Gary Brown
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
21 April 1999
Contents
Introduction
A New Kind of War
Air Power Alone
Precision and Economy
Yugoslavia is not Iraq
Progress of the War
Unachieved Aims, Lost
Objectives
Shifting Aims?
Where is the War Going?
President Milosevic's Strategy and NATO's
Dilemma
The View from Belgrade
NATO's Dilemma
Reassessment Required
New Political Objectives
New Military Strategy
A War of Wills
Endnotes
It is now almost
four weeks since NATO launched its air war-Operation ALLIED
FORCE-against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Prosecuted
with a combination of strategic bombers, tactical ground-attack
aircraft and cruise missiles, supported by the military and
economic resources of an immensely powerful alliance, this war has
already inflicted significant damage on FRY infrastructure and, to
an unquantifiable extent, on elements of its military.
This brief is a short analysis of the war,
primarily from the standpoint of military strategy.(1) It considers
the nature of the war and examines its development thus far. It
suggests that in the final analysis the war has become a contest of
political wills, that the Milosevic regime believes that the NATO
countries lack the will to take the steps probably necessary to
defeat it and that the accuracy or otherwise of this calculation
will probably determine the outcome.
This paper is current to noon 21 April 1999,
Canberra time.
Air Power Alone
This war is quite different from any other in
history. Notably, it is the first to attempt achievement of its
aims by the use of one arm of military power, air power, alone. Of
course, air power has often been used to carry out specific
missions, but never before has it been employed as the
sole means of waging major war. In modern times, where military
thinking and organisation has continually stressed integration of
ground, maritime and air elements into increasingly seamless force
structures, this is a radical departure. Whether it is also a
viable departure remains to be seen.
Precision and Economy
Even as an air operation this war is unique. It
has nothing in common, for instance, with the great bombing
campaigns of the Second World War. In those days thousands of bombs
were dropped from hundreds of aircraft in only partly effective
raids on key industrial targets, which were almost always in large
cities. Due to the highly inaccurate nature of free-fall ('dumb')
bombs civilian casualties around industrial targets-what are now
called 'collateral' casualties-were usually numbered in hundreds if
not thousands. For example, in August 1943, and again in October,
numerous US aircraft attacked a German ball-bearing plant at
Schweinfurt. The raids halted production for only six weeks and
caused some ongoing dislocation for perhaps six months. Very heavy
losses in US aircraft and crew were incurred. Hitler's Armaments
Minister, Albert Speer has testified that Germany actually
increased industrial production under the Allied
bombing.(2) Hundreds of planes and thousands of bombs could not
then reliably destroy a target, even at the price of heavy
casualties to both sides.
By contrast, the essential characteristics of
modern air power are its precision and economy of effort. It is the
norm (though exceptions do occur) for a 'smart' weapon to strike
what it is aimed at. And with cruise missiles it is normally
possible to strike a discrete target from a thousand kilometres
away. What could barely be done with hundreds of aircraft and with
serious casualties in 1943 is now possible using a few aircraft and
cruise missiles. Thus we hear of FRY installations-oil refineries,
industrial plants, bridges, even individual buildings in
Belgrade-being successfully targeted by NATO aircraft and/or
missiles.
The present war is also noteworthy for the
remarkably passive nature of FRY resistance to the NATO attacks. In
this respect it resembles the Iraqi failure in 1991 to oppose the
Coalition's air power-it may be recalled that large numbers of
Iraqi aircraft actually flew to Iran to avoid destruction. FRY air
defences naturally fire on NATO aircraft where they can, and have
achieved only limited success (one Stealth fighter is confirmed
lost by NATO), but since the first few days the Air Force has
hardly been seen. It is not known how many FRY combat aircraft (it
began the war with about 240 combat aircraft and 56 armed
helicopters)(3) have survived the NATO attacks on their bases, but
few if any bases should be operational after sustained air
assaults.
Yugoslavia is not Iraq
For all of that, the air war against the FRY
does not readily compare with that conducted in 1991 against Iraq
during operation DESERT STORM. The air operations against Iraq were
always intended to pave the way for a ground campaign to liberate
Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and were not expected to win the war
in their own right. And the open, flat, desert environment of the
Middle East is far more friendly to air power than the hilly, even
mountainous, woody terrain of the FRY and Kosovo. Likewise, the
desert climate rarely interfered in the Middle East, whereas in the
Balkans the fickle early (northern) spring weather has
significantly restricted NATO operations.
