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VIRTUALLY NO LIABILITY?: SECURITIES MARKETS IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE AN ISSUES PAPER
Table of Contents


CHAPTER 2

SOME ISSUES FOR CORPORATIONS AND SECURITIES MARKETS

Introduction

2.1 In Chapter 1 of this Paper, the Committee outlined, in broad terms, some of the potential effects of technological change on Australian corporations and securities markets. This Chapter deals with these effects in more detail.

2.2 In summary, it is suggested that, as a result of the development of an international electronic market in the trading of shares and related securities, the amount of corporate and investment information that is readily available, and the quality of that information, should increase. However, insubstantial 'information' such as gossip or rumour may also increase and will circulate more widely. Information from all sources should appear in a much more timely fashion. The ability to manipulate and interpret that information may also be enhanced, possibly assisted by specifically developed computer software and by new information intermediaries.

2.3 The new technology is also likely to bring about structural changes in securities markets. Many of the roles intermediaries now perform - which are explicitly recognised in, and specifically regulated by, the Corporations Law - may change, or even disappear, as investors or fund-raisers take on those roles directly, perhaps again assisted by computer software. However, there is scope for new types of intermediation and for new classes of intermediaries which are not yet recognised in the Law.

2.4 Given these developments, some of the problems currently faced by regulators may also change, or disappear. However, many new problems will arise - principally as a consequence of the internationalisation of markets, and of transactions that cross jurisdictional borders, or take place outside those borders. Some matters currently subject to regulation may, in the future, be more difficult (or even impossible) to regulate.

2.5 Given that developments are taking place in an international context, there will be an obvious need for widely accepted standards. These standards will be needed to govern the technology itself, the software it utilises, the manner in which information is presented, and the legal environment which will apply to transactions undertaken.

2.6 Finally, international markets are likely to bring with them a greater depth of choice for investors in, and issuers of, securities, and may include a greater range in the 'products' offered, including many novel products not currently contemplated by the legislation.

2.7 This remainder of this Chapter discusses these likely effects in greater detail.

Information

2.8 Currently the Corporations Law regulates the way in which information about corporations, their activities and their securities may be provided. Much of the information disclosed by companies must satisfy prescribed requirements. [1]

2.9 The Law also regulates those who may offer information or advice about securities, and imposes certain qualifications on the content of that advice. In general terms:

  • only licensed securities dealers or investment advisers may offer such advice; [2]
  • an adviser must not make recommendations about securities to anyone who may reasonably be expected to rely on that advice unless the adviser has a reasonable basis for making the recommendation; [3]
  • when making personal securities recommendations to clients, advisers must disclose any commission, fee or other benefit they will receive in connection with the recommendation, and any interest they have that might be capable of influencing the making of the recommendation; and
  • when providing general securities advice, advisers should include a warning that no analysis has been carried out to match the advice to the needs and circumstances of any individual investor. [4]

2.10 The rationale for licensing investment advisers was set out by the ASC in its Licensing Review Report Good Advice. While noting that its role was not to be a risk regulator, nor to protect investors from financial losses, the ASC observed that:

    In the context of a relatively fragmented and young market for investment advisory services and a relatively inexperienced investing community, it is considered appropriate that the ASC maintain a licensing role. Regulation which imposes requirements on advisers before they can enter the industry is considered justified having regard to the needs of retail investors who (as the market survey confirmed) rely largely on assumptions as to the competence and integrity of advisers, rather than undertake this assessment themselves.

    A form of licensing which sets minimum standards in recognition of retail investor needs is considered preferable to alternative forms of regulatory intervention (such as negative licensing) which rely largely on the role of market forces in excluding incompetent advisers. The possible losses to investors and the community would be too high if the ASC's role was limited to intervention after breaches occur. If, in the future, investors have equal access to information and clearer signals of appropriate advice, greater reliance on market forces to set minimum standards may be justified.

