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| Loaded |
Discharged |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year |
Interstate |
Intrastate |
Total |
Interstate |
Intrastate |
Total |
|
199495 |
33 692 |
15 498 |
49 190 |
34 180 |
16 286 |
50 466 |
|
199596 |
31 982 |
15 815 |
47 797 |
31 808 |
16 229 |
48 037 |
|
199697 |
32 581 |
16 562 |
49 143 |
32 505 |
17 530 |
50 035 |
|
199798 |
34 322 |
18 200 |
52 522 |
34 741 |
18 968 |
53 709 |
|
199899 |
31 934 |
16 454 |
48 388 |
31 047 |
17 053 |
48 100 |
|
199900 |
32 743 |
18 582 |
51 325 |
32 359 |
18 369 |
50 728 |
|
200001 |
33 216 |
18 786 |
52 003 |
32 783 |
18 692 |
51 475 |
|
200102 |
32 484 |
19 949 |
52 432 |
33 183 |
19 652 |
52 835 |
Source: Source: Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, Australian Sea Freight: 200102, Information Paper 50, January 2004, p. 2. Reasons for the discrepancies between tonnages loaded at ports and discharged at ports are discussed at http://www.btre.gov.au/docs/ip48/note.html#stats
Table 1 shows that volumes moved have fluctuated from year to year but have generally risen since 199495.
Coastal shippings most important task is the transport
of bulk cargo; in 200102, bulk cargo accounted for 88 per cent of
coastal cargo.(9) Bulk cargoes consist of dry commodities
such as coal, bauxite, alumina and iron ore, and wet commodities such
as crude oil and refined petroleum products. Non-bulk cargoes are generally
higher valued-added goods such as fruit and vegetables, timber, paper,
steel slab and processed food. Table 2 shows the major commodities transported
since 199697.
| Commodity |
1996-97 |
199798 |
199899 |
199900 |
200001 |
200102 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tonnes (millions) |
||||||
|
Iron ore |
8.3 |
8.2 |
b8.6 |
6.8 |
6.7 |
6.5 |
|
Bauxite/alumina |
10.1 |
10.3 |
9.9 |
12.1 |
11.6 |
11.6 |
|
Crude oil |
8.3 |
8.9 |
6.0 |
6.6 |
7.5 |
7.0 |
|
Petroleum productsa |
6.9 |
7.2 |
6.9 |
6.5 |
5.8 |
6.5 |
|
Other cargo |
15.6 |
18.0 |
17.0 |
19.2 |
20.3 |
20.9 |
| Total |
49.1 |
52.5 |
48.4 |
51.3 |
52.0 |
52.4 |
| Tonne-kilometres (billions) |
||||||
|
Iron ore |
38.1 |
40.9 |
b40.3 |
29.7 |
28.3 |
26.3 |
|
Bauxite/alumina |
22.2 |
22.4 |
21.8 |
27.9 |
25.7 |
25.6 |
|
Crude oil |
18.8 |
21.7 |
15.1 |
17.1 |
15.2 |
20.3 |
|
Petroleum products |
12.9 |
10.7 |
10.7 |
9.6 |
9.4 |
9.4 |
|
Other cargo |
20.7 |
21.2 |
20.9 |
24.6 |
25.9 |
28.8 |
| Total |
112.7 |
116.6 |
108.8 |
108.9 |
104.5 |
110.4 |
Source: Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, Australian Sea Freight: 200102, Information Paper 50, January 2004, p. 5.
Notes: a: excludes crude oil in row above. b: adjusted to balance more closely with discharged input/output tables for all iron ore ports
Examples of commodities shipped are:
The following table shows the volume of intrastate and interstate trade in 200102.
| State of origin |
State of destination |
|||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NSW |
VIC |
QLD |
SA |
WA |
TAS |
NT |
Total |
|
| NSW |
1 201 |
1 249 |
618 |
1 046 |
201 |
253 |
6 |
4 575 |
| VIC |
2 578 |
131 |
727 |
368 |
273 |
1 990 |
0 |
6 067 |
| QLD |
1 962 |
654 |
12 455 |
282 |
77 |
320 |
89 |
15 839 |
| SA |
2 283 |
1 474 |
704 |
1 989 |
149 |
272 |
3 |
6 875 |
| WA |
5 385 |
1 466 |
878 |
642 |
2 887 |
358 |
304 |
11 921 |
| TAS |
1 942 |
2 762 |
21 |
237 |
448 |
1 122 |
0 |
6 532 |
| NT |
47 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
6 |
444 |
123 |
623 |
| Total |
15 398 |
7 736 |
15 407 |
4 565 |
4 041 |
4 759 |
526 |
52 432 |
Source: Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, Australian Sea Freight 200102, Information Paper 50, January 2004, p. 6.
