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## **Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018**

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**Submission to the  
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security**

The Hon Margaret Stone  
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

12 October 2018

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## Summary

The Telecommunications and Other Legislation (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (the Bill) proposes to confer a range of significant new powers on intelligence and law enforcement agencies, to assist them in overcoming challenges presented by the use of encryption.

The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) will oversee the exercise of the new powers by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). IGIS understands that the challenges faced by these agencies are significant, and makes no comment on the policy underlying the proposals in the Bill. The comments in this submission are limited to the oversight implications of the proposals.

This submission advances two main propositions. **First**, while the *Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act)* provides sufficient authority to oversee the new powers in relation to ASIO, ASD and ASIS, the proposed amendments would increase considerably the scope and complexity of oversight arrangements and the workload of this Office. The adequacy of resourcing to maintain effective oversight would require ongoing monitoring and reassessment.

**Secondly**, IGIS has identified a number of technical issues in various provisions that would present difficulties for independent oversight and would benefit from some targeted amendments. IGIS makes several suggestions to address apparent ambiguities and provide clear standards against which IGIS could conduct oversight of agency decision-making. Key issues are summarised below.

## Key issues

- 1. The absence of, or limitations in, reporting and notification requirements:** the lack of reporting or notification requirements about intelligence agencies' actions under the amendments in **Schedule 1** (in relation to ASIO, ASD and ASIS) and **Schedules 2 and 5** (in relation to ASIO) will make IGIS oversight difficult, particularly in relation to conferral and use of immunities from legal liability, and the exercise by ASIO of extended computer access-related powers. IGIS supports the inclusion of some further statutory reporting and notification requirements<sup>1</sup>
- 2. A potentially unintended omission in authorised disclosure provisions:** the amendments to the *Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act)* in **Schedule 2** remove the existing lawful basis for the disclosure of certain interception information to, and by, IGIS officials for the purpose of performing oversight of ASIO. This appears to be unintended, and IGIS considers it important that there is no reduction in the existing authorisation.<sup>2</sup>
- 3. The potential for intelligence agencies to make technical assistance requests for the voluntary creation of 'backdoors':** the amendments in **Schedule 1** do not limit the power of any agency to request communications providers to introduce, or omit to rectify, a systemic weakness or vulnerability into a form of electronic protection. It is unclear if this result is intended. If so, the task for IGIS in overseeing these requests will be complex, and would be assisted by a requirement for intelligence agencies to notify IGIS of any such requests when they are made.<sup>3</sup>

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1 See the following parts of this submission: [1.4], [1.5], [1.6], [1.9] (Schedule 1); [2.1.3], [2.2.4], [2.2.7] (Schedule 2: ASIO warrants); [5.1.8] and [5.2.7] (Schedule 5: ASIO immunities and assistance orders).

2 See part [2.4] of this submission.

3 See part [1.3.4] of this submission.

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4. **Powers of intelligence agencies to confer immunities from civil liability:** the amendments in **Schedules 1 and 5** will empower members of intelligence agencies to confer immunities from civil liability on various persons, with fewer safeguards than existing mechanisms by which such immunities are conferred.<sup>4</sup> IGIS would support closer alignment of safeguards to ensure consistency of decision-making about the conferral of immunities across different schemes; and to avoid the potential for propriety risks if there is a choice of immunities with differences in applicable thresholds, conditions and limitations.
5. **Powers of intelligence agencies to confer an effective immunity from criminal liability to certain computer offences:** the amendments in **Schedule 1** will also empower ASIO, ASIS and ASD to confer on communications providers an effective immunity from criminal liability to certain computer offences in the *Criminal Code*, in respect of conduct in accordance with a technical capability request, or a technical capability assistance notice in the case of ASIO. The scope of the effective immunity appears to be broader than immunities that would be available to members of ASIO, ASD and ASIS if they were to engage in the same conduct.<sup>5</sup> IGIS questions whether this is the intended result.

## Other issues

### Schedule 1—Industry assistance (new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act 1997*)

- Apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies in the various decision-making thresholds, conditions, limitations and procedural provisions governing the new industry assistance scheme.
- An anomaly in the disclosure offences applying to new Part 15, under which IGIS officials are required to discharge the evidential burden to an exception that they made the disclosure for the purpose of performing functions or duties as IGIS officials.

### Schedule 2—Extensions of ASIO's warrant-based computer access powers

- Potential unintended consequences of the broad scope of the new telecommunications interception (TI) powers, and powers to temporarily remove computers and things from premises. Some of these consequences include:
  - the conferral of TI and temporary removal powers for the purpose of entering premises, and not only gaining access to relevant data held on, or accessible from, a computer; and
  - the conferral of a power to use force against persons and things to carry out TI.

### Schedule 5—ASIO powers to confer civil immunities on persons providing assistance

- An absence of statutory requirements to ensure that the decision to confer a civil immunity on a person or body is reasonable and proportionate, and that the conduct of that person or body in reliance on the immunity remains reasonable and proportionate.
- The absence of a maximum period of effect for ASIO's requests for assistance, and consequently the civil immunity from liability that applies to persons who comply with such requests.

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4 See the following parts of this submission: [1.1] and [1.4] (Schedule 1); and [5.1] (Schedule 5).

5 See part [1.5] of this submission.

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- The absence of statutory limitations on the civil immunity in relation to conduct that causes significant pure economic loss, or physical or mental harm or injury, to a third party.
- Apparent gaps and ambiguities in procedural provisions, including oral requests and variations.

**Schedule 5—Orders to assist ASIO in accessing data it has obtained under a warrant**

- Ambiguities in, and the breadth of, the classes of persons whose assistance may be compelled.
- Limitations in safeguards to the issuing and execution of assistance orders, including:
  - the absence of a statutory requirement that **all orders** must prescribe important details, including the place a person must attend, and the period in which they must assist ASIO;
  - the absence of statutory safeguards against the exercise of multiple coercive powers in relation to a person who is the subject of a proposed assistance order;
  - the absence of specific requirements governing the collection, handling, secondary use and retention of sensitive information obtained under an order, such as biometric information;
  - the absence of clear safeguards against the risk that a person who is attending a place in accordance with an assistance order may be arbitrarily detained or deprived of liberty.

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## Background

The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) welcomes the opportunity to make a submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) on the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018. The IGIS is an independent statutory officer who reviews the legality and propriety of the activities of the six agencies in the Australian Intelligence Community. Information about IGIS is at **Attachment A**.

## Focus of this submission

If the Bill is passed, IGIS will oversee the exercise by ASIO, ASD and ASIS of the new powers conferred on them, several of which are significant extensions of existing powers. This submission explains how IGIS will conduct such oversight. Its content is reproduced substantially from the Inspector-General's unclassified submission to the Department of Home Affairs on the Exposure Draft Bill of 13 September 2018. IGIS does not make any comment on the policy underlying the Bill, but identifies a number of technical issues that would present difficulties for independent oversight, and could benefit from targeted amendments to the Bill. This submission covers:

- **Schedule 1 (industry assistance)**—new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act 1997*, to the extent that it will:
  - authorise ASIO, ASD and ASIS to confer immunity from civil liability on various communications providers who voluntarily render certain forms of technical assistance to those agencies in accordance with a **technical assistance request**;
  - empower ASIO to issue **technical assistance notices** to those providers to compel them to provide such assistance, with civil penalties for non-compliance; and
  - empower the Attorney-General to issue **technical capability notices** (on the request of ASIO) that compel communications providers to develop and maintain certain technical capabilities for the purpose of being able to provide technical assistance to ASIO (or to render technical assistance to ASIO) with civil penalties for non-compliance.
- **Schedule 2 (computer access)**—amendments to the *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act)* to extend ASIO's warrant-based computer access powers to authorise the interception of telecommunications, the temporary removal of computers or other things from premises, and the concealment of activities done under a warrant after its expiry.
- **Schedule 5 (ASIO)**—amendments to the *ASIO Act* that will:
  - enable ASIO to confer immunity from civil liability on persons who voluntarily provide assistance to ASIO in the performance of its functions, in accordance with a request; and
  - empower the Attorney-General to make orders (on the request of ASIO) to compel persons to assist ASIO in accessing data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device that is accessed or seized by ASIO under a warrant.

## Resource impacts for IGIS

Oversight of the new powers will be complex and resource intensive. The adequacy of IGIS resourcing to maintain effective oversight (including complaint management and accessing independent technical expertise) will require ongoing monitoring, including as informed by the frequency and manner of use of the new powers by agencies.

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## Schedule 1—Industry assistance to ASIO, ASD and ASIS

Schedule 1 to the Bill proposes to insert a new Part 15 (‘industry assistance’) into the *Telecommunications Act 1997*. It would establish a scheme under which ‘designated communications providers’<sup>6</sup> may be requested (under ‘technical assistance requests’)<sup>7</sup> or compelled (under ‘technical assistance notices’<sup>8</sup> or ‘technical capability notices’<sup>9</sup>) to provide various forms of assistance to security and law enforcement agencies, provided that the acts or things comprising the assistance are done in connection with the ‘eligible activities’<sup>10</sup> of those providers.

If the Bill is passed, IGIS would oversee the actions of ASIO, ASD and ASIS in making and administering technical assistance requests, and the actions of ASIO in issuing and administering technical assistance notices.<sup>11</sup> IGIS would also oversee the actions of ASIO in making requests to the Attorney-General to issue technical capability notices, including oversight of the intelligence case accompanying the request, and any actions taken by ASIO in the administration of those notices.<sup>12</sup> This may include consideration of complaints from communications providers, and others who may be affected by the acts of communications providers pursuant to requests and notices.

### 1.1 Relationship with existing agency powers and immunities

A communications provider who engages in conduct in compliance with a request or notice will be immune from civil liability in relation to that conduct.<sup>13</sup> The Bill will also amend the *Criminal Code Act 1995 (Code)* to protect providers from criminal liability in relation to the telecommunications service and computer offences in Parts 10.6 and 10.7 of the *Code* in these circumstances.<sup>14</sup>

#### 1.1.1 Legal effect

As a general observation, the proposed amendments represent a significant change to the existing approach to the conferral of statutory immunities from legal liability on intelligence agencies and persons assisting those agencies in the performance of their functions. In particular:

- The existing arrangements relevant to ASIO are found in the special intelligence operations (SIO) scheme under Division 4 of Part III of the *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act)*. There are significantly more safeguards in the SIO scheme than those in new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*. These include requirements for Ministerial-level approval;<sup>15</sup> proportionality and other requirements in the issuing criteria that limit the conduct able to be

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6 New section 317C.

7 New Part 15, Division 2 (especially new section 317G).

8 New Part 15, Division 3 (especially new section 317L).

9 New Part 15, Division 4 (especially new section 317T).

10 New section 317C.

11 *Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act)*, subsections 8(1)-(2) and section 9A.

12 *IGIS Act*, sections 8 and 9AA(b).

13 New paragraphs 317G(1)(c)-(d) (requests) and new section 317ZJ (notices).

14 Schedule 1, items 2 and 3 (new subsection 474.6(7A) and subparagraphs 476.2(b)(iv)-(vi) of the *Code*).

15 *ASIO Act*, sections 35B and 35C.

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authorised;<sup>16</sup> exclusions of certain acts from the immunity;<sup>17</sup> and reporting and notification requirements to IGIS and the Attorney-General.<sup>18</sup>

- The current immunities from legal liability relevant to ASD and ASIS are in section 14 of the *Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA)* and section 476.5 of the *Code*. They apply only to acts done by staff members and agents of those agencies outside of Australia, in the proper performance by those agencies of their functions,<sup>19</sup> and a limited set of preparatory actions (excluding acts for which ASIO would require a warrant or an authorisation to do in Australia).<sup>20</sup>

One effect of the amendments in Schedule 1 is that intelligence agencies will potentially have multiple grounds of statutory immunity from civil and criminal liability that they could apply to communications providers who perform functions for them, which apply different thresholds and are subject to different conditions and limitations.

It is conceivable that, in some circumstances, agencies will have a choice about which type or types of statutory immunity they will engage in a particular operation.<sup>21</sup> In some circumstances, agencies may engage multiple forms of immunity for various participants in an operation. They may potentially do so in conjunction with the exercise of authority under one or more warrants or other authorisations to undertake certain intrusive activities.

The task of performing oversight of agency operations that involve multiple sources of legal authority (including multiple sources of immunities, coercive collection powers and intrusive covert collection powers) will be complex, particularly where choices exist about the sources of relevant powers and immunities. Further, as the immunities conferred on communications providers under the scheme will remove third party rights to recover damages or obtain other legal remedies in relation to loss or damage caused by acts done pursuant to notices and requests, this may be a new source of complaints to IGIS.

### 1.1.2 General limits on technical assistance and capability notices (new section 317H)

New subsection 317ZH(1) provides that a technical assistance notice or a technical capability notice has no effect to the extent, if any, that it would require a designated communications provider to do an act or a thing that would require a warrant or an authorisation under any law of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory. Several Acts are identified specifically, including the *Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act)*, *ASIO Act* and *ISA*.

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16 *ASIO Act*, subsection 35C(2) especially paragraph (c).

17 *ASIO Act*, paragraph 35K(1)(e).

18 *ASIO Act*, sections 35PA and 35Q.

19 *ISA*, subsection 14(1); and *Code*, subsection 476.5(1).

20 *ISA*, subsections 14(2)-(2A); and *Code*, subsections 476.5(2)-(2A). (Note that the immunity for preparatory and ancillary conduct under the *ISA* is for acts done within and outside Australia, but in subsection 476.5 of the *Code* it is for acts done within Australia.)

21 For example, **in the case of ASIO**, there may be a choice between the issuing of a technical assistance request and a request under new s 21A(1) of the *ASIO Act* (Schedule 5) or obtaining an authorisation for the provider as a participant in a special intelligence operation; or compelling assistance under a technical assistance notice or obtaining an order under new s 34AAA of the *ASIO Act* (Schedule 5). **In the case of ASIS and ASD** there may, in some circumstances, be a choice between the issuing of a technical capability request and engaging a provider as a consultant or contractor to provide services to the agency (thereby making them a 'staff member' of the agency under the *ISA* and enlivening the immunity in section 14 for certain acts done in the proper performance of the agency's functions).



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New subsection 317ZH(2) further provides that it is to be assumed that each law imposing a warrant or authorisation requirement applies both within and outside Australia. This means that there would be neither any legal compulsion for a communications provider to render assistance to ASIO under a notice, nor any civil immunity for any such assistance rendered, if that assistance comprises, among other things:

- the interception of telecommunications, or accessing stored communications, metadata or telecommunications data from a carrier or carriage service provider (being activities for which ASIO would require a warrant or an authorisation under the *TIA Act*);<sup>22</sup>
- an activity for which ASIO would require a special powers warrant, a questioning warrant, an authorisation to collect foreign intelligence, or an authorisation to conduct a special intelligence operation under the *ASIO Act*;<sup>23</sup> and
- activities for which an *ISA* agency would require a Ministerial authorisation (including activities for the specific purpose of producing intelligence on an Australian person; certain activities by ASIS that will or are likely to have a direct effect on an Australian person; and activities by ASD for the specific purpose of preventing or disrupting cybercrime undertaken or enabled by an Australian person outside Australia).<sup>24</sup>

The intended effect of new section 317ZH appears to be that new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* should not be used as a ‘backdoor’ method for agencies to collect intelligence or do related acts or things that would bypass their existing warrant or authorisation requirements.<sup>25</sup> This is an important safeguard. However, there are a number of uncertainties and potential gaps in the coverage of this provision (outlined below) which may make both compliance and oversight more complicated.

***No limitations on technical assistance requests***

New section 317ZH applies only to technical assistance notices and technical capability notices.<sup>26</sup> This raises the possibility that a technical assistance request could be given to a communications provider, asking it to voluntarily undertake collection activities for which the intelligence agency would require a warrant or an authorisation to carry out itself, in circumstances in which it would not be an offence for the communications provider to engage in that conduct. This may include circumstances in which a provider relies on an authorisation conferred by the amendments in item 3 of Schedule 1 to the Bill to avoid liability under the computer offences in Part 10.7 of the *Code*.<sup>27</sup>

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22 New paragraph 317ZH(1)(a).

23 New paragraph 317ZH(1)(d).

24 New paragraph 317ZH(1)(e).

25 See also: Explanatory Memorandum, p. 68 at paragraph [265].

26 New subsection 317ZH(1).

27 For example, offences for the unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer (*Code*, section 477.3); and unauthorised access to, or modification of, restricted data held in a computer (*Code*, section 478.1). The Explanatory Memorandum states, at p. 30, paragraph [16], that ‘the powers in new Part 15 cannot authorise access, modification or impairment in circumstances where a warrant or authorisation would be required (new section 317SC of Part 15 makes this clear’. As Schedule 1 to the Bill does not contain a ‘section 317SC’, this may have been intended to be a reference to section 317ZH. As noted above, new section 317ZH only applies limitations to notices,

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In such cases, the effect of the request would be that: the communications provider is immune from civil liability in relation to the activities; is immune from computer offences in relation to the causation of unauthorised access, modification or impairment of data held in or communications to or from a computer; and is entitled to payment by the agency in accordance with any contract made under new section 317K in connection with the request.

IGIS queries whether technical assistance requests are intended to be capable of use in circumstances in which they could effectively enable an agency to bypass statutory warrant or authorisation requirements. In any event, IGIS would consider that an intelligence agency would not be acting in the proper performance of its functions if it were to issue a technical assistance request to a provider to do an act or thing that the agency could not lawfully do without a warrant or an authorisation.

**Suggestion: legislative clarification of the intended use of technical assistance requests**

If there is no intention for technical assistance request to be used in these circumstances, as appears to be the case based on statements in the Explanatory Memorandum,<sup>28</sup> the limitation in new subsection 317ZH(1) could be amended to include requests, or an equivalent limitation could be expressly applied to the power of agencies to make requests under new section 317ZG.

***The potential use of notices to compel a provider to do acts or things that are authorised under an extant ASIO warrant***

Although new paragraphs 317ZH(4)(e) and (f) of the *Telecommunications Act* are expressed as being included merely ‘to avoid doubt’, these provisions appear to substantively qualify the limitation in new subsection 317ZH(1). They provide that the restrictions in new subsection 317ZH(1) do not prevent a notice from requiring a provider to give help to ‘assist in, or facilitate, giving effect to a warrant’, or to ‘give effect to a warrant’.

The intended meaning of the words ‘give effect’ in this context is unclear. In particular, it is unclear if these words are intended to mean that notices could be used to compel communications providers to do the acts or things that are authorised under an **extant** special powers warrant or interception warrant that has been issued to ASIO and is in force during the compliance period for the notice.<sup>29</sup> It is similarly unclear whether the words ‘give effect’ are intended to cover warrants that are issued to ASIO after a notice is given but during the period of effect of the notice.

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**not requests**, whereas the immunity in item 3 of Schedule 1 applies to conduct that is undertaken in accordance with a request. There does not appear to be any other provision in Schedule 1 to the Bill that would limit the power to make a technical assistance request to those circumstances in which the agency would not require a warrant or an authorisation to undertake the relevant act itself.

28 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 30 at paragraph [16].

29 The Explanatory Memorandum does not appear to provide meaningful insight into this issue. It states, at p. 69 at paragraph [268], that new subsection 317ZH(4) ‘makes clear’ that, notwithstanding subsections 317ZH(1) and (3), a notice can require a provider to assist in or facilitate giving effect to a warrant or an authorisation, or to give effect to a warrant or an authorisation.

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**Suggestion: legislative clarification of the intended meaning of the expression ‘give effect’**

As this type of ambiguity will make oversight more difficult, clarification of these matters would be desirable, preferably directly in the provisions of new section 317ZH.

**Oversight implications for IGIS in relation to new s 317ZH(4)(f)**

If the words ‘give effect’ in new paragraph 317ZH(4)(f) are intended to enable ASIO to issue notices that will compel communications providers to do acts or things that are authorised under an extant warrant, it would be necessary to determine the relationship between such a notice, and existing statutory requirements for the approval of persons to exercise authority under that warrant.<sup>30</sup>

In the absence of clear words to the contrary in new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*, IGIS considers that the separate statutory authorisation requirements to exercise authority under a warrant would likely apply in relation to a communications provider, in addition to the issuing of the notice to compel them to do the relevant things.

The application of existing statutory authorisation requirements to exercise authority under one of ASIO’s special powers warrants or interception warrants will be particularly important for oversight purposes if a **single** technical assistance notice issued to a provider is capable of compelling that provider to provide assistance to ASIO of a kind that could be used in **multiple** warrant operations that are carried out during the period of effect of the notice.

In these circumstances, the instrument authorising the provider to exercise authority under a particular warrant will be the primary record available to IGIS that links the compulsion of assistance under a notice with **each** warrant operation.

***The relationship between ‘listed acts or things’ in new s 317E, actions requiring authorisation under ASIO special powers warrants, and the limitations in new s 317ZH***

A technical assistance notice may require a provider to do one or more of the ‘listed acts or things’ specified in new section 317E.<sup>31</sup> However, several ‘listed acts or things’ appear to be acts or things for which ASIO would, or may depending on the facts, require a warrant or an authorisation to undertake itself.

