Chapter 3
The framework convention on climate change and the Kyoto Protocol
(Part a)
[The Kyoto Protocol] established a single measure of environmental
performance – a measure to drive economic and industry performance,
to be a trigger for innovation and perhaps to be a catalyst for a new
brand of knowledge economy. [1]
The Framework Convention on Climate Change [2]
Early developments in the climate change negotiation process
3.1 In 1979, the First World Climate Conference [3]
recognised climate change as a serious problem. Following discussions
on the possible effects of climate change on human activities, this scientific
gathering issued a declaration calling on the world's governments `to
foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be
adverse to the well-being of humanity'. The Conference also endorsed plans
to establish a World Climate Programme (WCP) under the joint responsibility
of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).
3.2 A number of intergovernmental conferences, focusing on climate
change, were held in the late 1980s and early 1990s. [4]
Together with mounting scientific evidence, these conferences helped to
air international concern about the issue. Stakeholders included government
policy-makers, scientists, and environmentalists. The meetings addressed
both scientific and policy issues and called for global action.
3.3 At the `Conference on the Changing Atmosphere' in Toronto in 1988,
the UN General Assembly took up the issue of climate change for the first
time and governments representing industrialised countries voluntarily
pledged to cut CO2 emissions by 20 per cent by the year 2005 (the so-called
`Toronto target'). [5]
3.4 As a result of this meeting, in 1988, the WMO and UNEP established
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Further discussion
on the IPCC and the findings of its assessment reports is found in chapter
2.
3.5 In 1990 the IPCC's First Assessment Report was published and confirmed
scientific evidence supporting the presence of substantial human induced
climate change. It further claimed that 60 to 80 per cent cuts in CO2
emissions over the next few hundred years would be needed to stabilise
the growing concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It had
a catalytic effect on both policy-makers and the general public and provided
the basis for negotiations on a framework convention on climate change
and recommended that negotiations should be launched for the development
of a global climate agreement. [6]
3.6 The UN General Assembly opened negotiations on the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and established an Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee (INC) with a mandate to develop the Convention.
[7]
3.7 The Second World Climate Conference in 1990, also supported
the call for a framework convention on climate change. Sponsored by WMO,
UNEP and other international organisations, this key conference featured
negotiations and ministerial-level discussions among 137 states plus members
of the European Community. The final declaration supported a number of
principles later included in the UNFCCC. These principles included:
- climate change as being a `common concern of humankind';
- the importance of equity between nations;
- the `common but differentiated responsibilities' of states assigns
the lead in combating climate change to developed countries;
- the special needs of developing countries;
- the importance of promoting sustainable development; and
- the precautionary principle. [8]
3.8 The INC met for the first time in February 1991 to develop the UNFCCC.
In May that year final negotiations concluded and, as a first step towards
addressing the issue, industrialised countries agreed to bring their CO2
emissions back to 1990 levels by the year 2000. However, the emissions
commitments in the UNFCCC were not to be legally binding. [9]
3.9 On 9 May 1992, the UNFCCC was adopted in New York by the INC and
opened for signature at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit in Brazil.
3.10 Article 2 of the UNFCCC states that its objective is to achieve:
… the stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
to a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,
to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner. [10]
3.11 The UNFCCC contained no firm or binding commitments on emissions
levels, but did lay down some general principles and objectives which
would shape the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Summit in 1997. It
specified that:
- developed countries (most members of the OECD plus the states of Central
and Eastern Europe undergoing the process of transition to a market
economy - known collectively as Annex I countries) should take the lead
with abatement measures;
- that the climate and economic vulnerabilities of developing states
should be recognised; and
- that abatement should be consistent with sustainable national development
and not infringe the goals of an open and supportive international economy.
[11]
3.12 Parties to the UNFCCC committed themselves to:
- develop, update and publish national greenhouse gas inventories;
- begin the development of programs and policies for climate change
mitigation;
- promote the development and transfer of clean and emissions-reducing
technologies;
- cooperate in managing the impacts of climate change on affected communities
and ecosystems; and
- promote research into climate change, technology, and policy; increase
education and training; and promote the cultivation of sinks and reservoirs
to absorb greenhouse gases. [12]
3.13 In addition, the Parties agreed to take climate change into account
in their relevant social, economic, and environmental policies; cooperate
in scientific, technical, and educational matters; and promote education,
public awareness, and the exchange of information related to climate change.
[13]
3.14 The Annex I Parties were required to describe the adopted policies
and measures designed to work towards returning greenhouse gas emissions
to 1990 levels by the year 2000. They were also required to give projections
through to the year 2000 of how their policies will affect emissions and
sinks. These projections were to be subjected to a regular review process.
A team of experts from developed and developing countries, and from
international organisations, was to be assembled for each review by the
Convention's Secretariat. However, the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol
in 1997 have superseded these objectives with individualised targets for
each Annex 1 country to be met on average over the first commitment period,
from 2008 to 2012, with 1990 as the base year.
3.15 The sharing of information by governments is central to the working
of the UNFCCC. The Convention requires its members to submit `national
communications' to the Conference of the Parties (CoP) [14]
on a regular basis. This information, about national greenhouse gas emissions,
international cooperation, and national activities, is reviewed periodically
so that the Parties can track the Convention's effectiveness and draw
lessons for future national and global action. The first communications
were submitted in September 1994 by Annex I Parties.
3.16 In December 1992, Australia became the ninth country to ratify the
Convention. By 21 March 1994, the UNFCCC entered into force having received
the required 50 ratifications. [15]
3.17 A watershed was reached at the Berlin Conference of the Parties
(CoP 1, the Berlin `Climate Summit'), held in 1995, when a large group
of developing countries stated that the UNFCCC commitments were inadequate
and called for industrialised nations to accept binding emissions
reductions. The Parties agreed to the `Berlin Mandate' to develop a Protocol
or other legal instrument by the time of the Third Conference of the Parties
(CoP 3), which was to have contained binding reductions within specified
time frames extending beyond 2000 to 2005, 2010 and 2020. [16]
The Berlin Mandate also stated that the negotiating process would not
introduce any new commitments for the developing countries. The Mandate
recognised that the share of global emissions from developing countries
will need to grow to meet their social and development needs. [17]
3.18 In December 1995, the IPCC produced the Second Assessment Report
on the science of climate change. The Report was written and reviewed
by some 2,000 scientists and experts world-wide. Its findings underlined
the need for strong policy action and concluded that `the balance of evidence
suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.
[18] Further details of the findings of the
Second Report is included in chapter 2.