The data in Table 3 show that interstate trade accounted for 62 per cent of coastal trade. Western Australia was the state of origin for most interstate trade, reflecting the importance of that states iron ore and crude oil shipments. NSW was the most important destination with shipments of iron ore from Western Australia and crude oil from Victoria accounting for much of that trade. Table 3 also shows that intrastate trade accounted for 38 per cent of coastal trade. The single biggest component of intrastate trade was shipments of bauxite from Weipa to Gladstone in Queensland.
According to the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, trends that have emerged over the past seven years include:
Additional details of interstate and intrastate trade, classified by major commodity group, are in Appendix 2, and the map shows major freight movements.
While bulk cargoes dominate mainland trade, the Tasmania
trade accounts for about one-third of the non-bulk coastal shipping
task.(11) In 200102, 6532 kilotonnes were loaded in Tasmania
and 5360 kilotonnes discharged.(12) Table 4 shows the main
commodities loaded and discharged.
| Description |
Loaded in Tasmania |
Discharged in Tasmania |
|---|---|---|
|
Cork and wood |
1141 |
957 |
|
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap |
1760 |
1323 |
|
Petroleum and petroleum products |
0 |
876 |
|
Paper, paperboard & articles of paper |
589 |
40 |
|
Coal, coke and briquettes |
0 |
99 |
|
Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s. |
1205 |
70 |
|
Other |
1837 |
1995 |
| Total |
6532 |
5360 |
Source: Bureau of Transport
and Regional Economics, Australian Sea Freight
200102, Information Paper 50, January 2004, p. 15.
n.e.s: not elsewhere stated
The range of goods shipped to and from Tasmania is more diverse than those shipped around the mainland partly because goods that would be transported by other modes on the mainland have to be shipped and partly because the goods shipped include a range of consumer and intermediate goods.
The Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics has compiled data on real (that is, adjusted for inflation) non-bulk coastal shipping freight rates for the Tasmania trade. The Bureau found:
Since the 1980s, real shipping rates to Tasmania have declined, but are still above pre-1976 levels (prior to which north-bound rates were subsidised by government).(13)
A number of factors have contributed to the decline in freight rates including Commonwealth government policies that led to the introduction of new ships and cargo technologies, and increased competition. Eight major trading vessels operated by four companies now provide shipping services between Tasmania and the mainland.
The Federal Government subsidises the mainland-Tasmania trade under two schemes:
According to the Directions by the Minister for Transport and Regional Services that govern the TFES, the Schemes purpose is:
... to assist in alleviating the sea freight cost disadvantage incurred by the shippers of eligible non-bulk goods moved between the mainland and Tasmania by sea.
The TFES provides payments to shippers to offset some of the costs of shipping eligible non-bulk goods. The TFES has two components:
Goods shipped as bulk cargo are ineligible for assistance because shipping is deemed to be the least-cost form of transport for such goods. Payments under the TFES are demand-driven and are uncapped. Table 5 shows expenditure under the scheme since 199001.
| Year |
Northbound |
Southbound |
Total |
|---|---|---|---|
|
200304 |
na |
na |
est. 80.1 |
|
200203 |
62.2 |
15.0 |
77.2 |
|
200102 |
58.1 |
13.9 |
72.0 |
|
200001 |
52.2 |
14.8 |
67.0 |
|
199900 |
47.6 |
11.8 |
59.4 |
|
199899 |
33.1 |
8.7 |
41.8 |
|
199798 |
32.5 |
8.9 |
41.4 |
|
199697 |
32.1 |
9.1 |
41.2 |
|
199596 |
35.0 |
7.7 |
42.7 |
|
199495 |
33.0 |
6.5 |
39.5 |
|
199394 |
32.0 |
5.6 |
37.6 |
|
199293 |
28.3 |
4.6 |
32.9 |
|
199192 |
28.4 |
4.3 |
32.7 |
|
199091 |
27.5 |
5.3 |
32.8 |
Source: Department of Transport and Regional Services, Tasmanian
Freight Equalisation Scheme Statistics, 2003 statistics.