    Unlike the market for retail advisory services, however, the ASC believes that many of the market imperfections do not exist at the sophisticated investor level because these participants are more capable of obtaining and monitoring the quality of services available to them. Moreover, their needs in relation to the types of advisory services they obtain are also different. The ASC, therefore, considers that participants at the sophisticated investor level do not require the ASC's protection to the same extent as retail investors ... [5]

Licensing and the Wallis Committee

2.11 It should be noted that the Wallis Committee also considered the issue of licensing. The approach advocated by that Committee involved the establishment of a single regime to license advisers providing investment advice and dealing in financial markets, with separate categories of licence for investment advice and product sales, general insurance brokers, financial market dealers, and financial market participants. [6] Under this licensing approach, the CFSC should:

  • have power to devolve responsibility for competency training and testing to industry bodies; and
  • develop a single set of requirements for investment sales and advice (including minimum standards of competency and ethical behaviour; requirements for the disclosure of fees and adviser's capacity; rules on handling client property and money; and financial resources or insurance available in cases of fraud). [7]

2.12 Subject to the outcome of a review, real estate agents providing investment advice would be required to hold a financial advisory licence. However, professional advisers such as lawyers and accountants would not be required to hold such a licence if they provided investment advice only incidentally to their other business and rebated any commissions to clients. [8]

Implications of the electronic dissemination of 'official' information

2.13 Clearly, both 'official' and 'non-official' information may be made available electronically. Under recently introduced or proposed procedures, information such as profit or company announcements may be lodged electronically with the ASX and the ASC, and may be disseminated electronically by them. Consideration is being given to proposals to enable the electronic delivery of notices of meeting to shareholders and the electronic lodgment of proxies by shareholders. Indeed, in a recent report, this Committee recommended that the Corporations Law should more extensively recognise electronic forms of communication between companies and their members, and regulatory authorities. [9] Such recognition would enable information to be disseminated more quickly, at a lower cost, and to be more readily searched and analysed.

2.14 Technology also has the potential to make information such as real-time share prices and trading volumes, and details of regulatory or enforcement action, much more widely available. Where such information is presently restricted to market professionals, in the near future it is likely to be available to anyone with basic Internet access.

2.15 However, a number of subsidiary issues may arise where 'official' information is made available electronically. Broadly, these involve:

  • the possibility of better or quicker access where some investors receive information electronically while others continue to receive it in a printed form;
  • the possibility that the forms governing the ways in which printed information should be presented may not be appropriate for information made available electronically; and
  • whether specific procedures may be needed to ensure that information made available in electronic form cannot be inadvertently or deliberately changed or tampered with.

Some issues:

  • will the greater availability of information in electronic form disadvantage those investors without access to information in that form?;
  • are further statutory provisions needed to deal with the forms in which information may be made available electronically?;
  • what regulatory approach should be taken to the provision of audio-visual or other information which supplements prescribed information?;
  • what regulatory approach should be taken to the provision of information in electronic form in languages other than English?; and
  • how can the authenticity and security of information lodged or disseminated electronically be guaranteed, and who should be responsible for guaranteeing that authenticity?

Implications of the electronic dissemination of other information

2.16 'Non-official' information about companies and their securities is difficult to categorise. It may extend from considered financial analysis, through investment advice, to advertising for share purchases, and to rumour and speculation. Information in all these categories is now commonly found in electronic form on the Internet.

2.17 The growing availability of stockbrokers' analysis is noted in para 1.9 above. Information and advice from investors or interested members of the public is also available. For example, in September 1996, 'Australian Stocks and Shares', an Internet site operated by Mr Gerry Pauley, was voted Australia's most popular destination in the inaugural AFR/Telstra Australian Internet Awards. The site was based on personal share trading, and included company information, educational material and graphs. [10] No charge was made for the advice provided, and the site also contained a disclaimer that its operator was not a financial adviser.

2.18 In spite of this, in October 1996 the site was closed after the ASC insisted that its operator obtain a dealer's licence:

    Mr Pauley was putting himself up as an expert and as such required a dealer's licence, said the ASC's spokesperson, Ms Irene O'Brien.

