Lodgement and Registration of Applications
3.1 Sections 61 to 64 of the Native Title Act 1993 provide that native
title and compensation applications pursuant to s.13 may be made to the
Registrar. The Registrar is required to accept applications that comply
with requirements set out in s.62 unless of the opinion that the application
is frivolous or vexatious or prima facie cannot be made out (s.63). In
the latter circumstance the application is referred to a presidential
member of the Tribunal who, following inquiry, either directs the Registrar
to accept or not accept the application.
3.2 On 23 February 1995, only some fourteen months after the passing
of the Act, the High Court handed down the Brandy decision in which a
statutory device for the registration and enforcement of determinations
of a non-court (the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) with
the Federal Court was held to be unconstitutional. This cast doubt on
the enforceability of native title and compensation determinations by
the Tribunal. As was explained in the first Outline document (p.33), the
process to register and enforce unopposed or agreed determinations made
by the Tribunal, which is not a court, is similar to the scheme found
to be invalid by the High Court in Brandy.
Role of the Federal Court
3.3 Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Native Title Amendment Bill 1996 addresses
the implications of Brandy by withdrawing various processes from the Tribunal
and conferring them on the Federal Court: receiving all native title applications,
controlling the proceedings and making any determinations concerning native
title and compensation:
All applications for determinations of native title and compensation
under the NTA are to be made to the Federal Court. There will be no
acceptance test for applications. The Native Title Registrar will have
the administrative function of assessing whether the claims pass a registration
test for inclusion on the Register of Native Title Claims but this will
not affect an applicant's right to be heard in the Court. [1]
3.4 The first Outline paper (p.33) confirms in relation to the amendments
to overcome the Brandy problem that the Government would adopt the proposals
that were contained in the previous Government's 1995 Amendment Bill:
Those proposals were the subject of extensive consultations last
year and most interested parties have accepted the desirability of proceeding
with them as part of this Government's package of amendments.
The 1996 bill adopts the 1995 bill proposals in this regard.
3.5 The Committee has the benefit of additional advice provided by the
Tribunal President on 31 August 1996; that advice, a submission to the
Committee, is reproduced as Appendix 3. All of the Amendment Bill items
at Part 1 amending the Act to address the implications of the Brandy decision
are accepted. In summary their effect will be:
- to provide for all native title applications to be filed in the Federal
Court;
- to dispense with the s.63 acceptance test;
- to provide for a registration test for applications (which will be
administered by the Tribunal);
- to provide that all determinations concerning native title are made
by the Federal Court; and
- to ensure that determinations of native title and compensation are
fully effective.
3.6 Further, given the resource constraints on native title holders the
Committee endorses the increase from two to three months in the time allowed
to:
- lodge effective responses to non-claimant applications; and
- have claims registered in response to s.29 notices.
Role of the Tribunal
Registration Test
3.7 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Native Title Amendment Bill 1996
(pp.1,5) advises that the Tribunal Registrar will have the administrative
function of assessing whether an application passes the registration test
for inclusion on the Register of Native Title Claims but this will not
affect the applicant's right to be heard in Court. [2]
Provided that they comply with the formal requirements, applications are
referred to the Registrar for notification of all persons whose interests
might be affected. Notably, this is an administrative process and does
not derive from common law rights.
3.8 Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the Amendment Bill (item 96) proposes the
insertion of s.190A covering the consideration of claims by the Registrar
and the administration of the registration test. In the first Outline
document (p.26) it is explained that, for confidence to be maintained
in the fairness of the process, there needs to be a balance between respect
for the interests of native title holders and the need to ensure that
the economic development of the nation as a whole is not unduly impeded:
The Government is of the view that a registration test with an
appropriate threshold is crucial to maintaining the balance.
3.9 Section 190A (7) provides the first condition for registration:
that the Registrar considers that, prima facie, each of the native
title rights and interests claimed in the application can be established.
