Current Issues Brief No 19 2002-03
Iraq: Issues on the Eve of War
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
18 March 2003
Regional and Other Fallout
Turkey and Iran
Islam, Anti-Americanism and Terrorism
Iraq and Its Neighbours
Source: Central Intelligence Agency
Location of Iraq's Ethnoreligious Groups
Source: Central Intelligence Agency
Kurdish and Shia Dissident Areas
Source: Central Intelligence Agency
The impending war against Iraq will have
Internally these include the humanitarian crisis
and post-conflict security situation.
The US plan is for full control under military
command with minimal involvement of exiled groups but using the
(vetted) existing regime network without the key elements of
There is widespread criticism that the plan does
not deal with the key issue of political reconstruction and appears
to represent a retreat from US declared aims of democratising
A war may result in regional instability if Iraq
fragments and creates problems for individual Arab states linked to
Achieving regime change in Iraq is part of a
wider US Bush doctrine to change the nature and dynamics of the
Middle East (and the world). This is feared by the individual Arab
states, though there have been some positive results in terms of
A war against Iraq would, more likely than not,
be seen as an anti-Islamic attack by the US and may win more
recruits and empathy for Islamic extremism. This perception has not
been helped by the religious overtones of President Bush's speeches
and US support for Israel. Most Arab states are fearful of Islamic
extremists and have suppressed them but they support the
anti-Israeli groups, who are seen as 'freedom fighters' and
'martyrs' for Palestine.
This brief seeks to examine the objectives and
plan of the United States (US) in post-Saddam Iraq and the Middle
East. It provides a background on Iraq, the events leading to the
eve of war and highlights the humanitarian and security problems to
be confronted. The US plan for post-conflict Iraq and the region
are also critically examined.
Modern Iraq is an artificial state carved out of
three Ottoman provinces by the British following the end of the
First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Among the
population of 22 million, there are three major communities: the
Kurds (15 per cent) in the northeast; Arabs (75 per cent)
consisting of Sunni Muslim Arabs in the middle; and Shia Muslims
(both Arab and non-Arabs) in the south. Shia Muslims form 60 per
cent of the population. The Christian, Armenian, Turkmen and
Assyrian minorities form five per cent of the population. The Kurds
also include Sunnis, Shia and Christians; Kurds are also found in
Syria, Turkey and Iran, all bordering Iraq. Within these groups
there are also tribal, clan and regional loyalties. The major
groups are not internally united politically and are influenced by
domestic factors and, in varying degrees, by external players such
as Iran and Turkey. Iraq's territorial integrity has been
maintained by a strong leader from the minority Sunni community;
attempts to form coalition governments in the past have failed.
Because of these factors there is fear that fragmentation of Iraq
will cause regional instability. The fear of the disintegration of
Iraq was one of the factors which allowed President Saddam Hussein
to survive the Gulf War in 1991.
Since the end of the Gulf War, President Saddam
Hussein, weakened by United Nations (UN) sanctions and 'no-fly
zones' enforced by the US and Britain to the north and south of
Iraq, has not posed a credible military threat to the United
States, his neighbours or the world. However, the costs have been
high for the civilian population. The catalyst for President Bush's
new doctrine of preventive intervention, based on a newfound
political will to act against Saddam, was the September 11 attack
on New York's twin towers. This was undertaken by Al Qaeda, an
extremist Islamic group which rejects the West's economic and
cultural challenges; opposes Arab governments it claims have
compromised Islam; and seeks to re-establish a pristine Islamic
order.(1) It is led by Saudi-born Osama bin Laden. By
linking its action to the 'War against Terrorism' the Bush
Administration's immediate aim is to prevent a future, more
devastating situation in the volatile Middle East as well as to
undermine support for 'terrorist' groups. Iraq is more substantial
than the shadowy Al Qaeda. Other US objectives (see below) for the
Middle East predate the events of September 11.
Despite internal disagreements among senior
civilian and military officials,(2) the US is convinced
that unless disarmed now, Saddam, could in future arm terrorist
groups with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On 8 November 2002
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1441 was passed
unanimously after eight weeks of negotiations with the undertaking
by the US to key members that it would not provide an automatic
trigger for military action. Commentatots conclude that
attempts by the US and Britain have produced no credible evidence
in the form of a 'smoking gun'. The linkage between the Iraqi
regime and terrorism have been rejected by many, particularly
European, countries led by France, Germany and Russia, the Arab
world and mass anti-war rallies worldwide.(3) They argue
that sanctions and renewed UN weapons inspections, given a more
rigorous time frame and resources, would prevent such an
eventuality. Saddam has not been totally uncooperative and has
responded to increasing pressure in measured ways to frustrate the
will of the US and its allies.
The US continues to state that it is prepared to
act unilaterally no matter what the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) decides but a second resolution has become necessary, not
the least to release the US from its earlier undertaking. For it to
pass, the US, under UNSC rules, needs at least nine of the fifteen
votes without a veto cast by France, Russia or China.(4)
Opponents have said there is no need for a second resolution.
France, Russia and China have threatened to use their vetos should
this be sought. Tremendous finance, trade and other pressure are
being exerted on members of the UNSC by the main
protagonists.(5) Other political reasons for a second
- The insistence of its major ally the British government which
has, it is reported, yet to convince its own security establishment
on the need for war.(6) Prime Minister Blair is facing a
Labour Party split, potential resignations, as well as further
declines in public support without another resolution for
- The need to increase public support for UN sanctioned
action, at home and abroad.
- Winning over wavering countries and strengthen the support for
countries, such as Australia, committed to the 'coalition of the
- The need to involve more countries in reconstruction and
humanitarian aid and thus reduce the costs for the US though the US
is prepared to meet the costs alone. The 1990-01 Gulf War cost the
US an estimated US$4 billion with the rest, US$76 billion, paid by
its Arab allies and Japan. The direct military costs for a war are
estimated to vary from, on the best to the worst scenario, between
US$50 billion to US$140 billion, while follow-on costs have been
estimated between US$121 billion to US$1595
It should be noted that apart from current
differences in dealing with Saddam, the key players (and other
countries) in the UN Security Council debate have, in the past,
actively aided Saddam's rise to power. The US, Britain, France,
Germany and Russia for example, despite recent declarations of high
principle, have been very selective in their memory of these
activities and are also protecting their national and commercial
interests in current and post-Saddam Iraq.(8)
Should the war against Iraq proceed, either
mandated by the United Nations or unilaterally pursued by the
United States and its 'coalition of the willing', there will be
internal, and external challenges. This assumes that Saddam would
not capitulate or go into exile and there is no internal coup to
depose him. The nature of the internal challenges depends on how
quickly or drawn out 'regime change' is achieved, the intensity of
local resistance and as a consequence, how much destruction, human
and economic, will be caused. Externally, the war may destabilise
the Middle East, increase international terrorist activities, and
alienate the Muslim community worldwide, influence international
relations as well as have an unknown impact on the global economy.