    "Because giving investment advice on the Internet is new, we're going to be cracking down on people. It's against the Corporations Law." Ms O'Brien said it didn't matter whether or not someone charged consumers.

    "If you give people investment advice and have them trust you, you need to be licensed because you're dealing with people's money.

    "There's an unfortunate tendency for people at the moment to read everything on the Internet as gospel" [11]

2.19 The ASC's action followed an earlier incident in which misleading information was published on the Internet. In March 1996, Mr Ron Gully, the operator of a Geelong-based Internet site, published a report predicting that the price of shares in three named oil exploration companies would skyrocket after the discovery of a "monster oil find in Manila Bay". He removed the report after four hours and suspended the service because of "legal problems" after one of the exploration companies notified the ASX that the report was "absolutely false". Mr Gully explained that he had received an anonymous tip from someone claiming to represent people on the drilling rig, but had not contacted the companies involved to confirm the tip.

    The incident has highlighted international concerns that individuals can manipulate the uncontrolled information superhighway to circumvent regulatory safeguards.

    A wave of electronic share tipping and share buying services have been established on the Internet.

    Mr Gully said he has had close to 45,000 "hits" from visitors to his six-month-old Web share tipping service, which he describes as "Australia's busiest financial services page".

    However, he also said yesterday that the contents of his Web page were just gossip. [12]

2.20 In June 1996, the ASC issued a Media Release dealing with investment advice on the Internet. This observed, in part:

    The ASC is particularly concerned that securities recommendations are being made by people who may not be licensed investment advisers and, as a result, not qualified, and that such recommendations might include information which is false or misleading or which repeats baseless rumours ...

    "Companies and individuals who are not licensed dealers or investment advisers who make recommendations or provide unsubstantiated information on securities through the Internet are warned that this conduct is prohibited under the Law and such conduct leaves those parties liable to civil and criminal sanctions," the ASC's National Co-ordinator of Enforcement, Andrew Procter, said. [13]

2.21 Problems continue to emerge in spite of such warnings. For example, as recently as May 1997, the "chat room" HotCopper (also operated by Mr Gully) published a series of comments about the shares of Carpenter Pacific Resources NL (Carpenter), which had released drilling results suggesting a significant gold discovery. These comments included hints of a possible takeover for Carpenter, and claims that a named broker, and officers of another company with an interest in the prospective mine, had indicated that the release of further positive drilling results was imminent.

2.22 Asked whether he had provided the information disclosed, the named broker stated that the particular Internet contributor had "caused a storm in a teacup by writing provocatively about what he has heard" but that there was "probably substance in what he has written". [14] Media reports of the incident suggested that:

    While the authorities are deeply concerned about the material HotCopper published, there is little they can do. Gully is not licensed, but he does not charge for his services and he publishes a disclaimer at the head of his chat site urging people to seek professional advice ...

    Apart from the obvious possibilities that such chat sites can be used to manipulate the market, the authorities are particularly concerned in Carpenter's case because ... 95.2 million share options expire at the end of June. They closed on Friday at 13.5c each, still well out of the money because 25c is owed. [15]

2.23 There is a more substantial history of similar activities in the US, often involving newsgroups or bulletin boards rather than home pages. The SEC Internet site reports a number of occurrences including:

  • an allegedly fraudulent offering of promissory notes, purportedly secured by US Government securities, through newsgroup bulletin board postings on the Internet, and through numerous advertisements placed on the Internet access provider CompuServe; [16]
  • an allegedly fraudulent promotional campaign for a Canadian resources company which involved placing messages targeted at US investors over the Internet through a New Orleans-based computer bulletin board service called the "Emerging Growth Stock" Bulletin Board Service; [17]
  • the sale, over the Internet, of investment contracts for the sale and leaseback of privately owned automated teller machines; a scheme which raised almost $3.5 million from at least 132 US investors; [18] and
  • the posting of numerous Internet messages "accessible to millions of potential investors across the country and world-wide" in an attempt to entice those investors with promises of riskless profits and above average returns from investments in two Costa Rican enterprises, ICP and the Jupiter Agro Development Project. [19]

