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Chapter 2 - Overview of the Bill
2.1
This chapter provides a brief overview of the Bill.[1]
Schedule 1 – Controlled operations, assumed identities and protection of
witness identity
Controlled operations
2.2
The contents of this Schedule replace the current controlled operations
provisions in Part IAB of the Crimes Act with national model legislation that
was developed by a Joint Working Group of the Standing Committee of
Attorneys-General and the Australasian Police Ministers Council to authorise
the use of controlled operations by law enforcement agencies in cross-border
investigations. A controlled operation is defined as covert or overt activity
which would normally be unlawful, but for which immunity is provided for the
purposes of securing evidence of serious criminal offences. The model
legislation was published in November 2003 in the Cross-Border Investigative
Powers for Law Enforcement Report.[2]
The intent of this legislation is to harmonise, as closely as possible, the
controlled operation regimes across Australia.
2.3
The Bill enables controlled operations in the case of a serious
Commonwealth offence or a serious state offence with a federal aspect. The
former is defined as an offence carrying a maximum penalty of three or more
years imprisonment. A state offence with a similar maximum prison term, but
pertaining to a subject on which the Commonwealth has constitutional power, or
an offence which is incidental to a Commonwealth investigation of a Commonwealth
offence, is defined as a serious state offence with a federal aspect. Regulations
may also prescribe a serious Commonwealth offence, and such an offence need not
prescribe a maximum imprisonment period of three or more years.[3]
2.4
The Bill covers the spectrum of controlled operations, and defines the
method of authorisation required for each. Formal applications are written, and
signed by the applicant. Urgent applications, made by telephone or any other
form of communication, are intended to be used when communication and time
restraints mean that the delay caused by making a formal application may affect
the success of the operation. Urgent applications must be followed up in
writing as soon as practicable, and they can be valid for no longer than seven
days. Formal applications may run for up to three months, but may be extended
by up to three months per extension.[4]
At present, extensions can be granted only once, upon application to the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
2.5
Applications, formal or urgent, must contain sufficient information for
an authorising officer (usually a Senior Executive Service officer of the Australian
Federal Police (AFP) or Australian Crime Commission (ACC)) to make a decision,
and include details of previous authorities applied for in relation to the
operation, whether granted or not. Applications must identify the nature of
criminal activity suspected (including suspected offences), the nature of the
controlled conduct which may be engaged in, the identity of those targeted, and
any conditions to which the operation is subject. An urgent application
contains similar information, but with less detail of, for example, the kind of
criminal activity which is suspected.
2.6
The authorising officer must not grant an authority unless satisfied, on
reasonable grounds, that:
- any unlawful conduct will be limited to the maximum extent
necessary to conduct an effective, efficient operation;
- the operation will be conducted in a way that ensures that, to
the maximum extent possible, any illicit goods will be under the control of
Australian law enforcement officers at the end of the operation; and
- the operation will not be conducted in a way that is likely to
induce a person to commit any offence they would not otherwise commit.[5]
2.7
Operations cannot be authorised if they would seriously endanger the
health or safety of a person, would cause death or serious injury, would
involve the commission of a sexual offence, or would result in significant loss
or damage to property other than illicit goods.[6]
2.8
Civilians may be authorised to participate in an operation, but only
where the authorising officer is satisfied that a law enforcement officer could
not perform the role.
2.9
Apart from applications to extend validity, other variations may be
applied for either formally or urgently. In the case of urgent applications,
the authorising officer must be satisfied that the delay caused by a formal
application may affect the success of the operation.[7]
2.10
The Bill provides that applications and authorities are not invalidated
by defects, unless the defect materially affects the application or authority.[8]
2.11
The Bill provides criminal and civil immunity from prosecution for
participants in controlled operations for acts which would be unlawful but for
their taking place as part of a controlled operation. Participants may be law
enforcement officers or civilians, including informants. The immunity operates
where the participant acts within the terms of the authority and, in the case
of a civilian, where instructions from law enforcement officers are followed.[9]
2.12
The Bill provides for compensation to a person who suffers personal
injury, or loss or damage to property, as a direct result of an authorised
controlled operation. Current provisions cover only personal injury.
