 |
Chapter 13
States and Territories
Lack of international status of State and Territory Governments
13.1 Only the Commonwealth government is recognised by the international
community as having 'international legal personality'.[1] The States have
never had international legal personality and accordingly have never had
the capacity to enter into treaties, even when they were colonies.[2]
Professor Zines has described the situation as follows:
Although the external affairs power in s. 51(xxix) is not expressed
to be exclusive, it is clear that it is only the Commonwealth that acts
on the international scene. Australia speaks to the world with one voice,
and that is the voice of the Commonwealth. The States did not develop
international personality. Executive power to engage in diplomatic relations,
enter into international treaties and conventions and declare war and
peace is therefore an exclusive power of the Commonwealth.[3]
13.2 As early as 1903, the Imperial authorities rejected a role for State
Governments in the process of treaty making. Dr Mary Crock described the
circumstances as follows:
In the Vondel Case,[4] for example, the South Australian Premier met
with little success when he tried to argue that while the treaty power
resided in Westminster, its mechanical operation was through the States.
The Premier maintained that the imposition of an intermediary between
his State and the King was an indignity to his Government and asked
why the States should not be as good a 'channel of communication' as
the Commonwealth. In response, the Imperial authorities simply accepted
the contention that the Federal Government's power was exclusive and
upheld the objections raised to South Australia's behaviour.[5]
13.3 The Secretary of State for the Colonies argued that:
the aim and object of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
was not to create merely a new administrative and legislative machinery
for the six states united in the Commonwealth, but to merge the six
states into one united federal state or Commonwealth furnished with
the powers essential to its existence as such.... By the [Constitution]
Act a new state or nation was created armed with paramount power not
only to settle the more important internal affairs relating to the common
interests of the united peoples, but also to deal with all political
matters arising between them and any other part of the Empire or (through
His Majesty's Government) with any foreign Power.[6]
13.4 States do, however, enter into international agreements which have
less than treaty status.[7] These are normally trade or cultural agreements.
State Governments have a range of offices overseas. States are represented
in London, Tokyo and Hong Kong. Mr Stuart Harris has recorded that States
communicate with foreign governments and conclude agreements with Governments
or more usually with instrumentalities of Governments, by use of agreements
such as a memorandum of understanding.[8]
13.5 It was submitted to the Committee that if the States seek consultation
with the Commonwealth about treaties, then States should consult the Commonwealth
about their own international agreements, before entering into them.[9]
Mr Roger Wilkins, Director-General of the NSW Cabinet Office, conceded
that there have been a few instances where Commonwealth policy and State
international agreements in the areas of trade or agriculture have clashed.[10]
Senator Cooney responded by suggesting that these problems might be overcome
if there were a body which dealt with consultation in both directions.[11]
13.6 While States lack the international status necessary to enter into
treaties, States are equipped to legislate with respect to treaties. This
was made clear by the submission made by the Western Australian Government:
State and Territory Parliaments (including the Western Australian Parliament)
have legislative power to implement treaties and conventions. The power
flows from the grant of plenary legislative power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the State Constitutions (see for
example, section 2 of the WA Constitution 1889). Furthermore, State
laws can validly operate outside Australia (i.e. beyond low watermark).[12]
Federal clauses
13.7 A 'federal clause' usually refers to a provision of a treaty under
which the international responsibility of a federal state is accepted
only for matters within the constitutional authority of the federal government.
If, as in the case of Australia, the federal authority has full power
to implement the treaty, the clause does not affect the obligations of
that country.[13] Background information on the role of federal clauses
in international law appears in Chapter 3.
13.8 The 1982 version of the Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State
Consultation on Treaties included an agreement by the Commonwealth to
seek federal clauses in treaties which cover subjects that are governed
by State law. In November 1983, the newly elected Hawke Government reaffirmed
most of the 'Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation
on Treaties', but gave a different view on the inclusion of federal clauses
in treaties. The Commonwealth Government stated that it did not favour
the inclusion of federal clauses in treaties and did not intend to instruct
Australian delegations to seek such inclusion. The revised document noted
that the inclusion of such clauses in treaties:
[i]s generally seen by the international community as an attempt by
the federal State to avoid the full obligations of a party to the treaty.
Experience at a number of international conferences has shown that such
clauses are regarded with disfavour by almost the entire international
community.[14]
13.9 The revised document further stated that the Commonwealth does not
object to making a short 'Federal Statement' on signing or ratifying treaties
where it is intended that the Australian States will play a role in the
treaty's implementation. The following statement is given as an example:
Australia has a federal constitutional system in which legislative,
executive and judicial power are shared or distributed between its central,
State and Territory authorities.
The implementation of the treaty throughout Australia will be effected
by the Federal, State and Territory governments having regard to their
respective constitutional powers and arrangements concerning their exercise.[15]
13.10 A number of those who made oral and written submissions to the
Committee considered that federal clauses should still play an important
role in Australia's treaty making process.
13.11 Mr JeremyBuxton was of the view that federal clauses were important:
It is not submitted that Australia ought to abandon these and other
multilateral conventions. It is however essential that we undertake
to implement them through the mechanism of our federal Constitution.
For this reason it is a matter of deep concern that in 1984 the Commonwealth
Government withdrew the previous reservation to the ICCPR that affirmed
its implementation through Australia's constitutional processes. 'Federal
clauses' must be an essential condition of adherence to conventions.[16]
13.12 The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry also submitted
that 'federalist clauses' should be included, as appropriate.
13.13 On the other hand, it should be noted that Australia may not be
able to achieve the insertion of federal clauses in treaties, because
they are considered by many countries as mere excuses for avoiding treaty
obligations. Federal clauses declined in popularity in the 1970s and the
majority of countries would not allow a federal clause to be inserted
in a multilateral treaty.[18] Professor Charlesworth, from the University
of Adelaide, when asked whether federal clauses are on the decline, responded:
That is right. Australian delegations, as I understand, used to be
instructed to try and seek them in treaties. The Canadians as well,
obviously, were quite interested in such clauses. The position has changed...