This raises the question of how the limitation in new subsection 317ZH(1) and the qualifications in new paragraph 317ZH(4)(f) would apply to a notice that specified such ‘listed acts and things’. For example, in some circumstances, ASIO may require a warrant to carry out the following ‘listed acts or things’ itself:

- The doing of acts or things under new paragraph 317E(1)(j) to ‘conceal the fact that any thing has been done covertly in the performance of a function, or the exercise of a power, conferred by the law of the Commonwealth ... so far as the function or power relates to ... (iii) the interests of Australia’s national security’ would appear to cover activities carried out for the purpose of concealing acts or things done under one of ASIO’s special powers warrants. However, those

30 See: *TIA Act*, section 12 (interception warrants) and *ASIO Act*, section 24 (special powers warrants).

31 New subsection 317L(3). (The type of assistance that can be required under a notice can include, but is not limited to, ‘listed acts or things’.)

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concealment-related actions generally require authorisation under the relevant special powers warrant, subject to the applicable statutory thresholds and conditions being met.<sup>32</sup>

- In some circumstances, it is possible that the doing of acts or things specified in new paragraphs 317E(1)(e)-(j) may cause a result that is prohibited or restricted under an ASIO special powers warrant. For example, ASIO's computer access warrants are subject to a limitation on the doing of acts or things that are likely to materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct the lawful use of a computer, **unless** they are necessary to do one or more of the things specified in the warrant. These warrants also impose an absolute prohibition on the doing of acts or things that are likely to cause any other material loss or damage to lawful users of a computer.<sup>33</sup>

It appears to IGIS that new section 317ZH would operate to provide that a technical assistance notice would be legally effective in compelling a provider to give help in the circumstances outlined above **only if**:

- ASIO was required to obtain, and had obtained, a special powers warrant authorising it to do the relevant acts or things;
- that warrant was in force for the period of effect (or compliance period, if any) of the technical assistance notice;
- the provider was authorised to exercise authority under that warrant in accordance with requirements under section 24 of the *ASIO Act*, and that authorisation was in force for the period of effect of the notice and the warrant; and
- the assistance purportedly compelled under the notice did not exceed the limits of the authority conferred under:
  - the warrant (including any statutory limitations on ASIO's warrant-based powers, or conditions imposed by the Attorney-General in respect of the particular warrant); or
  - the authorisation of the provider to exercise authority under the warrant.

**Suggestion: statutory reporting requirements**

Oversight of these matters is likely to be complex and would be significantly assisted by ASIO keeping written records that clearly link requirements in particular technical assistance notices to particular warrants and authorisation lists in relation to those warrants (being lists of the persons who are authorised to exercise authority under those warrants).

One way of facilitating consistent record keeping (and IGIS and Ministerial visibility) would be through amendments to the existing warrant reporting requirements in section 34 of the *ASIO Act* and section 17 of the *TIA Act*. These provisions could include a requirement to report if a person was compelled under a notice issued under Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* to do an act or a thing authorised under the warrant.

32 See, for example: *ASIO Act*, paragraphs 25(4)(e) (search warrants), 25A(c) (computer access warrants), 26BG(4)(g) and 26B(5)(i) (surveillance device warrants), 27A(1)(a) (FIC warrants) and the following authorities under identified person warrants: paragraphs 27D(2)(j) (search), 27E(2)(f) (computer access) and 27F(4)-(5) (surveillance devices). See further items 7, 8 and 12 in Schedule 2 to the Bill (new concealment powers in relation into computer access under ss 25A, 27A and 27E).

33 *ASIO Act*, subsection 25A(5), paragraph 27A(1)(a) and subsection 27E(5).

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*Relationship of the provision of 'technical information' under new paragraph 317E(1)(b) with ASIO questioning warrants, and the limitations in new subsection 317ZH(1)*

A further ambiguity arises in relation to notices that compel the provision of 'technical information' under new paragraph 317E(1)(b) and the limitations in new section 317ZH.

Presently, for ASIO to compulsorily question a person to obtain information that is, or may be, relevant to intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence, it must obtain a questioning warrant or a questioning and detention warrant under Division 3 of Part III of the *ASIO Act*.<sup>34</sup> However, it is conceivable that some 'technical information' sought to be obtained from a communications provider under new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* may be relevant to intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence.

It is unclear how the limitation in new paragraph 317ZH(1)(d) and the qualifications in new paragraphs 317ZH(4)(e) and (f) would apply, or are intended to apply, in these circumstances.

It is similarly unclear how new paragraphs 317ZH(1)(d) or (f) would apply in any other circumstances that are covered by another warrant or authorisation-based coercive power available to ASIO to collect intelligence, or information enabling the collection of intelligence. (For example, new section 34AAA of the *ASIO Act* in Schedule 5 to the Bill; or if ASIO's questioning warrant powers are in future expanded to enable questioning for the purpose of obtaining information that is important to the collection of intelligence relevant to all of the 'heads of security' under section 4 of the *ASIO Act*.)<sup>35</sup>

Similarly, the availability of new coercive powers, such as notices under new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*, may have an effect on the issuing thresholds for other powers available to ASIO. For example, in order for ASIO to make a request for a questioning warrant, the Attorney-General must be satisfied that, having regard to other methods (if any) of collecting the intelligence that are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the warrant to be issued.<sup>36</sup> In the absence of an explicit provision that removes overlap between the two schemes, the possibility of collection under a notice (or a request) under new Part 15 may need consideration as another collection method available to ASIO.

**Suggestion: explanation of intended interaction of s 317ZH with ASIO questioning warrants**

IGIS would be assisted by clarification of the intended application of the limitations in s 317ZH(1) in relation to assistance that involves a communication provider giving information to ASIO, in circumstances that are covered by the thresholds for issuing questioning warrants.

To avoid doubt, it may be desirable to consider the insertion of an express provision recording the intended interaction of new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* with ASIO's questioning powers under Division 3 of Part III of the *ASIO Act*, in relation to technical assistance that consists of the provision of information.

34 *ASIO Act*, subsection 34D(4) and paragraph 34E(1)(b).

35 Such an extension was supported by ASIO and the Attorney-General's Department during the PJCS inquiry into ASIO's questioning and detention powers. See: PJCS, [Advisory Report on ASIO's Questioning and Detention Powers](#), March 2018 at [3.13]-[3.32] and [3.125]-[3.128].

36 *ASIO Act*, paragraph 34D(4)(b).

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### *Interaction of new Part 15 with the proposed amendments to the ASIO Act in Schedule 5*

Similar interaction issues arise in relation to ASIO's use of the powers in new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* in Schedule 1 to the Bill and the proposed amendments to the *ASIO Act* in Schedule 5 to the Bill. In particular, several provisions in each Schedule appear to cover the same ground, but are subject to different levels of authorisation, thresholds, conditions and limitations. These discrepancies are discussed in the comments below on Schedule 5.

### *Legal status of a provider who is rendering assistance to ASIO under a request or notice*

In conducting oversight of ASIO's use of new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*, IGIS will also need to consider the legal status of a communications provider who is rendering assistance under a request or a notice.

Depending on the circumstances, the provider might be taken to be an 'ASIO affiliate' within the meaning of that term in section 4 of the *ASIO Act*.<sup>37</sup> That status could provide a legal basis for the provider being subsequently authorised by ASIO to perform other functions or exercise other powers able to be conferred on ASIO affiliates, while the provider remains an ASIO affiliate. (However, while it seems likely that a provider who is subject to a request would be an ASIO affiliate, there may be some ambiguity as to whether a provider who is **compelled under a notice** to provide assistance to ASIO could fall within the definition of an 'ASIO affiliate'.)<sup>38</sup>

Separately to the potential status of a provider as an 'ASIO affiliate', there is also some ambiguity as to whether a provider could be taken to be an 'entrusted person' for the purpose of the general secrecy offences under Division 1 of Part III of the *ASIO Act* for unauthorised communication of, or dealing with, certain information.<sup>39</sup> If so, providers could be subject to disclosure offences under the *ASIO Act*, in addition to the disclosure offences in new section 317ZF of the *Telecommunications Act* (and potentially general secrecy offences, such as those in Division 122 of the *Criminal Code*). The disclosure offence in subsection 18(2) of the *ASIO Act* for the unauthorised communication of

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37 An 'ASIO affiliate' means a person performing functions or services for ASIO in accordance with a contract, agreement or other arrangement.

38 In particular, there appears to be some doubt that a notice could be a form of 'other arrangement' for the purpose of the definition of an 'ASIO affiliate' in section 4 of the *ASIO Act*. There is an argument that the words 'other arrangement' are limited by the preceding words 'contract' and 'agreement' so as to require some kind of **voluntary relationship** with ASIO under which a person agrees, without being subject to any legal compulsion, to perform functions or services for ASIO. For this reason, it is also arguable that the words 'contract' and 'agreement' in the definition of 'ASIO affiliate' should be read down to exclude 'agreements' between ASIO and a communications provider about the terms and conditions on which the provider will comply with requirements set out in a technical assistance or capability notice (as contemplated in new paragraph 317ZK(4)(a) of the *Telecommunications Act*).

39 See the definition of an 'entrusted person' in section 4 of the *ASIO Act*, which is an ASIO employee, an ASIO affiliate or 'a person who has entered into a contract, agreement or arrangement with ASIO (other than as an ASIO affiliate)'. (See also the unauthorised communication offence in subsection 18(2) of the *ASIO Act*, which does not use the term 'entrusted person' but its elements in paragraph 18(2)(b) cover the substance of the definition of that term.) It is arguable that the words 'entered into' and 'arrangement' denote the **voluntary** entry into a relationship with ASIO, and therefore exclude a relationship that is brought into existence by the exercise of a coercive power.

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information is punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment, in contrast to the five-year maximum penalty in new section 317ZF of the *Telecommunications Act*.<sup>40</sup>

Further, a provider who acts in accordance with a technical assistance request or a notice issued by ASIO that amounts to the exercise of authority under one of ASIO's warrants (assuming that this is permissible under new section 317ZH) may also be taken to be a 'member' of ASIO for the purpose of subsection 3(1) of the *IGIS Act*. (That is, a person who is authorised to perform the functions of ASIO, for and on its behalf.) In this event, the legality and propriety of the provider's actions would be **directly** subject to IGIS oversight, **as the actions of ASIO**, under sections 8, 9 and 9A of the *IGIS Act*.<sup>41</sup>

**Suggestion: reporting and notification requirements**

This would have resource implications for IGIS, and would also require ASIO to provide early notification to IGIS of the making of requests or issuing of notices (see further **[1.9] below** in relation to reporting).

Similar issues would arise in relation to the status under the *IGIS Act* of communications providers who render assistance to ASIS and ASD in accordance with a request. It would be reasonable for a provider to be informed of these matters by the relevant Director-General or delegate when a request or notice is given.

**Ambiguities in the application of the Ministerial authorisation-related limitation in new paragraph 317ZH(1)(e)**

New paragraph 317ZH(1)(e) provides that technical assistance and capability notices are of no effect if they require a provider to do an act or thing for which a Ministerial authorisation is required under the *ISA*. There are several potential ambiguities and complexities in the application of this safeguard (explained below). These issues arise because the agencies that are subject to the Ministerial authorisation requirements in the *ISA* have no ability to issue technical assistance notices, or to request technical capability notices.

**Suggestion: clarification of intended application of s 317ZH(1)(e) to ASIO and 'interception agencies' issuing technical assistance notices, or requesting technical capability notices**

IGIS supports clarification of the intended application of new paragraph 317ZH(1)(e) in relation to ASIO and the 'interception agencies' which may issue technical assistance notices or request the Attorney-General to issue technical capability notices under new Part 15.

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40 The same issue also applies in relation to the status of designated communications providers who render voluntary assistance to ASIS or ASD in accordance with a technical assistance request. Sections 39 and 40 of the *ISA* contain offences for the unauthorised communication of information that relates to the functions of ASIS or ASD by persons who are in a 'contract, agreement or arrangement' with ASIS or ASD. These offences are punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment, in contrast with the maximum penalty of five years applying to new s 317ZF.

41 See: *IGIS Act*, subsection 3(3), which deems the action taken by a member of a 'Commonwealth agency' (which includes ASIO and the ISA agencies) to be that of the agency if the member takes the action in his or her capacity as a member.

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### Uncertainty about the relevance of Ministerial authorisation requirements in the ISA

It is unclear if a limitation based on the Ministerial authorisation requirements in the *ISA* would have any effect. The *ISA* Ministerial authorisations requirements do not apply to ASIO or ‘interception agencies’ within the meaning of new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*.<sup>42</sup> Further, the functions and powers conferred on *ISA* agencies (namely, ASD and ASIS) under new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* are limited to technical assistance requests, and new section 317ZH does not apply to those requests (only to technical assistance and capability notices, which are available to ASIO). Further, the issuing criteria for technical assistance and capability notices appear to limit the assistance able to be compelled under a notice to acts and things that are linked to the functions of the issuing or requesting agency (ASIO and ‘interception agencies’) whereas the Ministerial authorisation requirements in the *ISA* are linked to the functions of the *ISA* agencies.<sup>43</sup>

As a general principle of statutory interpretation, all words in a provision must be given some meaning and effect, as the Parliament is presumed not to have enacted a provision that has no practical effect.<sup>44</sup> An alternative reading is that new paragraph 317ZH(1)(e) applies the *ISA* Ministerial authorisation requirements as limitations on the requirements that may be specified in technical assistance and capability notices, notwithstanding that these notices may only be issued or sought by agencies **other than** the *ISA* agencies. In particular, this interpretation would mean that:

- if ASIO or an ‘interception agency’ was to issue a notice (or if the Attorney-General was to issue a capability notice on the request of ASIO or an ‘interception agency’), then
- that notice could not compel a provider to do an act or thing for which **ASIS or ASD** would require a Ministerial authorisation, if ASIS or ASD were to do the act or thing specified in the notice for the purpose of performing **their** respective functions.

### Broader interpretive implications for new section 317ZH

If the intended interpretation is as outlined above, then the same reasoning would presumably apply in relation to **all** of the laws listed in new paragraphs 317ZH(1)(a)-(g). For example, if the issuing or requesting agency in relation to a notice was ASIO, then new section 317ZH would provide that the notice has no effect if the AFP would require a warrant or an authorisation under the *Crimes Act* or *Surveillance Devices Act* to undertake the activity, even if it would not be necessary for ASIO to obtain a warrant or an authorisation under its governing legislation.<sup>45</sup>

If this is the intended interpretation, then the application of new section 317ZH is likely to be extremely complex to administer and oversee, because it would require a review of the application of **all of the specific Acts** listed in new paragraphs 317ZH(1)(a)-(e) in relation to **any or all** of the entities which are governed by the warrant or authorisation-based powers conferred under those Acts. New paragraphs 317ZH(1)(f) and (g) would further require a review of **any and all other** Commonwealth, State and Territory laws that would require **any entity** governed by them to obtain

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42 New subsections 317L(1) and 317T(1).

43 New paragraphs 317L(2)(a)-(c) and new subsections 317T(2) and (3).

44 *Commonwealth v Baume* (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414 (per Griffith CJ).

45 This could arise where there is an offence-specific exception in favour of ASIO (or classes of persons that cover ASIO employees and ASIO affiliates) that does not also cover AFP members, or where the elements of an offence do not cover ASIO personnel, but could or do cover AFP personnel.

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a warrant or an authorisation to undertake an activity of the kind that is specified in the technical assistance or capability notice.

A similar point can also be made in relation to new subsection 317ZH(3), which would require an assessment of whether any proposed use of a surveillance device or access to data held in a computer by a provider would require a warrant under State or Territory surveillance laws. This would be particularly complex in view of differences in individual State and Territory provisions (including relevant definitions and application provisions).

**Specific interpretive implications for new paragraph 317ZH(1)(e)**

If the intended interpretation is as outline above, then some further difficulties arise in relation to new paragraph 317ZH(1)(e). In particular:

- Some Ministerial authorisation requirements in the *ISA* are tied to matters that are specified in Ministerial directions.<sup>46</sup> This means that the substance of any limitation applied by new paragraph 317ZH(1)(e) of the *Telecommunications Act* may vary depending on the particular Ministerial directions under the *ISA* that are in force from-time-to-time.
- In some circumstances, ASIS does not need a Ministerial authorisation if it undertakes certain activities outside Australia involving the production of intelligence on an Australian person for the purpose of assisting ASIO, generally at the request of ASIO.<sup>47</sup> This means that the application of the limitation in proposed paragraph 317ZH(1)(e) of the *Telecommunications Act* may depend on the precise purpose for which the communications provider was required to give assistance.

These matters would make IGIS oversight complex, and would likely make it impossible for a communications provider to make a meaningful assessment of its legal position under new paragraph 317ZH(1)(e). Unlike IGIS, a communications provider is unlikely to have access to the necessary information, as the relevant Ministerial directions given under the *ISA* are not legislative instruments and are normally classified.<sup>48</sup>

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46 *ISA*, paragraphs 8(1)(a)(ii) (in relation to certain activities of ASIS); and 8(1)(b).

47 *ISA*, Part 2, Division 3 (ASIS assistance to ASIO).

48 *ISA*, subsections 6(3A) and 8(5). This is also the position in relation to requests made of ASIS by ASIO for the purpose of Division 3 of Part 2 of the *ISA*: subsection 13B(8).

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## 1.2 Decision-making criteria for requests and notices

### 1.2.1 Assessment of proportionality

#### *Technical assistance requests (new s 317G)*

There is no statutory requirement for the Directors-General ASIO, ASD or ASIS (or their delegates)<sup>49</sup> to consider, and be satisfied of, the proportionality or reasonableness of any immunity from civil liability as a pre-condition to making a request under new section 317G. For example, there is no requirement for the Directors-General or their delegates to consider:

- the importance of the particular assistance sought to the performance by the agency of its functions; and
- whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the conferral of immunity may have an adverse impact on innocent third parties who may suffer loss or damage, and would be deprived of a right to a legal remedy against the person, and if so, whether:
  - the national interest in performing the relevant function for which the assistance is sought is proportionate to the effect of the immunity on the rights of innocent third parties;
  - the assistance sought could be provided in a way that avoids or minimises the risk of causing loss or damage to an innocent third party; and
  - any alternatives are available to the conferral of a complete immunity from civil liability. (For example, the provision of an indemnity to the provider whose assistance is requested, via the making of an ordinary agreement rather than engaging new section 317G.)

The Explanatory Memorandum appears to suggest that the routine consideration of matters of proportionality could be inferred from the seniority of the relevant decision-maker (the Director-General or delegate who must be at least an acting SES Band 1 or a 'coordinator').<sup>50</sup> In the experience of IGIS, a statement of expectation or subjective policy intent about the way in which a discretionary decision-making power should be exercised has considerably less force in promoting sound and consistent decision-making than an explicit statutory requirement.

#### *The value of a statutory decision-making condition*

A statutory requirement for a decision-maker to assess specified matters as a pre-condition to making the relevant decision ensures that the relevant matters are clearly drawn to the attention of the decision-maker in each case. Further, in the experience of IGIS, a statutory requirement is the most effective way of facilitating better practice by agencies in keeping appropriately detailed and consistent record-keeping about their decisions to exercise a discretionary power. This ensures that the relevant decision-making process is auditable, including by IGIS.

In the absence of a statutory requirement to consider the proportionality and reasonableness of the conferral of a civil immunity on a communications provider through the making of a request under

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49 See the powers of delegation in new sections 317ZN, 317ZP and 317ZQ. They allow the Directors-General of ASIO, ASIS and ASD to delegate their functions and powers under new Part 15 to, respectively, ASIO affiliates and ASIO employees, and staff members of ASIS and ASD, who hold SES positions, or the position of 'coordinator' in the case of ASIO.

50 Explanatory Memorandum p. 43 at paragraph [88].

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new section 317G, IGIS would assess matters of proportionality and reasonableness in considering the propriety of agencies' decision-making about the making of a request. IGIS expects that agencies will develop internal policies and guidelines on the exercise of powers under new section 317G, which include proportionality considerations in relation to the conferral of civil immunity. Further, IGIS would regard the general requirement in paragraph 10.4(a) of the current *Ministerial Guidelines to ASIO* (issued under section 8A of the *ASIO Act*) as relevant to ASIO's decisions to confer civil immunity under new section 317G. Paragraph 10.4(a) provides that any means used for obtaining information must be proportionate to the gravity of the security threat posed and the probability of its occurrence.

**Suggestion: statutory decision-making criteria and administrative guidance on proportionality**

The insertion of express statutory proportionality requirements in new section 317G, similar to those in new sections 317P and 317RA for technical assistance notices,<sup>51</sup> would provide clear and consistent standards against which IGIS could conduct oversight of intelligence agencies' decision-making.

There would also be value in updating existing administrative guidance on the assessment of proportionality in applicable Ministerial guidelines, including the guidelines issued to ASIO under section 8A of the *ASIO Act*, to deal specifically with the exercise of powers to make requests (and thereby enliven immunities).

***Technical assistance and capability notices (new ss 317P, 317RA, 317V and 317ZAA)***

New sections 317P and 317RA contains some decision-making criteria that would require the Director-General of Security (or delegate) to take into account various considerations about the proportionality, reasonableness, practicality and feasibility of the requirements proposed to be specified in a technical assistance notice.