Compensation is not payable where the loss or damage has been caused by the exercise
of powers of criminal investigation available under different laws than those
relating to controlled operations. That is, only actions which are directly
connected to the controlled operation, and not conduct which is incidental,
will be compensable.[10]
2.13
Chief officers are responsible for reporting six-monthly to the
Ombudsman and Minister, in addition to annual reports to the Minister. Reports
must detail the number of authorities granted, refused and varied; the nature
of those authorities; any losses or damage which resulted and the number of
authorities expired or cancelled. Chief Officers must report on completed
operations, indicating the nature of the operation, the nature and quantity of
illicit goods detained, and all foreign countries through which those goods
passed. The Ombudsman is also granted comprehensive powers of inquiry and access
to any records held by an agency.[11]
Assumed identities
2.14
An assumed identity is a false identity that is used by law enforcement
or security and intelligence officers, or other persons, for a period of time
for the purpose of investigating an offence, gathering intelligence or for
other security activities. This part of the Bill implements national model
legislation to facilitate the use of assumed identities by law enforcement
agencies in cross-border investigations. For the purpose of these
provisions, law enforcement agencies include the AFP, the ACC, Customs, Australian
Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), the Australian Taxation Office
(ATO), or any other agency specified in the regulations.[12]
2.15
The provisions extend beyond law enforcement officers to include
security and intelligence officers and other authorised people (such as foreign
law enforcement officers) and allows those officers to acquire and use assumed
identities for law enforcement, security and intelligence purposes. Application
can be made by an enforcement or intelligence officer on behalf of themselves,
a colleague, a foreign officer, or a civilian. Application can be made to the
chief officer of the law enforcement or intelligence officer's agency. Officers
applying for identities to be used by foreign officers or in foreign countries
must apply to the chief officer of the AFP or ACC.
2.16
The authorising officer must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the
assumed identity is necessary:
- for the purposes of an investigation or for gathering
intelligence in relation to criminal activity;
- for the exercise of powers and performance of functions of an
intelligence agency;
- for the exercise of powers and performance of functions under the
National Witness Protection Program;
- for the training of people to carry out any of these functions or
powers; or
- for any administrative function in support of any of these powers
or functions.
2.17
The authorising officer must also be satisfied that the risk of abuse of
the identity is minimal. Specific criminal activity need not be pointed out by
the applicant for the purposes of obtaining authorisation. Where an assumed
identity is requested for use in a foreign country, the authorising officer
must also be satisfied that such an identity is reasonably necessary in the
circumstances.[13]
2.18
If the authority for an assumed identity relates to a civilian
supervised by a law enforcement officer, the authority can remain in force for
a maximum of three months.[14]
Otherwise, authorities for assumed identity run until they are cancelled, although
authorising officers are required to review the necessity of each authority
annually.[15]
2.19
The Bill makes provision for the return of evidence of the assumed
identity in case of cancellation. People operating under an assumed identity,
and third parties that assist them in creating and maintaining the identity,
are indemnified against prosecution for acts which would otherwise be illegal.[16]
2.20
The Bill creates offences for misuse of an assumed identity, and for
improper disclosure of information about an assumed identity. Each offence carries
a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment.[17]
2.21
A relevant chief officer must arrange for the audit of assumed identity
records at least six-monthly. Audits may be carried out by a person holding an
assumed identity, or a person who has issued, varied or terminated an identity,
but they may not audit their own file (should they hold a false identity) or one
on which they have worked.[18]
2.22
A report must be provided to the Minister by a relevant chief officer. Reports
must include a description of any unlawful activity uncovered by audits, and
statistical information about the agency's operations as they relate to assumed
identities. In the case of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, a similar report must be made
to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.[19]
Witness Identity Protection
2.23
This part of the Bill aims to protect the true identity of covert
operatives who give evidence in court. The provisions include protection for law
enforcement, security and intelligence officers and other authorised people (including
foreign law enforcement officers and civilians authorised to participate in
controlled operations) who are granted an assumed identity.
