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Research Paper no. 10 2002-03
Turbulent Times:Australian Airline Industry Issues 2003
John Kain and Richard
Webb
Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group
16 June 2003
Contents
Domestic
Trunk Airline Industry: Services, Structure and Prospects
Players
Qantas
Virgin Blue
Industry Finance
Regional Airline Industry: Services, Structure and Prospects
Australian International Airline Industry: Services, Structure and Prospects
Domestic
Airline Policies
Fares and Subsidies
Taxes and Charges
Foreign Investment
Australia's
International Airline Policies
Proposed Qantas-Air NZ Strategic Agreement
Capacity
and Fares
Impact on Ansett group Operations
Air Passenger Ticket Levy (the 'Ansett Levy')
Impact on Qantas Domestic Operations
Impact on Virgin Blue
Impact on the Regional Airline Industry
Economic
Characteristics of the Airline Industry
Economies of Scale
Import Dependence
End of the Trunk Airline Duopoly
Airlines' Competitive Strategies
Adequacy of Competition Law in its Application to the Airline Industry
Background
on the Structure of the Airports Industry
Airport Privatisation
Reform of Airport Pricing
The Scope of Airport Charges
Airways Services
Airways services comprise:
Airport Infrastructure Needs
Slots Systems
Airport Noise Amelioration Programs
Sydney
(Kingsford-Smith) Airport
Privatisation
Rationalisation of Sydney
KSA Operations
Future of a Second Sydney
Airport
These have been turbulent times for the Australian
airline industry. It has been confronted with a marked decline in international
tourism in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in
the United States
and, more recently, traffic loss attributable to the war in Iraq
and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks in parts of Asia
and Canada.
In addition to these upheavals, the industry
has undergone major structural change since the late 1990s. On the major
routes - the so-called 'domestic trunk routes', where there were four
airlines in 2000, there are now only two. In 2000, the domestic
trunk routes were dominated by Qantas Airways and Ansett Australiawith new entrants Virgin
Blue and Impulse Airlines emerging in niche markets. Nowadays the industry
has a lopsided two airline structure, with Qantas dominant since its
takeover of Impulse Airlines in 2001 and the Ansett group's subsequent
collapse in September 2001. Although Virgin Blue has rapidly built up
its market share, it still has less than a third of the market.
The upheavals in the trunk airline sector have carried
over to the regional airline sector. This is the part of the domestic
airline industry which services centres in rural and remote Australia. At the time of the
Ansett group's collapse, most regional operators had equity or close
operational relationships with either Qantas or Ansett.
While the domestic airline industry is largely deregulated,
Australia's international airline
industry remains quite regulated at the Commonwealth level, as it is
subject to the detailed capacity controls that are part of the long-established
system of bilateral air service agreements (ASAs) that underpin the
industry. ASA's provide the international legal framework enabling the
operation of scheduled international air services between countries.
These agreements control the amount of airline seat capacity which may
be deployed on scheduled services over individual country to country
routes; they are generally of treaty status and are enforceable in international
law.
The Howard Government has had a long term commitment to
a system of liberalised air services and this goal was supported by
the 1999 Productivity Commission inquiry into liberalising the economic
framework of the industry. To date, only the Trans-Tasman routes have
benefited substantially from the Government's 'open skies' objective.
In another move to free up the international side of the
industry, the Commonwealth adopted a policy of allowing more than one
Australian owned international airline to operate scheduled services
to and from Australia. However the September
2001 failure of the Ansett Airlines group brought an end to Ansett International's
short-lived operations. Although Qantas is once again the only Australian
flag carrier, Virgin Blue has signalled its interest in operating in
some international markets in Australia's immediate region,
such as the trans-Tasman market.
A significant worldwide trend that is starting to be felt
in Australia is the rapid emergence
of low-cost international carriers. Irish airline, Ryanair, is a high-profile
European example, while SouthWest Airlines is a long-established American
example. These are sometimes referred to as 'value-based airlines',
reflecting their emphasis on aggressive containment of costs to sustain
highly competitive fare levels. Two Australasian carriers have been
established in recent times to cater for this growing market: Australian
Airlines and Freedom Air. Unlike some of the new low-cost international
airlines in Europe, these carriers are
not independent but are fully-owned, stand-alone divisions of Qantas
and Air New Zealand (Air NZ) respectively.
Levels of competition vary widely within each sector. In
the domestic trunk airline sector, the fairly robust competition that
previously existed between Qantas, Ansett and the new airlines has come
and gone since the industry's 'deregulation' in 1989. This has given
way to a more restrained form of competition between Qantas and Virgin
Blue because Qantas is the only provider of nationwide, 'full-service'
scheduled services. Qantas has the advantage of comprehensive regional
and international networks and extensive feeder traffic links to other
overseas airlines' networks through its membership of the One World
Alliance.
In contrast, Virgin Blue is not a member of
an alliance, its service frequencies are modest in comparison with those
of Qantas, and its domestic network is nowhere near as extensive as
that of Qantas. But in the low-cost, budget travel niche that Virgin
Blue helped establish, competition with Qantas is vigorous. In response
to Virgin Blue's success, Qantas is taking steps to expand its share
of the budget travel market, while Virgin is now seeking to expand beyond
its leisure traveller niche by developing its business travel market.
The Ansett collapse has decreased competition
in many parts of the regional airline industry (of which the Ansett
group owned a large portion). The Qantas-owned regional airline, QantasLink,
dominates many routes and is the sole airline on some routes. Most of the former Ansett
group regional airlines are not linked with an international alliance
network. Nonetheless, Virgin Blue, Regional Expressformed by
the amalgamation of former Ansett group airlines, Kendell and Hazeltonand
other regional airlines such as Alliance Airlines in Queensland, compete
to varying degrees with Qantas services. Because regional airlines operate
mainly intra-state services, the states have sole responsibility for their economic regulation;
most states have liberalised or deregulated operations.
Putting aside the current slump in domestic
tourism, the potential for increased competition in the domestic airline
industry through the emergence of new carriers is generally more favourable
now than in the past. Although Qantas is likely to remain the dominant
player in the domestic passenger and freight markets, some of the factors
that led to the failure of previous new trunk route entrants are now
less of a barrier.
In particular, airport terminal facilities
are more readily available to new entrants now that some former Ansett
terminals have been freed up as common-user facilities. The current
relatively low cost of obtaining aircraft due to the depressed state
of the aircraft market also favours potential new entrants. The liberal
policy environmentincluding freedom of entry to domestic trunk routes
by domestic airlines, and guidelines that allow foreign airlines to acquire up to
100 per cent of the equity in an Australian airline or to start a new
domestic airline unless this is contrary to the national interestalso
favours new entrants.
What of the future for the Australian airline
industry? The apparent existence of economies of scalethe gains by
way of reduced costs from the increasing size of operationsin the domestic
airline industry suggests that there may be an on-going need for regulation
to prevent monopolisation over the long term. In the absence of effective
economic regulatory oversight of the industry, it has the potential
to evolve into a Qantas monopoly. High capital and set-up costs have
traditionally contributed to high entry costs and have increased the
market power of the incumbent airlines, impeding competition. Should
such circumstances continue to prevail over the longer term, it raises
the issue of whether Australia's
domestic market is really big enough to sustain competitive supply and
whether a lightly regulated oligopoly is still appropriate.
Although the former two airline policy was
not replaced with an industry-specific economic regulatory regime for
airlines, the industry is subject to the general competition policy
provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, which is administered
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
The Trade
Practices Act is intended to inhibit unfair competition throughout
industry generally, but the recent Boral
case in the High Court has led some observers to question its effectiveness
in protecting smaller businesses from what might be termed predatory
pricing by dominant companies. This is particularly relevant in today's
domestic airline industry, with its 'David and Goliath' structure in
the form of an emerging, relatively modestly sized and resourced Virgin
Blue versus a dominant and well 'cashed-up' Qantas.
The future of the regional airline sector
is far from clear; it seems likely that Qantas's regional operations
will continue to be a major force. However, the role and sustainability
of the non-aligned, newly restructured carriers such as Regional Express
and Alliance
Airlines have yet to be established.
As the state governments are primarily responsible for the economic
regulation of this sector, state policies could have a major influence
on its long-term structure and outlook.
Competition in Australia's
international airline industry will continue to be tempered by the bilateral
air service agreements unless there are successful multilateral moves
towards a more liberal regime over the longer term. Consequently, Qantas
is effectively 'guaranteed' a major role in its international markets,
although the intensity of competition with Qantas varies between markets
and could increase if new Australian flag carriers gain access to Qantas
routes. Australia's
'multiple-designation' policy means that more than one Australian-owned
carrier can potentially operate scheduled air passenger services to
and from this country.
The development of low-cost international
carriers such as Australian Airlines will assist in nurturing financially
viable traffic growth. Their potential to encourage increased traffic
through highly attractive fares is particularly important in the current
worldwide climate. Heightened security concerns and political uncertainty
have caused global tourism to stagnate, with huge financial losses being
reported by major, long-established 'full-cost' airlines, particularly
in North
America. The further expansion of low-cost international
airlines will assist in counteracting this trend and in sustaining Australia's
vital tourism industry.
Another facet of the changing airline industry
over the past decade has been the Commonwealth's withdrawal from the
operation of airports; all major airports are now operated by private
'owners' under very long-term leases from the Commonwealth. This has
led to a new framework of economic regulatory arrangements for such
airports. On 'privatising' the major airports, the Government imposed
price caps on airport company charges for the aeronautical services
which they supply to the airlines, but subsequently replaced the caps
with a price monitoring regime. Airport companies attracted
industry criticism for increasing aeronautical charges after the caps
were lifted, but justified the increases on the grounds that they will
be used to finance major airport investments, including upgrades
to accommodate the new generation, very large capacity, international
aircraft typethe A380 Airbuswhich Qantas and other international carriers
will introduce to their Australian routes over the next decade.
Continued traffic growth over the medium term
will mean that airports will face pressure to utilise existing infrastructure
more efficiently and it appears the Commonwealth will continue to involve
itself in addressing these challenges. There are important competition
policy issues at stake and these are closely associated with problems
of airport congestion. Slot systemspermission for aircraft movementsare
effective in rationing scarce airport and airspace capacity but can
restrain competition. Sydney
(Kingsford-Smith) Airport (KSA) is the only Australian airport to have
a slot system to ration airport capacity among competing airline users.
Sydney
KSA's
life could be extended if its operations were changed because its technical
capacity far exceeds its actual (regulation-constrained) capacity.
The Government has to
date shown a preference for administrative solutionssuch as a guaranteed
number of regional airline slots at peak times, a cap on the
number of hourly movements, and the noise curfewto 'economic' solutions
such as peak-load pricing and the sale of slots by auction. The
main regional airlines are major beneficiaries of administrative
regulation. Arguably, they are subsidised by passengers of non-regional
services. Sydney KSA remains the pivotal
airport facility for the Australian airline industry despite the growth
in new air service links that by-pass Sydney; increasing the
operating capacity of the existing Sydney
KSA
will delay the need for a second major airport in Sydney.
The Australasian airline
and aviation infrastructure industries have experienced major changes
to their policy and operating environments in the past decade. The upheavals
have included the collapse of the Ansett group, the absorption of Impulse
Airlines into Qantas, the entry and rapid growth of Virgin Blue and
the establishment of Australian Airlines, Freedom Air and Jetconnect.
The 1990s trend towards the liberalisation of Australasian air services
has continued with the establishment of an Open Skies agreement between
Australia
and New Zealand
in late 2000. The 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States and the 2003 Iraq
and SARS crises led to significant downturns in the international and
domestic aviation markets, resulting in further change.
In the aviation infrastructure industry, the past decade
has witnessed the transfer of all of Australia's
major airports from the Commonwealth to private companies under long-term
leases, changes to the regulation of cost recovery at airports and the
restructuring of charges for aviation services.
Upheavals in the domestic airline industry are
nothing new and they have invariably developed a strong political flavour,
as most recently witnessed during the 2001 Federal Election campaign
when the Federal Opposition and the Victorian Labor Government became
closely aligned with the AnsettTesna interests. Reflecting on the industry
in the early post-Second World War decades, former Liberal Party leader,
Sir Billy Snedden observed in 1981 that:
'The
aviation industry is politically volatile and always capable of arousing
public interest, discussion and controversy. From the mid-1940s to
the mid-1960s, it [civil
aviation] was one of the most debated topics in the Federal Parliament,
attracting attention beyond its economic significance. To many people
civil aviation became a battleground for conflicting political philosophies.'(1)
The industry's inherent instability and disproportionate
political significance were key factors influencing the genesis of the
two airline policy as set out in the Civil
Aviation Agreement 1952(2). The industry's turbulent
tendencies have returned in the 13 years that have elapsed
since the termination of the two airline policy in 1990. Unsustainable
growth has occurred in the domestic airline industry marked by a cycle
of the entry of new players, the collapse of some players and the emergence
of others. High capital costs have contributed to high entry costs and
have increased the market power of the incumbent airlines, impeding
competition. This raises the issue of whether Australia's
domestic market is really big enough to sustain competitive supply and
whether a lightly regulated oligopoly is still appropriate.