All these are difficult and complex issues, and given the nature of
war and politics, unpredictable.(9)
While their extent will depend on the nature and
duration of the invasion and subsequent destruction, the two major
problems after an attack will be:
- establishing security and law and order, and
- dealing with the exacerbated humanitarian crisis and civilian
US demographer Beth Daponte estimated that the
total casualties of the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath were
205 500.(10) While it is hoped that the military
campaign will be quick and sharp, analysts have warned against
expecting it to be a 'cakewalk'.(11) Unlike the Gulf War
which did not attack Iraq proper, key Iraqi defenders will be
fighting not only for their homeland but also for their own
survival. Unknowns include the strength and depth of the resistance
to the US, particularly by the forces most identified with the
regime such as the Special Republican Guards and overcoming them
will not, according to Toby Dodge, a Research Fellow at Chatham
House, 'be quick, easy or without pain'.(12) The
60 000 elite troops are expected to defend the major cities,
where 72 per cent of Iraqis live, by acts of suicide to prolong and
inflict maximum casualties. Baghdad alone has a population of five
million and is ten miles wide. The urban battles of Hue (1968) in
Vietnam, in West Beirut (1982) and Mohgadishu (1993) in Somalia
have demonstrated the difficulties of urban warfare and while
needing specialised forces 'the only solution in the future seems
to be to avoid entering cities at all costs'.(13) It has
been observed by Professor Michael Clark of King's College, London,
that despite a new doctrine of 'joint urban operations', 'the
degree of operational, organisational and psychological competence
of the US army to undertake an operation on this scale has still to
be demonstrated'.(14) Should the urban battles be
prolonged with resultant US troop and Iraqi civilian casualties,
there will be domestic and international political consequences for
the US and its allies.
In a worse case scenario Saddam may, with sealed
orders to loyal troops in place, breach dams, destroy oilfields,
and, according to President Bush, may have already given orders to
use WMD by spraying from unmanned aerial vehicles.(15)
He may attack Israel with a few unaccounted Scud missiles as he did
during the Gulf War, but this time with WMD warheads, linking his
survival with the most potent of issues, the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, to win mass Arab sympathies and widen the conflict.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, given his policy of being
tough with the Palestinians, may not be as accommodating as Yitzhak
Shamir was in not reacting. It is expected that should this happen,
Israel will retaliate.(16)
Fears have been expressed that without strong
military control, violent disorder will result from, for example,
pent-up frustration, revenge-seeking and potential civil unrest
along regional ethnic and sectarian lines. In evidence given to the
US Senate, Scott Feil, Executive Director of the Role of American
Military Power, a US Army body, estimated that military occupation
would require 50 000 troops and 75 000 security soldiers,
some of whom will need to have an understanding of the local
politics, rivalries and language.(17) There is public
disagreement between Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki and Deputy
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz on the actual numbers required. The
former said it would require 'several hundred thousands' while the
latter said it would be around 100 000 troops.(18)
The occupation may require participation from allies, or as in one
of the proposed options in the US post-conflict plan (see below),
UN personnel. Australia has suggested that the UN should play a key
role but has yet to agree to any future role.(19)
The US expects the 200 000 Iraqi regular
army, depoliticised (to minimise any political challenge) under
Saddam, to surrender quickly as during the Gulf War, and hopes to
be able to use it to help maintain security and law and order.
However unlike that conflict the Iraqi army will be defending their
country and avoiding open battles, and would be dispersed in the
urban areas. Rounding them up will take time. There are also troops
and militia belonging to opposition Kurdish (40 000) and Shia
(7 to 15 thousand) groups, but using them could be a double-edged
sword should they entrench themselves and support any future
separatist moves. Six of these opposition groups, deemed
democratic, have been given US$92 million for military equipment
and training, under the 1998 US Iraq Liberation Act, in December
2002.(20) There are also about 1000 former Iraqi
military and security officers, operating as the Iraqi National
Accord, living in the US and Europe who could be persuaded to
return. Saddam's agents had infiltrated the organisation. About
3000 opposition members have been receiving US training in military
and civilian relations, civil administration and translation in
Hungary since January this year.(21) The US is also
recruiting one hundred Iraqi exiles as advisers during the proposed
Humanitarian Aid and
An immediate problem will be providing
humanitarian aid and dealing with refugee numbers likely to be
caused by the invasion. This is in addition to the estimated
800 000 currently displaced internally and the 750 000
already living in neighbouring countries. The announced plan is
that US forces following the combat troops would distribute food
and other relief items and begin needed reconstruction to assure
Iraqis that they are 'immediately' better off than under
Saddam.(23) US international aid organisation USAID is
training a 60-person civilian Disaster Assistance Response Team
(DART) who will move into liberated areas to assess needs and
co-ordinate with the military, international organisations and
non-government organisations (NGOs) in the provision of relief
action. 'Massive' supplies have already been stockpiled in four
neighbouring countries. The military will deal with the initial
situation, but much of the work will be undertaken by civilian
While the actual needs of a post-invasion
situation are speculative, what is known is that UN sanctions and
Iraqi policy under them have already resulted in serious problems
in terms of food, medicine, water quality and supply, and
electricity. These are already strained and stretched and thus any
prolonged disruption to supplies and the fragile distribution
system, and new damage to infrastructure such as road, rails, power
stations and bridges, would exacerbate the current situation.
Currently, about 60 per cent of the Iraqi population are dependent
on the UN for food. More than 40 per cent of the population is
under 15 years old and has been vulnerable to diseases as a result
of poor water supply and lack of medicine.
In planning under a 'medium-case scenario', the
humanitarian arm of the UN plans to feed up to 10 million civilians
and care for at least 2.6 million refugees if Iraq is attacked but
stresses that this does not include the treatment of war
casualties.(25) The UN has appealed for US$120 million
to pay for urgent planning. The US has offered US$18.3 million with
another US$40 million in the pipeline. Australia has offered A$10
million for humanitarian relief. Other countries, including the
European Union, are also making contingency plans.
Humanitarian aid agencies have expressed dismay
about the lack of planning, co-ordination and funds, and said the
US military has only recently given licences to aid agencies. While
planning for any new refugee crisis is seen by Gil Loescher of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies as 'woefully
inadequate'(26) the agencies have started making
contingency plans, establishing networks, and stockpiling essential
items in neighbouring countries such as Iran and Jordan.
