

National Interest Analysis [2024] ATNIA 3
with attachment on consultation

**Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United
States of America on Technology Safeguards Associated with United States
Participation in Space Launches from Australia**

(Washington D.C., 26 October 2023)

[2024] ATNIF 6

NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS: CATEGORY 1 TREATY

SUMMARY PAGE

Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America on Technology Safeguards Associated with United States Participation in Space Launches from Australia

(Washington D.C., 26 October 2023)

[2024] ATNIA 3

[2024] ATNIF 6

Nature and timing of the proposed treaty action

1. The proposed treaty action is the entry into force of the *Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America on the Technology Safeguards Associated with United States Participation in Space Launches from Australia* (the ‘TSA’), signed at Washington D.C. on 26 October 2023.
2. Article X provides that the TSA will enter into force once the Parties have notified each other through an exchange of diplomatic notes confirming that all necessary domestic requirements have been completed.

Overview and national interest summary

3. The TSA will enable United States (US) companies, government organisations and universities to undertake commercial space launch activities in Australia by establishing a legal and technical framework to govern such activities. The TSA ensures the protection of US space technology in Australia, including rockets and satellites. The TSA is consistent with the shared non-proliferation goals of Australia and the United States, as embodied in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines.¹
4. The United States requires a TSA to be in place with MTCR partner countries in order to authorise space launch activities in the territory of the MTCR partner country. The United States currently has five TSAs in effect including with the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Without a TSA, US companies, government organisations and universities would be restricted from undertaking space launch activities in Australia.
5. Australia’s domestic regulatory and policy settings for space launch activities create an open marketplace and allow for launch by entities from around the world. The TSA will

¹ The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal and voluntary association of countries that share goals of non-proliferation of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policies, as embodied in the MTCR Guidelines. See MTCR Annex Handbook for further information: [MTCR Annex - MTCR](#)

allow US entities to undertake space launch activities in Australia and provide US entities with the same opportunities and access to launch from Australia.

6. The TSA focuses on the protection of US space launch technology and establishes a legally binding framework to ensure US technology remains under US control while in Australia, unless otherwise authorised or in exigent circumstances. While the purpose of the TSA is primarily to enable commercial civil space activities, many space launch technologies are considered ‘dual-use’, which means they can also theoretically be used for military purposes.
7. Australia has existing frameworks for the protection of dual-use space launch technology, including the primary mechanism for regulating space launch activities in Australia, the *Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018*, and Australia’s defence export control framework. These existing frameworks will be used to implement Australia’s obligations under the TSA. The obligations for protecting US space launch technology established under the TSA are consistent with Australia’s existing MTCR commitments, which aims to limit the proliferation of missile technology.
8. The TSA contributes to Australia’s national interest by opening up new commercial opportunities for Australia’s space launch sector. In turn, this will help grow a strong and sustainable space launch sector that can meet the growing domestic and international demand for space launch. The TSA will also strengthen our long and meaningful relationship with the United States on space by helping our close partner manage space launch capacity constraints in spaceports in the continental United States and by providing a responsible and reliable foundation for the United States to access space from Australia.

Reasons for Australia to take the proposed treaty action

9. The global space sector is forecast to grow rapidly from US\$464 billion in 2022 to US\$642 billion by 2030.² This growth trajectory is expected to continue into the following decade, with other forecasters such as global investment firm Morgan Stanley estimating that it will reach US\$1.1 trillion by 2040.³ A major driver of this growth is the significant commercialisation of the global space launch sector, which has led to significant reductions in cost to launch payloads (spacecraft, satellites, equipment, supplies) into space.
10. The United States has the largest and most advanced commercial space launch sector in the world and dominates the global space launch market. Between 2013 and 2022, approximately 6,000 satellites were launched worldwide on nearly 900 total launches. During this period, US providers accounted for over 50 per cent of total satellites launched. In 2022, the US accounted for just under 50 per cent of all launches and almost 60 per cent of all satellites launched. To 2032, global satellite demand is expected to

² Euroconsult, Space Economy Report 2023, 10th Edition

³ [Space: Investing in the Final Frontier](#) – Morgan Stanley, July 2020

almost triple relative to the previous decade with more than 20,000 satellites projected to be launched.⁴