This research paper describes the current state of
the Australian domestic and international airline industries, tracing
the main changes since domestic airline deregulation and commenting
on associated policy issues. It includes an analysis of the consequences
of the Ansett collapse, changes in the airports industry and emerging
competition and economic regulatory issues
affecting both the airline and airports industries.
An earlier version of the paper is available as an
audio brief, After
AnsettAirline Industry Trends and Issues, by John Kain and Richard Webb, recorded in 2002. A chronology
of the events leading up to Ansett Australia's last commercial flight
on 5 March 2002 and covering the aftermath of the airline group's
collapse is also available on the Department of the Parliamentary Library
website.
Australia's
airline industry can be classified into three broad categories:
An airline performing regular public transport
services and whose fleet contains exclusively high capacity aircraft,
defined as aircraft with more than 38 seats, or with a payload of
more than 4 200 kg.(3)
The domestic trunk airline industry encompasses the mainline domestic scheduled
air passenger service network. It is composed predominantly, but not
exclusively, of inter-capital routes.
Since the 1960s, the trunk route airlines have operated
mainly jet aircraft capable of carrying 100 to 250 passengers and between
two tonnes and ten tonnes of freight. While Boeing 727s and McDonnell
Douglas DC 9s were the dominant first generation aircraft types in Australia,
these aircraft types are now retired; the current day fleet relies heavily
on various models of the Boeing 737 and Boeing 767 jet aircraft types.
The industry was nominally 'deregulated' at the federal
level with the end of the two airline policy in 1990. However, some
state governments maintain economic regulation of intra-state routes,
while at the national level, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) monitors the state of competition in the industry
in accordance with its generic trade practices responsibilities. Appendix
1 contains a listing and brief description of the larger regional and
trunk route operators in Australia's
domestic airline industry as at May 2003.
In the past two years, the trunk airline industry has changed from a four-airline
structureQantas
Airways, Ansett Australia, Virgin Blue and Impulse Airlinesto
a lopsided two airline system.
The Qantas Airways Group has extensive commercial and
ownership links with a number of regional carriers. Qantas also has
code-sharing(4) and alliance arrangements with international
carriers through the One
World Alliance. This is the second largest of the five 'airline
alliances', or the groupings of allied airlines that underpin the globalisation
of the airline industry. (The Ansett group was a member of the largest
alliance, the Star Alliance.)
Qantas also has strong international equity links with British Airways,
which owns over 21.4 per cent of the airline. Qantas has a 46.2 per
cent interest in Fiji's
Air Pacific.
Qantas Domestic is now
the only provider of nationwide, 'full-service' scheduled air services.
Qantas has expanded its fleet rapidly since the Ansett group collapsed,
when Qantas's domestic market share was 55 per cent; it now has around
70 per cent of the travel market on the domestic trunk route network.
Qantas's extensive domestic and international route network can be seen
by clicking here to
view an interactive electronic route map.
In response to the growing popularity of discount air
travel in recent years, and to meet the competitive challenge from Virgin
Blue at the 'low fare' end of the market, Qantas has built on the low-cost
operating arrangements it inherited in its May 2001 acquisition of Impulse
Airlines. It has retained Impulse as a stand-alone unit within Qantas,
so deriving savings from utilising Impulse's low-operating cost, all-economy
class Boeing 717 aircraft and streamlined staffing/work practice arrangements.
Qantas has also further built on Impulse's value-based marketing approach
by expanding its range of 'all-economy', leisure-oriented services and
buying more Boeing 717s.
Virgin Blue Airlines is the Brisbane-based subsidiary
of the Virgin group of companies and began operation in 2000. Its original owner and founder was British businessman,
Sir Richard
Branson.The Virgin Group owns 46 per
cent of the equity in Virgin Blue company while Patrick Corporation—the
large, diversified Australian transport and logistics company—acquired
50 per cent of the airline in 2001–02. Senior staff of Virgin
Blue hold the remaining four per cent.
As a member of the Virgin group, Virgin Blue has loose
links with Virgin Atlanticwhich operates international services out
of Londonand Virgin Express,
the group's low-fare European airline based in Brussels.
Virgin Blue is not a member of any of the international airline alliances.
In October 2002, however, Virgin Blue began to code-share with a Star
Alliance member, United Airlines, somewhat compensating the latter for
the loss of its Australian Star Alliance partner, the Ansett group.
Since the winding-up of the Ansett group in early 2002,
Virgin Blue has provided the main trunk route competition for Qantas.
Virgin Blue operates mainly on the busiest portions of the trunk network,
offering single-class, no-frills, low-cost air travel, mainly between
selected capital cities and other centres. To contain costs, Virgin
Blue operates only one aircraft type, a Boeing 737 jet fleet, while
crew costs are minimised through work arrangements which require
crew to have a relatively wide range of skills and to perform a relatively
broad array of work tasks. In this respect, Virgin Blue has many of
the characteristics of the new breed of low cost airlines emerging worldwide
known as 'value-based airlines'.(5)
At the start of this year, Virgin Blue estimated that
it had 24 per cent of the domestic aviation market and established plans
to increase this share to 30 per cent over the remainder of 2003.(6)
When established several years ago, Virgin Blue focussed its marketing
efforts on passengers whose travel inclinations were relatively sensitive
to fare levels but were not so concerned with travel times and service
frequency consideration, such as leisure travellers. However, as its
route network and service frequencies have expanded, it has shown an
increasing marketing orientation towards travellers who are more concerned
about travel times and service frequencies and less concerned about
fare levels, such as business travellers.
Although initially reporting trading losses, the modestly
capitalised airline's trading position has turned around, bolstered
partly by the Ansett group's collapse. In its second year of operation
(to 28 March 2002), Virgin Blue recorded
a net profit of $35 million and it has been reported that its 200203
net profit result could be between $100 million and $120 million.(7)
The airline is planning a partial public float sometime over the next
12 months.
Virgin Blue has taken over much of the domestic terminal
space that the Ansett group occupied at the major airports. For example,
on 6 November 2002, Virgin Blue announced that it had entered an agreement
with Sydney Airports Corporation Limited
to move into the former Ansett group's Sydney KSA domestic terminalnow
known as T2thus overcoming the problems of Virgin Blue's original,
congested facilities at Sydney KSA.
Revenue for domestic operators derives chiefly from
the business sector and domestic and inbound tourism. It has been estimated
that domestic tourism (which includes visiting relatives and friends)
contributes 40 per cent of revenue, with the business sector contributing
35 per cent and inbound tourism 25 per cent.(8)
The Australian airline industry traditionally has been
relatively profitable by world standards, although this varies among
airlines and sectors, reflecting the on-going consequences of the two
airline policy and airport leasing agreements. These gave the incumbents
decided advantages over potential entrants in terms of long term contractual
access to terminals and landing and take-off slots.
Since the Ansett group's collapse, the industry's profitability
has held up well by world standards, despite the 20012003 inbound tourism
slump. Qantas increased its profitability partly by picking up much
of the 'high yield end' of the market (eg business travel) which Ansett
Australia formerly filled. That the recent steep escalations in fuel
prices do not appear to have had significant adverse consequences for
the Australian airline industry's profitability is partly because airline
operators hedge against large, short-term cost increases of this nature
through forward purchase contract arrangements. In addition, Virgin
Blue operates mainly new generation aircraft that are very fuel efficient,
while Qantas has progressively withdrawn those aircraft types that are
less fuel efficient.
Aviation war-risk insurance has become a significant
issue since the September 11 terrorist events in the United
States in 2001. War-risk insurance
covers losses arising from acts of war, including acts of terrorism,
strikes, riots and sabotage. Because existing aviation third-party war-risk
insurance was withdrawn from the global marketplace after the September
11 attacks, the Australian Government, like those of many countries,
agreed to provide third-party war, terrorist and hijacking indemnity
cover for damage on the ground to airlines, airports and other service
and facilities providers.
The Commonwealth indemnity covers the gap between the
insurance available in the market and the level of insurance held prior
before the September 11 attacks, and recipients of the Commonwealth
indemnity are required to hold commercial war-risk insurance to the
extent it is available. The Commonwealth indemnity is currently being
extended at three monthly intervals until such time as a more permanent
solution is found. The Government has
recently announced its intention to charge for this cover, although
details of the charging are still to be finalised.
A regional airline has traditionally been defined as:
An airline performing regular public transport
services and whose fleet contains exclusively low capacity aircraft,
defined as aircraft with 38 seats or less, or with a payload of 4
200 kg or less.(9)
However, in recent years there has been a trend towards
regional airlines operating much larger aircraft. The Bureau of Transport
and Regional Economics therefore defines a regional airline as:
An airline performing regular public transport
services and primarily servicing regional centres.(10)
Regional airlines mainly operate intra-state services.
The aircraft used vary in size from those seating eight
to ten passengers to small jets or turboprop aircraft seating
4080 and with capacity for up to two tonnes of cargo. Regional airline services are widely regarded in
regional communities as economic lifelines to major markets and service
centres, allowing the swift transport of residents, tourists and regional
produce across Australia's vast distances. The
accompanying map depicts some of the main regional air service routes.
Map: Regional Airline
Services in Australia 2000-01

Note: This figure displays all routes with an average of three or more
return services per week over 2000-01.
Source: BTRE, Working Paper 51, March 2003.
A Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics study found that regional airlines
served 206 centres in 1997. They used about 286 aircraft and employed
about 2700 people directly. Despite Australia's large size, more than
half the flight sectors offered covered distances of less than 300 kilometres.
About 80 per cent of these shorter routes were also serviced by land-based
transport.(11)
The rate of growth of regional services has been rapid. Over the ten years
to 200102, regional airline passenger movements grew at an average
annual rate of 12.1 per cent compared with 6.2 per cent for domestic
services and 7.4 per cent for international services. Still, regional
services account for about only 7 per cent of all domestic passengers.(12)
Over recent years there has been some blurring between regional and trunk
airline services, in part because of the passing of the old two airline
policy regulatory framework, which defined strict regulatory compartments
for the respective sectors. Constitutionally, the states have implicit sole responsibility
for the economic regulation of intra-state air services. Over the past
decade, most states have deregulated airline operations to varying degrees.
However, it is noteworthy that in Western Australia, there has been a recent
move back to regulating the state's air services in order to 'protect
vulnerable air routes'.(13)
QantasLinkwhich includes the former Qantas subsidiaries
of Airlink, Sunstate, Eastern and Southern Airlinesdominates regional routes,
serving 55 cities and towns. QantasLink is
operated by Impulse Airlines which, since May 2001, has been
a wholly owned subsidiary of Qantas Airways Limited. Impulse operates
a fleet of Boeing 717 aircraft in the QantasLink livery and these are
used on major regional routes as well as leisure-oriented trunk routes.
employs over 600 people
As part of its more recent network expansion initiatives,
Virgin Blue now provides links between the state capitals and regional
centres such as Alice Springs, Cairns,
Townsville, Launceston, Mackay, Rockhampton and Coffs
Harbour.
Regional
Express or Rex is one of the newest
regional airlines. Regional
Express is the operating name of Australiawide Airlines Limited, which
was formed through the acquisition of former Ansett subsidiaries, Hazelton
and Kendell Airlines, by a consortium including a group of Canberra-based businesses and former
Ansett group-employee interests. The airline operates routes
in New South Wales, Victoria,
South Australia, Tasmania
and the ACT with a focus on regional markets. South
Australia and western New
South Wales are important markets. Rex's
route network can be seen by clicking here to view an interactive
electronic route map. Rex is presently
seeking official support for a greater share of Government travel business
on its services to and from the National Capital; Qantas has dominated
this market since the collapse of the Ansett group.(14)
The current operating environment of the regional airline
industry is unusual in that a relatively large proportion of carriers
operate in a stand-alone fashion, fairly independently of the trunk
route airline companies and outside the global airline alliance system.(15)
This is in marked contrast with the trend up until the time of the Ansett
group collapse, when regional airlines were increasingly being integrated
with the trunk carriers, either through operational links such as ticketing
and baggage handling, but also through equity links. This trend culminated
only months before Ansett's collapse, when a QantasAnsett tussle for
ownership control of the NSW regional carrier,
Hazelton Airlines, was resolved in the Ansett group's favour.
