payment mechanics or internal process compliance.

The comparison with compulsory and publicly subsidised private superannuation reinforces the need for care. The Age Pension is already an administratively efficient public system. That should not be used to justify starving it of staff, weakening human service, forcing older Australians through digital channels or tolerating delay. Administrative efficiency should not become administrative neglect.

The Age Pension should be administered as a public entitlement, not as a grudging fiscal concession rationed through delay, complexity and digital exclusion. The Committee should recommend a decisive shift in administration so that the test is not the lowest administrative cost, but timely, accurate, accessible, humane and adequate support for older Australians in the real conditions in which they live.

Reference Source:

Dr. Cameron K. Murray, Scrap superannuation: It fails to meet the standards of a retirement income system. It is costly and inefficient, unnecessary, and incredibly unfair, Fresh Economic Thinking, January 2020.

(Note: a copy of this report can be supplied on request)