

Senate Environment and Communications References Committee  
Inquiry into the Triple Zero service outage

# Questions on notice – Australian Communications and Media Authority

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Canberra hearing – 12 March 2026

## QON 1:

**Ms RAINSFORD:** My recollection of that email is that it did not include anything forwarded from TPG. It documented what I understood to be a conversation between a departmental representative and a TPG officer where that was documented and then forwarded on to the Minister's office and to us.

**Senator HANSON-YOUNG:** Can we have a copy of that email?

**Ms RAINSFORD:** We can take that on notice."

## Answer 1:

See attachment A for correspondence between the ACMA and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts.

*Attachment A – 3 emails received from Department 24-26 September 2025*

## QON 2:

**Senator HENDERSON:** Can we ask who you spoke to from TPG?

**Ms O'Loughlin:** I don't have that in my notes but I'm certainly happy to—

**Senator HENDERSON:** Alright, can we get that on notice and also the correspondence, the email, on the 24<sup>th</sup> as well?"

## Answer 2:

See attachment B for correspondence between the ACMA and TPG's Senior Regulatory Specialist.

*Attachment B – TPG email to ACMA 24 September 2025*

## QON3:

**Senator HANSON-YOUNG:** Given all of the attention in that week following the Optus outage and the Optus deaths, did you pick up the phone and tell the Minister's office?

**Ms O'Loughlin:** Senator, I don't have that in my notes at the moment but we'll take that on

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notice.

**Senator HENDERSON:** But the answer that you've already given is no, isn't that correct?

**Ms RAINSFORD:** That is my understanding but I'll take it on notice and check with our staff to make sure."

### Answer 3:

The ACMA did not advise the Minister's Office that the Wentworth Falls incident had resulted in a fatality. The department provided this information in an email to the Minister's Chief of Staff at 5.03pm on 24 September 2025. See Attachment A, as part of the ACMA's response to QON 1, for correspondence between the ACMA and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts.

*Attachment A – 3 emails received from Department 24-26 September 2025*

NSW Ambulance informed the ACMA that there was a potential issue with Triple Zero calls. The ACMA's regulatory priority was to determine the cause and scale of the failed calls. The ACMA's immediate concern with any Triple Zero connectivity issue is the potential serious and widespread impacts, including determining whether an outage may be involved.

### QON 4:

**“Senator HANSON-YOUNG:** You found out because the New South Wales Ambulance called you on the day it occurred and you're saying that you just knew that the department also knew?

**Ms O'Loughlin:** Chair if I can just take that on notice and we will give you chapter and verse of exactly what happened over those days.

### Answer 4:

Refer to the timeline provided below for a comprehensive account of communications about the Wentworth Falls incident between the ACMA and other relevant parties from 24 September 2025 to 9 December 2025. The ACMA's focus in these communications was to gather sufficient information to understand what was known about the incident, whether it represented a single circumstance or a broad issue that may be affecting other consumers (such as a network outage) and to enable it to form a view as to whether a formal investigation against relevant obligations would be necessary or desirable.

#### Wentworth Falls timeline

Timeframe (if known)	Activity
<b>Wednesday 24 September 2025</b>	
10.40 am	NSW Ambulance emailed ACMA requesting a call to discuss an issue with connecting to Triple Zero that morning in the Wentworth Falls area of NSW.

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<b>Timeframe (if known)</b>	<b>Activity</b>
10:41 am	Phone call between NSW Ambulance and the ACMA. The ACMA's record of the call indicates that NSW Ambulance advised that the individual was deceased.
10:50 am	Message from acting General Manager ACMA to ACMA Chair to advise of an incident.
10.51am	Phone call between ACMA and TPG Telecom to advise of information received from NSW Ambulance. TPG advised it was aware of the incident and was investigating.
10.55 am (approx.)	Acting General Manager ACMA contacted acting Deputy Secretary in the department and each confirmed the other agency was aware of the incident. The acting Deputy Secretary advised that he had spoken to the Minister's Chief of Staff, Vodafone and Telstra, and had the same information about the incident as the ACMA.
11.10 am	Message from acting General Manager ACMA to ACMA Chair advising that the acting Deputy Secretary in the department had confirmed the same information held by the ACMA.
11.47 am	Email from ACMA to NSW Ambulance advising that the ACMA had spoken to TPG and that TPG was actively looking into the matter. The ACMA advised it would follow-up with questions to TPG to determine whether it needed to commence an investigation.
12.56 pm	Email from NSW Ambulance to ACMA acknowledging earlier email.
3.01 pm	Email from TPG to ACMA providing an update. Advised no widespread outage or disruption to emergency calls on the Vodafone Network, call patterns consistent with historical patterns. Exchange focused on connectivity issue and potential cause. No indication on wellbeing of individual.
3.19 pm	Email from ACMA to NSW Ambulance asking if the paramedics had tested the mobile phone to contact Triple Zero.
3.39 pm	Email received from NSW Ambulance confirming that paramedics were able to use another device (non TPG/Vodafone device) to make a test call to Triple Zero.
<b>Friday 26 September 2025</b>	
3.20 pm	Email from the Department to ACMA, providing an update on the Wentworth Falls incident based on information the Department had received from TPG

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Timeframe (if known)	Activity
	<p>and Telstra. This included advice that the call failures did not appear to be the result of a network issue, device details including why it had not been blocked, and that ‘thankfully the person is still with us’. The email contained the email chain between the Department and the Minister’s Office with the information that had been gathered and passed on to the Minister’s Office. The Department asked ACMA to investigate compliance with the ECS Determination, and the extent of similar issues with other devices in the category.</p> <p><i>Note: Both emails on 26 September 2025 from the department to the Minister’s Office and the department to ACMA, stated that the person was alive. The email also included an email from the department to the Minister’s Office of 24 September indicating that the person had passed away which was considered overtaken by new information. See Attachment A to QoN 1 responses for email chain.</i></p>
<b>Monday 29 September 2025</b>	
	The ACMA commenced a compliance assessment into TPG’s compliance with the blocking rules in the ECS Determination.
<b>Thursday 2 October 2025</b>	
10.39 am	Email from the department to ACMA with follow-up questions on operation of the ECS Determination.
10.43 am	Email from ACMA to the department acknowledging earlier contact from the department and advising that the ACMA will provide an update when available.
11.35 am	Email from the department to the ACMA following up on ACMA’s position regarding blocking of devices that are unable to call Triple Zero.
<b>Friday 3 October 2025</b>	
11.56 am	Email from ACMA to Telstra, TPG, and Optus, about the ECS Determination and devices unable to call Triple Zero, in light of the Wentworth Fall incident. Email communicates that ACMA expects full compliance with blocking rules.
2.25 pm	Return email from ACMA to the department advising the ACMA is making contact with telcos about devices unable to call Triple Zero, and that the ACMA would look into this matter specifically.
<b>Wednesday 8 October 2025</b>	

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<b>Timeframe (if known)</b>	<b>Activity</b>
	Following detailed analysis of the compliance assessment commenced on 29 September, the ACMA formally commenced its investigation into TPG's compliance with the ECS Determination.
<b>Thursday 30 October 2025</b>	
	ACMA staff email to TPG, notifying TPG that the ACMA has opened an investigation into the Wentworth Falls incident, and seeking information under s521 of the <i>Telecommunications Act 1997</i> .
<b>Thursday 20 November 2025</b>	
	TPG response to the s521 notice is provided to the ACMA.
<b>Tuesday 9 December 2025</b>	
	TPG advises the Optus Inquiry Committee that it had been informed by Telstra the day before that the individual had passed away and it was seeking further information. Telstra advises the Committee that it had confirmed to TPG on 8 December 2025 that the individual had passed away. Samsung advises the Committee that it became aware of the fatality relating to the Wentworth Falls incident that morning in the Committee hearing. <i>This information has been taken from the Hansard of the Committee's hearing of 9 December.</i>
<b>Friday 12 December 2025</b>	
	ACMA issues s522 notice to NSW Ambulance to clarify and confirm incident details.
<b>Wednesday 17 December 2025</b>	
	NSW Ambulance response to s522 notice is provided to ACMA.
<b>Monday 22 January 2026</b>	
	ACMA issues second s521 notice to TPG about the Wentworth Falls matter, as part of its investigation.
<b>Thursday 5 February 2026</b>	
	TPG response to second s521 notice is provided to the ACMA. Investigation is ongoing.

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**QON 5:**

**“Senator HENDERSON:** When the September 18 Outage happened, Australians were told four people died. That’s now been revised to two people. Do you accept that only two people died as a result of that outage?

**Ms O’Loughlin:** Senator, that’s the advice that we have been provided with consistently.

**Senator HENDERSON:** Have you received any advice that conflicts with that at all?

**Ms O’Loughlin:** Senator, I don’t believe so. I do think though there are probably still inquiries going on through state coroner processes which I don’t think have been finalised at the moment. Now whether that would reveal anything more I’m not aware.

**Senator HENDERSON:** So you’re not aware of any conflicting information. Did it strike you or were you concerned about this revision of the number of deaths? Did you make any inquiries as to one minute four people have died and then suddenly we discover no its only two people.

**Ms O’Loughlin:** I think there had been reporting from memory from South Australian Police that one of the incidents where it had been reported that somebody had died, the South Australian Police were publicly saying that that person had not passed away.