Since the Ansett group's collapse and the re-establishment
of some of the major regional airlines as independent companies, the
industry has expressed concerns about the sustainability of the current
arrangements and there have been calls for the Government to establish
a coherent national strategic framework for the airline industry that
defines the role of the regional sector.(16)
Responding to such concerns, a House of Representatives
Transport and Regional Services Committee inquiry was established in
July 2002 to review commercial regional aviation services in Australia
as well as transport links to major populated islands. The inquiry is
chaired by Paul Neville,
MP, and is still in progress as at June 2003. The Neville committee's
terms of reference require it to examine:
-
the adequacy of regional and rural air services in
Australia
-
the role of major air transport carriers in providing
regional services
-
policies and measures required to assist the development
of regional air services
-
the role of all three levels of government in assisting
the development of regional air services and assisting regional hub
services
-
the deployment of the most suitable aircraft types
-
interconnectivity between regional air transport
systems, major national air services and international services, including
on-carriage, through ticketing, freight handling, timetabling and
airport slotting.(17)
Government responses to the Neville Committee's recommendations
could have a significant influence on the structure and financial outlook
of the regional airline sector in years to come.
During 200102, 50 international airlines (including
dedicated freight operators) operated scheduled services to and from
Australia.(18) Qantas is the only international airline based
in Australia;
there is a legal requirement for Qantas to have its head office in Australia
under the Qantas Sale
Act 1992.
The Australian airlines' market share fell from 37.5 per cent
in 200001 to 35.2 per cent in 200102, partly because Ansett International
ceased operations with the collapse of the Ansett group. Ansett International
was a majority (51 per cent) Australian-owned company. In 200102,
Qantas's market share of passenger routes to and from Australia
was 34.5 per cent (in terms of passengers carried).(19) This
is considerably less than the 50 per cent share it had in the mid-1970s.
The concentration of companies in this segment of the
aviation industry in 200001 can be described as medium. In 200102,
the top ten airlines accounted for 83 per cent of international passenger
trips and the top four for 61 per cent. The remaining passenger trips
are served by a multitude of airlines using Australia's
comparatively large number of international gateways. The relative importance
of each of the main international airlines serving Australia is illustrated
in the accompanying pie chart depicting relative market shares as measured
by international passenger numbers by airline (inbound to Australia
and outbound from Australia) for the year ended June 2002.(20)
The Commonwealth Government effectively controls competition
in the Australian international airline industry because of bilateral
arrangements and associated landing rights provisions at designated
locations. A consequence is that Qantas is effectively 'guaranteed'
a major role in servicing the market. Qantas operates international
services to 75 destinations (including code-share flights by other airlines
on behalf of Qantas) in 32 countries.(21) However, the intensity
of competition varies between markets. On some routes, Qantas is the
dominant operator, while on other routes, it faces strong competition.
Competitive pressures have led Air NZ to withdraw from direct trans-Pacific
flights and the future of United Airlines' services is uncertain.

(measured by passenger numbers by airline)
year ended June 2002
Qantas's new wholly owned, low-cost international subsidiary,
Australian Airlines,
began operations in October 2002. The airline was established to serve
markets from which Qantas and other airlines had withdrawn and to service
inbound tourists from Asia. Australian Airlines
provides all-economy, full-service flights and reportedly has operating
costs some 30 per cent lower than Qantas's international operations.
Australian Airlines provides services between Cairns
and Nagoya, Osaka,
Fukuoka, Singapore,
Taipei and Hong
Kong and offers a daily connecting flight between Cairns
and the Gold Coast for international passengers. Australian Airlines
began with a fleet of four Boeing 767-300 aircraft, but proposes to
increase this to 12 aircraft within the next two years. The airline
also plans to provide outbound services, with flights from a second
base in a southern Australian capital city to a number of ports in Asia
late in 2003.
On 28 October
2002, Qantas initiated Jetconnect, a wholly owned subsidiary
which commenced operations on domestic services in New
Zealand, effectively taking over the
role of the former franchised Qantas New Zealand
operation.(22) Jetconnect flies Boeing 737-300 aircraft in
Qantas livery, but without the Spirit of Australia caption. It has a New Zealand
Airline Operators Certificate and its aircraft are registered in New
Zealand.
Virgin Blue is considering providing international
services from Australia
to New Zealand,
south-east Asia and the South Pacific.
Sydney
KSA is the main hub for international
air transport to and from Australia.
In 200102, it accounted for 48 per cent of international passenger
traffic and 49 per cent of international freight traffic. Melbourne
was the next busiest airport with 20 per cent of international passenger
traffic and 28 per cent of freight traffic.(23)
There are two main elements to the Commonwealth's economic
policy framework governing domestic airlines. First, Commonwealth policy
is that there are no restrictions on freedom of entry to domestic trunk
routes by domestic airlines. However, federal cabotage restrictionsi.e.
the government policy instruments which ensure that only Australian-based
airlines carry domestic passengers and freight and that foreign-owned
airlines do not carry domestic passengers on domestic sectors of their
international servicesare in force.(24) In the aftermath
of the Ansett collapse, the Government temporarily eased cabotage restrictions.
Individual States impose some restrictions on entry
to intra-state routes. Some state governments control route entry (for example Western Australia and New South Wales) with a view to ensuring
financial viability and stability in service provision, but in other
states (for example South Australia), there is freedom of
entry and exit. The former Ansett group subsidiary, Perth-based regional
airline, Skywest, has been granted a monopoly on some of its internal
Western Australia routes subject to it
securing finance to upgrade its aircraft fleet.(25) This
is consistent with the recommendations of a recent Review and Assessment
of the Effectiveness of Air Services in Western Australia. The review was undertaken
by the Centre for Asia-Pacific Aviation and Tourism Futures International;
it recommended that the WA Government not allow more competition because
it risked the loss of regular air services to many towns in the State(26).
Second, Commonwealth policy is that there is no industry-specific
economic regulation. In the area of competition policy, for example,
despite calls for industry-specific legislation, the ACCC is responsible
for the regulatory oversight and enforcement of competition. For example,
the ACCC (and its New Zealand
counterpart) are examining Qantas's proposal to take a 22.5 per cent
equity stake in Air NZ.(27)
Fares and
Subsidies
There is no federal regulation of fares other than
indirectly through the generic business conduct provisions of the Trade Practices
Act 1974. This raises the question of what effect deregulation
has had on fare levels. The Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics
found the following:
Compared to domestic fare levels in 1992 when the
BTRE [Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics] started reporting
on domestic air fares, real discount fares in the September quarter
2002 were almost 18 per cent below the December quarter 1992. However,
in real terms the fully flexible full economy and business fare series
were almost 9 per cent and 34.5 per cent respectively above December
quarter 1992 levels. The BTRE notes that the business and full economy
fare series diverged significantly in the mid-1990s with the change
from three classes to two classes on domestic services.(28)
The significant growth in the real average incomes
of Australians over the past decade combined with the fall in real air
fares, means that air fare affordability has improved quite markedly.
Today, more Australians can afford to fly because incomes are higher
relative to the level of fares. However, this does not necessarily mean
that the competitiveness of air travel has improved relative to other
transport modes; the continued rapid improvement in inter-capital and
inter-regional road links, the trend decline in real motoring costs
and improvements in regional rail services in some areas have served
to make inter-modal competition more vigorous.
The viability of some regional air services is dependent
on Commonwealth and state government subsidies. The Commonwealth subsidises
parts of the regional and general aviation sectors. In 200203, the
cost of the combined subsidies to both sectors is estimated to be $16.2
million:
-
-
the Commonwealth subsidises some airportsas part of the
move to location-specific pricingand en route charges for small airlines.
This will be discussed below. The cost of the subsidy for the transition
to location-specific pricing for airport control towers is estimated
at $7 million, while the cost of the subsidy for en route charges
is $6 million.
The Commonwealth also provided ad hoc subsidies to
regional airlines in the aftermath of the Ansett group collapse under
the Rapid Route Recovery Scheme; this cost $11.3 million.
Taxes and
Charges
The fare analysis undertaken by the Bureau of Transport
and Regional Economics did not include the various taxes on air fares
which the Commonwealth imposes nor did it include charges that the airports
levy on airlines which they, in turn, add on to passenger air fares.
Federal taxes are:
-
the passenger movement chargecommonly called the
departure taxof $38 on passengers departing on international flights
-
the air passenger ticket levyusually called the
Ansett levylevied at the rate of $5 per sector (previously $10
per ticket)
-
the aircraft noise levy imposed at Sydney
KSA and Adelaide
airports. The Board of Airline Representatives of Australia claims
that the levy adds $3.58 to the cost of some airline tickets.(29)
The passenger movement chargewhich replaced the departure taxwas introduced
to recover the cost of customs, immigration and quarantine processing
at Australia's borders and the issue of short-term visitor visas.(30)
The charge (legally a tax) is levied under the Passenger Movement Charge Act 1978
and the Passenger Movement Charge
Collection Act 1978
.
However, the charge has moved beyond cost recovery and is contributing to
consolidated revenue. Evidence given to the Senate Legal and Constitutional
Committee (Australian Customs Service program) on 28 May 2001 revealed that the amount collected exceeded the
costs of customs, immigration and quarantine services by $80 million.
The Ansett and noise levies are discussed below under
the Air Passenger Ticket Levy and Airport Noise Amelioration Programs
respectively.
Foreign investment guidelines allow foreign airlines to acquire up to 100
per cent of the equity in an Australian domestic airline or to start
a new domestic airline, unless this is contrary to the national interest.
Under this policy, Air NZ acquired its initial 50 per cent stake in
Ansett Australia in 1996 and full ownership
of the airline in 2000. However, it had to confine its equity in Ansett
International to 50 per cent in order for the international entity to
retain its Australian nationality status under the bilateral air service
system.(31)
A noteworthy exception to this policy relates to Qantas.
Under the Qantas Sale Act 1992,
the Commonwealth Government restricts foreign investment in Qantas through
the following provisions:
-
a cap of 49 per cent on aggregate foreign equity
holdings to ensure Qantas remains under Australian control
-
a cap of 35 per cent on aggregate foreign airline
equity holdings, and
-
a cap of 25 per cent on any one foreign person owning share
capital.
Qantas has argued that the 49 per cent foreign ownership
restriction should be lifted so that it can fund expansion.(32)
However, on 13 August 2002,
the Government decided to retain the restriction, apparently seeing
Qantas as a special case.
Australia's International Airline
Policies
There are a number of elements to the international
policy framework.
-
First, there is the bilateral air services agreements
system.(33) This consists of a set of arrangements (which have the status of treaties)
that regulate the operation of international air services, particularly
capacity, between Australia and other countries.
These arrangements usually comprise an Air Services Agreement and
there are some 3000 registered treaties within this framework. The
Howard Government has taken the stance that, for efficiency reasons,
it is essential to move away from the bilateral system of international
air services agreements towards a free world in aviation.(34)
-
Second, as noted, cabotage prevents foreign-owned airlines
carrying domestic passengers over domestic sectors of their international
services into and out of Australia.
-
Third, the Australia-New Zealand 'open skies' agreement
allows
Australian and New Zealand international airlines to operate across
the Tasman and then to third countries without restriction. Previously,
'beyond services' of this kind were restricted in terms of allowable
capacity (12 Boeing 747s per week) and third-country destinations
(a maximum of 11 countries). In addition, the international airlines
of both countries can operate dedicated freight operations from any
international airport in Australia and New Zealand to third countries.
Australia and New Zealand endorsed the agreement
in August 2002 thus formalising the memorandum of understanding in
place since November 2000.
-
Fourth, under 'regional open skies agreements', Australia allows foreign international
carriers unrestricted access to all international airports except
Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth. Regional open skies
policies incorporated into air services agreements enable regional
gatewayssuch as Cairns, Darwin and Adelaideto market themselves
as attractive destinations without concern about bilateral restrictions
on local market access.(35)
Since 1992, a key element of Australia's
international aviation policy has been 'multiple designation'. This
allows more than one Australian carrier to operate international air
services. So far, Ansett has been the only passenger carrier to have
taken advantage of this liberalisation. Although there have been proposals
for other new Australian flag international airlines, these have never
materialised.
In 2002, Air NZ and Qantas announced their plans to
establish a joint strategic relationship entailing:
-
Qantas taking a 22.5 per cent shareholding in Air
NZ
-
Qantas and Air NZ forming a group, made up of an
equal number of representatives from each airline, that would co-ordinate
the entire Air NZ domestic and international network and Qantas flights
to, from and within New Zealand
-
Air NZ and Qantas code-sharing on all New
Zealand domestic and trans-Tasman
flights and on flights between New
Zealand and the Americas
-
Air NZ code-sharing on Qantas Australian domestic
and Qantas international flights that connect with Air NZ flights.