11. US companies currently launch the majority of Australian satellites, which are typically exported from Australia to the United States for launch.⁵ The TSA will enable US companies to undertake space launch activities from Australia, including the launch of Australian satellites on US launch vehicles (rockets). It will also enable US companies, government organisations and universities to launch and return US satellites and spacecraft in Australia.
12. Australia's unique geographical and strategic advantages make Australia ideally positioned to capitalise on the growing global, commercial space launch sector. Many countries face barriers in scheduling space launch 'windows' due to high traffic transport corridors (air and sea) or are otherwise geographically restricted due to neighbouring countries and population density.
13. The TSA will provide a wide range of benefits to Australia's space sector, creating opportunities for Australian companies to meet the growing US demand for space launch activities outside of the United States. It is expected that United States demand for space launch will drive increased investment in launch infrastructure and will scale the Australian launch sector, which will reduce the cost to access space from Australia, resulting in more launches and making Australia more attractive as a global launch hub.
14. The TSA will expand the market available to Australian companies and uplift the entire space sector. By supporting growth in Australia's space sector, the TSA will also open new doors for high-skilled tech jobs and supply chains to support US space launch and return on Australian soil.
15. Increased US investment and activity in Australia as a result of the TSA is also expected to benefit the broader economy, especially in regional areas where space launch activities are likely to occur. In particular, service industries such as construction, transport, hospitality, security, maintenance, operations and logistics are expected to benefit as space launch activities are increased and Australia's launch sector is scaled.
16. The TSA will deepen Australia's bilateral relationship with the United States and further cement Australia as a trusted strategic partner and global ally in pursuit of shared values and objectives in economic, strategic, diplomatic and technology domains. It will establish Australia as a secure location from which the US can access space and unlock new launch sites and new launch trajectories. Gaining access to Australian launch sites will enable the United States to increase the cadence of space launches globally and provide a solution to the crowded launch corridors and congested launch windows experienced in the United States. The TSA obliges the United States to provide Australia with the purpose and outcomes of each US space launch activity in Australia, consistent

⁴ <https://spacenews.com/industry-report-demand-for-satellites-is-rising-but-not-skyrocketing/>

⁵ [Registration of Australian space objects launched into outer space](#)

with Australia's full knowledge and concurrence policy. This will enable Australia to determine whether to approve space launch activities, consistent with Australian law.

17. Australia is also a trusted MTCR partner that shares the goals of non-proliferation of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Through the TSA,⁶ both Australia and the United States recall their commitment to the objectives of non-proliferation and export control, as embodied in the MTCR Guidelines. The TSA does not restrict Australia from developing space launch vehicles and acknowledges that Australia is developing its own space launch vehicles, as well as Australia's intention to enable the private sector to grow the commercial uses of outer space in a peaceful, safe, and sustainable manner.
18. The TSA will also build on more than 60 years of partnership on space between Australia and the United States by encouraging greater cooperation on space launch activities. In addition to commercial opportunities, the TSA will unlock greater cooperation on scientific activities and will enable US government organisations and universities to launch scientific payloads from Australia. The TSA will also enable Australia to play host to the launch and return of major US spacecraft including crewed missions, subject to US approval and the suitability of Australia for a given space mission. In particular, the TSA could help establish Australia as a trusted and safe destination for the return of spacecraft from space, taking advantage of our unique geographical advantages.

Obligations

19. The purpose of the TSA is to protect US technology launched from Australia's territory.
20. The TSA establishes a legal and technical framework for the protection of US Launch Vehicles, US Spacecraft, US Related Equipment and US Technical Data (collectively and hereafter referred to as 'US technology') associated with the launch from and/or return to the Territorial Jurisdiction of Australia (Australia).
21. The TSA comprises a package of instruments, including the legally binding treaty text and less-than-treaty status subsidiary arrangements. The associated less-than-treaty status instruments clarify the scope of the TSA and implement core provisions of the TSA.
22. The main text of the TSA contains ten articles, which set out the obligations the Parties agree to undertake. The Preamble and Articles I and II outline mutual understandings under which the Parties enter into the TSA, and define the purpose, scope, and the key terms of the TSA. In accordance with Article III(9), the Parties agree to enter into associated less-than-treaty status instruments alongside the TSA to facilitate the implementation and clarify key aspects of the TSA.