They are certainly very much on the decline because they really amounted
to 'weasel words,' to use the term.
Countries could sign on and then say, 'Oops, we have a federal clause
and we have a federation, therefore we cannot do anything.' There is
a general acknowledgment in the international community that they have
been used as back ways out of treaty obligations. I am not aware of
one in a treaty in the last five years, for example. They were much
more common in the 1950s and 1960s.[19]
13.14 Professor Charlesworth also observed that the insertion of a 'federal
declaration' appears to be an attempt to revive the old federal clause
procedure, but noted that the extensive Commonwealth power under s. 51(xxix)
of the Constitution means that any such reservation or declaration is
meaningless.[20]
13.15 In the absence of the ability to achieve the insertion of a federal
clause in a treaty, and given that it may not have any constitutional
effect in Australia anyway because of the Commonwealth's extensive power
under s. 51(xxix) of the Constitution, the only effective course may be
for specific reservations to be made to clauses of the treaty. Professor
Detmold explained this as follows:
Because of the extent of the external affairs power now, simple federal
clauses do not really mean anything. If the Commonwealth or anyone wants
meaningful federal clauses they are going to have to spell out in the
treaty exactly what it is they are reserving. For example, they could
say, 'Traditionally such and such a matter has been regarded as a matter
for the states and we have no intention of disturbing that understanding.'
They could make a reservation in those specific terms rather than the
meaningless federal reservation.[21]
13.16 Mr Henry Burmester, from the Attorney-General's Department, acknowledged
that the Commonwealth's external affairs power could be reduced by placing
reservations on specific clauses of a treaty, but warned that such reservations
could not be applied in all cases:
There may be limits on the reservations that a state could make either
in the convention itself, which says there will be no reservations or
any reservation does have to be compatible with the object and purpose
of the convention.... But if there was a reservation, that would certainly
reduce the Commonwealth's external affairs power.[22]
13.17 Mr Daley, from the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet,
acknowledged that as many international treaties expressly forbid the
making of federal reservations the Commonwealth is often precluded from
making such reservations.[23]
Consultation with States and Territories
13.18 Consultations with the States and Territories on treaties and draft
treaties utilise a number of mechanisms. Currently these include:
- those set out in the 'Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State
Consultation on Treaties';
- the Standing Committee on Treaties; and
- relevant ministerial Councils where treaties are discussed.[24]
Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties
13.19 In 1977, proposals were made for a set of guidelines on how the
States should be consulted on the negotiation and ratification of treaties.
In 1982, the Premiers and the Commonwealth reached agreement on a set
of 'Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties'.
These procedures were revised by the Commonwealth Government in 1983 and
then revised again in 1992. The revised principles and procedures were
circulated by the Prime Minister to the States and Territories on 18 March
1992.[25]
13.20 The Principles and Procedures provide for consultation on matters
which are of particular sensitivity or importance to the States and Territories
in relation to both the negotiation and implementation of treaties.[26]
The Principles do not require that the States and Territories agree on
ratification before a treaty may be ratified. The Principles and Procedures
are subject to the condition that they are not to lead to 'unreasonable
delays' in the negotiation, joining or implementing of treaties by Australia.
13.21 The submission from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
provided further details about the Principles and Procedures as
follows:
The Principles and Procedures make it clear that consultation
is to take place from the time of the decision to enter into negotiations
until the treaty has been implemented, in particular, the States and
Territories are to be consulted on the way in which a treaty is to be
implemented. If a treaty to which Australia is a party requires the
submission of reports, the views of the State and Territory Governments
should be ascertained in the preparation of the reports.
The Principles and Procedures specifically provide that a State
or Territory representative should be included in the Australian delegation
to appropriate treaty negotiations. Such representatives have recently
been included on Australian delegations to negotiations on the Desertification
Convention and the Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as
on bilateral maritime delimitation negotiations with Indonesia.[27]
Standing Committee on Treaties
13.22 In July 1991, the Premiers' Conference agreed to the establishment
of a Standing Committee on Treaties. The 'Principles and Procedures for
Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties' provides that the Standing
Committee is to be composed of 'senior Commonwealth and State/Territory
officers'. The Committee is to 'meet twice a year, or more often if required'.
Its functions are to:
- identify treaty and other international negotiations of particular
sensitivity or importance to States, and propose an appropriate mechanism
for State involvement in the negotiation process;
- monitor and report on the implementation of particular treaties where
the implementation of the treaty has strategic implications, including
significant cross-portfolio interests, for States;
- coordinate as required the process for nominating State representation
on delegations where such representation is appropriate.[28]
13.23 Prior to each meeting of the Standing Committee a document is circulated
to the States and Territories which sets out the treaties in relation
to which the Commonwealth Government intends to take action. States and
Territories are also advised between the meetings of any new and concluded
negotiations.
13.24 The Committee received certain documents as examples of the information
provided by the Commonwealth to the State and Territory Governments.[29]
These documents show the range of information provided, from the detailed
to the perfunctory.
13.25 The Joint Submission of the States and Territories submitted that
the 'level of information provided by the Commonwealth to States and Territories
varies immensely from treaty to treaty' and that State and Territory views
are sometimes sought too late in the negotiation process. The States and
Territories proposed the formalisation of the process, submitting:
In addition to informal consultation, States and Territories should
formally respond to the Commonwealth's proposal to negotiate, ratify,
and implement treaties through the Treaties Council or the relevant
Ministerial Council. All formal responses, and the Commonwealth's answers
to them should be sent to the Standing Committee on Treaties. The Standing
Committee should prepare an annual report on the consultation process
for the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers, who could table
it in their respective Parliaments. This report should note those treaties
on which the Commonwealth and States and Territories did not agree,
highlight problems with the consultation processes, and hold up examples
of successful consultation processes. This would improve accountability
both for the Commonwealth's consultation and for State executive positions
on treaty negotiations.[30]
13.26 Senator Kemp has noted how difficult it is to obtain information
on whether the States have agreed to the ratification of a treaty, or
what may be their concerns.[31] The publication of regular reports may
alleviate this problem.