3.19 The IPCC Third Assessment Report is due to be completed in 2001.
The IPCC will produce a series of technical papers and special reports
before the Third Assessment Report is published. Likely outcomes are discussed
in chapter 2 of this report.
3.20 The Second Conference of the Parties (CoP 2), in July 1996, achieved
little direct progress on CO2 emissions reduction targets. However, with
the support of the US, the majority of Ministers present at the meeting
signed the `Geneva Declaration'. The Declaration stated that:
- the new IPCC science provided the basis for `urgently strengthening
action';
- the world faced `significant, often adverse impacts' from climate
change; and
- legally binding `significant overall reductions' in greenhouse gas
emissions should be negotiated by the next Conference of the Parties.
[19]
The Kyoto Protocol
The negotiations
3.21 In December 1997, the Conference of the Parties (CoP 3) adopted
the Kyoto Protocol, the culmination of 30 months of negotiations. The
Parties finally accepted legally binding greenhouse gas emissions commitments
for all Annex I countries and outlined specific new policies and measures
which could be used to meet them.
3.22 The 1997 Kyoto Conference agreed upon the six types of emissions
[20] for which emissions targets were to be
set; established multi-year budget periods to accommodate sudden shifts
in the economies of Parties; assigned a series of differentiated targets
for nations and groups of nations; and went some way to defining an acceptable
definition of sinks. Most nations agreed to a reduction of emissions during
the first five year `commitment period' from 2008 to 2012, and in relation
to 1990 as the base year.
3.23 In Kyoto, the European Union (EU) `bubble' (emissions from a group
of countries [21]) agreed to reduce emissions
to 92 per cent of 1990 levels, the US 93 per cent, Japan 94 per cent,
and Canada 94 per cent. New Zealand was allowed an increase to 101 per
cent and Australia 108 per cent of their 1990 emissions levels. The overall
aggregate effect of the Protocol, across all countries with targets, is
a reduction of 5.2 per cent globally by 2010 in comparison with 1990 levels.
[22]
3.24 However, the figures need to be considered in relation to the changing
emissions levels across nations through the 1990s. EU emissions were just
below 1990 levels, the rest of the OECD countries had increased emissions
by 6 to 10 per cent and the former `Eastern bloc' countries saw falls
of between 15 and 50 per cent. Thus, the overall effect of the UNFCCC
Annex I countries' commitments at Kyoto, if met, would only be to stabilise
the level of developed country emissions at 1990 levels, and would have
little impact upon developing country emissions. [23]
3.25 By themselves, the Kyoto commitments will make little impact upon
future global warming and represent only a first step in stabilising global
concentrations of CO2. It has been estimated that the agreed reductions
in emissions will hold back global temperature increase on average between
4 to 14 per cent by the end of the century, that is, by between 0.08ºC
and 0.3ºC. These figures can be compared with a rise, from 1860 to
1998, of global surface temperatures of 0.6ºC, and IPCC mid-range
projections of an additional increase of 2.0ºC by 2100. The projected
impact on sea-level rise is similarly modest, with a reduction in the
anticipated rise of only one centimetre by mid-century and a few centimetres
by the end of the century. [24] Sea levels
have risen between 10 to 25 cm since the end of the 19th century and mid-range
IPCC projections suggest a further rise of 50 cm by 2100. [25]
3.26 According to the Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation
Council (PMSEIC) the Kyoto Protocol `was a watershed in the global greenhouse
debate', [26] bridged an important threshold
in negotiations and created a new framework and machinery for future abatement
action:
It established a single measure of environmental performance –
a measure to drive economic and industry performance, to be a trigger
for innovation and perhaps to be a catalyst for a new brand of knowledge
economy. [27]
3.27 Optimists look to the second commitment period, after 2012, to achieve
the restructuring of national energy economies with the introduction of
new technologies, infrastructure and industries. There is also an expectation
that developed country actions, serving as a positive example, will help
draw developing nations into future commitments to emissions reduction.
[28] However, uncertainty has been created
by the reluctance of the US Congress to ratify the Protocol and the slow
progress in drawing developing nations into the commitment process. [29]
3.28 The Protocol was opened for signature in March 1998 and, as at 13
January 2000, it has received 84 signatures. Details may be found in appendix
4.
Other features of the Kyoto Protocol
3.29 Countries have a degree of flexibility in how they make and measure
their emissions reductions. Joint fulfilment, or `bubble' agreements between
developed countries are encouraged (Article 4). [30]
3.30 The Kyoto Protocol also establishes three innovative `flexibility
mechanisms' designed to assist developed nations meet their targets. These
include:
- Emissions Trading - (Article 17) which allows UNFCCC members
to trade unused emissions credits - effectively to redistribute Kyoto
emissions targets without affecting the global emissions total. Members
will also be able to acquire `emission reduction units' (ERUs) by financing
certain kinds of projects in other developed countries.
- Joint Implementation (JI) - (Article 6) which encourages Annex
I countries (and companies) to transfer to, or acquire from other Annex
I countries, ERUs for reductions over and above those which would otherwise
occur. [31] It is planned that JI will be
operational from the first commitment period in 2008.
- The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) - (Article 12) introduced
to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development
and in contributing to the ultimate objectives of the UNFCCC. The CDM
is a means by which developed countries may claim credits for emissions
reductions in developing countries, while developing countries gain
investment and access to improved technology. [32]
It also assists Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance
with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments
under Article 3. [33] Participation is voluntary
and may involve public and private entities. [34]
CDM is planned to be introduced as soon as the outstanding aspects of
the mechanism have been negotiated by the Parties and certified emission
reductions (CERs) will be used to assist in achieving compliance up
to and in the first commitment period. [35]
The provision for this early crediting in the CDM is unlike anything
else in the Protocol.