Scope

23. Article I provides that the purpose of the TSA is to preclude the unauthorised access to or transfer of advanced technologies subject to US export controls and associated with US

⁶ See preamble of the TSA, paragraph 2.

participation in the launching of US technology in Australia. In general terms, the TSA protects US technology while in Australia by precluding unauthorised access to or transfer of that US technology. The scope of the TSA is limited to protecting US technology launched from or returned to Australia. This technology includes US Launch Vehicles (such as rockets), and US Spacecraft (such as satellites).

24. Articles I and Article II(7) set out the scenarios for when US technology and space launch activities would fall within the scope of the TSA. The launch of US technology is to occur from within Australia (Article I). If a non-US spacecraft (that is, a Foreign Spacecraft or Australian Spacecraft) is launched on a US Launch Vehicle, this falls within the scope of the TSA. In every scenario either a US Launch Vehicle or a US Spacecraft is specified. In general, if no US technology is involved in the launch from Australia, then this is not within the scope of the TSA.
25. Article II provides the definitions of key terms used throughout the TSA. Article II(7) defines space Launch Activities as all actions associated with the launch of US technology from and returning to Australia. Article II(8) provides a definition of Non-US Launch Vehicles, which in effect includes Australian and other MTCR Partner launch vehicles. The TSA does not create any barriers to US Spacecraft being launched on Non-US Launch Vehicles from Australia, which includes Australian launch vehicles. Article II(4) defines an Australian Spacecraft to include payloads and satellites manufactured or assembled in Australia and used to conduct space Launch Activities. Article II(6) defines a Foreign Spacecraft to include payloads and satellites authorised for export to Australia by a government other than the US government and used to conduct Launch Activities.
26. In accordance with Articles III(6) and III(8), the TSA does not obligate Australia to approve the relevant licences and permits required for space Launch Activities in Australia involving US technology, including the launch of US Spacecraft from Australia. However, the TSA does signal a positive intention for Australia to approve the relevant licences and permits, contingent on consistency with Australian law and policies.
27. Article III(1) expressly acknowledges that the TSA does not restrict Australian authorities, including authorities of the States and Territories, from carrying out their statutory powers, duties and functions under Australia's domestic laws and regulations.

Protection of US technology

28. The TSA provides that, for any particular space Launch Activity in Australia involving US technology, the specific protections, including access and control mechanisms and procedures, will be set out on a case-by-case basis in any relevant US licence or authorisation, including in the relevant Technology Transfer Control Plan.
29. Article III(1) provides that Australian authorities, including authorities of the States and Territories, are not restricted from carrying out their statutory powers, duties and functions under Australia's domestic laws and regulations.
30. Article IV provides procedures for protecting (controlling access) to US technology, including establishing restricted areas within Australian facilities where the US

technology will be hosted. The restricted areas are defined at Article II(5) and Article II(9) respectively, as Controlled Areas (designated by Australia) and Segregated Areas that are jointly designated by Australia and the US.

31. Article IV(2) establishes that Australia must take necessary measures to prevent unescorted or unmonitored access by unauthorized persons to US technology, including access to the restricted areas where the US technology will be hosted, unless otherwise authorised by the United States.
32. Articles IV(3) and IV(4) provide obligations on both Parties to take necessary measures to ensure that US Participants retain control of US technology (except as otherwise authorised by the United States), and to ensure that all persons under their respective jurisdictions adhere to the procedures in the TSA. This includes an obligation on the United States to require US Licensees to conclude a Technology Transfer Control Plan, which should contain the relevant elements of the TSA and designate the boundaries of the restricted areas. Australia has an obligation to require that Australian Participants adhere to the Technology Transfer Control Plan and the analogous Australian Technology Security Plan. Having a Technology Security Plan in place before any space launch from Australia is also a domestic legal requirement under the *Space (Launches and Returns Act) 2018*.
33. Articles IV(5) and IV(6) provide that, if necessary, Australia must facilitate the expeditious return of US technology to the United States in the event that the provisions of the TSA, the Technology Transfer Control Plan or the Technology Security Plan have been breached. In such scenarios, the United States or Australia may revoke any applicable licenses, authorisation or agreements related to such launches under the TSA.