Notes: na: not available. est.: estimated
The purpose of the Tasmanian Wheat Freight Scheme (TWFS) is to compensate Tasmanian wheat users for the additional transport and handling costs (relative to mainland users) associated with shipping wheat to Tasmania. The scheme costs around $1.2 million annually.
In November 2000, the Government commissioned the Centre for International Economics to prepare an issues paper on the scheme.(14) The Government released the paper in July 2001 and sought comment from interested parties. The paper raised a number of questions about the schemes justification. For example, the paper pointed to the selectivity of the TWFS:
Assistance is not given to other industries in Tasmania that rely on bulk imports of inputs from the mainland. For example, the metals processing industry in Tasmania does not receive assistance to import ores and alumina from the mainland The cost disadvantage suffered by Tasmanian users is not a special case. Wheat-using industries in Darwin are also disadvantaged by their distance from wheat growing regions but they do not receive assistance.
Further:
The amount of assistance currently provided under the TWFS approximately covers the full cost of importing wheat across Bass Strait rather than just gap between sea freight costs and the costs associated with transporting goods an equivalent distance by road. In contrast, compensation under the TFES scheme is only provided for the gap between sea freight costs and road transport costs over an equivalent distance.(15)
The Government has yet to reveal what it proposes to do with respect to the TWFS and is continuing to fund the scheme while considering its future.
More generally, with respect to both schemes, the issues paper noted:
The Tasmanian transport assistance schemes (TWFS and TFES) fail to deliver compensation to all sectors of the Tasmanian community who might be disadvantaged by differential transport costs. The focus of these schemes is on Tasmanian producers, while no attempt is made to address the inequity that Tasmanian consumers may experience owing to higher transport costs of importing consumption goods from the mainland. Therefore the assistance schemes are limited in the extent to which they rectify inequities.(16)
In short, it can be argued that both schemes are inequitable and economically inefficient, favouring selected industries for no apparent reason. At an economy-wide level, it is not clear why Tasmania should have its transport disadvantage singled out when mainland States and industries also have transport disadvantages resulting mainly from distance. Consumers and industries in Western Australia, for example, are disadvantaged by their distance from the east coast cities. More generally, it is not clear why any State or industry should be selectively assisted for its transport cost disadvantage. In the circumstances, it could be concluded that the existence of the schemes is attributable to political rather than economic factors.
The main coastal passenger task is the transport of passengers (and vehicles) across Bass Strait. The Tasmanian government-owned TT-line has two ferries, Spirit of Tasmania I and Spirit of Tasmania II, which operate daily services between Melbourne and Devonport. The Spirit of Tasmania III, provides services between Sydney and Devonport. The ferries also provide roll-on roll-off freight services. In 20012002, TT-line carried 348,435 passengers, 138,429 motor vehicles, and 22,525 twenty foot equivalent units.(17) Southern Shipping operates the Matthew Flinders between Devonport and Port Welshpool via Flinders and Deal Islands. Patrick Shipping operates the Mersey Searoad between Port Melbourne and Grassy, King Island; this service carries only vehicles and passengers must fly between Melbourne and King Island on a commercial airline service.
All of the above services are eligible under the Bass Strait Passenger Vehicle Equalisation Scheme (BSPVES), which came into effect on 1 September 1996. The scheme subsidises the cost of travel by sea for an eligible passenger vehicle and its driver. The Commonwealth subsidises the scheme and Centrelink administers it. The cost of the subsidy is shown in Table 6.
| 199697 |
199798 |
199899 |
199900 |
200001 |
200102 |
200203 |
200304 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
8 403 |
12 940 |
11 122 |
13 104 |
15 070 |
17 054 |
26 550 |
30 750 |
Source: Department of Transport and Regional Services,
Portfolio Budget Statements, various years
Note: data for 200304 estimated
In addition to the Bass Strait services, there are other passenger and freight services serving islands such as Flinders, Kangaroo and Magnetic Islands.
A criticism of the BSPVES is that it distorts consumer behaviour in favour of one transport modeshippingat the expense of another modeaviation. Given that a purpose of the scheme is to attract tourists, it might be more efficient to subsidise fly-drive holidays, that is, fly to Tasmania and hire a car there.
