^{^[1]} Including challenges resolved in the High Court: Cormack v Cope (1974) 131 CLR 432; Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 81 (‘PMA Case’).

^{^[2]} Rick Crump, ‘Why the conference procedure remains the preferred method for resolving disputes between the two houses of the South Australian Parliament’, Australasian Parliamentary Review, vol. 22, no. 2, 2007, p. 120.

^{^[3]} Joseph Cook, speech delivered at Parramatta, NSW, 14 July 1914, Museum of Australian Democracy, http://electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/1914-joseph-cook.

^{^[4]} Christopher Cuneen, King’s Men: Australia’s Governors-General from Hopetoun to Isaacs, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, p. 109.

^{^[5]} Responsible Government in the Dominions, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1912.

^{^[6]} I.C. Harris (ed.), House of Representatives Practice, 5th edn, Department of the House of Representatives, Canberra, 2005, p. 457.

^{^[7]} Don Markwell, ‘Griffith, Barton and the early Governors-General: aspects of Australia’s constitutional development’, Public Law Review, vol. 10, no. 4, 1999, pp. 280–94.

^{^[8]} Sydney Morning Herald, 3 October 1914, p. 14.

^{^[9]} It was her fourth attempt, and she emerged as the runner-up, second to the victorious Liberal candidate, Sir R.W. Best, who secured 18,545 votes: Goldstein secured 10,264; E.W. Terry (Ind) 2,400.

^{^[10]} Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 8 April 1891, p. 707.

^{^[11]} ibid., p. 759.

^{^[12]} ibid.

^{^[13]} ibid., p. 761.

^{^[15]} Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Third Session, Melbourne, 10 March 1898, p. 2224.

^{^[16]} Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Second Session, Sydney, 17 September 1897, pp. 717–18.

^{^[17]} ibid., p. 718.

^{^[18]} ibid., p. 725.

^{^[19]} Evening News (Sydney), 1 August 1914, p. 8.

^{^[20]} Markwell, op. cit.

^{^[21]} The Advertiser (Adelaide), 31 December 1914, p. 10.

^{^[22]} Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 4 March 1891, p. 25.

^{^[23]} Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Second Session, Sydney, 15 September 1897, p. 584.

^{^[24]} See Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The double dissolution cases’ in H.P. Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australia’s Constitutional Landmarks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

^{^[25]} In 1914, 1951 and 1987, only one bill was listed in the Governor-General’s proclamation of the double dissolution; in 1974, there were six bills; in 1975, 21 bills; in 1983, 13 bills.

^{^[26]} John Faulkner, ‘A Labor perspective on Senate reform’, in Brian Costar (ed.), Deadlock or Democracy?: The Future of the Senate, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2000, p. 44.

^{^[27]} Sydney Morning Herald, 3 October 1914, p. 14.

Exploring the Role of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in Relation to Parliament*

^{^[1]} International Framework of the Ombudsman Institute, Sindie de Grenges de Catalinya, May 2014, p. 10.

Global Development: The Long-term Context of Australian Development*

^{^[1]} Robert J. Gordon, ‘Is US economic growth over? Faltering innovation confronts the six headwinds’, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. 18315, August 2012.

Politicians at War: The Experiences of Australian Parliamentarians in the First World War*

^{^[*]} H.W. Cavell, Imperishable Anzacs: A Story of Australia’s Famous First Brigade, William Brooks, Sydney, 1916, p. 78.

^{^[†]} C.E.W. Bean, The Story of Anzac: From the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915, vol. 1, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, 11th edn, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1941, p. xxiii.

^{^[‡]} Nathan Church, Hannah Gobbett, Martin Lumb and Rob Lundie, Commonwealth Members of Parliament Who Have Served in War: Colonial Wars and the First World War, Research Paper, 19 September 2014, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2014, p. 7. Estimates of MLAs who served in the First World War are based on rolls of honour compiled by the NSW, Victorian and Western Australian Legislative Assemblies.

^{^[§]} Joan Beaumont, Broken Nation: Australians in the Great War, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2014, p. 21.

^{^[**]} ‘MLA for the front’, Mudgee Guardian and North-Western Representative, 20 August 1914, p. 18.