Disclosure of information

34. Article V(1) does not permit the United States to provide Australia with assistance relating to the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, processing or use of US space technology, unless specifically authorised by the United States. No information related to US Launch Vehicles in particular, may be disclosed to Australia without prior US authorisation. This Article is consistent with the objectives of non-proliferation and export control as embodied in the MTCR Guidelines.
35. Article V(4) obligates both Parties to ensure that their respective licensees are provided with the necessary information from the relevant US licences and authorisations and that both governments also have access to this information.
36. Article V(5) provides that both Parties shall handle and safeguard any classified information shared under the TSA in accordance with the *Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Information*, and in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations of the recipient Party.

Ensuring US access to US technology

37. Article VI broadly ensures that US technology remains under US control while in Australia unless otherwise authorised by the US, or in exigent circumstances.
38. Article VI(1) obligates Australia to permit and facilitate oversight and monitoring of space Launch Activities by the United States.
39. Articles VI(2), VI(3) and VI(4) establish the US control of US technology by obligating Australia to ensure access and control on a 24 hour basis to the US throughout all the phases of a space Launch Activity. This includes providing unimpeded access for the US to conduct inspections and checks and to monitor the US technology electronically including by closed-circuit television where appropriate and safe to do so. The specific access mechanisms, including physical or electronic monitoring, will be set out on a case-by-case basis in the relevant US licence or authorisation, including in the relevant Technology Transfer Control Plan. These access mechanisms do not limit Australian authorities from fulfilling any necessary powers, duties and functions required under Australian law in accordance with Article III(1).
40. Article VI(5) provides that Australia must give timely notice to the United States of any operations that may impact the access and control requirements established by the TSA.
41. Articles VI(6) and VI(8) provide that Australia must require all Australian representatives to display visible identification while performing duties associated with space Launch Activities while in the restricted areas where US technology is hosted, and in other areas of the Australian launch site, to ensure the Australian representatives are easily identified.

Transport, preparation and post-launch procedures

42. Article VII(1) provides for processing procedures for the handling of US technology to and from Australia. This includes an obligation on Australia to not open appropriately labelled and sealed containers, except in exigent circumstances or to fulfil statutory powers, duties and functions, and an obligation to require US representatives and US technology to go through appropriate border checks including biosecurity inspections.
43. Article VII(2)(a) provides for procedures for the preparation of US technology at Australian launch facilities, including an obligation on Australia to permit Australian representatives to participate in unloading US technology. In addition, Australia has an obligation to ensure that Australian representatives do not access restricted areas for any purpose while US technology is being assembled, installed, tested, prepared and/or integrated unless they are specifically authorised by the United States, except in exigent circumstances.
44. Article VII(3) provides that post-launch, the Parties must ensure that only US representatives dismantle US technology. Such US technology must be returned to locations approved by the United States, destroyed in place or removed from Australia.

Launch Delay, Cancellation, Anomaly, or Failure

45. Articles VIII(1) and VIII(2) provide that in the event of launch delay or cancellation, Australia must permit the US to monitor US technology on an uninterrupted basis, to be present if US Spacecraft are exposed or removed from launch vehicles after they are mated, and to monitor and accompany US Launch Vehicles and US Spacecraft from the launch pad throughout the transport route to the restricted areas for de-mating or repair activities or return to the US as appropriate.
46. Article VIII(3) sets out procedures in the event of a launch anomaly or failure. This includes an obligation for Australia to permit US representatives to assist in the search and recovery of US technology or debris thereof from all accident sites within Australia. Australia must also provide a ‘debris recovery site’ for the storage of identified US technology and debris and ensure US access to the debris recovery site. The Article obligates Australia to return US technology and debris thereof to United States representatives without such items being studied or photographed, except in circumstances to be mutually determined by the Parties to protect the US technology from unauthorised disclosure. These launch failure procedures do not limit Australian authorities from fulfilling any necessary powers, duties and functions required under Australian law in accordance with Article III(1). Both Parties agree to allow their respective licensees to disclose information relating to launch failure to determine the cause, to the extent permissible by national security and foreign policy requirements.