Qantas has argued that the strategic partnership would
assist both airlines to retain their independence in an industry facing
considerable and continuing difficulties. It would also allow both airlines
to compete more effectively in an increasingly tough global aviation
market.(36)
The proposed strategic alliance requires the approval
of the New Zealand Minister of Transport (in his role as New
Zealand shareholder), Air NZ shareholders,
the New Zealand Commerce Commission and the ACCC. Virgin Blue has expressed
strong concerns over the proposal arguing that:
its [Virgin Blue's] path into the New Zealand
and Trans Tasman markets is now littered with barriers to entry in
the form of airport access, monopolies on ground handling, and the
ease with which AIR NZ and Qantas could use their own low-cost carriers
to suppress Virgin Blue's growth.(37)
Virgin Blue's formal response to the application for
the authorisation of the agreement calls for the authorisation to be
provided only if Virgin Blue (or another carrier) has actually entered
the trans-Tasman and New Zealand networks on a substantial scale prior
to the QantasAir NZ alliance coming into effect. It argues that, to
enable a new entrant to establish on this scale in a meaningful timeframe,
'a number of structural and other market changes' would be required:
-
Air NZ would need to divest itself of its low-cost carrier,
Freedom Air
-
to ensure that this outcome is not undermined through the
establishment by the alliance parties of a new low-cost operator or
the redeployment of an existing low-cost operator, Air NZ and Qantas
should not be allowed to establish another low-fare airline
-
this would ensure that new entrants do not face competition
from the establishment by the Air NZ-Qantas alliance of a new, low
cost operator
-
Qantas should be restrained from flying Australian Airlines
in addition to Impulse and Jetconnect aircraft on the trans-Tasman, New Zealand and Pacific routes for
a period of three years
-
new entrants must be provided access to terminal facilities
on a level equivalent to that enjoyed by Qantas and Air NZ, particularly
during peak times
-
Air NZ must enter satisfactory commercial arrangements
for maintenance services, spares and parts, ground handling services
and equipment at all major airports as Air NZ is currently the monopoly
supplier of many of these services
-
Qantas and Air NZ should provide an undertaking that they
will not increase capacity on any route for a period of two years
after a new entrant enters the market.(38)
On 10 April
2003, the
ACCC issued a draft decision proposing to deny approval to an alliance
between Qantas and Air NZ on the grounds that the alliance was 'very
anti-competitive and not in the public interest'; that is, the
alliance's anti-competitive effects outweighed any public interest benefits
from the proposal.
Air NZ's fragile financial condition in the aftermath
of the Ansett collapse, its limited market size and the lack of significant
prospects for improvement in its finances were, and will continue to
be, important factors driving the proposed agreement. In the circumstances,
it is likely that Air NZ and Qantas will make renewed applications to
the Australian regulatory authorities, including the Australian Competition
Tribunal, possibly with proposals for more generous concessions to third-party
airlines such as Virgin Blue.(39) There is strong 'nationalist'
support in New Zealand
for the retention of Air NZ as a separate, identifiable national carrier
supported by predominantly local equity; in these circumstances, it
seems unlikely that Air NZ will be subsumed within the Qantas group
in the foreseeable future. The New Zealand
regulatory authority is not due to make an announcement on its decision
in the case until September 2003.
The proposed Air NZ alliance is not the first of this
kind; eight years ago the ACCC approved a profit-sharing agreement between
Qantas and its 19 per cent shareholder, British Airways, relating to
their services on the AustraliaUK 'kangaroo route'. This is due to
expire in July 2003 and it has been reported that the airlines will
seek a renewal of the approval.
An immediate consequence of the collapse of the Ansett
group was the reduction of capacity in terms of seats available and
the number of flights. This was inevitable as Ansett held 39 per cent
of the domestic air travel market. The Bureau of Transport and Regional
Economics has found that the immediate impact of Ansett ceasing flights
was a reduction of 21 per cent in domestic airline capacity and 28.4
per cent reduction in the number of domestic flights for October 2001,
compared to October 2000.(40)
With respect to the effect on fares, the bureau found:
Despite a widespread perception that domestic discount
air fares increased following the demise of Ansett, this is not evident
in the BTRE's [Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics] published
domestic real airfare series It is more likely that the large reduction
in flights and capacity reduced the availability of discount seats.(41)
The Ansett administrators have maintained the Ansett Australia web site
to record details of the company's progress under administration including
the asset disposal process. Details of asset disposals can be found
on the timeline that the administrators maintain.
Following the termination of Ansett's mainline operations
in March 2002 after the collapse of the Tesna bid(42) for
the airline, the Ansett administrators decided to continue the operations
of the airline's subsidiaries pending their sale to third parties. In
addition, aircraft maintenance personnel and facilities were retained
to keep those parts of the fleet that Ansett owned in a fit condition
for sale. Ansett's terminals were largely mothballed, although a 'trickle'
of passengers from former Ansett regional airlines continued to use
them. The respective airport companies subsequently bought a number
of the terminals and leased them to Virgin Blue and Qantas.
The administrators have retained Ansett's airline operator's certificate;
any prospective new domestic airline entrant could buy it and save a
reported six months on the time it would take to process an application
for it's own certificate.
Some industry observers see Singapore Airlines as the most likely new
entrant to the domestic market, especially as it is suffering from the
lack of a Star Alliance domestic partner in Australia. Dubai-based Emirates
Airline is also considered to be a possible contender.
In September 2001, federal legislation was passed that
introduced a levy on air passenger tickets, bought on or after 1 October 2001, for flights originating
in Australia.
Funds collected from the levy are being directed towards the costs associated
with the Special Employee Entitlement Scheme for the former employees
of companies in the Ansett group. The Department of Employment and Workplace
Relations was charged with administering the entitlements scheme. The
scheme's 'safety net' was designed to ensure that the 15 000-plus
former Ansett group employees would be paid unpaid wages and leave,
and pay in lieu of notice. It was also to meet workers' redundancy entitlements
up to the community standard of eight weeks.
On 17 December
2001, a private sector entity, SEES Pty Ltd, was contracted
by the Commonwealth to secure a loan for the purpose of advancing funds
to the Ansett administrators in respect of unpaid Ansett group employee
entitlements. This approach was necessary so that an estimated $350
million for employee entitlements could be paid as quickly as possible,
given that the revenue forecast was only $8 million to $10 million per
month.
As of 31 March
2003, the levy had raised $225.6 million.(43)
The levy raised $113 million in 200102 and was projected to raise $138
million in 200203.(44) Some 12 983 former Ansett group employees
had been paid $335.6 million as at 31 March 2003.(45)
The Government's stance on the levy has been that it
would be collected until all money paid under the entitlements scheme
has been recovered. On 21
December 2002, a spokesman for the Minister for Transport
and Regional Services said that the Government would like to drop the
tax but it could do so until the exhaustion of all legal avenues stemming
from a Victorian Supreme Court ruling in favour of Ansett administrators.
That decision would ensure that $200 million of entitlements from airline
assets would not go to a superannuation fund.(46) A union
superannuation fund has since exercised a right to appeal to gain access
to funds that the administrators have recouped.(47)
On 1 April 2003, the Government reiterated announced
that while it wanted to remove the levy as soon as possible, it was
necessary to retain the levy 'in order to protect taxpayers interests'
following a decision by a union superannuation fund to exercise a right
of appeal to gain access to funds recouped by Ansett's administrators.(48) However on 10 June 2003, the Government announced that it had decided
to withdraw the Air Passenger Ticket Levy
at the end of June 2003, even though the legal position in relation
to the Ansett Ground Staff Superannuation action was yet to be resolved
as was also the precise amount and timing of payments expected to be
received by the Government from the Ansett Administrators.
In announcing the decision, the Minister for Transport
and Regional Services, the Hon. John Anderson MP stated that:-
the Government has received advice that irrespective
of the outcome of legal proceedings, there is likely to be sufficient
funding available from the Ansett administration to repay the $335.5
million in taxpayer's money advanced from December 2001.(49)
The Federal Opposition had previously argued that the
asset sale process and the Court superannuation decision showed that
the Government would get back from the administrators the original loan.
Consequently, the levy was seen as redundant and merely another form
of taxation.(50)
As noted, the collapse of Ansett left a large gap in
services. Lacking capacity and operating on a very limited number of
routes, Virgin Blue was unable to 'fill Ansett's shoes'. Nor was Virgin
Blue willing to provide full in-flight service, given its low-cost model.
In the absence of competitors, Qantas's market share on domestic trunk
routes rose to a peak of 84 per cent. Qantas also met the cost of ferrying
50 000 stranded Ansett group passengers free and providing reduced
fares to another 65 000.
Qantas responded to the sudden upsurge in demand by
scheduling more flights and by substituting larger for smaller aircraft.
Further, as the initial Ansett group collapse coincided with the sharp
decline in international air travel after the terrorist attacks in the
United States
in September 2001, Qantas diverted aircraft from its international fleet
to domestic routes. As a longer-term response, Qantas is building up
the capacity and cost effectiveness of its domestic fleet by acquiring
new, fuel efficient Boeing 737-800 aircraft.
Qantas is also responding to Virgin Blue's 'no frills'
approach by retaining and expanding no-frills, low-cost, all-economy
class operations. Qantas inherited similar operations from Impulse Airlines
and has added to them by expanding its fleet of the low operating cost
Boeing 717 aircraft that Impulse used on trunk routes.
Qantas has also acquired additional terminal space
to cope with its rapid growth in market share since Ansett's collapse.
For example, in September 2002, Qantas commenced operations from Sydney
KSA's Terminal 2 Domestic, the former
Ansett domestic terminal.(51)
Following the withdrawal of the Tesna consortium's
bid for Ansett, Virgin Blue, having low capitalisation, found itself
short of capital needed for expansion. Virgin Blue entered into a joint
venture with Chris Corrigan,
representing the Patrick Corporation, who paid $260 million for a half-share
of the company. The additional capital is assisting in the expansion
of the airline's fleet and the leasing of former Ansett terminal capacity
to service its growing market. As noted, Virgin Blue has also extended
its route network, which now includes a number of regional centres such
as Coffs Harbour
and Alice Springs.
Ansett owned a major proportion of the regional airline industry, including
Kendell Airlines, Hazelton Airlines, Aeropelican, Sunstate and SkyWest.
All survived as going concerns after the Ansett collapse, albeit under
administration for lengthy periods and after receiving considerable
federal and state government financial support. The most important purchase
of former Ansett regional airlines was the acquisition of Kendell and
Hazelton by Australiawide Airlines Limited, operating as Regional Express
(Rex).
Most of the former Ansett regional airline operations do not have partnership
arrangements with Qantas or Virgin Blue. Before Ansett collapsed, around
80 per cent of routes were operated only
by airlines with partnerships with Ansett or Qantas; Ansett's regional
subsidiaries were all tied in with the Star Alliance. Consequently,
the former Ansett regional airlines are outside the international alliance
network.
The future of regional services is unclear. Qantas's
highly developed corporate linksacross the regional, domestic and international
sectorsand scheduling to its non-regional services gives it a considerable
advantage over potential competitors. This suggests that competitive
initiatives by Qantas's regional carriers will be closely monitored
by the competition authorities to ensure that Qantas does not take unfair
advantage of its dominance in the market. One proposal to reduce this
dominance is that Qantas should be made to divest itself of its regional
operations and other regional operators should be encouraged to merge
into larger, more viable entities.(52)
Parts of the airline industry are characterised by
economies of scale.(53) Economies of scale occur when expanding
the production of a service results in a lowering of the average cost
of its production. The implication of this is that a larger service
provider will achieve lower costs than his smaller competitors, making
the latter vulnerable to takeover. In the long run, the implication
is that in the absence of government intervention, the industry will
gravitate towards a single provider (i.e. a 'natural monopoly'), a concern
that underpinned the economic rationale for the two airline policy from
its outset.
The policy was based on the premise that if Australia
wanted two competing airlines in the domestic market, government intervention
was necessary to ensure that both airlines were 'guaranteed' sufficient
market share so that each could remain commercially viable over the
long term. If economies of scale persist in the industry to this day,
this could suggest that there is a need for on-going regulation of the
airline industry to monitor and prevent any tendencies towards its monopolisation.
The airline industry is subject to economic regulation
by the ACCC under the generic business conduct and competition policy
provisions of the Trade Practices
Act 1974. The High Court has, in the recent Boral case, addressed
these provisions in detail in the context of claims of predatory pricing.