The outline of the US plan for post-Saddam Iraq
was revealed to the US Senate on 11 February
2003.(27) However since March 2002, planning involving
issues such as transitional justice to preserving cultural heritage
have been the subject of 17 working groups made up of 'free Iraqis'
under the Administration's Future of Iraq Project. The Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance headed by retired
General Jay Garner (to deal with the immediate post-conflict
situation) was however, only established in January 2003.
Given the superiority of US
forces(28) and assured eventual, but hopefully quick,
military success with minimal casualties for the invading forces
and Iraqi civilians, the Bush Administration, in testimony to the
US Senate, sees its objectives within Iraq as:
... the liberation of the Iraqi people; the
elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the
elimination of its terrorist infrastructure; the safeguarding of
its territorial integrity and the beginning of its political and
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has said
that the US would not be 'an occupying force' and, according to
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, would only 'stay as long as
necessary and leave as soon as possible'.(30) The plan
would, according to Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Marc
Grossman, in his testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, involve three conceptual stages:
- stabilisation, where an interim Coalition military
administration will focus on security, stability and order; laying
the groundwork for stage 2
- transition, where authority is progressively given to Iraqi
institutions as part of the development of a democratic Iraq,
- transformation, after Iraqis have drafted, debated and approved
a new democratic constitution and held free and fair elections, the
only way for any future Iraqi government to be truly
Military and Transitional
The US Council on Foreign Relations, an
independent think tank, in identifying the principles for the
post-conflict situation, has urged the 'fullest' involvement of the
UN, international agencies, neighbouring Arab states and for
'Iraqis to play a major role'.(32) The US plan while
accepting some of the Council's principles, is however for 'full
control' under an interim administration for up to two years,
headed by a US civilian but reporting to General Tommy Franks,
Commander of US forces in the Middle East.(33) This will
include a US appointed 'consultative council' and, depending on
developments, there are several optional plans, including a
possible UN administration to replace the interim administration.
Several Iraqi commissions would be established to, among other
things, restore the judicial system and draft a new constitution to
ensure, it was stressed by US officials, 'a representative' regime,
but not necessarily to 'democratise' Iraq, a clear departure from
It would appear that the US administration,
apart from the immediate post-conflict situation, is still
undecided what course to take. In evidence before the US Senate
officials implied that developments in Iraq 'could lead them to
revise the plan on the run'.(35) Marina Ottaway, from
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, sees the plan as 'a
technocratic approach well suited to a military administration
obviating the necessity of understanding and facing the complexity
of the society'. To her, the issue is not one of political
reconstruction, which would involve a new bargain among the 'same
old groups with conflicting interests and
In sum, apart from the immediate post-conflict
situation, during which a military administration would be put in
place, the US has yet to reveal how political reconstruction would
Reactions of the Iraqi Opposition
in Exile and Others
Earlier proposals had included elements of the
mainly exiled Iraqi opposition, taking part in a provisional, and
eventual, federal government.(37) The 50 opposition
groups are by no means united and have, in the past, fought each
other.(38) These diverse and competing groups led by the
Iraqi National Congress under Ahmed Chalabi, are mostly financed by
the US as well as Iran. They have held meetings in London, the US,
Turkey and Northern Iraq and formed a group of notables (prominent
members) to discuss their cooperation and plans, which include a
federal system. Feeling betrayed, they have condemned the US plan
as unworkable, undemocratic and relying on people associated with
the present regime.(39) Chalabi is seen by observers to
have little grass-roots support within Iraq, has said that Iraqis
can govern themselves and should be allowed 'to build democracy on
their own'.(40) An opposition Shia Arab leader, Mowaffak
al Rubaie, has even predicted that there will be 'rebellion' under
US occupation.(41) Bush's envoy Zalmay Khalizad, met the
opposition groups in late February, in Northern Iraq and assured
then that the 'coalition allies' will work closely with the
opposition committees and repeated US commitment to bring about a
democratic government 'as soon as possible and then
leave'.(42) At that meeting, the opposition established
a six-man leadership council and 14 committees, which, according to
Khalizad, would be integrated into the US plan.
Saudi Arabia in responding to the plan has also
warned that the US was 'deluding' itself if it thought it could
control Iraq.(43) Domestically, Senator Joseph Lieberman
warned against having 'one lead player and a dozen character actors
who are offered bit parts'.(44) To allay these fears,
President Bush has since restated the democratic aim for Iraq and
Rationale of US
The decision to incorporate elements of the
present regime and not the exiled opposition is based on US fears
that past rivalries among them and uncertainty of their popular
support within Iraq would surface to complicate an unknown but
inevitably difficult situation in term of chaos and instability.
The military view seems to have prevailed. It is a realistic
assessment of Iraqi political dynamics and culture. Saddam's
regime, despite its brutal nature, has operated with the existence
of a 'shadow state'. This consists of 'the networks of privilege
and patronage where real power lies in Iraq', and it has colonised
the state apparatus.(45) The 'shadow state' is made up
of kinship, tribes, clans and trusted individuals interlocked by
loyalty based on rewards and exemplary punishment. Elements within
this system are also divided based on varying degrees of loyalty,
fear and sheer opportunism.(46) The system predates
Saddam, but was re-moulded by him and reflects the artificial
nature of Iraq when it was created after the First World War. Some
form of its survival is deemed necessary for any regime in Iraq to
operate effectively. The US plan to replace Saddam at its head and
to maintain full control, would minimise any dislocation of this
system. It is assumed that the vetted internal elements, given past
patterns of behaviour would, with their fears of displacement
allayed, help maintain control indirectly, thus minimising civil
Of crucial importance is the control of Iraq's
oil revenues, used to advantage despite sanctions, by Saddam to
cement his rule. Some officials argue that they should be
considered as 'spoils of war' while others say it should pay for
the US occupation and both military and provisional
administration.(47) The Council on Foreign Relations
Report proposed that oil revenues be controlled by Iraqis and
revenue shared fairly through the UN 'Oil for Food' mechanism. It
warned that to do otherwise would convince Iraqis that war was
undertaken for 'imperialist rather than disarmament
reasons'.(48) Given the poor state of Iraqi oil
infrastructure, and declining production of 100 000 barrels
per day, any added and deliberate damage to the 10 oil refineries
as a result of war will involve years of rebuilding and would cost
billions.(49) While British and US firms are keen to
exploit Iraq's vast reserves, some of these have already been
allocated to French, Russian and Chinese interests by Saddam and
await the lifting of UN sanctions to be
A Risky Plan
The permutations and combinations of the above,
with disarmed and vetted elements of the present regime in play
along with possible actions on the part of interested neighbours
makes the post-war environment difficult to predict. Depending on
the duration of the US presence, the plan will test the resolve and
stamina of the US, already called into question in Afghanistan.