**Senator HENDERSON:** And did you make any inquiries or did you receive any information at all or did you seek to make any inquiries about—

**Ms O’Loughlin:** That was on the public record.

**Senator HENDERSON:** No that wasn’t my question, did you make any inquiries about that or do you hold any information which is inconsistent with what police have said publicly?

**Ms O’Loughlin:** Senator, I don’t believe we hold any information that’s different but again, I would be happy to take that on notice for you.

**Senator HENDERSON:** Did you make any inquiries as to suddenly why we went from four deaths to two, over and above what was reported publicly?

**Ms O’Loughlin:** I’m not quite sure we did because it was reported publicly but again we can look at that again.”

**Answer 5:**

The ACMA’s investigation focuses on Optus’ and related entities’ compliance with their regulatory obligations. If findings of non-compliance are made, the ACMA will consider the harm caused by that non-compliance in evaluation of potential enforcement outcomes. Please see response to QON 10 for further information on potential outcomes of any investigation.

The ACMA does not hold any information contrary to publicly available information. This may be a question appropriately directed to Optus as they have the primary relationship with the relevant authorities for these matters.

**QON 6:**

**“Senator HENDERSON:** On notice, could you please set out where the errors were made by your organisation and how they have been remedied. So when you talk about escalation, we want to understand what that means in detail.

**Ms O’Loughlin:** Absolutely, and Senator it goes to the point that you raised earlier that in that

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circumstance there should have been additional phone calls made, particularly with the Optus outage on the 18<sup>th</sup> of September where there was not notification to us for many hours that there was an outage. There was only notification when it was resolved and it wasn't until a good 24 hours later that the fact that there were fatalities was revealed. So in those circumstances where, as the Chair has said, there was an indication that the numbers weren't stacking up, we acknowledge that there should have been further follow ups during that period of time, at not just the levels where the information came into the organisation but certainly at more senior levels so we could actually try and ascertain what was going on. We will take that on notice and fully explain that for you."

### Answer 6:

The ACMA has acknowledged that additional follow up should have been undertaken after initial notification by Optus of the 18 September outage.

The ACMA was provided routine information about an outage impacting landline connections only, at 2:42 pm on 18 September 2025. Optus committed to provide further information to the ACMA about the impact and cause of the outage. Staff expected to receive further information from Optus on the evening of 18 September or the next morning. No such additional information was provided. At that stage ACMA staff should have taken proactive action to follow up with Optus when additional information was not received.

Standard operating procedures were updated in October 2025 to reflect the importance of identifying issues of concern about outages reported to the ACMA, and where that occurs, escalation within the ACMA. This includes a particular focus on outages of extended duration, or that may have specific impacts to emergency calling.

The ACMA does not consider there were any other gaps in our handling of this matter which was consistent with our regulatory obligations.

Optus' decision to not provide updated information to the ACMA, the department, Minister's office or the general public on the outage until the afternoon of 19 September 2026 is a matter for the company.

In future, the ACMA expects that the Triple Zero Custodian will be responsible for information flows between industry and government on outages of this kind.

### QON 7:

**Ms O'Loughlin:** As we mentioned earlier we have been asked for input on the terms of reference and we have provided that.

**Senator HENDERSON:** Alright, could we have a copy of that on notice please?

**Senator HANSON-YOUNG:** The advice that you've given to the department.

**Ms O'Loughlin:** I'll take that on notice."

### Answer 7:

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The ACMA was consulted on a draft set of terms of reference ahead of the Department briefing the Minister for Communications. The ACMA provided the department with minor drafting suggestions to improve clarity on the articulation of the scope and process for the review.

The Minister for Communications released the terms of reference for the review on 18 March 2026.

### QON 8:

**Ms Rainsford:** We've kicked off that process, the submissions to that consultation are in, they are published on our website at the moment and staff are working through those in parallel to the work to make sure that those changes to give effect to the public outages registers is done by the end of the month.

**Senator HENDERSON:** Could we on notice have a copy of all that work that you are doing?

**Ms Rainsford:** Yes certainly, it is public Senator, the consultation paper and the submissions are on our website.

**Senator HENDERSON:** If we could have a copy of that as well we would be grateful."

### Answer 8:

See attachments C to E for relevant public documentation about the public network outage register consultation in which we invited early views on the broader effectiveness of the Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages) Industry Standard 2024 to inform an upcoming review.

The ACMA received 13 non-confidential written submissions to the consultation.

- *Attachment C - Proposed amendments to the Customer Communications for Outages Standard consultation paper*
- *Attachment D - Draft Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages) Industry Standard Variation 2026 (No.1)*
- *Attachment E – public submissions available from [www.acma.gov.au/consultations/2026-01/proposed-public-register-telecommunications-outages](http://www.acma.gov.au/consultations/2026-01/proposed-public-register-telecommunications-outages)*

### QON 9:

**Senator HENDERSON:** Do you have any concerns that products are being sold on the market where consumers are being told they can use SMS via satellite but not for the Triple Zero service?

**Ms O'Loughlin:** Could I just take that on notice to dig into what that service is?

**Senator HANSON-YOUNG:** Are you aware of it?

**Senator HENDERSON:** So Telstra offers a SMS messaging service on some devices, some plans, via satellite when someone does not have terrestrial connectivity, but it does not work on Triple Zero. I think that's a major consumer protection issue, particularly from a regulator's perspective. Are you concerned about that, have you taken any action in relation to that, is Telstra under any obligation to communicate this properly to people who take up this plan?

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**Ms Rainsford:** So Senator, as the Chair said we'd like to take on notice just to dig in a bit more to that service. I'm aware of services in the market where people have the ability to text that they need Triple Zero help, which goes to a call centre which then makes the call that gets through to the emergency call person.

**Senator HENDERSON:** So that's the Google Pixel device, it does have that ability but the Telstra phone does not have that ability, that messaging service.

**Ms O'Loughlin:** So Senator, can we take that on notice and dig into that because we'll need to check our understanding. It would be of great concern is the answer to your question. Where you've seen innovation in the market is things like the Apple service where people will be connected to somebody who will call Triple Zero but if we can take that on notice and we'll come back to you as quickly as possible on it.

**Senator HENDERSON:** And what exactly are you taking on notice though?

**Ms O'Loughlin:** What that Telstra service actually is and what communication that Telstra are providing to customers to be clear about how it is working and how they can get through to Triple Zero, because I'm not quite sure I understand the tech at the moment."

### Answer 9:

On 18 March 2026, the ACMA received information from Telstra about its Satellite Messaging Service and how it is being sold. See Attachment F.

The letter details Telstra's communications with its customers on the limitations of the service, including that it cannot be used to call Triple Zero and that users cannot text Triple Zero.

Mobile telecommunications providers are subject to rules around responsible selling and provision of accurate information to customers. They are also subject to the Australian Consumer Law which prohibits misleading or deceptive practices.

The ACMA will consider whether Telstra's communications are consistent with existing rules.

*Attachment F – Telstra letter to ACMA on Telstra Satellite Messaging Services*

### QON 10:

**Senator HANSON-YOUNG:** What I would ask Ms O'Loughlin is if we could have a copy of the report to the investigation that you are undertaking because we've had you in front of us a number of times, we understand you're close, if there's anything that you are able to provide for us on that over the next few weeks we would appreciate.

**Ms O'Loughlin:** Chair, I'll certainly take that on notice for you.

**Senator HENDERSON:** Given that we have to report.

**Ms O'Loughlin:** I understand your timeframes.

**Senator HANSON-YOUNG:** Because otherwise its hard to say that you done much if we don't have the final product.

**Senator HENDERSON:** We could possibly take that offline because I think it's very important for this committee if we are reporting we don't want to necessarily report in a way that is not able to say that ACMA has made any progress so to the extent that ACMA is making progress and about to finalise its investigation, we want to make sure that we are going to report accurately and up to date given the important role that you're playing.

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### Answer 10:

The ACMA has made significant progress in its investigation into the 18 September 2025 Optus outage affecting calls to the Triple Zero service. It expects to be in a position for the ACMA Authority to finalise its consideration of the matter in the coming weeks and to also consider any enforcement action to be taken if there is evidence of non-compliance with relevant rules. The following provides a summary of the investigation's progress to date.

Following the outage on 18 September, the ACMA moved swiftly to gather sufficient information from Optus and publicly available sources on what was known about the outage at that time. It then analysed such information to enable it to form a view on the particular rules that may have been enlivened by the outage.

At that stage, the ACMA considered that Optus had serious questions to answer, particularly given the impact of the outage and the significant delays in it identifying the problem and notifying its customers, relevant emergency organisations and the general public of the event.

On 22 September, the ACMA announced that it had commenced an investigation into Optus' compliance with three sets of rules:

- [Telecommunications \(Emergency Call Service\) Determination 2019](#). This is the primary set of obligations on all carriers, carriage service providers and others in relation to access, carriage and handling of calls to the emergency call service. Amongst other matters, this includes requirements for carriers to maintain the effective functioning of networks and ensure that an emergency call is carried to the relevant termination point for the call.
  - There are tightly limited exemptions from the Determination's requirements that recognise some matters may be beyond the control of the carrier or CSP, and therefore unreasonable to hold a telco to account for the provision of access.
- [Telecommunications \(Customer Communications for Outages\) Industry Standard 2024](#). This requires that carriers must notify other carriers and CSPs, communicate with the public, and inform relevant stakeholders—including the ACMA—as soon as practicable after detecting an outage which meets the definition of a major or significant local outage or receiving notification from another carrier.
  - This is the ACMA's first investigation into compliance with the requirements of the Communications Outages Standard which came into full effect in June 2025.
- [Industry Code C536: Emergency Call Service Requirements](#). This sets out operational requirements for carriers and service providers to ensure end-users can access emergency call services.