2.24
The chief officer of a law enforcement or intelligence agency is able to
give a witness identity protection certificate which enables a witness to give evidence
under a pseudonym without disclosing his or her true identity, in order to protect
the personal safety of the witness or his or her family.[20]
The chief officer may delegate the decision-making power to an Assistant
Commissioner (or equivalent).[21]
The decision-maker must be satisfied that disclosing the person's true identity
would endanger them, or somebody else, or would prejudice current or future
investigation or security activity. The operative seeking protection must
complete a statutory declaration, containing the following information, to
inform the decision-maker:
- whether the operative has been found guilty of an offence, and if
so, particulars thereof;
- whether charges are pending or outstanding, and if so,
particulars thereof;
- where the operative is an intelligence or law enforcement
officer, whether they have been found guilty, or been accused of, misconduct,
and the particulars thereof;
- whether, to the applicant's knowledge, a court has made adverse
findings about their credibility, and the particulars thereof;
- whether the operative has made a false representation where the
truth was required, and particulars thereof; and
- anything else known to the operative relevant to their own credibility.[22]
2.25
The witness will appear in person to give evidence, be cross-examined and
have their demeanour assessed by the court. However, their real name and address
will be withheld from the court as well as the defence. Details relating to
the credibility of the witness, drawn from the statutory declaration, will
appear on a certificate of protection issued by the decision-maker, and made available
to the defence. This will mean that the defence is restricted in their ability
to question the credibility of the witness, as only those details revealed on
the certificate will be available.[23]
2.26
The decision to protect the identity of a witness is final, and cannot
be appealed against or otherwise challenged in any court.[24]
However, the court at which the protected witness appears will have the power
to give leave or make an order that may lead to the disclosure of the
operative's true identity or address. An application for leave must be made in
closed court. However, the court may only make such an order or give leave if
it is satisfied that:
- there is evidence that, if accepted, would substantially call into question
the operative's credibility;
- it would be impractical to properly test the credibility of the
operative without allowing for possible disclosure of their identity or
address; and
- it is in the interests of justice for the operative's credibility to be
tested.[25]
2.27
The provisions for granting leave do not require the court to 'balance'
the competing public interests in a fair and open trial (which may require
disclosure) against the protection of the identity of a witness. Rather, the
competing interests are taken into account by being considered separately by
the law enforcement agency (which would consider the need for protection) and
the court (which would consider the necessity for disclosure of identity to ensure
a fair trial). The application of these provisions will mean a departure from
the common law approach, where courts 'balance' these competing interests.
2.28
The Bill creates offences that relate to the disclosure of information
relating to a protected operative. Where a protection certificate is current,
and a person engages in conduct that results in a real identity being revealed,
a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment is available. Where a person is
also reckless about whether their conduct will endanger the health and safety
of a person, or will prejudice the effective conduct of an investigation, the
maximum penalty is 10 years imprisonment.[26]
2.29
Law enforcement agencies are required to provide annual reports to the
Minister, which must be tabled in Parliament, containing details of the issuing
and use of witness protection certificates. Intelligence agencies report to the
Inspector-General of Intelligence only.[27]
Schedule 2 – Delayed notification search warrants
2.30
This schedule provides for the establishment of a new class of search
warrants. Delayed notification warrants are similar in their powers to
traditional search warrants, with the exception that they do not require the
occupier to be served with notice of the search for up to six months after the
warrant was executed. This means that police or other eligible officers may
enter and re-enter premises, conduct searches, and examine, test, record, substitute
or seize contents during that period, without the knowledge of the occupier.
2.31
The executing officer is also empowered to impersonate another
person, and enlist the help of a member of the public to assist with gaining
entry to premises through use of force. Officers executing a search warrant are
able to search not only material on computers located on the search premises
but also material accessible from those computers but located elsewhere. This
will also enable the tracing of a suspect's internet activity and viewing of
material accessed by the suspect.[28]
2.32
Where reasonable grounds are found to exist, the period for notification
of the occupier may be extended by periods of up to six months on any one (written)
application, up to a maximum of 18 months. An extension beyond 18 months from
the date of entry may only be granted if the eligible issuing officer is
satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, and with the written
approval of the Minister. This recognises that some investigations may be undertaken
over an extended period.