With limited US military support, the power and influence of the
new Afghan government is restricted to Kabul. The US plan for Iraq,
depending on its duration, is potentially risky for the following
- With minimal input from Iraqis the transitional US regime may
be seen as a neo-colonial regime which would arouse nationalist and
regional anger. This may undermine the legitimacy of the new
regime, which would be tainted and seen as a creature of the US
after the eventual handover of power.
- Though practical, the plan would legitimise elements of the
'shadow state' which had benefited from Saddam's regime creating
only a more benign version of the status quo in terms of power and
influence, alienating those who are not connected to the system
unless incorporated by the US.
- It would marginalise and antagonise the largely exiled Iraqi
opposition groups and the actions of some of these may cause
internal instability. Both the Kurds and the Shias were encouraged
by the US to revolt against Saddam after the Gulf War, and when
they did, the US abandoned them. There is thus lingering distrust
of US preparedness to protect their interests. Their activities may
threaten the territorial integrity of Iraq, which the US has agreed
to maintain, and will heightened fears in the neighbouring states
of Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
- By emphasising 'representation' rather than 'democratisation'
it may, as a by-product, contribute to an increase in sectarian,
tribal and communal feelings which have been weakened, despite
appearances, under Saddam's regime.(51)
- It is seen to be a withdrawal from the stated aims of early
democratisation, which if implemented, may result in electoral
success by forces inimical to US interests. (In Algeria in 1992
following preliminary election success, a military coup prevented
an Islamic regime from taking power, which it would have done had
the final round of elections been held. The coup plunged that
country into virtual civil war thereafter). The US plan may result
in perhaps a more benign but strong leader. The Saudis have already
suggested that a Sunni Muslim general be appointed as
- If the minimal involvement of the UN and other governments
continues, the invasion would be seen as an exercise of US
'imperial' might with implications for other regional
The stated objectives of regime change in Iraq
and the disarmament of its WMD, do not include what some observers
and Bush officials see as an historic opportunity for the US to
determine the nature and dynamics of the Middle East (and beyond)
by promoting democratisation and modernisation and, as a
consequence, undermining Islamic extremism.(53) These
views have been expressed by, among others, Fouad Ajami, Professor
of Middle Eastern Studies at the School for Advanced International
Studies at John Hopkins University, who has written that such US
action would be welcomed by dancing in the streets.(54)
Current US thinking on Iraq was initiated by Paul Wolfowitz now
Deputy Defense Secretary and by Douglas Feith and other now senior
officials who have advocated the fall of Saddam since the early
1990s. These views were later taken up by Vice President Dick
Cheney who now leads the group known as the Neo-conservatives.
Others who share the same views include Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld and Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy
Board.(55) They argue that a democratic regime in Iraq
will have positive effects in the region:
- It would discourage other states, i.e. Syria and Iran, from
supporting 'terrorists', i.e. groups operating in Lebanon against
- These developments in turn would exert pressure on the
Palestinian Authority, stripped of its regional supporters, to
renounce terrorism and negotiate a peaceful outcome with the
- With the US no longer relying on Saudi Arabia for its oil and
bases, Saudi influence would decline, and it may be dissuaded from
funding Islamic charities linked to terrorist groups such as Hamas
which operates in Israel, and Al Qaeda.
- It would encourage citizens in the region to press for reforms,
after a successful, prosperous and democratic Iraq is established,
and though unstated, may result in other regime change in Arab
While regional objectives and pressures may be
said to have produced some positive reactions already (see below),
this overarching policy presented as a causal relationship, belies
the complex and unpredictable nature of events in a volatile
region. As Robert Higgs of the US Independent Institute notes, 'the
sheer preposterousness of this expectation suggests that is it
fuelled by more of a quasi-religious zealotry than by logic and
evidence'.(56) Lord Douglas Hurd, former British
Conservative Foreign Secretary, posed two critical questions in
relation to war on Iraq and central to the US and British
Do we help or hinder the essential struggle
against terrorism by attacking Iraq? Would we thus turn the Middle
East into a set of friendly democratic capitalist societies, ready
to make peace with Israel, or into a region of sullen humiliation,
a fertile and almost inexhaustible recruiting ground for further
terrorists for whom Britain is a main target?(57)
It needs to be noted that most of the
'terrorist' groups, both secular and religious, in the region are
aimed at Israel while others, based on Islam, are against their own
governments, some of which though brutal and oppressive, are
supported by the US.
More important is the fact that Al Qaeda, though
weakened, does not rely on state sponsorship and has operated
through small semi-independent and like-minded groups. Al Qaeda
opposes Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Arab states
likewise have no love for Al Qaeda or Islamic extremism, which
threaten their regimes. Many of them including Egypt, Algeria and
Syria have in fact acted violently against Islamic extremist groups
and parties. Seen in this light, a US war against Iraq would not
undermine Islamic extremism, which has resulted among other things,
in the September 11 attack.
The political and diplomatic fallout of an
invasion will reverberate not only in the region, but also
throughout the world. It has the potential to cause regional
instability for the Arab states' relations with Iraq, internal
domestic problems for the Arab and other Muslim States, strengthen
anti-Americanism worldwide and may contribute to an increase in
terrorist acts by extremist Muslims.
The Arab countries while divided by their
private fears of Saddam, are concerned about the future
implications for their regimes of the US pre-emptive strike and the
expected popular anger but have nonetheless have resigned
themselves to the inevitability of war. As a response to recent
events, in March 2003, Saudi Arabia announced a proposal for an
Arab Charter to the Arab League to protect Arab interests, but this
has yet to be discussed. The Charter seeks to 'improve the Arab
condition' through reforms including 'enhanced political
urge an awakening of the Ummah (the
Muslim community) to solidify its will and to demonstrate its
resolve to prove its vitality and its ability to face the threats
and challenges of the latest developments and the consequences they
This belated attempt, if successful in
alleviating the economic and social conditions of the Arab masses,
may yet prove to be an important key in undermining support for
extremism. The other key would be a just settlement of the
There are also fears, which also apply to other
countries, that strong opposition to the US will have long-term
consequences. An unnamed US official said, 'they know that if they
work with us they will reap benefits in the end'.(59) At
the same time Arab leaders, including US allies, have warned that
an attack would threaten the security of the region. Prince Saud
al-Faisal, Saudi Foreign Minister said any unilateral US action
would appear as 'an act of aggression'.(60) Egypt's
President Hosni Mubarak also warned that an attack would have
catastrophic consequences as well as 'set off a great fire of
The 22-member Arab League has been unsuccessful
in presenting a united front, with Kuwait dissenting, during its
February meeting of foreign ministers when it urged members to
'refrain from offering any assistance of facilities' to the US.