3.31 These proposals have created definitional and operational issues
yet to be resolved and were the subject of controversy during the Protocol
negotiations. All three mechanisms raised issues of:
- how transparency, efficiency and accountability can be assured;
- to what extent the trading of permits, ERUs and CERs can be used to
deliver the overall Annex I commitment;
- liability for traded units which are based on unfulfilled contracts;
- how to resolve the assessment of baselines for CDM and JI projects;
- the factor that the banking of CERs is allowed from 2000 for use in
the budget period but that ERUs cannot be banked and thus have no commercial
significance until 2008; and
- the question of developing countries. Without their participation
the three Kyoto mechanisms will have little chance of success. Developing
countries are expected to be major contributors of greenhouse gases
by 2010. There may be problems with implementation of long term projects
because of weak legal and institutional frameworks. In addition, there
are fears in Annex I countries that the costs of abatement resulting
from Kyoto commitments may result in industries relocating to developing
countries to avoid the restrictions (a situation commonly termed `carbon
leakage'). [36]
3.32 The mechanisms were promoted strongly by the US and other OECD countries,
and treated as the object of suspicion by the EU, China, India and other
G77 States. The Parties have agreed to defer their more detailed negotiations
and the design of these mechanisms to later meetings. [37]
3.33 In addition to the development of the above measures, the Parties
are bound to develop the compliance system outlined in the Protocol. Further
work is also required on provisions for the land use change and forestry
sector (sinks), methodologies for estimating emissions and removals, and
reporting obligations. [38] The shape and nature
of the Protocol's compliance system and the definition and rules to be
adopted on sinks, are likely to be key issues to be negotiated and agreed
at CoP 6 in November 2000. [39]
3.34 During the Kyoto negotiations two distinct negotiating blocs emerged
among the Annex I countries - the `umbrella group', consisting of Australia,
Canada, Japan, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, the
Ukraine and the US, and a group which included most other Annex I countries,
led by the EU. [40] The umbrella group has
made a joint submission on the rules for the operation of the Kyoto mechanisms,
where it seeks market-based, transparent and uncapped (unlimited) arrangements.
[41]
Australian policy and the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms
3.35 The Prime Minister's 1997 statement contained the provision of `$6
million for facilitating Australian involvement in the Kyoto project-based
mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation'.
[42] This funding was largely focused on facilitating
commercial involvement in projects in developing countries and meeting
the additional costs incurred by business in undertaking such a project.
[43]
3.36 Methods for promoting international partnerships in the context
of the CDM and JI of the Kyoto Protocol include:
- AusAID funds for programs which contribute to abatement and adjustment
to climate change, worth $154 million to November 1997;
- coal energy and training programs;
- efforts to channel Australian expertise in clean energy through the
Australian Energy Systems Exporters Group (AUSTENERGY);
- International Centre for Application of Solar Energy (CASE) programs
to promote and facilitate the sustainable application of solar and renewable
energies in developing countries; and
- the promotion of international greenhouse partnerships with Australian
industry in JI and CDM projects focused on the Asia-Pacific. [44]
3.37 Australia supports the National Strategy Study Program (NSSP), a
collaborative initiative between the World Bank and bilateral donors.
The Australian NSSP aims to build capacity of developing countries in
the Asia-Pacific region to explore the opportunities and potential benefits
of participating in the CDM. It also helps them to explore their role
in the CDM, identifying potential investment projects and developing national
policies regarding the CDM. Australia will provide $3 million to be used
for the execution of selected climate change-related studies in the Asia-Pacific
region. [45]
3.38 An International Greenhouse Partnerships Office has also been set
up within the Department of Industry, Science and Resources. [46]
International Greenhouse Partnerships are aimed at laying the groundwork
for Australia and cooperating countries to benefit from mutually beneficial
greenhouse gas mitigation projects under the project-based Kyoto mechanisms,
CDM and JI. Cooperating countries are expected to benefit through enhanced
investment, technology transfer and human resource development, and Australian
investors will be able to secure greenhouse gas mitigation credits from
such projects. [47]
3.39 Currently, Australia's overseas aid program is funding programs
and projects that help to abate greenhouse gas emissions and facilitate
adaptation to climate change. [48] In addition,
Australia has commitments of approximately $46 million to the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) [49] climate change program
since 1991 to assist with the introduction of:
- renewable energy technologies;
- agricultural research projects;
- environmental management projects;
- forestry and land management activities; and
- adaptation and abatement assistance to vulnerable small island states
in the Pacific. [50]
3.40 Australia now has nine approved greenhouse projects in five countries
(Chile, Fiji Islands, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Solomon Islands). Five
new projects on fugitive emissions, fuel conversion, energy efficiency
and renewables were endorsed recently. The Program is also building awareness
of the project-based Kyoto mechanisms by staging bilateral workshops in
cooperating countries and training and development courses in Australia.
[51]
Australia and Kyoto: A Special Case?
Arguments in favour
3.41 During the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, the Australian Government
made a claim that Australia has a distinctive set of national circumstances
and challenges which will have an impact on efforts to achieve effective
climate change abatement. Michael Grubb highlighted these national circumstances
in the climate change negotiations when he pointed out that:
Cooperation and action to limit climate change is complex because serious
responses could reach deep into countries' economic and political interests.
[52]
3.42 Mr Vivek Tulpule, representing ABARE, more recently argued that:
What we have said in the past is that Australia needs to worry about
its target relative to other countries because we believe - and our
modelling shows and other people's modelling shows - that Australia
would have been more severely affected by the European-style targets
that were being proposed at that time. [53]
3.43 While it is estimated that Australia's emissions account for only
1.4 per cent of total global emissions, it is the largest emitter per
person in the industrialised world. [54]
3.44 Australia's economy, trade profile, energy use and other circumstances
were argued as being unique among Annex I Parties in that:
- Australia's population, while small, has been increasing rapidly when
compared with the growth of other OECD countries. In the period 1985
to 1992, Australia had a population growth rate that was higher than
all other Annex I countries with the exception of Turkey. This in turn
has influenced Australia's growth in energy consumption;
- Australia has vast distances separating urban centres within the country
and even greater distances separating Australia from other countries.
Traversing these distances has implications for Australia's transport
sector and energy usage;
- changing land-use patterns and Australia's large forestry
sector accounted for around one-fifth of Australia's greenhouse
gas emissions in 1990. While most developed countries have relatively
stable patterns of land usage, land use patterns in Australia are still
undergoing significant change;
- Australia is the world's largest exporter of coal, bauxite, alumina,
lead, titanium and zircon and one of the world's leading exporters of
gold, iron ore, aluminium, nickel, zinc and uranium. Mineral resources
and resource processing industries are energy-intensive industries and
generate 8.5 per cent of Australia's GDP;
- agricultural and pastoral properties on Australia in 1994 to 1995
covered almost two-thirds of Australia's land surface. Agricultural
emissions are a very important component of Australia's emissions profile
accounting for 17 per cent of emissions;
- Australia has a significant export link with developing countries
in the Asia-Pacific region;
- Australia's abundance of fossil fuel resources has influenced energy
choices and the structures of the economy. Australia's energy sector
is highly reliant on gas and coal. Subsequently, Australia is a large
producer of fossil fuel-based products and continues to be heavily reliant
on energy and greenhouse-intensive production processes and export.