The court's conclusions on predatory pricing could have significant
longer-term implications for the Australian domestic airline industry;
there is a widespread view in the small business sector that the Boral
decision 'proved the Trade Practices Act did not protect small business
from big-business predatory pricing'.(54)
In the Boral case, the High Court undertook detailed
consideration of the concept of 'predatory pricing' as a form of business
conduct 'taking advantage' of market power. It has been suggested that:
'as a consequence of the decision, it is unlikely
that price cutting would breach section 46 unless a firm has the ability
to charge prices above a competitive level and recoup its losses after
it has driven its competitors out of the market'.(55)
This could be relevant in today's airline industry,
with its 'David and Goliath' structure in the form of an emerging, relatively
modestly sized and resourced Virgin Blue versus a dominant and well
'cashed-up' Qantas.
Unlike the two airline policy, the Trade Practices Act has no specific provisions regulating 'cut throat'
air fare competition. Nor does it have provisions to ensure the maintenance
of market shares and thus supporting the financial viability of smaller
industry players.
The Australian airline industry is heavily import-dependent,
especially, in relation to purchases of fuel, aircraft and spare parts.
The depreciation of the Australian dollar over the past two to three
years increased costs in the aviation industry. However, the more recent
appreciation of the Australian dollar, especially against the US dollar
will ease these pressures.
Qantas is able to offset the cost of import-dependence
to an extent because some of its earnings are in foreign currencies.
In contrast, the market of Virgin Blue and the regional airlines is
entirely domestic so all of their revenues are in Australian dollars.
The implicit model in the post-deregulation eranamely
two airlines of roughly equal size constrained by the actual or potential
entry of new competitorsno longer exists. Competition between Qantas
and Virgin Blue is arguably more limited than between Qantas and the
Ansett group under the former industry structure. Virgin Blue focuses
mainly on leisure travel over major trunk routes rather than an integrated
trunk and regional network and it offers only one-class service and
relatively infrequent flights. In this sense, it is not a comprehensive
replacement for the former full-service Ansett operation. Professor
John Quiggin
has summed up the new environment in the following terms:
It now seems that the best we can hope for is a
one-and-a half airlines policy, similar to the pre-1997 telecommunications
regime, with Qantas playing Telstra and Virgin or Singapore
playing Optus.(56)
Although Qantas is the dominant player in the domestic
passenger and freight markets, some of the factors that led to the failure
of previous new trunk route entrantssuch as EastWest Airlines, Compass
Airlines and Southern Cross Airlines ('Compass Mark 2')are less of
a barrier now. In particular, airport terminal facilities are more readily
available to new entrants, particularly now that some former Ansett
terminals have been freed up as 'common-user' facilities. These are
terminals and associated infrastructure that airports manage that are
used (potentially) by a number of different airlines. Still, this is
becoming less true over time as Qantas and Virgin Blue lease space that
previously Ansett occupied.
The relatively low cost of obtaining aircraft is another
factor favouring potential new entrants. Industry observers have identified a number of factors
which make the present a good time for Australian airlines to obtain
imported civil aircraft, namely:-
-
the weak international demand for new aircraft stemming
from subdued world travel after the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the adverse effects
on airline travel of the Iraq and SARS crises
-
this weak demand gives increased bargaining power to aircraft
purchasers over aircraft suppliers
-
the appreciation of the Australian dollar over 2002-03
means that imports generally, including aircraft, now tend to cost
less in Australian dollar terms.
It has been suggested that lifting the cabotage constraints on foreign airlines
serving Australia and allowing them to
carry freight and domestic passengers within Australia could increase competition.
Ideally, liberalisation would be achieved on a reciprocal basis with
other countries. If this proved unfeasible, a unilateral move to enhance
competition in domestic aviation could be considered.(57)
However, it is questionable to
what extent easing cabotage would increase competition. The schedules
of international airlines are generally not well suited to meeting domestic
flight requirements, and complicated procedures would be necessary to
allow domestic passengers to embark and disembark at international terminals
bearing in mind customs, quarantine and security considerations.
Qantas is trying to defend its market share through
service upgrades and innovations such as the CityFlyer services on key
trunk routes. It is reportedly considering investing about $1.5 billion
to expand its fleet of Boeing 737-800s to around 30 aircraft. These
can be readily converted to an all-economy configuration, helping Qantas
to compete with Virgin Blue.(58)
Virgin Blue's strategy seems to be one of 'cherry picking'that
is focusing on a limited number of high-density routes and not operating
a more traditional route system of a nationwide network that cross-subsidises
less profitable routes. Virgin Blue has also sought to minimise costs
through more flexible working arrangements including multi-skilling
(relative to past standards and to Qantas), and low overheads (for example
not having lounges or catering).
A key element of Virgin Blue's competitive strategy
is expansion: Virgin Blue aims to gain 50 per cent of the trunk route
market by 2007. Like Qantas, Virgin Blue is increasing its fleet capacity very quickly. Virgin
Blue has been a private company for much of its existence, but media
reports suggest it is 'cash poor' and is moving to sell equity on the
British stock market. The Virgin group is considering a public float
of Virgin Blue to assist its expansion although Patrick Corporation
reportedly has reservations about a float at this time. It has also
been reported that Patrick would prefer a lesser
degree of its own equity dilution as a result of the float than that
which the Virgin Group has envisaged.(59)
The development of international routes would enhance
Virgin Blue's competitive appeal. With Patrick Corporation acquiring
50 per cent of Virgin Blue, the airline has the potential to become
an international carrier in its own right, as it is now deemed to be
an 'Australian' company. Virgin Blue has announced its desire to expand
into overseas operations; a linkage with Virgin Atlantic flights from
Europe to Hong Kong would be one way it could establish a presence on
the AustraliaUK 'kangaroo route'. Expansion into trans-Tasman markets
is another possibility although Qantas, Air NZ and a no-frills operator,
Freedom Air, which is part of the Air NZ group, already service this
route. Virgin Blue has said that it will proceed with trans-Tasman services
regardless of whether the proposed alliance between Qantas and Air NZ
proceeds.(60)
Some factors may limit Virgin Blue's ability to compete.
Over the longer term, there may be doubts about Virgin Blue's financial
viability. It does not participate in an international airline alliance
and its market positioning excludes it from the higher-yield business
travel market. If Qantas reduces operating costs to levels comparable
with Virgin Blue, Virgin Blue would be at a disadvantage in light of
its relatively small market share.
With respect to freight, Air Cargo Partners (ACP)operating
as Virgin Blue Freight Managementis the designated freight group for
Virgin Blue Airlines. Through ACP's association with Air Cargo Partners
Worldwide, ACP can offer air cargo services across Virgin Blue's entire
national network as well as international cargo services. In addition,
Virgin Blue's half owner, Patrick Corporation, acquired the Ansett International
Cargo Handling business during the first half of 2002.
With the overall level of competition in the industry less effective than
before the Ansett group's collapse, it might be argued that it is only
the threats of new entry and ACCC monitoring that keep Qantas competitive.
Ansett's collapse has focused attention on the adequacy of competition
law in its application to the airline industry. Fulfilling a 2001 election
pledge, the Treasuer, Mr Costello
announced in May 2002 the terms of reference for a review of the competition
provisions (Part IV) of the Trade
Practices Act 1974. Former High Court judge, Sir
Daryl Dawson
headed the review, which released its report on 16 April 2003.(61)
A key issue in this review is the operation of section
46 of the Trade Practices Act,
which states that a firm with a substantial degree of market power must
not take advantage of that power for the purpose
of:
-
eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor
(in the market in which it is powerful or any other market)
-
preventing entry of a person to any market
-
deterring or preventing competitive conduct in that
or any other market.
In its submission to the Dawson Committee, the ACCC
advocated an 'effects' test under which a breach of section 46 could
be established if a firm with substantial market power had taken advantage
of that power and this had resulted in an anti-competitive outcome.
In this case, it would no longer be necessary to establish that the
firm had an anti-competitive purpose.
The ACCC has suggested that such an amendment would
assist in dealing with the aviation industry in the wake of the collapse
of the Ansett group. Qantas criticised this proposal arguing that the
measure would effectively prevent it from competing against Virgin Blue.
While debate is continuing, the ACCC has begun litigation against Qantas
alleging that it misused its market power by substantially increasing
the number of seats on the BrisbaneAdelaide route after Virgin Blue
entered the market in December 2000a behaviour sometimes referred to
as predatory 'capacity dumping'
As has been noted, there is considerable debate in
the Australian business community about the effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act's market conduct provisions
in the light of the High Court's decision in favour of the dominant
player in the recent Boral case.
Small business interests and others believe the decision reduces
the effectiveness of section 46 of the Act in curtailing predatory pricing.
Although, The Dawson Committee addressed this issue, the committee's recommendations do not appear to envisage
the type of changes in these provisions of the Act that might ease the
concerns of smaller businesses confronted by a dominant competitor.
E: Airports and Air Services
The Commonwealth has, over time, divested itself of
ownership of regional and local airports, while almost all capital city
airports have been transferred to private operators on long-term lease
arrangements. All international, domestic trunk and regional airports
are now owned or controlled by private lessee companies and consortiums
or local governments. This includes joint-use defencecivil airports
such as Canberra and Townsville.(62)
From the 1950s to the 1980s, the Commonwealth funded
the transfer of local and regional airfields and aerodromes to local
government authorities under the Aerodrome Local Ownership Plan. These
smaller aerodromes have not been privatised and generally remain the
responsibility of local government agencies such as port corporations.
Before 1997, the Commonwealth-owned Federal Airports Corporation operated
most major trunk route airports. The Hawke Government established the corporation in the 1980s when responsibility for running major
airports was separated from the Department of Transport. Although commercially-oriented,
the corporation set landing and terminal charges on a network-wide,
'single-till' basis.(63) Consequently, profitable airports
subsidised unprofitable or less-profitable ones, and revenues from non-aeronautical
activitiessuch as car parking and retailingsubsidised the cost of
providing aeronautical services such as the use of runways, taxiways
and terminals.
In 1997 and 1998, the Howard Government implemented the Keating government's
plan to sell leases for 17 major Australian airports (excluding Sydney) to private operators.
In June 1997, the Government privatised Brisbane, Melbourne and Perth airports (the so-called
Phase 1 airports) under 99-year leases. On 1 July 1998, the Government privatised a number of other major
airports within the so-called Phase 2 group of airports.(64)
The stated rationale was to improve the efficiency of airport investment
and operations in the interests of users and the general community,
and to facilitate innovative management. In the aftermath of the Ansett
group's collapse, the Government delayed the sale of the three
'Sydney Basin'
airports at Bankstown, Camden
and Hoxton Park
because of adverse sale conditions, but on 9
April 2003 announced that all three would be sold this year.(65)
The Government considered that competition between privatised airports could
be encouraged by restricting cross-ownership of certain airport pairs
and by limiting airline ownership to 5 per cent. These policies were
implemented under the Airports Act 1996
.
The Government, in the airport industry reform package that accompanied
privatisation, noted that the single-till pricing that the federal airports
corporation followed would not be mandated for the privatised airports.
Individual airport operators could retain profits, at their discretion,
from non-aeronautical activities.
Concern that privatised airports might abuse their market power with respect
to aeronautical services led the Government to introduce transitional price regulation designed
to allow all parties to adjust to the new environment. Price regulation
comprised a five-year, consumer price index minus X annual cap on prices
for aeronautical services at 11 of the largest privatised airports,
where X was a pre-determined amount specific to each airport. These
arrangements extendedfor the first five years of privatisationthe
aeronautical charges in place before privatisation. Given the
nature of the price cap, airport operator charges fell in real terms
between 1997 and 2001.(66) Sydney KSA was subject to price
surveillance by the ACCC.
The Productivity Commission reviewed the application
of price regulation in its report, Price Regulation
of Airport Services
. In its submissions to
the commission's inquiry, the airport lessees argued that the price caps and the methods
that the ACCC used to implement them were preventing airports from securing
adequate rates of return on their investment. Despite airports being
a monopoly business, the commission recommended that commercial constraints
impeded the ability of airport operators to extract a higher-than-reasonable
profit. The Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics has found that
the return on assets of ACCC-regulated airports ranged from 2.4 per
cent at Adelaide to 7.5 per at Melbourne.(67)
On 13 May 2002, the Government announced that it had
accepted the Productivity Commission's recommendation that the pricing
regimes at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Adelaide, Canberra and
Darwin airports be liberalised and subjected only to ACCC price monitoring
(rather than price capping) for five years from 1 July 2002.(68) The new framework comprises a package of
measures under the Airports Act
1996 and the Trade Practices
Act 1974. From 1 July 2002,
the ACCC's responsibilities include:
-
monitoring the prices, costs and profits relating
to the supply of aeronautical and aeronautical-related services at
Adelaide, Brisbane,
Canberra, Darwin,
Melbourne, Perth
and Sydney
airports
-
monitoring service quality at Adelaide, Alice Springs,
Brisbane, Canberra, Coolangatta, Darwin, Hobart, Launceston, Melbourne,
Perth, Sydney and Townsville airports
-
collecting and publishing information on the financial
performance of airports.
