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SAFEGUARDS IN CONTEXT
Safeguards are an important component of the international non-proliferation
regime. Appraising their effectiveness must be undertaken in a general
context of the regime itself, which embraces export controls, security
assurances, nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and a variety of arms control
and disarmament agreements. As the Committee was advised in a research
paper by David Anderson of the Parliamentary Research Service: "These
components are mutually reinforcing, and all must function effectively
if proliferation is to be halted". (Anderson, i)
Australia currently has a network of 14 bilateral safeguards agreements
covering 24 countries. Australia itself has agreements with Canada, Egypt,
Finland, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Russia,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The agreement with Euratom covers a further 11 countries - Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain.
In addition, Australia has entered into a physical protection agreement
with Singapore.
Australia has also concluded a bilateral safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in fulfilment of obligations under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian
Safeguards Office (DFAT/ASO) in a joint submission, "[a]ll of the
agreements cover the use of A[ustralian] O[bligated]N[uclear] M[aterial]
within the agreement partner's nuclear fuel cycle program except the agreement
with Russia which permits conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication
on behalf of other customer countries only" (S 60, II.6, 6).
In explaining the nuclear fuel cycle to the Committee, DFAT/ASO observed
that apart from weapon states,
[I]t is unusual for a country to be entirely self-contained in
the processing of uranium for civil use . . . [I]t is not unusual for
a Japanese utility buying Australian uranium to have the uranium converted
in Canada, enriched in France, fabricated in Japan and reprocessed in
the UK. The international flow of nuclear material enhances safeguards
accountability through "transit matching" of transfers at
different stages of the fuel cycle. (S 60, II.8,7)
Nuclear accountancy is, in a technical sense, the core of safeguards.
The Australian Safeguards Office accounts for AONM in the fuel cycle through
reports from each bilateral partner; shipping and transfer documentation;
calculations of process losses, nuclear consumption, and nuclear production;
knowledge of the fuel cycle in each country; regular liaison with counterpart
authorities; and reconciliation of any discrepancies with counterpart
authorities (S 60, II.2, 5).
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