2.24 In November 1996, in response to serious questions raised about OmniGene Diagnostics Inc, the SEC temporarily suspended over-the-counter trading in the company's securities and also posted information about the suspension on a message board that discussed OmniGene stock. A media release issued on behalf of the SEC noted:

    While the Commission has thus far used the Internet through its Web site (www.sec.gov) to solicit information about possible fraudulent activities, we will now be using the Internet to alert investors to potential problems with specific securities when circumstances warrant. This is the first time we've done so, but it will not be the last. [20]

2.25 There is a proliferation of general information about companies and their securities, both domestic and international, on the Internet. [21] One investor bulletin board - The Motley Fool - claims a regular readership base of 400,000:

    "What makes Web sites like Motley Fool different is that there are hundreds of people offering often quite expert investment advice at any one time, and it is free ...

    "There is no barrier to entry, the research is free, [and] participants report rates of return that are competitive with top-rating fund managers ..." [22]

2.26 Some of the information provided is unexceptionable, and represents the work of licensed advisers. Other information represents the work of thoughtful (but unqualified and unlicensed) amateurs. Other sources provide a forum for rumour and gossip, about which one observer recently noted:

    While cyberspace chat might have a more exclusive air to it, there can hardly be any guarantee that rumours from a "chat room" on the Internet are any newer or potent than rumours picked up over the telephone from a stockbroker or from an acquaintance in front of the ASX display board. [23]

2.27 To date, the approach chosen by the ASC seems to have required the operators of all Australian-based Internet sites to comply with the licensing provisions of the Law. However, little action seems possible in the case of "bulletin boards" or "chat rooms". There are obviously many competing considerations, including allowing investors full access to the information potential of electronic communications while minimising the opportunities for market manipulation and investment fraud.

2.28 Some other jurisdictions have attempted to draw distinctions between different forms of electronic communication. For example, the US National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) regards an Internet World Wide Web site, a site on a commercial online service (such as America OnLine) and communications posted on electronic bulletin boards as forms of advertising. Group electronic mail is regarded as sales literature. Individual electronic mail is regarded as correspondence, and a "chat room" is regarded as a public forum using an electronic medium. Different filing, review, approval and disclaimer guidelines seem to apply in each case. [24]

2.29 The information potential of the new technology is likely to be further enhanced by developments in software. The Wallis Committee referred to the future importance of "intelligent software" to make searching, obtaining and analysing information more manageable over public and private networks. [25] A recent report from one group of technology analysts reportedly forecast that "mobile units of intelligent software that search for customised information on the [World Wide] Web will transform the Internet into a finely tuned forum for electronic commerce generating almost US$5 billion of revenue by 2006". [26] Other reports refer to software programs known as 'smart agents', 'intelligent agents' or 'program navigators' which will allow investors to examine financial products and services, and select and purchase them. [27] In the areas of interest to this Committee, one example of the development of a program designed to analyse the information disclosed in a prospectus is referred to in para 2.60 below.

2.30The information potential of the new technology also seems to challenge the enforcement abilities of regulators such as the ASC. In addition to comments made within Australia about Australian shares, it is highly likely that comments about Australian shares (or overseas shares traded on the ASX) will be made on Internet sites, "bulletin boards" and "chat rooms" based outside Australia - challenging the jurisdictional reach and enforceability of the Law. It is also possible that comments about shares traded overseas may be made on Australian sites or through an Australian-based Internet service provider. It may be that there is a general need to re-evaluate the operation of the Law as it applies to investment advice and comments about securities.

