Australia’s Defence Relations with the United States

Report of the Delegation to the United States 28 June to 13 July 2005

Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

September 2005
Canberra
Cover Photos:

Cover 1: Senators David Johnston and Alan Ferguson prepare to mount an Abrams tank at the testing facility at the Joint Services Manufacturing Centre in Lima Ohio.

Cover 2: Delegation leader Senator Alan Ferguson and Deputy Leader the Hon Graham Edwards MP after laying a wreath on behalf of the Australian Parliament at the US tomb of the unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery, Washington D.C.

Cover 3: The delegation poses with the Australian Military Attache to the US, Brigadier Garry Bornholt after laying a wreath at the US Korean war memorial.

Cover 4: Delegation members Mr Steve Gibbons MP, Senator Alan Ferguson and Mrs Joanna Gash in discussion with Chairman Saxton of the US House Armed Services Committee.
Foreword

The *Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America* (the ANZUS Treaty) is a key element supporting Australia’s national security. The Treaty has operated for more than 50 years and appears to remain relevant in a strategic environment increasingly challenged by terrorism and non-state actors.

The Treaty was first invoked following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (US). The response to these attacks has required Australia and the US to achieve unprecedented levels of interoperability, with Australian Defence Force elements from all three services operating as part of US led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Defence Sub Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade established an inquiry into the state of the Australia’s Defence Relationship with the US. To confirm elements of the evidence to the inquiry and to gain first hand the US perspective of military and strategic policy issues relating to Australia and the Asia Pacific region, the Parliament sent a delegation of seven members of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade to the United States in July 2005 for an extensive series of inspections and briefings. This report describes the observations of the delegation. The report will in turn contribute to the final committee report into the Australia – US defence relationship.

The delegation itinerary allowed the members to address a broad range of strategic and Defence aspects of Australia’s relationship with the US. This report will describe the delegation’s observations in five broad topics. Chapter One will discuss the delegation observations on Defence interoperability drawn from meetings with the leaders of the two US regional Combatant Commands where Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel are training or conducting operations. These visits included briefings at Headquarters Pacific Command and a meeting with General John Abizaid, Commander of US Central Command.

Chapter Two of the report will discuss the delegation findings on the impact of the alliance on strategic affairs in the Asia Pacific region. These observations are the results of meetings with two respected US strategic ‘Think Tanks’ which provide policy advice to all elements of the US Government and bureaucracy. These visits to the RAND Corporation and the Strategic Studies Institute were invaluable in gaining a US perspective of key strategic issues, such as the developing US relationship with China, India and Indonesia.
Chapter Three will describe the delegation visits to US military elements. These visits were selected to give the delegation an awareness of the scope of the US Military and to introduce elements with which the ADF may in future seek to benchmark. The delegation itinerary included meetings with the leadership of 1st US Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF), recently returned from Iraq, and the USS Bonhomme Richard – a US amphibious ship recently returned from service in the Arabian Gulf and Indonesia, where it conducted Tsunami relief.

Chapter Four of the report will discuss delegation observations of three major US defence industry organisations. These visits were designed to observe progress on major Australian defence projects such as the Abrams Tank and the Joint Strike Fighter, to discuss Australian industry involvement and to get a sense of the scale of the massive US defence industry.

In the last component of the visit to the US, the delegation sought to determine whether the strength and understanding of the defence relationship extends to all levels of the US Government. Chapter Five will describe the perspective gained through meetings with the Australian Embassy staff in Washington and at the United Nations, senior US Department of Defense officials and the leaders of selected peer Congressional Committees. These meetings were all informative of the impact and importance of the Australia US alliance.

Exposure to this range of issues and experiences could only be achieved as a result of a very well orchestrated program. The delegation thanks the Australian Embassy staff in Washington for developing and coordinating a first rate program. In particular the delegation thanks their US based escort, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Hofman, for his patient insights into the US and its military culture. The delegation also wishes to thank the Australian Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the Consulates in Hawaii and Los Angeles for their support and the benefit of their considerable experience.

Finally it is important to report one consistent message from the extensive series of meetings and visits undertaken by the delegation. In almost every agency visited by the delegation, the outstanding performance of the Australian Defence Force, alongside their alliance partners in training and on operations, was commented on favourably before any other topic of discussion. This performance earns Australia great credit around the world and all Australians should be proud of these achievements.

Senator Alan Ferguson,
Chairman and Delegation Leader
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.
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<td>Defence Adviser</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Fergus McLachlan</td>
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Membership of the Delegation

Leader (Chairman)  Senator A B Ferguson
Deputy Leader (Deputy Chair)  Hon G J Edwards, MP
Members  Hon B C Scott, MP  Mrs J Gash, MP
          Senator S Hutchins  Mr S W Gibbons, MP
          Senator D Johnston
Secretary and Defence Adviser  Lieutenant Colonel Fergus (Gus) McLachlan
Delegation Escort (US)  Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Hofman
Inquiry Terms of reference

Since World War Two, Australia and the United States (US) have developed strong defence relations. In particular, the last decade and a half has seen a new level of defence involvement encompassing Australian participation in the first Gulf War, the invoking of the ANZUS Treaty, and Australian involvement in US led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The *Defence Update 2003* commented that Australia’s alliance with the US ‘remains a national asset’ and the ‘United States’ current political, economic, and military dominance adds further weight to the alliance relationship.’

How should the Australian-US alliance be developed to best meet each nation’s security needs both in the Asia Pacific region and globally focusing on but not limited to:

- the applicability of the ANZUS treaty to Australia’s defence and security;
- the value of Australian-US intelligence sharing;
- the role and engagement of the US in the Asia Pacific region;
- the adaptability and interoperability of Australia’s force structure and capability for coalition operations;
- the implications of Australia’s dialogue with the US on missile defence;
- the development of space based systems and the impact this will have for Australia’s self-reliance;
- the value of joint Defence exercises between Australia and the US, such as Exercise RIMPAC;
- the level of Australian industry involvement in the US Defence industry; and
- the adequacy of research and development arrangements between the US and Australia.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEWC</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning and Control (Aircraft)</td>
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<td>AIM-D</td>
<td>Army Integrated Management Tank – Digital (M1 Abrams)</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Areas of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ANZUS Treaty</td>
<td>Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States</td>
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<td>AWD</td>
<td>Air Warfare Destroyer</td>
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<td>DMO</td>
<td>Defence Materiel Organisation</td>
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<td>DSTO</td>
<td>Defence Science and Technology Organisation</td>
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<td>EWC</td>
<td>Expeditionary Warfare Centre (Raytheon)</td>
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<td>FLIR</td>
<td>Forward Looking Infra Red</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>ICTs</td>
<td>Industry Capability Teams</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<td>ITARs</td>
<td>International Traffic in Arms Regulations</td>
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<td>JCTC</td>
<td>Joint, Combined Training Centre</td>
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<td>JSF</td>
<td>Joint Strike Fighter</td>
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<td>JSMC</td>
<td>Joint Systems Manufacturing Centre</td>
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<td>MARFORPAC</td>
<td>US Marine Forces Pacific</td>
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<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine Air Ground Task Force</td>
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<td>MBTs</td>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>I MEF</td>
<td>1st Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
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<td>RAND</td>
<td>RAND Corporation (Contraction of Research and Development)</td>
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<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Rim of the Pacific Exercise</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service</td>
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<td>SSI</td>
<td>Strategic Studies Institute</td>
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<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>US Central Command</td>
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<td>USPACOMD</td>
<td>US Pacific Command</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
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US Observations Regarding Interoperability

US Combatant Commands

Background

1.1 The US organises operational control of its combat forces into nine regional Unified Combatant Commands. A Unified Combatant Command is composed of forces from two or more services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is normally organized on a geographical basis into regions known as Areas of Responsibility (AORs). The delegation visited two of these Commands to discuss both interoperability issues and to gain a first hand understanding of the strategic view held by the Commanders of these globally significant organisations.

1.2 US Pacific Command (USPACOM), located at Camp H.M. Smith in Honolulu Hawaii, was appropriately the first stop for the delegation as it entered the US. The USPACOMD AOR coincides with most of Australia’s own area of interest and interaction between the Australian and US defence forces is most common in this theatre.

US Pacific Command

1.3 Commander U.S. Pacific Command is the senior commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. Its Commander, Admiral William J. Fallon, reports directly to the US Secretary of Defense, who in turn, reports to the President of the United States.

1.4 USPACOMD is responsible for more than 50 percent of earth's surface; approximately 169 million square km. The AOR extends from the west coast of the United States mainland to the east coast of Africa, from the
Arctic to Antarctic; including the state of Hawaii and forces in Alaska. It comprises the following:

- Nearly 60 percent of the world's population. 43 countries, 20 territories and possessions, and 10 U.S. territories.
- The world's six largest armed forces: (1) People's Republic of China, (2) United States, (3) Russia, (4) India, (5) North Korea, (6) South Korea.
- Five of the seven worldwide U.S. mutual defense treaties:
  - ANZUS (Australia - New Zealand - U.S., 1952)
  - U.S.-Republic of the Philippines (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1952)
  - South East Asia Collective Defense (U.S. - France - Australia - New Zealand - Thailand - Philippines, 1955)
  - U.S.-Japan (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1960)
- 35 percent of U.S. trade is within the region, amounting to more than $548 billion in 1998. In contrast, 19 percent of U.S. trade is with the European Union, 20 percent is with Canada, and 18 percent is with Latin America. Asia-Pacific nations, not including the U.S., account for about 34 percent of the Gross World Product (the U.S. accounts for 21 percent of GWP).  