^{^[††]} Beaumont, op. cit., pp. 16–17.

^{^[‡‡]} ‘Mr Hampson enlists’, The Bendigonian, 27 January 1916, p. 9.

^{^[§§]} War Service Record, NAA, B2455, Hampson, A.J.

^{^[***]} Beaumont, op. cit., p. 17.

^{^[†††]} ‘Mrs Seery at Gosford’, The Gosford Times and Wyong District Advocate, 3 May 1917, p. 8.

^{^[‡‡‡]} Stuart Piggin, ‘Fleming, William Montgomerie (1874–1961)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, online edition, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/fleming-william-montgomerie-6190/text10639.

^{^[§§§]} Graeme Powell, ‘O’Loghlin, James Vincent (1852–1925)’, The Biographical Dictionary of the Australian Senate, online edition, http://biography.senate.gov.au/.

^{^[****]} Ryrie cited in Church, Gobbett, Lumb and Lundie, op. cit., p. 8. For another example, see ‘Major Baird, welcome home by state parliamentarians’, Bendigo Advertiser, 6 April 1917, p. 7.

^{^{[††††]}} Peter Travers, ‘O’Loghlin, James Vincent (1852–1925)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, online edition, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ologhlin-james-vincent-7905.

^{^{[‡‡‡‡]}} Darryl McIntyre, ‘Braund, George Frederick (1866–1915)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, online edition, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/braund-george-frederick-5340/text9027.

^{^[§§§§]} Ian Harmstorf, ‘Homburg, Hermann Robert (1874–1964)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, online edition, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/homburg-hermann-robert-7069.

^{^[*****]} Jenny Tilby Stock, ‘South Australia’s German MPs in World War I: the limits of tolerance’, p. 7, http://www.sahistorians.org.au/175/documents/south-australias-german-mps-in-world-war-i-the-lim.shtml.

^{^{[†††††]}} Bede Nairn, ‘Carmichael, Ambrose Campbell (1866–1953)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, online edition, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/carmichael-ambrose-campbell-5506/text9369.

^{^{[‡‡‡‡‡]}} War Service Record, NAA, B2455, Carmichael A.C.

^{^[§§§§§]} Nairn, op. cit.

^{^[******]} ibid.

^{^{[††††††]}} ibid.

^{^{[‡‡‡‡‡‡]}} ‘Another Laborite’, The Daily News, 31 January 1916, p. 6.

^{^{[§§§§§§]}} ‘The 51st “Over There” ’, Western Mail, 20 August 1936, p. 9.

^{^[*******]} Chris Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics: The Impact of the Military on Australian Life and Political Institutions, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1996, p. 122.

Commonwealth Executive Power and Accountability Following Williams (No. 2)

^{^[1]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams (No. 1)’).

^{^[2]} See Cheryl Saunders, ‘The scope of executive power’, Papers on Parliament, no. 59, April 2013, pp. 15–34 and Glenn Ryall, ‘Williams v Commonwealth—a turning point for parliamentary accountability and federalism in Australia?’, Papers on Parliament, no. 60, March 2014,
pp. 131–48.

^{^[3]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416 (‘Williams (No. 2)’).

^{^[4]} Ryall, op. cit., p. 131.

^{^[5]} Anne Twomey, ‘Post-Williams expenditure—when can the Commonwealth and states spend public money without parliamentary authorisation?’, University of Queensland Law Journal, vol. 33, no. 1, 2014, pp. 9–10.

^{^[6]} ibid., p. 9.

^{^[7]} More recently, arguments based upon the Williams principles have also been advanced in a challenge to the offshore detention regime which is currently before the High Court. See Transcript of Proceedings, Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCATrans 160 (24 June 2015).

^{^[8]} Senate debates, 19 June 2014, p. 3412 (George Brandis), 23 June 2014, p. 3555 (George Brandis).

^{^[9]} Twomey, op. cit., p. 27.

^{^[10]} Ryall, op. cit., p. 143. This provision is now section 32B of the Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Act 1997 (Cth) (the FF(SP) Act).

^{^[11]} ibid., pp. 143–7.