This includes a requirement in new paragraph 317P(a) for the Director-General or delegate to be satisfied that the requirements imposed by the notice are reasonable and proportionate. Equivalent requirements apply to variation decisions under new section 317Q.<sup>52</sup>

**The assessment of reasonableness and proportionality**

New section 317RA provides that the Director-General or delegate must, in considering whether the requirements in a technical assistance notice, or a varied notice, are reasonable and proportionate, have regard to a number of specified matters. These include the interests of national security and law enforcement; the legitimate interests of the communications provider; the objectives of the notice; the availability of other means to achieve the objectives; the legitimate expectations of the Australian community relating to privacy and cybersecurity; and such other matters as the Director-General considers relevant as the case requires.

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51 New section 317P requires the Director-General of Security to be satisfied that the requirements imposed by the notice are 'reasonable and proportionate' and that compliance is 'practicable and technically feasible'. New section 317RA prescribes a number of matters that must be taken into consideration. (But note the comments below, suggesting that more detailed decision-making criteria could usefully be included in new section 317RA for the purpose of new section 317P.)

52 New subsection 317Q(10).

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IGIS welcomes the inclusion of these requirements, which will assist in promoting consistency of decision-making and record-keeping, and will provide clear and transparent benchmarks against which IGIS will conduct oversight of issuing and variation decisions.

However, IGIS notes that there is no specific requirement for the Director-General to consider the potential impact on third parties who may be adversely affected by the conferral of civil immunity due to the loss of a right to a legal remedy for any loss, damage or injury caused by the providers actions in compliance or purported compliance with a notice. IGIS concurs with the statement in the Explanatory Memorandum that the concepts of reasonableness and propriety would require consideration of this matter in each case.<sup>53</sup>

**Suggestion: an additional statutory consideration—impact of immunity on third parties**

IGIS considers that there would be benefit in adding this to the list of mandatory considerations to ensure consistency of consideration and record-keeping.

Consideration might also be given to updating the *Minister's Guidelines to ASIO*, issued under section 8A of the *ASIO Act*, to provide further and more detailed guidance on the assessment of the reasonableness, proportionality and technical feasibility of proposed requirements in technical assistance notices.

Equivalent decision-making criteria to those in new sections 317P, 317Q and 317RA apply to the Attorney-General in relation to the issuing and variation of technical capability notices under new sections 317V, 317X and 317ZAA,. While IGIS would not review the decisions of the Attorney-General, the advice provided by ASIO as part of a request for the issuing or variation of a notice would be subject to IGIS oversight.

Accordingly, statutory or administrative guidance (or both) about the consideration of impacts of a civil immunity on innocent third parties could also aid oversight of IGIS oversight of ASIO's requests to the Attorney-General for the issuing or variation of a capability notice, including its advice on the proportionality-related requirements in new sections 317V and 317Z.

**Exercise of multiple coercive powers in relation to a communications provider**

The decision-making criteria for issuing technical assistance and capability notices do not specifically require the decision-maker to take into account the potential for oppression as a result of the exercise of multiple coercive powers against an individual communications provider, in relation to the same or substantially similar subject matter.<sup>54</sup> (This includes either a stand-alone requirement; or specifically in the matters that must be taken into consideration under new sections 317RA and 317ZAA in assessing the reasonableness and proportionality of a notice.

In particular, the general requirement in new paragraphs 317RA(c) and 317ZAA(c) to consider the 'legitimate interests' of the provider does not necessarily provide a clear directive to routinely consider the cumulative impact of the exercise of multiple coercive powers against them.)

53 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 49 at paragraph [132].

54 Compare the requirements for requests for questioning and detention warrants in *ASIO Act*, paragraphs 34D(3)(c)-(d) and 34F(3)(c) and (d). These requests **must** include information about previous requests or warrants issued in relation to the person. These matters are then able to be taken into consideration by the Attorney-General in deciding whether to approve the request.

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The risk of oppression to a provider may arise in multiple scenarios in which a notice has been issued, or is proposed to be issued, including:

- the issuing by ASIO of multiple technical assistance notices to a particular provider, or the issuing by the Attorney-General of multiple capability notices in relation to a particular provider on the request of ASIO;
- the issuing of multiple technical assistance or capability notices to a particular provider by, or at the request of, several different agencies under new Part 15;
- the exercise by ASIO of coercive powers against a particular provider under multiple laws (such as, technical assistance notices, questioning warrants, and orders to provide technical information or assistance under new section 34AAA of the *ASIO Act* in Schedule 2); and
- the exercise of different types of questioning and other coercive information-gathering powers against a provider by multiple agencies under their respective governing legislation (for example, certain police powers, ACIC examinations and the ASIO powers noted above).

**Suggestion: statutory requirement to consider the exercise of multiple coercive powers**

IGIS considers that amendments to the statutory requirements of reasonableness and proportionality in decision-making about the issuing of notices in new sections 317P, 317RA, 317V and 317ZAA could provide an effective means of managing this risk, and for IGIS to conduct oversight of this aspect of agencies' decision-making in issuing or requesting notices (as applicable).

These provisions could include:

- in the case of decisions to issue technical assistance notices, a requirement for the decision-maker to assess the potential for oppression arising from the exercise of multiple coercive powers against a provider in line with the above; and
- in the case of requests for technical capability notices, a requirement for the requesting agency to provide information to the Attorney-General about any previous requests made and notices issued, and information about the exercise or proposed exercise of other coercive powers in relation to the provider.

These requirements would also need to be supported by arrangements between agencies for the sharing of relevant information about the exercise or proposed exercise of coercive powers.

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### 1.2.3 Linkage of assistance to agency functions (new ss 317G(2), 317L(2) and 317T(2))

Requests and notices are linked to the giving of help in relation to the performance of functions or exercise of powers by agencies that relate to specified matters. These include the following:

- ***In the case of technical assistance requests***—agency functions or powers that are linked to criminal law enforcement and the enforcement of pecuniary penalty provisions, or protecting the interests of Australia’s national security, foreign relations or national economic well-being.<sup>55</sup>
- ***In the case of technical assistance and technical capability notices***—agency functions or powers that are linked to criminal law enforcement and the enforcement of pecuniary penalty provisions, or safeguarding national security (but not the interests of Australia’s foreign relations or national economic well-being).<sup>56</sup>

#### *Technical assistance requests—linkage to functions of ASD and ASIS*

In the case of technical assistance requests made by ASD and ASIS, references in new section 317G to functions or powers relating to Australia’s interests in national security, foreign relations and national economic well-being have a clear link to the functions and powers of ASIS and ASD, as subsection 11(1) of the *ISA* uses these expressions in delimiting those agencies’ functions.

#### *Technical assistance requests and notices—linkage to functions of ASIO*

In the case of technical assistance requests and notices issued by ASIO, and technical capability notices requested by ASIO, the expressions ‘the interests of Australia’s national security’ (new section 317G) and ‘safeguarding national security’ (new sections 317L and 317T) are not identical to the defined term ‘security’ in section 4 of the *ASIO Act*, which is central to ASIO’s functions in section 17 of that Act. This will potentially make it complex to identify links to ASIO’s functions and powers in some cases. However, as the ordinary meaning of the term ‘national security’ appears to be narrower than the meaning of the defined term ‘security’ in the *ASIO Act*,<sup>57</sup> new sections 317G, 317L and 317G may serve a limiting function in respect of the matters that may be the subject of a request or notice made or requested by ASIO.

#### *Potential ambiguity—law enforcement-related functions*

The references in new sections 317G, 317L and 317T to agency functions that relate to criminal law enforcement and the enforcement of pecuniary penalties<sup>58</sup> are not directly relevant to the functions of ASIO, ASD or ASIS, given that these agencies’ governing statutes expressly provide that their functions do not include the enforcement of the law.<sup>59</sup>

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55 New paragraph 317G(2)(b) and new subsection 317G(5).

56 New paragraph 317L(2)(c) and new subsections 317T(2) and 317T(3).

57 In particular, the concept of ‘national security’ may not cover the matter in paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘security’ in section 4 of the *ASIO Act*, being ‘the carrying out of Australia’s responsibilities to any foreign country in relation to a matter mentioned in any of the subparagraphs of paragraph (a) or the matter mentioned in paragraph (aa)’.

58 New paragraphs 317G(5)(a)-(c), 317L(2)(c)(i)-(iii) and 317T(3)(a)-(c).

59 *ISA*, subsection 11(2) and *ASIO Act*, subsection 17(2).

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Suggestion: legislative clarification of application in relation to ASIO, ASD and ASIS

It is unclear whether these provisions of new sections 317G, 317L and 317T are intended to have some indirect application to ASIO, ASD and ASIS. (For example, by reason of the exceptions to the prohibition on law enforcement functions in paragraphs 11(2)(c), (d) and (f) and subsection 11(3) of the *ISA*, or the cooperation functions of ASIO in paragraph 19A(1)(d) of the *ASIO Act*.)<sup>60</sup>

IGIS would support clarification of the intended application, preferably in the provisions of new sections 317G, 317L and 317T.

*Differences between new Part 15 and obligations to give help in existing section 313*

IGIS acknowledges that the obligations imposed on telecommunications carriers, carriage service providers and intermediaries in existing subsections 313(3) and 313(4) of the *Telecommunications Act* use a broadly similar drafting formula to the proposed references to agency functions in new sections 317G, 317L and 317T.<sup>61</sup>

However, IGIS notes that the powers to compel specific forms of assistance in notices issued under new Part 15 are of a materially different character to the general obligation to provide ‘such help as is reasonably necessary’ in existing subsections 313(3) and 313(4). The coercive powers in new Part 15 also apply to a considerably larger range of entities than telecommunications carriers, carriage service providers and intermediaries.

Further, new Part 15 proposes to confer immunities from civil liability on communications providers, whereas existing section 313 confers only an immunity to an action or other proceeding **for damages** (and not from other **non-pecuniary remedies** such as injunctions or specific performance, which may be of considerable value to innocent third parties who would be prevented by new Part 15 from seeking such orders to restrain a communications provider from causing further loss or damage as a result of compliance with a request or notice ).<sup>62</sup>

IGIS suggests that these significant differences between existing sections 313(3) and 313(4) and new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* give rise to a greater need for legal certainty in the

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60 The Explanatory Memorandum states, at p. 44 at paragraph [96], that the provision is intended to cover ‘precursory and secondary intelligence gathering activities that support the investigation and prosecution of suspected offences’. However, it is not entirely clear how, if at all, this statement is intended to apply to the exceptions in subsections 11(2) and 11(3) of the *ISA* in the context of the ‘relevant objectives’ of technical assistance requests made by ASIS and ASD.

61 Subsections 313(3) and (4) of the *Telecommunications Act* provide that carriers, carriage service providers and carriage service intermediaries must, in connection with the operation of telecommunications networks or facilities or the supply of services, provide such help as is reasonably necessary to officers of any Commonwealth, State or Territory authority for specified purposes. These purposes cover criminal law enforcement and laws imposing pecuniary penalties, protection of the public revenue, and safeguarding national security. These purposes **do not include** matters concerning foreign relations or national economic well-being. (Cf: Explanatory Memorandum, p. 44, paragraph [92] which states that the agency functions referred to in new subsection 317G(5), including in relation to Australia’s interests in foreign relations and national economic well-being, are ‘**consistent with** the purposes for which agencies currently seek assistance from domestic carriers and carriage service providers under section 313 of the *Telecommunications Act*.)

62 *Telecommunications Act*, subsection 313(5).



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application of new Part 15, and therefore merit a greater degree of precision in the drafting of new sections 317G, 317L and 317L, in relation to their application to the functions of particular agencies.

The fact that the powers in new Part 15 will be available to a far more constrained group of agencies than ‘authorities of the Commonwealth and of the States and Territories’ (as is the case for the obligations in existing section 313) also suggests that more precise drafting is feasible in relation to new Part 15 than may be feasible for the scheme in existing subsections 313(3) and 313(4).

### 1.3 Conditions of assistance to be provided under a request or notice

#### 1.3.1 Absence of a fixed maximum period of effect (new ss 317HA, 317MA and 317TA)

Technical assistance requests issued by the Directors-General of ASIO, ASD and ASIS and notices issued by the Director-General of Security (or their delegates) are subject to a ‘default’ period of effect of 90 days from when the notice or request was given.<sup>63</sup> Technical capability notices are subject to a ‘default’ period of effect of 180 days from issue.<sup>64</sup>

However, these ‘default’ periods only apply if the request or notice does not specify an expiry date. If a request or a notice specifies an expiry date, then it is taken to be in force until the start of the expiry date (unless revoked sooner).<sup>65</sup> It therefore appears to be possible for a decision-maker to prescribe an expiry date which is **longer than** the ‘default’ period with no fixed upper limit on the prescribed period of effect.

IGIS notes that, from the perspective of both legality and propriety, there are many advantages in prescribing a fixed maximum period of effect for a coercive or intrusive power. The power to compel the provision of assistance, and the power to extinguish third parties’ rights to remedies by the conferral of an immunity from civil liability meet this description.

#### *The value of a fixed maximum period of effect*

The imposition of a fixed maximum duration creates a trigger for a new issuing decision. This effectively requires a periodic re-assessment of the grounds for issuing requests and notices and their specific terms (including consideration of any changes in circumstances).

Even if there is no statutory limit on the number of requests or notices that could be issued subsequently, these periodic reviews would aid oversight and accountability, and would be consistent with most other intelligence warrants and other powers, which have a fixed maximum period of operation, subject to renewal. The discretion conferred on the issuing authority in relation to the period of effect is normally to impose a **shorter period** than the statutory maximum, not a **longer period**, as appears to be permitted under new paragraphs 317HA(1)(b)(i), 317MA(1)(b)(i) and 317TA(1)(b)(i).

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63 New sections 317HA and 317MA.

64 New section 317TA.

65 See paragraph (1)(b) of each of new sections 317HA, 317MA and 317TA.



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**Suggestion: a statutory maximum period of effect**

IGIS would support a limitation on the power of the decision-maker to set an expiry date, specifically through the insertion of a statutory maximum period of effect that is aligned with the 'default' period of effect if no expiry date is specified (being 90 days or 180 days).

**Further suggestion: qualification of powers of variation in relation to extensions**

Further, since there are explicit powers to vary requests and notices in new sections 317JA, 317Q and 317T, IGIS considers that there would be benefit in including a provision to make explicit that a variation which extends (or further extends) the period of effect of a request or notice cannot extend the total period beyond the applicable statutory maximum. This would be consistent with existing provisions of the *ASIO Act* that limit powers of variation in relation to the duration of special powers warrants and authorities for the conduct of special intelligence operations.<sup>66</sup>

### 1.3.2 Revocation requirements in relation to notices

Technical assistance and capability notices are also subject to revocation requirements. These provisions impose an obligation on the relevant decision-maker to revoke the notice, if he or she is satisfied that the requirements are not reasonable or proportionate, or if compliance is not practicable or technically feasible.<sup>67</sup>

There is no positive obligation on the decision-maker to consider *whether* the grounds for mandatory revocation are met during the period in which the notice is in force. Nor is there any positive obligation on the decision-maker to consider any representations that are made by the provider about the revocation of a notice. Nor are there obligations on agency staff members to bring information to the attention of the decision-maker that suggests that the grounds of issuing have ceased to exist.<sup>68</sup> In practice, this may limit the effectiveness of the revocation requirements.

The absence of such obligations may be particularly problematic in the absence of a fixed maximum period of effect for those notices that specify an expiry date under new subparagraphs 317MA(1)(b)(i) and 317TA(1)(b)(i). (Noting that the absence of a statutory maximum period creates the potential for notices to remain in force for prolonged periods of time, which could be far in excess of the 'default' periods of 90 days for technical assistance notices and 180 days for technical capability notices that do not specify an expiry date.)

However, the acts and omissions of the Director-General of Security (or delegate) in considering (or failing to consider) whether an assistance notice must be revoked would be subject to IGIS oversight as a matter of propriety, and could be a source of complaints to IGIS. The acts and practices of members of ASIO in bringing relevant information to the attention of the Director-General or

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66 *ASIO Act*, subsections 29A(3) and 35F(5).

67 New sections 317R and 317Z.

68 Cf *ISA*, subsection 10(2A). This provision imposes a duty on *ISA* agency heads to inform their Minister if satisfied that the grounds for issuing a Ministerial authorisation no longer exist, and to take steps to discontinue the relevant activities. It also imposes a duty on the Minister to consider revoking the Ministerial authorisation. IGIS queries whether equivalent requirements could be applied to new s 317Z of the *Telecommunications Act* (revocation of technical capability notices by the Attorney-General); and similar requirements applied to agency heads under new s 317R (revocation of technical assistance notices).

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delegate would similarly be subject to IGIS oversight. Similarly, ASIO's actions in providing advice or information to the Attorney-General about the existence of the grounds of revocation for a technical capability notice would also be the subject of IGIS oversight.

**1.3.3 Are requests and notices intended to cover the repetitive provision of assistance?  
(New ss 317G, 317L and 317T)**

Requests and notices apply to the doing of 'one or more specified acts or things' by a provider.<sup>69</sup> It is unclear whether requests and notices are capable of covering, and therefore immunising (and compelling in the case of notices) one or both of the following types of performance:

- the doing of a particular act or thing on a **single occasion** only, with the result that the request or notice (or a provision of the request or notice) is spent after the act or thing is done; or
- the provision of '**standing assistance**' comprising the **repetition** of a particular act or thing for the period of effect (or compliance period, if any) for the request or notice, with performance to occur upon the request or direction of the relevant agency, or at the discretion of the provider, or some combination.

**Suggestion: statutory clarification of the intention in relation to 'standing assistance'**

Clarification of the circumstances in which requests and notices can be used will be important to IGIS oversight of their use by ASIO, ASD and ASIS (as applicable). The potential for the repetition of requested or compelled assistance under a single request or notice will be particularly relevant to the oversight of agencies' assessment of proportionality-related matters in making issuing decisions, and decisions in specifying or nominating (as applicable) the expiry date for a request or a notice, in the absence of a fixed statutory maximum period of effect.

**1.3.4 Provision of advice to designated communications providers**

New subsections 317HAA(1)-(3) provide that if the Directors-General of ASIO, ASIS or ASD (or their delegates) give a technical assistance request, they must advise the relevant communications provider that compliance with the request is voluntary.

**Suggestion: statutory form and timing requirements for advice**

IGIS oversight of agencies' compliance with this requirement may be complicated by the absence of a statutory form requirement in relation to such advice, or a requirement that the advice concerning voluntary compliance must be given **as part of** a request given in writing or orally, **and** as part of a written record of an oral request. Such requirements would facilitate consistent record-keeping practices, and the subsequent oversight by IGIS of those records.

These observations also apply to the requirements in new subsection 317MAA(1) for the Director-General of Security to advise a communications provider about the effect of a technical assistance notice that has been issued by the Director-General.

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69 New paragraph 317G(1)(a), new subsections 317L(1) and 317T(1).

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### 1.3.5 The prohibition on creating ‘backdoors’ (new s 317ZG)

#### *Limitations in the prohibition—no application to technical assistance requests*

New section 317ZG prohibits a technical assistance or technical capability notice from requiring a provider to create a so-called ‘backdoor’ in the form of the introduction of a systemic weakness or vulnerability into a form of electronic protection.<sup>70</sup> It also prohibits these notices from preventing a provider from rectifying any existing ‘backdoors’ that it may identify.<sup>71</sup> These prohibitions also expressly cover obligations to build new decryption capabilities, and actions that would render existing systemic methods of authentication or encryption less effective.<sup>72</sup> Notices are of no effect to the extent that they purport to impose such requirements on a provider.<sup>73</sup>

No such prohibitions apply to technical assistance requests. This raises the legal possibility that ASIO, ASIS or ASD could negotiate an agreement with a provider to **voluntarily** create or fail to remediate a ‘backdoor’. That provider would have civil immunity for doing so,<sup>74</sup> and would be taken to have been authorised for the purpose of the computer offences in Part 10.7 of the *Code*.<sup>75</sup> (For example, offences for causing unauthorised access to, or modification of, restricted data held in a computer under section 478.1 of the *Code*.)

While it is foreseeable that many providers would decline any such request because it is incompatible with their commercial and reputational interests, the possibility appears to exist that an individual provider could be persuaded to do so, and if so, compensated in accordance with a contract, agreement or other arrangement made under new section 317K.<sup>76</sup>

#### Suggestion: clarification of intended application

IGIS queries whether requests are intended to be utilised in this way, and would support clarification of the intended application.

If there is such an intention, any use of requests in this way would raise significant propriety risks, including in the assessment of the impacts of a ‘backdoor’ on the users of the relevant services, equipment or devices, whose information security may be unknowingly compromised. Employees or contractors of the communications providers may be prevented from disclosing this to users as result of the disclosure offences in new section 317ZF (among other potentially applicable secrecy offences, including those in the *ASIO Act*, *ISA* and new Division 122 of the *Criminal Code*).

70 New paragraph 317ZG(1)(a).

71 New paragraph 317ZG(1)(b).

72 New subsections 317ZG(2)-(4).

73 New subsection 317ZG(5).

74 New paragraphs 317G(1)(c) and (d).

75 New subparagraph 476.2(4)(b)(iv) of the *Code* (item 3 of Schedule 1 to the Bill).

76 It is also notable that the general principle in new section 317ZK that (unless otherwise agreed) a provider should neither profit from providing assistance, nor bear the reasonable costs of doing so, is limited to **notices**. Contracts made under new section 317K in relation to **requests** are not subject to an equivalent requirement. Consequently, there is no apparent prohibition on contractual terms that would cause a provider to **profit** from providing assistance to an agency under a request, including a request to create or leave open a ‘backdoor’ in electronic protection. IGIS queries whether agencies’ statutory contracting power should be subject to a limitation on making such contracts.