For registration of applications it is clearly necessary that they comply
with the formal requirements of s.61 and s.62. The proposed substitution
for s.63 provides for that. However, and the High Court decision in Waanyi
[3] notwithstanding, there has never been a
satisfactory understanding of the prima facie test pursuant to
s.63 of the Act. In his paper Working with the Native Title Act
of 16 May 1994 (p.23), Justice French noted that under the (original)
prima facie test, an applicant did not have to establish that the
claim could be made out before the Registrar could accept it. It was merely
a 'screening process' to identify applications that were 'patently hopeless'
or which did not meet the formal requirements pursuant to s.62. Further,
in his Reasons for Ruling in Relation to Criteria for Acceptance of
a Native Title Determination Application dated 15 September 1994,
Justice French, confirmed (p.23) that in his opinion the words 'prima
facie' in relation to the Registrar's functions under s.63 bear their
ordinary or dictionary meaning: 'arising at first sight'; 'based or founded
on the first impression'; and 'at first appearance':
However, that ordinary meaning of the words is in some degree
metaphorical and does not, in my opinion, preclude some investigation
by the Registrar for the purpose of determining whether it can be said
at the outset that the claim could not be made out.
3.10 Importantly, in Northern Territory v Lane and Ors (p.37) O'Loughlin
J found (24 August 1995) that the Registrar is an officer of the Commonwealth;
her role is not judicial. This is considered with the view taken by French
J in his Reasons for Ruling of 15 September 1994 (p.18):
While the formation of an opinion by the Registrar or a Member
may, in a practical sense, affect the rights or interests of parties
to an application, it does not bind them in the same way that a judicial
decision does.
O'Loughlin J concluded (p.46) that, under the existing s.63, were the
Registrar to make a subjective, quasi-judicial assessment about the quality
of every application that would exceed her statutory mandate.
3.11 Further, O'Loughlin J considered (p.51) that there was no obligation
on the part of the Registrar to make certain inquiries before taking a
decision pursuant to s.63: on the other hand, she is not prevented from
utilising her knowledge if it is relevant to the issue:
The responsibilities of the Registrar are, as a matter of common
sense, to utilise such information as is contained in the application,
together with her knowledge and that of her staff ...
However, in considering the Waanyi appeal the High Court decided
that, in assessing native title applications, it was not appropriate for
the Registrar to consider information provided by third parties.
3.12 Now, the proposed amendments will not alter the fact that the Registrar
is an officer of the Commonwealth exercising an administrative function.
In conducting the new prima facie registration test pursuant to s.190A
(7), then, the Registrar must accept claims for registration having been
satisfied that:
It is clear that this condition raises the threshold for registering
applications beyond that applying following Justice O'Loughlin's judgement
and that of the High Court in Waanyi concerning acceptance.
3.13 One implication of the judgement by O'Loughlin J was that the Registrar
is required to note a claimant on the Register of Native Title Claims
as soon as practicable after a claim is received. This contradicted the
Tribunal's approach to identifying 'hopeless' applications in the prima
facie test process before registration. Accordingly, the President amended
the Tribunal's procedures to register applications virtually upon receipt.
[4] This provided for the 'right to
negotiate' pursuant to ss.26 to 44 to apply virtually upon lodgement of
an application. The provision of the Amendment Bill for s.190A (6) entails
that a test is reinstituted for registration, reinstating a registration
threshold with the consequence that the 'right to negotiate' does not
apply virtually upon lodgement of an application. Crucially, however,
an application filed in the Federal Court would not require registration
by the Tribunal to proceed as a matter before the Court. Failure to be
registered, rather, precludes the application from the Act's provisions
concerning the 'right to negotiate' over future acts, rendering the applicant
ineligible to bargain under the future act regime, but does not deny the
right and access to judicial determination.
[Table of Contents]
The Registration Threshold
3.14 On 2 August 1996 Mr Ray Robinson, acting Chair of ATSIC, was quoted
in The Australian calling for a more stringent test for native title claims:
In a significant statement of support for reform of the native
title laws, Mr Robinson said the Federal Government had to strengthen
the threshold for applications to counter excessive ambit claims.
He said a number of current claims covering parts of south-east Queensland
were "absolutely ridiculous".
"All they have to do is put in an application and it goes
to the Native Title Tribunal and it registers the claim - there is no
test or anything." Mr Robinson told SBS Radio.
"There has to be more stringent tests before they can even be allowed
to even have their claims registered."
. . .
"Anyone can go along to the registrar and stick in a claim:
like we have individuals sticking in a claim for half of Queensland,"
he said.
"What good does it do Aboriginal people to have a whole
heap of claims in when the rightful owners are not really getting their
right say in court because these vexatious ambit claims are being put
in and the whole process stuffs up?"
