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Additional comments by Senator Fierravanti-Wells
Access Card - Inquiry Into Human Services
(Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007
There
may be benefit in the Committee’s recommendation that this bill be combined
with the proposed second tranche of legislation for the access card system into
a consolidated bill as it will enable the important concepts of security and
privacy protections to be considered in their entirety alongside the benefits
the access card will provide. However, having regard to the evidence provided
in submissions many of the concerns expressed by the Committee have already
been addressed in the current legislation and the Committee’s report fails to
give due regard to the benefits of the access card in its proposed form in
meeting its stated purposes.
A
primary concern of the Committee has been whether there is a potential for the
access card to evolve into an national identity card in the event that a
biometric photo, signature and a unique number are visible on the face of the
card. As the Committee itself noted the Government has explicitly declared in
Clause 6(2) of the bill that “access cards are not to be used as, and do not
become, national identity cards.” The protections contained in the bill are
sufficient to allay such concerns.
The
Committee’s concerns with respect to the features to be included on the face of
the access card, in particular the inclusion of a photograph, fail to take into
account important evidence on the purpose for the inclusion of such features.
In
this regard particular note should be made of the public submission provided by
KPMG which stated at page 17:
The rationale for having the photo on
the face of the card is fundamentally about a person being able to simply and
quickly prove who they are in a number of service outlets. One of the
platforms of the entire HSS initiative is a strengthened POI and a capacity to
authenticate a user, identify their entitlements (such as concessional status)
and ensure they have access to the right services and benefits.
The capacity to authenticate a user
must be applied across the entire DHS, DVA service system including providers
such as allied health workers, GPs, pharmacists and ambulances, who for the
first time, will have access to volunteered information about a persons
emergency contact details. Being able to simply and quickly identify the
cardholder is paramount in these circumstances.
KPMG has attempted to design a system
on a card reader platform that will facilitate uniform access by the full range
of DHS and DVA providers. Therefore, whilst pharmacists and GPs might have
card reading technology capable of photographic identification, not all
providers in the system will. If DHS design a system of access and
entitlements based on who has a card reader capable of photo identification and
who does not, the system will be forced to slip back into different standards
and different business rules. The system again becomes unpredictable and
confusing for consumers.
Also, whilst the card won’t be
required by people outside the DHS service system as POI, a consumer may choose
to use it to prove their identity in other environments such as accessing a
transport concession, joining a registered club, applying for a passport, or
obtaining airline tickets.
Finally, KPMG considers that greater
trust in the overall system will be strengthened by considers(sic) being
confident that their card can not be used by someone else. Having a photograph
on the card and all the other securities in place, in our view, is likely to
strengthen that confidence.
The
Committee Report ignores the fact that even if readers capable of
electronically reading a photograph were available in all service delivery
outlets, which in itself may not be possible, there would continue to be a number
of situations in which readers would not be available for use:
- During electricity blackouts and
when systems are down;
- Natural disasters; and
- ‘In home’ and remote location
service providers (eg Doctors)
On
the basis of the above, the inclusion of a photograph and other personal
information on the surface of the card as proposed is necessary as it will
provide a unique and highly flexible method of ensuring accurate service
delivery.
Evidence
heard by the Committee also established the importance of the inclusion of a
photograph and other personal information on the surface of the card as being
essential security measures in reducing the fraudulent abuse of the health and
welfare systems and in minimising the prevalence of identity fraud and theft. These
are important protections for cardholders and also ensure that entitlements
flow only to those who are eligible.
The
combination of "on card surface" and "in chip" security
elements along with the modular design of distinct databases will also constitute
a significant improvement over current systems and will ensure the suitable
protection of cardholder information.
The
stated intention of the access card is to streamline the delivery of government
services. However, it is also important that recognition be given to the
community’s desire that the card also provide personal utility beyond the
immediate needs of government. This card represents a platform for the
facilitation of government service delivery into the future and in the form
proposed, will be sufficiently flexible to meet the changing needs of
individuals.
The
merits of the access card as proposed by the Government were well articulated
by the Sydney Morning Herald in its editorial of 14 March 2007 which stated:
The Federal Government's planned access
card is already attracting opposition of a predictable kind from privacy
groups. Their concerns are understandable, but so is the Government's need to
streamline and secure access to welfare and other benefits, including Medicare
payments. For recipients of such benefits - and that means virtually every
Australian - the card should make life easier. Its primary function, the
elimination of welfare fraud, will also save taxpayers money - $3 billion over
10 years, say the Government's consultants.
.....
Outside government, the card cannot
be demanded as identification. Within it, each agency will only be allowed
access to a given individual's files with that agency. Those decisions are
prudent, and should provide further reassurance. Worries about identity theft
can never be entirely eliminated, even by the most secure encoding methods -
but the access card is far more tightly regulated than the existing
plethora of identity cards for government benefits, all of which have been
making the identity thieves' work simpler.
The access card will always be
a trade-off between administrative efficiency and individual rights and
security. There is no single correct answer to the questions it raises. If
implemented, it will most likely be a source of occasional controversy as
governments seek to alter what it does. In that respect, it is like many of
society's laws, regulations and institutions that inhibit individuals' freedom.
On balance, however, we believe its benefits outweigh its dangers. The access
card deserves support.
Senator Concetta
Fierravanti-Wells
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