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**Further suggestion: statutory notification requirement in relation to requests for ‘backdoors’**

Given the level of risk involved in such activities, IGIS would support an express requirement for ASIO, ASD and ASIS to notify the Inspector-General (and their responsible Minister) of the making of technical assistance requests for a provider to create or fail to remediate a systemic weakness or vulnerability.

**Challenges for independent oversight of compliance with new section 317ZG**

In conducting oversight of ASIO’s decisions to issue a technical assistance notice, or the terms of any request for the Attorney-General to issue a technical capability notice, IGIS will consider whether the notice or request to the Attorney-General complied with the limitations imposed by new section 317ZG.

The task of ascertaining whether a particular requirement under a notice amounted to a ‘systemic’ weakness or vulnerability may be extremely complex. The distinction between a ‘systemic and a ‘non-systemic’ or ‘selective’ weakness or vulnerability may not always be clear, and is likely to require detailed assessments of fact and degree that are highly specific to the circumstances of individual cases, including the attributes of particular technologies and circumstances of their use. To some extent, the complexity of this task is acknowledged in the Explanatory Memorandum, which states that ‘the nature and scope of any weakness or vulnerability will turn on the circumstances in question and the degree to which malicious actors are able to exploit the change required’.<sup>77</sup>

The degree of complexity of this task also appears to be reflected in the arrangements in new subsection 317W(7) as part of the consultation requirements if the Attorney-General intends to issue a technical capability notice. The Attorney-General and the provider who is the subject of the proposed notice may jointly appoint an expert to carry out an assessment of whether the proposed notice would contravene the limitations imposed by new section 317ZG. No equivalent mechanism applies to technical assistance notices.

**Resource impacts for IGIS**

The task of assessing ASIO’s compliance with new section 317ZG will require a sophisticated understanding of a wide variety of communications and security technologies, including new and emerging technologies. One challenge for IGIS will be obtaining, within existing resources, necessary access to **independent** technical expertise to inform such assessments and to critically analyse ASIO’s assessments and any information that may be provided by communications providers, and make an independent assessment.

It is presently unclear whether this need can feasibly be met from ordinary staffing. The extremely broad and rapidly changing range of technologies with which IGIS may need to have faculty may create a need for a level of expertise that exceeds what can reasonably be obtained ‘in house’. The costs of engaging external consultants to act as specialist technical advisers may be prohibitive from within existing resourcing, if a need for such expertise is required regularly. This is contingent on ASIO’s use of notices in practice, which is also contingent on a range of external factors.

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77 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 68 at paragraph [258].

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IGIS also notes that the issue of access by oversight bodies to independent technical expertise, particularly in relation to new and emerging technologies, may merit consideration in a more systemic way, including the potential for legislative frameworks and supporting administrative arrangements to ensure such access. (For example, the *Investigatory Powers Act 2016* (UK) establishes a Technology Advisory Panel to assist the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the Secretary of State about the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers conferred under that Act.)<sup>78</sup>

**IGIS access to reports prepared under new subsection 317W(7)**

In addition to the consideration of the resource implications of access to independent technical expertise, IGIS would be assisted by a mechanism to access to the expert reports prepared and given to the Attorney-General under new subsection 317W(7) for the purpose of the consultation obligations in relation to the issuing of technical capability notices.<sup>79</sup> Access to these reports would:

- offer a source of technical information to assist the Inspector-General’s consideration of compliance with section 317G, in appropriate cases,<sup>80</sup> and to build an informed understanding of specific technologies and the impacts of the removal of certain forms of protection, while also operating within the strict secrecy and security requirements established under the *IGIS Act*;
- inform IGIS oversight of ASIO’s requests to the Attorney-General for the issuing of technical capability notices. (That is, by comparing the case provided by ASIO to the Attorney-General about compliance with new section 317ZG with the findings in a report provided under new subsection 317W(7), if commissioned as part of the consultation requirements for that notice); and
- inform IGIS oversight of ASIO’s decisions to issue a technical assistance notice that is related in some way to a technical capability notice already issued, and which was the subject of a report under new subsection 317W(7).<sup>81</sup>

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78 *Investigatory Powers Act 2016* (UK), sections 246-247.

79 These reports may be commissioned from a person who has relevant expertise, who is appointed jointly by the Attorney-General and the communications provider to whom the proposed notice relates. They contain an assessment of whether a proposed technical capability notice would contravene section 317G. See further: new subsections 317W(7)-(11).

80 For example, if the same type of technology is the subject of a technical assistance notice issued by ASIO, or a request by ASIO for the issuing of a technical capability notice.

81 For example, this circumstance may arise if a technical capability notice compelled the provision of technical assistance to ASIO under new paragraph 317T(2)(b) and, after the expiry of that notice, ASIO decided to issue a technical assistance notice covering the same matter. It might also arise if a technical capability notice was issued to compel a provider to create or maintain a capability for the benefit of ASIO (or various agencies including ASIO) and ASIO subsequently issued a technical assistance notice to compel the provision of assistance using that capability. In both cases, if a report is provided under new subsection 317W(7), its findings on compatibility with new section 317ZG may be relevant to an assessment by IGIS of ASIO’s actions in issuing a technical assistance notice or requesting the issuing of a technical capability notice (although the report would be not determinative of an independent finding by IGIS).

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**Suggestion: a statutory access provision for IGIS**

IGIS supports consideration of a legislative mechanism to enable the provision of these reports, for example via an amendment to new section 317W or potentially an amendment to section 32A of the *IGIS Act* (which provides for the IGIS to have access to certain agency reports).<sup>82</sup>

## 1.4 Immunity from civil liability for acts done under a request or notice (new ss 317G(1)(b)-(d) and 317ZJ)

### 1.4.1 Scope of immunity

The immunity from civil liability for acts done in accordance with a technical assistance request or a technical assistance or capability notice is not subject to any express limitations or exclusions. For example, there are no exclusions for conduct that constitutes an offence; causes serious loss of, or damage to, property; or causes significant financial loss to another person.

This is in contrast with the proposed immunity in new subsection 21A(1) of the *ASIO Act* (in Schedule 5 to the Bill) for persons who provide voluntary assistance to ASIO, which contains specific limitations and exclusions.<sup>83</sup> The existing immunity from civil liability conferred on participants in ASIO's special intelligence operations also includes explicit limitations and exclusions.<sup>84</sup> The absence of limitations or exclusions on the proposed immunity in relation to technical assistance requests and technical assistance and capability notices must also be considered in the context of its breadth of application, covering the actions of the agents of a provider (as well as officers and employees) and things that are done in good faith in *purported* accordance with a technical assistance request or a technical assistance or capability notice.<sup>85</sup>

**Suggestion: consistent statutory conditions and limitations on immunities in new Part 15**

IGIS suggests that consideration is given to applying conditions and limitations on the immunities in new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*, which are consistent with conditions and limitations on other immunities available to agencies (including agents and others assisting them); and with new subsection 21A(1) of the *ASIO Act* (subject to IGIS's comments at [5.1] below on the latter provision).

### 1.4.2 Absence of notification or reporting requirements about the use of the immunities

The Bill does not require ASIO, ASD or ASIS to keep any records of, or notify IGIS or their Ministers about, the use of the civil immunities conferred by the issuing of requests and notices. In the absence of such records, IGIS may obtain some visibility through complaints made by providers or third parties whose rights to obtain remedies are removed by the civil immunity, and through

82 This could include take the form of a requirement for IGIS to be notified of the provision of reports under new subsection 317W(7) and to provide a copy on request.

83 Schedule 5, item 2 (new paragraphs 21A(1)(d) and (e) of the *ASIO Act*). Note that IGIS has identified some possible unintended limitations in the conditions applying to the immunity in new subsection 21A(1) of the *ASIO Act*. (See [5.1] below.)

84 *ASIO Act*, paragraphs 35K(1)(d)-(e). Paragraph 35K(1)(f) also provides that the Attorney-General may by legislative instrument specify further requirements in a determination made under subsection 35K(2), and the availability of immunity is conditional on participants' compliance.

85 New subparagraph 317G(1)(b)(ii), new paragraphs 317G(1)(d) and 317ZJ(1)(b) and new subsection 317ZJ(3).

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notification by agencies on a purely administrative basis. However, the receipt of individual complaints and administrative notification by agencies would not provide a reliable means for IGIS to develop an informed understanding of the circumstances in which the immunity is enlivened and its effects, and those instances in which the limits of the immunity are exceeded.

**Suggestion: statutory reporting and notification requirements to IGIS**

IGIS oversight of the exercise of the powers by intelligence agencies under new Part 15 would be significantly assisted by a requirement for agencies to report periodically to IGIS (and potentially their respective Ministers) on the use of requests and notices.<sup>86</sup> This would include instances that are known to ASIO, ASIS and ASD in which:

- a provider engaged in conduct in accordance or purported accordance with a request made by ASIO, ASIS or ASD (as applicable) or an assistance notice issued by ASIO, or a capability notice issued by the Attorney-General on the request of ASIO; and
- the provider's conduct caused significant loss of, or serious damage to, property; or significant financial loss; or
- the provider engaged in conduct in purported compliance with the request or notice that is excluded from the immunity. (For example, as a result of the limitations in new section 317ZH in relation to a notice.)

Such a requirement would, by extension, require ASIO, ASD and ASIS to take reasonable steps to obtain visibility of the acts and things done by providers in accordance with a request or notice, as applicable. This may be implemented by including conditions in requests or notices, or associated contracts. In any event, standards of propriety in relation to the making of requests or issuing of notices would require agencies to consider the likely impact of an immunity, and to have means to ensure that the conferral and application of that immunity remain proportional.

## **1.5 Immunity from criminal liability to certain computer offences (Criminal Code, new ss 476.2(4)(b)(iv)-(vi), item 3 of Schedule 1)**

Item 3 of Schedule 1 to the Bill proposes to extend the 'authorisation' provision in Part 10.7 of the *Code*. The proposed amendments provide that a person who does an act or thing in accordance with a request or notice given under new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* is taken to be entitled to cause access to or modification of data held in a computer; the impairment of an electronic communication to or from a computer; or the impairment of the reliability, security or operation of data held on an electronic data storage device.

The result is that the computer offences in Part 10.7 of the *Code*, in relation to causing unauthorised access, modification or impairment, do not apply to communications providers who engage in conduct that would otherwise constitute an offence under that Part, if they act in accordance with a request or notice.<sup>87</sup>

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86 See also the comments below on the annual reporting requirements in new section 317ZS.

87 See especially the computer offences in sections 477.2, 477.3, 478.1 and 478.2 of the *Code*.



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### 1.5.1 A broader immunity for providers than for intelligence agency staff and agents

As a matter of practicality, it is understandable that there is a desire to apply some form of limitation to the potential criminal liability of a communications provider who complies with a technical assistance or capability notice that purports to compel the provision of assistance.<sup>88</sup>

However, the proposed amendments in item 3 would seem to effectively confer an immunity on providers in relation to the computer offences in Part 10.7 of the *Code* that is considerably broader than the immunities available to staff members or agents of ASIO, ASD and ASIS.

#### *In the case of ASIO*

Members of ASIO are only taken to be authorised under section 476.2 of the *Code* if they act in accordance with a warrant issued by the Attorney-General.<sup>89</sup> ASIO's computer access warrants prohibit the doing of acts or things that are likely to materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct the lawful use of a computer by any other person, unless necessary to do one or more of the acts or things authorised by the warrant.<sup>90</sup> These warrants also prohibit ASIO from doing any other act or thing that is likely to cause material loss or damage to a lawful user of a computer.<sup>91</sup>

Consequently, if ASIO were to exceed the limits of its authority under a warrant, the persons performing or directing the performance of the relevant acts or things under the warrant could be exposed to criminal liability under Part 10.7 of the *Code*.

No equivalent limitations would apply to the proposed authorisation of communications providers, where those providers act in accordance with an assistance request or notice issued by ASIO, or a capability notice issued by the Attorney-General on ASIO's request.<sup>92</sup>

#### *In the case of ASD and ASIS*

Staff members and agents of those agencies are only covered by the immunity in section 476.5 of the *Code* in relation to acts done outside Australia in the proper performance of their functions;<sup>93</sup> and certain preparatory acts done within Australia, provided that ASIO would not require a warrant to carry out those acts.<sup>94</sup>

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88 Without a limitation on their exposure criminal liability under the computer offences in Part 10.7 of the *Code*, a provider could be simultaneously **compelled** by the notice to engage in the relevant conduct specified in the notice; and **prohibited** from doing so by the criminal law. It is not clear that the issuing of a notice under Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* would enliven the defence of lawful authority in section 10.5 of the *Code*.

89 *Code*, subparagraph 476.2(4)(b)(i).

90 *ASIO Act*, paragraph 25A(5)(a), subsection 27A(1) and paragraph 27E(5)(a). Further, the causation of material interference with, or interruption or obstruction of, the lawful use of a computer must be reported to the Attorney-General in warrant reports: *ASIO Act*, subsection 34(2). See [1.9] below.

91 *ASIO Act*, paragraph 25A(5)(b), subsection 27A(1) and paragraph 27E(5)(b).

92 As noted at [1.9] below, there are also no reporting requirements on the use of requests or notices by ASIO, ASD and ASIS (as applicable). This is in further contrast to sections 34, 34ZH and 35Q of the *ASIO Act* (reports by ASIO on special powers warrants, questioning and detention warrants and special intelligence operations) and section 10A of the *ISA* (reports by ASD and ASIS in relation to Ministerial authorisations).

93 *Code*, subsection 476.5(1).

94 *Code*, subsections 476.5(2) and 476.5(2A).

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ASD and ASIS would also require a Ministerial authorisation if the acts were done for the purpose of (or purposes including) the production of intelligence on an Australian person; or in the case of ASIS would have a direct effect on an Australian person; or in the case of ASD, acts done for the purpose of (or purposes including) preventing or disrupting cybercrime undertaken or enabled by an Australian person.<sup>95</sup>

No equivalent limitations would apply to the proposed authorisation of communications providers for the purpose of Part 10.7 of the *Code*, in respect of acts or things done in accordance with a request made by ASD or ASIS.

### 1.5.2 Potential immunity for providers who comply with legally ineffective notices

The authorisation in item 3 may be capable of covering acts done in accordance with technical assistance and technical capability notices that have no legal effect under new section 317ZG or 317ZH of the *Telecommunications Act*.<sup>96</sup>

This possibility arises because Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* appears to distinguish between a notice (which is defined in new section 317B as a notice given under new section 317L or 317T); and the separate imposition of limitations on the legal effect of a notice (as applied by new sections 317ZG and 317ZH). This may leave scope for an argument that a notice which has no legal effect is still a 'notice' within the meaning of new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*. The authorisation in item 3 does not contain any explicit qualification or exclusion in relation to notices that have no legal effect, and there may be scope for differing legal opinions about whether this is implied.

**Suggestion: statutory clarification of intended effect**

If there is no intention for item 3 to provide an authorisation in respect of compliance with a legally ineffective notice, then IGIS considers it would be preferable for this to be made explicit.

### 1.5.3 Immunity for providers in relation to voluntary acts in accordance with requests

It might also be questioned whether the authorisation in item 3 should treat **voluntary compliance** with a request in the same way as **mandatory compliance** with the requirements of a notice. In particular, new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* does not expressly prohibit an agency from making a request of a provider to do the following acts or things, and thereby enlivening an effective immunity from criminal liability under Part 10.7 of the *Code* in favour of the provider:

- an act or thing that the agency could only do itself under a warrant or another type of statutory authorisation; or
- an act or thing that the agency **could not** be authorised to carry out under a warrant or authorisation, due to limitations or prohibitions on the acts capable of being authorised; or
- in the case of ASD and ASIS, an act or thing that would not be covered by the immunity in section 476.5 of the *Code* for ASD or ASIS staff members and agents. (For example because the act or thing was not done in the **proper** performance by the agency of its functions; or because

95 *ISA*, subparagraphs 8(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii).

96 That is, if a notice purported to compel a provider to do acts or things that would require a warrant or an authorisation and the conditions specified in new subsection 317ZH(4) did not apply; or if a notice purported to compel a provider to create, or to refrain from fixing, a 'backdoor'.

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it was done in Australia and was not preparatory or ancillary to an act done outside Australia.)<sup>97</sup>

**Suggestion: a statutory limitation on the power of agencies to make requests**

Consideration might be given to expressly limiting the power of these agencies to make technical assistance requests, and limiting the scope of the authorisation in item 3 in relation to acts done in accordance with a request.

Such amendments could align the effective immunity for providers with the limits of authority for ASIO, ASD and ASIS to engage in computer-related activities that would otherwise constitute offences under Part 10.7 of the *Code*.

**1.5.4 Reporting on circumstances in which the immunity is enlivened**

As per the suggestion at **[1.9] below** (reporting requirements) oversight would be aided by a reporting requirement for intelligence agencies in relation to their use of new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*. This could usefully include a specific requirement for those agencies to report to the IGIS and their Ministers on each instance in which a communications provider engages in conduct pursuant to a request or a notice, and that conduct:

- engages the immunity from criminal liability to the Code offences in item 3 of the Bill; and
- causes material damage, material interference or material obstruction to a computer.

**1.6 Attorney-General's procedures and arrangements for requesting technical capability notices (new s 317S)**

New section 317S provides that the Attorney-General may, in writing, determine procedures and arrangements to be followed in the making of requests for the issuing of technical capability notices, which may include conditions to obtain the agreement of a person or body before making a request.<sup>98</sup>

IGIS would conduct oversight of ASIO's compliance with those procedures and arrangements in making requests for the issuing of capability notices (including requests made jointly with other agencies).<sup>99</sup> However, neither the Bill nor the existing provisions of the *IGIS Act* contain a

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97 The making of requests by ASIO, ASD and ASIS in these circumstances would, however, raise matters of propriety in relation to the actions of that agency. There would be additional matters of legality in relation to any requests made by ASIS to a communications provider to provide assistance that had a direct effect on an Australian person. IGIS has taken the view that the requirements in subparagraphs 8(1)(a)(ib) and (ii) of the *ISA* for ASIS to obtain a Ministerial authorisation for such activities also apply to **requests** made by ASIS to **other persons** to undertake those activities. On this view, ASIS would need to obtain a Ministerial authorisation in order to make a technical assistance request in new section 317G of the *Telecommunications Act* in these circumstances. However, if ASIS did not obtain a Ministerial authorisation, an immunity from liability to computer offences in Part 10.7 of the *Code* would still be available to a communications provider who complied with that request, even though no such immunity would be available to ASIS staff members and agents under section 14 of the *ISA* or section 476.5 of the *Code* as a result of the breach of the Ministerial authorisation requirement.

98 New subsection 317S(1).

99 IGIS would also oversee ASIO's compliance with other requirements that may be specified by the Attorney-General under new section 317S, such as procedures contemplated in the Explanatory

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mechanism to ensure that the Inspector-General is given a copy of the relevant documents, including variations.

In particular, the present obligations in section 32B of the *IGIS Act* on Ministers to give copies of directions and guidelines to the Inspector-General are limited to the responsible Ministers for intelligence agencies (which no longer includes the Attorney-General). Further, as determinations made under new section 317S are not legislative instruments<sup>100</sup> and could be classified, they may not be accessible via open source means. The absence of a statutory mechanism to facilitate timely access by IGIS to the latest versions of the Attorney-General's procedures and arrangements may complicate oversight of ASIO's compliance with requirements set down by the Attorney-General.

**Suggestion: a statutory requirement to provide IGIS with procedures and arrangements**

IGIS supports an amendment to new section 317S that requires the Attorney-General to give the Inspector-General a copy of all procedures and arrangements as soon as practicable after they are made.<sup>101</sup>

Consideration could also be given to a statutory requirement for copies of procedures and arrangements determined by the Attorney-General to be given to other integrity agencies with oversight responsibilities for the 'interception agencies' that may use the industry assistance scheme (such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman in relation to AFP and ACIC).

## **1.7 Terms and conditions on which help is to be given under a notice (new s 317ZK)**

New section 317ZK sets out the key conditions upon which assistance is to be provided under a notice. These conditions include the general basis upon which a provider must comply with a requirements in a notice. (Namely, neither profiting from, nor bearing the reasonable costs of, compliance, unless the provider and agency otherwise agree.)<sup>102</sup> Other conditions include a default requirement for the parties submit to arbitration of the terms and conditions of compliance, if they cannot reach agreement.<sup>103</sup>

However, the Director-General of Security (or delegate) may decide to 'turn off' the statutory terms and conditions in new section 317ZK in relation to a requirement in a technical assistance notice issued by ASIO, if he or she is satisfied that the application of the section would be contrary to the public interest.<sup>104</sup> An equivalent power is conferred on the Attorney-General in relation to technical capability notices.<sup>105</sup> In determining whether it would be contrary to the public interest for new section 317ZK to apply, the decision-maker must have regard to several prescribed matters, including: the interests of law enforcement and national security; the objects of the

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Memorandum, at p. 51, paragraph [145], to 'ensure that additional agencies are notified of requests being made'.