3.15 There has been general acceptance of a threshold test for native
title applications; the debate has centred on the nature of such a test.
The Social Justice Commissioner has commented on the original four conditions
for registration contained in the Amendment Bill 1996:
The Government's proposed four-fold criteria test is oppressive.
When taken together with the need to prepare a claim to pass the proposed
test within a three month period it is tantamount to removing the right
to negotiate from claimants. [5]
In raising the registration threshold, then, does the Amendment Bill
(s.190A) raise the threshold too high? On any assessment the threshold
test for registration will require careful consideration by claimants.
The Amendment Bill requires at s.190A (7) that, as the first condition
for registration, the Registrar, upon prima facie examination,
must consider that each of the native title rights and interests
claimed can be established. This requires the Registrar, without
necessarily consulting sources beyond the application, to conclude that
native title may have survived and that the claimants can establish that
they are the traditional owners. This is a more thorough test before
the Registrar than that applying under s.63 of the existing Act for
acceptance. Under s.63 the application merely had to survive a negative
test - that no circumstances were known that would knock out an application.
Under the provisions of the Amendment Bill, a positive test would be required.
A positive test was already required under the Act, s.63(3)(a), when applications
were referred to the Tribunal President.
3.16 The second registration condition is at s.190A(8). It provides that
it must appear to the Registrar that the application contains sufficient
information, a map, details of all searches carried out to determine the
existence of interests, reasons for not conducting searches that could
have been relevant, sufficient description of native title rights claimed,
a description of the factual basis on which the claim is proposed, details
of the current use of the land, information about the claimant's group
rights and, finally, that the application complies with the formal requirements
of ss.61 and 62.
3.17 The third condition at s.190A(9) is that all searches to discover
the existence of interests in the area covered by the application have
been carried out. The fourth condition at s.190A(10) is that the lease
does not disclose that the claim covers any land or waters covered by
ordinary title or a residential, commercial or perpetual lease (other
than a pastoral or agricultural lease or a lease to Indigenous people).
3.18 The Exposure Draft proposes three further conditions. The fifth
condition (p.7) is that there is not on the Register of Native Title Claims
a claim over the same area by any member of the group. The sixth (p.8)
is that the claim must be made on behalf of all persons in the group which
is said to hold native title. The seventh condition (p.32) is that the
claim be certified by a representative body; if not so certified, it must
include a statement to satisfy the Registrar.
3.19 The outcome of the proposed amendments in regard to registration,
then, would be to:
- impose a registration threshold before applications would access the
future act provisions of the Act;
- but allow applications to proceed to mediation in the Tribunal pursuant
to s.61 and the proposed s.86A:
Unless an order is made under subsection (5) that there be no
mediation, the Federal Court must refer every application under section
61 to the NNTT for mediation, including the ascertaining of agreed facts,
as soon as practicable after the end of the period specified in the
notice under section 66 (86A(3)).
That is, the threshold for claimant registration would be raised for
the future act process but there would remain no test for filing an application
in the Federal Court which then could proceed to mediation. Under the
original Act, applications have been subject to the s.63 test as subsequently
affected by the judgement of O'Loughlin J in Northern Territory v Lane
& Ors (August 1995) and by the High Court in Waanyi v Queensland
& Ors (February 1996) before being eligible to enter the mediation
process.
3.20 The effect of the proposed amendments in allowing mediation for
any application to proceed at the Court's discretion is endorsed. Given
the objectives of mediation, native title applicants ought to be able
readily to present their claims in a forum where they can be mediated
with affected parties. The discovery and recognition of native title common
law rights may be enhanced in these circumstances.
3.21 It is also acknowledged that, in the interests of expediting development,
a threshold that sifts 'hopeless' applications (or those containing a
'hopeless' element) from those justifying access to the right to negotiate
procedures is warranted. In this regard the effect of the higher threshold
must be ameliorated by the fact that the Amendment Bill provides (ss.
28, 30 and 32) for three months in which native title applicants can respond
to future act notices; as it stands the Act allows only two months. Nevertheless,
further amendments to this provision of the Amendment Bill may be required
if anomalies occur in access to the right to negotiate regime by native
title holders.
A Tougher Option
3.22 The virtual removal of the right to negotiate would become a significant
prospect were a proposal from the Queensland Government to be adopted.