^{^[12]} Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1; James Spigelman, ‘Constitutional recognition of local government’, Speech delivered at the Local Government Association of Queensland 116th Annual Conference, Brisbane, 24 October 2012, pp. 12–13.

^{^[13]} Anne Twomey, ‘Déjà Vu—the Commonwealth’s response to the Williams Case’, Constitutional Critique (Constitutional Reform Unit, Sydney Law School), 3 July 2014, http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/cru/2014/07/deja_vu_the_commonwealths_resp_1.html.

^{^[14]} ibid.

^{^[15]} Australian Government Solicitor, ‘Further challenge to the Commonwealth’s power to contract and spend money on school chaplains’, Litigations Notes, no. 24, 6 November 2014, p. 3.

^{^[16]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 458 [43].

^{^[17]} ibid., 460 [46].

^{^[18]} ibid., 460 [47].

^{^[19]} Australian Government Solicitor, op. cit., p. 4.

^{^[20]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 470 [87].

^{^[21]} Australian Government Solicitor, op. cit., p. 4.

^{^[22]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 460 [49].

^{^[23]} (2006) 229 CLR 1.

^{^[24]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 461 [50].

^{^[25]} Simon Evans, ‘Williams v Commonwealth (No 2): the National School Chaplaincy Program struck down again’, Public Law Review, vol. 25, 2014, p. 171.

^{^[26]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 463 [57]–[59].

^{^[27]} Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1; Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 463 [60].

^{^[28]} ibid., 464–465 [65].

^{^[29]} ibid., 465 [69].

^{^[30]} See, for example, Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 342–343; Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 10; Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 167. See also Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 242–243; Brown v West (1990) 169 CLR 195, 197; Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, 510–512.

^{^[31]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 466 [71].

^{^[32]} ibid., 450 [13].

^{^[33]} ibid.

^{^[34]} Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonald, ‘Looking at the executive power through the High Court’s new spectacles’, Sydney Law Review, vol. 35, no. 2, 2013, p. 272.

^{^[35]} Ryall, op. cit., pp. 137–9.

^{^[36]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 467 [75].

^{^[37]} ibid., 468 [78].

^{^[38]} ibid.

^{^[39]} ibid., 468 [79].

^{^[40]} ibid., 468 [80].

^{^[41]} Ryall, op. cit., pp. 137–9. This is a significant departure from British constitutional practice. At the time the Constitution was drafted the powers of the two houses in the United Kingdom in relation to financial legislation were governed by a resolution of 3 July 1678. This resolution declared that all financial grants were the ‘sole gift’ of the House of Commons, and that the Commons had the sole right to determine all financial legislation. Therefore, at the time that the Constitution was drafted, the House of Lords was, at a fundamental level, already a ‘powerless second chamber’, particularly in relation to financial matters. See Harry Evans, ‘The Australian Constitution and the 1911 myth’, Papers on Parliament, no. 52, December 2009, p. 88.

^{^[42]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 468 [80].

^{^[43]} ibid.

^{^[44]} ibid. For a recent discussion of the influence of the Constitution of the United States of America on the development of the Australian Constitution, see Kathleen Morris and James Allsop, ‘The United States and the Australian Constitution: influence of US constitutional model on development and interpretation of the Australian Constitution’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 89, 2015, pp. 309–30.

^{^[45]} Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 271–272 (Dixon J).

^{^[46]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 469 [82]–[83].

^{^[47]} The Senate Regulations and Ordinances Committee has undertaken significant work to ensure that explanatory statements for regulations that add new items into the FF(SP) Regulations explicitly state, for each new item, the constitutional head of power that purportedly supports each new spending program.

^{^[48]} Explanatory Statement, Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Amendment (2015 Measures No. 3) Regulation 2015 (Cth), p. 3.

^{^[49]} Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Regulations 1997 (Cth) sch 1AB pt 4 item 75.

^{^[50]} Explanatory Statement, Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Amendment (2015 Measures No. 3) Regulation 2015 (Cth), p. 4.

^{^[51]} Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Regulations 1997 (Cth) sch 1AB pt 4 item 76.