2.33
The Bill applies to warrants issued in relation to 'relevant offences'
being:
- a Commonwealth offence that is punishable on conviction by
imprisonment for a period of 10 years or more;
- a state offence that has a federal aspect that is punishable on
conviction by imprisonment for a period of 10 years or more;
- an offence against section 8 or 9 of the Crimes (Foreign
Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978;
- an offence against section 20 or 21 of the Charter of the United
Nations Act 1945; or
- an offence against subsection 147.2(1) or (3), section 270.7, or subsection
471.11(2) or 474.15(2) of the Criminal Code.[29]
2.34
The Bill would enable the chief officer of the AFP or of the police
force of a state or territory to authorise an application for a delayed
notification search warrant in respect of particular premises. The applicant
must be from the same police force as the chief officer. An applicant cannot
apply for a delayed notification search warrant without such authorisation. The
requirement for authorisation to apply for a delayed notification search
warrant is an additional safeguard which is not contained in the general search
warrant provisions.
2.35
In considering whether to authorise an application, a chief officer must
have regard to a three-part test which must be satisfied before the authority
can be issued. The applicant must apply the same test prior to requesting
authorisation. The applicant, and then the chief officer, must be satisfied
that:
- there are reasonable grounds to suspect that one or more relevant
offences have been, are being, are about to be or are likely to be committed;
- entry to and search of the premises will substantially assist in
the prevention of, or investigation into, those relevant offences; and
- there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary for
the entry and search of the premises to be conducted without the knowledge of
any occupier of the premises.[30]
2.36
The chief officer may delegate his or her powers or functions under proposed
Division 2A to a member of the staff of the agency. In the case of the AFP, the
delegation may be to a Deputy Commissioner, a senior executive AFP employee or
a person of equivalent or higher rank. In the case of the police force of a
State or Territory the delegate may be a person of an equivalent rank to, or a
higher rank than, a member of the AFP referred to above. State or territory
officers investigating state or territory offences, whether or not they have a
federal aspect, can only use the relevant search warrant powers available in
their state or territory.[31]
2.37
The application must include the name of the applicant, as well as the
name of the officer executing the warrant. It must also include details or a
copy of the authorisation by the chief officer, an address or description of
the premises, and the duration of the warrant sought. The application must include
a description of the kinds of things that are proposed to be searched for, and
state whether entry to adjoining premises, or re-entry to the original
premises, is required. The application must be supported by an affidavit setting
out the grounds on which the warrant is sought, and the reasons for which any
proposed entry to an adjoining premises is considered necessary.[32]
It must also state whether the applicant knows that a similar application has
been made during the past three months, and if that application was refused, the
applicant will be required to justify why the delayed notification search warrant
should be issued.[33]
2.38
Application may be made by telephone, fax, e-mail or any other means of
communication where the applicant believes that it is impracticable for the application
to be made in person, or that delaying the application until it can be made in
person would frustrate the effective execution of the warrant. Written
confirmation is required by the applicant within one day.[34]
2.39
Where an eligible issuing officer for a delayed notification warrant
decides against issuing such a warrant, they may issue instead a regular
warrant (known as a Division 2 warrant).[35]
2.40
Before issuing a delayed notification search warrant in relation to a
relevant offence, the eligible issuing officer must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for the applicant's suspicion and belief that form the basis
of the application, having regard to the application of the three part test
outlined above. The issuing officer must
then examine the application against seven further matters in considering
whether to grant the warrant. These matters are:
- the extent to which the exercise of the powers would assist the
prevention of or investigation into the relevant offences;
- the existence of alternative means of obtaining the evidence or
information;
- the extent to which the privacy of any person is likely to be
affected;
- the nature and gravity of the alleged offence(s) for which the warrant
is sought;
- if it is proposed that adjoining premises be entered for the
purpose of entering the target premises whether that entry is reasonably
necessary;
- whether any conditions should be included in the warrant; and
- the outcome of any known previous applications for a search
warrant (delayed notification or otherwise) in connection with the same
premises.[36]
2.41
Eligible issuing officers who are Federal judges or Administrative
Appeal Tribunal members may issue a delayed notification search warrant in
relation to premises located anywhere in the Commonwealth or an external
Territory, but the Bill restricts eligible issuing officers who are State or
Territory Judges to issuing delayed notification search warrants only in relation
to premises located in that state or Territory.[37]
2.42
When notice of the warrant is eventually given to the occupier, a copy
of the warrant will be attached and will give the occupier information
regarding what was authorised. The notice will contain details of how the
warrant was executed. These requirements aim to ensure that the occupier of the
premises is aware of why a delayed notification search warrant was issued in
respect of the premises, and what was done under the warrant.