3.23 The Queensland Government has taken up this position in its submission
to the Committee. Concerning the proposed s.190A(10) which provides that
the Registrar is unable to register an application that covers ordinary
title and residential or commercial leases, it suggested that the Parliament
should:
... redraft the sub-section having regard to the principles enunciated
by the High Court in Mabo (No. 2). In that case, the High Court held
that leasehold interests conferring a right of exclusive possession
were apt to extinguish native title. It is submitted that the principle
as enunciated should find some life in the proposed amendment rather
than references to specific types of tenure. [6]
3.24 The question of statutory acknowledgement of extinguishment of native
title has implications beyond the registration test. While in Mabo (No2)
the High Court did provide some indicia about the extinguishment of native
title on certain leases, it did not deliver a binding judgement that could
be understood as determining the circumstances under which native title
has survived in the face of pastoral and mining leases. That this is an
established fact with respect to pastoral leases was confirmed by proceedings
in the High Court in the Waanyi appeal. [7]
There the Commonwealth requested the High Court to determine the matter.
In his (minority) judgement, Justice Kirby advised:
...Twenty advocates appeared before the Court able to argue the
point. All of them, save ultimately the applicants, asked that it be
determined. The interveners, representing the Commonwealth, four States
and the Northern Territory asked the Court to proceed. The written submissions
of the parties, reflecting the original grounds of appeal, dealt with
the point. No one contested its national importance. No procedural or
jurisdictional impediment stood in the way. One day, certainly, the
point will have to be resolved. I was quite unconvinced that the cup
should pass.
Principles concerning extinguishment may be latent in Mabo (No2);
however, to this point the High Court has not determined the matter.
3.25 In the absence of High Court determination, then, should the legislature
decide? Of course, sovereignty entails the power to extinguish native
title. The majority in Mabo (No2) concurred:
Sovereignty carried the power to create and extinguish private
interests in land. The courts can review the legality but not the merits
of an exercise of power to extinguish; the legality will depend upon
the authority of the organ of government purporting to extinguish the
private interest. [9]
Nevertheless, there are limitations on the legislature in this regard;
one is constitutional: s.51 (xxxi), which prevents the Commonwealth from
doing so except on just terms; and the other is statutory: the Racial
Discrimination Act which constrains the States and Territories. [10]
And both of these limitations informed the Government's position in
the first Outline document:
The Government's policy prior to the election was to ensure the
NTA's workability but in so doing to respect the provisions of the RDA.
The Government's advice is that the legislative extinguishment of native
title on pastoral leases would be inconsistent with the principles of
the RDA and that it would probably involve an acquisition of property
interests by the Commonwealth thus requiring it to provide just terms
compensation (possibly of a substantial amount). [11]
3.26 The Coalition Government, then, has taken the view that to legislate
to extinguish any native title on pastoral leases, or to allow the States
or Territories to do so, would be seen as inconsistent with its election
commitments. Moreover, it argues that because there would be a number
of legal arguments open to Indigenous interests, the ensuing litigation
would preempt, possibly for a long period, the certainty sought by the
proponents of the legislative extinguishment option. [12]
3.27 There is an additional reason for the legislature to decline the
option of extinguishing native title wholesale on a class of titles, namely
leasehold interests. That reason centres on the merit of such a legislative
act. Native title was not extinguished by the acquisition of British sovereignty
but has been extinguished parcel by parcel through the issuing of various
land titles. Post-Mabo (No2), those land grants that were invalid because
of the existence of native title have been validated by the Native Title
Act. Whatever the inconvenience that the present uncertainty over extinguishment
provides for industry, the question is whether further extinguishment
of native title on leasehold land across the nation should be effected
by legislative means. The Committee's answer is in the negative.