Our initial analysis informed the drafting of 8 statutory notices to 8 Optus entities to gather information to support the investigation. This also required us to map the corporate structure and operational responsibilities within the Optus group, enabling us to identify which legal entities held relevant obligations.

Responses to the statutory notices and other documents reviewed in the course of the investigation provided the ACMA with significant volumes (40 documents, 416 pages) of data

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and information requiring detailed consideration and analysis. Investigations of this type often require analysis of complex technical information regarding the incident and the company's actions across multiple entities.

The ACMA has also considered in-depth all evidence provided by Optus to this Inquiry and the extensive and very insightful report to the Optus Board by Dr Kerry Schott AO.

Once analysis of the facts of the incident has been completed, an assessment against the relevant regulatory rules is undertaken to enable the ACMA to form a view on whether there are instances, and if so, how many, of non-compliance against each obligation.

This is the stage that the ACMA's investigation is currently at. We expect to conclude our assessment in the next few weeks. At this stage, we do not expect that we will need to seek any additional information from Optus.

The ACMA will then need to consider an appropriate enforcement response if non-compliance is found.

Under the relevant regulatory instruments, there are a number of compliance and enforcement options available if non-compliance is found. These options range in severity from administrative remedies through to seeking civil penalty orders in the Federal Court.

If the ACMA considered that there is evidence of non-compliance that could be appropriately addressed through administrative enforcement action, the ACMA could (dependant on remedies provided in the relevant instrument) take one or more of the following actions:

- giving formal warnings
- giving an infringement notice
- issuing a remedial direction
- giving a direction to comply with a registered industry code
- accepting an enforceable undertaking.

In this instance, a preliminary findings report would be prepared and shared with the entity subject to investigation to meet the ACMA's procedural fairness obligations, providing opportunity to dispute any matters of fact or provide additional information. An administrative outcome would then be decided by the ACMA Authority, and the entity informed of the outcome.

An example of an administrative action were the penalties totalling more than \$12 million for breaches of emergency call rules paid by Optus in 2024.

Alternatively, if the ACMA formed the view that there is evidence of potential non-compliance that requires testing in court, preliminary findings would not be prepared as it would be a matter for the court to make findings on contraventions and penalties. The ACMA would file its proceedings and the affected parties would file their evidence in defence to the court for its decision.

The ACMA is bound to comply with the Commonwealth's model litigant rules when contemplating or conducting litigation. The Legal Services Directions 2017 sets out the

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Commonwealth's obligations in this regard and imposes an obligation on the ACMA to obtain written advice from the external lawyers retained by the ACMA as to whether there are reasonable grounds for starting the proceedings. The advice also must indicate whether there are reasonable grounds for success.

As an example, in 2024, the ACMA filed proceedings in the Federal Court against Optus alleging that during a data breach which occurred between 17 to 20 September 2022, Optus failed to protect the confidentiality of its customers' personal information from unauthorised interference or unauthorised access. The matter remains before the court.

The ACMA will make public its decisions arising from its investigation as soon as possible.

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## APPENDIX A

## TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Time	Description of event	Source
<b>Thursday 18 September 2025</b>		
<b>12:17 am</b>	Optus preparations for firewall upgrade commence. Calls to Triple Zero start being impacted.	Optus press conference 22 September
<b>12:30 am</b>	Optus begins a routine firewall upgrade. This inadvertently blocks some calls to Triple Zero. Normal calls are unaffected.	ABC
<b>12:40 am</b>	Optus customers in WA, SA and NT begin experiencing issues reaching Triple Zero (according to original advice provided to ACMA).	Optus email notification received 18 September at 3:17pm
<b>2:42 pm</b>	<p><b>ACMA was first notified of the outage by a phone call</b> from Optus (Optus phoned National Interests Section manager) advising:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Approximately 10 Triple Zero calls from WA and SA had failed since an upgrade was implemented at 3am that morning.</li> <li>&gt; The problem had only impacted fixed-line calls, and Optus had rolled back the upgrade that caused the outage and is undertaking welfare checks.</li> <li>&gt; Problems were only noticed this afternoon and that is all the information they had available.</li> <li>&gt; Optus committed to provide further information when available that day or next morning</li> </ul>	ACMA
<b>2:45 pm</b>	Optus emails the Department and the Minister's Office advising that some customers in SA and WA were experiencing impacts to Triple Zero Calls.	Media (Channel 9)
<b>2:52 pm</b>	Optus emails the Department and the Minister's office with an update that work to rectify the issues is complete and services have returned to normal and that 10 calls may have been impacted – each call is being worked through, and welfare checks will be made.	Media (Channel 9)

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<b>Time</b>	<b>Description of event</b>	<b>Source</b>
<b>2:52 pm</b>	ACMA Manager National Interests Section sends summary of call with Optus to Acting Executive Manager Telecommunications Safeguards and Numbers Branch to advise of issue.	ACMA
<b>3:17 pm</b>	ACMA receives email notification from Optus under Section 27 of the <i>Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2019</i> (ECS Determination) advising: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o It had become aware of an outage on 19 (sic) September adversely affecting the carriage of emergency calls over the Optus network before handover to the Emergency Call Person. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Note: 10 minutes later a correction was received to advise the date of the outage was 18 September ie that day.</li> </ol> </li> <li>o Mobile users unable to dial emergency calls from SA, WA and NT.</li> <li>o Outage commenced at <b>00:40</b> AEST and was resolved at <b>14:34</b> AEST).</li> <li>o The incident had been resolved.</li> <li>o No information on the number of customers impacted was included.</li> </ul>	ACMA
<b>Friday 19 September 2025</b>		
<b>2:30 pm (approx.)</b>	Optus CEO Stephen Rue calls ACMA Chair and advises of outage. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Optus found 624 calls had not connected.</li> <li>&gt; This is the first time that the ACMA becomes aware of the severity of the outage.</li> <li>&gt; Welfare checks successfully conducted on approximately 300 callers, and 3 deaths have been identified. Unsuccessful welfare checks on remaining callers referred to Police in relevant states/territories in accordance with normal processes for follow up by Police services.</li> </ul>	ACMA
<b>3:00 pm (approx.)</b>	ACMA Chair briefs Authority Members and relevant staff	ACMA
<b>3:40 pm</b>	Optus informs the Communications Minister that 100 Triple Zero calls had failed.	Media (ABC)
<b>4:00 pm</b>	Optus updates Communications Minister to say 600 Triple Zero calls had failed.	Media (ABC)

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<b>Time</b>	<b>Description of event</b>	<b>Source</b>
	The Department is informed of 3 deaths.	
<b>4:47 pm</b>	WA police received an email from Optus informing them an additional 123 Triple Zero calls failed, and that one person has died.	Media
<b>5:45 pm</b>	<p><b>Optus Press Conference:</b> Mr Rue confirms three people had died, one in WA and two in SA. The deaths include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; An eight-week-old boy from the Adelaide suburb Gawler West.</li> <li>&gt; A 68-year-old woman from the Adelaide suburb Queenstown.</li> <li>&gt; A 74-year-old man from Willetton in Perth.</li> </ul> <p>It is the first time the public hears about the outage.</p>	Media
<b>7:00 pm</b>	SA Premier Peter Malinauskas holds a press conference, saying Optus had not told the SA government about the deaths before Mr Rue's press conference.	ABC
<b>8:48 pm</b>	Singtel posts a statement on the Singapore Stock Exchange (which is closed) announcing the investigation into the Triple Zero failure.	Media / Singapore Stock Exchange
<b><i>Saturday 20 September 2025</i></b>		
<b>3:20 pm</b>	<p>Second Optus press conference held by Mr Rue where he:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Confirms individual customers had made reports to Optus and these were treated as individual reports, but were not escalated to resolve the Triple Zero calling problems.</li> <li>&gt; Apologises for late notifications to premiers and chief minister and says Optus will 'urgently' look into its process for notifying regulatory and government agencies.</li> <li>&gt; Advises he will appoint an 'independent person' to lead a review into the incident.</li> </ul>	Media
<b>4:20 pm</b>	WA police confirm a fourth person, a 49-year old man from Perth has died. Referred to Coroner for investigation.	Media
<b><i>Sunday 21 September 2025</i></b>		
<b>11:30 am</b>	SA Police say the death of an eight-week old baby boy was unlikely related to the outage, as his grandmother immediately used another network to call Triple Zero.	Media