Ministerial Councils
13.27 According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the 'Principles
and Procedures' provide that existing Commonwealth/State consultative
bodies may be used to discuss matters in relation to treaties.[32] A number
of Ministerial Councils deal with specific types of treaties on an ongoing
basis. These Councils include the following:
- Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New
Zealand and the Australia and New Zealand Minerals and Energy
Council;
- Australia and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council
and Intergovernmental Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development
(ICESD);
- Australian Transport Council (Marine and Ports Group);
- Labour Ministers' Conference;
- Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture;
and
- Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG).[33]
13.28 The rationale behind the relevant Ministerial Councils discussing
treaties is that they have the expertise and broader policy knowledge
to effectively consider the substantive issues that arise under treaties.[34]
13.29 Mr Stewart-Crompton, of the Department of Industrial Relations,
appeared to give some weight to the views of the States and Territories
in relation to a decision to ratify a treaty. He submitted to the Committee:
The approach to ratification of Conventions by Australia is that this
occurs only where two preconditions are satisfied:
- that law and practice in all relevant jurisdictions is in compliance
with the Convention in question, and
- that all State and Territory governments have formally agreed to ratification
(except for those Conventions whose subject matter falls within the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Government alone).[35]
In recent years, the Commonwealth has on two occasions ratified ILO
Conventions without the formal agreement of the States and Territories
(apart from those Conventions whose subject matter falls within the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth alone).[36]
13.30 The two Conventions which were ratified without the consent of
all the States are ILO Convention No. 156, Workers with Family Responsibilities,
and ILO Convention No. 158, Termination of Employment. The latter
of these Conventions is discussed in Chapter 9.
SCAG Working Group on Human Rights
13.31 The Government recently announced that at the next meeting of the
Commonwealth and State and Territory Attorneys-General, (SCAG) the Commonwealth
will propose the establishment of a Working Party on Human Rights.[37]
The Working Party on Human Rights would have the task of working towards
a coordinated national strategy on human rights and should, it is claimed,
provide a base for future cooperation in satisfying Australia's international
human rights responsibilities - including responses to communications
to the international human rights treaty bodies.[38]
Criticisms of the current consultation processes with States and Territories
13.32 The Joint Submission of the Governments of the States and Territories
of Australia indicates that there were a number of problems with the existing
consultation procedures. They had a number of difficulties as follows:
- The level of information provided by the Commonwealth to States and
Territories varies immensely from treaty to treaty.
- State and Territory views are sometimes sought too late in the negotiation
process.
- Complex multilateral treaties affect many departments in different
ways. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is sometimes not aware
of all the State departments which deal with matters affected by a treaty.
- The system of consultation does not allow States and Territories to
track the progress of consultation on treaties through different departments
and so they cannot ensure that all of their knowledge is passed on to
the Commonwealth.
- The consultation process is not transparent, and the public remains
unaware of State and Territory concerns and of Commonwealth responses
to them; and
- The Commonwealth has the power to over-ride State and Territory objections
to a treaty even in circumstances where it may be unreasonable to do
so.[39]
13.33 One of the arguments for detailed State and Territory involvement
is that 'State and Territory officials may have hands-on experience of
an area which Commonwealth officials negotiating the treaty may not have.'[40]
13.34 The Joint State and Territory Submission pointed out:
The Commonwealth does not always consider adequately how its implementation
of a treaty will mesh with existing State and Territory administrations
and laws... The Commonwealth legislation may not provide a comprehensive
regime, and may result in patchwork legislation which increases administration
and compliance costs. Commonwealth legislation may prevent the operation
of State legislation which imposes higher standards or more appropriate
conditions. The Commonwealth may selectively intervene so as to upset
the overall balance achieved by day to day administration.[41]
13.35 Ms Marie Swain, from the New South Wales Parliamentary Research
Service, has noted:
The States have a number of concerns with the present system. The first
is that the Federal government is able, seemingly unilaterally to commit
Australia to treaties, with which the States may not be in accord. And
although the States are supposed to be consulted about treaties the
Federal government is contemplating becoming a signatory to, there is
no requirement for the views of the States to be taken into account.[42]
[O]nce treaties have been ratified the States can almost be coerced
into amending their legislation, if amendment is necessary to give effect
to the obligations under the treaty, or risk the Federal Government
enacting overriding legislation if they choose not to do so.[43]
State criticism of the current operation
of the Standing Committee on Treaties
13.36 The States and Territories have been critical of the way the Standing
Committee on Treaties functions in practice.
13.37 A number of problems were identified in a position paper attached
to the Joint State and Territory Submission. The paper stated that:
States and Territories have not used the Committee consistently or
effectively and are seldom represented by senior officials. The Commonwealth
sees the Committee merely as a clearing house for information and is
not prepared to discuss the substance of particular treaties. More fundamentally
it is a committee of officials and is not politically accountable.[44]
13.38 The Victorian Government's Background Paper noted that although
the 'Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on
Treaties' states that the Standing Committee will monitor and report on
the implementation of particular treaties and propose appropriate mechanisms
for State involvement in the negotiation process, this has not occurred.
The Standing Committee has become little more than a 'clearing house'
for information on treaties.[45]
13.39 The Background paper states:
- supervising the Commonwealth-State consultation process;
- ensuring that all relevant State Departments are consulted; and
- clearly articulating State attitudes to contentious treaties.
