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The Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 - TENTH REPORT
Table of Contents

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 2

 

CHAPTER 2

Widely Supported Amendments

Introduction

2.1 Although in points of detail some amendments proposed in the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 may not be fully supported by all commentators, in essence several matters enjoy general agreement. They are:

  • the 'Brandy' amendments;
  • amendments concerning indigenous land use agreements (ILUAs);
  • those amendments affecting the operations of Representative Bodies; and
  • an increased threshold test for claim applications.

2.2 The ATSIC submission (p.2) confirms this view, at least in part:

    There are some things about the Act which we all know need modification now. We should focus on these. There is no need for this massive legislative rewrite. For example, there is consensus that following the Brandy High Court decision there was a need to redefine the roles of the Federal Court and the National Native Title Tribunal in handling native title claims. There is also consensus that following certain Court decisions there was a need to restore a workable threshold test for registration of claims, and in particular to sort out multiple and overlapping claims.

Notably, many of the Bill's most strident critics make no reference to their views on these matters.[1]

The Brandy Amendments

2.3 Only some fourteen months after the passing of the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA), the High Court handed down the Brandy decision in which a statutory device for the registration and enforcement of determinations of a non-court (the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) with the Federal Court was held to be unconstitutional. This cast doubt on the enforceability of native title and compensation determinations by the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT). The Explanatory Memorandum has described this problem as follows:

    The Brandy case decided that the process for making determinations by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission involved an invalid exercise of judicial power, which under the Constitution is vested in the courts. The decision casts doubt on the validity of the NTA processes under which the NNTT, which is not a court, can make certain determinations of native title and compensation. Under the current scheme in the NTA, applications for a determination of native title or compensation are lodged with the NNTT and the NNTT has the function of making determinations for unopposed or agreed applications, with opposed applications being referred to the Federal Court.[2]

2.4 The Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 provides amendments entailing that the Federal Court will decide all applications for a determination of native title or compensation. Many of these amendments were included in the Native Title Amendment Bill 1995, introduced by the Keating Government on 29 November 1995.

2.5 In its sixth report (The Native Title Amendment Bill 1996) this Committee agreed with the proposal to provide for all native title applications to be filed in the Federal Court. Not only does the Committee endorse that judgement, it notes that there have been no dissenting submissions concerning the proposal.

Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs)

2.6 The Commonwealth submission (p.63) has noted the widespread support for the enhanced agreements process in the Bill. On 17 October 1997 the Special Minister of State confirmed that the agreements provisions were developed in close consultation with Indigenous interests.[3] Nevertheless, some witnesses have argued that the right to negotiate is a desirable conjunct to ILUAs.

2.7 The Committee concurs with the Commonwealth that there appears to be no reason to suppose that the tendency for general agreements will not continue to increase. Further, and as noted by the Commonwealth, the mining and seafood industries have indicated that they will continue to seek agreements about resource use. The Commonwealth has concluded (Submission, p.63):

    There is widespread support for the enhanced agreements process in the Bill. Most interest groups recognise the potential for such agreements to provide a lasting and workable resolution to native title, land use and co-existence issues at a local or regional level, either with or without government participation. One inhibiting factor, addressed by the amendments, has been the need to ensure that agreements are concluded with the appropriate indigenous people for an area and that once concluded, an agreement can be binding and can provide certainty in relation to acts done in conformity with their provisions. The range of matters that can be covered is very wide, and includes the relationship between native title rights and interests and other rights and interests and the manner of their respective exercise, the doing of future acts, and the settlement of claims.

Representative Bodies

2.8 In its sixth report (p.69ff) this Committee considered proposed changes to the operation of Representative Bodies. For that report some concerns were expressed about the proposed reforms, and some of those concerns have been raised again with the Committee in the course of its examination of the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997.