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<b>Time</b>	<b>Description of event</b>	<b>Source</b>
<b>3:00 pm</b>	Optus (Mr Rue) holds another press conference: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Places an immediate halt to further changes in the network.</li> <li>&gt; Confirms two callers in NSW near the SA border were also unable to contact Triple Zero.</li> </ul>	Media
<b>5:00 pm</b>	A NSW government spokesperson confirms they were not informed of the callers' inability to contact Triple Zero until Sunday, three days after it happened.	Media
<b>Monday 22 September 2025</b>		
<b>n/a</b>	ACMA opens investigation of 18 September outage. Over the next few days, the following activities were undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; In addition to the information provided to the ACMA by Optus and other parties (as identified above), we undertook an extensive information gathering process, sourcing and analysing all publicly available material related to the outage so that the ACMA had the fullest possible picture of the event.</li> <li>&gt; Using this comprehensive information set, we conducted detailed analysis to identify potential breaches of the <i>Emergency Call Service Determination</i> and the <i>Communications Outages Standard</i> and to determine the specific evidence required to substantiate any such breaches. This analysis directly informed the development of the questions included in the statutory notices.</li> <li>&gt; We also mapped the corporate structure and operational responsibilities within the Optus group, enabling us to identify which legal entities held relevant obligations.</li> <li>&gt; We drafted 7 statutory notices to 7 Optus entities to support the investigation. (we later issued another statutory notice to an additional Optus entity)</li> <li>&gt; We sought advice on legal matters that we identified.</li> </ul>	ACMA
<b>8:45 am</b>	Minister Press Conference: ACMA Chair confirms the ACMA has launched an investigation into the outage. The Minister reports that Optus will be 'held accountable' for the outage.	ACMA Media (ABC)
<b>2:30 pm</b>	Vocus contacts the ACMA to advise that it contacted Optus on Saturday 20 September to enquire about any impacted customers and were advised the matter was being looked into.	ACMA

**Senate Environment and Communications References Committee  
Inquiry into the Triple Zero service outage**

<b>Time</b>	<b>Description of event</b>	<b>Source</b>
<b>5:00 pm</b>	Optus confirmed an additional 7 calls failed to connect to emergency services, 4 of which were from WA. Total of failed calls now 631.	Media (ABC)
<b>5:30 pm</b>	Vocus received an informal update from Optus that Vocus customers were impacted by the outages, advising that 10 Vocus customers attempted to make unsuccessful Triple Zero calls during last week's outage. Optus confirmed that welfare checks were conducted and indicated all customers were confirmed to be okay.	Advice from Vocus to ACMA
<b><i>Wednesday 24 September 2025</i></b>		
<b>6:45 am</b>	Optus announces Kerry Schott AO will lead the independent review into the technical failure on 18 September. Singtel Group CEO Yuen Kuan Moon issues an apology for the Triple Zero failure stating 'We are working with the Optus board and management to ensure a thorough investigation of this incident to prevent any future recurrence'.	Media (ABC)
<b>1:00 pm</b>	Optus (Mr Rue) holds another press conference where he: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Confirms staff were not following procedures known to protect calls during the network firewall upgrade.</li> <li>&gt; Says he did not believe the failure was due to a lack of funding or staff from Singtel.</li> </ul>	Media (ABC)
<b><i>Thursday 25 September 2025</i></b>		
<b>10:42 am</b>	ACMA Letter to Optus to advise investigation opened sent from Chair to Optus CEO.	ACMA
<b>1:30 pm</b>	Vocus contacts the ACMA and advised it received another notification at 12:41pm advising Optus identified an additional 3 Vocus customers that attempted to make unsuccessful Triple Zero calls during last week's outage, and that welfare checks were conducted.	Advice from Vocus to ACMA
<b><i>Tuesday 30 September</i></b>		
<b>9:00 am (approx.)</b>	Minister Wells meets with Optus CEO, Optus Chair (John Arthur), and Singtel Group CEO (Mr Yuen Kuan Moon) to discuss outage.	Minister Media Statement

**Senate Environment and Communications References Committee  
Inquiry into the Triple Zero service outage**

<b>Time</b>	<b>Description of event</b>	<b>Source</b>
<b>3:00 pm (approx.)</b>	Statement by Optus Chair released announces appointing of Kearney, a consulting firm, to have immediate oversight, quality assurance and verification as Optus uplifts its mobile network management.	Optus website
<b><i>Tuesday 7 October 2025</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	ACMA issues s521 Notice to Optus entities to provide information (due date for response 5pm 28 October 2025) We continue to gather information that is publicly available.	ACMA
<b><i>Monday 20 October 2025</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	ACMA issues s521 to Amaysim based on advice from Optus.	ACMA
<b><i>Monday 27 October 2025</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	Optus requests extension to s521 response date for one question. ACMA grants extension to 5pm Friday 31 October.	ACMA
<b><i>Tuesday 28 October 2025</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	Senate inquiry called into the Triple Zero service outage.	Senate inquiry website
<b><i>Wednesday 29 October 2025</i></b>		
<b>12:20 am</b>	Optus s521 response received (other than one question granted extension)	ACMA
<b><i>Friday 31 October 2025</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	Optus s521 responses to one question the ACMA provided an extension for received at 12:24pm (ahead of 5pm deadline).	ACMA
<b><i>Monday 3 November 2025</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	First public hearing of the Triple Zero service outage Senate inquiry. <b>ACMA and Optus executives appear.</b>	Senate inquiry website
<b><i>Thursday 13 November 2025 (approx)</i></b>		

**Senate Environment and Communications References Committee  
Inquiry into the Triple Zero service outage**

<b>Time</b>	<b>Description of event</b>	<b>Source</b>
<b>n/a</b>	Optus' submission to the Triple Zero service outage Senate inquiry is published.  We analysed the submission to identify any new lines of enquiry and any inconsistencies with the information provided by Optus (none were identified)	Senate inquiry website
<b><i>Tuesday 9 December 2025</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	Second public hearing of the Triple Zero service outage Senate inquiry	Senate inquiry website
<b><i>Thursday 18 December 2025</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	Optus releases the Independent Report into the outage prepared by Dr Kerry Schott which states that police have informed Optus that 2 deaths were related to the outage. We analysed the report to identify any new lines of enquiry and any inconsistencies with the information provided by Optus (none were identified).	Optus website
<b><i>Thursday 26 February 2026</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	Third public hearing of the Triple Zero service outage Senate inquiry	Senate inquiry website
<b><i>Thursday 13 March 2026</i></b>		
<b>n/a</b>	Fourth public hearing of the Triple Zero service outage Senate inquiry	Senate inquiry website

From: Sparreboom, Shanyn <[shanyn.sparreboom@infrastructure.gov.au](mailto:shanyn.sparreboom@infrastructure.gov.au)>  
Sent: Friday, 26 September 2025 3:20 PM  
To: Elizabeth Quinn <[elizabeth.quinn@acma.gov.au](mailto:elizabeth.quinn@acma.gov.au)>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@acma.gov.au>  
Cc: CHISHOLM, James <[James.CHISHOLM@infrastructure.gov.au](mailto:James.CHISHOLM@infrastructure.gov.au)>; Grunhard, Samuel <[Samuel.Grunhard@COMMUNICATIONS.gov.au](mailto:Samuel.Grunhard@COMMUNICATIONS.gov.au)>; LA RANCE, Lisa <[Lisa.LARance@infrastructure.gov.au](mailto:Lisa.LARance@infrastructure.gov.au)>; Irwin, Andrew <[Andrew.Irwin@infrastructure.gov.au](mailto:Andrew.Irwin@infrastructure.gov.au)>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@INFRASTRUCTURE.gov.au>; Sillieri, Kathleen <[Kathleen.Sillieri@infrastructure.gov.au](mailto:Kathleen.Sillieri@infrastructure.gov.au)>  
Subject: FW: wentworth falls Triple Zero call matter [SEC=OFFICIAL]  
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

**CAUTION:** This email is from an external sender. Do NOT click on links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and KNOW the content is safe. If you are in doubt, please contact the Corporate Service Desk.

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

Hi Elizabeth and [REDACTED]

We have become aware that a Vodafone customer tried to call Triple Zero on their phone but the call did not go through. After discussions with TPG ([REDACTED]) and Telstra ([REDACTED]), the following has been ascertained:

- TPG confirmed that there was no evidence of network problems.
- Telstra confirmed that no evidence of a camp-on from the phone IMEI number (so camp-on did not occur). Call volumes from Vodafone otherwise appear normal and are coming through as would be expected.
- Phone was a Samsung J2. [REDACTED] says this is among the cohort of older phones that was not blocked under the 3G shutdown rules because it is capable of making Triple Zero calls over 4G, but requires the software to be updated / user action to enable Triple Zero calling over 4G. He says that despite repeated messages to the user over many months, the software had not been updated or the user action not taken, hence it was unable to call Triple Zero.
- The user was sufficiently knowledgeable to use other methods to contact emergency services and was attended to. The paramedics tested the phone and confirmed it could not reach Triple Zero.
- Thankfully the person is still with us.

The information points to a problem with the device as the device cannot call Triple Zero. We ask that ACMA consider:

- whether this is a breach of the ECS Determination – given the person can make other calls but not Triple Zero calls;
- the extent to which there are other devices in this category – if MNOs are sending messages to customers to update software then they would have knowledge of impacted customers and devices;
- what action should be taken by MNOs with respect to these customers; and
- if it is not a breach whether changes need to be made to the ECS Determination.

We would be grateful if the ACMA could keep the department informed of its consideration of this issue. We are deeply concerned that there may be devices that cannot call Triple Zero in the market.

For completeness, below is the email trail of information gathered after we heard about the incident for

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, 24 September 2025 3:11 PM  
**To:** Elizabeth Quinn; [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: Emergency call issue - Wentworth Falls [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Just sharing update from TPG below.