Australia's manufacturing sector is more dependent on fossil fuels than
any other OECD country (with the exception of Iceland) and energy and
greenhouse-intensive goods account for over 80 per cent of Australia's
merchandise exports; and
- trade specialisation has caused Australia's economy to become more
energy and greenhouse gas intensive. The country's trade profile means
about 20 per cent of the country's greenhouse gas emissions are embodied
in exports (notably aluminium and agricultural products). Similarly,
emissions associated with Australia's highly greenhouse-intensive exports
are attributed to Australian sources rather than to the countries consuming
these exports. Australia is a significant net exporter with nearly 70
per cent of Australia's total energy production destined for overseas
markets. [55]
3.45 Prior to CoP 3 in Kyoto, the Australian Government argued vigorously
that, since Australia is heavily dependent on fossil fuels for export
revenue, and relies on fossil fuels as the chief source of domestic energy,
uniform emissions reductions targets would be very costly and would impose
a disproportionate economic burden on Australia compared with other Annex
I countries. [56]
3.46 The Government advocated a form of `differentiation', that is, allocation
of different targets between Annex I countries, on the basis of equal
economic cost per capita for each Annex I country. The Australian Government
claimed that this proposal was consistent with the UNFCCC's reference
to `common but differentiated responsibilities'. [57]
Australia would, under this proposal, have more lenient targets than most
other countries.
3.47 The United Nations review team, for the first Australian National
Communication in 1994 to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for
the UNFCCC, agreed that `Australia is in many respects unique' and:
… [t]he team recognize[d] the complexity of Australia's system
of government where the Federal Government has limited constitutional
powers to implement measures, and where progress depends on establishing
partnerships with state and local governments. [58]
3.48 The team acknowledged the leadership of the Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) to implement commitments under the Convention. The
broad range and quality of a number of climate-related research activities
being carried out in the country was also recognised, as well as research
in the pure and applied sciences on climate change issues, including expected
impacts of and adaptation to climate change.
3.49 Support for the negotiations, designed to provide Australia with
a special emissions target set in the context of national circumstances,
is noted in a number of submissions including the Department of Resources
Development (WA), Wesfarmers CSBP, and the Minerals Council of Australia.
3.50 The Department of Resources Development (WA) argued that:
The preparation of national greenhouse initiatives must be implemented
in respect of national strategic policy priorities and within the context
of the Prime Minister's statements referring to protection of Australia's
international competitiveness and the mining sector.
… any move to control greenhouse gas emissions by restricting
expansion or development of new projects would have a major impact on
the Western Australian and Australian economies.
… new developments will potentially locate in countries that are
not signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, with no benefit to the global
environment but a real cost to the Australian economy. [59]
3.51 Wesfarmers CSBP told the Committee:
… if Australia somehow or other falls into an international line
with a short time frame that keeps the Kyoto mechanism at 25 or 26 countries
and ignores the other 170, there is a very real risk that countries
like ours will have a really difficult time, because every product we
are manufacturing is competing against direct imports, particularly
in the case of fertilisers in Western Australia at the moment. [60]
3.52 The organisation explained that they were concerned that `if the
time lines are too short, or they are skewed against one country in favour
of another, then companies like ours will have a very hard row to hoe'
and stressed that they:
… would not support greenhouse gas costs whether they are permits
or taxes that apply only to Australian-based companies and not imported.
We would find it a very difficult situation if we were to have, for
example, something like a carbon tax or an emission permit attached
to our plants in Australia producing a product which someone else could
bring in over a jetty without that cost while still creating the CO2
somewhere else in the world. From that it follows in our view that it
would be very difficult for Australia to act unilaterally with greenhouse
because we are such a small part of the world and we are a trading nation,
whether importing or exporting. [61]
3.53 Richard Wells, Executive Director, Minerals Council of Australia
explained:
We argued in Kyoto that the Australian economy is very different and
deserves recognition in any international target setting. Therefore,
we were very much supportive of the view that we could not afford, as
an economy, to take some of the cuts that other countries did that do
not have such a dependence on fossil fuel and fossil fuel dependent
industries. We still argue that the Australian economy has special characteristics.
There is nothing to apologise for; it is part of our competitive advantage
which benefits the Australian community. But what we need to do is be
responsible about bearing our share of the burden in achieving these
things internationally, so it is the same position. [62]
Outcome of the negotiations and the agreed target for Australia
3.54 On the basis of the case it presented, the Australian Government
achieved a differentiated emissions target of 108 per cent over 1990 levels
in the 2008 to 2012 period, a target that is 13 per cent higher than for
most OECD countries.
3.55 This agreed target was supported in several submissions to the Committee,
but other submissions expressed concern about the adverse implications
for achieving future targets.
3.56 His Excellency Ralph Hillman, Ambassador for the Environment, said
that:
This outcome was seen as a good achievement for Australia. We had the
concept of differentiation accepted in the negotiations, we had sinks
included in a way that accommodated our interests and we were given
a plus eight per cent target, which recognised Australia's particular
economic circumstances. [63]
3.57 However, the Australian Conservation Foundation noted that Australia
could be faced with an equivalent or greater cut to emissions in
the second and subsequent commitment periods. Mr Don Henry, Executive
Director of the Australian Conservation Foundation suggested that:
Australia will not be allowed to get away with very flexible interpretations
of exactly what our Kyoto target means. I would imagine that will be
the international pressure that will be on us because it would set an
example that would totally undermine some of the efforts and dimensions
particularly to bring developing countries either into the mechanisms
at the moment or more vigorously into the overall effort. [64]
3.58 Although the negotiated 2008 to 2012 target has given Australia
some `breathing space', this could quickly disappear if a national framework
for effective abatement actions to reduce emissions in the energy sector
is not developed. Ms Tristy Fairfield from the Friends of the Earth (Fitzroy)
explained:
We need to accept the fact federally that we are going to get much
tougher emissions targets after the 2012 commitment period. We have
not actually made any real change towards achieving the targets that
we have got. [65]
…
By moving so slowly we are failing to recognise that we are going to
have much tougher emissions targets after the next round, particularly
if we fail to meet the soft targets we got in this round. After 2012
we do not seem to have any long term vision. … there are no real
on-the-table plans for the post-2012 commitment period. [66]
3.59 Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Minister for the Environment and Heritage,
also warned that Australia may be left vulnerable when targets are established
for post-2012 periods. Senator Hill pointed out that the agreed target
for Australia:
… should not be interpreted, however, as a signal that we can
continue to rely on driving economic growth through the increased emission
of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto outcome has given Australia the breathing
space required to make the structural changes in our economy.
The international trend, in fact, appears to be significantly moving
toward a `decoupling' of economic growth from a related growth in emissions.