However, the League and its members are seeking to ensure that they
retain some influence in the post-conflict
situation.(62) The US is still discussing with Arab
leaders their proposal to allow Saddam and key members of his
regime to go into exile.(63) The United Arab Emirates
officially proposed the offer of exile, but it was rejected, at the
Sharm el-Sheikh Arab League's emergency summit on 1 March, as
precedent setting. The proposal provides immunity to Saddam and
others to leave within fourteen days, after which Iraq would be
placed under the control of the UN and the Arab
League.(64) The Summit's declaration urged Arab
countries 'not to participate in any military action aimed at
Iraq's or any Arab country's safety and territorial integrity' and
urged that more time be given to UN inspectors. It expressed their
'total rejection of any attack on Iraq' and called for its
resolution through international channels.(65)
Syria, Yemen and Libya are seen as the strongest
opponents of war, and while the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Jordan are seen generally as US allies, they too have expressed
their objection, preferring action sanctioned by the UN.
Syria, with 35 000 troops in Lebanon, is a
key player in the region and is one of the seven countries listed
by the US as supporting terrorism. Syria, along with other states,
supports anti-Israeli groups (which are condemned as 'terrorists'
by Israel) because they are fighting to liberate Palestine. Syria
is technically still at war with Israel which has occupied and
annexed its Golan Heights, headwaters of the River Jordan. Aware of
the changing environment, Syria, with its military forces needing
an upgrade, and economy dependent on Iraqi oil, trade, and control
of Lebanon, has responded and cooperated with the US since
September 11 in providing intelligence information on Al Qaeda.
Like Jordan, it lacks resources and urgently needs investments and
foreign capital. Syria's relations with Iran, North Korea and Iraq
and control of the anti-Israeli groups operating in Lebanon are key
elements of its pivotal role in the region. It could if it so
desires, cause instability in several countries such as Jordan and
Lebanon. Under Syrian pressure Hizbullah (Iranian supported) has
been withdrawn from the Lebanese border with Israel since May 2002
and Damascus-based Palestinian groups have taken a lower
profile.(66) Syria's support for UNSCR 1441 surprised
many but it still opposes an invasion, seeing itself as a potential
future US target. While wary of US policy it has undertaken
economic reforms and relaxed some of the tight political control
under President Barshar al-Assad.(67) It has also
recently conducted elections (on 2 March 2003), boycotted by five
parties with the ruling coalition, the National Progressive Front,
winning two-thirds of the 250 seats.
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
are seen as allies (have either publicly or privately allowed the
US to use their facilities) and are also concerned with their own
domestic fallout in the event of invasion and have taken
pre-emptive measures. In Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood is the
main opposition, some members have been arrested but the government
sanctioned a rally of 100 000 against the war in Cairo.
Jordan, with its majority population Palestinians and an opposition
also led by the Islamic Action Front which is closely linked to the
Muslim Brotherhood, has prepared contingency plans in case of mass
protests. Elections will be held in June. These two countries
receive substantial US military and other aid. Jordan enjoys a free
trade agreement with the US but also relies on UN approved
discounted Iraqi oil and trade.
Saudi-US relations have been strained since
September 11 and discussions on the reduction, if not the
withdrawal, of US troops were raised by the US in January
2002.(68) Most of those involved in the September 11
attack were Saudis. Saudi-born Osama bin Laden has accused the
ruling regime of betraying Islam by supporting the US and having
its infidel troops in the land of Islam. The Saudi Government has
tried to reject this claim saying that the country is 'ruled by
Islam' and is not under Western influence.(69) Saudi
bases used to enforce the 'no-fly' zone in the south of Iraq were
important during the Afghanistan campaign but because of strains,
the US has developed an alternative base in Qatar. Despite US
reports the Saudis have not announced that they would support the
US. As noted above the Saudi Government wants Iraq to remain
intact, fearing an expanded Iranian state at its border. A pro-US
Iraq would also decrease US reliance on Saudi oil, reducing its
The United Arab Emirates have sent troops, as
part of the 'Peninsular Shield' to defend Kuwait.
Turkey and Iran
The non-Arab countries bordering Iraq, Turkey
and Iran, are concerned with spillover effects on their countries.
Turkey, seeking European Union membership and the only Muslim
member of NATO, with 12 million Kurds, is fearful of a breakaway
'Kurdistan'.(70) Since 1991 and under the no-fly zone,
the Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed prosperity and regional autonomy from
Baghdad. Having US troops in that region would limit Turkey's
actions and the proposal to base troops in Kurdish Iraq has been
rejected strongly by the Iraqi Kurds as well as the non-Kurdish
opposition in exile. In anticipation of war in Iraq, Turkey has
reinforced troops in the border region.
Turkey has also complained that UN sanctions
against Iraq have cost it about US$100 billion in trade. This has
primarily affected its Kurdish areas where high unemployment has
encouraged support for the separatist (Turkey-based) Kurdistan
Workers Party, PKK. The US could only launch a northern attack in
Iraq through Turkey but the US has warned that this 'would be
desirable but not essential' to US plans.(71) This has
put Turkey under tremendous pressure since blocking the US would
mean problems with its Kurdish area, no influence in the reshaped
Iraq and no economic compensation.
Turkey's new Justice and Development Party
government, which listens to its generals, faces popular (94 per
cent) opposition to a war.(72) The US is seeking to base
62 000 troops and has offered US$24 billion in aid and loans,
as an incentive to secure parliamentary agreement. The Turkish
government, which was, despite promises, not adequately compensated
after the 1991 Gulf War, apart from asking for more, insisted on a
written offer. However, this US offer was narrowly rejected, with
fifty government members crossing the floor in Parliament on
1 March.(73) A second vote is likely to take place
following the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his replacement
of Abdullah Gul as PM. The US has since withdrawn its offer.