OFFICIAL

---

**From:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@tpgtelecom.com.au>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, 24 September 2025 3:01 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@acma.gov.au>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@tpgtelecom.com.au>  
**Subject:** Emergency call issue - Wentworth Falls

**CAUTION:** This email is from an external sender. Do NOT click on links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and KNOW the content is safe. If you are in doubt, please contact the Corporate Service Desk.

Hi [REDACTED]

Thank you for your time today.

As an update, we received an escalation today at 10:14am from the Duty Officer at the Telecommunications Emergency Management Unit, New South Wales Telco Authority, regarding unsuccessful emergency call attempts by a single user and device in the Wentworth Falls area. New South Wales Ambulance attended the location.

Currently, there is no evidence of a widespread outage or disruption to emergency service calls on the Vodafone network at the time of the incident. Internal monitoring tools and alerts indicate no ongoing issues, and emergency call traffic patterns are consistent with historical averages. We have conducted a review of 000 call volumes over the past 7 days breaking the review down by "hour per day". Our review has concluded that 000 call volumes for this morning are at the same levels as experienced throughout the past week.

A preliminary investigation identified five call attempts using non-mobile emergency numbers: 22 22 (an alert code for cardiac events in medical facilities) and 106 (a standard phone emergency number not supported on mobile phones).

The handset involved in these attempts has been identified. Further investigations are underway to determine the reason the handset did not connect to emergency services when the correct number was dialled.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]

Senior Regulatory Specialist

Mobile: [REDACTED]

Email: [REDACTED]@tpgtelecom.com.au



*I acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of the dyungungoo (country) on which I live and work, the Kabi Kabi People. I pay my respects to their Elders past, present, and emerging.*

Confidential



Australian  
Communications  
and Media Authority

# **Proposed amendments to the Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages) Industry Standard 2024**

## Consultation paper

JANUARY 2026

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# Introduction

We are seeking feedback on proposed amendments to the [Telecommunications \(Customer Communications for Outages\) Industry Standard 2024](#) (the CCO standard).

The proposed amendments are in response to the [Telecommunications \(Customer Communications for Outages Industry Standard Amendment\) Direction 2025](#) (the outages register direction) issued by the Minister for Communications to the ACMA, which commenced on 12 December 2025. The outages register direction is to introduce rules for the establishment of public registers of significant local outages and major outages.

The Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages) Industry Standard Variation 2026 (No. 1) (the draft instrument) gives effect to the outages register direction by inserting a new Part 4 into the CCO standard. It sets out requirements for carriers to establish and publish publicly available outages registers and obligations for carriage service providers (CSPs) to ensure visibility of these registers. The instrument also sets out:

- the minimum information the outages registers must include
- accessibility requirements (including Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.2 compliance)
- extractability requirements
- obligations to keep information updated and accurate
- minimum retention periods for information
- clarifications of certain definitions.

We invite submissions on the attached draft instrument.

Under the [Telecommunications Act 1997](#) (Telco Act), compliance with industry standards is mandatory. A range of enforcement options apply to non-compliance with industry standards, including infringement notices and civil penalties.

The outages register direction requires the amendments to be made and **commence by 31 March 2026** and for the outages registers to be **operational by 30 June 2026**.

In April 2025, the ACMA announced its intention to review the effectiveness of the new Triple Zero-related rules, including the CCO standard, after they had been in operation for 12 months. In light of recent network failures, and alongside our work to implement the outages register direction, we are taking this opportunity to invite early views on issues related to the effectiveness of the CCO standard. These early insights will help inform the broader review that will occur later in 2026.

## Background

The CCO standard was established in response to a ministerial direction issued to the ACMA in August 2024 (the 2024 ministerial direction), following recommendations from the [Review into the Optus outage of 8 November 2023 – Final Report](#).

The CCO standard contains requirements for customer communications during major outages and significant local outages. In accordance with the 2024 ministerial direction, rules for major outages commenced on 31 December 2024. Additional rules for significant local outages were introduced in April 2025 and commenced on 30 June 2025.

On 11 November 2025, the Minister for Communications made the *Telecommunications Service Provider (Network Outages Register) Determination 2025* (SPD), requiring CSPs who are mobile carriers to establish and publish an outages register containing information about significant local outages and major outages affecting the supply of a public mobile telecommunications service.

On 12 December 2025, the Outages Register Direction was issued to the ACMA to amend the CCO standard to introduce similar requirements to those in the SPD, but expanding the obligations to all carriers, and applying to outages affecting all carriage services, not just mobile services.

# Issues for comment

We invite comments on the draft instrument, including:

## 1. Implementing the outages register direction – objectives and scope

Section 6 of the outages register direction sets out the objectives and content requirements of the amendments. These are intended to be additional to, and not in substitution for, the objectives set out in the 2024 direction. The draft instrument seeks to give effect to the outages register direction by introducing obligations for carriers to establish and publish outage registers and for CSPs to ensure visibility of these registers. These obligations are intended to meet the objectives set out in section 6 of the outages register direction, including timely publication of accurate information, standardised presentation, accessibility requirements (WCAG 2.2 compliance), and extractability of information for analytical purposes.

We are seeking views on whether the draft instrument achieves these objectives and whether there are any gaps or if any improvements should be considered.

The outages register direction also allows the ACMA to deal with matters differently for different classes of carriers or carriage service providers, or to exempt certain classes from particular requirements. We are interested in whether stakeholders consider this flexibility should be reflected in the draft instrument and, if so, in what way.

### Question 1

Do the proposed amendments to the CCO standard (as set out in the draft instrument) give effect to the objectives and minimum content requirements of the outages register direction? If not, please explain why, and suggest wording that would better meet the objectives of the outages register direction.

### Question 2

Are there any additional matters aligned to the objectives that should be included in the draft instrument, including whether the flexibility to treat different classes of carriers or CSPs differently or exempt certain classes should be applied? Please explain your position and, provide evidence and suggested wording where relevant.

### Question 3

Should the obligation for CSPs to display a link to the outage register apply only to CSPs who are not carriers (as currently drafted to reflect the outages register direction), or should it also apply to carriers that act as CSPs to ensure transparency for consumers? We are interested in whether this might be a gap and what approach would best meet the objectives of the outages register direction.

## 2. Timing for register publication and alignment with notification requirements

The draft instrument requires information to be included in the outage register “as soon as practicable” after the information comes to the knowledge of the carrier and prescribes periodic update intervals. These intervals (every 6 hours for the first 24 hours, then once during each subsequent 24-hour period) are aligned with the timing requirements for notifications under the existing CCO standard. This approach was adopted to create efficiencies for carriers and CSPs while maintaining clarity through standalone rules.

### Question 4

Do you consider the timing requirements for updates to the outage register (including periodic review) to be clear and workable? If not, please explain why and suggest improvements.

## 3. Minimum content requirements and standardised presentation

The outages register direction sets out additional content requirements for the CCO standard, to be included in the register. These are *additional* to, and not a replacement of, the content referred to in subsection 6(2) of the 2024 Direction (reflected in section 13 of the CCO standard).

The draft instrument specifies the register must include, to the extent that it is known by the carrier, information about relevant outages, including: the outage type, start date and time, duration, impacted geographical areas, types and numbers of services affected, number of premises impacted (where practicable), and the responsible carrier or CSP (if appropriate). It also prescribes a form in Schedule 1, reflecting the outages register direction’s objective of a standardised presentation of outage information in a manner that allows the information to be extracted by external entities for analytical purposes.

While the draft instrument focuses on implementing the outages register direction, we are seeking views on whether the content requirements for outage registers and notifications under section 13 of the CCO standard should be aligned now (in this amendment process) to improve consistency and reduce duplication. The content requirements for the outage register under the outages register direction differ from the content requirements for notifications under section 13 of the CCO standard, which were informed by the 2024 direction. While some fields overlap, others do not. If alignment is to be pursued, a single form could potentially be used for both purposes, with subsets of fields required for each.

### Question 5

Are there any additional content elements aligned to the outages register direction’s objectives that should be included in the outages register? Please list these and provide reasons as to why they ought to be included.

### Question 6

Should the content requirements for outage registers and notifications under section 13 of the CCO be aligned to reduce duplication and improve consistency and usability? If so, would a single form or data structure (such as that proposed at Schedule 1 but with additional fields) achieve this? If not, please suggest an alignment format that would be most practical that is also aligned with the objectives of the outages register direction.

**Question 7**

Do you have any concerns about the proposed format in which the information is required to be presented at Schedule 1? If so, what changes would you suggest to improve clarity, usability, or consistency (noting the accessibility requirements imposed by the outages register direction)?

**4. Extractability and accessibility**

The draft instrument requires outage registers to be published in a manner that allows extracts for analytical purposes by the Custodian, emergency service organisations, and other relevant stakeholders.

Currently, the draft instrument does not prescribe a structured format (such as CSV, JSON, or API). We are seeking feedback on whether carriers should have flexibility to choose their own format, or whether the CCO standard should specify a minimum structured format to ensure consistency and usability. Your feedback will help us decide whether to address this through guidance or amendments, and whether it would be useful to harmonise the format of outage registers with the format used for outage notifications in the longer term.