In other words, developed nations are growing their economies without
a corresponding increase in greenhouse emissions. [67]
3.60 He went on to argue that Australia needed to join this trend:
The ability of developed nations to decouple their economic growth
from emissions growth will have major implications when the international
negotiations begin to determine the first round of post-Kyoto Protocol
reduction commitments. Nations which have achieved this decoupling will
be well placed to meet these further commitments. Nations which continue
in the ways of the past will inevitably face an even tougher, more costly
task. It seems sensible that Australia should take precautionary action
now to ensure it does not fall into this latter category. [68]
… it's not just the cost of action which must be considered but
the cost of inaction. [69]
3.61 One other problem perceived by a number of submissions is that emissions
growth in Australia has already exceeded the target agreed in Kyoto and
future cuts in expected growth of emissions are necessary. [70]
Ms Gwen Andrews, Chief Executive of the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO)
acknowledged, before the Committee, that the Australian projections of
the effect of existing measures on reducing business as usual have moved
from 118 per cent to a projection that may go as high as 123 per cent
above 1990 levels. [71] In July 2000, the AGO
announced that Australia's latest National Greenhouse Gas Inventory showed
a 16.9 per cent increase overall in emissions from all sectors (excluding
land clearing) from 1990 to 1998. [72]
3.62 The PMSEIC, stated that meeting the negotiated commitment will require
a cut of 35 per cent, or 135 Mt (million tonnes of CO2 equivalent), from
expected growth by 2010. [73]
3.63 Mr Michael Rae, representing the World Wide Fund for Nature, told
the Committee that, because Australia has been highlighted as being a
special case, there will be considerable additional international attention
on the need for Australia to achieve its target in the first commitment
period:
IPCC is saying that we need between 50 and 70 per cent reductions immediately
to stabilise emissions. That is clearly the sort of target we should
be going for at a global level. I think Australia was particularly fortunate
at Kyoto to win the target it did, looking at a very narrow view, and
I cannot imagine that the international community will allow us to persist
in not meeting our own obligations.
I think it would be a very clear responsibility of government to signal
to the community that that particular apportionment of emissions is
unlikely to continue for a very much longer and the Australian people
and the Australian economy will have to adjust. The question is whether
we do that in an orderly fashion or whether we get a very painful shock
to the system as the international community brings us to account. [74]
3.64 There is a strong argument to suggest that under the targets established
for the second commitment period, to be negotiated after 2005, Australia
will face a more stringent target well below 100 per cent. This prospect
requires leadership from government and recognition from industry that
serious abatement action needs to begin now.
Concern that Australia has presented a `special case'
3.65 Other submissions also expressed considerable concern that Australia
had presented a special case at Kyoto. Climate Action Network Australia
(CANA) objected to the Australian Government's negotiation in Kyoto and
claimed that:
This is a dishonourable position and one that Australia should disown
immediately. It is unjust, inaccurate and hypocritical… . [75]
3.66 The Australia Institute argued that the Australian proposal for
differentiated targets was seen as being driven primarily by self-interest.
[76] It added:
At home and abroad, Australia was increasingly characterised as a `pariah
nation', bracketed with the OPEC countries and seen to be pursuing narrow
self-interest with little regard for the environment or the diplomatic
implications of seeking special concessions. [77]
3.67 Also, Professor Ian Lowe [78] pointed
out:
At the moment Australia is the only major carbon intensive economy
that has not undertaken to reduce its emissions. [79]
3.68 It may be argued that Australia's reputation will be further affected
by Australia's interest in maximising the scope of the Kyoto flexibility
mechanisms. In the lead up to the next Conference of the Parties, Australia
has been seeking very broad definitions in relation to sink activities,
CDM projects and emissions trading rules. Australia's stance on these
issues could be interpreted as a preoccupation with minimising the requirement
for stronger greenhouse abatement measures.
3.69 In its submission to the Committee, the Australia Institute challenged
a number of the arguments made by the Australian Government at Kyoto when
negotiating a special case for emission targets. [80]
The Institute addressed the claim that Australia's fossil-fuel dependence
makes it harder for the country to cut emissions and argued that this
was unsubstantiated by economic modelling results. The Institute pointed
out that:
… the opposite is more likely to be the case. In determining the
cost of emission reductions, the key test is not the relative amount
of fossil fuel burnt but how efficiently a country burns it. As an economy
reduces its emissions it will start with the cheapest abatement measures
(energy savings) and then move to the more expensive measures by replacing
energy-using equipment and switching from high-emission sources such
as coal to low emission sources such as natural gas and nuclear power.
[81]
3.70 The Institute also explained that exports of fossil fuels have no
impact on Australia's greenhouse gas emissions, as emissions are counted
in the country in which the fuels are combusted. [82]
In this case only energy used in mining, processing and transporting fuels
appear in Australia's emissions inventory. In relation to transport the
Institute argued that, although Australia is a big country:
… most travel in Australia occurs in urban areas and, accordingly,
the size of our country has only a small impact on total travel requirements.
Secondly, when compared to other developed countries, the share of emissions
from transport in Australia is about average. [83]
The economic modelling of the special case
3.71 To support its argument in Kyoto at CoP 3, the Australian Government
requested the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics
(ABARE) to provide estimates using the MEGABARE model of the economic
costs to Australia of cutting emissions. The Australia Institute submission
to the inquiry noted that:
The model results in 1995 indicated that real Gross National Expenditure
(GNE) would fall below the `business-as-usual' path by amounts ranging
from -0.27 per cent in the year 2000 to -0.49 per cent in 2020. [84]
3.72 The model and its predictions have since been the subject of criticism.
The Australia Institute argued that:
… the MEGABARE model failed to allow for technological change
in response to policies to cut emissions, excluded assessment of the
benefits of reducing emissions, ignored emissions from land clearing,
seriously overstated the likelihood of jobs going off-shore, and employed
various presentational ticks that gave a grossly misleading picture
of the economic costs of reducing emissions.
Economists outside of ABARE concluded that the MEGABARE model did not
provide accurate or reliable estimates of the economic impacts of emission
reduction policies and should be disregarded. [85]
3.73 The Committee questioned ABARE about the nature of the peer review
of the work of that organisation. [86] Dr Fisher,
representing ABARE, explained to the Committee that:
[Any review] depends on when these things are being published. For
example, we released the document you have before you, the one we put
in as the submission, using our own internal review system, but the
content of that is now subject to the energy modelling forum processes
and we will use the feedback we get from that as input into the next
document that we produce later this year. [87]
3.74 However, the Australia Institute claimed that:
The Minister revealed that most of the funding for the modelling work
had been received from businesses and business organisations involved
in the fossil fuel industry… . These organisations paid $50,000
for a seat on the Steering Committee overseeing the modelling work.