1.5 During the visit the delegation met with Vice Admiral Gary Roughead, Deputy Commander of USPACOMD and the Commander designate of the US Pacific Fleet. Admiral Roughead was assisted during the visit by Rear Admiral Mike Tracey the J5 or Joint Plans Officer for the Command.

1.6 Admirals Roughead and Tracey both spoke in glowing terms of the standards and performance of ADF, both during training exercises such as Exercise Talisman Sabre, and during operational activities such as the Tsunami Relief in December 04 / January 05. They described the very high levels of procedural interoperability achieved between the two defence forces in the Pacific Theatre, based on shared military and social cultures.

1.7 Admiral Roughead made particular mention of the shared leadership and decision making between USPACOMD and the ADF at the height of the Tsunami crisis. The long established relationships between the two organisations allowed the most effective distribution of aid to the region without overlap and waste, and with unprecedented speed. Admiral Roughead suggested Australia was the only alliance partner in the Pacific Theatre capable of achieving this immediate level of understanding and cooperation.

1 http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml
1.8 Admiral Tracey also described the importance to the US of exercises such as Talisman Sabre, now regarded as the major exercise in Pacific Command for enhancing the core skills of US forces and for enhancing interoperability with Australian forces.

1.9 HQ Pacific Command also stressed the importance to the Command of the ongoing development of the shared Joint Combined Training Centre (JCTC) in Australia. The JCTC will form an important step in the PACOMD preparedness pathway, particularly in the development of core warfighting skills and for interoperability with Australian forces. The delegation was given the impression that HQ PACOMD would be happy to see development of the JCTC move as quickly as practical toward resolution.

1.10 Admirals Roughead and Tracey talked at length about the migration of US effort and interest to the Pacific. The success of the Global War on Terror in the Middle East had the potential to cause threat elements to look for new ‘vacant’ or ‘un-governed’ spaces. These terms described spaces where the rule of law was insufficient to detect and deter illegal actions by terror groups. HQ PACOMD planning is directed at keeping ahead of these threats by engaging with the countries in the region with territory susceptible to this type of infiltration. The delegation was briefed that HQ PACOMD and the US Government acknowledged Australia’s significant contribution toward maintaining stability in Timor Leste and more recently in Solomon Islands as these were regarded as potential spaces denied to threat forces as bases of operation.

1.11 Members of the delegation questioned the USPACOMD leadership in some depth about their relationship and policy towards China and Taiwan. The response from the command responsible for any military involvement in a dispute between these governments was very moderate. USPACOMD reiterated the US policy supporting one China but opposed to any re-unification of China and Taiwan by force. USPACOMD stressed that they maintain capability based forces in the Pacific, rather than forces geared for any particular military threat.

1.12 Finally the delegation raised the issue of the USPACOMD relationship with Indonesia. The delegation described the importance of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia and reminded USPACOMD that Indonesia was the world’s third largest democracy but that it needed ongoing support from countries such as the US and Australia in developing its democratic structures. PACOMD acknowledged that the US absence from Indonesia had been exposed during efforts to provide support after the Boxing Day Tsunami. Where Australia clearly had relationships with the Indonesian military that facilitated rapid access to disaster effected areas, the US military no longer had these relationships. PACOMD is now an
advocate for the re-establishment of military to military relationships with Indonesia but is limited by US Congressional legislation from undertaking this interaction. The Australian delegation took this issue up in later discussions with both the US Department of Defence and with Congressional leaders in Washington.

**US Central Command**

1.13 The delegation visited the second Unified Combatant Command currently sharing interests with Australia, at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa Florida. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) is assigned operational control of U.S. combat forces in Central Asia and Africa and has under operational control Australian forces in Iraq and will soon have operational control over Australian Special Forces elements as they return to Afghanistan.

1.14 Organized as a headquarters element, USCENTCOM has no war fighting units permanently assigned to it. Instead, all four Armed Services provide USCENTCOM with component commands, which, along with a joint special operations component, make up USCENTCOM's primary war fighting and engagement organizations. This system of Joint Command has been adopted by Australia with VCDF exercising similar control over assigned joint forces through HQ Joint Operations Command in Sydney.

1.15 In its first year as a command, USCENTCOM conducted Operations EARLY CALL and ARID FARMER – both successful in quelling Libyan-sponsored insurgencies in Sudan and Chad respectively. In the 1990s, USCENTCOM became known for its success in the liberation of Kuwait (OPERATION DESERT STORM) under the leadership of Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, and for humanitarian intervention in Somalia.
1.16 USCENTCOM is commanded by General John Abizaid. General Abizaid met with the delegation for an extended period during their visit to his headquarters and was fully aware of Australia’s contribution to the Global War on Terror and to the invasion and stabilisation of Iraq. General Abizaid described his father’s involvement in the Pacific Campaign of the Second World War and expressed his admiration for the ability of the Australian Government to now establish strong ties with Japan to the extent that the Australian Army was now protecting Japanese troops in the Al Muthanna Province of Southern Iraq.

1.17 General Abizaid regarded the relationship between US and Australian service people as the closest he had experienced during his many years of service. He regarded this closeness as the key element in the level of interoperability achieved between the two militaries. General Abizaid was also very complimentary of the New Zealand contribution to operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

1.18 General Abizaid expanded extensively on his expectations of the course of operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He was grateful for Australia’s return to Afghanistan, coming at the same time as an expected ‘Spring Offensive’ by Taliban forces and those forces determined to disrupt the impending elections. He stressed that the coalition must work hard to maintain the correct balance of forces between Iraq and Afghanistan.

1.19 The Commander summarised his current view of the situation regarding progress in Iraq as “cautiously optimistic”. He regarded the majority of the resistance in Iraq as now being a combination of specific Sunni resistance and general Iraqi insurgency. The Al Qiada influence in Iraq is
assessed as being damaged by the excesses of the attacks directed at the Iraqi population. General Abizaid noted the importance of the surveillance operations being conducted by the Australian Airforce and Navy in the effort to prevent the movement of terrorists between the different parts of the CENTCOM AOR.

1.20 General Abizaid also discussed the manner in which threat forces were using the internet and news media to defeat the coalition in the “information war”. He described confidence amongst the Iraqi population about the eventual defeat of the insurgents as high, at 70% of the population in a recent survey. He described his own and the military confidence as high and yet he believed confidence among US legislators was low. These and other frank observations were appreciated by the delegation and added considerably to their understanding of the US view of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

1.21 The delegation was then given an extensive classified briefing by the CENTCOM staff. This briefing provided depth to General Abizaid’s personal observations. Among the themes was the understanding of the multi-generational nature of the war on terror. The brief stressed that coalitions are critical to the success of any extended conflict. The brief described the importance of resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people but stated that it would be wrong to assign too much value to this conflict, rather the war was now against an ideology which targets western values.

1.22 The delegation was particularly grateful for the frankness and depth of briefings at CENTCOM. The high regard with which Australian military forces were held was confirmed and the delegation departed confident that strategic and operational military planning was based on a depth of mutual understanding.

Interoperability

1.23 The delegation pursued a broad agenda seeking to understand military interoperability issues throughout the visit to the US. The Unified Combatant Commands are the place where this interoperability is actually tested and observations by these organisations were given significant weight by the delegation. However the observations in this section are drawn from a number of discussions throughout the delegation itinerary.

1.24 The ANZUS Treaty may be regarded by some as dated however it was observed by some agencies in the US that the codification of the alliance has allowed the development of formal structures for the interchange of
technical and procedural information. The achievement of these interoperability or standardisation agreements is not possible for all countries seeking to exchange information with the US.

1.25 One of the biggest interoperability successes described to the delegation has been at the highest or strategic level. The ADF has now created an understanding in the US Department of Defence that military planning must be carried out in parallel between the two countries whether or not the two Governments have completed their democratic decision making processes. Should Australia subsequently elect to participate in a particular military action then Australian interests will have been factored in at the outset of planning. Should the Government of Australia choose not to be involved in a particular action the US process continues without Australian involvement. This is a unique national position that has been earned over many years of sharing values and risks but more recently through the exchange of explicit liaison officers at the key Combatant Commands and in the Pentagon.

1.26 At the lower or tactical level of interoperability the US agencies understand that keeping pace with US technological advances is difficult and expensive for coalition partners, making interoperability a challenging process. The solution advised by RAND is to carefully target and test the technologies before selecting them for broad introduction. The delegation was briefed that this was the process effectively used during the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq when Australian Special Forces had to be quickly added to the US ‘Network’ to avoid the risk of fratricide. The technologies added to and tested by Australian Special Forces will now enter the conventional Australian Army through the Abrams Tank project and other enhancements to the ground combat force.