The airport corporations charge airlines for the services
they provide. These charges are to cover the cost of providing:
-
government-mandated security services: the Board
of Airline Representatives of Australia claims that the chargewhich
varies by airportranges from $3.50 to $5.50 per passenger, and that
additional measures add $1.20 per passenger on international flights(69)
-
terrorism insurance: charges vary from airline to
airline. According to the Board of Airline Representatives of Australia,
the charges can be as high as $12 per passenger. Sydney Airports Corporation
Limited is seeking to recover the increased cost of terrorism insurance,
effective 1 April 2003.
The airport company estimates that the increase cost is about $4 per
return trip for international passengers and about $2 for domestic
passengers(70)
-
aeronautical services: charges range from $38 at
Sydney KSA
to between $22 and $26 per passenger at other airports.(71)
Following the end of the price caps, some airports increased aeronautical
charges considerably. For example, Melbourne airport increased charges
by 35 per cent, which translated to an increase of around $1 for domestic
passengers and $3 for international passengers.(72) The increases
were criticised at the time. However Productivity Commission chairman,
Gary Banks, has stated:
Some
have interpreted recent hikes in aeronautical charges at particular
airports as evidence of the damaging exercise of market power. However,
that largely misses the point of the increases.
The price agreements which have been
reached set prices for several years (for example, for 5 years at Melbourne
and Brisbane airports) and importantly will cover major
investment programs. For example, Melbourne
Airport is committed to a
$150 million upgrade including modification of its runways to accommodate
the A380 Airbus
As for the magnitude of the rises in
aeronautical chargeswhich, by the way, might equate to $1 to $2 per
domestic passengerthese need to be seen in the context of the desirable
shift from single-till cross subsidisation to dual-till pricing. It
is also worth noting that the new investment would have led to increased
charges under the old price cap regime. Big increases can be called
for. The ACCC itself did not object to a 97 per cent increase in aeronautical
charges at Sydney KSA
in 2001 under the previous regulatory regime. In sum, price increases
that generate appropriate investment levels at airports without excessive
returns accruing to airports are to be encouraged, not condemned.(73)
-
airspace management
-
en route and airport terminal-related air traffic control
-
aviation environment services
-
rescue and fire fighting services.
These services remain a Commonwealth responsibility; the Airservices Act 1995
established Airservices Australia
to discharge these services and to charge users of capital city
and major regional airports to recover their cost.
Airservices Australia has moved from
network to location-specific pricing for its airport-related charges.
Under network pricing, the cost of providing services differed among
airports, but charges did not reflect these differences. As a result,
some airports cross-subsidised others. Airservices Australia
first introduced location-specific pricing for airport rescue and fire
fighting services on 1 July
1997. It also charges
for en route air navigation services on a user-pays basis.
The move to location-specific pricing meant that airways charges at some
airports those previously subsidised under network pricingrose considerably.
To ease the transition, the Government's 199899 Budget introduced a
subsidy for the transition to location-specific pricing for some regional
and general aviation airports. To a large extent, it is a subsidy to
regional and rural Australia as it is mainly regional
airports such as Tamworth that benefit. The estimated
cost of the subsidy in 200203 is $7 million.
The Department of Transport and Regional Services administers
the Payment Scheme for Airservices Australia's En Route Charges which
subsidises Airservices Australia en route air traffic control charges
incurred by around 30 small scheduled service airlines and operators
of aero-medical services such as the Royal Flying Doctor Service. Regional
airlines that operate small aircraft will also be exempt from en route
charges from 1 January
2002 to June 2005. The subsidy will cost $6 million in 200203.
The Government is committed to retaining ownership of Airservices Australia, but its corporatisation
and the outsourcing of some of its services, such as fire fighting,
are on the agenda. The Government is introducing the Air Services Legislation
Amendment Bill 2003 that would, among other things, convert Airservices
Australia into a company registered
under the corporations law. This would distance it from theist current
level of parliamentary scrutiny.
The pattern of long-term investment in upgrading facilities at the major
airports has tended to be'lumpy'with concentrated, large-scale infrastructure
investments being undertaken every few decades in response to changing
aircraft technology and spurts in demand for flights. For example, large
scale upgrading of Australia's capital city airports
occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s to facilitate the transition
to the large jet aircraft that replaced prop and turbo-prop trunk route
aircraft. Likewise, the introduction of the Boeing 747 jumbo jets in
the late 1960s and early 1970s required large investments in longer,
wider and stronger runways and new, larger terminals.
A similar leap in infrastructure investment at Australia's international airports
will be required in preparation for the introduction from March 2006
of the Airbus A380
double-decker 'mega jets'. It has been estimated that Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane airports will have to
spend around $250 million each in order to accommodate the new aircraft.(74)
Slots
Systems
In view of the strong long-term growth in Australian air traffic,
efficient allocation of airport capacity, especially of runway capacity,
is increasingly urgent. This is particular the case at airports like
Sydney,
where the opportunities to expand capacity are limited by severe space
and environmental constraints.
There are several approaches to dealing with this challenge. One is the
use of administratively based airport slot systems. A 'slot' is the concession or the entitlement to use runway
capacity at a certain airport on a specific date and at a specific time.
Slots
are typically allocated to airlines by administrative direction. An
alternative approach that many
economists now advocate is the use of market mechanisms, such as auctioning
slots to the highest bidders.
While
slot systems are
highly effective in rationing scare airport and airspace capacity, they
can restrain competition among incumbent airlines and between incumbents
and new entrants. Slot systems thus have the potential to negate the
gains of aviation liberalisation if national governments misuse them
or allow airport owners to use them to pursue parochial interests. To
promote competition, slot systems should ensure that new entrants have
a fair chance of establishing viable operations. Market based solutions
such as the sale of slots by tender would ensure that slots go to airlines
whose passengers place the highest value on the slots (see discussion
below under 'Rationalisation of Sydney KSA Operations').
Sydney KSA is the only Australian
airport that has a slot management scheme. The system was introduced
in 1998 to facilitate the movement 'cap' authorised under the Sydney Airport Demand
Management Act 1997. Under the Act, the number of aircraft
movements is capped at 80 an hour (although the Minister for Transport
may determine a different limit). Slots were allocated to airlines primarily
on the basis of the services that the airline operated in 1997.
A particular feature of the slot system at Sydney KSA is that slots for
regional airlines are effectively protectedthe 'regional ring fence'because
slots 'grandfathered' by regional airlines (that is, those inherited
from long-standing usage patterns) can only be swapped for slots for
interstate and international airlines within 30 minutes of their originally
scheduled time. In December 2000, the Government announced that regional
slots would be capped at current levels during peak periods. Outside
peak hours, regional airlines would be free to bid for new slots, but
would be subject to new rules about aircraft size. The intention is
to encourage the use of larger aircraft.(75)
Airport
Noise Amelioration Programs
There are two noise amelioration programs: one at Sydney
KSA and the other at Adelaide
airport.
The Department of Transport and Regional Services administers
the Sydney Airport Noise Amelioration Programme, which began in 1994
when the third runway was opened. Since then, buildings have been bought
or sound-insulated at a cost of more than $400 million. Costs are recovered
through a levy on jet aircraft landings. This raises between $37 million
and $38 million annually; the total collected, as at 31 December 2002, was around $267 million.(76)
The enabling legislation is the Aircraft Noise
Levy Act 1995
and the Aircraft
Noise Levy Collection
Act 1995
. These allow the Minister
for Transport to declare an airport to be the subject of an aircraft
noise levy (a leviable airport). The Collection Act specifies qualifying
airports as those having a public building within a 25 Australian
Noise Exposure (ANEF)
contour or a residence within a 30 ANEF contour.(77) In
the 199697 Budget, the Government announced that it would extend the
period of the levy at Sydney
KSA from 10 years to 12 years to recover
the additional compensation costs associated with the reopening of the
east-west runway.
The Government announced the Adelaide
airport program in May 2000 and applied the levy in the 200001 Budget.
The program involves the sound-insulation of around 600 residences and
five public buildings.
At the end of June 2002, about $395 million had been
spent on noise reduction measures at both airports.
Sydney (Kingsford-Smith)
Airport
The Government announced the lease sale, by tender,
of Sydney KSA
on 25 June 2002. A Macquarie Bank-led consortium known as Southern
Cross was the successful bidder and paid $5.6 billion for the 99-year
lease(78) and trades as Sydney Airports Corporation Limited.
Net proceeds are estimated at $4.23 billion and have been used to pay
off government debt. The Labor Opposition has argued that proceeds should
have been spent on transport infrastructure rather than just retiring
government debt.(79)
The Government
has emphasised that the sale would not change the Government's full
regulatory control over the airport, including the noise abatement measures
and guaranteed slots for regional airlines. The Government further pledged
that the pricing regime for regional airlines would be maintained after
privatisation: ' so that they cannot be forced out by an underhand
policy of the landlord upping the rent'.(80)
Provisions of the Airports Act require that:
-
Sydney
KSA must remain majority Australian-owned
-
airline ownership in the airport is limited to 5
per cent
-
cross-ownership restrictions apply to investors with
a stake in Melbourne,
Brisbane or Perth
airports.
These restrictions are designed to safeguard competition
in the Australian aviation industry.
The airport's new owners have indicated that there
is no need for a second Sydney
airport as there is still considerable potential to expand Sydney
KSA's capacity. The airport's life
could be extended if its operations were changed because its technical
capacity far exceeds its actual (regulation-constrained) capacity. In
2000, Sydney KSA
averaged 77 passengers per aircraft movement compared with 94 at Melbourne,
155 at Singapore,
169 at Hong Kong and 204 at Narita airport near
Tokyo.(81)
Two key constraints are the regional slots at peak
times and the (noise-related) cap on the number of hourly movements.
The Government-guaranteed regional slots are, in effect, a quota system.
If a market were to operate whereby rights to land or take off in peak
times were auctioned, or if there were peak-load pricing to discourage
marginal flights, the outcome would be different. In all likelihood,
regional flights would be confined to non-peak times and/or relocated
to sites such as Bankstown Aerodrome in peak times. The Government has
indicated that it wants the lessee of Bankstown
to develop it as an 'overflow' airport to take excess traffic from Sydney
KSA, with an extended runway and new
terminal facilities.(82)
The Sydney Airport Curfew
Act 1995 provides for a curfew on most operations between
11pm and 6am. During the curfew,
only certain categories of operations are permitted. They relate principally
to small aircraft and 'low-noise' jets. The curfew also provides for
runway use restrictions between 10pm and 11pm and between 6am and 7am. The Act imposes a fine of $110 000 on operators who breach the curfew.
The curfew, which contributes to a classic peak-load problem, affects mainly
long-haul international airlines. They arrive when the curfew is lifted,
leading to a peak in demand for international terminal services between
7am and 10am. This coincides with peak demand for domestic services, which
begins at 7am and continues to 9:30am. Consequently, facilities
such as the international terminal and runways have considerable surplus
capacity at non-peak times. The curfew thus has considerable economic
and financial costs.
In short, regulation of the operations at Sydney KSA shows that the Government
prefers administrative rather than 'economic' solutions such as peak-load
pricing and the sale of slots by auction. Regional airlines are major
beneficiaries of regulation. They are probably effectively subsidised
by passengers of non-regional services.
Since the 1940s, federal and state governments formed from both Coalition
and Labor parties, have grappled with the need to build a second Sydney airport. A chronology
of policies and developments associated with second Sydney
airport issues since 1946 is available on the Department of the Parliamentary
Library website.
Of the 19 sites that have been considered, two remained under discussion
in the 1990s, namely Badgery's Creek and Holsworthy, although the latter
was subsequently rejected. As campaigns against both sites were mounted, discussion continued
on a 'Sydney West second airport and the
possibility of using the Richmond RAAF base.
However, the sale of Sydney KSA reinforced its status
as the primary airport in the region, something that is unlikely to
change over the next two decades. In any event, current policy is that
a future federal government will decide if development of the Badgery's
Creek site should proceed. Specifically, under the sale arrangements
for Sydney KSA, Southern Cross will have the first right of refusal
to build and operate any second major airport within 100km of the Sydney
central business district if the Federal government of the day decided
that it was needed.
The Government has stated that any decision by a federal
government to build a second airport would be subject to a review of
Sydney's
airport needs in 2005, although it does not believe that a second airport
will be necessary before the end of this decade.(83) As at 16 June 2003, the Commonwealth had
spent more than $144 million buying land at the proposed Sydney West airport site at Badgery's
Creek.