[88]
3.75 The submission from the Australia Institute also argued that `ABARE
did not subject its work to a proper process of peer review' [89]
and by:
… limiting membership of the Steering Committee to organizations
willing to pay $50,000, ABARE had failed to protect itself adequately
from `allegations of undue influence by vested interests'. Its practices
`could create a reasonable public perception that the research projects
were weighted in favour of the interests of Australian industry'. [90]
3.76 The Australia Institute, has more recently commented:
We all know that, prior to Kyoto, the ABARE's modelling was enormously
influential in the political debate, it was the basis of the whole of
the Australian Government's position, and yet no one was acknowledging
the extraordinary arbitrariness of the ABARE model, and indeed of other
models. I have heard today from Vivek [Research Director, Trade and
International Policy Branch, ABARE] that these figures are two years
old and now are sharply different. The costs now estimated by ABARE
are markedly lower than they were prior to Kyoto. If we had known that
two and a half years ago, does that mean the Australian Government's
position in the lead-up to and at Kyoto would have been markedly different?
[91]
3.77 The Minister for the Environment and Heritage, Senator Hill has
remarked that:
ABARE's work since Kyoto has actually indicated that the cost of compliance
may not be as great as originally expected. [92]
3.78 Dr Hamilton argued that other modelling techniques have shown that
investment in energy efficiency would substantially reduce the estimated
economic costs of bringing about large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
and that these sort of results are not reflected in the calculations from
the ABARE GTEM [93] model. [94]
He added that:
[I]t is impossible to use ABARE model results to draw any conclusion
about the desirability or otherwise of policies because they only assess
the costs of emission reductions, they do not make any estimate of the
benefits of reducing emissions. [95]
3.79 Mr Alan Pears, representing the Sustainable Energy Industry of Australia
(SEIA), also expressed criticism of the ABARE model:
… not only I but many others see ABARE's analysis as being the
absolute worst-case, most pessimistic, scenario because it actually
means replacing a lot of our coal-fired power stations by renewable
energy and pursuing almost no energy efficiency by 2020. It is a very
high cost scenario. [96]
3.80 Mr Pears explained that:
When we start putting this analysis into perspective, we find that
something like 85 per cent of Australian industry will benefit under
a very conservative costing analysis of greenhouse response. When we
look at the industries that are supposedly adversely affected, we have
to recognise that ABARE's analysis assumes those people will do very
little to change. [97]
3.81 Dr Brian Fisher, Executive Director of ABARE, explained to the Committee
that the model produced for the Kyoto negotiations in 1997 had been superseded
by new premises which have emerged post-Kyoto:
All of the simulations done pre-Kyoto were done in a policy world where
we thought that we would only be dealing with one gas, namely carbon
dioxide. We were talking about uniform percentage reductions for every
country. As it turned out, we agreed at Kyoto that we would include
six gases in the coverage and we would differentiate targets.
There is quite a substantial difference and impact on Australia and
on its sectors as a consequence of moving from a ten per cent reduction
in emissions against the 1990 base versus an eight per cent increase.
There is a radical difference in terms of the impact on sectors as a
consequence of inclusion of gases like methane and nitrous oxide. [98]
3.82 Dr Fisher concluded that the early modelling:
… was based on correct presumptions at the time but as a consequence
of the negotiations and agreement to include totally different coverage
we have a new set of model results. [99]
3.83 He emphasised that the Committee `should not rely on those results
because they were done in a totally different environment for a totally
different set of policy settings' and that MEGABARE is not a model ABARE
uses any more. He explained that ABARE now uses a model called GTEM which
incorporates the greenhouse sensitive gases carbon dioxide, methane and
nitrous oxide. [100] Dr Fisher added that
ABARE is:
… currently working on [their] next set of projections and those
will be re-leased once [they] finalise [their] analysis of [their] fuel
and energy survey, which is a biennial activity. [101]
3.84 At a Round Table on Global Warming held before the Committee, Mr
Vivek Tulpule, Research Director in Trade and International Policy at
ABARE, noted:
The quality of the data just keeps improving all the time. As we have
the resources and the funding to improve the quality of the data, we
do that. [102]
3.85 However, Mr Tulpule added that the Australian Government, at the
time of the Kyoto Conference of Parties, `would have been informed by
models that ranged across the top end of what people were saying, and
the bottom end'. [103] He emphasised that:
Both of those models, despite the fact that these curves are at different
levels, came up with pretty much the same conclusions. Those conclusions
were that Australia would be more severely harmed as a result of the
independent abatement EU styles of policies that were being proposed
at that stage, despite the positions of these curves. The second thing
they found was that emissions trading would help Australia achieve emission
reduction targets at a much lower cost than would independent abatement.
[104]
3.86 Mr Tulpule noted:
At a global level, modellers everywhere are worried about how you model
technological change. How do you incorporate this properly into greenhouse
models in order to be able to assess the sorts of policies that governments
are now actually putting on the table, which are to do with R&D
- especially in the United States - and which are to do with technological
improvements? [105]
3.87 Ms Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew Center on Global Climate
Change also pointed out that: `[m]any of the economic models that are
used to develop the cost estimates are unrealistic' [106]
and that `different countries have interpreted the language in the treaty
differently, and this has affected their assessment of whether and how
they will be able to reach their targets'. [107]
Ms Claussen suggests that there is a clear need to `renegotiate the targets
or the timetables'. [108]
Recommendation 4
The Committee recommends that future work undertaken by ABARE on the
economic impact of climate change and greenhouse gas abatement should:
- be subject to wide-ranging peer review to ensure open and objective
reporting; and
- incorporate opportunities for low cost and negative cost abatement.
Footnotes
[1] Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and
Innovation Council, From Defence to Attack: Australia's Response to
the Greenhouse Effect, 25 June 1999, p 3.
[2] See appendix 3 of the report for key dates
in the climate change negotiation process.
[3] unfcc.de/resource/iuckit/fact17.html (17/07/00),
p 1.
[4] The key events were the Villach Conference
(October 1985), the Toronto Conference (June 1988), the Ottawa Conference
(February 1989), the Tata Conference (February 1989), the Hague Conference
and Declaration (March 1989), the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference (November
1989), the Cairo Compact (December 1989), and the Bergen Conference (May
1990), unfcc.de/resource/iuckit/fact17.html (17/07/2000), p 1.
[5] greenpeace.org/~climate/politics/reports/conferences.html
(18/07/00), p 1.