1.27 The delegation challenged a range of US agencies to support better access for the ADF to ‘source’ technology such as programming code and in turn better access to the US market for the Australian Defence industry. This desire was clearly understood by the US agencies however the impediments are significant. Many are impediments from the US Legislature which are long standing. These include the Jones Act and its military equivalent, which prevent US agencies purchasing ships not built in the United States. Other restrictions may be within Australia’s immediate ability to influence. Any arguments about increased access to US technology must be based on the maintenance of trust that the technology will not pass through Australia to other countries. It was suggested to the delegation that the practices used by Australian Defence industry to secure their facilities and their intellectual property are not at the same standard as those used in the US. The delegation experience of the approval process for access to US defence industry sites suggests that
measures in the US are significantly more stringent than those used in Australia.

1.28 Finally there was some discussion of areas where Australia was assessed as being able to offer potential advances to counterpart US organisations. These were described as military cultural rather than military technology advantages. The US Army has begun to recognise that a subtle cultural shift is necessary if it is to maximise its ability to win in the complex warfighting environment faced by western forces in the 21st Century. SSI suggested that the Australian Army may have made this subtle shift more readily than the much larger and less agile US Army. SSI described the Australian Army as one of only two or three Armies in the world completely trusted by the US to bring to a coalition these types of fully developed skills. Australian troops were described as being far more than merely a political contribution to a coalition in a place such as Iraq. They were regarded as sufficiently skilled to genuinely contribute in the most delicate of military situations.

Figure 1.2 Hon Graham Edwards, MP meets with Aust. exchange Warrant Officer prior to his deployment to Iraq with the US Marine Corps

1.29 The Chief of Staff of the US Army (CSA) was reported as seeing Australia as one of the places he can seek help achieving the cultural changes he believes are necessary to maximise the potential of US forces in complex environments. One of the areas the CSA sees Australia as being in advance of the US Army is through Australia’s extensive use of exchange personnel. The delegation was briefed that CSA was envious of the Australian ability to learn the best lessons from the US and UK militaries.
through its network of exchange personnel. Proportionally the US exchange program is significantly smaller than that run by Australia. The delegation noted with some concern that this successful Australian program is one of the areas identified for cuts to achieve Defence ‘efficiency’ savings.
Strategic Affairs in the Asia Pacific

Background

2.1 The delegation itinerary included a series of discussions with ‘think tanks’ and academics from institutions devoted to international relations and national strategy. These included The RAND Corporation, the US Army Strategic Studies Institute and with academics from the American Enterprise Institute and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

RAND Corporation

2.2 The RAND Corporation is a non-profit research organization. It is arguably the world’s first and pre-eminent ‘think tank’. RAND aims to provide objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.

2.3 For more than 50 years, the RAND Corporation has pursued its non-profit mission by conducting research on important and complicated problems. Initially, RAND (the name of which was derived from a contraction of the term research and development) focused on issues of national security. Eventually, RAND expanded its intellectual reserves to offer insight into other areas, such as business, education health, law, and science. RAND’s approach to problem solving has become the benchmark for other think tanks that followed.

2.4 The RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy provides expertise on critical issues facing Asia and US-Asia relations. Decision makers and opinion leaders in the United States, Asia and throughout the world rely on RAND analysts for non-partisan, objective advice on Asia's greatest challenges.
2.5 The delegation met with Mr. William H. Overholt, the Asia Policy Chair at RAND. The meeting took place at RAND’s new purpose built facility at Santa Monica California.

2.6 Mr Overholt provided the delegation with a range of insights about the US and Australian positions in the Asia Pacific region. He spoke at length about the relationship between the US and Japan and China. Significantly these discussions at RAND equipped the delegation well for the numerous views about the US – China relationship expressed to the delegation throughout their travels in the US.

The Strategic Studies Institute

2.7 The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the U.S. Army's institute for geo-strategic and national security research and analysis. It forms part of the US Army War College. SSI conducts strategic research and analysis to support the War College curricula, provides direct analysis for US Army and Department of Defense leadership, and serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community.

2.8 Australia traditionally exchanges students with the War College. The student this year is Colonel Jeff Sengleman, a Special Forces Officer.

2.9 SSI is composed of civilian research professors, uniformed military officers, and a professional support staff. All have extensive credentials and experience. SSI is divided into three components: the Art of War Department focuses on global, trans-regional, and functional issues, particularly those dealing with Army transformation; the Regional Strategy and Planning Department focuses on regional strategic issues; and the Academic Engagement Program creates and sustains partnerships with the global strategic community. In addition to its organic resources, SSI has a web of partnerships with strategic analysts around the world, including the foremost thinkers in the field of security and military strategy. In most years, between a third and a half of SSI's publications are written by these external partners.
US-China Relationship

2.10 RAND and SSI described two conflicting views that underpin US strategic discussion on China. These can be broadly summarised as viewing China as either the ‘threat of the future or the prize of the future’.

2.11 In the first view, held by many members of the US Legislature, China is seen as a rising power that will inevitably clash with the established global power in every aspect of competition – including military. This theory is based on the 19th and 20th Century European model in which great powers inevitably clash when a rising power seeks to impose its will on the established power.

2.12 In the second view of the US–China relationship, which RAND believe to be held by the Bush Administration, common interests that flow from trade and extensive engagement will over time bring the two powers closer together, making conflict highly unlikely. The US Department of Defence, an arm of the Executive Branch of Government clearly shares this view. Both Pacific Command and the Department officials at the Pentagon, in discussions with the delegation, confirmed the military’s prudent preparedness for conflict but expectation that conflict was unlikely with China.

2.13 RAND observed that the US Congress appears determined to push the Bush administration away from China. At the same time it could be argued that China is more aligned with the US on free trade than the other
major Asian power Japan, which remains closer to the view held by Europe. Equally RAND suggest that the 20th Century military alliance with Japan in the Pacific ignores the reality of an emerging 21st Century social and economic alliance with China.

2.14  The extent to which China has become the focus of policy debate in the US was a significant observation for the delegation. While arguably Japan was the focus of US interest in the early years of the Bush administration, RAND argues that the President has moved further toward China than any of his predecessors. However, many members of the Legislature appear not to share the President’s view and significant reservations about China’s emergence remain.

US Japan Relations

2.15  The extensive discussion of the US China relationship at RAND and SSI were almost always linked to the state of the US alliance with Japan. Japan’s position in US strategic consideration was described as being either black or white. For example in the early part of the 20th Century Japan was considered an important ally in limiting the expansion of Russia into the Pacific. By the middle of the century Japan was the villain as it sought to secure resources and markets in the Pacific that threatened US power. By the end of the century Japan was again a key ally, first in the cold war containment of the Soviet Union, and later as part of a loose policy to shape the emergence of modern China.

2.16  The delegation was briefed by Mr Bill Overhalt at RAND on the emergence of the Japanese Right, which he believed was determined to “resist becoming a little Britain for the US in the Pacific”. The same group would prefer an independent Taiwan and would resist moves to unify the Korean Peninsular. This group is therefore at odds with the Bush Administration. On the other hand RAND briefed that the current Japanese leadership are increasingly concerned about the emergence of China and are moving quickly to refresh their alliance with the US, including by carefully embracing a security role in the region. The challenge for the US is to avoid being caught up in Japanese local politics, instead seeking to step back to look for common strategic objectives.

2.17  It was suggested to the delegation that the Australia US alliance may be being used by the US to benchmark their alliance with Japan. This in part explains the rapid changes being seen in the Japanese security role in the region and globally. It also suggests a synergy from the cooperation between the Japanese engineers in southern Iraq and their Australian
security force that may not have been evident at the time of the deployment.

Indonesia

2.18 The delegation questioned whether the US appears to be missing an opportunity to engage with a newly democratic Indonesia. Both Pacific Command and the Department officials at the Pentagon were aware of this deficiency but are impeded from acting to improve the situation by legislative bans imposed by the Congress. The lack of US defence engagement with the third largest democracy in the world and the world’s largest Muslim nation is a potential weakness in Pacific security affairs.

2.19 The delegation raised the question of Indonesia, and more specifically the legislative restrictions on US Defence engagement with Indonesia, with the Chair of the sub-committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Murkowski. Senator Murkowski acknowledged the deficiency, stating in her view that it may be largely due to a lack of understanding of Indonesia by members of the Congress. The delegation suggested that US re-engagement with Indonesia was an area in which Australia could assist both parties and is therefore a key observation made by the delegation during its travels.

US India Relations

2.20 India was characterised to the delegation, by the Defence officials at the Pentagon, as the ‘biggest mover in US foreign policy’. It has taken some time but India has been ‘de-hyphenated’ from Pakistan (the India – Pakistan relationship) and is now being considered as a significant ally in its own right. The US officials clearly understood the importance of India as the world’s largest democracy and as also containing one of the largest moderate Muslim populations in the world.

2.21 While India is clearly worthy of individual attention from the US the challenge for US officials is to develop the bilateral relationship with India while remaining a partner with Pakistan in the Global War on Terror. While progress has been made most officials in the US regard this balance as largely unresolved.

2.22 While India may have been “de-hyphenated” from Pakistan many officials now see India as being a balance to an emerging China. The strengthening US relationship with India was described by the SSI as being part of an informal process of channelling China’s power. US economic interests in
both India and China were acknowledged as being too important for overt or military containment, but subtle and less militant shaping were assessed as offering significant long term benefit.