Unachieved Aims, Lost Objectives
The declared political aim at the outset of
operation ALLIED FORCE was to force FRY President Milosevic to
accept two conditions:
-
- autonomous status within the FRY for the Albanian-majority
Kosovo region, and
-
- NATO troops in Kosovo to ensure FRY and Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) compliance.
Once operations began, there was in addition a
third objective:
-
- damaging the Yugoslav forces so as to prevent or at least
seriously hinder their campaign against ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo.
NATO's attacks are undoubtedly inflicting
significant damage on their targets. Much infrastructure-notably
oil refineries-has been destroyed. Less damage will have been
taken, however, by mobile elements and installations which are
below ground or have been effectively camouflaged. On one day NATO
claimed the destruction of only seven Yugoslav tanks.(4) The FRY
has about 1270 tanks, most of which are doubtless carefully
hidden.(5) As noted, airfields should be useless by now and can be
kept so by frequent bombing with cratering weapons. Any fixed
military installation (bases, barracks, facilities of various
kinds) will presumably have been targeted and destroyed by NATO.
Physical communications within Yugoslavia have been disrupted by
the destruction of key bridges, and electronic means-especially
those used by the military-have also been heavily targeted.
Despite all this, at the time of writing the
first two aims mentioned above have yet to be achieved, while the
third is clearly now unachievable. Since the start of NATO
operations the FRY has systematically organised the deportation (or
worse) of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in
an 'ethnic cleansing' operation on a scale paralleled only by the
Nazi atrocities of World War II and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
Kosovo is now well on the way to becoming, if not an Albanian-free
zone, at least one where Albanian numbers have been drastically
reduced. The FRY forces have also launched operations designed to
destroy or at least cripple the armed ethnic Albanian irregular
forces, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
Some allege that this is the direct result of
NATO operations.(6) However the Milosevic regime has a track record
of ethnic cleansing campaigns and, in the situation as it was
prewar, it is likely that Belgrade would have attempted some such
operation in Kosovo regardless (this is why pressure was exerted on
Yugoslavia in the first place).(7) However, the NATO attack has
allowed the 'cleansers' to invoke the cover of wartime censorship
and restrictions, expelling all foreign observers from the area,
while air power has proven to be of small value in actually
hindering the operation. NATO attacks no doubt catalysed, rather
than caused, the anti-Albanian action and were also a convenient
cover story with which Belgrade could explain the exodus from
Kosovo.
Ethnic cleansing, unfortunately, requires little
more than a reasonable number of lightly armed irregulars willing
to stomach the dirty work, light FRY regular forces to protect them
from the KLA, plus minimal logistics to move them from place to
place. And of course large scale movements of the 'cleansed', by
foot, road transport (or even trains provided by a thoughtful
Belgrade regime), can hardly be prevented by air power and also
serve as cover for FRY troop and equipment movements. The recent
mistaken NATO attack (14 April) on a refugee convoy shows that the
movements of deportees cannot be prevented unless one is willing to
fire on them. This NATO will not do.
Shifting Aims?
In present circumstances it is at least
questionable whether the originally declared political aims remain
relevant. Kosovo in effect is now well on the way to being
ethnically 'cleansed'. It is now inconceivable that, for all their
declared determination, those ethnic Albanians who survive
eviction, expropriation and deportation will ever consent to return
to a Kosovo under the authority of a Serb dominated regime. For
this reason, if Albanians are to return to postwar Kosovo the
political status of the region may well have to change. It may have
to become a kind of UN or NATO protectorate, or be allowed to join
Albania.
None of this, however, has yet been clarified by
the NATO political or military leadership. Nonetheless it is
becoming more and more difficult to believe that the aims for which
the war was started can ever be achieved. There is a risk,
therefore, of this war becoming that most dangerous of things, a
war with no clear aims. As was seen in both Vietnam and
Afghanistan, no practical amount of military power, even that of a
superpower, can win such a war.
If one accepts
pronouncements from NATO and the United States, the war will
continue to be exclusively an air war and will be prosecuted as
such for as long as it takes. Calls from military analysts for the
use of ground troops against the FRY have been consistently
rejected at the highest level. President Clinton has called for war
funding for a further six months. Until very recently it has seemed
that the US at least is determined not to commit ground troops to
combat. At the time of writing there has been perhaps a hint of a
softening in this position, with unconfirmed reports that NATO is
now planning for an invasion with 80,000 troops in late May.(8)
Officially, however, there is still great reluctance to contemplate
a ground campaign.