The value of the Committee is limited and could be increased. Despite
the explicit provisions of the Principles and Procedures, the Committee
does not regularly propose mechanisms for Commonwealth-State consultation
over particular treaties. Nor does it oversee the nomination of State
representatives to delegations. The Committee has never reported on the
implementation of treaties. It is difficult for it to do so because the
Commonwealth refuses to discuss the substance of particular treaties at
the Committee.[46]
Recent examples of consultation practices
with the States and Territories
13.40 The Victorian Government Background Paper claimed that consultation
with the States and Territories was 'patchy' and discussed the circumstances
in which Australia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child[47]
and ILO Convention 158, Termination of Employment.[48] These
are discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
13.41 The Victorian Background Paper claimed that the States were not
fully consulted on a range of other treaties, including the UN Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, the Protocol on Environment Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty, the Declaration under article 90 of Additional Protocol
1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949[49] and the Convention for the
Protection of Mentally Ill Persons.[50]
13.42 The Victorian Background Paper also referred to the question of
Australia's accession to the First Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Mr Wilkins, the Director-General
of the New South Wales Cabinet Office, also noted that different Attorneys-General
of New South Wales had 'emphatically protested that Australia should not
enter into that Optional Protocol'.[51] This case appears, however, to
be one of concern that the objections of the States were ignored, rather
than a lack of consultation, because consultation occurred over a significant
period of time.[52]
Improvement of consultation processes with the States and Territories
13.43 There is some evidence that the Commonwealth has been improving
its processes of consultation with the States and Territories.[53]
13.44 This has been evident in a number of areas, particularly with the
establishment of the Standing Committee on Treaties. It has also been
evident in the participation of State and Territory officials at treaty
negotiations:
Mr Campbell [from the Attorney-General's Department] - I think
they [the States] were represented on most of the prominent environment
conventions recently. Certainly the desertification convention, the
biodiversity convention and the climate change convention all had representatives
from the states attending negotiations as part of the Australian delegation.
At least one of the state solicitors-general, over the whole history
of the law of the sea negotiations, has attended the major sessions,
including the sessions of the preparatory committee for the law of the
sea.
Mr Lamb - I think our records are very good actually. We have
also had representatives of the states in our delegations over the years
at the UN Commission on Human Rights annual sessions. Even though it
is not a treaty making body itself, it is a body that frequently generates
thinking about what ought to happen in a treaty or how a treaty might
be implemented or what the standards are that are being used.
We are looking at the moment at the composition of the Australian delegation
at the first negotiating session later this year at the working group
set up by the Commission on Human Rights on the draft declaration on
the rights of indigenous peoples. Although that is not a treaty itself,
it is regarded by the states as a document of sufficient importance
to warrant their close interest. So we have said we think it is perfectly
reasonable that they should think that way. If they wish to nominate
a state to carry the flag for them inside the negotiating sessions,
they are free to do so.[54]
13.45 Mr Lamb claimed that the consultative process used by the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade is better 'than that which exists in any
other country, including Canada, the UK, the US, Germany or the countries
that have requirements for parliamentary approval or veto'.[55]
13.46 While the Commonwealth considered that there was a very high level
of consultation with the States, the States had a different view. As noted
above, the Joint State and Territory Government submission stated that
the 'level of information provided by the Commonwealth to States and Territories
varies immensely from treaty to treaty' and 'State and Territory views
are sometimes sought too late in the negotiation process'.[56]
13.47 The view that Commonwealth consultation of the States is 'varied'
was supported by witnesses who appeared before the Committee.[57] Although
agreeing that there has been some improvement, Ms Hanlon, from the Victorian
Department of Premier and Cabinet noted that the Commonwealth was 'starting
from a very low base'.[58] Mr Daley, from the Victorian Department of
Premier and Cabinet, noted that exercises such as this inquiry have been
the catalyst for improved consultation, but that measures should be taken
to ensure that the improved levels of consultation continue when there
is less scrutiny.[59]
Direct involvement of the States and Territories in the treaty making
process
13.48 A number of witnesses suggested that the States should have a more
direct role in the treaty making process.[60]
13.49 A Western Australian parliamentarian, the Hon. Phillip Pendal MLA,
recommended that treaties should be the subject of scrutiny and debate
in the State Parliaments.[61] Dr Thomson, from the Western Australian
Attorney-General's Department, responded that there is, at present, no
impediment to treaties being debated and scrutinised in the State Parliaments.[62]
13.50 Mr Pendal also suggested that where a treaty affects State legislation,
it would not be unreasonable to allow the States the right to veto a treaty.
In order to avoid the necessity of constitutional amendment, he proposed
that if a majority of States voted against a treaty, this message should
be sent to the Senate, which should then vote on the matter.[63]
13.51 The Governments of the States and Territories seemed less enthusiastic
about the involvement of the State and Territory Parliaments in the treaty
making process and did not claim for their Governments a direct role in
treaty making, or the power to veto treaties. Their position was summarised
by Mr Daley as follows:
I think essentially we see it as being too difficult, too complex and
too messy to try to involve all of the State parliaments in a formal
way as well and that the Commonwealth Parliament is an appropriate forum
for that sort of consultation.[64]
The States are not asking for any formal part in the treaty process.
We are not saying that, under this law that you are proposing under
section 51, Australia shall not approve a treaty unless it has the approval
of State Governments.... That is quite clearly a State and Territory
position. We are saying that there should be extensive consultation,
and we are saying that that consultation should be done properly.[65]
Need for States and Territories to take a broader interest in treaty
processes
13.52 Historically, at least part of the problem with the consultation
process with the States and Territories may have been caused by the failure
of State Departments to keep informed the relevant Department of the Premier
or Chief Minister. Ms Tyers and Mr Daley from the Victorian Department
of Premier and Cabinet commented:
Ms Tyers - [N]egotiations about treaties go on between various
Commonwealth government departments and a range of state government
departments which makes it very difficult to coordinate the process.
Mr Daley -.... It is not just that the standing committee on
treaties does not know; it is that the central departments like the
Premiers' departments do not know. ....
Negotiations over the Basel Convention, for example, started off in
either the Environment Protection Authority of Victoria or the Department
of Conservation and Natural Resources; I am not sure which of the two.