The Commonwealths power with respect to coastal shipping derives partly from section 98 of the Constitution which states:
The power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to trade and commerce extends to navigation and shipping
Areas of Commonwealth involvement in shipping and navigation include maritime safety and security, the marine cargo liability regime, and the issue of licences to allow vessels to operate on the coastal trade. While a number of Commonwealth Acts govern coastal shipping operations, Part VI of the Navigation Act 1912 which deals with cabotage, directly affects coastal shipping. The purpose of the Act, when promulgated, was to protect Australian shipping from unfair foreign competition and to maintain safety and living standards for Australian seafarers. Part VI was not proclaimed until 1921 so cabotage has applied since then. Around the time of proclamation, concern was expressed about the effects of cabotage on Australias economic development. The Royal Commission on the Navigation Act(18), which reported in August 1924, argued for the repeal of Part VI mainly on the grounds of higher shipping costs that, it concluded, cabotage would impose on coastal shipping services especially the Bass Strait trade and services to Western Australia.
In the Navigation Act, coastal trade is referred to as coasting trade. Subsection 7(1) deems a ship to be engaged in the coasting trade:
if it takes on board passengers or cargo at any port in a State, or a Territory, to be carried to, and landed or delivered at, any other port in the same State or Territory or in any other State or other such Territory
Ships engaged in coastal trade can be licensed or unlicensed. The Act gives preference to licensed ships but provides for non-licensed ships to operate in the coastal trade in certain circumstances. With respect to the former, the key section is section 288. This requires any ship operating in the coastal trade to be licensed. Although the legislation allows licences to be issued for up to three years, in practice, the Department of Transport and Regional Services issues licences annually at a nominal fee (currently $22). Licences are granted subject to two main conditions:
It is important to note that licences are not limited to Australian registered, owned or crewed ships. A licence may be issued to a ship operating under any flag, regardless of the nationality of the crew or national ownership, provided that it meets these conditions.
Section 289 relates to the payment of Australian wages. It states:
Every seaman employed on a ship engaged in any part of the coasting trade shall, subject to any lawful deductions, be entitled to and shall be paid ... wages at the current rates ruling in Australia for seamen employed in that part of the coasting trade ...
The second condition is in section 287 of the Act. This prohibits from the coastal trade a ship that has received in the past 12 months or is receiving or is likely to receive, a subsidy from a foreign country. The purpose of this section is to prevent a ship from using the subsidy to enter the coastal trade by undercutting competitors.
A licensed ship must comply with Part II of the Act, which contains requirements regarding matters such as crew qualifications and numbers, accommodation and wages and conditions.
As noted, the Act provides for non-licensed ships to operate in the coastal trade in certain circumstances. For a non-licensed ship to operate, it must have a coastal trade permit. In essence, permits are issued when no licensed ship is available. Section 286 provides that the Minister may grant permits to unlicensed shipsunconditionally or conditionally when the Minister is satisfied that, in respect of trade between any Australian ports:
A permit issued under these arrangements may be a single voyage permit (SVP) or a continuing voyage permit (CVP):
The Department of Transport and Regional Services has issued a Single Voyage Permit Information Paper and the Minister has issued guidelines for granting licenses and permits.
Unlike ships that operate under licence under Part VI of the Navigation Act, ships operating under permits may be in receipt of a subsidy from a foreign government. Subsection 286(2) provides that a ship using a permit shall not be deemed to be engaging in the coasting trade, that is, it is not treated under the Navigation Act as a licensed vessel.
The permit system is discussed further in the cabotage section at page 21.
Since the mid 1980s, a number of measures have improved the efficiency of Australian ships engaged in international and coastal trade. The following outlines these reforms.(19)
In 1981, Sir John Crawford produced a report for the Fraser Coalition Government titled Revitalising Australian Shipping. The report recommended the provision of financial incentives for investment in new ships in the forms of accelerated depreciation, the extension of the investment allowance to ships trading overseas, and the abolition of the duty on imported ships. These measures were conditional on reductions in crew numbers. The Crawford recommendations were substantially implemented. Several new ships entered the fleet and there were some reductions in crew sizes although numbers were still above OECD standards.