There is good reason for this reluctance. The
FRY will most likely offer more effective resistance than Iraq. The
terrain favours the defence to an extraordinary degree, and there
is a strong will to fight what are perceived-due to successful
propaganda and prewar media censorship by President Milosevic's
government-as aggressors and invaders supporting Albanian
terrorists determined to strip Serbia of part of her ancient
heartland. In a sense Yugoslavia has been ready for war since Tito
broke with Moscow in the late forties and prepared the country for
possible Soviet attack. As might have been expected, the coming of
war has caused the Serbs to bury their internal differences and
unite in the face of foreign attack, and they have a proud military
tradition of their own.
Part of that tradition, the successful Yugoslav
guerrilla war against the Nazis (1941-45), is often cited but is
perhaps less relevant than some think. Though Tito's partisans did
tie up large numbers of Germans and inflicted significant losses on
them, it needs to be recalled that at no time could Germany employ
its full might against Tito's forces. Simultaneously Germany was
fighting a huge war in the East against the Soviets and, after
D-Day (mid-1944), against the Western Allies as well. Tito's
partisans moreover received extensive supplies and support,
especially from the British.
If NATO desires, however, it can deploy its full
power against the FRY. This would represent overwhelming force.
Yugoslavia can be isolated from any significant sources of resupply
and its Armed Forces in effect starved to death. Russia, Serbia's
traditional ally throughout this century, is presently too weak to
do more than register empty protests unless it wishes to employ
nuclear weapons-something already ruled out by the Russian Foreign
Minister.(9) Nevertheless it is clear that ground operations
against a determined FRY defence would result in losses to NATO.
There would be body bags returning to the countries that committed
troops to a ground campaign.
The View from Belgrade
The preceding is probably the assessment made in
Belgrade. There it is most likely believed that the political will
to employ ground troops is lacking in NATO and that the FRY can
endure the air war until such time as NATO tires of the effort and
expense, and international political pressures can be brought to
bear to terminate the campaign. If so, then the FRY may yet emerge
battered but territorially untruncated and, moreover, with the
clear gain of an 'ethnically cleansed' Kosovo.
Such an outcome would represent a serious blow
to NATO and especially American prestige and would of course be a
catastrophe for the remaining Albanian people of Kosovo.
Nevertheless, in going to war NATO was always risking some such
outcome. When a decision is made to invoke force to settle
political disputes, it is necessary to consider carefully what
level of force is likely to be necessary to achieve the aims.
President Milosevic probably thinks that NATO's leaders failed to
do this.
NATO's Dilemma
Naturally, NATO has not disclosed its military
strategy concepts or operational plans. Nevertheless, on the basis
of what is publicly known, NATO-or at least the civilian
Governments which control NATO policy-appears to have believed that
air power alone could bring Yugoslavia to an acceptable position
and simultaneously prevent (or at least retard) the 'cleansing' of
Kosovo. Certainly NATO has failed in this last aim and, as noted,
the original political objectives seem increasingly irrelevant.
One can only speculate as to how long the air
war will be allowed to continue. In theory, given enough aircraft,
ordnance and time NATO could bomb the FRY back into the proverbial
'stone age'. But few if any Kosovar Albanian lives would be saved
thereby, and such a process would take a long time-longer, perhaps,
than domestic and international pressures will allow. At the time
of writing NATO, for all its military power, actually seems little
closer to achieving its aims than it was at the start of the
war.
The only military way out of this trap is for
NATO to invade Yugoslavia, defeat the FRY armed forces and dictate
terms to the Milosevic regime. But this involves a ground war and
therein lies NATO's apparent dilemma: a continued air war with
dubious prospects of success or a ground war with numerous body
bags?
New Political Objectives
If as suggested above the original war
objectives are now irrelevant, then for what is this war now being
fought? A clear restatement of NATO's terms is necessary: without
this, even the Belgrade government can have no clear idea of what
NATO's demands now are. If Kosovo is to be taken from Serbia but
retained in the FRY, if it is to be a UN protectorate of some kind,
if it is to go to Albania-these points need to be clearly
understood. Likewise, it needs to be understood that the harsher
the terms the stiffer will be the resistance-the 'unconditional
surrender' demand in World War II is widely held to have prolonged
that conflict.
New Military Strategy
Defining acceptable terms is one necessary
thing, but the means to force Belgrade to agree to them are
another. If the military strategy of an air war does not produce
significant results within an undefinable but probably not
extensive timeframe, then NATO will be perceived to have failed.