I think it has particularly been a problem with environmental treaties
in recent years in that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
goes and talks to state environmental departments, by and large does
not talk nearly so much to business or industry-type departments - whatever
they are called in the relevant states - and, consequently, the advice
and consultation it gets from the states tends to be very much focused
towards one side of the issue. No, it does not talk to premiers' departments
on a large number of treaties. Or at least it does not do so until the
negotiations are pretty much concluded.[66]
13.53 The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
in its report, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect
Human Rights, received evidence on the consultation practices with
the States and Territories. The Committee concluded:
On the basis of the evidence it was difficult for the Committee to
assess how much consultation between the Commonwealth and the States
took place and how effective it was. In theory, it appeared to be elaborate,
involving a variety of mechanisms and levels of government, both official
and ministerial. Yet in practice some states talked of meticulous involvement
and even inclusion in delegations to the UN, others claimed no consultation
or information until after treaties had been ratified.
There did appear to be a problem of dissemination within some bureaucracies
where information passed from Commonwealth line departments to State
line departments, did not pass to the central coordinating agencies
within the Premier's Department and vice versa. This Committee was also
aware of a level of opposition, disinterest or claims of stretched resources
from some States when the subject of human rights was broached.
13.54The Joint Committee recommended:
the further streamlining of the processes of the Commonwealth/State
Standing Committee on Treaties to improve the collection and dissemination
of information between line departments and the coordinating agency
at both the State and Commonwealth levels; and
the establishment of an educative program on the treaty process for
officials at all levels of government.[68]
13.55 The Government has not yet responded to the Joint Committee's 1994
report.
13.56 Dr Herr argued that if States and Territories are to have a greater
role in the treaty processes, there is a consequential need for the States
'to take a broader interest and that will involve them in devoting far
more resources to monitoring international affairs than they currently
do.'
13.57 The Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department considers that the
existing methods for consultation with the States and Territories in relation
to treaties are satisfactory. However, the Department noted in its submission
that the existing structures are not adequately utilised by the States
and Territories:
[T]here is no doubt that the States do not avail themselves fully of
the consultation process - for example they could make more use of the
Commonwealth-State Standing Committee on Treaties. Moreover, it is the
Commonwealth's experience that ... much of the material which is given
to the States and Territories on treaties is not given a wide distribution
within their Governments.[70]
13.58 The Joint State and Territory submission agreed that the Standing
Committee on Treaties could operate more effectively and that it should
be upgraded. The States and Territories made the following suggestions:
It [the Standing Committee on Treaties] should nominate an appropriate
process for treaties in which States and Territories have an interest.
It should nominate a lead MinCo for each treaty which States and Territories
consider important. Of course, the nominated MinCo or governments might
subsequently agree to a different process for a particular treaty. The
Standing Committee on Treaties should collate and publish the response
of MinCos and the Treaties Council.
States and Territories should also indicate to the Standing Committee
on Treaties a contact officer for each treaty. Responsible Ministers
would set directions so that States' and Territories' contact officers
could respond to continuously shifting international treaty negotiations
and ensure that Commonwealth negotiators have information from those
who deal with the treaty subject matter on the ground.[71]
Greater involvement of the States and Territories and the problem
of delay
13.59 One of the issues of concern about greater involvement of the States
and Territories in the treaty making process is that it may result in
undue delay in entering into treaties.
13.60 Several academic commentators gave evidence to the Committee in
relation to some cases in which consultation with the States and Territories
has led to major periods of delay in the ratification of international
treaties.[72]
13.61 Commentators have noted that this was the case during the process
which led to Australia's accession to the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR:
In the case of Australia's accession to the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, the lack of agreement among the states was the principal reason
for the eleven year delay between Australia's ratification of the Covenant
and its eventual acceptance of the Protocol.[73]
13.62 Historically, the practice of obtaining the agreement of States
before Australia entered into certain international agreements has seen
a significant delay in Australia joining important international treaties.
One commentator noted:
There is a long history of Australia's incapacity to ratify many of
the agreements adopted by the International Labour Organisation. For
many years the Commonwealth was able to adopt but a small percentage
of the Organisation's agreements because of a declared policy to ratify
only those ILO Conventions to which the States had given or had promised
to give legislative effect.[74]
13.63 The Attorney-General's Department also raised the issue that increasing
consultation with the States may lead to delays in the treaty making process:
The point also needs to be made that many of the proposals outlined
above for further information and consultation [with the States] could
not be implemented without costs, both financial and in terms of substantial
delays in the treaty process.[75]
13.64 In 1992, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
concluded that the process of Commonwealth-State consultation 'proved
to be woefully slow, [with] lapses of decades occurring in some cases.'
The Committee concluded that it 'would seem that federal governments in
their desire not to upset the States have been as culpable as the States
in their willingness to let inertia prevail'.[76]
Treaties Council
13.65 In 1985, the Australian Constitutional Convention recommended the
establishment of an Australian Treaties Council by the then Premiers'
Conference. Membership of the Council would give an emphasis to expertise
in international law and inter-Governmental relations. The proposed Council
was to function as a body through which the interests of the States could
be identified and views expressed and coordinated.[77]
13.66 In 1988, the Constitutional Commission recommended that an Australian
Treaties Council be established along the lines proposed by the Australian
Constitutional Convention.[78] The proposal for a Treaties Council has
not been implemented in its entirety although there have been a number
of improvements in Commonwealth and State and Territory consultation mechanisms
as discussed above. In particular, a Standing Committee on Treaties has
been established to provide assistance to the Commonwealth on the negotiation
and implementation of treaties.[79]
13.67 Mr Henry Burmester, of the Attorney-General's Department, asked
a number of important questions in relation to the proposal for a Treaties
Council:
There have been suggestions for a treaties council - and I am happy
to return to that issue - but I think it is important to ask ourselves
precisely what function such a body might fulfil. Is it to be COAG by
just another name? Is it to be essentially a state body enabling the
states to coordinate their view? Or is it to be some sort of federalstate
secretariat and, in that case, where does it report to and essentially
what role does it have, given there are existing mechanisms in place?[80]
Support for a Treaties Council
13.68 There was fairly strong support for an increased role for the States
in the treaty making process in the evidence before the Committee. The
Committee received a number of submissions expressing support for a Treaties
Council.[81]
13.69 The Joint State and Territory Submission to the Committee stated
that the Premiers and Chief Ministers have agreed to a position paper
which recommends that a Treaties Council be formed as an adjunct to the
Council of Australian Governments to discuss key strategic treaties and
to assist in drawing the Commonwealth's attention to the concerns of the
States and Territories.[82]
13.70 The Joint State and Territory Submission noted that the proposed
Treaties Council would only have an advisory role, and that the Commonwealth
Executive would retain responsibility for decisions on treaty issues.[83]
13.71 According to the Joint State and Territory Submission the proposed
Treaties Council would be preferable to the Standing Committee on Treaties:
The Council would be chaired by the Prime Minister and would heighten
Commonwealth awareness and understanding of the States' and Territories'
concerns about specific treaties. Unlike the Standing Committee on Treaties
[which comprises officials] the Treaties Council would be politically
accountable and its members would have clear authority to state the
position of their governments.[84]
13.72 The Western Australian Government, in an additional submission
to the Committee, called on the Commonwealth Parliament to enact legislation
to underpin the Treaties Council:
It is proposed that an agreed Treaties process, that involves the Commonwealth,
States and Territories through a Treaties Council, be created by legislation.