Some issues:

  • what regulatory approach, if any, should govern the provision of formal investment advice or informal investment comments by electronic means?;
  • should such a regulatory approach be uniform, or should it differentiate between comments which are paid for, or which are solicited, and comments which are offered without charge or which are offered under a disclaimer?;
  • should such a regulatory approach distinguish between comments made by the operator of an Internet site, and comments made on a "bulletin board" or in a "chat room"?;
  • what regulatory approach, if any, should govern the provision of information or advice to individuals or groups of individuals by electronic mail?;
  • what regulatory approach, if any, should be adopted where rumours about an Australian-listed company are placed on the Internet outside Australia, or through a service provider located outside Australia?;
  • what regulatory approach, if any, should be adopted where rumours about a company listed overseas are placed on the Internet within Australia, or through a service provider located in Australia?;
  • what remedies, if any, should be available where securities transactions take place in Australia based on electronically-generated rumours that are later found to be false?;
  • what effect, if any, will the trend to electronically provided information have on:

      i) those provisions in the Law (Pt 7.7) which require licence-holders and "financial journalists" to maintain registers of their interests in securities;

      ii) that provision in the Law (s 77(6)) which distinguishes incidental advice about securities in the media from investment advice; and

      iii) the existing distinction between "inexperienced" and "sophisticated" investors?

Footnotes

[1] For example, the information required to be included in a company's annual return is set out in s 335 and Form 316 of the Law. Information required to be included in a prospectus is governed by ss 1021 and 1022. The ASX Listing Rules provide a further regulatory structure for disclosure by listed companies.

[2] Corporations Law ss 780, 781. While the Law speaks of 'carrying on an investment advice business', such a business need not be carried on for profit.

[3] Corporations Law s 851.

[4] Corporations Law s 849.

[5] Australian Securities Commission, Good Advice, reproduced in ASC Digest SPCH 163.

[6] Wallis Committee Report, p 273.

[7] Wallis Committee Report, pp 273-4.

[8] Wallis Committee Report, pp 275-6.

[9] See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities, Report on the Draft Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill 1996, Canberra, (November 1996), pp 10-14.

[10] 'Stocks site shuts amid Net tangles', Sydney Morning Herald, (31 October 1996) p 25.

[11] 'Stocks site shuts amid Net tangles', Sydney Morning Herald, (31 October 1996) p 25.

[12] 'Internet share tipping draws ASC attention', Australian Financial Review, 26 March 1996.

[13] Australian Securities Commission, Media Release 96/121, reproduced in ASC Digest, pp MR 172-3.

[14] 'ASC frowns on Net talk', Australian Financial Review, 19 May 1997, p 60.

[15] 'ASC frowns on Net talk', Australian Financial Review, 19 May 1997, pp 28, 60.

[16] Securities and Exchange Commission v William B Sellin II, Zaitech Holdings Inc and Baccaratt Holdings Inc: SEC Litigation Release No 15012, 12 August 1996.

[17] Securities and Exchange Commission v Wye Resources Inc and Rehan Malik: SEC Litigation Release No 15073, 26 September 1996.

[18] Securities and Exchange Commission v Western Executive Group Inc, Cash Systems USA Inc, Charles R Reitz, Robert R Parrish, Robert J Struth and R Stephen Edgel: SEC Litigation Release No 15106, 3 October 1996.

[19] Securities and Exchange Commission v Scott A Frye: SEC Litigation Release No 15139, 29 October 1996.

[20] Securities and Exchange Commission, 'Commission Posts OmniGene Notice on America OnLine' Media Release 96-133, 20 November 1996.

[21] See, generally, Martin Roth, The Internet for Investors, Wrightbooks, Melbourne (1996) pp 54-71 and pp 124-140.

[22] 'Investor bulletin boards threaten retail networks', The Australian 9 October 1996, p 34.

[23] 'Regulators still nervous about rules of cyberspace', Australian Financial Review 13 February 1997, p 23.

[24] See, generally, National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Regulatory & Compliance Alert, April 1996, pp 4-5.

[25] Wallis Committee Report, p 107.

[26] 'Smart agents on the Web to track down specialist data', Australian Financial Review 4 April 1997, p 23.

[27] 'Freed is good', The Bulletin, 11 March 1997, p 48.


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