^{^[52]} Explanatory Statement, Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Amendment (2015 Measures No. 3) Regulation 2015 (Cth), pp. 3–4.

^{^[53]} ibid.

^{^[54]} George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew Lynch, Blackshield and Williams Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials, 6th edn, Federation Press, Annandale, NSW, 2014, p. 923.

^{^[55]} Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 5th edn, Federation Press, Annandale, NSW, 2008, p. 397.

^{^[56]} (1996) 187 CLR 416, 486.

^{^[57]} Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Regulations 1997 (Cth) sch 1AB pt 4 item 75.

^{^[58]} Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Regulations 1997 (Cth) sch 1AB pt 4 item 76.

^{^[59]} Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397.

^{^[60]} Twomey, ‘Post-Williams expenditure’, op. cit., p. 23.

^{^[61]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 319 [402] (Heydon J).

^{^[62]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 179–180 [4] (French CJ); 235 [146] (Gummow and Bell JJ); 250–251 [196], 267 [240] (Hayne J); 346 [498] and 348 [503] (Crennan J); and 373 [591] and [594] (Kiefel J).

^{^[63]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 373 [594] (Kiefel J).

^{^[64]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 235 [146] (Gummow and Bell JJ).

^{^[65]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 348 [504] (Crennan J).

^{^[66]} Explanatory Statement, Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Amendment (2015 Measures No. 3) Regulation 2015 (Cth), p. 3.

^{^[67]} ibid., p. 4.

^{^[68]} Western Australian Department of Education, First Steps: Steps Resources, http://det.wa.edu.au/stepsresources/detcms/portal/.

^{^[69]} Western Australian Department of Education, First Step Mathematics, http://det.wa.edu.au/stepsresources/detcms/navigation/first-steps-mathematics/.

^{^[70]} Andrew Hemming, ‘Williams v Commonwealth: much ado about nothing’, University of Queensland Law Journal, vol. 33, no. 1, 2014, pp. 239, 242.

^{^[71]} Spigelman, op. cit.

^{^[72]} The initial tranche of regulations was enacted by Parliament in Schedule 2 to the FFLA Act. However, if the plaintiff’s broad submission in Williams (No. 2) is accepted then these regulations (despite being enacted by Parliament) may be invalid. See Ronald Williams, ‘Plaintiff’s Submissions’, Submission in Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2), no. S154 of 2013, 28 February 2014, 21 [87]; Attorney-General (WA), ‘Annotated Written Submissions of the Attorney General for Western Australia (Intervening)’, Submission in Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2), no. S154 of 2103, 14 March 2014, 4 [18]–[19].

^{^[73]} Senator the Hon Scott Ryan, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Education, ‘National School Chaplaincy Programme to go ahead’, Media release, 27 August 2014, https://ministers.education.gov.au/ryan/national-school-chaplaincy-programme-go-ahead.

^{^[74]} Senate debates, 19 June 2014, p. 3412 (George Brandis).

^{^[75]} Australian National Audit Office, Audits of the Financial Statements of Australian Government Entities for the Period Ended 30 June 2014, ANAO Report no. 16, 2014–15, p. 41.

^{^[76]} Benjamin Saunders, ‘Williams [No 2] Symposium: some curiosities and further thoughts on Williams [No 2]’ on Opinions on High (10 July 2014), http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/ 2014/07/10/saunders-williams-2/.

^{^[77]} ibid.

^{^[78]} Nicholas Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local, 5th edn, Federation Press, Annandale, NSW, 2013, p. 100.

^{^[79]} Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham Londonborough Council [1992] 2 AC 1, 36 (Lord Templeman).

^{^[80]} Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Ineffective transactions, unjust enrichment and problems of policy’, Legal Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, 1989, p. 308; Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co Ltd v Riche (1875) 7 HL 653.

^{^[81]} Arrowsmith, op. cit., p. 310.

^{^[82]} Guy Aitken and Robert Orr, Sawer’s: The Australian Constitution, 3rd edn, Australian Government Solicitor, Canberra, 2002. p. 22.

^{^[83]} ibid., p. 23.

^{^[84]} (1931) 46 CLR 73.