2.23 RAND also offered some insight into the Indian perspective of the impact of the emergence of Chinese economic and military power. The delegation was briefed that Indian officials had briefed RAND that China’s economic success has been a source of great confidence and motivation for India. India, with its highly educated work-force, regards itself as better placed to compete in the global market place than most sectors of the Chinese economy.
Benchmark Military Capabilities

Introduction

3.1 The Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade periodically reviews Defence procurement decisions and is briefed on future operating concepts. Many of these issues involve consideration of capabilities not yet in service with the ADF, such as large deck amphibious ships, or benchmarking against peer organisations in the British or US militaries. The committee members can and do observe some of these capabilities in action on such activities as Exercise Talisman Sabre. However members rarely have the opportunity for detailed discussion with the US owners of such capabilities about the strengths and weaknesses of the structures and systems.

3.2 During the delegation to the US the members sought to understand in more detail the large deck amphibious ship capability and the high readiness expeditionary capability fielded by the US Marine Corps.

1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)

3.3 The delegation travelled to San Diego California to visit Camp Pendleton, home to I MEF. I MEF is a warfighting command comprising ground, air and logistics elements. It equates in size to the combined Australian Air Force and Army. It is a worthy benchmark for Australia as it operates similar equipment, has a similar military culture and frequently operates alongside Australian forces on exercises such as Tandem Thrust and Talisman Sabre. However, for its size the MEF offers a remarkably high
number of ready forces, able to be deployed at 96 hours or less throughout the Pacific region.

3.4 I MEF deploys and employs expeditionary, air-ground task forces in response to the requirements of the regional Combatant Commanders. At the time of the delegation visit the MEF was reconstituting forces which had been assigned to both Pacific and Central Commands.

3.5 I MEF took part in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. In December 1992 through April 1993 I MEF participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, handing over the Baidoa Area to the Australian Task Force. I MEF returned to Somalia to facilitate the US withdrawal in early 1995. Most recently I MEF led the coalition advance from Kuwait to Baghdad in the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, alongside the US Army V Corps. The advance was conducted over 800km from Kuwait to Baghdad and involved heavy fighting in almost every urban centre and river or canal crossing. Elements of I MEF have since returned to Iraq and were responsible for the recent defeat of insurgent forces in the regional capital of Fallujah.

3.6 There are three MEFs, strategically positioned for global coverage. I MEF, base in southern California at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, and III MEF, which is forward deployed on Okinawa Japan, and Hawaii, fall under the control of the Commander of Pacific Command. II MEF, located at bases in North and South Carolina, falls under the control of the Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic. All three are located near major naval bases and excellent airports, ensuring the rapid deployment of Marine combat power worldwide.

3.7 Normally commanded by a Lieutenant General, a MEF can include one or more divisions in its ground combat element, one or more aircraft wings in its air combat element, and one or more force service support groups in its combat service support element. The command element provides the command and control necessary for effective operational planning and execution.

3.8 I MEF is currently commanded by LTGEN John Sattler who, along with his complete senior staff, met with the delegation for an extended brief about the Marines and their high readiness expeditionary capability.
Before commencing their briefing about Marine capabilities the MEF staff described the importance to the Marines of the training opportunities presented by visits to Australia. The Marines are embarked aboard ships for extended periods so highly value opportunities to disembark elements for readiness of work up training exercises. The field exercise ranges in Australia are regarded as among the best in the world and the chances to work with similar Australian units provide an opportunity to increase interoperability and share knowledge on tactics, techniques and procedures.

In addition to the training component of visits the Marine leadership thanked the delegation for the hospitality directed toward their troops during leave ashore. In particular the Marine unit most recently returned from an extended deployment to Iraq and to Indonesia for disaster relief described a stop in Brisbane where they were made particularly welcome.

The Marine briefings covered an extensive range of topics. The delegation were particularly interested in the scaleable and self contained nature of Marine forces.

The MEF staff described Marine force packages, called Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) based on four components:

- A Command and Control capability which has the capacity to act as the headquarters of a Joint Task Force or the nucleus of a larger Marine task force that may follow into a theatre;
- A Ground Combat capability based on a combined arms grouping of infantry, armour, artillery and combat engineers;
- An Aviation element based on the mix of rotary wing transport needs of the force, integral fixed wing close air support and attack helicopter capabilities and C130 based transport and airborne refuelling capabilities. It is important to note that these elements are all Marine forces, dedicated to the protection and projection of their fellow Marines; and
- A Logistic element which consists of sufficient stocks to maintain the force for between 15 and 60 days depending on the size of the force.

3.13 The delegation were briefed on the Marine philosophy in which every member of the task force is trained as a Marine rifleman before he or she moves on to another speciality. This common cultural starting point ensures every part of the force is dedicated to working to support and protect the part of the force engaged in close combat. It also ensures that in a modern conflict where fronts and flanks are uncertain and combat can commence anywhere that every Marine can contribute to their own protection. This philosophy could be described as the ultimate level of joint behaviour.

3.14 The MAGTF of most interest to the delegation was the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) as MEUs equate to the combined arms battlegroups Australia is seeking to be able to embark using our next generation amphibious capability. The MEU is the highest readiness element of the Marine Corps and is regarded as the US military crisis response force for operations anywhere in the world. The Marine’s described the MEU as follows:
- The MEU can be embarked on an amphibious task group of three ships and be sailing within 96 hours from call out.
- The MEU consists of all four elements of a MAGTF with a manpower requirement of ~ 2200 personnel.
- The MEU was a self sustaining package with the ability to operate without additional support for 15 days.
- The US Marine Corps has a standing requirement to form seven MEUs. These seven MEUs are deployed around the world to positions from which they can react to any hot spot within 6-10 days steaming time by ship.
- The tasks undertaken by the MEU are flexible and can range from humanitarian missions and training tasks to full combat missions.

3.15 The delegation confirmed this level of capability is an important benchmark for the ADF. The delegation explored the deployment culture and the family and support structures in place to cope with the year on year off deployment cycle.
3.16 LTGEN Sattler concluded the briefing with a direct request to the members of the delegation to understand the operational tempo faced by US forces. His Marines were on a one is to one deployment cycle which involved a deployment for seven months to a year followed by the same time at home before deploying again. General Sattler concluded his brief by stating his appreciation for the deployment of Australian troops to Southern Iraq where they neighbour the Marines.

**USS Bonhomme Richard**

3.17 The USS Bonhomme Richard, a Wasp class amphibious assault ship, is one of the most modern and capable amphibious ships in the world. It is named after the famous warship of the revolutionary war with the British on which CAPT John Paul Jones responded to a British call to surrender by replying “I have not yet begun to fight!”. Now anecdotally referred to as the Revolutionary Gator, Bonhomme Richard was designed to support amphibious assaults by embarked US Marine forces and provide a rapid build-up of combat power ashore in the face of opposition. The United States maintains the largest and most capable amphibious force in the world and is arguably the only force still capable of conducting an opposed amphibious landing onto a defended enemy beach.

*Figure 3.2* Senator David Johnston observes the super structure aboard USS Bonhomme Richard

3.18 While the Bonhomme Richard at almost 42 000 metric tonnes is almost 30% bigger than the two amphibious designs short listed by the ADF,
many of the design features sought by the Australian Navy are represented on the US design.

3.19 The Commanding Officer of the Bonhomme Richard, Captain Scott Jones (USN), escorted the delegation on an extensive tour of the ship. Captain Jones was nearing the end of his tenure as CO and had extensive experience operating the ship. His command encompassed a demanding period of operations which included combat operations supporting Marine forces in Iraq and humanitarian relief operations in Indonesia following the December 2004 Tsunami so he was in a good position to advise the delegation on the type of features they should support in the Australian ships.

3.20 Captain Jones advised that accepting a small increase in cost to build surplus cabling and processing capacity into the ship at launch would save significant cost and disruption to the capability downstream. His experience of two years in command of the Bonhomme Richard was that the capacity needed by the ship, as its Command and Control responsibilities expanded and the expanding needs of the crew for online training and contact with home became clear, was double that of when it was launched.

3.21 The adoption of an integrated ‘Ship Area Network’ allowed all the Command and Control spaces to be modular, expanding to meet the needs of embarked forces or providing back up if a node was damaged or offline.

3.22 The Captain also described to the delegation the importance to the amphibious capability of the well deck, so named because the ship could take on ballast and lower itself in the water in order to flood an interior space. This interior space became a dock, protected from the elements, where landing craft could be rapidly loaded and sent ashore. He explained that his 46 helicopters could never have moved the tonnage of relief supplies taken ashore in Indonesia in just one load from each of his landing craft. The delegation was shown the importance of the deck space, or “meterage” leading away from the well deck for laying out the Marine vehicles and equipment for operations ashore.
The most significant difference between the Wasp Class ships and the capability to be procured for the RAN is the number of deck landing spaces for helicopters and in the case of the US ships vertical take off jet aircraft. Size aside, the layout of the larger ship and the spaces necessary for maintenance relate directly to the type of design that will be chosen for the RAN.

At the end of the tour the delegates concluded that information supplied supported the ADF’s choice of two large and capable amphibious ships over a larger number of smaller ships. The types of capabilities resident on the larger ships such as the well deck, space for numerous command and control nodes and the ability to launch and maintain a larger number of helicopters, are critical in the rapid delivery of forces ashore.
Defence Industry Visits

Introduction

4.1 This chapter of the delegation report will discuss the outcomes of delegation meetings with three major US defence industry organisations. These visits were designed to observe progress on major Australian defence projects, to discuss Australian industry involvement and to get a sense of the scale of the massive US defence industry.