2.43
The executing officer of a delayed notification warrant must, as soon as
practicable after execution, or the expiry of an unexecuted warrant, make a
report to the chief officer setting out a number of matters including:
- the address, location or other description of the warrant
premises;
- whether or not the delayed notification warrant was executed;
- the method used to apply for the warrant; and
- where applicable, why the warrant was not executed.
2.44
Where the warrant was executed, the report must also address the
following:
- the date of execution;
- the name of the executing officer;
- the name of any officer assisting and the kind of assistance
provided;
- the name of the occupier, if known;
- whether adjoining premises were entered, and the name of the
occupiers, if known;
- the things that were done under the warrant;
- details of items seized, substituted, copied, recorded, operated,
printed, tested, or sampled;
- whether or not the warrant assisted in the prevention of, or
investigation of, a relevant offence;
- details of compliance with conditions and directions to which the
warrant was subject;
- details of occupier's notice, where already given; and
- details of adjoining occupier's notice, where already given.[38]
2.45
The chief officer of an authorising agency must report to the
Minister within three months of the end of each financial year. The report must
set out the number of warrants applied for and issued to officers of the
authorising agency during the year, and specify the number applied for in
person or by electronic means. The report must also include details of the
relevant offences to which the issued delayed notification search warrants
relate. The report must not only specify the number of warrants that were
executed, but must also specify the number of warrants that were executed under
which things were seized, placed in substitution, returned to or retrieved from
the premises, and copied, operated or printed. Additional information may be
requested by the Minister, and the chief officer is obliged to provide it. The
Minister is required to table the report in Parliament.[39]
2.46
The Bill establishes an inspection regime requiring the Commonwealth Ombudsman
to inspect the records kept by authorising agencies at least once every 12 months.
The role of the Ombudsman is to determine whether the records kept are accurate
and whether an authorising agency is complying with its obligations under proposed
Division 2A. The Ombudsman is empowered to enter premises occupied by the
authorising agency at any reasonable time after notifying the chief officer of
the agency. The Ombudsman is then entitled to full and free access at all reasonable
times to all records of the delayed notification search warrants scheme that
are relevant to the inspection. Agency staff are required to co-operate with
requests for assistance and to retrieve information reasonably required by the
Ombudsman.[40]
2.47
The Ombudsman may also require written and oral information from any
officer of an agency where the Ombudsman has reason to think the officer can
assist with inquiries. Failure to comply with requests from the Ombudsman for
information are not excused on the grounds that doing so would contravene a
law, would be contrary to the public interest or might tend to incriminate the
person or make them liable to a penalty, or to disclose certain advice of a
legal nature. The Ombudsman may also pass information to an equivalent state or
territory inspecting authority where it is considered necessary for that
authority to carry out its functions. The maximum penalty for failure to comply
with the Ombudsman's request for information is six months imprisonment.[41]
2.48
The Ombudsman is required to provide a written report to the Minister
every six months on the results of each inspection undertaken, and a copy of
the report must be tabled in Parliament.[42]
Schedule 3 – Amendment of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002
2.49
The amendments in Schedule 3 address some operational
difficulties experienced by the ACC and make minor technical amendments. They seek
to bring the provisions pertaining to search warrants into line with those in
the Crimes Act model.
2.50
The term 'constable' is defined to mean members or special
members of the AFP or state or territory police. The term 'constable' is used
in proposed section 23A which deals with the use of force during the execution
of a search warrant.[43]
2.51
The definition of 'eligible person' is amended to exclude examiners from
the classes of people who can apply for a search or telephone warrant. Examiners
do not have the authority to direct any person in the execution of a warrant and
do not perform any operational functions. Accordingly, only staff members of the
ACC who are also members of the AFP or a State or Territory Police force or service
are to be an ‘eligible person’ under the ACC Act.[44]
2.52
Under section 22 of the ACC Act, search warrants are issued by an
'issuing officer' which is defined to include a judge of the Federal Court or
of a court of a state or territory, or a Federal Magistrate. This has been
restrictive in some localities. The bill adds 'a magistrate' to the current
list of persons authorised to issue a search warrant to the ACC, bringing the
legislation into line with the Crimes Act.