The Commonwealth Parliament could exercise its powers, under sections
51(39) and 61 of the Constitution, to enable the treaty process and
the Treaties Council.
Western Australia's proposal is that a Treaties Act be passed by the
Commonwealth Parliament to assist in establishing a Treaties Council.
The Council's functions would relate to processes for negotiation, drafting,
ratification, implementation and monitoring of Treaties and any resulting
application of the treaty and alleviate concern expressed by State and
Territory Governments, non-government organisations, and the public,
that adequate treaty consultation does not occur.
The Treaties Council would comprise of the Prime Minister, State Premiers
and Territory Chief Minsters. The legislation would also formalise a
role for the Senate to approve the ratification of Treaties. The Senate,
as an essential federal, constitutional and democratic body, must also
be involved in the process which determines Australia's involvement
in Treaties.[85]
13.73 Premier Wayne Goss has also recently called for the establishment
of a Treaties Council.[86]
13.74 The Federal Coalition has also supported the establishment of a
Treaties Council. Mr Alexander Downer, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs,
has stated that a Coalition Government would 'establish a Treaties Council
as part of the Council of Australian Governments, and this initiative
will be associated with a general strengthening of the consultative procedures
on international law-making between the Commonwealth and the States'.[87]
13.75 Mr Daryl Williams QC, the Member for Tangney, has expanded on this
proposal. He envisaged that the Treaties Council would not only provide
the States with better information and advice on the impact of treaties,
but would also become a focus for some public consultation during treaty
negotiations.[88] Mr Williams QC submitted to the Committee that the Council
needs to go beyond the Standing Committee on Treaties:
[T]he establishment of the Standing Committee does not obviate the
need for a Treaties Council. The Standing Committee is not independent
of the governments represented on it, its members do not include persons
appointed solely because of relevant expertise, and its advice and reports
are not public. In addition, the functions of the Standing Committee
are much more limited than those the proposed Council would have.[89]
13.76 The Australian Mining Industry Council[90] and the Business Council
of Australia both supported the establishment of a Treaties Council.[91]
The Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (Inc) wanted treaties
to be approved by a two-thirds majority of a council made up of the Premiers,
Chief Ministers and the Prime Minister.[92]
13.77 The NSW Farmers Association supported a Treaties Council on the
grounds that the external affairs power is a concurrent power, and its
exercise should be shared between the Commonwealth and the States through
cooperative means.[93]
13.78 The composition of the Treaties Council was the subject of divergent
opinions. While the States and Territories saw it as being composed of
State Premiers and Territory Chief Ministers, others considered that its
members should be appointed by reason of their expertise in legal and
governmental matters. Mr Jeremy Buxton argued that it should be 'an independent
body and not just established through COAG'. He envisaged it as 'a body
with commanding people of great legal and other expertise that could evaluate
the possible effects of these multilateral treaties and conventions on
the whole body politic'.[94]
13.79 The Hon. Elizabeth Evatt also suggested that the proposal to establish
a Treaties Council be looked at again, and saw it as a body made up of
representatives of governments or parliaments of the Commonwealth. She
considered that one of its functions should be to ensure that Australia
is at all times fulfilling its convention obligations.[95]
Conclusion and recommendation
13.80 Only the Commonwealth Government has international legal personality,
and therefore only the Commonwealth Government has the power to enter
into treaties. The Australian States, however, play an important role
in Australia meeting its international obligations. In many cases, treaties
are implemented by State legislation or State administrative action. Accordingly,
the Committee considers that a more effective mechanism for Commonwealth/State
consultation on treaties is imperative.
13.81 The States and Territories, in their joint submission to the Committee,
did not seek a power to veto treaties nor did they seek a direct role
for State Parliaments in treaty making. Instead, they sought proper and
detailed Commonwealth/State consultation on treaties.[96] Such consultation
has already been achieved, in part, through the establishment of the Standing
Committee on Treaties, and the other procedures set out in the 'Principles
and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties'.
13.82 However, the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments have
been critical of the operation of the Standing Committee on Treaties.
The Commonwealth has noted that the Standing Committee on Treaties is
not effectively utilised by the States and Territories, and the States
and Territories have suggested that it be upgraded.
13.83 The States and Territories consider that one of the major problems
with the Standing Committee on Treaties is that it is a committee of officials
and is therefore not politically accountable. Accordingly, in addition
to upgrading the Standing Committee on Treaties, the officials' committee,
the States and Territories have called for the establishment of a Treaties
Council comprising heads of Governments.