Raytheon Expeditionary Warfare Centre

Overview

4.2 The first industry site visited by the delegation was the Raytheon Expeditionary Warfare Centre (EWC). The EWC was chosen for inclusion on the delegation itinerary both because the technology being developed at the facility forms part of the Raytheon expertise being utilised on the important Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project, and because the facility is an example of the scale of the US Defence Industry. Importantly the specific technology being developed at the EWC will also feature in the impending Government decision on the future amphibious capability for the RAN.

4.3 The delegation were hosted at the EWC by Mr. David E. Gray, Executive Director of the Expeditionary Warfare Centre. Mr. Gray was assisted by Mr. Jerry Fitzmorris, the Raytheon staff member responsible for support to the Australian business unit of the company.
4.4 Raytheon is one of the leading defence and aerospace systems suppliers in the world. In 2004 it had sales of $US 20.2 billion and employed 80 000 people worldwide.\(^1\) This scale of operation, across the defence, government, commercial electronic and space sectors, is well beyond that possible in Australia’s relatively small market. The delegation was briefed on the following main business units:

- **Missile Systems:**
  - produces strike systems such as cruise missiles, air to air and land combat missiles; and
  - advanced programs such as directed energy weapons and armed unmanned air vehicles.

- **Integrated Defence Systems:**
  - mission systems integration for submarines, including the Collins Class;
  - other naval systems such as the future US amphibious class and the next generation destroyer;
  - integrated air defence; and
  - ballistic missile defence.

- **Intelligence and Information Systems** – which produces intelligence and information solutions.

- **Space and Airborne Systems:**
  - Tactical aircraft systems such as the targeting pod in competition for the upgrade to Australia’s FA18;
  - Unmanned and reconnaissance sensors such as those that form the sensor package for the Global Hawk UAV; and
  - Electronic warfare and communications systems.

- **Network Centric Systems** – supporting networked decision making:
  - Command and control;
  - Network sensors; and
  - Communications.

**Observations**

4.5 In Australia Raytheon is represented by a wholly owned subsidiary company. The company described its Australian subsidiary as a self sufficient indigenous company, optimised for the Australian market and able to leverage particular Australian expertise into the global market. The

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\(^1\) Unpublished Raytheon Briefing to Australian Parliamentary Delegation, 2 July 2005.
delegation was particularly interested in the process of ‘reach-back’ in which the Australian subsidiary can bring forward US technology in a cost effective manner.

4.6 The delegation was briefed that reach-back was being used to cost effectively support a range of current ADF projects. This reach back reduced the risk to the Australian Government by drawing on expertise already developed on US projects. The reach-back support includes the following:

- Collins replacement combat system – the use of US engineers seconded to Australia for training of Australian technicians and ongoing through life support;
- Air Warfare Destroyer – bringing to Australia Aegis knowledge and ship systems integration experience; and
- RAN Amphibious Ship project bid – importing to Australia system architects, major program management and supply chain management.

4.7 The delegation exposure to the scale of the Raytheon operation and the philosophy of reach-back support was an important aid to understanding the industry component of the Australia – US Defence relationship. The delegation is grateful to Raytheon Australia for facilitating their access to the parent company and to Raytheon US for the frank and extensive briefing and tour.

The M1 Abrams Tank

Overview

4.8 In 2004 the Defence Sub Committee reviewed the Defence decision to purchase new main battle tanks (MBT). The Committee noted concerns about the purchase but concluded that the "new MBTs will provide a positive addition to the Army and the ADF's broader objectives." However some Australian media speculation that the decision to purchase a refurbished Abrams tank meant Australia would be exposed to the same problems as the projects to procure the refurbished amphibious ships Manoora and Kanimbla and the Sea Sprite helicopters. To determine whether Defence faced a similar risk with the Abrams, the committee included a visit to the US Joint Services Manufacturing Centre (JSMC). The JSMC, formally known as the Lima Tank Plant, is the home of the Abrams tank.

4.9 At Lima the delegation was briefed by the US Government agencies with responsibility for Abrams, the manufacturing plant leadership and the industry contractor, General Dynamics Land Systems. This comprehensive
brief gave the delegation insight into the US military’s long term plans for the vehicle, their expectations of the contractor, and the performance of the vehicle on operations. General Dynamics then gave a similarly detailed brief about the tank Australia is purchasing which, importantly, was conducted in the presence of the US project team who have proven to be a discerning customer.

4.10 The delegation then proceeded into the manufacturing plant where they observed the re-manufacturing of tanks for the US Army. While some steel for the Australian tanks has arrived at the plant, Australian manufacture has not yet commenced so the delegation observed the progress of US vehicles. It is important to note that one of the strengths the delegation observed about this Australian defence project is that it piggy-backs on a very successful US program with minimal changes.

Observations

4.11 The Project Manager for US ground combat systems Colonel Larry Hollingsworth briefed the delegation on the US system for managing their Armoured Fighting Vehicle fleet. He described the impact of the high operating tempo faced by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the resulting sustainment and modernisation plans. The delegation was impressed by the detail of the US plan and with the US intention to support the Abrams tank through until 2050.

4.12 The delegation also noted that the M1 Abrams Army Integrated Management – Digital (AIM-D) version of the tank would form the majority of the US tank fleet until 2035. This is a clear strength of the Abrams project from the Australian standpoint as we are now linked to an organisation supporting ~ 4000 tanks in service, the majority of which are identical to those purchased by Australia. The delegation did note that the year 2035 becomes an important decision point for Australia. At that time the next generation Abrams will merge with the follow on system, called the Future Combat System, forcing Australia to choose one path or the other.

4.13 The Australian purchase has come at a key juncture in the life of the Abrams. In the last decade, in both the US and Australia, many civilian theorists questioned the utility of heavily protected weapon systems that were difficult to strategically deploy. These theorists were convinced that rapid deployment was more important than protection for soldiers, convinced by a series of peacekeeping deployments where the threat of close combat was minimal. It was during this period that Australia’s Leopard tank was neglected. However the ‘Blackhawk Down’ incident in Somalia showed the increased lethality of the modern battlefield, in which
even the most irregular forces have access to heavy weapons and rocket propelled grenades that can destroy lighter military vehicles. This modern battlefield demands we provide our valuable soldiers the best protection available. As the US military became aware of this need for protection they decided to modernize the Abrams tank and their other key land fighting systems.

4.14 It is this modernised Abrams that was demonstrated to the delegation. The tank includes a new and vastly more capable Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) sighting system and fire control computer which will allow Australian ground forces to detect targets and destroy them with precision, critically important when the threat forces may be operating amongst the civilian population. The Australian tank has improved armour that negates the need for depleted uranium and which forms part of a survivability package that includes blast proof compartments and fire suppression systems more advanced than on any other ground combat vehicle in the world. The tank has been modernised to be digitally capable, meaning that it can form part of a networked team with systems such as the Tiger Helicopter, the Airforce Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft and in the future the Joint Strike Fighter.

Figure 4.1 The delegation observes the test and evaluation phase of the M1 Abrams remanufacturing process

4.15 Finally to dispel the idea that the Abrams purchased by Australia was simply a veneer over an old vehicle the delegation was shown the complete upgrade process. In one of the largest enclosed production facilities in the world the vehicle is reduced to its original internal frame before being completely rebuilt. The most modern engineering processes
available are in use at the plant, including computer controlled laser and water jet cutters, which achieve error tolerances previously unheard of in manufacturing on this scale. The delegation observed the fitting of a new more fuel efficient engine, a pulse jet dust filter system and digital electronics to integrate the numerous systems on the vehicle. To complete their understanding of the process the delegation were taken out onto the test facility and driven around the test track in completed vehicles.

4.16 After an extensive inspection the delegation were impressed with the Abrams rebuild process. The 59 M1 Abrams tanks for Australia have been selected from tanks whose usage has been in peace time training and which have not fired depleted uranium ammunition. They will not include any elements of depleted uranium armour but will be the best protected fighting vehicles in the world. Significantly for Australia the tanks will be almost exactly the same as those used by the majority of the US Army and have been procured under a US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract linked directly to the price and arrangements in place for the US military, ensuring best value for the Australian tax payer.

Lockheed Martin - Joint Strike Fighter

Overview

4.17 The aim of the visit to the Washington Headquarters of Lockheed Martin was to enable the delegates to understand the range of issues associated with Australia’s likely purchase of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

4.18 The Defence Sub-Committee has received a number of submissions during inquiries into the Defence Annual Report 2003-04 and the current inquiry into Australia – US Defence relations concerning progress on the JSF project. Because the project represents the largest single defence procurement in Australian history it will continue to be followed closely by the Parliament and the public until the capability is delivered into service. With so many opinions being expressed about the JSF it was considered important that the delegation seek briefings from the US Government Project Office and the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, in order to receive the most recent and accurate information.