Working with international partners

47. Article III (3)(a)(i) restricts Australia from launching Foreign Spacecraft from Australia that are owned or controlled by countries that, at the time of launch, are subject to United Nations Security Council sanctions or by countries that have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. As likeminded countries, Australia expects there will be no disagreement over whether a country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Article III(3)(a)(ii) provides a mechanism for identifying other circumstances where Australia will not permit the launch of Foreign Spacecraft, through consultation and mutual determination.
48. Article III(3)(b) restricts Australia from permitting significant quantitative or qualitative inputs of equipment, technology, manpower, or funds into essential and integral parts of launch vehicles or launch facilities of the Australian Licensees from countries that are not Partners (members) of the MTCR. The Article does not define the thresholds for ‘significant’ and ‘essential and integral’ which provides for discretion in Australian decision making. The Article also includes a mechanism for exceptions as mutually agreed between the Parties.
49. Article III(3)(e) provides that Australia must enter into less-than-treaty-status, politically binding arrangements with other governments having jurisdiction and/or control over entities substantially involved in space Launch Activities by means of Non-U.S. Launch Vehicles. The substantive scope and provisions of such politically binding arrangements must be equivalent to the TSA, unless as mutually determined between the Parties. Australia must ensure through relevant domestic licences and permits that entities

involved in Launch Activities in Australia, including foreign entities, abide by the terms and conditions substantively equivalent to those included in the Technology Transfer Control Plans, consistent with the TSA obligations. Such politically binding arrangements within the meaning of Article III(3)(e) would not require Australia to conclude a treaty with other governments.

Other obligations

50. Article III(2) provides that Australia may not use funds obtained from space Launch Activities for the acquisition, development, production, testing, deployment, or use of MTCR Category 1 systems (primarily launch vehicles). However, funds may be used for the development and improvement of the Australian space program and the provision does not prevent the transfer of such funds to the Commonwealth's consolidated revenue fund for distribution across Commonwealth programs, including space programs.
51. Article III(3)(c) provides that Australia must ensure no Australian Participants (defined under Article II(3)) as nationals of Australia or other nationals operating on behalf of Australia) take any unauthorised possession of equipment or technology being imported to support space Launch Activities, unless in exigent circumstances and in accordance with procedures mutually determined by the Parties.
52. Article III(3)(d) provides that Australia must take necessary measures to ensure that projects related to space Launch Activities, or items imported for use in these projects are not used for other purposes, except as mutually determined between the Parties or the government of the country from which the items were exported.
53. Article III(4) provides that the Parties must appoint an entity for each space Launch Activity to oversee the exchange of US Technical Data between Australian Participants and non-Australian entities involved in that space Launch Activity.
54. Article V(2) provides an obligation on Australia to not permit the retransfer of US technology without prior written approval of the United States.
55. Article V(3) obligates Australia to ensure US technology is only used for the purposes licenced and authorised by the United States.

Implementation

56. Australia's implementation of the TSA will be led by the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Defence and other relevant departments and agencies that administer legislative and regulatory frameworks that intersect with the TSA and the approval of space launch activities in Australia.
57. The primary legislation through which Australia will give effect to its obligations under the TSA is the *Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018*, which will be used to regulate space launch activities involving US technology through relevant launch facility licences and Australian launch permits. The *Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018* includes

existing provisions that recognise obligations under international agreements relating to safeguarding of technology, such as the TSA. Other domestic frameworks that will be used to implement the TSA include Australia's export control framework established under the *Defence Trade Controls Act 2018*, legislation relating to the disclosure of information such as the *National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004* and the *Crimes Act 1914*, the *Biosecurity Act 2015*, the *Customs Act 1901* and relevant state and territory laws and regulations relating to transportation, storage and handling of dangerous goods.

58. Domestic implementation of the TSA does not require changes to Australian laws or regulations.
59. In accordance with Article III(9), the Parties can develop and implement associated less-than-treaty status arrangements to clarify key aspects of the TSA including roles, responsibilities and procedures for the protection of US technology.

Review of implementation and dispute resolution

60. Article IX provides that the Parties will take a consultative approach towards the implementation of the TSA including review and adjustments as required to maintain effectiveness. Any dispute regarding implementation and interpretation will be resolved by consultation through diplomatic channels.