In 1985, the Hawke Government established the Maritime Industry Development Committee (MIDC). It recommended the acquisition of new generation ships, multi-skilling of crews, and the abolition of various labour demarcations.(20) The Government accepted these recommendations and provided capital assistance for the purchase of vessels under the Ships (Capital Grants) Act 1987. The resulting investment reduced the average age of the Australian shipping fleet to below the average age of the world fleet. Crew numbers were reduced to the levels on most OECD ships. The abolition of demarcation problems was reflected in a fall in the number of ship days lost through crew disputes; in 199293, this number was the lowest in over a decade.
On 11 November 1988, the Hawke Government announced the establishment of the Shipping Reform Task Force. This followed an Industries Assistance Commission report that criticised the industrys efficiency.(21) On 1 June 1989, the Government announced that it had accepted the thrust of the Task Forces proposals. Key elements were:
With respect to permits, under guidelines issued before 1989, only SVPs were issued. To increase competition in coastal trade, the then Minister for Transport and Communications, the Hon. Ralph Willis, announced that the SVP system would be made more flexible:
Cabotage policy was carefully examined by the Shipping Reform Task Force. No member recommended its withdrawal but it was suggested that changes be made to the application of the permit system to increase its flexibility ... The Government agrees with the Task Force that the permit system should be made more flexible and has decided that new guidelines will be issued for the operation of the permit system. These will apply to single voyage permits and will also include the use of permits for continuous trading which, although allowed for under the Navigation Act, have not been issued for 20 years.These continuous voyage permits, which can be issued for up to three years, will improve efficiency and competitiveness in the coastal shipping market in a number of ways.(22)
The Government established the Shipping Industry Reform Authority (SIRA) to oversee the development and implementation of the program. SIRA was established initially for the three years from 1 July 1989 but its term was extended. By 1994, average crew sizes had been reduced to 18 and multi-skilling had been implemented.
Still, shipping costs remained high. In March 1994, the Bureau of Industry Economics published an analysis of the cost of Australian coastal shipping compared with OECD shipping.(23) The study found that, overall, costs of Australian ships were higher than for ships from New Zealand, Norway, the UK and Germany but were less than the costs of American, Canadian or Japanese ships. The analysis showed that while Australian shipping had lower capital costs than any of the other countries, Australian crew costs were around 25 per cent higher than average even though Australian crews were of a similar size to OECD crews. Further, on 26 March 1996, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission released a report that found that the costs of coastal shipping were continuing to grow despite smaller crews, government subsidisation of capital expenditure in the forms of capital grants and accelerated depreciation, and government contributions to early retirement.(24) In May 1996, the Howard Government abolished the capital grants and accelerated depreciation.
On 13 August 1996, the then Minister for Transport and Regional Development, the Hon. John Sharp, established the Shipping Reform Group (SRG). The Groups task was:
to provide the mechanism for industry consultation on winding back cabotage and examination of a second register(25) for Australian shipping.(26)
The Group, which reported in March 1997, recommended, among other things:
The Government did not respond formally to the SRG recommendations. But the Government liberalised the permit system including dropping the requirement that CVPs be issued only in circumstances that provided long-term benefit to the shipping industry, and by streamlining the administration of the permit system with new ministerial guidelines issued in June 1998. Liberalisation enabled greater participation by foreign flag vessels in coastal trade. Further, company employment was implemented in July 1998, replacing the roster system.(28)
On 10 December 1998, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Hon. John Anderson, established the Shipping Reform Working Group to:
assess progress in implementing the recommendations of the SRG. It will also look at the benefit to the economy of the Australian shipping industry, develop measures for monitoring labour and efficiency reforms such as enterprise employment, and examine support to the shipping industries of other OECD countries and support provided to other Australian industries.(29)
The Group reported in May 1999. The Minister did not release the report on the grounds that he had pledged that the Groups advice would remain confidential.(30) However, a press report claimed that the Group had recommended an annual grant to ensure the international competitiveness of Australian shipping, and had considered the option of mixed foreign and Australian crews on coastal ships.(31)
A number of other reforms have also affected coastal shipping. Major areas of reform are the reforms to ports that State governments have implemented and the waterfront (stevedoring) reforms.