Furthermore, while the Howard Government had indicated
that Bankstown Airport,
the largest of the three general aviation airports in the Sydney
Basin, would be expanded
to cope with overflow from the recently privatised Sydney
KSA, it has recently retracted this
strategy. In announcing the sale of Bankstown
Airport in April 2003, Acting
Transport Minister Wilson Tuckey indicated that the 'overflow' role
for Bankstown was no longer
necessary because of a decline in air
traffic after the terrorist attacks of September
11 2001, the collapse of Ansett
and the trend to larger aircraft on regional routes. He indicated that the sale would proceed without development
obligations.(84)
-
Sir Billy Snedden, 'Foreword'
in H.W. Poulton, Law, History
and Politics of the Australian Two Airline System, Parkville, Melbourne, 1981, p. xv.
-
-
-
Code sharing is a commercial agreement between two airlines that allows
an airline to put its two-letter identification code on the flights
of another airline as they appear in computerised reservations systems.
Airlines that share coders typically coordinate schedules to minimise
connection times as well as provide additional customer services,
such as one-stop check-in and checking baggage right through to
the final destination.
-
Value-based airlines are typified by business models based on high frequency
direct flights using a very limited set of aircraft types, with
a single rather than basic class of service, no or extremely little
interlining, a strong regional focus and very low marketing, ticketing
and revenue management costs. See Network Economics Consulting Group,
Report on the competitive effects and public benefits arising from the
proposed alliance between Qantas and Air New Zealand, Network
Economics Consulting Group Pty Ltd, Canberra,
8 December 2002, p. 9.
-
Jane Boyle, 'Virgin looks to treble its profits', Australian Financial Review, 5 February 2003, p. 45.
-
'Virgin
Blue set to treble profits', Travelbiz
(electronic newsletter), 6 February 2003.
-
IBISWorld Australia, Scheduled
Domestic Air Transport in Australia (electronic
document), 22 April 2003, p. 8.
-
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, loc. cit.
-
-
-
-
'Skywest: Regulation means certainty', Traveltrade, 26 March 2003, p. 6.
-
'Anderson backs Rex, Virgin push', Australian Financial Review, 11 June 2003, p. 2.
-
The recent
agreement between Rex and Virgin Blue allowing passengers to book
flights on both airlines and to book luggage across both operators
is significant in that it is a step back towards the more typical
integration of regional and trunk airline services. See
'Virgin and Rex become fellow travellers',
Australian Financial Review,
11 June 2003, p. 1.
-
Thomas, Ian, After
AnsettEmerging Public Policy Issues in the Australian Airline Industry.
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Vital Issues Seminar series,
19 March 2002.
-
-
-
-
-
-
Qantas New Zealand had a very
short history. It was owned and operated by Tasman Pacific Airlines
in New Zealand, and operated under a Qantas franchise
using the Qantas logo and copyrights. The Airline had Dash 8 and
Bae 146 aircraft of the former Ansett New Zealand, and operated
until Tasman Pacific was placed into receivership. With the
collapse of Qantas New Zealand, Qantas assisted the
stranded New Zealand public using
its own 737 aircraft for internal New Zealand flights. This led to the establishment
of Jetconnect.
-
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics,
Aviation Statistics and Analysis, International
Airlines, op. cit.
-
The removal of cabotage restrictions has long been advocated by proponents
of complete airline deregulation who point out that it could encourage
foreign and Australian international carriers who operate international
flights over domestic routes to offer cheap, marginally costed fares
to domestic passengers, thereby stimulating domestic tourism and
travel. The opposing argument is that removal of cabatage would
result in domestic route 'cream skimming' and capacity dumping by
foreign carriers and that this would represent a net welfare loss
to Australia as well as endangering the financial viability of the
domestic airline industry.
-
'Skywest
seeks cash to buy Fokkers', Australian
Financial Review, 13 June 2003, p. 62.
-
'Air review
urges competition curb' and 'State to protect struggling airlines',
The West Australian, 25 January 2003.
-
-
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics,
Avline, op. cit, p. 8.
-
-
House of Representatives, Debates,
21 September 1994, p. 1295.
-
On 18 September
1996, Treasurer Peter Costello announced that approval,
with conditions, had been given under the Government's foreign investment
policy to the proposal by Air NZ Limited to acquire a 50 per cent
interest in Ansett. This decision was taken following consultations
between the Treasurer and the Minister for Transport. The proposal
was seen as consistent with the requirements of the Air
Navigation Act 1920 and the Government's air navigation policy.
The other 50 per cent of Ansett continued to be held by The News
Corporation Limited (NewsCorp).
In order to ensure that Air NZ's proposed acquisition
complied with the Government's air navigation policy and the
Air Navigation Act 1920, the foreign investment approval is
subject to certain conditions. These conditions, in particular,
required Ansett's internationally operating entity, Ansett International
Limited (AIL), to be substantially owned and effectively controlled
by Australians, which was necessary for AIL to retain its status
as a designated Australian international carrier airline. Included
in the conditions was the requirements that AIL's head office
and operational base remain in Australia and at least two thirds
of AIL's Board, including the chair, are Australian citizens.
Source: Treasurer's Press Release, 'Foreign Investment Case',
18
September 1996.
-
-
The Independent Air Services Commission, a division of the Department
of Transport and Regional Services, undertakes part of the administration
of the bilateral air service agreements system. Its role is to determine
the outcomes of applications by existing and prospective Australian
airlines for capacity and route entitlements available under air
services arrangements. These determinations allocate the available
capacity on a route to one or more carriers and set conditions.
The Government, through the Department of Transport and Regional Services, has responsibility
for administering and negotiating Australia's air services arrangements. In this role,
the department is responsible for maintaining a Register of Available
Capacity for use by the commission and applicants.
-
John
Anderson, Minister for Transport and Regional Services,
'Australia Calls for a Free World in Aviation', Media Release A86/2000, 5 June 2000,
-
-
-
'Virgin Blue Demands Protection from Tie-up',
Flight International,
1824 February 2003, p. 13.
-
Virgin Blue submission in response to applications
for authorisation of the proposed QantasAir New ZealandAir Pacific Alliance, 12 February 2003.
-
'Airlines aim to bypass Fels', Australian
Financial Review, 28 April 2003, p. 64.
-
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics,
Avline, op. cit, p. 10.
-
-
The Tesna
consortium was registered as a company in October 2001. It was established
to recapitalise and revitalise the mainline operations of Ansett
Australia and consisted of two prominent Australian business
people, Messrs L. Fox and S. Lew. In withdrawing its bid for Ansett
on February 27 2002, the consortium attributed the
bid's collapse to its inability to reach agreement with third parties
on issues principally related to the transfer of domestic airport
terminal leases. Contract requirements for the transfer of leases
at Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth to Tesna could not be finalised
in time. It also said that serious issues remained unresolved including
those relating to environmental risk and the use of Ansett's International
Air Transport Association designator code.
-
Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, Answers to Questions on Notice, Supplementary Estimates
2022 November 2002, p. 124.
-
Department of Transport and Regional Services, Portfolio Additional Estimates
Statements 200203, p. 33.
-
Personal communication from the Department of
Transport and Regional Services.
-
M. Blenkin, 'Fed: Govt says no Xmas present, no end to Ansett tax', AFP
(Electronic News Service), 21 December 2002.
-
'Trustee's appeal means Ansett levy will linger',
Australian Financial Review,
25 March 2003, p. 3.
-
'Ansett levy to stayfor now', Australian Financial Review, 2 April 2003, p. 5.
-
John
Anderson, 'Ansett levy to end this month', Media Release,
10 June 2003.
-
Martin Ferguson, '$1/2 billion slush fund growing under false pretences',
Media Statement, 30 January 2003.
-
-
Bruce Teague, 'Qantas competitors need a helping hand from the Government', Sydney Morning Herald, 22 March
2002.
-
Economies of scale are the gains by way of reduced costs of production
per unit of output arising from the increasing size of plant or
operations.
-
Toni O'Loughlin, 'Small business presses for competition law inquiry', Australian Financial Review, 4 April
2002,
p. 16.
-
Minter Ellison, Newsalert,
'Misuse of Market Power Redfined',7 February 2003, p. 2
-
John Quiggin, 'Competition policy takes a nose dive', Australian Financial Review, 14 September 2001, p. 13.
-
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Survey
Australia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Paris, March 2003, p. 102.
-
'Virgin sails past SingTel hiccup', Australian
Financial Review, 10 July 2002, p. 15.
-
'Virgin looks to treble its profits', Australian Financial Review, 5 February 2003, p. 45.
-
Jane Boyle, 'Virgin vows to cross Tasman', Australian Financial Review, 13
February 2003, p. 17.
-
Commonwealth of Australia, Review
of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act, Canberra, 31 January 2003.
-
On 17 December
2002,
the Transport and Regional Services Minister John Anderson and Defence
Minister Robert Hill, announced that the Government would examine
whether merging military and civil air-traffic management systems
could cut duplication and costs. See 'Australia to examine unified air traffic management system',
Joint Media Statement 12 February 2002,
-
A single till is an arrangement for setting airport charges whereby
all airport revenues and costs are taken into account in setting
aeronautical prices. Allowable aeronautical prices are set on a
'residual basis', after subtracting from total airport costs the
revenue derived from non-aeronautical activities. In contrast, a
dual till is an arrangement for setting airport charges whereby
the costs and revenues of providing aeronautical services are included
in the assessment of allowable aeronautical prices. In other words,
aeronautical services are priced on a 'stand-alone' basis, without
regard to any net revenues from non-aeronautical services.
-
The Phase 2 airports comprised Adelaide, Alice Springs,
Canberra, Coolangatta, Darwin, Hobart, Launceston, Townsville, Mount Isa, Tennant Creek, Archerfield, Jandakot, Moorabbin
and Parafield.
-
'Last call for sale of Sydney airports', Australian
Financial Review, 10 April 2003, p. 6.
-
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics,
Avline, op. cit, p. 2.
-
-
-
Board of Airline Representatives of Australia, op. cit. p 3.
-
Sydney Airport Corporation Limited, 'Insurance Costs Recovery', Media
Release, 28 February 2003.
-
Board of Airline Representatives of Australia, op. cit. p. 3.
-
'Airport & Airline: Asia
Pacific', No. 187, 19 July 2002.
-
-
'Mega jets force airports upgrade', Australian
Financial Review, 4 July 2002, p. 1.
-
-
Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, Answers to Questions on Notice, Supplementary Estimates
2022 November 2002, p. 125.
-
The Noise Exposure Forecast system is a scientific measure of the aircraft
noise exposure levels around aerodromes. It can be used for assessing
average community response to aircraft noise and for land-use planning
around aerodromes. In the Australian system, noise exposure levels
are calculated in Australian Noise Exposure Forecast units, which
take into account various factors concerned with aircraft noise
such as the intensity, duration, tonal content and spectrum of audible
frequencies of the noise of aircraft take-offs, approaches to landing
and reverse thrust after landing. The Department of Transport and
Regional Services has developed transparent noise information software
which can be customised to enable aircraft noise disclosure information
to be rapidly produced for individual airports
-
John Anderson, 'Sale of Sydney Airport', Media Release, 25 June 2002.
-
Martin Ferguson, Press Release 'Sale of Sydney Airport', 25 June 2002. Ferguson's
press release noted that:
Labor supports
the sale of Kingsford Smith Airport. The sale of Sydney airport completes a process of airport sales commenced
by Labor in government. The real difference between the Government
and the Opposition is that, in addition to retiring debt, the
Opposition believes that there is a requirement on this generation
to actually invest in our future infrastructure needs. In the
past, previous generations did that. That sale of Sydney airport, after retiring debt, represents a return to
Government of about $4.2 billion.
-
John Anderson, 'Regional access to Sydney Airport guaranteed', op. cit.
-
Aviation Analyst-Asia Pacific, No. 32, September 2001, p. 15.
-
John Anderson, 'regional access to Sydney Airport guaranteed', op. cit.
-
John Anderson, 'Sale of Sydney Airport', op. cit.
-
'Last call for sale of Sydney airports', op. cit.
Appendix 1: Principal Regional Airlines, Australia, May
2003
Aeropelican
Description:
Is now a subsidiary of Horizon Airlines, after being purchased from
the Ansett Administrators.
Aircraft: DHC-6-300
Twin Otter (4)
Routes: Newcastle/ Belmont and Newcastle/ Williamstown to Sydney
Airlink
Description:
airlink has been involved in charter operations out of Dubbo for about
31 years and commenced regional airline services in 1991 on routes vacated
by Hazelton Airlines. In late 2001 Air Link moved its on-carriage to
QantasLink/ Eastern flights after Hazelton had temporarily suspended
operations. Air Link introduced in March 2003 a Beech 1900D, used exclusively
for the Dubbo-Sydney route.