100 New subsection 317S(4).

101 Consideration could alternatively be given to amending section 32B of the *IGIS Act*.

102 New subsection 317ZK(3).

103 New subsection 317ZK(4).

104 New paragraph 317ZK(1)(c).

105 New paragraph 317ZK(e).

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*Telecommunications Act*; the imposition of a regulatory burden on the provider; and the reasons for the giving of the notice.<sup>106</sup> The Bill does not contain a specific requirement for a provider to be notified of a decision to ‘turn off’ the application of section 317ZK in relation to them.

Existing Part 14 of the *Telecommunications Act* does not contain an equivalent power to ‘turn off’ the terms and conditions in section 314 in respect of the obligations on carriers, carriage service providers and intermediaries to give certain help to Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities under subsections 313(3) and 313(4).

### 1.7.1 IGIS oversight of the Director-General’s power to ‘turn off’ new section 317K

IGIS is unlikely to have significant involvement in the oversight of ASIO’s actions in costs negotiations in those cases in which the Director-General of Security (or delegate) **does not** decide to ‘turn off’ new section 317ZK. This reflects the availability of arbitration under that section.

However, decisions of the Director-General (or delegate) to ‘turn off’ new section 317ZK may be a source of complaints to IGIS by affected providers, in addition to potential complaints about disputed matters that would otherwise have been governed by the costs negotiation and arbitration provisions in new section 317ZK. Oversight of the actions of the Director-General or delegate under new section 317ZK will be assisted by the inclusive list of statutory factors that must be taken into account in assessing matters of public interest. However, complaints about decisions to ‘turn off’ new section 317K and underlying disputes about the apportionment of costs may have significant resource implications for IGIS.

### 1.7.2 Record-keeping in relation to decisions to ‘turn off’ new section 317K

It is important that IGIS has visibility of all decisions of the Director-General (or delegate) to ‘turn off’ the application of new section 317ZK to technical assistance notices issued by ASIO.

IGIS also notes that an assessment of some of the matters prescribed as mandatory considerations for public interest-based decisions to ‘turn off’ new section 317ZK may not be within ASIO’s ordinary knowledge. (For example, the interests of law enforcement, and the assessment of the regulatory burden on the provider.) IGIS would examine the factual basis upon which the Director-General or delegate formed his or her views on those matters.

#### Suggestion: a statutory requirement for decisions to be made or recorded in writing

Ready access to written records of decisions, supporting reasons, and the information on which they are based, will be essential to such oversight. This could be facilitated through the imposition of a statutory requirement on the Director-General (or delegate) to record his or her decisions and the supporting reasons in writing.

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106 New subsection 317ZK(2).

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### 1.7.3 Complications in applying and overseeing decisions about the ‘public interest test’

The power to ‘turn off’ new section 317ZK seems to apply collectively to **all of the conditions** in that section rather than individual conditions, such as the arbitration of certain matters. (In particular, as there is no requirement for decisions to ‘turn off’ new section 317ZK to be made **by instrument**, the discretion in subsection 33(3A) of the *Acts Interpretation Act* may not be available.)<sup>107</sup>

If there is no ability to ‘turn off’ only **some** of the conditions in new section 317ZK in appropriate cases, this may complicate the application and oversight of the public interest test. In this event, it would be necessary for the decision-maker to make an ‘aggregated’ assessment of whether it would be contrary to the public interest for **all** of the conditions in new section 317ZK to apply to a requirement under a notice.

**Suggestion: an explicit power to turn off only some conditions, and a power of deferral**

IGIS questions whether provision could be made for greater flexibility in the exercise of the statutory power, so that the decision-maker is given discretion to decide to ‘turn off’ **some** of the conditions in appropriate cases; and could also decide to **defer** the availability of some conditions as a result of urgent circumstances (for example, until after a provider has performed its obligations under a notice) rather than to permanently exclude their application.

## 1.8 Disclosing information about requests and notices for oversight purposes (new s 317ZF)

New subsection 317ZF(1) applies various restrictions on the disclosure of information about the giving, existence, contents and performance of requests and notices, by various persons to whom that information is entrusted. Contravention of those restrictions is an offence.<sup>108</sup> However, new paragraph 317ZF(3)(f) and new subsection 317ZF(5) contain exceptions for disclosures to IGIS officials, and disclosures by IGIS officials, in connection with the performance by those persons of their functions or duties or the exercise of their powers as IGIS officials.

Subject to one issue (which is explained below), the exceptions in relation to IGIS officials are adequate to ensure that necessary information can be disclosed to, and by, IGIS officials for the purpose of conducting independent oversight of intelligence agencies’ actions under the scheme. The provisions are generally consistent with the approach taken to exempting disclosures to and by IGIS officials from various secrecy offences that apply to the disclosure of sensitive information.<sup>109</sup>

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107 Subsection 33(3A) of the *Acts Interpretation Act* relevantly provides that, where an Act confers a power to make, grant or issue any instrument of a legislative or administrative character with respect to particular matters, the power is construed as including a power to make, grant or issue an instrument with respect to only **some** of those matters. (Courts have drawn a conceptual distinction between a power to **issue an instrument**, which itself has an operative legal effect; and a power to **make a decision** which is immediately operative but, in the interests of good administration, is recorded in writing. See: *Laurence v Chief of Navy* (2004) 139 FCR 555 at 558 per Wilcox J.)

108 This is punishable by a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment: new subsection 317ZF(1).

109 See, for example: *ASIO Act*, section 18D; *ISA*, subsection (3) of sections 39-40B and subsections (2A) of sections 40C-40M; and *Code*, subsection 122.5(3).

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### 1.8.1 Imposition of evidential burden on IGIS officials (new subsection 317ZF(5))

The exception in new subsection 317ZF(5) (covering disclosures by IGIS officials) does not relieve an IGIS official from the requirement to discharge the evidential burden in respect of their status as an IGIS official, and the making of the disclosure in their capacity as an IGIS official.

In contrast, other exceptions to Commonwealth secrecy offences for disclosures of information by IGIS officials for the purpose of performing their official functions remove the evidential burden from the IGIS official as defendant in relation to these matters.<sup>110</sup> This recognises that current and former IGIS officials are under a legal disability as a result of the secrecy obligations and attendant offences in section 34 of the *IGIS Act*. These obligations are likely to prevent an IGIS official from adducing the evidence necessary to discharge the evidential burden in relation to the matters in new subsection 317ZF(5).

#### Suggestion: removal of evidential burden from IGIS officials

Accordingly, IGIS would support an amendment to new subsection 317ZF(5) bring it into alignment with the prevailing approach to equivalent provisions under other secrecy laws, including the official secrecy offences in Division 122 of the *Criminal Code* as enacted by the *National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (EFI Act)*.

### 1.8.2 Exceptions for disclosures to, and by, officials of other integrity agencies

IGIS queries whether further exceptions may be appropriate for disclosures to other integrity agencies (such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Australian Commissioner for Law Enforcement Integrity) which have specific oversight functions in relation to some of the 'interception agencies' that may use the new industry assistance scheme (the AFP and ACIC).

#### Suggestion: alignment of exceptions with other Commonwealth secrecy offences

In addition to exceptions for disclosures to the Ombudsman and ACLEI, consideration might also be given to including exceptions for the making of public interest disclosures, disclosures to the Information Commissioner for the purpose of performing functions under freedom of information and privacy legislation, and the reporting of suspected offences or maladministration in the investigation of offences in connection with the new scheme.

This would bring the disclosure regime in new section 317ZF into line with the authorised disclosures for integrity related purpose in the official secrecy provisions in section 122.5 of the *Criminal Code* (as enacted by the *EFI Act*). Alignment of the exceptions may be desirable, as it would seem possible for a disclosure of information about a request or a notice to constitute a specific secrecy offence in Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* and a general secrecy offence in Division 122 of the *Code*.

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110 See, for example: *ASIO Act*, section 18D; *ISA*, section 41B; and *Code*, section 122.5(12).

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## 1.9 Reporting on intelligence agencies' use of new Part 15 (new s 317ZS)

The annual reporting requirements in new section 317ZS do not extend to the activities of ASIO, ASD and ASIS under new Part 15, as these reports are limited to the activities of 'interception agencies'.

In the experience of IGIS, reporting requirements about the exercise by intelligence agencies of intrusive and coercive powers significantly aid independent oversight. Reporting requirements are valuable because they mandate the consistent collection and maintenance of records, and the evaluation by the agency (and its Minister) of how each exercise of those powers assisted the agency to perform its functions. Reports also assist IGIS to:

- develop a comprehensive understanding of the way in which those powers are used;
- identify and analyse trends or patterns, including with respect to systemic issues; and
- compare the approaches of different agencies (where appropriate) including to identify best practice, or inconsistent practices not attributable to specific functions of individual agencies, or common compliance issues.

### Suggestion: classified annual reporting requirements for intelligence agencies

While there may be security related arguments that the **public** annual reporting requirements in new section 317ZS should not apply to ASIO, ASD or ASIS, it is unclear why those agencies could not at least be subject to **classified** reporting requirements to their Ministers and IGIS in relation to their use of the scheme in new Part 15. Such reporting requirements could be included in agencies' classified annual reports.

### Further suggestion: 'per request' and 'per notice' reporting for intelligence agencies

IGIS considers it important that there is also reporting on a 'per-request' or 'per-notice' basis, consistent with requirements in relation to ASIO warrants under section 34 the *ASIO Act* and Ministerial authorisations under section 10A of the *ISA*.

In particular, IGIS considers it important that intelligence agencies are required to inform their Minister and the Inspector-General in relation to conduct that engages the immunity from civil liability and the effective immunity from liability to the computer offences in Part 10.7 of the *Code*, where that conduct results in material loss, damage or harm to a third party, or material interference with or obstruction of the lawful use of a computer.

## 1.10 Incorrect references to the IGIS Act in the Explanatory Memorandum

IGIS notes that the commentary in the Explanatory Memorandum on Schedule 1 to the Bill contains some incorrect or misleading references to the *IGIS Act*. These references would benefit from correction to ensure that they do not mislead or confuse members of the public, including communications providers, about the independence of the office of the IGIS from the National Intelligence Community that it oversees.

In relation to the conditions for making technical assistance requests under new paragraph 317G(5)(d), the Explanatory Memorandum states that this provision 'reflects the functions of

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Australia's intelligence and security agencies as set out in the *IGIS Act* and the *ASIO Act*.<sup>111</sup> The reference to the *IGIS Act* may have been intended to be a reference to the *ISA*. IGIS is not part of the National Intelligence Community, and will not be conferred with any powers under new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*. These matters are important to public confidence in the independence of IGIS, including the oversight of the actions of ASIO, ASIS and ASD under Part 15.

In relation to compliance and enforcement measures in Division 5 of new Part 15, the Explanatory Memorandum cites the *IGIS Act* as part of the justification for the non-merits reviewable status of technical assistance and capability notices. It states that the exclusion of merits review of decisions made under new Part 15 is 'consistent with other decisions made for national security and law enforcement purposes—for example those made under the *IS Act*, *ASIO Act*, *IGIS Act* and *TIA Act*. Decisions of a law enforcement nature were identified by the Administrative Review Council in its publication *What decisions should be subject to merits review?* as being unsuitable for merits review'.<sup>112</sup> The reference to the *IGIS Act* in this context may create a misleading impression that IGIS is a security or intelligence agency akin to those agencies which are governed by the other Acts listed (such as ASIO, ASIS and ASD), or is a law enforcement agency, or will otherwise be conferred with powers under new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*.<sup>113</sup>

## Schedule 2—ASIO's computer access warrants

Schedule 2 to the Bill proposes to amend ASIO's warrant-based computer access powers (in sections 25A, 27A and 27E of the *ASIO Act*). The key amendments will permit ASIO to:

- undertake telecommunications interception (TI) for the purpose of doing any thing that is specified in the warrant, including but not limited to accessing relevant data held on, or from, a computer;<sup>114</sup>
- temporarily remove a computer or other thing from premises, for the purpose of doing any thing specified in the warrant;<sup>115</sup> and

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111 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 45 at paragraph [99].

112 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 60 at paragraph [207].

113 Further, the reason that the decisions of the IGIS are not merits reviewable is their connection with the making of **advisory recommendations** to the ultimate decision-maker (being the responsible Minister, Prime Minister or Attorney-General). See further: Administrative Review Council, [What Decisions Should be Subject to Merit Review](#), 1999 at [4.44]-[4.48] ('recommendations to ultimate decision-makers'). This ground was identified as wholly separate to the potential exclusion from merits review of decisions concerning national security, the latter being recognised as a type of 'policy decision of a high political content' at [4.23]. Decisions of IGIS are clearly not of a political nature or content (being advisory recommendations of an independent oversight body, whose mandate is to examine the legality and propriety of intelligence agencies' actions).

114 Items 6 and 11: new paragraphs 25A(4)(ba) (computer access warrants) and 27E(2)(ea) (computer access authorisation under identified person warrants). Note that the power in new paragraph 25A(4)(ba) will be applied to foreign intelligence warrants by existing subsection 27A(1).

115 Items 5 and 10: new paragraphs 25A(4)(ac) (computer access warrants) and 27E(2)(da) (computer access authorisation under identified person warrants). Note that the power in new paragraph 25A(4)(ac) will be applied to foreign intelligence warrants by existing subsection 27A(1).



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- undertake certain activities (including TI and temporary removal of computers and other things) to conceal the fact that any thing was done under a warrant, for up to 28 days after the warrant ceases to be in force, or as soon as reasonably practicable after the 28-day period.<sup>116</sup>

As a general observation, clarity on the face of the statute is particularly important in the context of ASIO's warrants, in terms of facilitating compliance by ASIO and independent oversight by IGIS of ASIO's actions. Unlike most law enforcement warrants, decisions about the issue and exercise of powers under these warrants are unlikely to be litigated, given that they are normally covert to the target and others. Consequently, there is likely to be limited, if any, opportunity for the judicial determination of the meaning of ambiguous provisions.

## 2.1 Telecommunications interception powers

### 2.1.1 No requirement to particularise telecommunications services or persons

The amendments in Schedule 2 will not require a warrant under section 25A or 27A, or an authorisation under section 27E, to particularise any telecommunications services or persons (by reference to their use of a service or a device) in respect of which interception is authorised. This is in contrast with requirements for TI warrants issued to ASIO under Part 2-2 of the *TIA Act*.<sup>117</sup>

The absence of such a requirement may reflect an intention that the primary statutory limitation on interception carried out under a computer access warrant is the purpose for which that interception may be conducted. That is, the purpose of doing any thing specified in the warrant in accordance with subsection 25A(4) and equivalent provisions in sections 27A and 27E (as amended) rather than which service is intercepted for that purpose.

Nonetheless, the absence of a requirement to specify telecommunications services or persons will further expand the powers available to ASIO under its computer access warrants. These powers are already broad, including as a result of the definition of a 'computer',<sup>118</sup> the 'security matter'<sup>119</sup> or 'foreign intelligence matter'<sup>120</sup> in respect of which warrants can be issued, and the applicable issuing thresholds.

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116 Items 7, 8 and 12: new subsections 25A(8) (computer access warrants), 27A(3C) (foreign intelligence warrants) and 27E(6) (authorisation under identified person warrants).

117 *TIA Act*, sections 9, 9A, 11A and 11B. See also the condition for the issuing of a section 11C warrant that a section 11A or 11B warrant would be ineffective: subparagraph 11C(1)(b)(iii).

118 *ASIO Act*, section 22. (A 'computer' means all or part of one or more computers, computer systems, computer networks or any combination of these.)

119 *ASIO Act*, subsection 25A(2). (This is the matter that is important to security, in respect of which the warrant is issued. A 'security matter' could be defined very broadly, to cover legal and natural persons including bodies politic, entities or other things such as activities or events, and would not necessarily require the relevant matter to be known, in the sense of the identification of a particular person or entity, or a specific activity or event.)

120 *ASIO Act*, paragraph 27A(1)(a). (This is a matter specified in a notice given to the Attorney-General, as the purpose for which the foreign intelligence collection warrant is issued. For a warrant to be issued, the Attorney-General must be satisfied, on the basis of advice from the Defence Minister or Foreign Minister, that the collection of foreign intelligence relating to that matter is in the interests of Australia's national security, foreign relations or economic well-being. As with a 'security matter' the 'foreign intelligence matter' could be very broadly defined to cover natural and legal persons, including bodies politic, entities or other things such as activities or events.)

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Even taking into account the anticipatory nature of intelligence collection activities under ASIO's special powers warrants, the result is that the exercise of TI powers might be authorised on a much broader scale than may be immediately apparent on the face of the provisions, and on a broader scale than would be permitted under the *TIA Act*.

This circumstance will be relevant to IGIS oversight of the information that ASIO provides to the Attorney-General about the proposed collection activities in its warrant requests. In particular, it will be relevant to IGIS oversight of ASIO's decision-making about whether to request the issuing of a warrant with specific conditions that limit interception to particular services or persons; and the information that ASIO provides to the Attorney-General about its consideration of this matter.

### 2.1.2 Scope of interception activities authorised

The amendments will authorise TI for the purpose of doing any thing specified in the warrant, in accordance with the list of things that the Attorney-General may specify under subsections 25A(4), 27A(1) or 27E(2) (as amended).<sup>121</sup> IGIS understands that the amendments are intended to remove the need for ASIO to obtain two warrants (one authorising computer access and the other authorising TI) to conduct computer access and network exploitation activities.<sup>122</sup> The proposed powers may be framed more broadly than what is necessary to achieve this intended outcome.

#### *Authorisation of TI to do any of the things in subsection 25A(4) as specified in the warrant*

TI can be authorised for the purpose of doing any of the things in subsection 25A(4) or 27E(2). However, not all of the acts or things specified in subsections 25A(4), and 27E(2) are directly connected with ASIO obtaining access to 'relevant data'<sup>123</sup> that is held in, or is accessible from, a computer. For example, under the amendments as presently drafted, it would be open to the Attorney-General to authorise TI for the purpose of ASIO gaining entry to premises under paragraphs 25A(4)(aa) and (aaa) and equivalent provisions in subsections 27A(1) and 27E(2). It is unclear whether the conferral of such power is intended.

#### **Suggestion: limitation of the TI power to a subset of things specified in the warrant**

Consideration could be given to limiting the TI power to a **subset** of the things specified in subsections 25A(4) and 27E(2) such as the acts done for the purpose of accessing relevant data under paragraphs 25A(4)(a)-(ab) and 27E(2)(c) and (d).

#### Implications of the scope of the proposed TI power

The circumstances in which TI powers might be thought necessary to gain entry to premises are not immediately apparent. (Is this power intended to, for example, authorise the interception of communications sent and received by a known occupier or user of premises, in order for ASIO to ascertain their movements and activities at a particular time and therefore ensure that entry could

121 See also the authorisation of TI for concealment purposes in items 7, 8 and 12: new paragraphs 25A(8)(h), 27A(3C)(h) and 27E(6)(h) including after the expiry of the warrant.

122 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 80 at paragraphs [352]-[355].

123 See: *ASIO Act*, paragraph 25A(4)(a), subsection 27A(1) and paragraph 27E(2)(c). ('**Relevant data**' is data that is relevant to the security or foreign intelligence matter in respect of which the warrant is issued; or in the case of identified person warrants, data that is relevant to the prejudicial activities of the identified person).

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be made covertly? Could it authorise TI for the purpose of disabling, or using, a security surveillance system installed on the premises, noting that commercially available surveillance products commonly have internet or cellular connectivity?)

The conferral of TI powers for the purpose of gaining entry to premises would also result in different powers being available to ASIO to gain access to premises under a computer access warrant, as compared to other types of special powers warrants that authorise access to premises, such as search warrants and surveillance device warrants.

In practical terms, the breadth of the TI powers proposed to be conferred under ASIO's special powers warrants is also relevant to the subsequent use that could be made of intercepted information in reliance on new subsection 63AC(2) of the *TIA Act* (item 124 of Schedule 2 to the Bill).

In particular, new paragraph 63AC(2)(f) of the *TIA Act* would authorise the subsequent use of intercepted communications for purposes **other than** doing the things authorised by a computer access warrant, if their content related, or appeared to relate, to the involvement, or likely involvement, of a person in activities that are, or are likely to be, a threat to security (within the meaning of that term in section 4 of the *ASIO Act*).

IGIS notes that the broader the purposes for which TI powers may be exercised under a computer access warrant, the greater the practical likelihood that the contents of intercepted communications may contain information that is not relevant to the particular purpose for which the interception was carried out. This may, in turn, increase the practical likelihood that ASIO will make secondary use of those communications in accordance with new subsection 63AC(2) of the *TIA Act*, rather than obtaining a separate interception warrant under the *TIA Act* to undertake the interception.<sup>124</sup>

***Application of 'use of force authorisation' in ss 25A(5A)(a), 27A(2)(a) and 27J(3)(d)***

Existing paragraphs 25A(5A)(a), 27A(2)(d) and 27J(3)(d) provide that a computer access warrant, a foreign intelligence warrant, or an authorisation under an identified person warrant **must authorise** the use of any force against persons and things that is reasonably necessary to do the things specified in the warrant (or in an authority under an identified person warrant). Therefore, if a warrant authorises ASIO to carry out TI as a result of the amendments in Schedule 2 to the Bill, that warrant **must** authorise ASIO to use force against things and persons for the purpose of TI (as well as any other activities authorised under the warrant).