Australian ports have a history of inefficiency characterised by poor work practices and management. This included:
low productivity of labour and capital equipment, over-servicing by tugs, charges unrelated to the cost of services provided and poor integration with other services as reflected in truck queues at terminals and rail receival depots.(32)
Over the past 30 or so years, ports have undergone major structural changes, in part in response to changing technologies associated with material handling and ship design, for example, containerisation and the increased use of very large bulk carriers and tankers. Reform has also been stimulated by government economic programs such as the national competition policy, which has led to a far greater commercial focus in port operations than was traditionally the case.
Reforms over a number of years have increased port efficiency. In 2002, the Productivity Commission, in its report on the Economic Regulation of Harbour Towage and Related Services, reviewed reforms of port authorities. Reforms have included:
corporatisation, commercialisation, restructuring, privatisation and the contracting out of some functions. Structural reforms of port authorities also resulted in the restructuring of some entities and the devolution of regulatory functions to independent bodies. The primary aim of the reforms was to replicate market disciplines, including the establishment of clear objectives to eliminate any conflict between commercial and non-commercial objectives. Greater emphasis was placed on the commercial role of port authorities to create incentives for efficient management.(33)
The Commission found that the reforms had contributed to a fall, in real terms, in port authority charges for containerised and bulk ships at major ports, improved average ship turnaround time at container terminals in most jurisdictions, and increased labour productivity.(34) The Commission also found that in the harbour towage industry:
Labour and capital productivity have improved as a result of changes in work practices over the past decade. Reforms targeted at the towage industry in the early 1990spartially funded by the Commonwealth Governmentreduced crew numbers significantly and changed work practices More recently, three man crews have been introduced on many tugs.(35)
Over many years, maritime unions were able to obtain working conditions and incomes that were generous compared with those of many other workers. Restrictive work practices were widespread and industrial disputes common. However, waterfront reforms, before but especially since the dispute between Patrick Stevedores and the Maritime Union of Australia in 1998, have improved productivity in cargo handling and ship turnaround times. Stevedoring productivity has increased considerably since 1996. Higher productivity has helped to reduce coastal shipping costs.
The Governments policy towards coastal (and international) shipping is encapsulated in the notion that Australia is a shipper nation not a shipping nation, that is, that Australia is principally a buyernot a supplierof shipping services.(36) On 19 March 1999, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Hon. John Anderson, summarised the Governments policy towards shipping:
Key among this Governments shipping policies have been privatisation of the Government-owned shipping line A[ustralian] N[ational] L[ine],(37) the removal of ad hoc support measures for shipping which did not contribute to the development of an efficient fleet, the winding back of cabotage, an end to outdated industry employment practices on vessels, and the modernisation of shipping legislation.(38)
On 1 December 1999, the Minister announced that the Government would not provide financial assistance to the Australian shipping industry and subsequently confirmed this policy:
The option of providing direct fiscal support for the Australian shipping industry has, however, not proved feasible. It is also unlikely that this situation will change.(39)
In February 2000, the Australian Shipowners Association decided that it would no longer seek subsidies from the Federal government to ensure the viability of Australian-owned ships engaged in international as well as coastal trade.(40)
However, effective from 1 July 2000, the Government introduced a 100 per cent rebate of the excise on heavy fuel oilthe main source of power for ships engaged in coastal tradeand diesel fuel used in marine transport.(41) This rebate has continued under section 36 of the Energy Grants (Credits) Scheme Act 2003. The rebate eased the cost disadvantage that coastal shipping faces relative to road transport. But the Government also extended the rebate to rail transport, negating to some extent the competitive benefit to coastal shipping.
In December 2001, the Australian Shipowners Association announced a review of Australian shipping covering both international and coastal shipping. Two former Federal Ministers for Transport, the Hon. Peter Morris and the Hon. John Sharp conducted the review. The review, titled the Independent Review of Australian Shipping, reported in September 2003. The Reviews findings and recommendations, insofar as they relate directly to coastal shipping, include:
The Reviews findings and recommendations are set out in full in Appendix 3.