4.19 To this end the delegation was grateful for the opportunity to speak with Admiral (USN) Steve Enewold, the Project Director and Mr. Rick Kirkland, Vice President Lockheed Martin Corporate and International Business Development. In speaking with these officials the delegation intent was to cut through the ‘fog of war’ to get to the real state of the project.
Observations

4.20 One of the issues raised in submissions to the Inquiry relate to the actual performance characteristics of the aircraft. The aircraft has been criticised for not having significantly more aeronautic capability than the current generation of Russian built aircraft being procured by countries in the Asia Pacific. At the outset of the briefing the project office made it clear to the delegation that the aim of the project was not to make a quantum leap in aeronautic performance and that criticism in this aspect of the project was misinformed. The aircraft is intended to have similar aerodynamic performance characteristics as the FA18 or the US F16.

4.21 However the aircraft will make a quantum advance in the area of stealth technology, both in reducing signature and in the application of countermeasures. The aircraft will also have advanced avionics, able to network with other JSF and other command and control systems such as the AEWC aircraft. This networked capability, combined with stealth technology, is intended to enable the JSF to defeat threat aircraft before aeronautic advantage is an issue. The conventional take-off aircraft will also have a 50% range advantage over the FA18, placing the JSF range close to midway between the FA18 and the longer range F111. Finally the aircraft is intended to be significantly easier to support, as a result of greater reliability and lower cost of operation, than current generation aircraft. Therefore the US Project Office argue, JSF as a component of a complete capability, will be significantly more able than the aircraft it replaces and other aircraft being operated in the region.

4.22 Criticism of the choice of aircraft has also included comment that the JSF has not achieved weight or performance targets. The assertion has been taken up by some members of the US Congress who have threatened to cut development funding to the aircraft until the weight problems have been resolved. The delegation put these criticisms to the US Project Office. Admiral Enewold, who has responded to the Congressional criticisms, explained that the majority of the weight over-runs have been in the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the JSF. Significant re-engineering of the aircraft was necessary as a result of these weight issues, causing a 12 month delay in the project. However the conventional JSF, sought by Australia, is projected to meet or exceed key performance parameters set by the US Airforce. Weight savings identified in the STOVL aircraft will in turn be passed on the conventional aircraft, potentially further improving performance and allowing increased development potential over the life of the aircraft.

4.23 While redesign work is being undertaken, the test flight program will continue on the original or ‘heavy’ aircraft. This will ensure minimal delay
occurs in the systems integration work, which is generally regarded as the most complex element of the JSF system. The project office acknowledged that there had been a 12 month delay from the original time-line developed at the outset of the project, but indicated that as long as the development funding agreed by the US Government was not altered, there would be no further slippage over the remainder of the projected development schedule.

4.24 One of the most interesting observations to emerge during discussion of production and scheduling, concerned the state of the art digital design and manufacturing systems used on JSF. The multi-national team building the aircraft, including a number of Australian companies, share a digital design data-base for the aircraft. Collaborative design takes place in this virtual or internet based ‘design room’, allowing precise input from all agencies as the aircraft takes shape. This is a 24 hour process in which Australian design inputs take place during the Australian working day and then form part of US based considerations the next day.

4.25 A significant outcome of this digital design function has been the increased accuracy of the manufacturing process. Assembly time has more than halved and error rates in fabrication are also less than half of that achieved on legacy aircraft. These results are projected to allow the manufacturers to meet affordability expectations and may accelerate delivery schedules once production of service aircraft commences. Projected production costs are expected to be approximately equal to the current cost of the F16.

Figure 4.2 Hon Bruce Scott MP pilots the F35 Joint Strike Fighter simulator, observed by Mrs Joanna Gash MP, Crystal City Virginia
Discussions of alternatives to the JSF by Australian air power theorists have suggested the F22 Raptor may be a better capability for the RAAF. Lockheed Martin also produce this highly capable air superiority fighter and were able to provide some comment on this alternative for the delegation. Firstly it is not clear whether the F22 will be sold to any allies because of the sensitivity of technology and the International Traffic in Arms (ITARS) limitations imposed by Congress. If such a sale was possible the cost of the aircraft would be expected to be exponentially greater than the JSF as the development costs of the aircraft will be shared over a far smaller number of aircraft. However, Lockheed Martin briefed the delegation that many of the avionic capabilities of the two aircraft are now common. As an advance is identified on one platform it is added to the other, reducing overall cost and increasing capability. By the time the JSF is produced Lockheed Martin expect many elements of the two aircraft to be common.

Finally the delegation was briefed on Australian Industry participation in the program by Mr Abhay Paranjape, the JSF International Program Manager for Lockheed Martin. Mr Paranjape briefed the delegation that the allied industry participation program did not include any automatic industry offsets. Each business competing for work on the program must win the work on merit in a competitive process.

The $AUD 200 million Australian Government contribution to the program meant that Australia was regarded as a Tier 3 partner. The Tier 1 partners are the US and UK, responsible for the majority of the main assemblies that comprise the aircraft. Tier 2 partners include the Italians and Dutch, each able to bid for significant sub-systems. Industries from Tier 3 partner countries are able to bid on contracts for the sub systems that comprise the Tier 1 and 2 assemblies.

Australian companies have been very successful in winning business in this very competitive environment. Current business, in the prototyping or low rate production phase amounts to $US 210 million. If the Australian firms continue to perform at their current high level these contracts are expected to expand significantly in the full production phase in which up to 4000 aircraft are expected to be made.

Lockheed Martin have been particularly impressed by the innovation and quality of the Australian companies who have now been granted access to contribute to the digital design of the aircraft. They have also been impressed by the collaborative or team Australia approach used by the Australian Government to group like companies as allies rather than enemies on the project. As a result Australian companies have a very high
take up rate on bids when compared with peer nations. Of the $US 846 million in projects available to Tier 3 partners Australian companies have had the ability to bid against $US 433 million in opportunities. Lockheed Martin briefed the delegation that the $US 210 million achieved against the opportunities available has been the highest amongst contributing countries.

4.31 In summary the visit to the Washington Headquarters of Lockheed Martin allowed the delegation to discuss a number of issues that surround the JSF procurement decision in Australia. The delegation was made aware of the true delays due to weight over-runs in the design of some variants of the JSF. The delegation was made aware of the impact of possible delays in funding the development phase of production by the US Congress. While these restrictions involve relatively small amounts of money they may cause significant delays in the project that will impact on Australia’s proposed delivery time line.

4.32 The Congressional decisions are expected in late 2005 and need to be followed closely by the Government and the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. The Committee will continue its oversight of this issue, including the US project office response to Congressional criticisms, through an inquiry into the ability of the ADF to maintain air superiority in our region to 2020.
Observations of the Defence Relationship by the Components of the US Government

Introduction

5.1 The delegation achieved significant insight into the Australia US defence relationship during extensive visits to the US Combatant Commands. Pacific Command and Central Command are the agencies with the most frequent contact with Australia and the ADF and in these Headquarters the delegation experienced the very strong good will that flows to Australia from the Defence relationship. The Strategic think tanks visited by the delegation in the US also understood the relationship that has developed between the two Defence Forces and in some cases regarded this relationship as the closest interaction between the US and any of its allies.

5.2 In the last component of the visit to the US, the delegation sought to determine whether the strength of the defence relationship extends to the top levels of the US Government.

5.3 To determine the extent the Defence relationship influences thinking at the executive and legislative levels of the US Government the delegation had a series of meetings in Washington D.C. and in New York These included extended discussions with Ambassador Richardson and his senior advisers at the Australian Embassy, Ambassador Dauth and his senior staff at Australia’s permanent mission to the United Nations, meetings with senior US Department of Defence officials and with some of the leaders of key Congressional Committees.
An Overview of the Relationship

5.4 The delegation was grateful to receive considerable input from the senior members of the Australian Embassy staff. These included: Mr Gary Quinlan, the Deputy Chief of Mission; Admiral Raydon Gates, Head Australian Defence Staff Washington; Mr Andrew Shearer, Minister Counsellor (Political); Ms Anastasia Carayanides, Minister Counsellor (Commercial); Ms Jane Hardy, Counsellor (Congressional); and Mr Michael Shoebridge, Counsellor (Defence Policy). Much of the material briefed to the delegation was background material to prepare the members for discussions with US officials and will not be reproduced in this report, however a number of observations added considerably to the delegations understanding of the key issues in the Australia US relations.

5.5 The delegation was briefed that while understandably much discussion of the relationship in Australia concentrates on its value to this country, the alliance is also regarded as very important to the US. Australia is regarded in Washington as a key US ally in East Asia, to the extent that our alliance is used to benchmark the US alliance with other allies such as Japan.

5.6 It was also made clear to the delegation however, that the relationship was not static. The alliance was described as having a hard or pragmatic edge, leading to the question “What will Australia offer next?” Naturally the US, like Australia, will seek to understand where the benefit is for them in each transaction between the two nations. However it appears clearly understood at the Executive Level of the Administration that Australia more than carries its weight in the Pacific, thus freeing American resources to be used in locations they are harder pressed. This observation accords with the impression given to the delegation at HQ Pacific Command.

The US Department of Defense

5.7 The US Department of Defense forms part of the Executive Arm of the US Government. To explore the Department view of the bilateral Defence relationship the delegation met with Mr Peter Florey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and a number of senior members of the Defense staff.

5.8 Mr Florey and his staff were particularly positive about the Defence relationship. They described it as being based on shared values underpinned by a considerable history of common sacrifice. Australia was considered to be part of a very small group of countries with whom the
US shares such a position. Mr Florey also made it clear that the relationship with Australia was not taken for granted and the range and depth of the dialogue between the two countries is considered remarkable.