Iran, which fought against an Iraqi invasion
between 1980-88, and was identified by the US as part of an 'Axis
of Evil', fears future encirclement by pro-US regimes in Iraq and
Afghanistan. During the Gulf and the recent Afghan War it helped
the US and its allies in providing search and rescue missions. On
Iraq, Iran has supported and has influence with the Shia-based
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (which also receives US
aid). The Iraqi Shias, who form 60 per cent of the Iraqi
population, like the Kurds, are not united. There are also
pro-Iranian Kurds. Many Iraqi Shia fought against Iran during the
Iran-Iraq War. Mainly concentrated in the south, Saddam has crushed
their resistance and revolt, which after US instigation, was
abandoned by the US in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia
is fearful that a breakaway southern Iraq would join Iran, posing a
threat to its security.
Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, which deposed
the pro-American Shah, Iranians have been undergoing an internal
struggle between the religious and liberal elements, many of whom
favour some links with the US and more democratic
space.(74) The conservative Clerics have used the
current situation to impose stronger internal control, although
this is being resisted. The outcome of this struggle will have a
profound impact on the Muslim world but ironically and
unfortunately, the impact of US policy has been to strengthen the
less tolerant Clerics.
The US and its allies have stressed that the war
against Iraq would not be against Islam but against terrorism.
However, the perception, reinforced by Muslim political and
religious leaders, including neighbours of Australia, is otherwise.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda warned that it would
radicalise some elements within Indonesia and like Malaysia's Dr
Mahathir, said that it would be seen as anti-Islam and 'a war on
Muslims'.(75) Osama bin Laden, in his latest speech, on
16 February 2003 has made this very clear, seeing the US as
undertaking a new 'Zionist Crusade' and urged Muslims to use
suicide attacks and bombings against the US to prevent a war on
Most Muslims have little sympathy for extremist
Islam and deplore the violence, death and damage caused by them.
However, the religious overtones of President Bush's speeches, the
actions of US and other authorities, in the treatment of suspects
who are Muslims, and the detention of Al Qaeda suspects in
Guantanamo Bay have provided a context to persuade some Muslims
that anti-Islam may be the underlying motive of US action. New US
legislation has also been criticised for breaching civil liberties
and key values, such as the rule of law, raising questions for
friends and foes alike about US commitments to them when they
themselves are threatened.(77)
The religious dimension of the conflict has been
reinforced by President Bush, a born again Christian, who opens
every cabinet meeting with a prayer. He has also used the term
'Crusade'(78) initially to describe the war against
terrorism and has threatened to 'rain holy hell on
them'.(79) In this he has the support of the Evangelical
Christians who are not only influential within his Republican Party
but are also strong supporters of Israel.(80) Bruce
Lincoln, a professor of the history of religion in Chicago
University, who has analysed Bush speeches, says that the religious
overtones have been 'escalating'.(81) In his speech to
the American Enterprise Institute, for example, Bush repeated that
the war on Iraq is a 'battle for the future of the Muslim
world'.(82) This view was originally stated in the 2002
US National Security Strategy document which Professor Paul
Wilkinson, an authority on terrorism from the University of St
Andrews, saw as 'curiously grandiose'.(83) He sees the
US desire to reshape the world to its own image as not unlike the
desire of some Muslim fundamentalists to do just the opposite.
While acknowledging different faiths in the US, Bush in a speech in
Nashville, has also singled out a special place for
Apart from support by evangelical Christians in
the US, attempts to secure the support of the
Vatican(85) and other religious leaders on moral grounds
have failed.(86) The Vatican fears that an attack on
Iraq would be seen as a Christian crusade against Muslims and had
sent an envoy to meet Bush in early March. It should be noted that
Saddam has been condemned by Osama bin Laden as an 'apostate' who,
in his 11 February 2003 message, called on the Iraqi people to
overthrow Saddam, a fact ignored by US Secretary of State Colin
Powell at the United Nations Security Council
meeting.(87) Ironically, an attack against Iraq may
result in terrorist retaliations, not in support of Saddam
but as a defence of Muslims and Islam by Al Qaeda and other
independent extremist groups against the actions of the US and its
Anti-Americanism in the Middle East is reported
to be at its worst. There are three major factors: the US policy of
supporting unpopular authoritarian regimes, the unresolved
Palestinian-Israel conflict, which is blamed on US bias towards
Israel,(88) and US cultural values and material
dominance which particularly affront the Muslim extremists.
The Anti-Americanism of the Arab masses has
generally been ignored by US policy makers as a passing phase
without much long-term effect, except in the case of Iran. However,
Husain Haqqami, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, notes that its significance is as 'a weapon of
recruitment and motivation for extremist groups'.(89)
Miriam Rajkumar, a Carnegie project associate, notes that present
anti-American 'anger cuts across age, economic, social and
intellectual spectrums and has reached alarming levels' with the US
seen as the major threat to the Middle East.(90)
Belatedly, private interests, with links to the US administration,
are planning to launch an Arabic news and entertainment program to
be called Al Haqiqa (The Truth) and exported to the Middle
East in about March 2003.(91) This is to counter the
popular Qatar-based, Al Jazzera, which the US has tried,
but failed to influence.
The failure of the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace
talks following the Gulf War will not convince the Arabs that the
US would, after attacking Iraq, have the political will to find a
just solution for them. This unresolved conflict continues to be
the major issue for Muslims in general and Arabs in particular and
has been exploited by both Saddam and Osama bin Laden. Several
members of the Arab League linked Israel to US policy on Iraq at
its 1 March meeting. As noted above they see the anti-Israeli
suicide bombers as 'nationalist freedom fighters' or 'martyrs' for
Palestine and not terrorists. Saddam has given up to
US$25 000 to families of 'martyrs' but the US has underplayed
the fact that Saudi Arabia has also given millions, and in December
2001 set aside another US$50 million, to the families of both the
injured and 'martyrs'.(92)
Arab and other Muslims leaders have warned that
an attack on Iraq will result in terrorist acts against the US and
its allies. The attack on the US Consulate in Karachi on 28
February by a local extremist group may be a precursor to future
attacks. Friendly Middle Eastern states, such as Jordan and Egypt,
as well as Indonesia, may face increased domestic instability and
resort to tough and repressive measures fuelling the vicious
A war against Saddam will have unpredictable
consequences. Unlike the Gulf War, the US has not only fewer allies
who are willing to commit troops, but faces strong opposition from
many of its friends in Europe. These countries and others have
willingly supported the US-led War against Terrorism, as in
Afghanistan, but have drawn a line against pre-emptive action
against Iraq. The Arab countries, with few exceptions, are also
against a war, seeing their own future under threat with the Bush
doctrine of pre-emptive strike.