13.84 The Committee is concerned that the creation of a new Treaties
Council, in addition to the Standing Committee on Treaties, would merely
duplicate the number of bodies dealing with treaties. The Committee considers
that it would be preferable to reform existing bodies, rather than create
an extra body.
13.85 The Committee considers that the preferable approach would be to
abolish the Standing Committee on Treaties and replace it with a Treaties
Council. The Committee considers that the Treaties Council should not
only reflect the views of State and Territory Governments, but it should
also reflect the views of State and Territory Parliaments.
13.86 The Treaties Council should comprise representatives appointed
by the Government and Opposition of each State and Territory. Similarly,
a representative of the Government, Opposition and the minor parties in
the Commonwealth Parliament should be included on the Treaties Council.
13.87 The impact of treaties is so significant that the Committee considers
that it is necessary to go further than the proposal suggested by the
States and Territories in their joint submission to the Committee. Whereas
the States' and Territories' proposal for improved Commonwealth/State
consultation on treaties only extends to a Treaties Council of Government
representatives of States Territories, the Committee recommends parliamentary
representation from the States and Territories.
13.88 The broad-based parliamentary membership of the Treaties Council
is recommended in response to the calls in the community for greater and
more diverse Commonwealth/State consultation on treaties.
13.89 The size of the Treaties Council may give rise to suggestions that
it would be unwieldy. However, the Committee does not envisage the Treaties
Council as being a decision making body. Rather, the Treaties Council
will be an advisory body. The purpose of the Council will be to facilitate
the widest possible consultation on concerns raised by the States and
Territories in relation to treaties. The broader representation on the
Council will assist this process. Furthermore, the Council will be a forum
for the States and Territories to directly provide input to the Commonwealth
Parliament, that is the Government, the Opposition and minor parties,
in relation to treaties of concern to them.
13.90 The Committee considers that the deliberations of the Treaties
Council would not add to the delay in the treaty making process. The Committee
notes that the negotiation of many treaties occurs over a period of several
years. Such a time frame would therefore readily accommodate effective
consideration of proposed treaties by the Treaties Council.
13.91 The Treaties Council should meet on a regular basis, at least twice
a year. The Council should actively consider the potential impact of treaties
on State and Territory laws, and the most appropriate manner of implementing
treaties. The Treaties Council should be more than a clearing house for
information. It should hold deliberative meetings and publish reports,
which would make the views of the States and Territories available to
the public. The Committee considers that these reports should be tabled
in the respective Commonwealth, State and Territory Parliaments.
13.92 The Committee considers that it would be preferable if the Treaties
Council were established by legislation, to give it a firm and transparent
basis. Such legislation could be enacted by the Commonwealth at the request
of the States and Territories, or could be uniform cooperative legislation
in the States and Territories and the Commonwealth.
Recommendation 7:
That the existing Commonwealth-State Standing Committee on Treaties be
abolished and replaced with a Treaties Council that is preferably established
by legislation. The Treaties Council should comprise members appointed
by both the Government and Opposition of each of the Parliaments of the
States and Territories and the Government, Opposition and minor parties
of the Commonwealth Parliament. The role of the Treaties Council should
be to consider the potential impact of treaties on State, Territory and
Commonwealth laws, and the method of implementing treaties. The Council
should provide public reports which could be tabled in the Parliaments
of the States, Territories and the Commonwealth.
- Seas and Submerged Lands case (1975) 135 CLR 337 at 373. This
position appears to be accepted by the States and Territories. See:
Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 6, p 1329.
However, see H. Burmester, 'The Australian States and Participation
in the Foreign Policy Process' (1978) 9 Federal Law Review 257,
at 262.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 16 May 1995, p 386, per Sir Maurice Byers QC;
p 432, per Mr R. Wilkins; 14 June 1995,p 627, per Mr J. Daley. The States
never had international legal personality. However, as discussed earlier
in Chapter 4, the States had the limited power to refuse to be bound
by commercial treaties to which Britain became a party.
- L. Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 3rd ed., Butterworths,
1992: pp 235-6.
- Australia, Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1903, ii, 1149ff.
- M. Crock, 'Federalism and the External Affairs Power', (1983-1984)
14 Melbourne University Law Review 239, at 242.
- Quoted in: A.B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions,
Vol II, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1912: p 799.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 15 May 1995, p 236, per the Hon. P. Pendal
MLA.
- S. Harris, in B. Hocking (ed) Foreign Relations and Federal States,
Leicester University Press, 1993, p 98.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 13 June 1995, p 521, per Professor K. Wiltshire.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 16 May 1995, p 437.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 16 May 1995, p 437.
- The Hon. C. Edwardes, MLA, Submission No. 100, Vol 6, p 1266.
- Constitutional Commission, Final Report of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol 2, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, p 733. See also: H. Burmester, 'Federal
Clauses: An Australian Perspective' (1985) 34 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 522.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Negotiation, Conclusion
and Implementation of International Treaties and Arrangements, Canberra,
August 1994, p 30.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Negotiation, Conclusion
and Implementation of International Treaties and Arrangements, Canberra,
August 1994, p 30.
- Mr J. Buxton, Submission No. 23, Vol 2, p 237.
- 1 Mr B. Davis, Submission No. 92, Vol 6, pp 1111-1112.
- However, ILO Conventions still contain federal clauses for historical
reasons: Hansard, SLCRC, 16 May 1995, p 371, per the Hon. E.G.
Whitlam.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 25 July 1995, p 827, per Professor H. Charlesworth.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 25 July 1995, p 828, per Professor H. Charlesworth.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 25 July 1995, p 828, per Professor M. Detmold.
Mr A. Rose agreed with this statement at p 829.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 672, per Mr H. Burmester.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 644, per Mr J. Daley.
- A. Funder, 'Treaty-making Procedures in Australia', (1994) 5(4) Public
Law Review 289.
- The Principles are an attachment to: Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Negotiation, Conclusion and Implementation of International
Treaties and Arrangements, Canberra, August 1994. See A. Funder,
'Treaty-making Procedures in Australia', (1994) 5(4) Public Law Review
289.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia and International
Treaty Making, Information Kit, October 1994.