2.53
The Bill would allow an examiner to exclude a particular legal practitioner
from proceedings where he or she has reason to believe that allowing the legal
practitioner to appear at the examination may prejudice the effectiveness of
the special ACC investigation or operation. This will allow examiners to
exclude a legal practitioner who may, knowingly or unknowingly, have a conflict
of interest if he or she continues to appear on behalf of a witness. For example,
where the legal practitioner is unknowingly under investigation themselves. The
Bill also gives to examiners a discretion to allow a break in proceedings for
a witness to obtain replacement legal representation.[45]
2.54
Administrative decisions of an examiner may be reviewed by the
Federal Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the
ADJR Act). However, decisions under this section will be exempt from the
requirement to provide reasons (by virtue of Schedule 2 of the ADJR Act) in
circumstances where providing reasons may prejudice either:
- the safety or reputation of a person;
- the fair trial of a person who has been, or may be, charged with
an offence, or;
- the effectiveness of an ACC operation or investigation.
2.55
The ACC Act currently contains an offence of giving information that is
false or misleading in a 'material particular' at an examination, which is
punishable by five years imprisonment or a penalty of 200 penalty units (less
if heard by a court of summary jurisdiction). The EM states that it is
difficult to enforce this provision as it is often difficult to identify
whether something is a 'material particular'. During an investigation, the ACC
can demonstrate that information relates to a material particular by reference to
the elements of the particular offence being investigated. However, when
conducting an operation, the ACC is unlikely to be investigating a specific
offence and, as a result, has difficulty identifying a 'material particular'.
The Bill modifies the offence by reversing the burden of proof. That is to say
that the defendant will bear the evidential burden of proof in proceedings for
an offence of giving information that is false or misleading in a ‘material
particular’ at an examination. The defendant bears the burden of adducing or
pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the
information was not false or misleading in a material particular, rather
than the prosecution having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
information was false or misleading in a material particular.[46]
Schedule 4 – Amendment to the Witness Protection Act 1994
2.56
This Bill amends the Witness Protection Act, which is the basis for the
National Witness Protection Program (NWPP). The program provides protection and
assistance to witnesses involved in serious or high profile legal proceedings
which could pose a risk to their life or the lives of their family members.
2.57
The amendments aim to provide greater protection and security to the
witnesses or other people who are protected under the NWPP, members of the AFP
who serve in the Witness Protection Unit and other AFP employees who are
involved in the operation of the NWPP. The amendments also clarify the
operation of the Witness Protection Act in relation to current and former
participants, their families and other relevant persons who require new
identities, protection or other assistance under the NWPP. The Bill extends the
Witness Protection Act to cover participants who have been included in the NWPP
because they were involved in state offences with a federal aspect.
2.58
The Bill also contains provisions which prohibit the disclosure of
information about an individual who is a current participant, where the
information disclosed is about the original identity (or former NWPP identity)
of the individual. Similar provisions protect against disclosure of the fact
that a person is undergoing assessment for inclusion in the NWPP. The Bill also
clarifies the prohibition on potential participants who have undergone
assessment for the program from disclosing any relevant information.[47]
2.59
The Bill specifies that the Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner, an AFP
employee or a special member of the Australian Federal Police, is not to be
required to divulge or communicate to a court, tribunal, royal commission or
any other commission of inquiry information that reveals the identity of an AFP
employee or special member of the AFP who is involved in the operation of the
NWPP. The Ombudsman and his staff are covered by a similar provision.[48]
Schedules 5 and 6 – Other amendments and transitional arrangements
2.60
The amendments contained in Schedules 5 and 6 are primarily technical
and clarify, rather than extend, the power of agencies.
2.61
The provisions relating to seized electronic equipment are noteworthy.
The provisions seek to make clear that electronic equipment can be operated on
to access data, including data not held on the equipment at the time of
seizure, for the purpose of determining whether there is any evidentiary
material held on, or accessible from, the equipment. This would negate the
current requirement for a communications warrant to be served on the relevant
telecommunications carrier under the Telecommunications (Interception and
Access) Act 1979.[49]
The Bill also empowers the examination of an electronic item after the
expiration of the search warrant under which the item was seized.
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