2.9 The particular continuing concern is that when native title holders have difficulties with their nominated Representative Body, it may be difficult to achieve assistance from that Representative Body. Mr Woosup of the Ankamuthi people stated:

    To summarise my support of Mr Charlie and the Dingaal people, I am opposed to ATSIC being the sole source of resource funding for native title claimants and I am opposed to ATSIC being an external review body. I support the continued role of the Attorney-General's Department in funding claimants who have problems with the land councils and being an external review body when those problems with the council arise. This means you will need to amend sections 203C, 203B(1), 203FB and 203FA.[4]

2.10 The Commonwealth's response to this concern (Submission, p.72) is that representative bodies do not presently, and will not under the amendments, have a monopoly on representing native title clients in their areas:

    Claimants are able if they so choose to seek representation elsewhere. There is no requirement that all claims must be endorsed by representative bodies in order to be registered. If a claimant is either refused assistance by a representative body, or does not want to use such a body, in some circumstances ATSIC may be able to make a grant to enable that claimant to be assisted by some other person or body.

The benefits of the proposed amendments to the Representative Body regime were carefully considered in the Committee's sixth report and its overall conclusions on this matter stand.

2.11 Nevertheless, one particular matter deserves attention. The Bill contains a provision requiring a representative body to use a 'bank' (new s.203CB). The provision defines 'bank' as 'a person who carries on the business of banking, either in Australia or outside Australia'. The submission from the Credit Union Services Corporation noted that this definition is inconsistent with October 1997 amendments which broadened the definition of 'bank' in other legislation. The amendments were designed to remove what credit unions saw as discrimination against them, and the Corporation asked that the definition in the Bill be altered in a similar way.

2.12 The Committee was told by the Commonwealth Government that the definition used in the Bill reflected the position at the time it was initially drafted, rather than any in-principle opposition to using the newer, broader, definition.[5] The Committee recommends that the Government consider whether the definition of 'bank' in the proposed s.203CB should be broadened to include credit unions.

The Threshold Test

2.13 The Act provides for a Register of Native Title Claims to be kept by the NNTT. Entry of a native title claim on the register is a pre-condition for the claimant obtaining access to a number of special benefits under the Act. The most important of these is that a registered native title claimant may be a party to negotiations in relation to future acts covered by the right to negotiate.[6]

2.14 While there is some debate about where to set the threshold standard for native title applications, there is virtually no debate that (post - Waanyi) the application threshold needs to be restored:

    There is also consensus that following certain Court decisions there was a need to restore a workable threshold test for registration of claims, and in particular to sort out multiple and overlapping claims.[7]

Indeed as pointed out by the Special Minister of State, Indigenous representatives such as Mr Sugar Ray Robinson have stressed the inadequate nature of the threshold test for the registration of claims.[8] In August 1996 as acting chair of ATSIC, Mr Robinson called for a more stringent test, saying that:

    Anyone can go along to the registrar [of the NNTT] and stick in a claim: like we have individuals sticking in a claim for half of Queensland. ... What good does it do Aboriginal people to have a whole heap of claims in when the rightful owners are not really getting their right say in court because these vexatious ambit claims are being put in and the whole process stuffs up?[9]

2.15 In his Second Reading speech, the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon Kim Beazley MP, said that Labor supports the government in seeking to deal with the registration and determination of claims and the resolving of competing interests in an expeditious and effective regime. He said that these objectives may be advanced by the proper and appropriate adjustment of the registration test.[10]

2.16 The NIWG provided several pages of comment on the proposed threshold test, and also gave the following critique (Submission, p.62):

    Although the primary purpose of the registration test, as discussed above, is in relation to the right to negotiate, it also has application in relation to ILUAs and to the statutory access right. The requirements in relation to an application to the Federal Court involve some tightening of the present test, but principally in relation to the question of authority to lodge a claim. In relation to current claims on the Register, which have been accepted pursuant to s.63, it appears that these will be referred to the Federal Court, whether or not they stay on the Register.

The NIWG assessed the threshold test as 'onerous'.[11] However, the Committee notes that the proposed threshold test is no more onerous than the requirements that would have to be met by a native title claimant who elected to proceed at common law, and in many respects reflects the original understanding and intention of the 1993 Act.