As interception warrants issued under Part 2-2 of the *TIA Act* do not authorise the use of force, this is an extension of powers available to ASIO, and not merely the relocation of an existing TI power into a different Act. It is unclear if the use of force against a person or thing could ever be necessary or reasonable to intercept a telecommunication under a warrant, however, the proposed amendments create the possibility for such an assessment to be made.

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124 Cf the statement in the Explanatory Memorandum, at p. 15, paragraph [54], that 'ASIO can only use intercepted information in order to execute the computer access warrant. In order for ASIO to use intercepted information for its own intelligence value, ASIO must obtain an interception warrant under the *TIA Act*'. No reference is made to the effect of new subsection 63AC(2) of the *TIA Act* with respect to the secondary use of this information, including the effect of the broad exception in new paragraph 63AC(2)(f) for information that relates, or appears to relate, to the involvement of a person in activities that are, or are likely to be, a threat to security (within the meaning of that term in the *ASIO Act*).

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Suggestion: possible exclusion of TI from the ‘use of force’ authorisation

If there is no intention to require warrants to authorise the use of force for the purpose of TI, consideration could be given to amending subsection 25A(5A) to exclude TI activities from the mandatory authorisation for the use of force.

If there is an intention to authorise ASIO to use force against persons or things for the purpose of carrying out TI, this would be subject to the requirement in section 31A for ASIO to notify IGIS, in writing, as soon as practicable if force is used against a person. IGIS would examine such activities closely, as well as ASIO’s training and internal authorisations for the use of force potentially available in the exercise of TI powers.

### 2.1.3 Warrant reports

Schedule 5 to the Bill does not make a consequential amendment to the reporting requirements for special powers warrants under section 34 to impose a specific obligation on ASIO to report on the **interception activities** that are conducted under a computer access warrant.

This means that interception activities carried out under a computer access warrant will be subject to less detailed reporting requirements than for interception activities conducted under an interception warrant issued under Part 2-2 of the *TIA Act*. Section 17 of the *TIA Act* relevantly requires warrant reports to specifically address how **each interception activity** carried out under an interception warrant assisted ASIO in performing its functions. These reports must also include particulars of the telecommunications service or services to or from which each intercepted communication was made under named person warrants in sections 9A and 11B. In contrast, section 34 requires ASIO to report on the extent to which the action taken under the warrant assisted ASIO in carrying out its functions. This does not require the same particularisation of interception activities as section 17 of the *TIA Act*.

Suggestion: alignment of reporting requirements with the *TIA Act*

Oversight of the extended computer access warrant powers would be enhanced if reports on computer access warrants prepared under section 34 of the *ASIO Act* were required to address the same matters as those in section 17 of the *TIA Act* with respect to interception activities.

## 2.2 Temporary removal of computers and other things from premises

The new temporary removal powers are exercisable during and after the expiry of a warrant, for the purpose of doing **any thing** specified in the warrant, in accordance with subsections 25A(4), 27A(3C) and 27E(2).<sup>125</sup>

### 2.2.1 Purpose of temporary removal

The Explanatory Memorandum identifies that the temporary removal power is intended to be used in ‘situations where ASIO may require specialist equipment, which cannot be brought onto the premises in a covert fashion, **in order to access the computer**’ (emphasis added).<sup>126</sup> However, the

125 See also the temporary removal powers for the purpose of concealment in items 7, 8 and 12: new paragraphs 25A(8)(f), 27A(3C)(f) and 27E(6)(f).

126 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 79 at paragraph [348].

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proposed amendments would be capable of authorising temporary removal for broader purposes than obtaining access to relevant data that is held in, or is accessible from, a computer. This is because the activities that may be authorised under a computer access warrant in subsections 25A(4) and 27E(2) cover a broader range of activities, including gaining access to premises. As with the earlier observations on TI powers, consideration might be given to whether the temporary removal power could be limited to a subset of matters in subsections 25A(4) and 27E(2).

### 2.2.2 Meaning of ‘other things’ that may be temporarily removed

In addition to the temporary removal of computers from premises, computer access warrants will be able to authorise the temporary removal of ‘other things’ from premises. There is ambiguity in the meaning of these words. This may complicate oversight of the removal of things other than computers from premises that are accessed under the warrant.

In particular, could the removal power authorise the removal of **any object** on the premises for the purpose of doing an act or thing authorised in the warrant? It is arguable that the meaning of the words ‘or other thing’ should be construed by reference to the preceding word ‘computer’ and the broader context of the words ‘or other thing’ in a provision whose purpose is to authorise computer access. On this interpretation, the ‘other thing’ would need to have a rational connection with a computer. (For example, a data storage device, such as an external hard drive or media drive, which operates in conjunction with a computer.) Even if the words ‘other thing’ were given a narrow interpretation, there may be uncertainty as to whether a particular thing had the requisite nexus with a computer.

**Suggestion: statutory clarification of the ‘other things’ that can be removed temporarily**

In view of the above ambiguity, the temporary removal provisions could usefully provide greater clarity about the ‘other things’ that can be removed under a computer access warrant.

### 2.2.3 Duration of temporary removal

Temporary removals of computers or other things from premises under computer access warrants are a potential source of complaints to IGIS, given that most people make significant use of computers in conducting their business and personal affairs. The removal of a computer from premises could have severe impacts on its owner and other users, who may be prevented from making essential communications, conducting lawful business and deriving an income for the period of removal.

The amendments do not specify a maximum period of time during which computers and ‘other things’ may be removed from premises before they must be returned. Nor is there a statutory requirement to return a computer or other thing that is removed as soon as reasonably practicable. The result appears to be that the amendments could authorise the removal of a computer or any other thing from premises for an open-ended (and potentially protracted) period.

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**Suggestion: alignment with statutory conditions for temporary removal under search warrants**

Consideration could be given to inserting a statutory condition on the duration of removals and the return of computers or things to premises.

For example, existing subsections 25(4C) and 27D(5) (in relation to search warrants and search authorisations under identified person warrants) provides that a record or any other thing that has been removed from the subject premises or from a person at or near the premises may be retained for only such time as is reasonable. If returning the record or thing would be prejudicial to security, then it may only be retained until its return would no longer be prejudicial to security. (However, this may still be a substantial period of time, and could enable indefinite retention if it is determined that return at **any time** would be prejudicial to security.)

#### 2.2.4 Absence of reporting requirements for temporary removals

The Bill does not propose to amend the warrant reporting requirements in section 34 to require reports on computer access warrants to identify whether a computer or other thing was removed from premises, and if so, the purpose and duration of the removal. Reporting may be triggered under existing subsection 34(2) if a removal causes material interference with, or interruption or obstruction of, the lawful use of a computer by another person. However, as outlined below, there is ambiguity as to whether this would cover **all instances** of removal, and this ambiguity may lead to inconsistent interpretations, and therefore inconsistent reporting practices.

**Suggestion: specific reporting requirement for all removals**

The absence of a specific reporting requirement for **all removals** may also mean that that suitably detailed records may not be made (or may not be made consistently) of the reasons for, and duration of, each removal, which would make oversight difficult. Consequently, IGIS would support a statutory reporting requirement for all removals.

This would also help to alleviate complexity in relation to the application of reporting requirements concerning temporary removals that cause material interference, interruption, obstruction or loss or damage (discussed at [2.2.5]-[2.2.7]below).

#### 2.2.5 Temporary removal and the existing limitation on acts that are likely to materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct the lawful use of a computer

It is conceivable that the removal of a computer from premises could amount to the doing of a thing that is likely to materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct the lawful use of that computer by other persons. (That is, the removal would necessarily deprive the owners and any other users of the computer of the opportunity to use it for the period of removal.)

Given the centrality of computers to the conduct by most persons of their ordinary, lawful business and personal affairs, that deprivation could reasonably be regarded as likely to be a **material** interference with, or a material interruption or obstruction of, their lawful use of the computer in many cases. In this event, the limitation in existing paragraph 25A(5)(a), and equivalent provisions applying to sections 27A and 27E, would apply. The removal may only be effected if it is **necessary** (and not merely convenient or useful) to do the thing authorised under subsection 25A(4) for which the computer was removed from the premises.

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ASIO would need to make an assessment, in the circumstances of each proposed removal, of whether a person would be deprived of the use of a computer, and if so whether the condition of necessity is met. This is likely to be complex for ASIO to assess and for IGIS to oversight. Nonetheless, IGIS would expect to see evidence of an assessment of these matters in the course of ASIO's decision-making about the exercise of a temporary removal power. This oversight would be assisted by a standing reporting requirement for all temporary removals, noted above.

**2.2.6 Temporary removal and the existing prohibition on acts that are likely to cause material loss or damage to persons lawfully using a computer**

Existing paragraph 25A(5)(b) (and equivalent provisions applying to sections 27A and 27E) would have the effect that the removal of a computer or any other thing from premises would not be authorised if, in the circumstances, the removal is likely to cause any other material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer.

This would seem to cover the risk of physical damage caused by the removal and return of a computer or in operating other equipment to gain access to the relevant data held on, or accessible from, that computer when it has been removed. It could also cover economic loss sustained by a user of the computer as a result of being deprived of its use or functionality for the period of removal. For example, if a computer was a business asset from which a person derived an income.

Paragraph 25A(5)(b) (and equivalent provisions applying to sections 27A and 27E) is an absolute prohibition. IGIS would therefore pay close attention to ASIO's assessment of the likelihood of such loss or damage in its decision-making about whether to exercise a temporary removal power.

**2.2.7 Application of the existing reporting requirements in subsection 34(2) to temporary removals of computers and other things from premises**

Existing subsection 34(2) will require ASIO to report on exercise of a removal power if the removal causes material interference with, or obstruction or interruption of, the lawful use of a computer, other electronic equipment or a data storage device. (For example, if the removal deprived a person of the ability to use the computer, or if the computer is damaged during its removal or return.)

The amendments to subsection 34(2) made by items 14 and 15 of Schedule 2 to the Bill will also extend the reporting requirement to material interference, obstruction or interruption caused by a temporary removal under the concealment powers in new subsections 25A(8), 27A(3C) and 27E(6).

However, it may be difficult to accurately identify whether temporary removal, in fact, deprived a person an opportunity to lawfully use a computer or other thing during the period of removal, and if so, the effects of the removal on the person.

Such difficulty may tend in support of amending section 34 to include an additional reporting requirement for **all instances** of removal (as suggested at [2.2.4] above). Without such a reporting requirement, IGIS would have limited practical capacity to know the frequency with which computers and other things are removed from premises, and to use this information to independently examine ASIOs actions and broader risk-management practices in relation the exercise of the new warrant-based removal powers.



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### 2.2.8 Differences in the temporary removal powers applying to search warrants

The amendments in Schedule 2 that confer removal powers in connection with computer access warrants are drafted differently to the existing powers under search warrants (and authorisations under identified person warrants) that may authorise the removal of computers from premises.<sup>127</sup> Differences in the drafting of the individual provisions applying to different warrants may create a risk that the respective removal powers could be subject to different interpretations.

#### Suggestion: possible alignment of search warrant provisions

It may be desirable for the Bill to make some amendments to sections 25 and 27D, if there is a desire for consistency in all of ASIO's warrant-based computer removal powers.

In particular, the power of removal in relation to search warrants (and search authorisations under identified person warrants) applies generally to 'records' and 'other things' found on the premises (or on a search of a person at or near the premises) for the purpose of 'inspecting' or 'examining' those records or things.<sup>128</sup> The powers to use computers, equipment and devices found on, or brought to, the subject premises to access relevant data are authorised separately to the removal power.<sup>129</sup> The consequences of this separation include the following:

- the temporary removal power is not linked explicitly to the purpose of exercising the separate powers to use a computer, equipment or device;<sup>130</sup>
- there may be scope for doubt as to whether the existing purposes of removal (being 'inspection' or 'examination') could cover certain computer-related activities specified in the separate powers to use computers, such as: the conversion or copying of relevant data; and adding, copying, deleting or altering other data for the purpose of accessing relevant data;<sup>131</sup>
- the statutory limitations on causing material interference, interruption, obstruction, loss or damage to lawful users of the computer, equipment or device are expressed as applying to the powers to **use** those items (and no mention is made of the separate power of removal for the purpose of examination);<sup>132</sup> and
- the reporting obligation under subsection 34(2) in relation to search warrants is also expressed as applying to the causation of material interference, interference, obstruction, loss or damage

127 *ASIO Act*, ss 25(4)(d), 25(4A)(c) and 25(4C)-(6) (search warrants); and ss 27D(2)(g)-(i) and 27D(5) (authorisation to search premises and persons under identified person warrant).

128 *ASIO Act*, ss 25(4)(d)(i) and 25A(4A)(c)(i); and 27D(2)(g)(i).

129 *ASIO Act*, ss 25(5)-(6); and 27D(2)(h)-(k) and 27D(6)-(7).

130 Cf proposed ss 25A(4)(ac) (item 5) and 27E(2)(da) (item 10) which authorise temporary removal for the purpose of doing any thing under subsection 25A(4) or 27E(2), which includes using a computer or other things to access relevant data under existing ss 24A(4)(a) and (ab) and 27E(2)(c) and (d).

131 The amendments made in items 5 and 10 of Schedule 2 to the Bill could create or enlarge doubt. It might be argued that the presence of an express reference to these activities as a purpose of removal in ss 25A and 27E, and the absence of an express reference in ss 25(4), 25(4A) and 27D(2), might evince an intention for the latter (search-related) powers to be interpreted differently.

132 *ASIO Act*, ss 25(6) and 27D(7) which apply specifically to acts done under ss 25(5) and 27D(2)(h)-(k). Cf ss 25A(5) and 27E(5) which apply to all of the acts authorised under ss 25A(4) and 27E(2).

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in connection with the exercise of the powers to **use** a computer, equipment or device (and no reference is made to the separate removal power).<sup>133</sup>

## **2.3 Concealment of acts or things done under a computer access warrant**

Schedule 2 to the Bill proposes further amendments to the *ASIO Act* to insert new subsections 25A(8), 27A(3C) and 27E(6).<sup>134</sup> These provisions authorise specified concealment activities at any time while the warrant is in force, and up to 28 days after its cessation (or at the earliest time that is reasonably practicable after that 28-day period).

In addition to authorising ASIO to do any thing that is reasonably necessary to conceal the doing of an act or thing under a warrant, the concealment-related powers include: entry to premises; the temporary removal and return of computers or other things from premises; the use of other computers or communications in transit; the interception of telecommunications; and other things reasonably incidental to these activities. There is no requirement for the Attorney-General to specifically authorise any or all of these concealment activities in individual warrants. Rather, all computer access warrants are taken to authorise these activities.

### **2.3.1 Interaction of existing concealment powers with the new concealment powers**

There appears to be uncertainty in the relationship between the proposed concealment powers in new subsections 25A(8) and 27E(6), and the existing concealment powers in paragraphs 25A(4)(c) and 27E(2)(f). The existing provisions enable the Attorney-General (or the Director-General in the case of section 27E) to authorise the doing of any thing that is reasonably necessary to conceal the fact that a thing has been done under the relevant warrant. Such activities must be specifically authorised in each warrant, and that authorisation is only in force for the duration of the warrant.

Consequently, there is overlap between the concealment activities that are authorised under new subsections 25A(8) and 27E(6) **while the warrant is in force**, and the concealment activities that may be authorised by the Attorney-General under existing paragraph 25A(4)(c) and the Director-General or the Attorney-General under existing 27E(2)(f) during the same period.

#### **Suggestion: removal of overlap of existing and new concealment powers**

As it is difficult to envisage how the two sets of provisions could operate concurrently, it may be simpler for existing paragraphs 25A(4)(c) and 27E(2)(f) to be repealed, so that concealment is governed solely by new subsections 25A(8) and 27E(6).

### **2.3.2 No limitation on concealment activities likely to cause ‘material interference’ or ‘material loss or damage’ to lawful computer users**

The concealment-related powers in new subsections 25A(8), 27A(3C) and 27E(6) do not appear to be subject to equivalent limitations and prohibitions to those in existing subsection 25A(5) (and corresponding provisions applying to sections 27A and 27E) in relation to acts that are likely to materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct the lawful use of a computer by any person; or cause material loss or damage to lawful users of a computer.

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133 *ASIO Act*, s 34(2)(b).

134 Items 7, 8 and 12.

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The limitations and prohibitions in subsection 25A(5) (and equivalent provisions in sections 27A and 27E) only apply to things that are **authorised under** subsection 25A(4) (and equivalents). Hence, the limitations in subsection 25A(5) would only apply to an authorised concealment activity during the life of the warrant that is authorised under existing paragraph 25A(4)(c), and incidental matters under paragraph 25A(4)(d). This gap may be unintended.

**Suggestion: an equivalent limitation on the concealment powers to that in s 25A(5)**

Consideration could be given to amending the concealment powers in new subsections 25A(8), 27A(3C) and 27E(6) to include an equivalent limiting provision to that in existing subsection 25A(5).

**2.3.3 Reporting on concealment activities carried out after the expiry of a warrant**

Item 16 of Schedule 2 amends the reporting requirement in section 34 of the *ASIO Act* to provide that actions taken under the concealment provisions in new subsections 25A(8), 27A(3C) and 27E(6) is taken to have been done under the relevant warrant (namely, the computer access, foreign intelligence or identified person warrant).

A reporting requirement on concealment activities that are undertaken after the expiry of the warrant will assist oversight of those activities. However, the consolidation of a reporting requirement for ‘post-warrant’ concealment activities with the requirement to report on activities undertaken **during** the period of the warrant may unintentionally create delay in the making of warrant reports. As there is no maximum period of time during which ‘post-warrant’ concealment activities may be carried out after the warrant has expired, it is possible that such activities may be undertaken a considerable period of time after the warrant has ceased to have effect.

**Suggestion: a separate reporting requirement for ‘post-warrant’ concealment activities**

To facilitate the timely provision of warrant reports under section 34, consideration could be given to the inclusion of separate reporting requirements for concealment activities that are carried out (or are continuing to be carried out) later than 28 days after the expiry of the warrant, in reliance on the post-warrant concealment powers in new subsection 28A(8), 27A(3C) or 27E(6), as applicable.<sup>135</sup>

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135 IGIS acknowledges that no separate reporting requirements currently apply to activities carried out under existing subsection 26B(5) to retrieve a surveillance device, and conceal the retrieval activity, after the expiry of the relevant surveillance device warrant. However, activities to conceal the retrieval of a surveillance device are of a materially different character to the activities involved in the concealment of access to a computer. The latter may require different actions, over time, to initially conceal and thereafter continue to conceal access.

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## 2.4 Disclosures of 'ASIO computer access intercept information' to IGIS

The Bill proposes to amend Part 2-6 of the *TIA Act* (permitted dealings with intercepted information) to create a new concept of 'ASIO computer access intercept information' that covers TI information obtained under a special powers warrant authorising computer access.<sup>136</sup>

The Bill proposes to amend paragraph 64(1)(a) of the *TIA Act* to exclude 'ASIO computer access intercept information' from the permitted uses and disclosures of intercept information in connection with ASIO's functions, and the performance by IGIS of her functions.<sup>137</sup>

The Bill also proposes to insert new section 63AC, which authorises permitted dealings with 'ASIO computer access intercept information'.<sup>138</sup> However, new section 63AC only prescribes permitted dealings in relation to 'ASIO computer access intercept information' for the purpose of doing things that are authorised by an ASIO computer access warrant, or in other prescribed circumstances, which are generally directed to security and safety related purposes. They **do not** cover the performance by IGIS of oversight functions.<sup>139</sup>

### 2.4.1 Possible unintended omission of an exception for disclosures to and by IGIS officials

IGIS assumes that this is an unintended result.<sup>140</sup> Its effect is to remove the **existing ability** of persons to make disclosures to IGIS officials under paragraph 64(1)(a) of intercept information that is currently obtained by ASIO under a TI warrant issued under the *TIA Act*. The proposed amendment of section 64 to exclude 'ASIO computer access intercept information' without including IGIS in new section 63AC would also have the effect of removing the lawful authority of IGIS officials to deal with and communicate that information to each other for the purpose of performing their oversight functions.

The basis for proposing this amendment is unclear. All that would change as a result of the proposed amendments to the *ASIO Act* in Schedule 2 to the Bill is that some of the information that is currently disclosed to, and by, IGIS officials under paragraph 64(1)(a) would be obtained by ASIO under a different type of warrant (namely, a computer access warrant under the *ASIO Act* rather than a TI warrant under the *TIA Act*).

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136 Schedule 2, item 124 (new s 63AC). See also item 120 (amendment to s 5(1) to insert a definition of 'ASIO computer access information' and 'ASIO computer access warrant').

137 Schedule 2, item 125,

138 Schedule 2, item 124.

139 New paragraphs 63AC(2)(d)-(i).

140 The Explanatory Memorandum states, at p. 122 at paragraph [687], that the amendment to section 64 is **intended** to prohibit the communication of, or other dealings with, ASIO computer access intercept information 'even if in connection with ... the performance of the IGIS of his or her functions'. It may be that the absence of a provision in new section 63AC enabling disclosures to, and by, IGIS officials is an unintended oversight in the drafting of that section. However, if there is an intention to prohibit the disclosure of 'computer access intercept information' to, and by, IGIS officials, this would severely impede IGIS's ability to conduct meaningful oversight of ASIO's actions under computer access warrants. IGIS would oppose such an attempt.