**Question 8**

Noting that information in the outage register needs to be extractable, should the CCO standard specify a minimum structured format (for example, a downloadable file or machine-readable format such as CSV), or allow flexibility for carriers to choose their own approach? What benefits or challenges would each option create?

The draft instrument requires outage registers to be presented in plain English, and to comply with Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.2.

**Question 9**

Are there existing challenges in presenting content that complies with WCAG 2.2 standards? If so, please outline what, if any, support or guidance would assist to achieve this.

**5. Commencement**

The outages register direction provides that the amendments to the CCO standard be made and commence in full no later than 31 March 2026, and that the outages registers be operational by 30 June 2026.

The information on the register must include information about outages that have occurred, or have continued, on or after 31 March 2026.

**Question 10**

What is the earliest practical date industry could have the amendments fully implemented and the outages register operational, ahead of the mandated timelines?

**6. Broader operation of the CCO standard**

To help shape the review of the CCO standard that will take place later in 2026, we invite early submissions on the following matters alongside feedback on the draft instrument.

Since the commencement of the rules for outages, we have received feedback from industry and the public raising concerns about the operation of some of the provisions. This feedback has been recorded and will be considered as part of the review of the CCO standard. While

this paper is focused on implementing the outages register direction, we are seeking early input on matters that may inform the broader review later this year, including the application of the existing definitions of significant local outage and major outage, arrangements for natural disasters, and whether rules should apply to planned as well as unplanned outages.

#### **Question 11**

In relation to significant local outages and major outages, please comment on the following matters, and where relevant, include examples:

- (a) How do providers currently assess what constitutes a major outage and a significant local outage?
- (b) How are the words “likely to affect” in those definitions applied in practice?
- (c) Are there any parts of the definitions that would benefit from further clarification?
- (d) Are the current thresholds appropriate and, if not, what alternative thresholds would better achieve the objectives of the 2024 direction and why?

#### **Question 12**

Are the current arrangements for communicating with customers about outages caused by natural disasters appropriate and effective? In particular:

- (a) Do existing rules support timely, accurate and accessible information to the public about outages in disaster contexts?
- (b) Have there been any challenges in applying the definition of ‘natural disaster’ (for example, meeting the time thresholds for significant local outage or major outage that trigger notification obligations) in determining the cause of an outage?
- (c) Should there be any changes to the current provisions regarding outages caused by natural disasters? If so, please provide reasons and evidence where relevant to support your response.

**Question 13**

Should the CCO standard be extended to include communications with customers about planned outages, noting that these can cause impacts to triple zero connection? Please provide reasons. If so:

- (a) Which elements (for example, timing, minimum content, accessibility requirements) should apply to communications about planned outages?
- (b) Should the obligations for planned outages differ from those obligations for unplanned outages? If so, how?
- (c) How do/should providers balance proactive communication for planned maintenance with clarity about potential impacts on access to critical services (including triple zero)?

**Question 14**

Are there any other issues or gaps relating to the operation of the CCO standard you consider should be examined in the 2026 review (for example, opportunities to reduce duplication, improve consistency or strengthen accessibility)? Please explain your views and provide evidence where relevant.

# Invitation to comment

## **Making a submission**

We invite comments on the issues set out in this consultation paper.

- [Online submissions](#) can be made by uploading a document. Submissions in PDF, Microsoft Word or Rich Text Format are preferred.
- Submissions by post can be sent to:  
Paul Nicholas  
National Interests Section  
Australian Communications and Media Authority  
PO Box 13112  
Law Courts, Melbourne Victoria 8010

The closing date for submissions is COB, **18 February 2026**.

Consultation enquiries can be emailed to [national.interests@acma.gov.au](mailto:national.interests@acma.gov.au).

## **Publication of submissions**

We publish submissions on our website, including personal information (such as names and contact details), except for information that you have claimed (and we have accepted) is confidential.

Confidential information will not be published or otherwise released unless required or authorised by law.

## **Privacy**

View information about our policy on the [publication of submissions](#), including collection of personal information during consultation and how we handle that information.

Information on the Privacy Act 1988, how to access or correct personal information, how to make a privacy complaint and how we will deal with any complaints, is available in our [privacy policy](#).



# Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages) Industry Standard Variation 2026 (No. 1)

---

The Australian Communications and Media Authority makes the following industry standard under subsection 125AA(1) of the *Telecommunications Act 1997*.

Dated:

Member

Member/General Manager

Australian Communications and Media Authority

---

## 1 Name

This instrument is the *Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages) Industry Standard Variation 2026 (No. 1)*.

## 2 Commencement

This instrument commences on 31 March 2026.

## 3 Authority

This instrument is made:

- (a) under subsection 125AA(1) of the *Telecommunications Act 1997*; and
- (b) in accordance with sections 5 and 6 of the *Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages Industry Standard Amendment) Direction 2025*.

Note 1: The direction referred to in paragraph (b) was given to the ACMA by the Minister under subsection 125AA(4) of the *Telecommunications Act 1997* and is a legislative instrument registered on the Federal Register of Legislation.

Note 2: The Federal Register of Legislation may be accessed free of charge at [www.legislation.gov.au](http://www.legislation.gov.au).

## 4 Variations

The instrument that is specified in Schedule 1 is varied as set out in the applicable items in that Schedule.

## Schedule 1—Variations

(section 4)

### ***Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages) Industry Standard 2024 (F2024L01447)***

#### **1 Section 3**

Repeal the section, substitute:

#### **3 Authority**

This instrument is made:

- (a) under subsection 125AA(1) of the *Telecommunications Act 1997*; and
- (b) in accordance with:
  - (i) sections 5 and 6 of the *Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages Industry Standards) Direction 2024*; and
  - (ii) sections 5 and 6 of the *Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages Industry Standard Amendment) Direction 2025*.

Note 1: The directions referred to in paragraph (b) were given to the ACMA by the Minister under subsection 125AA(4) of the *Telecommunications Act 1997* and are legislative instruments registered on the Federal Register of Legislation.

Note 2: The Federal Register of Legislation may be accessed free of charge at [www.legislation.gov.au](http://www.legislation.gov.au).

#### **2 Paragraph 4(c) (at the end of the paragraph)**

Omit “and”.

#### **3 Paragraph 4(d)**

Repeal the paragraph, substitute:

- (d) is intended to give effect to the objectives, and address the matters, set out in section 6 of the 2024 Direction as they relate to the carriers and carriage service providers referred to in paragraph (a); and
- (e) is also intended to give effect to the objectives, and address the matters, set out in section 6 of the 2025 Direction as they relate to the carriers and carriage service providers referred to in paragraph (a).

#### **4 Section 5 (definition of *Direction*)**

Repeal the definition.

#### **5 Section 5**

Insert:

**2024 *Direction*** means the *Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages Industry Standards) Direction 2024*.

**2025 *Direction*** means the *Telecommunications (Customer Communications for Outages Industry Standard Amendment) Direction 2025*.

---

DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION

**Custodian** has the same meaning as in the *Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999*.

**emergency service organisation** has the same meaning as in section 147 of the *Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999*.

## 6 Section 5 (at the end of the definition of *major outage*)

Add:

Note: In relation to paragraph (a), an end-user is unable to establish and maintain a relevant carriage service if the end-user is unable to use the service in the way it is ordinarily able to be used. For example, in the case of a relevant carriage service that is a standard telephone service, an end-user is unable to establish and maintain the service if the end-user is unable to use the service to make a call (including a call to an emergency service number) successfully.

## 7 Section 5 (at the end of the definition of *relevant carriage service*)

Add:

Note: This definition covers different types of carriage services, including standard telephone services and other carriage services that are 'emergency telephone services' (within the meaning of the *Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2019*).

## 8 Section 5 (at the end of the definition of *significant local outage*)

Add:

Note: In relation to paragraph (a), an end-user is unable to establish and maintain a relevant carriage service if the end-user is unable to use the service in the way it is ordinarily able to be used. For example, in the case of a relevant carriage service that is a standard telephone service, an end-user is unable to establish and maintain the service if the end-user is unable to use the service to make a call (including a call to an emergency service number) successfully.

## 9 Section 5

Insert:

**Web Content Accessibility Guidelines** means:

- (a) the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.2 published by the World Wide Web Consortium; or
- (b) guidelines published by the World Wide Web Consortium which are expressed to extend, replace or supersede the guidelines described in paragraph (a).

Note: The Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.2 could, at the time of making this instrument, be accessed free of charge from the World Wide Web Consortium's website at [www.w3.org](http://www.w3.org). Also, see paragraph 6(b).

**website** means a website that is generally available to the public.

## 10 Section 5 (paragraph (h) of the note at the end)

Repeal the paragraph, substitute:

- (h) telecommunications network (section 7);
- (i) standard telephone service (section 7).

## 11 At the end of Part 3

Add:

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## Part 4—Outage register

### 20 Application

This Part applies to:

- (a) a carrier whose telecommunications network is used to supply relevant carriage services to end-users; and
- (b) a carriage service provider who supplies relevant carriage services to end-users.

### 21 Definitions

In this Part:

**outage register**, in relation to a carrier, means a register established and maintained by the carrier under section 22.

**relevant outage**, in relation to a carrier, means any major outage or significant local outage that:

- (a) affects a telecommunications network owned by the carrier that is used to supply relevant carriage services to end-users; and
- (b) either:
  - (i) commences but is not resolved before 31 March 2026; or
  - (ii) commences on or after 31 March 2026.