3.28 It is appropriate here to record what has already been lost by native
title holders. Native title has been extinguished wherever traditional
owners have lost connection with their land. And the majority in Mabo
(No2) held that extinguishment by inconsistent Crown grant did not give
rise to a claim for compensatory damages (although this view is subject
to the operation of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975). Further, in validating
past acts and grants, or allowing States and Territories to do so, the
Native Title Act 1993 extinguished native title where there had been an
invalid grant of freehold or the grant of a commercial, agricultural,
pastoral or residential lease or the construction of a public work (all
defined by the Act). Native title will be extinguished where Category
A past acts are validated by the Act (ss.15(1)(a) and (b) and 229): these
acts are grants of freehold or of a commercial, agricultural, pastoral
or residential lease, or the construction of a public work. (Various past
grants, called category C and D past acts, do not extinguish native title;
in particular, mining leases do not extinguish native title by virtue
of the Act.) [13]
3.29 Given the fragments of native title that may survive and the difficulty
confronting common law native title holders in establishing a case for
compensation pursuant to s.17 of the Act, there would need to be presented
a significant argument favouring wholesale extinguishment before the Committee
could support additional legislative extinguishment of this order. To
this point the 'uncertainty' argument does not qualify as a ground for
overturning the concern to prevent further erosion of native title. At
the least, any legislative action to further extinguish native title would
be precipitate given the High Court's imminent judgement in the Wik matter
which involves pastoral leases without reservations in favour of Aboriginal
access.
[Table of Contents]
Implications
Queensland Submission
3.30 On the question of extinguishment of native title over leaseholds,
the Queensland Government in Submission No. 48 (p.2):
- submitted that where leasehold interests conferred a right of exclusive
possession, the principle of extinguishment 'should find some life in
the proposed amendment rather than references to specific types of tenure';
- advocated that 'if it is intended not to amend the fourth condition
by incorporating a reference to a leasehold interest conferring a right
of exclusive possession ... s.190A(10)(b) ought to be amended by including
the expression "mining lease" ';
- suggested that the reference to pastoral or agricultural leases be
deleted altogether; and
- proposed that the amendment be reworded to provide that a claim cannot
be registered over land subject to a category A past act as defined
in s.229.
The Committee's response is as follows:
- The principle of extinguishment is already represented robustly in
the Act: pursuant to s.15 category A past acts (as defined in s.229)
extinguish native title.
- There appears to be wide acceptance of the notion that mining leases
and pastoral leases should be treated differently in regard to extinguishment.
It is not clear that, as suggested by the Queensland Government, there
is 'a questionable distinction between mining leases and other forms
of leasehold interests'. In particular, numerous pastoral leases contain
reservations (or may imply them) in favour of Aboriginal access. Licences
to mine (unlike exploration licences) entail sole use; they are like
pastoral leases that entail sole occupancy. Nevertheless, the Act (s.238)
applies special treatment to mining leases (Category C past act) by
ensuring that, when validated, they do not extinguish native title.
Pending resolution of the common law on the question whether leases
extinguish native title, it would not be proper to preclude native title
claimants from the right to negotiate, even where previous licences
to mine were granted.
- The notion that all mining leases should disqualify native title claims
from registration would entail a significant diminution of the right
to negotiate and is unacceptable.
- With regard to the Queensland Government's proposal that claims over
land subject of a validated category A past act not be registered, this
would involve the Registrar in determining whether a relevant act fell
within the definition of 'past act' in s.228, which in turn would require
the Registrar to consider whether the act relied on was at the time
it happened wholly or partially invalid because of its effect on native
title. This would require the Registrar to determine, at an administrative
level, questions of law (including the effect of the Racial Discrimination
Act) which the courts have not resolved.
- The unresolved issue of extinguishment on pastoral leases will receive
some guidance in the near future when the High Court issues its judgement
in the Wik matter. At the least it would be premature to consider legislative
action concerning extinguishment on pastoral leases until then.
Further, given the High Court's judgement in the Waanyi appeal
that the National Native Title Tribunal should register an application
which is 'fairly arguable', the Queensland Government's proposal that
the term prima facie be replaced in s.190A(7) with 'reasonably
arguable' is accepted. There has never been an adequately clear understanding
of the concept of the prima facie test pursuant to s.63(1)(b).
Recommendation 7
| That the amendment proposing s.190A(7) be adopted
with the substitution of 'reasonably arguable' for 'prima facie'.
|
Transitional Provisions
3.31 The Exposure Draft proposes transitional provisions which would
result in the new registration test being applied to:
- native title claims lodged after 27 June 1996 (the date the Native
Title Amendment Bill 1996 was introduced in the House of Representatives)
[14]; and
- native title claims lodged before 27 June 1996 if, after the new registration
test comes into effect, a s.29 notice is issued notifying of a proposed
future act in relation to any area covered by the claim, and no previous
s.29 notice has been given under the new provisions. [15]
3.32 The Social Justice Commissioner has argued that the application
of the new registration test to claims lodged before the new test comes
into effect is unjust, and that the test should only operate in relation
to claims lodged after the test comes into effect. [16]
There are, however, significant difficulties with this view:
- The transitional arrangements concerning applications fall into two
categories:
- applications lodged before 27 June 1996 (when the Amendment Bill
1996 was introduced), and
- applications lodged after 27 June.