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Suggestion: restore the explicit authorisation for disclosures to, and by, IGIS officials

IGIS seeks the inclusion of an exception in new section 63AC for disclosures of that information to, and by, IGIS officials for the purpose of those officials performing their functions and duties and exercising their powers as IGIS officials (and the coverage of related dealings for the aforementioned purpose).

#### 2.4.2 *The need for an exception for disclosures to and by IGIS officials*

It is essential to the ability of IGIS to conduct oversight of ASIO's interception and related activities that the *TIA Act* continues to provide a clear exception for the voluntary disclosure of **all forms** of intercept information (however described) to, and by, IGIS officials for the purpose of those officials performing their functions or duties and exercising their powers as IGIS officials.

As the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill notes, 'it is almost always necessary for ASIO to undertake limited interception for the purpose of executing a computer access warrant'.<sup>141</sup> The Human Rights Statement of Compatibility in the Explanatory Memorandum also identifies IGIS oversight of ASIO's computer access warrants as a key safeguard to ensure that the new powers authorised under those warrants are 'exercised lawfully, with propriety, and with respect for human rights'.<sup>142</sup>

IGIS could not effectively oversee ASIO's warrant-based computer access activities without the ability to obtain, deal with and communicate the intercept information to be covered by the new concept of 'ASIO computer access warrant information'.

### Schedule 5—Other amendments to the ASIO Act

#### 5.1 Civil immunity for giving voluntary assistance to ASIO: new s 21A(1)

Schedule 5 to the Bill proposes to insert new section 21A in the *ASIO Act*.<sup>143</sup> New subsection 21A(1) would confer an immunity from civil liability on persons or bodies who render voluntary assistance to ASIO in accordance with a request by the Director-General of Security, or a senior position-holder to whom the Director-General has delegated the power under new subsection 16(1A).<sup>144</sup>

##### 5.1.1 Legal effect

The establishment of a model of internal authorisation for the conferral of civil immunities on persons who voluntarily assist ASIO to perform any of its functions is a significant departure from the existing process for granting statutory immunities to such persons.

Currently, only the Attorney-General may confer a civil immunity on participants in a special intelligence operation (SIO) by granting an authority for such an operation under Division 4 of Part III of the *ASIO Act*. This enlivens a statutory immunity (from both civil and criminal liability) for authorised participants who engage in authorised conduct.

141 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 15 at paragraph [51] and p. 80 at paragraph [352].

142 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 16 at paragraph [61].

143 Schedule 5, item 2.

144 Schedule 5, item 1.

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The Attorney-General must specifically authorise an operation as an SIO, the relevant conduct to be undertaken in that operation, and the participants.<sup>145</sup> SIOs may only be authorised in relation to a sub-set of ASIO's statutory functions.<sup>146</sup> The issuing criteria include matters directed to an assessment of the proportionality of the relevant conduct sought to be authorised, which do not have an equivalent in new subsection 21A(1).<sup>147</sup>

Importantly, the SIO scheme also requires ASIO to notify the IGIS as soon as practicable when an operation is authorised, and to report periodically to the IGIS (and Attorney-General) on the conduct of those operations.<sup>148</sup> These requirements ensure that IGIS has visibility of the circumstances in which immunities from legal liability are conferred and applied, which facilitates oversight. The civil immunity scheme in new subsection 21A(1) does not contain equivalent requirements to give IGIS visibility of the exercise of the new power to confer immunities, which may limit the practical capacity of IGIS to perform effective oversight.<sup>149</sup>

### 5.1.2 Thresholds for conferring immunity

New paragraph 21A(1)(b) enlivens an immunity from civil liability for a person or body who provides voluntary assistance to ASIO if the Director-General (or delegate) is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that the conduct specified in a request is likely to assist ASIO in the performance of its functions.

This threshold is broad, in that it is capable of covering:

- acts that are likely to yield only minor or peripheral assistance to ASIO in the performance of **any** of its functions (as well as acts that are likely to yield a substantial degree of assistance in the performance of functions, including assistance that is critical to identifying and responding to security threats that may not otherwise be possible without that assistance); and
- assistance that consists of **the performance of one or more of ASIO's functions**, such as the collection of intelligence under subsection 17(1)(a), or **the performance of services for ASIO** that in some way helps ASIO in the performance of its functions. This would seem to make it possible for assistance requests under new subsection 21A(1) to be utilised as a basis upon which persons become 'ASIO affiliates' within the meaning of that term in section 4 of the *ASIO Act*. (For example, sources and members of other Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities that are cooperating with ASIO.)<sup>150</sup> If ASIO were to adopt a practice of using new

145 *ASIO Act*, subsection 35D(1).

146 *ASIO Act*, subsection 35D(1)(a) ('special intelligence functions').

147 *ASIO Act*, subsection 35C(2).

148 *ASIO Act*, sections 35PA and 35Q.

149 As explained at **[5.1.8] below**, IGIS supports the inclusion of notification and reporting requirements.

150 That is, a request made under subsection 21A(1) could be taken to be an 'arrangement' between the person and ASIO for the performance of functions or services for ASIO. (IGIS also notes that there may be some uncertainty as to whether a person who is **already** in a contract or legally binding agreement with ASIO for the provision of assistance could be covered by a request made under subsection 21A(1) in respect of the services that are the subject of the contract or agreement. As that person would be under a legal obligation to perform the services, they might not be taken to be rendering the assistance voluntarily, or in accordance with a request. However, that would not seem to prevent a pre-existing contract from being terminated and replaced by a request made under new subsection 21A(1) and supported with a new contract or agreement in relation to the conduct covered by the request under new subsection 21A(4).)

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subsection 21A(1) as the means by which persons become ASIO affiliates, the result would be that civil immunity could be conferred on a very broad class of persons.

The breadth of the civil immunity conferred under new subsection 21A(1) raises several implications for oversight by IGIS of the legality and propriety of ASIO's decision-making about making requests for assistance, particularly with respect to the assessment of proportionality (as discussed below).

***Oversight of proportionality related considerations***

There is no statutory requirement for the Director-General or delegate to consider, and be satisfied of, the proportionality or reasonableness of any immunity from civil liability in order to make a request under subsection 21A(1).

**Suggestion: a proportionality based condition for the making of requests**

As with the above comments on Schedule 1 in relation to technical assistance requests, IGIS would support the inclusion of a proportionality based assessment in the statutory conditions for making a request under new subsection 21A(1), or in the *Minister's Guidelines to ASIO*. This would provide clear standards against which IGIS could conduct oversight of ASIO's decision-making.

**5.1.3 Uncertainty in the coverage of conduct causing 'pure economic loss'**

The immunity from civil liability is subject to some limitations, including a limitation in new paragraph 21A(1)(e) for conduct that results in significant loss of, or serious damage to, property. However, it is not clear if the concept of 'significant loss of property' would cover, or is intended to cover, so-called 'pure economic loss' sustained by a third party, which is caused by a person's conduct in accordance with a request to assist ASIO under new subsection 21A(1). Examples of this type of loss include loss of income, and decrease in the market value of property.

If conduct causing significant 'pure economic loss' is not covered by the limitation on the civil immunity in new paragraph 21A(1)(e), third parties may be deprived of a right to a legal remedy in respect of such loss. The reasons for an absence of an equivalent protection in relation to significant economic loss as for significant loss of or damage to property are not readily apparent.

It is possible that a person who suffers such loss may complain to IGIS, if they were to become aware of the reasons for their loss of their right to a legal remedy. It is open to IGIS to recommend the payment of compensation to a person who suffers harm or sustains damage as result of the actions of an intelligence agency, and to recommend the cessation or modification of the form of assistance requested by ASIO that caused the loss.<sup>151</sup> However, an advisory recommendation is clearly of lesser value to an aggrieved person than a legally enforceable remedy.

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151 *IGIS Act*, paragraph 22(2)(b). IGIS also notes that the task of quantifying such loss would be complex.



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**Suggestion: an explicit statutory exclusion**

To ensure clarity in the scope of the immunity, IGIS would support consideration of an explicit exclusion of conduct causing significant economic or financial loss.

As further suggested at **[5.1.8] below**, IGIS would also support reporting and notification requirements in relation to the use of the immunity.

**5.1.4 No exclusion of conduct causing physical or mental harm or injury**

There is no exclusion from the civil immunity for conduct that causes physical or mental harm or injury to another person. While new paragraph 21A(1)(d) excludes conduct that would involve the commission of an offence against a Commonwealth, State or Territory law, not all conduct that causes injury or harm is an offence, particularly conduct that would constitute the tort of negligence.

As with the above comments on 'pure economic loss', this may be a source of complaints to IGIS. However, in the absence of statutory notification or reporting obligations on ASIO, it would be difficult for IGIS to consistently identify those instances in which actions done in accordance with a request under new subsection 21A(1) caused harm or injury to another person, who is deprived of a legally enforceable right to a civil remedy.

**Suggestion: an explicit statutory exclusion**

IGIS supports consideration of an explicit statutory exclusion of such conduct from the immunity, as well as reporting and notification requirements suggested at **[5.1.8] below**.

**5.1.5 Relationship with ASIO warrants and statutory authorisations**

New subsection 21A(1) does not expressly exclude conduct that would require ASIO to obtain a warrant (or another form of authorisation) to undertake itself. This raises questions about how requests made under subsection 21A(1) will interact with existing warrant or authorisation requirements. IGIS would support clarification of the intended interaction.

***Relationship with ASIO warrants***

As a primary purpose of ASIO's special powers warrants is to provide lawful authority for activities that would otherwise constitute an offence, the above matter is managed substantially (but not entirely) by the limitation on the civil immunity in new paragraph 21A(1)(d) for conduct that involves the commission of an offence against a Commonwealth, State or Territory law.

However, not all of the conduct for which ASIO would require a warrant to undertake itself is **necessarily** an offence if it is undertaken by another person. For example, it may be that the Director-General makes a request of a person (*the first mentioned person*) to access data held in a computer that the first-mentioned person lawfully uses, or to obtain physical things in a house at which the first-mentioned person lawfully resides. It may be that the relevant data or things belong to, or are jointly owned or used by, another person who is of security interest to ASIO (*the second-mentioned person*). It may be that the first-mentioned person commits no criminal offence in accessing the data or things and giving them to ASIO, even if they may have otherwise been exposed to civil liability for doing so.

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If ASIO sought to obtain the relevant data directly from the computer or thing on the premises, it would require authorisation under a special powers warrant (such as a search warrant, a computer access warrant or an identified person warrant) to obtain the relevant data or thing. If the first-mentioned person was assisting ASIO in the conduct of a warrant operation that person would require authorisation under section 24 of the *ASIO Act* to exercise authority under the warrant.

*Relationship with other authorisation requirements*

Similarly, if ASIO sought to obtain foreign intelligence, the collection of which would not require a warrant under section 27A but would require an authorisation from the Attorney-General under section 27B, the question arises as to whether it could effectively bypass the requirements of the latter provision by requesting assistance from **another person or body** under new subsection 21A(1) in the form of undertaking a collection activity. The limitation in new paragraph 21A(1)(d) for conduct constituting an offence would not provide a limitation in these circumstances, because the collection activities requiring authorisation under section 27B are those that do not constitute offences.

A similar question arises in relation to the interaction of new subsection 21A(1) with the SIO scheme in Division 4 of Part III of the *ASIO Act* to the extent it involves the conferral of civil immunity in relation to particular ‘special intelligence conduct’ that does not involve the commission of an offence. SIOs are subject to considerably higher issuing thresholds and levels of approval than the requirements under new subsection 21A(1).

**Suggestion: an express limitation on the power to make s 21A(1) requests**

If there is no intention for new subsection 21A(1) to effectively bypass requirements for ASIO to obtain special powers warrants (or a Ministerial authorisation under section 27B, Division 4 of Part III or any other law requiring an authorisation to engage in conduct that is not otherwise an offence) then it would be desirable for the Bill to include a further limitation in new subsection 21A(1).

This could be to the effect that new subsection 21A(1) does not apply to requests for persons to engage in conduct for which ASIO would require a warrant (or another form of Ministerial authorisation or approval) to undertake.

**5.1.6 Relationship with technical assistance requests**

The request-based immunity scheme in new subsection 21A(1) of the *ASIO Act* appears capable of covering the same circumstances in which ASIO could make a technical assistance request of a communications provider under new section 317G of the *Telecommunications Act* (in Schedule 1 to the Bill). However, the latter scheme includes more conditions and limitations. These include: limitations on making oral requests;<sup>152</sup> a ‘default’ 90-day period of effect for requests if no expiry date is specified (which IGIS has suggested at [1.3.1] above be replaced with a statutory maximum);<sup>153</sup> and express provisions governing variation.<sup>154</sup>

152 New subsection 317H(2).

153 New paragraph 317HA(1)(b). See also new section 317J (request for performance in a specific period, and on specified conditions) and the discussion at [1.3.1] of this submission.

154 New section 317AJ (including limitations on oral variations corresponding to those in new s 317HA).

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**Suggestion: statutory clarification of interaction of s 21A(1) with technical assistance requests**

In the absence of provisions in the *ASIO Act* that exclude conduct that could be the subject of a technical assistance request from the voluntary assistance scheme in new subsection 21A(1), ASIO would effectively have a choice of civil immunity schemes. IGIS would support statutory clarification of the relationship between new subsection 21A(1) and technical assistance requests.

**5.1.7 Period of effect of requests**

Requests made under new subsection 21A(1) and the resultant immunity from civil liability are not subject to a statutory maximum period of effect. This is in contrast to SIOs, which are limited to 12 months and can only be ‘renewed’ through the making of a request for a new authorisation for the relevant activities.<sup>155</sup> It is also in contrast to the ‘default’ maximum period of 90 days for technical assistance requests under new subsection 317HA of the *Telecommunications Act*. (As noted at [1.3.1] above, IGIS supports the imposition of a fixed statutory maximum period of effect for technical assistance requests, which sets the outer limit of any period of effect that may be specified by the decision maker, as well as any ‘default’ period that applies if no expiry date is specified.)

**Suggestion: a statutory maximum period of effect**

Oversight would be enhanced by the inclusion of a statutory maximum period of effect, preferably aligned with that applying to technical assistance requests in Schedule 1 to the Bill (which IGIS has suggested could be 90 days, consistent with the current ‘default’ maximum period of effect).<sup>156</sup>

The practical effect of a statutory maximum period of effect would be that the Director-General or delegate would need to undertake periodic reviews of requests to determine whether they should continue (via the making of a new request, subject to the relevant conditions being met).

**Further suggestion: statutory clarification of the application of s 21A(1) to ‘standing assistance’**

Further, it is not clear whether a request made under new subsection 21A(1) can only cover, and therefore immunise, a **single instance** of the specified conduct; or whether subsection 21A(1) may also authorise the making of **‘standing requests’** that cover the repetition of the relevant conduct on multiple occasions (whether ‘on-call’ by ASIO, or ‘at-will’ by the relevant person, or a combination). Such ambiguity may make oversight more difficult.

As with the earlier comments on new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* in Schedule 1 to the Bill, the making of a ‘standing request’ would also be relevant to an assessment of the proportionality of ASIO’s decision to make a request, and any terms or conditions specified in that request.

155 *ASIO Act*, paragraph 35D(1)(d).

156 *Telecommunications Act*, new paragraph 317HA(1)(b). See also: [1.3.1] above.

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### 5.1.8 Procedural provisions

A number of procedural aspects of the power in new subsection 21A(1) may add complexity to oversight by IGIS. These matters concern: the making of oral requests; the content of requests; the legal basis for the variation and revocation of requests; and limitations in the extent to which IGIS may have visibility of the circumstances in which new subsection 21A(1) is applied and the immunity is enlivened.

#### *Oral requests*

New subsection 21A(2) provides that requests under new subsection 21A(1) may be made orally or in writing. There are no statutory limitations on the circumstances in which oral requests may be made, such as a reasonable belief that it would be impracticable to make the request in writing because of circumstances of urgency. This is in contrast with the proposed requirements applying to technical assistance requests given by in new subsection 317H(2) of the *Telecommunications Act*, which limit oral requests to circumstances in which there is an imminent risk of serious harm to a person or a substantial risk of property damage, and it is not practicable to make a written request.

While there is a requirement in new subsection 21A(3) for the Director-General or delegate to make a written record of an oral request within 48 hours of the oral request, there is no requirement for a copy of that record to be given to the person whose assistance has been requested orally. This is also in contrast with the requirements for technical assistance requests and notices given by ASIO under new subsections 317H(4) and 317M(4) of the *Telecommunications Act*, which requires a copy of the written record to be provided as soon as practicable. This may leave doubt for the person as to the limits of their civil immunity, especially if the terms of an oral request for assistance are complex.

#### *Suggestion: statutory conditions for the making of oral requests*

As a matter of propriety, IGIS would expect that requests are generally made in writing, and that also copies of written records made of any oral requests are provided as soon as practicable to the persons to whom requests are made.

However, the inclusion of these matters as statutory requirements (consistent with the requirements applying to technical assistance requests) would assist in the oversight of actions taken under new subsection 21A(1).

#### *Content of requests*

New subsection 21A(1) is not subject to an equivalent requirement to that in new subsection 317HAA(1) of the *Telecommunications Act*, which will require the Director-General to inform a designated communications provider that compliance with a technical assistance request is voluntary.

#### *Suggestion: statutory requirement to advise a person that compliance is voluntary*

The inclusion of an equivalent requirement in new subsection 21A(1) of the *ASIO Act* would be beneficial in ensuring that persons and bodies subject to such requests are clearly informed of their legal position. IGIS would oversee ASIO's compliance with that legal requirement.

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### *Variation and revocation of requests*

New section 21A does not make provision for the variation or revocation of requests for assistance, in contrast to the detailed requirements applying to technical assistance requests and notices in new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* in Schedule 1 to the Bill.

This may reflect an intention to rely on subsection 33(3) of the *Acts Interpretation Act*, which provides that a power to make an instrument includes the power to vary or revoke the instrument (in the like manner and subject to like conditions, if any, for the making of the instrument). However, while it might possibly be arguable that a written request made under subsection 21A(1) could be an ‘an instrument of an administrative character’ for the purpose of subsection 33(3) of the *Acts Interpretation Act*, a written record of an oral request may not be.<sup>157</sup>

#### *Suggestion: clarification of existence, source and scope of variation power*

IGIS would be assisted by clarification of the intended source of a power to vary or revoke subsection 21A(1) requests.

Further, if new subsection 21A(1) is amended to include an explicit power of variation as well as a maximum period of effect (as suggested above) then IGIS would support an express limitation on the power to vary a request by extending its period of effect. This limitation would prohibit a request from being varied to extend or further extend the cumulative period of effect beyond the statutory maximum.

### *Reporting and notification requirements*

The discretion to confer an immunity from legal liability is a significant power, having particular regard to the potential impacts of that immunity on third parties, who may be deprived of legal remedies for major loss, damage, injury or other harm. The conferral of such a power on members of an intelligence agency, rather than a Minister, is a significant devolution of this power.

Independent oversight by IGIS of the exercise of powers under new subsection 21A(1) would be significantly assisted by a requirement for ASIO to notify IGIS when the power is exercised, and to report periodically to IGIS on the use of that provision.

IGIS considers that the existing notification and reporting requirements in sections 35PA and 35Q of the *ASIO Act* for special intelligence operations are equally important for the oversight of acts that enliven the immunity for civil liability under that scheme as for acts that enliven the immunity for criminal liability. Accordingly, and in view of the proposed devolution of power to intelligence officials, IGIS would support equivalent types of notification and reporting requirements in relation to new subsection 21A(1).

#### *Suggestion: statutory reporting and notification requirements to IGIS*

Periodic reporting requirements could also be extended to the ASIO Minister and Attorney-General, and would usefully require the following information to be provided:

- statistical information on the use of the provision in the relevant period (perhaps annually);

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157 *Laurence v Chief of Navy* (2004) 139 FCR 555 at 558 (Wilcox J).

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- the types of assistance provided under section 21A (perhaps focusing on identifying significant assistance); and
- instances that are known to ASIO (if any) in which a person engaged in conduct to assist ASIO in the performance of its functions that caused significant loss of, or serious damage to, property, or other conduct that is excluded from the immunity such as the commission of an offence (and the quantum of loss if known, or an estimated quantum).

### *Oversight of the actions of persons providing assistance to ASIO*

If a person is requested under new subsection 21A(1) to provide assistance to ASIO that comprises the actual performance of certain of ASIO's statutory functions, then the person is likely to become an 'ASIO affiliate' within the meaning of section 4 of the *ASIO Act*. Depending on the circumstances, that person may also be taken to be a 'member' of ASIO for the purpose of the *IGIS Act*. In this event, the actions of that person in providing the assistance requested under new subsection 21A(1) would be taken to be those of ASIO, and directly subject to IGIS oversight.

This would require more complex oversight arrangements in relation to the person's actions in providing the relevant assistance, as well as in relation to any 'secondary use' that may be made of the person's status as an 'ASIO affiliate' while they are rendering assistance to ASIO. (Namely, their potential authorisation to exercise certain powers under the *ASIO Act* or other legislation including the *TIA Act*.) It may be appropriate that such persons are informed by ASIO of their status as an 'ASIO affiliate' as well as their obligations to cooperate with IGIS.