5.9 An example of the extent to which Australian opinion is trusted by the US Department is the degree to which Australian military officers are embedded in key US Defense Headquarters. The delegation was briefed on the types of sensitive tasks being undertaken by these officers and acknowledges the benefit to both organisations of this input.

5.10 A further example of the role Australia has in the relationship emerged during discussion of both countries’ relationships with Indonesia. The US Defense officials acknowledge the importance of Indonesia in the Asia/Pacific region and equally acknowledge the lack of understanding of the newly democratic nation by US agencies. They value the relationship Australia has established with the Government of President Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO, particularly because legislative restrictions imposed by the US Congress prevent interaction between the US Military and Indonesia. The US Defense officials encouraged the delegation to take up the issue of Indonesia with the US Legislature during their meetings. The delegation accepted this request and engaged the Congressional officials at some length.

5.11 The discussions with the Defense officials made clear to the delegation how important Australia’s bilateral relations with its regional neighbours are to stability in the Asia Pacific region, particularly as they can be used to increase the level of understanding of regional issues within America. The Australian leadership and facilitation of western access to Aceh in the aftermath of the Boxing Day Tsunami have demonstrated this regional leadership position to a wide audience in the US and highlighted the retarding effect of US restrictions on interaction with Indonesia.

5.12 During the course of the discussion attention turned toward the third partner of the ANZUS Alliance, New Zealand. The US response was quite straightforward. They indicated that Australia and New Zealand are viewed quite separately by the US, not together as the formal ANZUS alliance suggests. The New Zealand contributions to operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been very well received by the US leadership but some tension remained in the relationship over New Zealand’s restriction of access to nuclear powered US Navy ships. The delegation observed that the Australia US defence relationship was currently more substantial than the US defence relationship with New Zealand.

5.13 In further discussion about combined training the US Defense officials described the importance of the Joint Combined Training Centre (JCTC) to US involvement in the region. The benefit to such organisations as the US
Marines and Navy in Pacific Command has been described in other chapters of this report but the Department officials also envisioned the JCTC as a location where Australia and the US could also interact with other regional allies, bringing countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines into the excellent interoperability arrangements achieved between Australia and the US. This expansion of military interaction was described as necessary to ensure US engagement was seen to extend beyond what may appear to be selfish Global War on Terror goals.

5.14 The discussions with the US Defense officials were frank and wide ranging.

The US Congress

5.15 To get a complete sense of the view held toward Australia by this immense and complex legislative body is a full time task for the staff of the Australian Embassy in Washington D.C. The delegation sought the opinions of peer committees in the Congress to gain a snap shot of the thinking of those working on similar issues in the US.

5.16 The outcome of the meetings with the peer Committee Chairs were quite different to those with the leaders in the US Defense Department. Where those discussions included very specific understanding of the relationship with Australia and the key elements of interoperability, the discussions in the Legislature were less specific and necessarily reflected the wide diversity of views within this representative arm of government.

5.17 The delegation commenced its meetings at Congress with Congressman Jim Saxton, Chairman of the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Sub Committee of the House Committee on Armed Services. Chairman Saxton explained to the delegation that Australia was warmly regarded by the majority of members of the Congress but was rarely more specifically considered. However, he continued, members such as himself and those who deal with defence and national security matters regard Australia’s specific contribution to the alliance very highly. He grouped Australia with the UK as two of the few countries who understand the nature of the global terror threat, making the bonds between the nations even stronger.

5.18 Chairman Saxton appeared to be less aware of the specifics of the Defence relationship. He was aware that Australia was a partner in such major programs as the Joint Strike Fighter, but had less understanding of broader engagement and interoperability issues. Chairman Saxton
explained that he believed that Congress would value the international involvement in the JSF program highly, making it more attractive to the law makers than exclusive US programs, such as the F22 Raptor.

5.19 The delegation next met with Senator Lisa Murkowski, the Chair of the Sub Committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator Murkowski is a relatively recent appointment to Chair of the Asia Pacific sub-committee but clearly determined to master her brief and valued the delegation view of the region. She was aware of the general nature of the defence relationship between the two countries, particularly the Australian involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan but otherwise confirmed Chairman Saxton’s view that Congress members rarely focussed on Australia or its issues.

Figure 5.1  Delegation members meet with US Senator Lisa Murkowski in Washington D.C. (R-L Sen Steve Hutchins, Sen Lisa Murkowski, Mr Steve Gibbons MP and Hon Mr Graham Edwards MP)

5.20 Senator Murkowski was particularly interested to hear the Australian view of the importance of Indonesia in East Asian and Pacific affairs. The delegation stressed the importance of the removal of legislative bans on US International Military Education and Training (IMET) in achieving the recommencement of US Defense engagement in Indonesia. Senator Murkowski was aware of the sensitivities over these restrictions. She advised that the excellent cooperation achieved with Indonesia during the period of Tsunami relief and cooperation with the investigation of the deaths of US civilians near a mine in West Papua was easing concerns amongst her Congressional colleagues. This type of cooperation was considered essential before legislative restrictions could be lifted.
5.21 The last delegation meeting in the Congress was with Congressman Rob Simmons, the Chairman of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Sub Committee of the House Committee on Homeland Security. Congressman Simmons is a Vietnam Veteran and former member of the CIA with extensive understanding of intelligence and intelligence sharing issues.

5.22 Congressman Simmons discussed the issue of intelligence sharing between allies by first describing to the delegation some of the challenges faced in getting agencies within the US to share their knowledge amongst themselves. These ‘tribal’ battles continued to reduce the effectiveness of the US response to the terror threat. The Chairman observed that removal of some of the procedural restrictions on access to US systems and intelligence for close allies such as the UK and Australia was still in a queue behind these US domestic reforms.

5.23 The delegation appreciated the opportunity to meet with their peers in the US Congress. Though it is difficult to draw conclusions about the US Congress as a whole from such a brief visit it appears that members have a level of affection and trust for Australia. However it is possible to extrapolate from the three meetings with Congressional leaders that the Defence relationship between the two countries is not uniformly well understood within the US Legislature. Further work at this level is necessary if Australia is to attempt to overcome legislative restrictions to technology transfer, intelligence access and to remove legislative restrictions on US military interaction with Indonesia.
Appendix A – Ceremonial and Commemorative Activities

In addition to the program of inspections and briefings the delegation sought to add depth to their understanding of the US history and military culture by commemorating significant historic events. Some of these were events shared in both Australian and US history, such as the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts, other events were those that shaped the US culture, such as the the US Civil War and the Attack on Pearl Harbour.

The delegation leader, Senator Ferguson, shared responsibility for participation in these ceremonies amongst the members of the delegation. In each case all members of the delegation attended the activities as representative of the Australian Parliament.

The program of Ceremonial Activities was as follows:

Pearl Harbor – USS Arizona Memorial

RADM Donnolly, Deputy Commander US Pacific Fleet, hosted the delegation for a tour of Pearl Harbor and a briefing on the Japanese attack that commenced the Pacific Campaign of the Second World War. The delegation then travelled with Admiral Donnolly to the USS Arizona Memorial, where the delegation participated in a commemoration ceremony. The Hon Mr Bruce Scott, MP laid a wreath on behalf of the Australian Parliament.
Monday 4 July (US Independence Day Holiday)

The delegation was unable to meet with industry or defence officials due to the US Independence Day Holiday on 4 July 2005. Instead the delegation observed the community National Day celebrations in Orlando Florida.

Gettysburg National Battlefield Park

After visiting the US Army Strategic Studies Institute the delegation was given a tour of the neighbouring Gettysburg Battlefield Park by historian Lieutenant Colonel Ray Millen. Gettysburg was the most significant battle of the US Civil War and the scene of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. The battle is central to the understanding of the Civil War and thus modern America.

Washington DC

The delegation conducted a number of commemorative activities in Washington D.C. The first of these was at the Arlington National Cemetery, on Saturday 9 Jul 2005, where Senator Ferguson laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns on behalf of the Australian Parliament.
The delegation then moved to the gravesite of Pilot Officer Milne, the only Australian buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

The delegation, escorted by the Military Attache, Brigadier Gary Bornholt, then moved to the Washington Mall where two wreaths were laid. The first wreath was placed on the ‘Australia’ marker at the US Korean War Memorial by Mrs Joanna Gash, MP.

The second wreath was laid at the US Vietnam War Memorial by the Hon Mr Graeme Edwards, MP. Both of these activities were conducted amidst very large
crowds of US summer holiday visitors, who were uniformly moved by the Australian ceremonies.

In the afternoon the delegation was invited to tour the former home of George Washington, at Mt Vernon Estate to the south of Washington D.C. During the tour Senator Ferguson laid a wreath at General Washington’s tomb.