### 22 Outage register

- (1) A carrier must establish and maintain a register (the **outage register**) that contains information about any relevant outage.
- (2) The outage register must include the following information, about each relevant outage, to the extent that it is known by the carrier:
  - (a) the type of outage (that is, whether it is a major outage or significant local outage);
  - (b) the date and estimated time the outage commenced;
  - (c) the geographical areas impacted or likely to be impacted by the outage;
  - (d) to the extent technically practicable and relevant:
    - (i) the types of relevant carriage services impacted by the outage;
    - (ii) the number of those services for each type;
    - (iii) the number of premises impacted by the outage;
  - (e) the date and estimated time the outage is resolved (being when all relevant carriage services impacted by the outage are fully restored);
  - (f) the carrier or carriage service provider responsible for resolving the outage;
  - (g) the total duration of the outage, once it is resolved.

Note: The outage register may include any additional information about any relevant outage or any other outage.

- (3) The carrier must ensure that any information referred to in subsection (2) is included in the outage register as soon as practicable after the information comes to the knowledge of the carrier.

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- (4) The carrier must ensure that the outage register is operational at all times on and after 30 June 2026.

### **23 Outage register must be kept up to date and accurate**

- (1) A carrier must ensure that any information contained in the outage register is kept up to date and accurate.
- (2) As soon as practicable after becoming aware of a material change that relates to a relevant outage, the carrier must ensure that:
  - (a) the information that is contained in the outage register about the outage is reviewed; and
  - (b) any information that is no longer up to date or accurate is rectified accordingly.
- (3) In any other case, the carrier must ensure that:
  - (a) the information contained in the outage register about a relevant outage is reviewed as frequently as the carrier considers necessary and at least:
    - (i) once every 6 hours for the first 24 hours of the outage; and
    - (ii) once during each subsequent 24-hour period of the outage; and
  - (b) any information that is no longer up to date or accurate is rectified accordingly.

### **24 Certain information must remain in outage register**

Any information that is contained in the outage register about a relevant outage must remain in the register until at least the end of 2 years after the date the outage is resolved.

### **25 Other requirements for outage register**

- (1) Any information that is contained in the outage register about a relevant outage must be:
  - (a) presented in the form set out in Schedule 1; and
  - (b) expressed in plain English.
- (2) The outage register must be maintained by electronic means.
- (3) The outage register must be made available for inspection by being published on:
  - (a) the carrier's website; or
  - (b) if the carrier does not have a website:
    - (i) another carrier's website; or
    - (ii) another website that the carrier considers is suitable for the purposes of inspection.
- (4) The website concerned must display, in a prominent position, the outage register or a link to the outage register.
- (5) The outage register must:
  - (a) be in an accessible file format; and
  - (b) comply with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines.
- (6) The outage register must be published in a manner that allows any of the following to take extracts from the register:
  - (a) the Custodian;

- (b) any emergency service organisation;
- (c) any other relevant stakeholder.

## 26 Carriage service provider's obligation in relation to outage register

- (1) This section applies to a carriage service provider who supplies relevant carriage services to end-users, but who is not a carrier.
- (2) The carriage service provider must ensure that at all times on and after 30 June 2026 its website displays, in a prominent position, a link to the outage register published by the carrier for the relevant carriage services.
- (3) In this section:  
*carrier for the relevant carriage services* means the carrier whose telecommunications network is used by the carriage service provider to supply the relevant carriage services to end-users.

## 27 Relationship with other requirements

To avoid doubt, the obligations in this Part are in addition to, and not in substitution for, the requirements in any other Part of this instrument.

Note: This Part contains additional requirements to ensure that more information about outages is made generally available to the public.

## 12 At the end of the instrument

Add:

### Schedule 1—Form

(paragraph 25(1)(a))

**Alert / Update / Restoration<sup>1</sup>**

**Outage type: Major outage / Significant local outage<sup>2</sup>**

**Date and estimated time outage commenced:<sup>3</sup>**

**Geographical areas impacted or likely to be impacted:<sup>4</sup>**

**Types of relevant carriage services impacted:<sup>5</sup>**

**Number of relevant carriage services impacted for each type:<sup>6</sup>**

**Number of premises impacted:<sup>7</sup>**

**Date and estimated time outage is resolved:<sup>8</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Strike out whichever is not applicable. For example, if it is the initial entry about a relevant outage, strike out "Update" and "Restoration".

<sup>2</sup> Strike out whichever is not applicable.

<sup>3</sup> Insert.

<sup>4</sup> Insert. This could include suburbs or postcodes impacted, and the broader region in which those suburbs or postcodes are located. For example: "Lithgow, Regional NSW".

<sup>5</sup> Insert to the extent technically practicable and appropriate.

<sup>6</sup> Insert to the extent technically practicable and appropriate.

<sup>7</sup> Insert to the extent technically practicable and appropriate.

<sup>8</sup> Insert once known. This is when all relevant carriage services impacted are fully restored.

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Section 1

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**Carrier or carriage service provider responsible for resolving outage:<sup>9</sup>**

**Total duration of outage:<sup>10</sup>**

**Additional information:<sup>11</sup>**

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<sup>9</sup> Insert if appropriate.

<sup>10</sup> Insert once known.

<sup>11</sup> Optional.

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## Attachment F

18 March 2026

Ms. Nerida O'Loughlin PSM  
Chair and Agency Head  
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)  
Level 3, 40 Cameron Avenue  
BELCONNEN ACT 2617

**By email:** [Nerida.OLoughlin@acma.gov.au](mailto:Nerida.OLoughlin@acma.gov.au)

**Copy:** [cathy.rainsford@acma.gov.au](mailto:cathy.rainsford@acma.gov.au); [elizabeth.quinn@acma.gov.au](mailto:elizabeth.quinn@acma.gov.au); [michael.brealey@acma.gov.au](mailto:michael.brealey@acma.gov.au)

Dear Ms O'Loughlin

### Questions taken on notice – Telstra Satellite Messaging

Telstra provides the following information to assist the ACMA in replying to questions taken on notice during the Senate Environment and Communications References Committee (Senate Committee) hearing on 12 March 2026, including clarifying the scope and limitations of Telstra Satellite Messaging and the customer communications currently in place (including in relation to Triple Zero).

This letter addresses the two specific questions raised by the Senate Committee:

1. What is the Telstra service?
2. What communications does Telstra provide to customers about how the service works and how customers can access Triple Zero?

For ease of reference, certain screenshots reproduced in this letter contain yellow highlighting that has been added by Telstra to draw the ACMA's attention to relevant statements; this highlighting does not appear in the original Telstra materials.

#### 1. What is the Telstra service?

Telstra Satellite Messaging enables eligible Telstra customers with compatible devices to send and receive text messages via satellite when they are outside the coverage footprint of the Telstra Mobile Network. The service is enabled by "satellite-to-mobile" technology and is messaging only; it does not provide voice calling (including emergency calling to 000).

Key operating parameters include:

- **Capability and use case:** The service supports sending and receiving text messages using the device's native messaging interface when connected to a Starlink "Direct to Cell" satellite link. It is



complementary to (and distinct from) the Telstra Mobile Network and is intended as an additional layer of connectivity for basic messaging where terrestrial coverage is unavailable.

- **Connection method:** Compatible devices will automatically seek a satellite connection when beyond the range of the Telstra Mobile Network, provided the user is outdoors with a clear line of sight to the sky. When connected, supported devices display “Telstra SpaceX” as the network identifier. Further information is available at: <https://www.telstra.com.au/coverage-networks/mobile-technology/satellite-to-mobile#how-it-works>
- **Eligibility:** The service is included on eligible Telstra Upfront Mobile Plans (consumer and small business), subject to the customer having a compatible device running the latest software. Telstra maintains an eligibility/compatibility checker and device list, including model identifiers and software requirements for certain variants. Available at: <https://www.telstra.com.au/coverage-networks/mobile-technology/satellite-to-mobile#compatibility-checker>
- **Customer uptake and value:** Telstra Satellite Messaging is providing a valued service to customers. Telstra is seeing around 90,000 devices connect to its satellite-to-mobile service on average per day.<sup>1</sup> This represents strong uptake given the limited compatible handset range and the newness of the product. Any action that would limit availability or use of Telstra Satellite Messaging could reduce consumer access to basic messaging connectivity in areas without terrestrial mobile coverage.
- **Coverage footprint and access conditions:** The service is available from most outdoor areas on mainland Australia and Tasmania, subject to the customer being beyond terrestrial coverage, outdoors, and having a direct line of sight to the sky. Published exclusions include the Australian Radio Quiet Zone in Western Australia and certain remote offshore territories and islands.

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<sup>1</sup> Telstra Group Limited, *Annual General Meeting presentations 2025* (CEO speech), 14 October 2025, <https://www.telstra.com.au/content/dam/tcom/about-us/investors/agm/telstra-agm-presentations-2025.pdf>




## Telstra Satellite Messaging coverage

### Can I use Telstra Satellite Messaging anywhere in Australia?

Telstra Satellite Messaging is available from most outdoor areas on mainland Australia and Tasmania, and in immediate offshore areas as shown in the map below. It can only be accessed if your compatible phone is beyond the reach of our mobile network, if you are outdoors, and if you have a clear line of sight to the sky.