## **5.2 The compulsory provision of assistance to ASIO: new section 34AAA**

New section 34AAA of the *ASIO Act* would confer a power on the Attorney-General to compel a person to provide information or assistance to ASIO that is 'reasonable and necessary' to enable ASIO to access, copy or convert data held in, or accessible from, certain computers or data storage devices. Namely, computers or data storage devices that:

- have been, or will be, accessed under various special powers warrants including computer access, search and surveillance warrants; or
- have been found and seized during the search of a person who is detained under a questioning warrant or a questioning and detention warrant.<sup>158</sup>

The requirements for the making of orders under new section 34AAA are modelled broadly on those applying to the making of orders to assist law enforcement agencies under existing section 3LA of the *Crimes Act 1914* in connection with search warrants issued under that Act. Some modifications are applied to reflect ASIO's specific functions. These include the conferral of the power to make orders upon the Attorney-General rather than a judicial officer; and differences in the purposes for which, and persons in relation to whom, orders may be made.

Given the coercive nature of orders made under new section 34AAA, IGIS is likely to pay close attention to ASIO's actions in requesting and executing those orders. There are some features of the proposed scheme (outlined below) that will make oversight difficult, and could be addressed with some targeted amendments.

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158 New subsection 34AAA(1), Schedule 5, item 3.

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### 5.2.1 Persons in relation to whom orders may be made

New paragraph 34AAA(2)(c) authorises the making of an order in relation to a specified person who:

- has some kind of link with the computer or device, as set out in new subparagraphs 34AAA(2)(c)(ii)-(vi); or
- is reasonably suspected of being involved in activities that are prejudicial to security, as set out in new subparagraph 34AAA(2)(c)(i).

#### *Coverage of legal persons*

It is unclear whether there is an intention for the definition of a 'person' in section 2C of the *Acts Interpretation Act* to apply to the 'specified persons' in new paragraph 34AAA(2)(c) and thereby cover legal persons (particularly bodies corporate) in addition to natural persons, especially with respect to the specified persons in subparagraph 34AAA(2)(c)(i). That is:

- Is it intended that an individual officer of a body corporate (or possibly an official of a body politic) could be the subject of an order under new section 34AAA, on the basis that the body corporate or body politic is reasonably suspected of being involved in prejudicial activities?
- If so, must the order identify a **particular member** of the body corporate (or body politic) to render the specified assistance?
- If so, could that individual be **any member** of the body corporate (or body politic), even if the named individual personally had no involvement in the prejudicial activity?

#### *Suggestion: clarification of the intended application to legal persons*

Clarification of the intended application, desirably in the provisions of the Bill, would remove potential ambiguity and assist with the oversight of ASIO's requests for orders and their execution.

#### *Persons 'involved in' activities that are prejudicial to security*

IGIS considers that the threshold in new subparagraph 34AAA(2)(c)(i) that a person is reasonably suspected of being '**involved in**' activities that are prejudicial to security is quite low, since there is no requirement for the person to be **knowingly or intentionally** involved in those activities. This raises the possibility that a person might be taken to be 'involved in' prejudicial activities because:

- the person is a conduit through which another person is acting, and their involvement may be unintentional and potentially unknown to them; or
- the person may provide products or services to another person that enable the other person to engage in prejudicial activities. The first-mentioned person may have no knowledge of the use to which their products or services are put by the second-mentioned person.

Further, new subparagraph 34AAA(2)(c)(i) does not require there to be any nexus between the prejudicial activities (or suspected prejudicial activities) in which the specified person is involved, and the security matter in respect of which the relevant warrant is issued.

This would appear to make it possible for an order to be sought and issued in relation to a person who is suspected to be involved in prejudicial activities (including unknowingly) that are **wholly unrelated** to the particular warrant operation, but that person is believed to possess technical



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expertise in computer access and network exploitation that could be utilised to access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device that is the subject of the warrant. (In contrast, the corresponding provision in existing subparagraph 3LA(2)(b)(i) of the *Crimes Act* for law enforcement orders requires the issuing magistrate to be satisfied that the person specified in the order is ‘reasonably suspected of having committed the offence stated in the relevant warrant’.)

**Suggestion: clarification of intended application**

This broader application of new section 34AAA of the *ASIO Act* may be unintended, noting that the justification given in the Explanatory Memorandum refers to the use of orders to compel ‘**a target or the target’s associate**’ to render assistance such as the provision of ‘a password, pin code, sequence or fingerprint necessary to unlock a phone’ (emphasis added).<sup>159</sup>

If a narrower application is intended, it may be desirable for new subparagraph 34AAA(2)(c)(i) to be clearly limited to persons who are involved in prejudicial activities that relate to the **same** security matter in respect of which the warrant mentioned in new subsection 34AAA(1) is issued.

**Oversight implications if a broader application is intended**

However, if a broader application is intended, IGIS is likely to scrutinise closely the basis upon which ASIO has identified (and explained in its request to the Attorney-General) that the specified person possesses the relevant knowledge under new paragraph 34AAA(2)(d); and the proportionality of a request for an authorisation to exercise coercive powers against that person, in line with paragraph 10.4(a) of the current *ASIO Guidelines*. (In considering matters of proportionality, IGIS will take into account the basis upon which the person is said to be ‘involved in’ prejudicial activities, and whether those prejudicial activities are the same as the security matter in the relevant warrant.)

**5.2.2 Assistance that may be compelled under an order**

New subsection 34AAA(3) contains a number of procedural requirements that apply if the relevant computer or data storage device **is not** on premises in relation to which a warrant is in force. These requirements include: the specification of the period of time in which the person must provide information or assistance and the place at which they must do so;<sup>160</sup> and any other conditions determined by the Attorney-General.<sup>161</sup>

It is not clear why the requirements in new subsection 34AAA(3) are limited to circumstances in which a computer or data storage device is not on warrant premises.

There may conceivably be circumstances in which a computer or data storage device physically remains on the warrant premises while the warrant is in force (and after the warrant ceases to be in force) but the conditions specified in new subsection 34AAA(3) would be equally important to provide certainty and transparency about the scope and limits of authority under the order, and a clear basis for IGIS to conduct oversight of ASIO’s actions under the order.

159 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 143 at paragraph [877].

160 New paragraphs 34AAA(3)(a) and (b).

161 New paragraph 34AAA(3)(c).

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For example, the requirement in new subsection 34AAA(3) for an assistance order to specify conditions would not seem to have any application if:

- ASIO accesses a computer remotely under a computer access warrant; or
- ASIO accesses premises under a computer access warrant or a search warrant, and data is copied from a computer on those premises without any removal of that computer, and an order is issued to require a person to provide assistance in making that data accessible to ASIO in an intelligible form (for example, applying decryption or removing other forms of protection); or
- an order is issued to require a person to provide information to ASIO while a warrant is in force but before it is executed, so that ASIO can use the information to access relevant data from a computer or data storage device during the warrant operation.

**Suggestion: application of s 34AAA(3) requirements to all orders**

Given the importance of the conditions specified in new subsection 34AAA(3) to the scope and limits of authority under an order, IGIS considers that those conditions should apply to all orders, irrespective of the physical location of a computer that is accessed under the related warrant.

**5.2.3 Requirements relating to form, record-keeping, discontinuance and destruction**

Orders made under new section 34AAA are not subject to equivalent requirements to those which apply to the underlying warrant in sections 30, 31 and 32 of the *ASIO Act*. The application of equivalent statutory parameters to new section 34AAA would assist oversight, since these orders operate in combination with special powers warrants. Specifically, existing sections 30, 31 and 32 impose requirements in relation to the matters outlined below.

***The form in which requests are made***

Existing subsection 32(1) imposes an obligation on the Director-General in the event a warrant is requested orally. Such a request must be followed with a written request. In contrast, new section 34AAA is silent about the form which orders or requests for orders must be made (for example, in writing or orally in defined circumstances).

**Suggestion: an equivalent to subsection 32(1)**

In the experience of IGIS, statutory form requirements are a valuable means of promoting consistent record-keeping practices. IGIS therefore supports an equivalent requirement to that in s 32(1).

***Record-keeping requirements***

Existing subsection 32(4) requires the Director-General to keep a record of all warrants issued and revoked by the Attorney-General, and all requests for warrants.

**Suggestion: an equivalent requirement to s 32(4)**

New section 34AAA does not prescribe any record-keeping requirements, which may make it difficult for IGIS to correlate section 34AAA orders with the underlying warrant. IGIS would be assisted by an equivalent requirement.

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### *Obligation to discontinue action before expiration of warrant and notify Attorney-General*

Existing section 30 imposes obligations on the Director-General if he or she becomes satisfied that the grounds on which a warrant was issued cease to exist while the warrant is in force. The Director-General must, as soon as practicable, notify the Attorney-General and take such steps as are necessary to ensure that action taken under the warrant is discontinued.

#### *Suggestion: an equivalent requirement to section 30*

New section 34AAA contains no equivalent requirement if the Director-General becomes satisfied that the grounds for issuing an order cease to exist during its period of effect. Consideration might also be given to extending the requirement applying to warrants under existing section 30 to related section 34AAA orders.

### *Secondary use and destruction of certain records of information obtained under a warrant*

Existing section 31 requires the Director-General to cause the destruction of records or copies of information obtained under a warrant, if satisfied that the record or copy is not required for the performance of functions or the exercise of powers under the *ASIO Act*.

Information obtained under a section 34AAA order is not obtained under a special powers warrant, but rather an ancillary order to such a warrant. Consequently, such information is not subject to the destruction obligation in existing section 31, nor any specific limitations on its secondary use. Significantly, section 34AAA orders could involve the collection of sensitive information, including personal information. For example, the Explanatory Memorandum expressly contemplates that this could include biometric information, such as a person's fingerprints, where necessary to gain access to a computer through a biometric identification system.<sup>162</sup>

#### *Suggestion: consideration of an equivalent requirement to section 31*

IGIS would support consideration of statutory requirements, and supporting guidance in the *Minister's Guidelines to ASIO*, in relation to the retention, destruction, handling and secondary use of information obtained under a section 34AAA order, particularly any biometric information.

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162 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 143 at paragraph [877].

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#### 5.2.4 Notification and service of orders

New section 34AAA does not contain a requirement for an order to be served on the specified person. Nor does it prescribe the date of service as the earliest commencement date for any ‘compliance period’ within which a person may be required to provide information or assistance under an order. This contrasts with the provisions of new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act* governing the duration and compliance period in relation to technical assistance requests, and technical assistance and capability notices.<sup>163</sup>

##### Suggestion: statutory notification or service requirements

As a matter of propriety, IGIS would expect that orders are served on the specified person; that ASIO’s requests for orders suggest a condition that any ‘compliance period’ commences from either the date of service or a later date as specified; and that the duration of any suggested compliance period is reasonable in all of the circumstances. However, given the coercive nature of orders under section 34AAA it may be preferable for these matters to be prescribed as legislative requirements.

#### 5.2.5 Possibility that a person attending under an order may be taken to be in detention

There is a question as to whether a person who is required to attend a place to provide information or assistance to ASIO under a section 34AAA order may be subject to a form of detention; and if so, whether there are adequate safeguards in new section 34AAA.

These questions may arise if the person is led to believe that they are not free to leave the place of attendance if they sought to do so. For example, due to the physical obstruction of exit points; or an indication to the person that they would, or may, be arrested on suspicion of the offence in new subsection 34AAA(4) if they attempted to leave without attempting to provide the assistance or information.<sup>164</sup> The risk that a person may be taken to be in detention by attending a place in compliance with an order may also arise due to the absence of statutory maximum time periods for attendance.<sup>165</sup>

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163 New sections 317HA and 317J (technical assistance requests); 317MA and 317N (technical assistance notices); and 317TA and 317U (technical capability notices). See also, new s 317ZL (service of technical assistance and capability notices).

164 See, for example: United Nations Human Rights Committee, [General Comment No. 35 Article 9 \(Liberty and Security of the Person\)](#), 112th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014) at [5]-[6].

165 If a person is taken to be in detention, or otherwise deprived of their liberty while in attendance under a notice, there is also a question as to whether the deprivation of liberty is arbitrary. In this regard, IGIS notes that some aspects of proposed section 34AAA may create a risk that orders may be issued or executed in a way that a person is arbitrarily detained or deprived of liberty. In particular, orders can be issued in relation to persons who may not have had any involvement, or knowing involvement, in activities prejudicial to security; and in relation to persons who have been involved in prejudicial activities that are wholly unconnected with the relevant warrant, but are thought to possess relevant technical expertise.

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**Suggestion: consideration of whether further statutory safeguards are needed**

IGIS will pay close attention to the proposed terms of an order sought by ASIO, in assessing whether the information and assistance sought is 'reasonable and necessary' as required by new subsection 34AAA(1). However, consideration might be given to whether the *ASIO Act* or the *Minister's Guidelines* should include further safeguards, including against the risk of arbitrary deprivation of liberty in connection with section 34AAA.

IGIS notes that section 3LA of the *Crimes Act* does not make specific provision for the fact that a person who is the subject of an assistance order under that provision might be taken to be in detention. However, an important distinction is that those orders are issued by a judicial officer rather than a Minister.

**5.2.6 Interaction of section 34AAA orders with other coercive powers**

There is also a question of how a requirement for a person to attend a place and provide information or assistance under a section 34AAA order may interact with ASIO's compulsory questioning and detention powers under Division 3 of Part III of the *ASIO Act*, or technical assistance notices issued by ASIO under the proposed amendments to the *Telecommunications Act* in Schedule 1 to the Bill.

***Concurrent operation of section 34AAA orders with questioning and detention warrants***

New paragraph 34AAA(1)(a)(ix) enables orders to be issued to compel assistance **or information** in relation to accessing data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device that has been seized under section 34ZB during a search of a person being detained under a questioning warrant or a questioning and detention warrant.

In particular, if a device is seized under section 34ZB, could the person then be required to comply with an order under section 34AAA while the questioning warrant or questioning and detention warrant is in force? (For instance during a break in questioning under the warrant?) If so, complex questions may arise about the interaction of the two schemes, including the legal basis for the presence and role of the IGIS while the section 34AAA order is being executed (noting that the specific provisions of Division 3 of Part III of the *ASIO Act* would not apply to new section 34AAA). Neither the Bill nor the Explanatory Memorandum address this scenario.

**Suggestion: statutory clarification of the interaction of s 34AAA with questioning and detention**

IGIS supports clarification of the intended operation of orders under new section 34AAA in relation to persons who are being detained under a questioning or questioning and detention order.

***Potential for the exercise of multiple coercive powers against a person***

Issues of potential oppression may also arise as a result of the exercise of multiple coercive powers in relation to a person to obtain the same or substantially similar information.

For example, there is the possibility that ASIO may exercise coercive powers to require a person to provide their access credentials to a computer a section 34AAA order; and subsequently under a questioning warrant, or if the person is a communications provider, under a technical assistance notice issued by ASIO. There is also the possibility that ASIO may exercise coercive powers to obtain

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such information from a target who is also under investigation by law enforcement agencies, and is or was subject to coercive powers exercised by those agencies (for example, under section 3LA of the *Crimes Act*).

In examining ASIO's requests to the Attorney-General for the making of section 34AAA orders (and its requests for the issuing of questioning warrants or questioning and detention warrants, or the issuing of technical assistance notices), IGIS is likely to examine evidence of ASIO's consideration of whether the person has been subject to requests for authorisations to exercise other coercive powers in relation to the same or a substantially similar matter, and if so, the reasons for which a further request is being made.

IGIS also would also consider whether the Attorney-General has been specifically informed of the exercise, or potential exercise, of multiple coercive powers against a person in all requests for authorisations to exercise coercive powers made by ASIO.

**Suggestion: statutory requirements for requests to the Attorney-General under s 34AAA**

IGIS would support a statutory requirement for ASIO to include in all requests made to the Attorney-General for orders under section 34AAA information about previous orders and requests for orders in relation to a person, consistent with the requirements applying to requests for questioning warrants under existing section 34D.

### 5.2.7 Reporting requirements

The Bill does not impose any specific Ministerial reporting requirements on ASIO in relation to orders made under section 34AAA. The Ministerial reporting requirements under existing section 34 (special powers warrants) and 34ZH (questioning warrants and questioning and detention warrants) are expressly limited to 'action taken under the warrant' and therefore would not cover action taken under a section 34AAA order relating to a warrant.

**Suggestion: statutory reporting requirements for s 34AAA (aligned with warrant reports)**

A reporting requirement in relation to new section 34AAA orders could usefully be integrated with the existing warrant reporting requirements in sections 34 and 34ZH. This would help to ensure that the IGIS, the responsible Minister for the agency and the Attorney-General have a comprehensive picture of how the relevant warrant and any related section 34AAA orders have **collectively** assisted ASIO in the performance of its functions.

### 5.2.8 Secrecy obligations

Orders made under new section 34AAA do not appear to be subject to any specific secrecy offences for disclosures of their contents or existence by persons who are subject to them. This is in contrast with the specific secrecy offences for persons who are the subject of questioning warrants or questioning and detention warrants under existing section 34ZS of the *ASIO Act*, and the new secrecy offences in Schedule 1 to the Bill for persons who disclose information about requests and notices issued under new Part 15 of the *Telecommunications Act*.

IGIS questions whether this may reflect a view that a person who is the subject of a section 34AAA order is liable to the secrecy offences in subsection 18(2) and sections 18A and 18B of the *ASIO Act*. This would only be possible if the person was taken to be an 'ASIO affiliate' or an 'entrusted person'

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who has entered into an 'arrangement' with ASIO **other than** as an ASIO affiliate, within the meaning of those terms in section 4 of the *ASIO Act*. Alternatively, it is possible that there is an intention to place sole reliance on the general secrecy offences in new Division 122 of the *Criminal Code* for disclosures of 'inherently harmful information'. In either case, to the extent that these existing offences would cover disclosures of information about a section 34AAA order, they contain sufficient provision for the disclosure of that information to, and by, IGIS officials (in addition to the immunities conferred under subsection 18(9) and section 34B of the *IGIS Act* for compulsory and voluntary disclosures of information to IGIS officials).

However, as noted in the earlier comments on Schedule 1 to the Bill, there may be doubt that a person who is the subject of a section 34AAA order could be an 'ASIO affiliate' or otherwise an 'entrusted person' by reason of that order. It is arguable that these concepts apply only to persons who **voluntarily** enter into some form of relationship with ASIO (that is, under a contract, agreement or other arrangement) and do not extend to relationships that are created by the exercise of coercive powers.

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## Attachment A

### Role of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

The IGIS is an independent statutory officer who reviews the activities of the following agencies:

- Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO);
- Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS);
- Australian Signals Directorate (ASD);
- Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO);
- Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO); and
- Office of National Assessments (ONA).

The Office of the IGIS is part of the Attorney-General's portfolio, and was previously located in the Prime Minister's portfolio from its commencement on 1 February 1987 until 10 May 2018. The IGIS is not subject to direction from any Minister on how responsibilities under the *Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act)* should be carried out. The Office has 28 staff at 12 October 2018.

The *IGIS Act* provides the legal basis for the IGIS to conduct inspections of the intelligence agencies and to conduct inquiries of the Inspector-General's own motion, at the request of a Minister, or in response to complaints. The overarching purpose of the IGIS's activities is to ensure that each intelligence agency acts legally and with propriety, complies with ministerial guidelines and directives, and respects human rights.<sup>166</sup> A significant proportion of the resources of the Office are directed towards ongoing inspection and monitoring activities, so as to identify issues, including about the governance and control frameworks within agencies, before there is a need for major remedial action. IGIS staff have access to all documents of the intelligence agencies, and the IGIS is often proactively briefed about sensitive operations.

The inspection role of the IGIS is complemented by an inquiry function. In undertaking inquiries, the IGIS has strong investigative powers, including the power to require any person to answer questions and produce relevant documents, take sworn evidence, and enter agency premises. IGIS inquiries are conducted in private because they almost invariably involve classified or sensitive information, and the methods by which it is collected. Conducting an inquiry is resource intensive but provides a rigorous way of examining a complaint or systemic matter within an agency. The Inspector-General also receives and investigates complaints and public interest disclosures about the intelligence agencies. These come from members of the public and from current and former agency staff.

In response to the recommendations of the *2017 Independent Intelligence Review*, the Government announced that, subject to the introduction and passage of legislation, the jurisdiction of the IGIS will be extended to include the intelligence functions of the Department of Home Affairs, Australian Federal Police, Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. Resources for the IGIS are being increased to allow the office to sustain a full time equivalent staff of 55 and to allow the agency to move to new premises.<sup>167</sup> The IGIS will also assume oversight functions in relation to the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) following passage of legislation presently before the Parliament to establish that agency as the successor to ONA.<sup>168</sup>

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166 See *IGIS Act*, section 8 in relation to the general jurisdiction of the IGIS.

167 The Hon M Turnbull MP, Prime Minister and Cabinet Portfolio Budget Statements 2018-19, *Budget Related Paper No. 114*, 8 May 2018, p. 278 (an additional \$52.1 m over 5 years from 2017-18).

168 Office of National Intelligence Bill 2018; and Office of National Intelligence (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2018.

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