Before that happens, if NATO desires military victory over the FRY
then a more developed strategy is required. It is now clear that
any such strategy will need to include the extensive use of ground
forces. Air power alone has already failed to stop the 'cleansing'
of Kosovo and thus far there is little indication that it has
weakened Belgrade's will to fight on.
For ground operations the next four months are
the critical time, because large forces can move freely in this
poorly developed region only during the northern summer. But a
substantial NATO force will need to be deployed, operational plans
drawn up, the political difficulties of embarking on direct combat
addressed. All this, especially deployment, takes time. Just how
much time is open to debate: some believe that the US has
compromised its ability to rapidly deploy forces, though this
conclusion is by no means beyond dispute.(10)
There is little doubt that NATO can defeat the
FRY forces in a properly conducted ground war (which would of
course be supported by the continued use of air and even sea
power). However there remains the question of casualties. The
defensive advantages enjoyed by the FRY forces-they are far better
placed than were the Iraqis-suggest that a NATO victory will not
come cheap. In some ways the effects of the air war will assist the
ground defence, because (for example) destroyed bridges will hinder
the movement of fast NATO forces along the few good roads. This is
a consequence of the initial decision to use air power alone:
because no thought was given to ground operations, the destruction
of bridges which, it now seems, might later be needed by NATO
forces was not seen as a problem.
Whatever NATO's real intentions were, it is
arguable that it was bad military strategy to so emphatically rule
out ground operations. There is a possibility that if Belgrade can
be convinced that NATO will undertake an invasion, it might give up
the struggle. Whatever the casualties NATO might take in a ground
war, the FRY forces would suffer far worse. And Serbia itself,
which dominates the FRY, would be crippled for years to come if
NATO invades and defeats its armed forces in open combat. Kosovo
would certainly be lost, while Serb minorities in Bosnia and other
former Yugoslav republics would lose a powerful protector.
Montenegro might abandon its Serbian alliance. Instead of 'Greater
Serbia', Belgrade might become the capital of a much reduced
'lesser' Serbia. Anti-Serb wars promoted by neighbours seeking
vengeance for past injuries might be waged. Milosevic's military
advisors, if at all competent, will no doubt tell him this. A truly
credible threat of invasion might, therefore, suffice. No
such threat has yet been posed: on the contrary, NATO leaders are
taking every opportunity to state the exact opposite. This must
greatly reassure President Milosevic and reinforce his domestic
position.
This war has
quickly become one of wills. On the one hand is the will of the
Belgrade regime, now with overwhelming popular support, to endure
whatever NATO air power can throw at it for as long as necessary.
The air war is NATO's attempt to break that will. Thus far it has
not succeeded.
On the other is the will of NATO-again, of the
civilian Governments which control NATO-to win the war. NATO faces
a hard choice between a continued air campaign, which has yet to
produce decisive results to compensate for the loss of life caused,
and a ground war which will deliver results but only at the cost of
the lives of many NATO soldiers.
Whichever side has the stronger will to win is
the factor that will ultimately decide this war.
-
- On 30 March 1999 the FADT Group issued a Research Note, The
War Over Kosovo, which provided some background to the
conflict.
- John Sweetman, Schweinfurt: Disaster in the Skies,
Ballantine Books, London 1971, pp. 108-119 and pp. 137-43. Albert
Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Sphere Books 1971, pp.
390-92.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 1997-98, p. 100.
- NATO Press Briefing, 17 April 1999. From NATO Website:
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990417a.htm.
- Of these tanks, however, about 970 are obsolete types-World War
II Soviet T-34s (about 180) or early postwar T-55s (about 790).
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 1997-98, p. 99.
- Jennifer Hewitt, 'Lack of direction worries Congress', The
Age, 14 April 1999.
- For a good historical survey of the breakup of Yugoslavia, see
David Anderson, The Collapse of Yugoslavia: Background and
Summary, Research Paper No.15, 1995-96, issued 23 November
1995.
- Geiif Kitney, 'Serb vow: we are ready for all-out war', The
Age, 18 April 1999.
- 'Foreign Minister Ivanov Denies Missile Retargeting, Says
Russia Committed to Peace', Russian Federal News Service, in
English, 1348hrs (GMT), 9 April 1999.
- Thomas Ricks, 'Sending in ground troops is out of US reach,'
Sydney Morning Herald, 20 April 1999.