2.17 The Commonwealth (Submission, pp.67,68) has responded to this concern by pointing out the advantages that flow to registered native title holders; the claimants:

    * have the right to negotiate (where the right to negotiate still applies under the amendments) in relation to mining on, or the compulsory acquisition for third party purposes of, the claimed land (see sections 29, 30, 30A, 31 and 32); * are entitled to be specifically notified, heard and consulted in relation to the doing of an act that is an approved scheme act (subsection 26A(6)) or an approved gold or tin mining act (subsection 26B(7)); * are entitled to be specifically notified of a State/Territory Minister's intention to request that the Commonwealth Minister determine that an area be an approved opal or gem mining area for the purposes of the right to negotiate regime, to make submissions in this regard and to have those submissions considered (subsection 26C(4)); * are entitled to be specifically notified of, and object against, acts in any alternative State/Territory 'right to negotiate' regime under section 43 (paragraph 43(2)(a) and (d)), or equivalent State/Territory regime under section 43A in relation to pastoral lease or reserved land (paragraph 43A(4)(b)); * will qualify for the statutory access rights provided by the Act (paragraph 44A(2)(a)); * are able to prevent what could otherwise be impermissible future acts in relation to the claimed land which is subject to a non-claimant application (sections 24FA to 24FE); * are entitled to notice of, and an opportunity to comment, in relation to, a grant of a right to take natural resources from non-exclusive agricultural or non-exclusive pastoral leasehold land under paragraph 24GE(1)(f); * are entitled to be specifically notified in some cases of the provision of facilities for services for the public (subsections 24KA(7) and (8)), acts that pass the freehold test (subsections 24MD(6) and (7)) and offshore acts (subsections 24NA(8) and (9)); * have the right to be notified of other claims made in the area (subsection 66(3)); and * are required to be a party to an ILUA (area agreement) for that agreement to be valid (section 24CD).

The clear implication (accepted by the Committee) is that, where these valuable rights accrue, there needs to be a credible threshold test.

2.18 For the reasons discussed in paras.3.7 - 3.13 of the Committee's sixth report, the interpretation given by the courts to some of the criteria for registration in the Act deprives those criteria of any meaningful effect in sifting out what Justice Robert French, President of the National Native Title Tribunal, has described as 'patently hopeless' applications.[12] Evidence to the current inquiry was that native title claims are being lodged which cover freehold land and which claim exclusive possession of land covered by pastoral leases.[13] It was noted in the sixth report that there was general agreement that claims should receive greater scrutiny before being accepted for registration, but disagreement over how stringent the criteria for acceptance should be.[14] The submissions and evidence to the current inquiry was similar.

2.19 Mr John R Bannon, a consultant to the Kuyani Aboriginal Association in South Australia, told the Committee that he had no problem with the elevation of the threshold test: 'we think it is an entirely appropriate process'.[15] He said that the native title claims he was associated with would have no difficulty in meeting the proposed test.

2.20 The Committee believes that the proposed registration test will not create undue difficulties for justifiable claims. The new test will, however, sift out the 'hopeless' applications, will allay the concerns of those who at present have to become involved in the claims process without good cause, and will up-grade and make more reputable the currency of native title. It will also have the desired effect of preventing unrealistic expectations among potential claimants, and inconvenience to non-claimants, who in some cases include members of the Indigenous community.

 

Footnotes:

[1] See, for example, the submission from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Mr Michael Dodson. Notably, in his submission, Mr Patrick Dodson, Chairperson of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation described the Bill merely as '293 pages of extinguishment' (p.6).

[2] Explanatory Memorandum, p.237.

[3] Evidence, p.2021.

[4] Evidence, p.1442.

[5] Evidence, p.2026.

[6] Note that a claim which fails the registration test and hence is denied the special statutory benefits may still proceed through the Federal Court to a determination unless it is struck out, settled or withdrawn.

[7] ATSIC Submission, p.2.

[8] Evidence, p.2022.

[9] 'ATSIC chair calls for Mabo tightening' The Australian, 2 August 1996, p.5.

[10] House of Representatives Daily Hansard, 25 September 1997, p.8323.

[11] NIWG Submission, p.7.

[12] Justice RS French 'The National Native Title Tribunal - Early Directions' (Paper delivered at a conference Working with the Native Title Act, Sydney, 16 May 1994) p.23.

[13] See for example Evidence, pp.658-60, 1471, 1593-94

[14] Sixth Report, November 1996, para.3.15, and the Minority Report attached to that report, para.4.1.

[15] Evidence, p.363.

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