[6] unfccc.de/resource/process/components.response/landmarks.html
(17/07/000, p 1.
[7] United Nations General Assembly Resolution
45/212.
[8] unfcc.de/resource/iuckit/fact18.html (17/07/00),
p 1 (also see /fact17.html).
[9] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol: A
Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 115-17.
[10] Cited in Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 37.
[11] Cited in Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 37.
[12] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 39-40.
[13] unfcc.de/resource/iuckit/fact18.html (17/07/00),
p 1.
[14] Conference of the Parties established
as the supreme body of the Convention responsible for: periodically reviewing
the obligations of the Parties and institutional arrangements under Convention;
promoting and facilitating the exchange of information on measures adopted
by the Parties to address climate change and its effects; promoting and
guiding the development of comparable methods for preparing inventories
of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks; and establishing
subsidiary bodies necessary or the implementation of the Convention (B
Graham, M Hinchy, B Fisher and V Tulpule, Climate Change Negotiations
– the Kyoto Protocol, Outlook 98, Proceedings of the National
Agricultural & Resources Outlook Conference, Commodity Markets and
Resource Management, Volume 1, 3 – 5 February 1998, ABARE, Canberra,
1998, p 67).
[15] unfccc.de/resource/process/components.response/landmarks.html
(17/07/00), p 1. As at 20/07/98 the Convention has been ratified by 175
countries and the European Union, unfccc.de/fccc/conv.
[16] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 47.
[17] Greenpeace, Guide to the Kyoto Protocol,
Greenpeace International, October 1998, p 3.
[18] United Nations, The International Response
to Climate Change, Climate Change Information Kit, Climate Change
Information Sheet 17, unfcc.de/resource/iuckit/fact17.html (17/07/00),
p 2.
[19] greenpeace.org/~climate/politics/reports/conferences.html
(18/07/00), p 2.
[20] `Anthropogenic (human) sources of six
greenhouse gases are to be included in national greenhouse gas emission
inventories, including emissions from land use change. However, for the
purposes of calculating the base period inventory, emissions form land
use change are not included when defining the emission targets unless
land use changes were a net source of emissions in 1990. The six greenhouse
gases covered by the Protocol are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride' (Frank
Jotzo, Edwina Heyhoe, Kate Woffenden, Stephen Brown and Brian Fisher,
Kyoto Protocol: Impact on developing countries and some implications
for the design of the Kyoto mechanisms, Outlook 2000, Proceedings
of the National Outlook Conference, Natural Resources, Volume 1, 29 February
– 2 March 2000, ABARE, Canberra, 2000, p 48). The six gases are to
be combined in a `basket', with reductions in individual gases translated
into `CO2 equivalents' that are then added up to produce a single figure
(unfcc.de/resource/iuckit/fact21.html (17/07/00), p 1). Countries also
have a choice of baselines for the synthetic gases, 1990 or 1995.
[21] The Protocol provides in principle for
the establishment of `bubble' arrangements between any group of Parties
that choose to fulfil their commitments jointly. It also requires transparency
in the way particular bubbles may operate… . [These] Parties, such
as those comprising the European Union, may fulfil their (aggregate) commitments
jointly (as a `bubble'). In the event of the European Union not meeting
its aggregate Kyoto commitment, each member party will be responsible
for meeting the target inscribed for it in its instrument of ratification
(Frank Jotzo, Edwina Heyhoe, Kate Woffenden, Stephen Brown and Brian Fisher,
Kyoto Protocol: Impact on developing countries and some implications
for the design of the Kyoto mechanisms, Outlook 2000, Proceedings
of the National Outlook Conference, Natural Resources, Volume 1, 29 February
– 2 March 2000, ABARE, Canberra, 2000, p 49).
[22] greenpeace.org/~climate/politics/reports/conferences.html
(18/07/00), pp 2-3.
[23] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 118 and 155.
[24] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 156-57.
[25] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
IPCC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific-Technical Information
Relevant to Interpreting Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, clause 2.7.
[26] Prime Minister's Science, Engineering
and Innovation Council, From Defence to Attack: Australia's Response
to the Greenhouse Effect, 25 June 1999, p 3.
[27] Prime Minister's Science, Engineering
and Innovation Council, From Defence to Attack: Australia's Response
to the Greenhouse Effect, 25 June 1999, p 3.
[28] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 158.
[29] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 255 (US ratification) and pp 103-07.
[30] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 122-24.
[31] `Annex I Parties may trade among themselves
emission reduction units (ERUs) resulting from projects aimed at reducing
anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals
by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy… . Such
projects have to provide a reduction in emissions or an enhancement of
removals by sinks additional to any that would otherwise occur... . The
ERUs may not be acquired if such action is not in compliance with obligations
under Articles 5 and 7. … The ERUs are to be supplemental to domestic
actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3' (Peter
Cameron, `From Principles to Practice: the Kyoto Protocol', Journal
of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 18(1), February 2000, p 1-18
at p 8).
[32] greenhouse.gov.au/pubs/factsheets/fs_cop5.html
(17/07/00), p 3.
[33] `The operational details surrounding the
CDM have yet to be negotiated. To qualify as a CDM project, the project
activity must result in reductions in emissions (removal of carbon dioxide
by sinks) that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of
the certified project activity… . Under the CDM, the certified emission
reductions (CERs) obtained from the year 2000 onward can be used toward
meeting Annex B emission reduction targets in the first commitment period…
. The Protocol stipulates that a share of the proceeds from the CERs will
be used to cover administrative expenses and to assist developing countries
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change
to meet the costs of adaption (Article 12.8)' (Frank Jotzo, Edwina Heyhoe,
Kate Woffenden, Stephen Brown and Brian Fisher, Kyoto Protocol: Impact
on developing countries and some implications for the design of the Kyoto
mechanisms, Outlook 2000, Proceedings of the National Outlook Conference,
Natural Resources, Volume 1, 29 February – 2 March 2000, ABARE, Canberra,
2000, p 61).
[34] Peter Cameron, `From Principles to Practice:
the Kyoto Protocol', Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law,
18(1), February 2000, p 1-18 at p 8.
[35] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 135 and 202 ff.
[36] Peter Cameron, `From Principles to Practice:
the Kyoto Protocol', Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law,
18(1), February 2000, p 1-18 at p 9.
[37] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 87-102; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, December 1997, Articles 6, 12 and 17.
[38] unfccc.de/resource/process/components/response/respkp.html
(17/07/00), pp 1-2.
[39] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March, 2000, p 3.
[40] ABARE, Submission 106, p 880.
[41] Australian Greenhouse Office, Submission
169, p 1685.