Australian coastal shipping is generally more costly than foreign-flagged competitors mainly because the cost of crews is higher even though Australian crew levels are now close to the international average. The cost of coastal shipping and the need for efficiency gains have been recurring themes in a number of reports. For example, the study by the Allen Consulting Group, commissioned by the SIRA, found that between January 1988 and November 1991, Australian oil tanker freight rates were about 22 per cent higher than the world rate.(42) The Industry Commission, in its report on mining and minerals processing, argued for efficiency gains by increasing the contestability of transport services provided by coastal shipping.(43) According to the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Hon. J Anderson, in 1999, the cost disadvantage was about $3.5 million annually for a typical large trading vessel. This was comprised of $1 million for capital costs, $2 million for manning costs and about $0.5 million for other operating costs. Changes in exchange rates, reductions in capital premiums on the cost of Australian-specification ships, and improved efficiencies have ameliorated these cost differentials in the five years since 1999. Further, coastal shipping competes to varying degrees with road and rail transport (except in those areas where cargoes are particularly suited to sea transport) and both of these modes have improved efficiency.(44)
Another source of disadvantage for Australian ships is that foreign vessels can sometimes charge freight rates based on marginal coststhe additional costs of a voyage such as extra fuel usedrather than higher average costs (the latter include marginal costs and items such as depreciation). For example, when Australian ships plied the container trade between south-eastern ports and Freemantle, to be profitable, they charged a rate per container that covered average cost. Because opportunities to backload cargo from Western Australia were limited, the rate had to cover the cost of the round trip. In contrast, a foreign ship carrying domestic cargo one way as part of a longer international voyage can carry freight does not have to cover the cost of back loading. More generally, limited opportunities for back loading, especially for specialised carriers, keep upward pressure on freight rates.
The Australian Shipowners Associationwhich represents Australian shipownersclaims that Australian ship operators have to meet legislative requirements that foreign operators do not. Consequently, Australian shipowners are at a cost disadvantage compared to foreign competitors (these requirements and the Australian Shipowners Associations claims are summarised in Appendix 4). It is true that some legislation imposes additional costs that some foreign shippers do not incur. On the other hand, other Australian industries also incur these costs. Further, the legislation also reflects Australian standards which few would argue should be given up. On 13 December 2001, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Hon. John Anderson, noted that:
The Australian shipping industry has raised concerns that it is disadvantaged when competing with foreign flagged vessels due to the provisions of Australian legislation relating to such matters as customs, migration, income tax, ship registration, occupational health and safety, compensation and rehabilitation and industrial relations. Some of these concerns are perhaps not without merit and we take them very seriously.While we must recognise that the legislation reflects community standards, we are, at the same time concerned to ensure that Australian industry is not subject to unreasonable obstacles that inhibit its ability to compete internationally.(45)
Cabotage is basically a form of protection for Australian flag ships provided by the Navigation Act 1912.(46) On economic efficiency grounds, there seems to no valid reason for continuing cabotage.(47) This is particularly the case since protection for most industries has been wound back considerably. Cabotage increases the cost to users of coastal shipping compared to foreign-flag vessels that are not subject to the wages and other conditions of the Navigation Act 1912.
Abolishing cabotage would have important consequences. A study by Access Economics found:
notwithstanding the negative impact on our balance of payments, there would be an overall positive economic benefit to the Australian economy if the coasting trade was opened to the most competitive shipping serviceseven if Australian shipping lost its current share of this trade.(48)
The study also concluded that 80 per cent of coastal activity would disappear if cabotage were abolished.(49)
Cabotage can be abolished only by repealing the relevant sections of the Navigation Act 1912. In a notable departure from competition policy as applied elsewhere in the economy, the Government has been unwilling to introduce foreign competition by repealing the relevant sections of the legislation. Rather, the Government has sought to reduce the consequences of cabotage by increasing the number of SVPs and CVPs.(50) The Independent Review of Australian Shipping prepared for the Australian Shipowners Association reported that:
The review heard overwhelming evidence that over the past few years the criteria [for issuing permits] have been administered in such a way that the coastal trade could now be regarded as virtually deregulated.(51)
The number of single and continuing voyage permits and tonnages is increasing as shown in Table 7. The commodities carried under permits are shown in Table 8.
| Year |
Single voyage permits |
Continuing voyage permits |
||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number |
Tonnes |
Number |
Tonnes |
|
|
198788 |
16 |
48 732 |
||
|
198889 |
48 |
577 239 |
||
|
198990 |
88 |
981 142 |
||
|
199091 |
140 |
1 098 329 |
||
|
199192 |
203 |
1 320 774 |
||
|
199293 |
307 |
895 730 |
||
|
199394 |
470 |
1 405 516 |
||
|
199495 |
428 |
3 367 097 |
||