Chapter 4 - Elections
for the Senate
Terms
of state senators
Except in cases of simultaneous dissolution, senators representing the
states are elected for terms of six years. Terms commence on 1 July following
the election.
The terms of
senators elected following a dissolution of the Senate (Constitution, s. 57)
commence on 1 July preceding the date of the general election. Following a
general election for the Senate, senators are
divided into two classes. Unless another simultaneous election for both Houses
intervenes, those in the first class retire on 30 June two years after the
general election; those in the second class retire on 30 June five years after
the general election. The method of dividing senators is described below.
The provision for dating a senator’s term from 1 July preceding
simultaneous general elections for both Houses has been seen to be the source
of a problem stemming from the preference of governments, for financial reasons
as well as others of party advantage, to avoid separate dates for a general
election of the House of Representatives (the term of which is governed by the
date of the simultaneous dissolution) and an ensuing periodical election for
half the Senate. The consequence in most cases has been to hold an “early”
general election of the House to coincide with the next periodical Senate
election (1903; 1955; 1977; 1984; 1987 (the latter a simultaneous
dissolution)). An instance where an “early” general election for the House was
not subsequently held in order to synchronise with the next periodical election
for the Senate was May 1953; the 1955 general election for the House is the only
occasion when an “early” general election has been called to coincide with
election of senators to fill the places of second class (long term) senators
elected following simultaneous elections for both Houses.
Elections arising from simultaneous dissolutions of August 1914 and
July 1987 did not give rise in significant form to the issue of keeping
elections for the two Houses synchronised because of the close proximity of the
commencing dates for Senate and House terms in the relevant circumstances. The early
dissolution of the House of Representatives in November 1929 had, in the event,
no effect on synchronisation of Senate and House elections because another
early dissolution, occasioned by defeat of the Scullin Government on the floor
of the House, was needed in December 1931, a date when a periodical election
for the Senate was convenient.
The House of Representatives was prematurely dissolved in 1963; as a
consequence there was a periodical election for the Senate the following year.
Subsequently there were general elections for the House in 1966, 1969 and 1972,
and periodical elections for the Senate in 1967 and 1970. This sequence of
unsynchronised elections ended with the simultaneous dissolutions of April
1974.
The case for
synchronisation of elections for the two Houses is more a question of
convenience and partisan advantage than one of institutional philosophy.
Financial considerations simply buttress arguments of party advantage. In a
truly bicameral system there is no requirement at all for synchronisation of
elections. Proposals to make this a requirement of the Australian Constitution
have four times failed at referendum (1974, 1977, 1984, 1988), even though “expert”
opinion continues to favour a constitutional amendment of this character (First
Report of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, April 1988, PP 96/1988,
pp 345-8).
If there is to be change, a more practical approach would be an
alteration of the Constitution to provide that the terms of senators elected in
a simultaneous dissolution election should be deemed to commence on 1 July
following (rather than preceding) the date of election. Provided that the House
of Representatives was not subsequently dissolved within two years of election,
synchronisation of a general election for the House and a periodical election
for the Senate could be restored with relative ease. Such a proposal, if
adopted, would remove the current defect in simultaneous dissolution
arrangements of circumscribing the standard six-year term for senators by
anything up to one year. This approach would, on the other hand, avoid the two
major deficiencies posed by simultaneous election proposals: the augmented
power placed in the hands of a prime minister by extending executive government
authority over the life of the House of Representatives to half the Senate; and
diminishing bicameralism by irrevocably tying the electoral schedule for the
Senate to that of the House of Representatives. Effective bicameralism requires
that the second chamber should have a significant measure of autonomy in its
electoral cycle, as well as distinctive electoral arrangements. (See H. Evans, ‘A
modest proposal addressing the question of “too many elections”’, The House
Magazine, 15 May 1991.)
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