The US believes that unless force is threatened
and with a demonstrated willingness to use it, Saddam will continue
to survive. To date, Saddam's divide and rule policy, using his
right to choose suppliers under the UN 'Oil for Food' program to
reward and punish friends and foes alike has worked, both
domestically and internationally, in his favour. The Iraqi leader
may yet buckle at the last minute. His responses to date have been
cleverly calibrated to ensure his survival. His recent Presidential
Decree passed by a compliant Parliament, banning the import and
production of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and
destroying his Al Samoud missiles at the insistence of UN
inspectors, is a case in point.
The US may have waded too far out and the
momentum towards war may be unstoppable. Observers have pointed out
that military action, despite dangers, may yet turn out to be the
easiest part of US policy, but 'like a barbed hook once it goes in,
there is no quick release'.(93) The US will not only
have to deal with potential internal disorder and the humanitarian
crisis in terms of refugees and civilian casualties, but also the
more challenging task of political reconstruction. In this it faces
a complex web of divisions, suspicions and fear among Iraqis as
well as an uncooperative and suspicious region. This situation may
be eased if the conflict is over quickly with minimum military and
civilian casualties, but it will not be a short haul.
In getting rid of Saddam, outsiders may need to
consider that while he is universally condemned for his brutality
and excesses, his primary audience in the current crisis is
not the world but the Arab and Muslim parts, with their
diasporas in Europe, US and elsewhere. Faced with potential
annihilation, he may yet choose to fight, seeing himself as a
modern day Saladin, who incidentally was a Kurd. He is assured that
in the eyes of millions, he (like Osama bin Laden) will be seen as
an Arab, if not a Muslim hero, prepared to opportunistically stand
up for Arab honour and the Arab cause against the most powerful
nation in the world.
Although he might finally lose his life and in
the process destroying many others, including Muslims, his actions
have so far restrained the unilateralism of the US. His destruction
would ensure that many others, with little prospect of a better
life and misguided as they may be, would continue to fight against
the US and its 'coalition of the willing'. It is from among them
that future 'martyrs' will be spawned, perhaps not in the form of
Al Qaeda but in their individual and independent acts, wherever
they live. The war against Saddam will thus ironically cause more
acts of terror by people who had nothing to lose but their
It may be argued that if a small part of the
projected costs of the war were to be used to alleviate the social
and economic condition of the Arab and other people in despair in
the world, they would have less cause to support any form of
extremism. This unfortunately would be harder and take longer to
achieve but a war against Iraq is no magic panacea to deal with the
real causes of terrorism either. The tragedy is that it may inspire
more acts of violence and the world would be none the safer.
While much attention is focus on the impending
war on Iraq, this brief indicates that it is but a part of a larger
US policy to change the Middle East and perhaps the world.
Professor Gary Sick of Columbia University sees this as 'an
imperial moment' where pre-emptive action, based on
unchallengeable, permanent power, the US would determine world
affairs and the war against Iraq is 'a test and validation of the
new doctrine'.(94) It is the wider implications of the
war against Iraq that should concentrate our minds because this
test will result with costs not only for the US but also for the
rest of the world.
It would appear that the US, UK and Spain have
not been able to achieve majority support for a second resolution
and have withdrawn it from the UNSC. A majority decision would have
given them a 'moral' victory. France (with the support of Germany
and Russia) has said that it would veto any Resolution which would
result in war with Iraq. China also opposes war without UN
President Bush on 18 March 2003 gave President
Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face an
US-led military assault.
- For detail of his aims and objectives see 'Who is Osama bin
Laden?', BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1551100.stm
and 'Hunting for Bin Laden', Frontline, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/.
- For details see Michael Ong, Ann Rann and Andrew Chin, 'The
Iraqi Precipice', E-Brief, Department of the Parliamentary Library,
20 December 2002, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/FAD/iraq.htm.
- The US claims that Saddam has links with the Ansar Al Islam an
extremist group operating in Kurdish Iraq against the Kurds. Mullah
Krekar, its leader, rejects this and claims that they had also
rejected US offer of collaboration before September 11 2001 and
that Ansar is not linked to Al Qaeda. Agence
France-Presse, 1 February 2003.
- The UNSC has five permanent members, US, UK, France, Russia and
China, and 10 others are elected from the General Assembly for a
two-year term. Under its rules, no UNSC Resolution may be passed
without 'Great Power' unanimity, i.e. the veto power.
- Paul Reynolds, 'Analysis: Intense diplomatic battle', BBC
News, 10 March 2003. See also The Australian, 13
Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Both the military and spooks are opposed to
war on Iraq', The Guardian, 24 February 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,901728,00.html.
- William Nordhaus, 'The Economic Consequences of War', The
New York Review, 5 December 2002, pp. 9-12.
- David Sands, 'France, Germany Protect Iraqi Ties', The
Washington Times, 20 February 2000, http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030220-11583742.htm.
- The US forces were 'defeated' by the enemy 'dictator' during a
simulated War Game last year and 'won' only after the rules were
changed. See, 'Wake-up Call', The Guardian,
6 September 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,787017,00.html.
- Business Week, 6 February 2003.
- Chris Bury, 'No Cakewalk: Iraq military will not give up
easily', ABC News (US) 3 March 2003,
- See Toby Dodge, 'In the Services of Saddam', The World
Today, November 2002.
- Robert Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, 'Urban Warfare and the Urban
Warfighter', Parameters, Summer 1999, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/hahn.htm.
- Michael Clarke, 'D-Day or Delay?', The World Today,
February 2003, p. 6.
- For Saddam's likely actions see Rear Admiral Stephen H. Baker,
'Could Saddam Take Iraq Down with Him?' Center for Defence
Intelligence, Terrorism Project, 2 January 2003,
- Mitchell Lansberg, 'Israelis Prepare for Life in the Bull's-eye
again', Los Angeles Times, 26 September 2002,
- James Fallows, 'After Saddam 2', Prospect, November
2002, p. 25.
- International Herald Tribune, 1 March 2003.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 2003.
- The six are the Iraqi National Accord, Iraqi National Congress,
Kurdistan Democratic Party, Movement for Constitutional Monarchy,
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Supreme Council of the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq.
- 'Hungary Approves Iraqi Training', BBC News,
18 December 2002.
- Australian Financial Review, 14 March 2003.
- Karen De Young and Peter Slevin, 'Full U.S. Control Plan for
Iraq', Washington Post. 20 February 2003,
- For details of US government relief efforts in Iraq see
- Sydney Morning Herald, 15-16 February 2003.
- See Gil Loescher, 'Be Prepared', The World Today,
February 2003, p. 7.
- Under Secretary Douglas Feith, testifying before the US Senate
on 11 February 2003,
- For details see Economist 1 February 2003, pp. 26-7.