But there are a few places where it won't work. There is no Telstra Satellite Messaging coverage in the Australian Radio Quiet Zone in Western Australia, north-east of Geraldton or in the remote offshore territories and islands of Australia.



- **Published limitations:** Telstra's public materials state the service is not designed to be an emergency service and should not be relied upon for help in an emergency. Telstra Satellite Messaging supports SMS only and does not enable voice calling, including calls to 000/112. Telstra Satellite Messaging cannot be used to call 000 or 112 emergency services or text Triple Zero (000) directly (this is because Triple Zero does not support SMS text messaging). It does not support one-way messaging such as emergency broadcast messaging.

## 2. What communications does Telstra provide to customers about how the service works and how customers can access 000?

Telstra's customer communications in relation to Telstra Satellite Messaging are provided through multiple public-facing channels, including the Telstra Satellite Messaging page,<sup>2</sup> and associated support pages.<sup>3</sup> These materials explain how the service operates and include clear warnings that it is not designed for emergencies and cannot be used to contact emergency services, including by calling 000/112 or texting Triple Zero (000) via the satellite messaging service. These disclosures are reinforced through Telstra's sales channel communications (including front of house (FOH) scripting where relevant) and through the Critical Information Summary (CIS) for the eligible Telstra Upfront Mobile Plans on which Telstra Satellite Messaging is included.

### a) How the service works (customer-facing explanations)

Across Telstra's product and support materials, customers are informed that:

<sup>2</sup> Telstra, 'Telstra Satellite Messaging is here', <https://www.telstra.com.au/coverage-networks/mobile-technology/satellite-to-mobile>, accessed 16 March 2026.

<sup>3</sup> Telstra, 'Get help for Telstra Satellite Messaging', <https://www.telstra.com.au/support/mobiles-devices/satellite-to-mobile>, accessed 16 March 2026.



- Telstra Satellite Messaging enables sending/receiving texts via satellite when beyond the Telstra Mobile Network, subject to a compatible device, latest software, and an eligible plan;
- the handset will connect automatically when the user is outdoors with a clear view of the sky, and “Telstra SpaceX” will display when connected;
- the service may be intermittent, and some messages may take minutes (or longer) depending on satellite availability, location and device; and
- there are coverage constraints and geographic exclusions described on Telstra’s product/support pages.

**b) Emergency use and access to Triple Zero (000) – clear statements and warnings**

Telstra’s customer-facing materials include explicit warnings that the service is not designed for emergency communications and cannot be used to contact emergency services, including Triple Zero. For example:



[Telstra Satellite Messaging webpage](#)

- Under *FAQs*, we explain Telstra Satellite Messaging cannot be used to call 000 or 112 and that users cannot text Triple Zero (000) directly from Telstra Satellite Messaging;

∨ Can I use Telstra Satellite Messaging to call 000 Emergency services?

No, Telstra Satellite Messaging cannot be used to call 000 or 112 Emergency services. Nor can you text Triple Zero (000) directly from Telstra Satellite Messaging.

- Under *FAQs*, we caution customers not to rely on the service for help in an emergency and note that SMS is not suitable for warning people about serious risks or requesting emergency assistance.

∨ Can I use Telstra Satellite Messaging to stay informed on emergency situations?

No. Do not rely on Telstra Satellite Messaging for help in an emergency. SMS is not suitable for warning people about serious risks or asking emergency service organisations to come to someone's aid.

- Under *Things you need to know*, we state that Telstra Satellite Messaging is not designed to be an emergency service and cannot be used to call 000 or 112, nor to text Triple Zero (000) directly.



∨ Things you need to know

### Telstra Satellite Messaging

To use Telstra Satellite Messaging, you need:

1. a compatible phone with the latest software,
2. a Telstra Upfront Mobile Plan, and
3. to be located outdoors within the satellite network with a clear view of the sky.

The satellite network will extend beyond the range of our mobile network to most outdoor areas on mainland Australia and Tasmania, excluding the Australian Radio Quiet Zone in Western Australia and remote offshore territories and islands of Australia.

Telstra Satellite Messaging is not designed to be an emergency service, as you cannot text Triple Zero (000) directly. If you intend to visit remote regions, it is always recommended to plan ahead and take extra precautions in the case of an emergency.


Telstra Satellite Messaging is an intermittent service, so the experience of sending and receiving a message is different than via mobile connection. Some messages may take a few minutes or longer to send and receive, depending on location, device and availability of Starlink Direct to Cell satellites.

Telstra Satellite Messaging cannot be used to:

- receive one-way messages (such as emergency broadcast messages)
- send or receive MMS
- send or receive instant messages that require the internet such as WhatsApp messages
- make or receive voice or video calls
- access data
- send or receive messages when you are overseas

### [Upfront Mobile Plan Cards](#)

On all relevant Upfront Mobile plan cards, Telstra identifies Telstra Satellite Messaging as an available inclusion, together with the other features of the applicable plan. Each card also contains a “Learn more” prompt that, when selected, takes customers directly to Telstra’s Satellite Messaging information page, where they are presented with the information outlined above.



### Customer Information Summary (CIS)

Telstra also includes information about the availability of Telstra Satellite Messaging on the eligible Telstra Upfront Mobile Plans through the CIS for those plans. The CIS supports customers by summarising key plan features and directing customers to the detailed product/support information, including limitations – such as that Telstra Satellite Messaging is not designed for emergencies and cannot be used to contact 000/112.



## Satellite Messaging

To use Telstra Satellite Messaging, you need a compatible phone with the latest software, a Telstra Upfront Mobile Plan, and to be located outdoors within the satellite network with a clear view of the sky.

Telstra Satellite Messaging isn't designed to be an emergency service, as you can't text Australian emergency responders directly. If you intend to visit remote regions, it's always recommended to plan ahead and take extra precautions in the case of an emergency.

Check for more information on coverage, what it can't be used for and how it works at [telstra.com/coverage-networks/mobile-technology/satellite-to-mobile](https://telstra.com/coverage-networks/mobile-technology/satellite-to-mobile).

### Media releases

The Telstra Exchange announcement for Telstra Satellite Messaging does not present the product as a full substitute for the mobile network; it expressly set out key limitations of the service, including that it is currently limited to SMS text messaging only (not voice or data) and is separate from, and performs differently to, Telstra's terrestrial mobile network.

Importantly for emergency communications, the page explicitly warns the service is not designed to be an emergency service and specifically notes that customers cannot text Triple Zero (000) directly, recommending people planning to visit remote regions plan ahead and take extra precautions.

#### **c) How customers can get through to Triple Zero (000)**

Consistent with the above, Telstra Satellite Messaging does not provide a pathway to contact Triple Zero by satellite text and does not support calling 000/112 while using the satellite-to-mobile link. Telstra's materials clearly explain to customers the Telstra Satellite Messaging service cannot be used to call 000 or 112, nor to text Triple Zero (000) and that customers should not rely on Telstra Satellite Messaging in emergencies and should plan ahead and take appropriate precautions when travelling in remote regions.

Where customers require satellite-based voice calling capability (including for emergency calling contingencies in remote areas), Telstra separately offers "Telstra Mobile Satellite" services using Iridium certified handsets and a dedicated service/number, which is different to (and not the same as) Telstra Satellite Messaging.

For completeness, Telstra's materials also distinguish Telstra Satellite Messaging from Apple's "Emergency SOS via satellite" feature (which uses a different satellite constellation and may support emergency text flows on supported devices), reinforcing that Telstra Satellite Messaging is not an emergency service and does not enable texting Triple Zero.



✓ How is Telstra Satellite Messaging different to Apple's Emergency SOS via satellite feature?

Telstra Satellite Messaging and Apple's Emergency SOS via satellite are two different services and use distinct satellite constellations.

Apple's Emergency SOS via satellite is available on iPhone 14 or later (all models) and can be used to text emergency services when you're off the grid with no cellular and Wi-Fi coverage. For more information, please visit Emergency SOS via satellite on [apple.com](https://apple.com).

Telstra Satellite Messaging is enabled by Starlink Direct to Cell and complements the Telstra Mobile Network to allow Telstra customers with a compatible device with the latest software, and Upfront Mobile Plan to send and receive texts from most areas of mainland Australia. It is not designed to be an emergency service, as you cannot text Triple Zero (000) directly from Telstra Satellite Messaging.

Additionally, Apple has stated (in their answers to questions on notice dated 6 March 2026<sup>4</sup>) that "Emergency SOS via satellite" "can help users connect with public emergency services under exceptional circumstances when no other means of reaching emergency services are available. If users try to call or text emergency services but can't connect because they are off the grid – somewhere with no cellular and Wi-Fi coverage – their iPhone offers to connect via satellite". Apple also describes this capability as independent from cellular infrastructure; accordingly, it operates separately from carrier mobile networks (including Telstra's). Further information can be found on Apple's website.<sup>4</sup>

Telstra has no objection to the ACMA attaching this letter to its response to the Senate Committee. If it would assist, Telstra can provide further information, or supporting material as required.

Yours sincerely,



Regulatory Affairs & Legal Services Executive  
Corporate Affairs, Risk and Legal

 [telstra.com](mailto:telstra.com)

<sup>4</sup> Apple, 'Use Emergency SOS via satellite on your iPhone', <https://support.apple.com/en-au/101573>, accessed 16 March 2026.