- Mr C. R. Jones, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission
No. 93, Vol 6, p 1151.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Negotiation, Conclusion
and Implementation of International Treaties and Arrangements, Canberra,
August 1994.
- Mr A. Henderson, Submission No. 135, Vol 8, pp 1862-1968 and Submission
No. 136, Vol 8, pp 1970-2082.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 7, pp
1333-34.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 631, per Senator Kemp.
- Mr C. R. Jones, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission
No. 93, Vol 6, pp 1148-1149.
- Mr C. R. Jones, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission
No. 93, Vol 6, p 1149.
- Mr C. R. Jones, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission
No. 93, Vol 6, p 1150.
- Mr R. Stewart-Crompton, Submission No. 146, Vol 9, p 2170.
- Mr R. Stewart-Crompton, Submission No. 146, Vol 9, p 2170.
- Attorney-General's Department, The Justice Statement, May 1995.
- 1 Attorney-General's Department, The Justice Statement, May
1995, pp 175-176.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 6, p
1333.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 6, p
1333.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 6, p
1333.
- Ms M. Swain, International Treaties, NSW Parliamentary Library
Research Service, 1995: p 17.
- Ms M. Swain, International Treaties, NSW Parliamentary Library
Research Service, 1995: p 18.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 6, p
1338.
- Mr K. Baxter, Submission No. 111, Vol 7, pp 1469-70
- Mr K. Baxter, Submission No. 111, Vol 7, p 1470.
- See also Mr N. Moore MLC, WA Minister for Education, Submission No.
65, Vol 3, pp 549-550.
- Mr K. Baxter, Submission No. 111, Vol 7, pp 1466-68.
- This declaration would allow an International Fact-Finding committee
to inquire into allegations by another country that Australia had committed
a grave breach of the Protocol or the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (i.e.
a war crime).
- Mr K. Baxter, Submission No. 111, Vol 7, pp 1468.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 16 May 1995, p 430, per Mr R. Wilkins.
- The Hon. M. Lavarch MP, House of Representatives, Hansard,
12 October 1994, p 1775.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 700, per Ms P. Martin.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 1 May 1995, pp 44-45, per Mr W. Campbell and
Mr C. Lamb.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 677, per Mr C. Lamb.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 6, p
1333.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 16 May 1995, p 429, per Mr R. Wilkins; Hansard,
SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 632, per Mr J. Daley.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p. 643, per Ms F. Hanlon.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 643, per Mr J. Daley.
- See for example, Mr S. Blizard, Submission No. 70, Vol 3, p 582.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 15 May 1995, p 237, per the Hon. P. Pendal
MLA.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 15 May 1995, p 252, per Dr J. Thomson.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 15 May 1995, p 256, per the Hon. P. Pendal
MLA.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 627, per Mr J. Daley.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 707, per Mr J. Daley.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 2 May 1995, pp 130-131.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, A
Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights,
AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p 45.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, A
Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights,
AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p 46.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 22 May 1995, p 456, per Dr R. A. Herr.
- Mr H. Burmester, Submission No. 75, Vol 4, p 718.
- Joint Submission of the States and Territories, Submission No. 107,
Vol 6, p 1343.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 13 June 1995, p 521 and p 530, per Professor
K. Wiltshire.
- Mr B.R. Opeskin and Dr D.R. Rothwell, Submission No. 73, Vol 4, p
654
- Dr M. Crock, 'Federalism and the External Affairs Power', (1983-1984)
14 Melbourne University Law Review 239, at 242. A. Byrnes and
H. Charlesworth, 'Federalism and the International Legal Order: Recent
Developments in Australia', (1985) 79 The American Journal of International
Law 623. See also G. Whitlam, 'National and International Maturity',
(1992) 42 Australian Journal of International Affairs 29, where
the author details significant delays in entering a number of international
treaties.
- Mr H. Burmester, Submission No. 75, Vol 4, p 33.
- Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, A Review
of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, AGPS,
Canberra, 1992, p xxvii. See also: Dr R. A. Herr and Ms W. Lacey, Submission
No. 78, Vol 5, pp 905-6.
- See summary in: Constitutional Commission, Final Report of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol 2, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, para. 10.480,
p 736.
- Constitutional Commission, Final Report of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol 2, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, para. 10.480, p 731.
- Professor G. Winterton, Submission No. 89, Vol 5 p 1074.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 1 May 1995, p 5, per Mr H. Burmester.
- For example, the Hon. P. Pendal MLA, Submission No. 126, Vol 7, p
1887. The Hon. E. Evatt, Submission No. 110, Vol 7, p 1411. Mr D. Purnell,
Submission No. 69, Vol 3, p 579.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 6, p
1334. Professor K. Wiltshire also advocated the use of COAG to consider
treaties: Hansard, SLCRC, 13 June 1995, p 528.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 6, p
1342.
- Joint Submission of the States and Territories, Submission No. 107,
Vol 6, p 1342.
- The Hon. C. Edwardes, MLA, Submission No. 100, Vol 6, p 1273.
- The Australian, 11 July 1995, p 17.
- Mr A. Downer, Address to the 44th Federal Council of the Liberal
Party, Albury, 30 October 1994.
- Mr D. Williams QC, Submission No. 154, Vol 10, p 2233.
- Mr D. Williams QC, Submission No. 154, Vol 10, p 2233.
- Mr D. Buckingham, Submission No. 45, Vol 2, p 407.
- Mr M. Soutter, Submission No. 51, Vol 3, p 435.
- Mr G.A. Savell, Submission No. 80, Vol 5, p 977.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 14 June 1995, p 727, per Mr F. Gulson.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 15 May 1995, pp 330-331, per Mr J. Buxton.
- Hansard, SLCRC, 16 May 1995, p 382, per The Hon. E. Evatt.
- Joint State and Territory Submission, Submission No. 107, Vol 7, p
1342.
|
 |
