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SAFEGUARDS POLICY: DEVELOPMENT
The Fox conclusions formed the basis of policy on bilateral safeguards
outlined to the House of Representatives by the then Prime Minister, Mr
Malcolm Fraser, on 24 May 1977 (CPD, HoR, 1700-5). The principal purpose
of the policy was to establish a framework of control whereby nuclear
energy could be employed for civil purposes whilst ensuring that nuclear
material could not be diverted to nuclear weapons production or nuclear
explosives. The features of the safeguards policy were:
- Australia would "retain the right to be selective in the countries
to whom uranium export will be permitted" (ibid., 1702).
- Uranium mined in Australia would, as a minimum, only be sold to non-nuclear
weapon states which were parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
and to nuclear weapon states which gave Australia an assurance that
nuclear material it may supply for peaceful purposes is not diverted
to military or explosive purposes. Uranium supplied by Australia had
to be covered by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
(ibid., 1702-3).
- All exports of uranium were to be covered by IAEA safeguards immediately
upon leaving Australian ownership.
- Uranium mined in Australia would only be sold to countries which had
concluded bilateral agreements with the Australian Government. Australia
would seek undertakings that importing countries would only use nuclear
material supplied by Australia for peaceful purposes, and that nuclear
material derived from its use will not be diverted to military or explosive
purposes. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards will apply to
verify compliance with this undertaking. Australia would retain the
right to cease supply of uranium to any country which breached safeguards
undertakings (ibid., 1703).
- Nuclear material supplied by Australia or nuclear material derived
from its use would remain under safeguards for the full life of the
material in question or until it is legitimately removed from safeguards.
The policy also provided that should comprehensive IAEA safeguards cease
to apply to an importing country, international safeguards should continue
to apply both to nuclear material derived from Australian imports and
all other nuclear material (ibid., 1703).
- Under bilateral agreements, Australian consent would be required before
Australian-obligated nuclear material was transferred to a third country.
- Uranium supplied by Australia for peaceful purposes would not be enriched
beyond 20 per cent Uranium-235 without prior Australian consent. (The
figure of 20 per cent was chosen as representing a level of enrichment
below the practical requirements for a nuclear explosive, while being
above the enrichment level required for most peaceful uses, excepting,
for example, some research and radioisotope production reactors (ibid.,
1703).
- Any reprocessing of nuclear material supplied by Australia could only
occur with the prior consent of the Australian Government, pending the
outcome of current activity concerning reprocessing (ibid., 1704).
- Nations concluding bilateral agreements with Australia would need
to include an assurance that adequate physical security will be maintained
on their nuclear industries. Agreements would specify that minimum standards
of physical security would be based on those of the IAEA (ibid., 1704).
- All contracts would specify that uranium exported from Australia is
subject to safeguards as agreed between the importing country and the
Australian Government (ibid., 1704).
- Reprocessing would be permitted only for legitimate energy purposes
combined with intensification of safeguards as a defence against diversion
of plutonium to non-peaceful purposes and to ensure plutonium was not
stockpiled excessively in a manner which could pose future proliferation
problems. (Malcolm Fraser, House of Representatives, 25 August 1977,
quoted S 60, 39-40)
Late in 1980 the Government announced that it would be prepared to consider
granting its consent to reprocessing Australian-obligated nuclear material
in the following circumstances:
- agreement in advance to reprocessing for the purpose of energy use;
- agreement in advance to reprocessing for the purpose of the management
of materials (plutonium, fission products and unused uranium) contained
in spent nuclear fuel;
- case by case consideration of requests for consent to reprocessing
for other peaceful non-explosive purposes including research;
- storage and use of plutonium of Australian origin separated from spent
fuel to be in ways that do not cause proliferation dangers;
- provision for consultation and review of the operation of the agreement
conditions; and
- commitment by customer countries to support the development of more
effective international control measures relevant to reprocessing, including
an international plutonium storage scheme. (A. Street, House of Representatives,
26 November 1980, quoted S 60, 41)
In accordance with this policy Australia has granted prior consent to
reprocessing on a programmatic basis for energy use and spent fuel management
to Euratom, France, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland.
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