Routes: Dubbo
to Sydney, the Mudgee; Dubbo-Coonamble, Walgett and Lightning
Ridge; Dubbo to Cobar; and Dubbo to Bourke.
Aircraft: Beechcraft
1900D (1), PA-31-350 (5), Cessna 310R (4)
Airlines of South Australia
Description: founded
in 1998, Airlines of South Australia currently operate flights from
Adelaide to Port Augusta and Port Lincoln and from Port Augusta
to Leigh Creek, Innamincka, Birdsville and Boulia.
Aircraft: Embraer
110-P1 (2), Embraer 110-P2 (1), PA-31-350 (4), Commander 500S (1).
Alliance Airlines
Description: Founded
in mid-2001, alliance Airlines in March ceased all operations from Rockhampton
and Gladstone. The company cited financial reasons for the decision.
Routes: Alliance operates services from Brisbane
to Norfolk Island and Townsville; and a weekly Sydney to Norfolk Island service.
Aircraft: Fokker
F100 (2), Embraer EMB 120ER (2).
Australian Air Express
Description:
Established in 1992 as a joint venture between Qantas (the Australian
Airlines) and Australia Post, Australian air Express currently wet leases
seven Boeing 727F freighters from Trans Australian Air and three BAe
146s from National Jet Systems.
Aircraft and Routes: The airline has Boeing 727F's based in Perth, Melbourne, Hobart and Cairns,
BAe 146's based in Brisbane and Adelaide, Hawker Siddley's based in
Sydney and Metro 3's based in MacKay, Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne.
Australian Air Express's fleet of 727's service the following routes:
Perth/ Melbourne/ Brisbane/ Townsville/ Cairns; Perth/
Sydney/ Melbourne/
Perth; Perth/
Melbourne/ Perth;
Cairns/ Townsville/ Brisbane/ Melbourne/ Perth;
Hobart/
Launceston/ Melbourne/ Launceston/ Melbourne; Melbourne/
Brisbane/ Melbourne/ Hobart. The 146's operate Brisbane/
Sydney/ Melbourne/ Sydney/ Brisbane; Adelaide/
Sydney/ Brisbane/ Sydney/ Adelaide
and Adelaide/ Melbourne/ Sydney/ Melbourne/ Adelaide.
Australian Airlines
Description: is
wholly owned by Qantas but operated independently and managed separately.
Set up as a low cost international airline in October 2002, Australian
Routes: Airlines
currently operates four Boeing 767-300s but plans to increase its fleet
in the near future. Operating from Cairns, the airline offers daily services to Osaka, Nagoya
and the Gold Coast; with three services every week to Fukuoka, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taipei.
Aircraft: Boeing
767-300ER (4)
Cape York Air
Description:
Cairns-based Cape Yok Airlines provides air services to 67 airports
on Cape York and throughout Far North Queensland. Additionally the company has a base
located on Badu Island in the Torres Straits. The company is a contractor to
Australian post and reciecves as Australian Federal Government subsidy
under the Rural Air Service Scheme (RASS). The company's air mail delivery
service is the longest service of its type in the world.
Routes: Horn Island to Boigu, Badu, Kubin, Mabuiag and Saibai.
Aircraft: Cessna
208A (1), BN Islander (1), PA-31-310 (2), Partenavia P.68B (1).
Emu Airways
Routes: Adelaide to Kingscote; Adelaide to Wudinna.
Aircraft: Beech
1900C (2), PA-31-350 (2), Cessna 402B (1).
Golden Eagle Aviation
Description:
are agents for Australian air Express and the company have a comprehensive
delivery and pick up service.
Routes: Port
Hedland, South Hedland, Wedgefield, Derby, Karratha, Dampier, Karratha's light
industrial area, Wickham and the surrounding areas.
Aircraft: The
airlines current fleet are located over three bases throughout the Kimberly and Pilbara. These bases have the following aircraft:
Port Hedland Piper Chieftain (1), Piper Seneca (1); Derby Cessna
206 (3), Britten Norman Islander (2), Piper Navajo (2), Cessna 310 (1);
Kununurra: Cessna 206 (1), Piper Chieftain (1), Piper Seneca (1).
Horizon Airlines
Description:
provides a wide range of aviation services to the Australian public
and industry. Operations vary from Regular Passenger Services (RPT)
with Metro 23 aircraft, to charter operations in Metro 2's, through
to ad hoc charters in the 44-seat turbo prop BAe-748. Additionally Horizon
Airlines operate three, BAe-748 freighters Australia wide.
Routes: Horizon
services Sydney to Taree, Newcastle (Williamstown), and Cooma.
Aircraft: BAe-748
(5), metro 23 (2, soon to be 3), Metro II (1)
King Island Airlines
Routes: operate
two daily flights Monday to Friday between Melbourne / Moorabbin and King Island; and one daily service on Saturday and Sunday.
Aircraft: EMB-110P1
Bandeirante (1), PA-31-350 Chieftain (4).
Macair Airlines
Routes:The
Macair network connects the following ports: Bedourie, Boulia, Brisbane,
Birdsville, Burketown, Cairns, Charleville, Cloncurry, Cunnamulla, Doomadgee
Mission, Dunk Island, Edward River (Pormpuraaw), Hughenden, Julia Creek,
Kowanyama, Lizard Island, Longreach, Mornington Island, Mount Isa, Normanton,
Oakey, Quilpie, Richmond, Thargomindah, Toowoomba, Townsville, St George,
Windorah and Winton.
Aircraft: Saab
340B (2), DHC-6-300 92), Fairchild Metro 23 (4), Fairchild Metro III (4).
National Jet Systems
Description:
provides aviation services such as wet leasing, scheduled airlines operations,
charter and resource industry air services for major corporate and government
organisations.
Routes: Darwin to McArthur River, Perth to
Christmas Island and Cocos
Islands.
Aircraft: BAe
146-100 / RJ70 and Dash 8-200.
Norfolk Jet Express
Routes: Norfolk Island to Brisbane,
Melbourne and Sydney.
Aircraft: Boeing
737-4L7 (1).
Northwest Regional Airlines
Routes: Broome
to Port Hedland, Karratha and Exmouth, Broome to Fitzroy Crossing and
Halls Creek.
Aircraft: Cessna
404 (3), Cessna 310R (1)
O'Connor Airlines
Description:
carries around 80 000 people each year.
Routes: currently
provides daily flights to and from Mount Gambier, Melbourne, Adelaide,
Whyalla and Mildura.
Aircraft: BAe Jetstream 32EP (3), Cessna 441 (1).
Qantas Airways
Description:
Founded in the Queensland outback in 1920, Qantas is the world's oldest continually
operating airline and is Australia's largest domestic and international carrier. Qantas
is also one of the world's leading long distance airlines, having pioneered
services from Australia to North
America and Europe.
Qantas operates a fleet of 185 aircraft, Routes: Serves 67 domestic
destinations including a number of major regional ports and 75 international
destinations in 32 countries.
Aircraft: Boeing
747-400 (29), Boeing 747-338 (6), Boeing 767-300ER (25), Boeing 767-238ER
(7), Boeing 737-838 (15), Boeing 737-400 (22), Boeing 737-300 (17),
A330-200 (3).
Qantaslink
Description and Aircraft: Qantas' regional
airline, QantasLink regional airlines are wholly owned subsidiaries
of Qantas and operate in excess of 2700 flights each week to 55 destinations
across Australia.
QantasLink flies more frequently and to more destinations that Qantas
domestic. QantasLink comprises four separate
regional
airline entities - Airconnex (Impulse Airlines), Airlink, Eastern Australia
Airlines and Sunstate Airlines. With 61 aircraft in the QantasLink fleet,
three aircraft types are used: Boeing 717 jets (14)
BAe
146 jets (15) and De Havilland Dash 8 turboprops (32).
Qantaslink / Airconnex (Impulse Airlines)
Routes: Airconnex currently serves 14 ports
throughout Australia:
Adelaide,
Brisbane,
Coolangatta (Gold Coast), Hamilton
Island,
Hobart, Launceston
Mackay Maroochydore
(Sunshine
Coast),
Melbourne,
Newcastle,
Proserpine
(Whitsunday Airport),Rockhampton,
Sydney and Townsville.
Aircraft:
Boeing 717-200 (14)
Qantaslink
/ Eastern Australia Airlines
Routes:Eastern
operates from Sydney to Albury, Armidale, Ballina, Canberra, Coffs Harbour,
Dubbo, Grafton, Lord Howe Island, Moree, Mount Hotham, Narrabri, Newcastle/William
town, Port Macquarie, Tamworth and Wagga Wagga and from Melbourne to
Burnie/Wynyard, Canberra, Devonport, Mildura, Mount Hotham and Newcastle/William
town.
Aircraft:
Dash 8Q300 (5), Dash 8200 (3), Dash 8-100 (13)
Qantaslink / Sunstate Airlines
Routes: Sunstate operates a network of services from Brisbane to the following ports: Barcaldine,
Blackall, Blackwater, Bundaberg, Cairns, Charleville, Coffs Harbour, Coolangatta, Emerald, Gladstone, Hamilton Island, Longreach, Lord Howe Island, Mackay, Melbourne, Newcastle/Williamtown, Rockhampton,
Roma, Thursday Island, Townsville and Weipa.
Aircraft: Dash 8-300 (4), Dash 8200 (2),
and Dash 8-100 (5)
Regional Express (Rex)
Description:
Rex is one of
Australia's
newest regional airlines and was formed through the merger of Hazelton
and Kendell Airlines. Its headquarters are in Sydney with its
main operational, engineering and maintenance base in Wagga Wagga.
Rex is about to commence
an interlining agreement with Virgin Blue.
Routes:
Rex services the capital cities of Adelaide, Canberra, Melbourne, and
Sydney and the regional centres of Ceduna, Port Lincoln, Coober Pedv,
Kangaroo Island (Kingscote), Whyalla, Olympic Dam, Broken Hill, Mt Gambier,
Portland, King Island, Burnie, Devonport, Wagga Wagga, Albury, Merimbula,
Dubbo, Bathurst, Griffith NSW, Lismore, Mildura, Moruya, Narrandera,
Orange, Parkes and Ballina.
Aircraft:
Saab 340 (21), Fairchild Metro 23(7)
Rex
recently announced a major upgrade of its Saab aircraft fleet, replacing
10 34-seat Saab aircraft with 10 updated and `as new' versions of the
Saab 340B starting March 2003
Skytrans
Description: Skytrans Airlines is a Queensland-based airline and
air charter business with bases in Cairns and the Torres Strait.
Routes: With a fleet of 17 aircraft, the company operates scheduled services from
Cairns to Aurukun, Coen,
Cooktown, Karumba, Lockhart River, and Yorke Island with a connection
to Horn Island. The company also
flies charter operations throughout Australia, Papua New Guinea and the south western
Pacific.
Aircraft: King Air 200 (1),
BN Islander (2), Cessna 404 Titan (7), Cessna 402C (2), Cessna 310R(6)
Skywest Airlines
Routes: Skywest operates a network of services from Perth to Albany, Carnarvon, Esperance,
Exmouth, Geraldton, Kalgoorlie, Laverton, Leinster, Leonora, Meekatharra,
Mt Keith, Shark Bay/Monke
Mia and Wiluna.
Aircraft: Fokker 50 (5) Fokker 100
Sunshines Express
Routes: Sunshine
Express operates services from Brisbane to Biloela/Thangool, Hervey Bay, Maroochydore and Maryborough and also offers charter
services. Aircraft: Shorts 360-300 (1), Metro III (2)
Tasair
Routes: Tas
Air operate RPT services on the following routes: Hobart/Wynyard; Devonport/Wynyard/King
Island
Aircraft: PA-31-350
(4), Commander 500S (3)
TransAustralian Air Express
Routes: Trans
Australian Express regularly services the following cities: Melbourne, Perth,
Sydney, Cairns,
Townsville, Hobart and Launceston.
Aircraft: Boeing
727-200 (4), Boeing 727-77C (1)
Virgin Blue Airlines
Routes: Virgin Blue's network includes links to a number
of larger regional centres including
Broome, Cairns, Coffs Harbour, the Gold Coast,
Launceston, Mackay, Rockhampton, the Sunshine Coast, Townsville and the
Whitsunday Coast. Virgin Blue is about
to commence an interlining agreement with Regional Express (Rex).
Aircraft: 737-800 (9), 737-700
(14), 737-400 (1), 737-300 (1)
Source: Aircraft and Aerospace magazine, May 2003 edition,
p. 16.
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