^{^[85]} See, for example, Lambert v Weichelt (1954) 28 ALJ 282, 283 (Dixon CJ); Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309, 437 [355] (Crennan J); ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 199 [141] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

^{^[86]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 457 [36] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

^{^[87]} Senate debates, 19 June 2014, p. 3412 (George Brandis).

^{^[88]} Australian Government Solicitor, op. cit., p. 3.

^{^[89]} Twomey, ‘Déjà Vu’, op. cit.

^{^[90]} ibid. As noted above, this broader constitutional uncertainty is also relevant to the validity of over 400 non-statutory funding schemes purportedly authorised in the initial tranche of regulations.

^{^[91]} Evans, op. cit., p. 167.

^{^[92]} Cheryl Saunders, ‘Williams [No 2] Symposium: Cheryl Saunders on the executive power of the Commonwealth after Williams [No 2]’ on Opinions on High (25 June 2014), http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2014/06/25/saunders-williams/.

^{^[93]} Graeme Hill, ‘Williams [No 2] Symposium: Graeme Hill on narrowing the issues’ on Opinions on High (23 June 2014), http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2014/06/23/hill-williams/.

^{^[94]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 235 [145].

^{^[95]} ibid.

^{^[96]} Cheryl Saunders and Kevin Yam, ‘Government regulation by contract: implications for the rule of law’, Public Law Review, vol. 15, 2004, p. 53; Seddon, op. cit., pp. 40–1; Gabrielle Appleby ‘There must be limits: the Commonwealth spending power’, Federal Law Review, vol. 37, 2009, p. 97.

^{^[97]} Shipra Chordia, Andrew Lynch and George Williams, ‘Williams v Commonwealth: Commonwealth executive power and Australian federalism’, Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 37, no. 1, 2013, p. 190.

^{^[98]} In this regard it is important to note that many of the spending schemes already in the FF(SP) Regulations are described in very broad terms. This means that new spending initiatives may be able to be instituted by the executive under these broadly framed items without the need for new regulations (and therefore any parliamentary scrutiny at all). Examples of broadly worded schemes include: ‘421.001 Regional Development; Objective: To strengthen the sustainability, capacity and diversity of regions through focused stakeholder consultation and engagement, research, policy development, and program delivery activities’ and ‘421.002 Local Government; Objective: To build capacity in local government and provide local and community infrastructure, and to improve economic and social outcomes in local communities’. See Amanda Sapienza, ‘Using representative government to bypass representative government’, Public Law Review, vol. 23, 2012, p. 165.

^{^[99]} Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Eleventh Report of 2014, 3 September 2014, p. 558.

^{^[100]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 179 [4] (French CJ).

^{^[101]} Office of Parliamentary Counsel, OPC Drafting Manual, October 2012, pp. 15–16.

^{^[102]} Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Drafting Direction No. 3.1: Constitutional Law Issues, October 2012, p. 19.

^{^[103]} Cheryl Saunders, ‘The scope of executive power’, p. 30.

^{^[104]} Spigelman, op. cit.

^{^[105]} Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 258–259 [216] (Hayne J); 351–352 [516] (Crennan J).

^{^[106]} Geoffrey Lindell, ‘The changed landscape of the executive power of the Commonwealth after the Williams case’, Monash University Law Review, vol. 39, no. 2, 2013, p. 386.

^{^[107]} Williams v Commonwealth (No. 2) (2014) 252 CLR 416, 464 [65].

^{^[108]} Lindell, op. cit., p. 386.

^{^[109]} The party composition of the Senate almost invariably reflects the party disposition of voting in the electorate more closely than does the House of Representatives (where government is formed). The electoral system of the House of Representatives regularly awards a majority of seats (and government) to parties which secure only a minority of electors’ votes (occasionally less than 40 per cent) and on several occasions less than those of the major losing parties. See Harry Evans and Rosemary Laing (eds), Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice, 13th edn, Department of the Senate, Canberra, 2012, pp. 10–18.

^{^[110]} Harry Evans, ‘The case for bicameralism’ in Nicholas Aroney, Scott Prasser and J.R. Nethercote (eds), Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The Upper House Solution?, University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, WA, 2008, p. 73.