Costs

61. The TSA does not contain provisions concerning costs.
62. There is expected to be some additional administrative costs to the Australian Government through the implementation of the TSA. Such costs would arise in relation to the assessment and review of more complex US related launch licences and permits under *Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018*, as well as for increased compliance and monitoring activities to ensure the necessary protections for US technology are established and maintained. These costs will be a function of increased space Launch Activities in Australia. The administrative costs are not expected to be significant and will largely be incurred by the Department of Industry, Science and Resources. State and territory governments responsible for associated approvals relating to space Launch Activities in a given state or territory are also likely to incur additional administrative costs as a function of increased space Launch Activities, including assessment of environmental impacts, approvals of infrastructure development and mobilising emergency responders. The Department of Industry, Science and Resources will continue to engage with State and Territory governments on the management of space launch and return activities in Australia.
63. There will be costs to both Australian and US industry from conducting space Launch Activities under the TSA. However, such activities would be consistent with the primary objectives of the TSA, which is to create the potential for new space-related commercial opportunities between Australian and US companies. In operationalising the TSA, including establishing and maintaining the necessary protections for safeguarding US

technology, the costs will be specific to each space Launch Activity depending on various factors including the US technology involved and the protections required. These costs are largely inherent in conducting any space launch activity in Australia, including space launch activities not involving US technology, and are not entirely unique to the TSA. Requirements for demonstrating the protection of space launch technology is a feature of the *Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018* and is consistent with Australia's commitments under the MTCR. The allocation of costs for the protection of US technology between respective Australian and US companies involved in a space Launch Activity will be a commercial decision for the individual companies involved.

Regulation Impact Statement

64. The Office of Impact Analysis has been consulted and has confirmed that an Impact Analysis is not required.

Future treaty action

65. Article X(2) provides that the TSA may be amended by written agreement of the Parties. Any amendments to the TSA would be a treaty action and subject to Australia's domestic treaty process, including tabling in Parliament and consideration by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT).

Withdrawal or denunciation

66. In accordance with Article X(3), the TSA can be terminated by either Party by giving the other Party written notification of its intention to terminate, with termination taking effect one year after written notification. Termination by Australia would be a treaty action and subject to Australia's domestic treaty process, including tabling in Parliament and consideration by JSCOT

67. In the event of termination, certain obligations will continue in force in accordance with Article X(4), relating to security, disclosure and use of information and return of US technology from a delayed or cancelled launch, or US technology, and/or components or debris thereof resulting from a failed or anomalous launch. In accordance with Article X(3), all articles will cease to have effect upon termination of the TSA, unless mutually determined.

Contact details

International Partnerships
 Australian Space Agency
 Department of Industry, Science and Resources

ATTACHMENT ON CONSULTATION

Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America on Technology Safeguards Associated with United States Participation in Space Launches from Australia

(Washington D.C., 26 October 2023)

[2024] ATNIA 3

[2024] ATNIF 6

CONSULTATION

1. Consultation was conducted with relevant Australian Government departments and agencies. These include the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Defence, the Attorney-General's Department, the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, the Australian Trade and Investment Commission, the Australian Border Force, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications and the Arts, the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Comcare and the Treasury.
2. All state and territory governments have been consulted on the development of the TSA throughout the course of negotiations, including departments responsible for space and defence, trade departments and relevant emergency management agencies such as police, fire and worksafe authorities. States and territories have also been consulted through the respective Commonwealth-State-Territory Standing Committees on Treaties (SCOT) points of contact. State and territory governments and agencies were supportive of the TSA and changes to state and territory legislation will not be required to implement the TSA.
3. Industry consultation was also undertaken with targeted space sector participants throughout the course of negotiations including launch facility operators, launch vehicle manufacturers and satellite manufacturers, as well as the Space Industry Association of Australia, the national peak body for the space industry in Australia. This consultation was limited in nature with respect to sharing a detailed understanding of the negotiated text due to the confidential nature of international negotiations between governments. Industry consultation will continue throughout the treaty implementation process to ensure industry is aware of their requirements for participating in space Launch Activities under the TSA.
4. In addition to the Minister for Industry and Science, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney-General approved the proposed treaty action.