Applications lodged after 27 June would be treated under the new s.190A;
most of those provisions were announced on 27 June. Nothing in the new
arrangements will prevent any such applications from proceeding to mediation.
And those that are registered will attract the 'right to negotiate'
if any relevant s.29 notices are subsequently issued.
- For applications lodged prior to 27 June, however, an arrangement
is required for the processing of any s.29 notices to be issued following
the new provisions coming into force. Clearly, all future s.29 notices
should trigger the right to negotiate equitably. Accordingly, in this
regard all applications (whether lodged prior to 27 June or subsequently)
should pass the registration test prior to attracting the right to negotiate.
- The 'transitional' provisions, then, only differentiate between applications
for which the right to negotiate is relevant and those for which it
is not. They do not differentiate between applications qualifying in
future for the right to negotiate: all are treated alike in regard to
registration. Why should there be any distinction between applications
in regard to the future issuing of any s.29 notices?
- The current situation is clearly unsatisfactory in that a claimant
gains the right to negotiate upon lodgement, without any prima facie
scrutiny. The right to negotiate is an administrative benefit; the
Government is merely proposing to place conditions on eligibility for
that benefit in the future. Legislation is often passed imposing additional
conditions on the future attainment of administrative benefits (such
as social security legislation).
- Strictly, the registration test would not be retrospective legislation
(as the Social Justice Commissioner appears to have conceded) [17]: during the period between the lodgement
of the claim and the amendments coming into effect, the claim would
have been entitled to registration upon lodgement and to the administrative
benefits registration entails. And it is not clear that a claimant would
have to give up any benefits subsequently gained as a result of arbitration
or a negotiated agreement.
- Neither the registration test nor the transitional provisions would
prevent a claim from proceeding to a hearing on the issue of native
title or compensation; those rights would be unaffected.
- On 27 June the Government effectively signalled its intention to apply
the new registration test to claims lodged on or after that date; claimants
and their legal advisers were therefore on notice that claims lodged
from then on would only attract the right to negotiate if they complied
with a more thorough test.
- Notably, pre-27 June applications will not lose a benefit that they
had under the existing Act. The 'right to negotiate' only applies once
a s.29 notice is issued. Where it was not issued, the benefit did not
apply. That would continue to be the case under the transitional provisions
and registrations qualifying for the right to negotiate will receive
equitable treatment.
[Table of Contents]
Footnotes
[1] Explanatory Memorandum, p.1.
[2] For a schedule setting out the registration
test see Appendix 4 of this report.
[3] In the Waanyi appeal the High Court
held that the Tribunal must accept a claim under s.63 if on its face and
on the basis of material supplied by the applicant, the claim is 'fairly
arguable'.
[4] Procedures for Applications for Native
Title Determination and Compensation, 8 September 1995, para 2.8.
[5] Native Title Report July 1995 - June
1996, p.9.
[6] Submission No. 48, 21 August 1996.
[7] North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation
v The State of Queensland and Ors, unreported, p.82.
[8] ibid, p.82.
[9] Mabo 2 (1992) 175 CLR, p.63.
[10] ibid., p.111.
[11] Towards a More Workable Native Title
Act, p.1.
[12] Towards a More Workable Native Title
Act, p.12.
[13] Section 228 defines 'past act' as a legislative
act before 1 July 1993, or an executive act before 1 January 1994, that
was wholly or partly invalid because of native title. The most common
cause of invalidity would be the Racial Discrimination Act which came
into force on 31 October 1975.
[14] Exposure Draft, Part 2, Division 2, Item
7(4) (p.76).
[15] ibid., Item 7(3).
[16] Dodson, M, Native Title Report: July
1995 - June 1996, pp.124 and 125.
[17] ibid., citing Pearce D.C. and Geddes R.S.,
Statutory Interpretation In Australia, Butterworths, 4th edition,
1996, pp.245-6.
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