Figure A.4  Hon Mr Graham Edwards MP lays a wreath at the Vietnam War Memorial in the Washington D.C. Mall.
Appendix B – Delegation Program

Honolulu Hawaii

Tuesday 28 Jun 05

0950  Arrive Honolulu Airport – QF3 from Sydney
  ■ Met by: Consul General Quinn
  ■ Luggage to be taken to Hotel by Consulate Staff

1100  Depart Airport for Consulate

1130 – 1230  Lunch and Consulate Brief
  ■ Australian Naval Attaché CDRE Gerry Christian to join program from this point

1230 – 1315  Travel to US Pacific Command (US PACOMD)

1315 – 1400  USPACOM Command Brief

1400 – 1430  Office Call on RADM Mike Tracy
  ■ Director for Strategic Planning & Policy

1430 – 1500  Office Call on VADM Gary Roughead
  ■ Deputy Commander USPACOM

1500 – 1530  Travel to Boathouse

1530 – 1700  Tour of USS Arizona Memorial
  ■ hosted by RADM Donnelly (Alternative program for Mr Edwards)
  ■ wreath laying on behalf of the Australian Parliament – Mr Scott, MP

1700 – 1800  Travel to Consul General’s Residence
1800 – 2100  Dinner with US Military officials and Hawaiian Strategic Studies academics

**Wednesday 29th June**

0600   Check-Out and Baggage to Foyer
0620   Depart for Airport – AA270 to LA Departing at 0820
4:34pm  Arrive Los Angeles Airport from Honolulu
  ■ Met on arrival by LTCOL Andy Hofman
5:00pm  Depart Airport for Park Hyatt Hotel
  ■ Address: 2151 Avenue of the Stars Los Angeles, CA 90067
5:30pm  Arrive hotel
6:45pm  Depart hotel for Consul-General’s Residence
7:30pm  Dinner at Residence
****  Depart Residence for hotel

**Los Angeles**

**Thursday 30 June**

9:00am  Depart hotel for Rand Center for Asia Pacific Policy
10:00am Meet with Director Bill Overholt for discussions.
12:00pm Either depart for hotel to checkout and then drive to San Diego or check out 8.30am and depart for San Diego directly from Rand. Lunch along the way.
3.00/4.00pm Arrive San Diego
Evening   Free

**San Diego**

**Friday 1 July**

8:00am  Depart hotel for 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton.
9:00am  Briefing and discussions with 1 MEF.
11:00am Depart for Raytheon Expeditionary Warfare Center
12:00pm Arrive at Raytheon
12:00pm Welcome and Introductions
12:15pm Raytheon Company overview
  ■ Integrated Ship Electronics
- Integrated Combat Systems
- Reachback capability and knowledge transfer
- Tour of facility

2:15pm  Depart for San Diego Naval Base
3:00pm  Arrive at San Diego Naval Base
3:00pm  Tour of USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD6)
5:00pm  Depart for hotel.
Evening  Free

**Saturday 2 July**
6:30am  Check out of hotel and depart for San Diego airport.
8:00am  Depart San Diego for Los Angeles/Orlando
  - UA 6160/UA 272
5:28pm  Delegation arrives Orlando International Airport on UA272 from Los Angeles
6:45pm  Depart airport for Hyatt Regency Grand Cypress Hotel
7:15pm  Delegation arrives hotel

**Florida**

**Sunday 3 July**
9:00am  Delegation departs hotel for Kennedy Space Center,
10:30am  Minibus arrives Visitors Center, Kennedy Space Center
(Arrive)  ****  Tour and scheduled activities
4:00pm  Delegation departs Kennedy Space center for Hotel
5:30pm  Delegation arrives hotel

**Monday 4 July (US Independence Day Holiday)**
9:00am  Delegation departs hotel for City of Orlando Independence Day activities.
7:00pm  Delegation dinner – 4th of July Fireworks.
Tuesday 5 July
9:00am    Delegation departs hotel for US Central Command (CENTCOM) HQ, McDill AFB, Tampa.
11:00am   Arrive McDill Air Force Base
11:00am   Briefings and discussions with HQ CENTCOM staff
          - Meet with General John Abizaid
          - Briefing on CENTCOM area of operations and Australian Interoperability issues.
3:30pm    Depart CENTCOM HQ for United Airlines terminal, Tampa Airport
4:00pm    Arrive United terminal
5:25pm    Delegation departs for Pittsburgh/Harrisburg on UA 2619
9:45pm    Delegation arrives Harrisburg on UA 4010
10:15pm   Depart airport for Hilton Harrisburg Hotel
10:45pm   Arrive hotel

Carlisle PA

Wednesday 6 July
8:00am    Depart hotel for US Army War College, Carlisle PA
9:00am    Arrive US Army War College
9:00am    Discussions with Strategic Studies Institute
11:00am   Depart US Army War College for Gettysburg National Battlefield Park
          *****  Arrive Gettysburg Park
          *****  Tour
6:00pm    Delegation Dinner with Australian Exchange student US Army War College
          *****  Depart Gettysburg for hotel
          ****  Arrive hotel

Dayton Ohio

Thursday 7 July
5:30am    Depart hotel for Delta terminal, Harrisburg airport
7:00am    Delegation departs Harrisburg for Cleveland/Dayton on DL 2653
9:45am  Delegation arrives Dayton airport on DL 3359 from Cleveland
10:30am  Depart airport for Joint Systems Manufacturing Center (JSMC) Lima
11:45am  Arrive JSMC in Lima
   ■ Brief by US Dept of Defence Abrams Project Office
   ■ Brief by General Dynamics Land Systems – Abrams tank manufacturer
   ■ Tour M1 Abrams rebuild factory
   ■ Familiarisation drive M1 Abrams tank
3:30pm  Delegation departs Lima Tank Plant for Dayton Doubletree Downtown Hotel
5:00pm  Arrive hotel

**Washington DC**

**Friday 8 July**

7:00am  Delegation departs hotel for Delta terminal, Dayton airport
8:40am  Delegation departs Dayton for Atlanta/Baltimore Washington Airport on DL 351/1426
1:01pm  Delegation arrives at BWI airport on DL 1426  
   Met by:  Mr Corcoran
2:00pm  Delegation departs airport for Hay Adams Hotel
3:00pm  Delegation arrives Hay Adams Hotel  
   check-in/refresh
4:00pm  Delegation departs hotel for Embassy
4:15pm  Meeting with Head Australian Defence Staff – Washington, RADM Raydon Gates and Defence Attaches
5:00pm  Embassy Reception – US Defence and invited guests
   ****  Delegation departs Embassy for hotel
   ****  Delegation arrives hotel

**Saturday 9 July**

8:30am  Depart hotel for Arlington National Cemetery
8:50am  Arrive at Arlington National Cemetery
9:00am  Wreath-Laying at Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
   ■ Delegation Leader - Sen Ferguson
9:20am Meet with Superintendent Arlington National Cemetery
9:30am Visit Pilot Officer Milne gravesite
  ■ only Australian buried at Arlington National Cemetery
9:45am Visit Group Marker for the victims of September 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon
10:15am Depart Arlington National Cemetery for Vietnam and Korean Memorials
10:30 am Arrive at the Vietnam and Korean Memorials
  ■ wreath laying ceremony Korean War Memorial – Mrs Joanna Gash, MP
  ■ wreath laying ceremony Vietnam Memorial – Mr Graeme Edwards, MP
12:00noon Depart memorials for hotel
1:00 pm Depart hotel for Mt Vernon Estate (former home of George Washington)
1:45 pm Tour Mt Vernon Estate
  ■ includes wreath laying ceremony at Washington tomb – Sen Ferguson.
5:00 pm Return to hotel

**Sunday 10 July**
Rest Day – delegates own arrangements.

**Monday 11 July**
8:15am Depart for Embassy
8:30am Briefing with Ambassador Dennis Richardson, AO and principal staff:
  ■ Mr Gary Quinlan – Deputy Chief of Mission
  ■ Admiral Raydon Gates, Head Australian Defence Staff (Washington)
9:30am Depart Embassy for Pentagon
10:00am Discussions with OSD/Joint Staff
  ■ Chaired by Mr Peter Florey - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
12:30pm Depart Pentagon for Crystal City
1:30pm Joint Strike Fighter update briefing
  ■ Admiral Steve Enewold, JSF Program office US Dept of Defence
  ■ Mr Rick Kirkland, Vice President Lockheed Martin Corporation
4:00pm Depart Crystal City for hotel

**Tuesday 12 July**

9:00am Depart hotel for Capitol Hill meetings

9:30am Meeting with Congressman Jim Saxton

- Chair Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities sub committee of the House Armed Services Committee

10:30am Meeting with Senator Lisa Murkowski

- Chair sub committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

11:30am Meeting with Congressman Rob Simmons

- Chair Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment sub committee of the House Committee on Homeland Security.

12:30pm Ambassador Richardson working lunch – Australian Embassy

- Mr Tom Donnelly – American Enterprise Institute
- Mr Dan Blumenthal - American Enterprise Institute
- Mr Kurt Campbell – Centre for Strategic and International Studies

2:00pm Depart Embassy for State Department

2:30pm Meeting US Dept of State Director for International Relations in the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization

3:40pm Depart for Union Station

5:00pm Depart for New York by train

8:00pm Arrive Penn Station NY

8:30pm Arrive hotel

**New York**

**Wednesday 13 July**

9:00am Depart hotel for United Nations Headquarters

9:30am VIP tour UN Headquarters

11:00am Depart UN HQ for Australia Permanent Mission

11:15am Discussions with HE Mr John Dauth, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN

- Mr Rick Nimmo – Counsellor
Colonel Tim Simkins – Defence Attache

12:00pm      Lunch own arrangements
3:30pm      Depart hotel for JFK International Airport
7:20pm      Delegation departs US for Sydney.