[42] Statement by the Prime Minister of Australia,
the Hon John Howard, Safeguarding the Future: Australia's response
to climate change, 20 November 1997, http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/ago/safeguarding.html
(17/07/00).
[43] Statement by the Prime Minister of Australia,
the Hon John Howard, Safeguarding the Future: Australia's response
to climate change, 20 November 1997, http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/ago/safeguarding.html
(17/07/00).
[44] Australian Greenhouse Office, The National
Greenhouse Strategy: Strategic Framework for Advancing Australia's Greenhouse
Response, 1998, pp 31-37.
[45] Australian Greenhouse Office, Submission
169, p 1687.
[46] isr.gov.au/resources/netenergy/greenhouse/partnerships/index.html
(04/09/00), p 3.
[47] Australian Greenhouse Office, Submission
169, p 1687.
[48] AusAID, The Overseas Aid Program and
the Challenge of Global Warming, 1999, p 2.
[49] The GEF is the financial mechanism of
the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
[50] Australian Greenhouse Office, Submission
169, p 1686.
[51] Australian Greenhouse Office, Submission
169, p 1687.
[52] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 27.
[53] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 901.
[54] Using official totals for 1995 supplied
to the UN by the 35 Annex B (industrialised) Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
the Australia Institute calculated that Australia had the highest emissions
per capita at 26.7 tonnes: `this is twice the level for all other wealthy
countries (13.4 tonnes) and 25 per cent higher than emissions per person
in the US (21.2 tonnes). While the US has higher emission per capita from
energy (20.6 tonnes compared to Australia's 17.6 tonnes), Australia has
much higher levels of emissions from agriculture and land-use change',
(The Australia Institute, Submission 79, p 2).
[55] United Nations General Assembly, Executive
Summary of the National Communication of Australia, 26 October 1995,
A/AC.237/NC/4, p 3. See also Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Australia and Climate Change Negotiations, An Issues Paper, September
1997, pp 4-6 at dfat.gov.au/environment/climate/accn/overview.html (02/02/00);
Australian Greenhouse Office, Submission 169, p 1682; and The National
Greenhouse Strategy: Strategic Framework for Advancing Australia's Greenhouse
Response, Australian Greenhouse Office, Canberra, 1998, p 100.
[56] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 583.
[57] The Australia Institute, Submission 79e,
p 2311. The Institute explained that: `The phrase `common but differentiated
responsibilities' was first used in the Framework Convention and reiterated
in the Berlin Mandate'. However, the Institute pointed out that: `the
phrase referred to the `common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities between developed and developing countries.
It is important to recognise this because the Australian Government used
the phrase to give legitimacy to its differentiation argument in the lead-up
to the Kyoto Conference. This was intended to give the impression that
the Framework Convention and the Berlin Mandate provided the principle
on which the Australian case was based. This was a misuse of the wording
of the Convention for it was never understood to apply to `differentiated
responsibilities' among the rich countries'.
[58] United Nations General Assembly, Summary
of the report of the In-Depth Review of the National Communication of
Australia, 14 December 1995, FCCC/IDR.1(SUM)/AUS, p 2.
[59] Department of Resources Development (WA),
Submission 67, p 502.
[60] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, p 522.
[61] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, pp 522-23.
[62] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March 2000, p 75.
[63] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 2.
[64] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
21 March 2000, p 195.
[65] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
20 March 2000, p 161.
[66] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
20 March 2000, p 162.
[67] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Opening
Address to the Insurance Council of Australia's Canberra Conference,
10 August 2000, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Media Release
and Speeches, environment.gov.au/minister/env/2000/sp10aug00.html (13/08/00),
p 3.
[68] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Opening
Address to the Insurance Council of Australia's Canberra Conference,
10 August 2000, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Media Release
and Speeches, environment.gov.au/minister/env/2000/sp10aug00.html (13/08/00),
p 3.
[69] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Opening
Address to the Insurance Council of Australia's Canberra Conference,
10 August 2000, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Media Release
and Speeches, environment.gov.au/minister/env/2000/sp10aug00.html (13/08/00),
p 4.
[70] Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission
191, p 2015.
[71] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
22 June 2000, p 686.
[72] Australian Greenhouse Office, Media Release,
National Greenhouse Gas Inventory for 1998 released, 13 July 2000, greenhouse.gov.au/media/nggi98.html
(21/07/00), p 1.
[73] Prime Minister's Science, Engineering
and Innovation Council, From Defence to Attack: Australia's Response
to the Greenhouse Effect, 25 June 1999, p 2.
[74] Proof Committee Hansard, Sydney,
23 March 2000, p 444.
[75] Climate Action Network Australia, Submission
193, p 2033.
[76] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 584.
[77] The Australia Institute, Submission 79e,
p 2312.
[78] Professor Ian Lowe, Griffith University,
gave evidence before the Committee in a private capacity.
[79] Proof Committee Hansard, Brisbane,
26 May 2000, p 559.
[80] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 579.
[81] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 580.
[82] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 581.
[83] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 583.
[84] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 580.
[85] The Australia Institute, Submission 79e,
pp 2313-14.
[86] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, pp 819-20.
[87] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 559.
[88] The Australia Institute, Submission 79e,
pp 2315.
[89] The Australia Institute, Submission 79e,
pp 2316.
[90] The Australia Institute, Submission 79e,
pp 2317.
[91] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 899.
[92] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Opening
Address to the Insurance Council of Australia's Canberra Conference,
10 August 2000, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Media Release
and Speeches, environment.gov.au/minister/env/2000/sp10aug00.html (13/08/00),
p 4.
[93] `The Global Trade and Environment Model
(GTEM) is derived from the MEGABARE model and the GTAP model. The most
significant features that distinguish GTEM from MEGABARE are the extended
coverage of greenhouse gas emissions, the inclusion of interfuel substitution
and emission reduction responses in noncombustion greenhouse gases…
. Global computable general equilibrium models such as GTEM have the capacity
for estimating the impacts of international climate change policies on
key economic variables and emissions. The economic variables considered
include the prices of consumer goods and inputs into production, sectoral
and regional output, trade and investment flows between regions and, ultimately,
national income and expenditure levels in Annex B and non-Annex B regions
(Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries:
Impacts and implications for mechanism design, ABARE, 2000, p 74).
[94] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 900.
[95] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 903.
[96] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
21 March 2000, p 230.
[97] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
21 March 2000, p 230.
[98] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 820.
[99] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 821.
[100] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 825.
[101] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 825.
[102] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 891.
[103] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 896.
[104] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 891.
[105] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 901.
[106] Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew
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