- Loescher, loc. cit.
- Australian Financial Review, 25 February 2003.
- Washington Post, 11 February 2003.
- 'Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy', http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Post-War_Iraq.pdf.
- De Young and Slevin, op. cit.
- 'A Real Plan for Rebuilding Iraq', International Herald
Tribune, 3 March 2003.
- See for example Kanan Makiya, 'After Saddam 1',
Prospect, November 2002, pp. 20-2.
- For details of these groups see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1881381.stm.
- 'Iraqi Opposition Condemns US Plan', BBC News, 12
- The Daily Telegraph, 20 February 2003.
- The London Free Press, 24 February 2003.
- Jim Muir, 'Saddam's Foes Hear US Plan', BBC News, 27
February 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2801079.stm.
- 'US Deluding Itself over Iraq: Saud', Arab News, 27
February 2003, http://www.arabnews.com/Article.asp?ID=23134
- Dan Balz, 'Lieberman Cautions on Iraq Rebuilding',
Washington Post, 26 February 2003,
- Charles Tripp, 'After Saddam', Survival, vol. 44, no
4, Winter 2002-03, pp. 23-37.
- Isam al Khafaji, 'A Few Days After: State and Society in
post-Saddam Iraq' in Tony Dodge and Steven Simon, eds, Iraq at
the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime
Change, IISS, Adelphi Paper 354, 2003, pp.78-92.
- Knut Royce, 'Plan: Tap Iraq's Oil', Newsday,
10 January 2003, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0110-01.htm.
- 'Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy', pp. 10-11,
- ibid., pp. 20-6.
- 'Carve-up of Oil Riches Begin', The Observer, 3
November 2002, http://www.observer.co.uk/focus/story/0,6903,825099,00.html.
- For details of this see Isam al Khafaji, op cit.
- Anthony Shadid, 'War's Aftermath, Now Arabs Focus',
Washington Post, 2 February 2003,
- See Gary Sick, 'Imperial Moment', The World Today,
December 2002, pp. 4-6 and James Kurth, 'Confronting the Unipolar
Moment: The American Empire and the Islamic Terrorism', Current
History, December 2002, pp. 403-8.
- Fouad Ajami, 'Iraq and Arabs Future', Foreign Affairs,
- Nicholas Lemann, 'After Iraq', The New Yorker,
February 2003. The idea of removing Saddam as a solution to the
Middle East was first raised privately within the then Bush
Administration after the Gulf War. Publicly this was in a 1996
paper, A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the
Realm, prepared by, now Bush officials, to then Israeli Prime
Minister-elect Natenyahu. For text of this see http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm.
- Robert Higgs, 'George Bush's Faith-Based Foreign Policy',
San Franciso Chronicle, 13 February 2003,
- Douglas Hurd, 'Between Peace and War: Iraqi in Perspective',
RUSI Journal, vol. 148 no. 2, February 2003,
- 'A Pact for Reforming the Arab Condition', Arab News,
- Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February 2003.
- 'Saudi Warns US against Iraq War', BBC News, 17
February 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2773759.stm.
- Canberra Times, 21 February 2003.
- Anthony Shadid, op.cit.
- De Young and Selvin, op.cit.
- 'Exile Proposed for Saddam', BBC News, 1 March 2003,
- 'Public Spat mars Summit', BBC News,
1 March 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2811403.stm.
- Sue Lackey, 'Syria plays the "long game"', Jane's Defence
Weekly, 5 June 2002.
- Hugh Pope, 'The Heat on Iraq Spurs Syria', Wall Street
Journal, 18 February 2003.
- 'U.S. Plans to Reduce Military Presence in Saudi Arabia', World
Tribune.com, 18 January 2002, http://18.104.22.168/2002/ss_saudis_01_17.html.
- According to Prince Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz, the Acting
Defence Minister, Australian Financial Review, 19 February
- On this issue see Gareth Stansfield, 'Dream On', The World
Today, February 2003, pp. 9-11.
- White House spokesman Ari Fleisher, Canberra Times, 21
- 'Turkish army backs US troops', BBC,
5 March 2003.
- 'Turkey Upsets US Military Plan', BBC News,
1 March 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2810133.stm.
- Ali M Ansari, 'State at Risk', The World Today,
November 2002, pp. 15-16.
- Malaysia's Dr Mahathir, during his address to the Non-Aligned
Movement of 114 nations in Kuala Lumpur, Canberra Times,
24 February 2003.
- 'Bin Laden Tells Muslims to fight "enemy" US', ABC News
(US), 16 February 2003, http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/World/reuters20030216_29.html.
- See Peter Grier, 'Fragile Freedoms', The Christian Science
Monitor, 13 December 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1213/p1s2-usju.html.
- Robert Parry, 'Bush's "Crusade"', Consortiumnews,
26 September 2001, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2001/092501a.html.
- Quoted by Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, 'Combating Terrorism: "It
Starts Today"', The Washington Post, 1 February 2003.
- Jim Lobe, 'Conservative Christians are the biggest backers of
Iraq war', Inter Press Service,
10 September 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1010-02.htm.
- Quoted by Michael Tackett, 'Bush expressions of faith enter war
debate', Chicago Tribune, 2 March 2003.
- For text of his speech see http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,904085,00.html.
- Quoted by Christopher Andreae, 'His answer to terrorism lies
not in war', Christian Science Monitor,
6 March 2003.
- For Bush's faith see Jennifer Loven, 'Bush Speeches give
religion presidential seal', Arizona Daily Star,
23 February 2003.
- John Allen Jr, 'Vatican will not support American War on Iraq',
National Catholic Reporter, 20 September 2002,
- 'Chorus of religious voices opposed to war on Iraq growing
louder', Episcopal New Service,
21 February 2003, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/ens/2003-040.html.
- William Rivers Pitt, 'Osama rallies Muslims, condemns Hussein',
TruthOut.com, 12 February 2003, http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=15176.
In his 11 February 2003 broadcast, Osama urged Iraqis to
rise up against both American aggression and 'socialist' Saddam
- Anthony Shadid, op.cit.
- 'America Needs to Listen to Muslims', International Herald
Tribune, 28 February 2003. Also available at
- 'The Arab World Is Seething', Carnegie Analysis,
20 February 2003,
- For details of it programs see Nina Teicholz, 'Privatising
Propaganda', Washington Monthly, December 2003,
- Pamela Hess, 'Saudi Arabia sets aside $50 Million for
"Martyrs"', Washington Post, April 2002,
- Fellow, op. cit. p. 23.
- Gary Sick, op. cit. p. 5.
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