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Chapter 4 - Strategies for countering future serious and organised crime
4.1
During the course of the inquiry, the committee heard from a range of law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) across the Australian jurisdictions, and from a
range of academics and experts, and attempted to explore strategies that could
be undertaken to counter the emerging trends in serious and organised crime. It
is the committee's primary concern that those we ask to deal with the impact of
serious and organised crime are best equipped to do so.
4.2
The submission from the South Australia Police argues the need to establish
an agreed philosophical basis across all jurisdictions that will guide and underpin
interventions in this area of crime. It suggests that such a philosophical
basis must seek to:
- achieve recognition by governments and law enforcement that
effective intervention is not necessarily confined to apprehension and
imprisonment;
- understand the business that organised crime is in, recognise
opportunities for intervention and task those with the necessary skills and
legislative support to undertake the activity;
- intervene at the earliest opportunity in enterprises such as drug
manufacture;
- acknowledge that deployment of finite law enforcement resources
must be to those interventions that have the most disruptive effect on
organised crime;
- achieve recognition by regulatory agencies including those that
issue forms of identity that they are part of the solution;
- establish a consensus that proof-of-identity documents must
incorporate biometrics and other emerging technologies;
- establish a ‘joined up’ approach between state and Commonwealth
law enforcement and regulatory agencies within and across jurisdictions;
- coordinate intervention activities between agencies to optimise
outcomes;
- establish a ‘joined up’ approach between ministerial bodies such
as the Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management—Police, the
Standing Committee of Attorneys General and the Ministerial Council on Drug
Strategy;
- remove the incentive to engage in profit motivated serious and
organised crime by the confiscation of unexplained wealth;
- ensure that organised crime cannot engage in legitimate business
structures and practices that facilitate crime and the protection of proceeds
and intervene at the earliest opportunity in attempts by crime entities to
establish such structures;
- recognise that organised crime depends on professional service
providers in the business and legal environments;
- achieve acceptance by professional bodies that there are ethical
and professional boundaries within which their members can extend assistance to
clients;
- establish effective and uninhibited exchange, access to and
collation of information about criminal activity, associated money movement and
those that engage in it;
- maintain a legislative environment in which the inhibitions
created by state and territory boundaries are minimised;
- establish a legislative environment that accepts that some
intrusions into privacy is part of the price paid for safer communities; and
- engage law enforcement practitioners in the development of
legislation intended to intervene in organised crime.[1]
4.3
The committee agrees with many of the issues raised by the South
Australia Police, and believes that these must be addressed in order to develop
effective strategies to counter serious and organised crime. Particular
emphasis must be placed on dealing with information exchange, the harmonisation
of legislative and operational approaches and the mechanisms required to
achieve this.
4.4
Strategies to counter future serious and organised crime will continue
to require LEAs, agencies and the private sector to develop strategic
partnerships. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) actively pursues a strategy
of establishing partnerships in fulfilling its law enforcement
responsibilities. These partnership activities include:
- providing direct operational, technical and forensic support;
- enhancing the number and nature of formal relationships with
domestic and international police services and regulatory bodies;
- establishing joint strike teams on a range of crime types,
involving the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), state and territory police
and/or regulatory agencies;
- engaging actively with partner agencies in working groups on key
issues;
- hosting collaborative arrangements such as the Australian High
Tech Crime Centre and managing Australia’s Interpol and Europol interactions;
- providing capacity building in resources, training, and mentoring
to regional agencies to assist in strengthening their intelligence, investigative,
forensic, and technical capabilities; and
- funding and contributing to transnational crime and cooperation
centres in key Asia-Pacific locations.[2]
4.5
Similarly, at a state level, LEAs are increasingly forming partnerships
with a range of sectors and across jurisdictions in order to address serious
and organised crime within their individual jurisdictions:
The strategic partnership between NSW Police and government at
both state and federal level is essential in order to develop effective policy
and legislation to address emerging threats. The ongoing development of
networking and information sharing protocols between partner agencies and
increased liaison with industry in select fields will facilitate targeting of
organised crime networks on a wider scale and provide greater options for
investigations.[3]
4.6
The ACC outlined that its multi-agency ACC Board approved task force approach
has provided the mechanism through which a coordinated and targeted response to
serious criminal activity can be achieved in a time critical environment. The
strategy of engaging partner agencies, who supply resources commensurate to the
level and nature of the targeted activity within their jurisdiction or sphere
of responsibility, has proved extremely successful. The task force model is an intelligence-based
process that involves:
- identifying and profiling nationally significant criminal groups,
including developing insights into their activities, structures and
methodologies;
- assessing the level of threat represented by each group;
- considering and selecting operational response options in
relation to those groups that represent the highest threat;
- building a multi-disciplinary team that includes the specific
skill sets required to disrupt the identified high threat groups; and
- conducting investigations and operations utilising various
intelligence and evidence collection methods, including the coercive powers.[4]
4.7
The ACC submission further notes the importance of collaboration between
law enforcement and wider government and industry. This is seen as vital to
generating effective responses to serious and organised crime, both in building
the understanding of the changing criminal environment and in developing
strategies that combine the strengths of operational law enforcement activity, regulatory
and legislative change and community involvement. Partnerships between law
enforcement, industry specialists and government offer the opportunity for law
enforcement to build its capability and to increasingly access specialised
skills and tools.[5]
Conclusion
4.8
The committee has not attempted to list exhaustively the programs and
legislative reforms aimed at addressing serious and organised crime canvassed
in the evidence received. Rather, chapters 6 and 7 will, in examining the
adequacy of legislative and administrative arrangements, highlight specific
strategies in areas where the committee sees potential for a contribution to
countering future serious and organised crime.
4.9
While the committee appreciates the need for partnerships and
cross-agency and multi-jurisdictional taskforces, it is extremely concerned
that there is a broad range of cross-jurisdictional issues that must be
resolved before more streamlined strategies to address the emerging trends in
serious and organised crime can be effectively implemented.
4.10
It is the committee's opinion that the current federated system of law
enforcement creates obstacles for LEAs and opportunities for serious and
organised crime groups. Consequently, the cost of organised crime to society,
and particularly the cost of countering organised crime into the future,
continues to escalate. These issues are discussed in the following chapter.
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