Research Paper 2 1999-2000

Constitutional Referenda in Australia

Scott Bennett
Politics and Public Administration Group

Sean Brennan
Law and Bills Digest Group
24 August 1999

Contents

Major Issues

In November 1999 Australian voters will participate in two referenda on the questions of whether Australia should become a republic and whether a new preamble should be added to the Commonwealth Constitution. Voters will have received a government-sponsored booklet spelling out the proposed changes to the words of the Constitution, and including 2000-word arguments on the YES and NO cases. These will be the 43rd and 44th constitutional referenda since the first in 1906. Over the years, eight amendments have been made: single changes in 1906, 1910, 1928, 1946 and 1967; and three changes in 1977. On five occasions a national majority has been gained, though not a majority of States, causing the proposed alteration to fail.

Section 128, the constitutional provision which provides for referenda emerged from the Convention negotiations of the 1890s as a classical political compromise. In drawing up mechanisms for initiating referenda proposals and ratifying the outcomes, s. 128 gave something to the Commonwealth and to the States, to both the executive and (purportedly) the legislature, and to the people as well as the politicians. This paper canvasses some of the ambiguities created by this particular form of compromise wording, and some prominent proposals for its reform. It also acknowledges that s. 128 takes its place amongst a range of other methods by which constitutional arrangements in Australia can be altered, notably through intergovernmental negotiations and judicial review by the High Court.

There have been a number of significant amendments of the Constitution using s. 128. The 1910 and 1928 cases provided a means for the Commonwealth to ease the burden of State debts, with the latter also providing constitutional backing for the Financial Agreement and the Loan Council. Many Australians have benefited from the social services amendment of 1946, while Australia's indigenous population regards the Aborigines referendum of 1967 as a major landmark in their relationship with the Australian political system. The issue of the replacement of Senators was one of the major points of political contention during 1974-5 and two years later an amendment attempted to remedy this problem. In the same year, residents of Australia's Territories gained the vote in constitutional referenda.

Although constitutional referenda are important occasions of political activity, remarkably little research has been undertaken on Australians' voting behaviour at such times. However, referenda have been much written about and commented upon and this paper discusses some of the views that have been propounded about Australia's voting record in them.

Many critics of our constitutional referenda have been concerned by what they see as the relatively poor record of constitutional change in this country. Some believe that achievement of the 'double majority' is too difficult, while others criticise official support for the handing out of NO cases. There is a common claim concerning voter ignorance and conservatism which is said to account for so many negative votes.

By contrast, others suggest that voters are well aware of what is involved, citing different patterns to the returns as evidence. Amendments perceived to weaken the federal system have generally been given short shrift, whereas attempts to repair the perennially-flawed finance chapter have been received sympathetically. Proposed changes to the Senate are likely to be repelled but matters dealing with Australian society are usually considered closely. It has been claimed that such varying outcomes are a reminder that voters go to a referendum polling place possessing some consciousness of Australian history and politics which influences the way they vote. Other evidence for this has been the fact that particular results have often indicated a voter awareness of what was involved-the vastly different results in the two instances in 1967 for instance. Australian voters have been cautious, and conservative at times, but they have shown their willingness to accept change when persuaded that such change is sensible or right.

Whatever one's view of constitutional referenda, there seems general agreement among commentators that the major parties have treated the electorate with a great deal of disdain in the years since the first referendum in 1906. Not the least of the criticisms of the parties has been the inconsistency in their stance on constitutional amendment. Most notably this has involved supporting issues while in government, which are then opposed when submitted by their opponents.

But the parties have erred in more fundamental ways. They have often tried to do too much at one time, they have sometimes been less than earnest in putting YES cases, and they have sometimes ignored the political times which have made some questions unlikely to be accepted. They have also been unable to avoid opportunistic, short-term responses that have put the embarrassment of their opponents ahead of a careful consideration of the issues under discussion. The parties have also overlooked strong community views on particular questions, and they have often antagonised the Premiers, who have participated in quite a number of NO campaigns.

Overall, then, the history of Australian constitutional referenda has been one of controversy, with many observers criticising the voters, but others directing their criticism at the parties. While the history of referenda in Australia provides some useful perspectives on party and voter behaviour, it offers limited predictive power for the outcome of the referenda to be held in November 1999. Because of the unique combination of issues and circumstances wrapped up in the republic issue, these attempts to change the Constitution will pose fresh questions for the analysis of referenda in Australia.

Introduction

During October-November 1999 public attention will be focussed on the Commonwealth Constitution, as voters consider the questions of Australia becoming a republic, and of adding a new preamble. The process by which the Constitution is amended is complex and probably little-understood by the general community. This paper details the process, and discusses some of the constitutional questions that have arisen since the first amendment in 1906. The paper also looks at some of the statistical aspects of the 42 constitutional referenda that have been held, and investigates the impact of the eight changes that have been made to our Constitution. The debate on the factors that explain referendum successes and failures forms a substantial part of the paper.

Amending the Constitution

The Constitutional Provisions

A proposal to amend the Australian Constitution must first take the form of a Bill submitted to the Commonwealth Parliament. Between two and six months after it leaves the Parliament, the proposal 'shall be submitted' in a referendum to the voters in the various States and Territories.

For an amendment to be ratified, the so-called 'double majority' is required. There must be a majority of voters saying YES in a majority of the States (i.e. at least four of the six), but there must also be a nation-wide affirmative vote. Territory votes are included in the national total, but not in any State figure (Appendix 1).

Issues put to the people in the style of a referendum, but not affecting the Constitution, are usually called plebiscites. Three national plebiscites have been held (Appendix 2). Most Australian referenda and plebiscites have been conducted at the State level.

The YES and NO Cases

Parliament prescribes the manner in which referendum votes are taken. In most referenda since the Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act 1912 (No. 2), each elector has received a pamphlet containing arguments in favour of, or against, any proposal upon which s(he) is voting. Normally, these arguments must be no more than two thousand words in length, and must be authorised by a majority of those parliamentary members who voted for or against the proposed law. When more than one referendum is held on the same day, a particular argument may be more than two thousand words, provided the average of YES or NO arguments is not greater than two thousand words.(1)

In some cases, NO arguments are not produced. In 1967, for instance, arguments for and against the Nexus alteration were produced, but only a YES argument in relation to the Aborigines amendment. The Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (s. 11) states that such arguments as are produced must be submitted to each voter, 'not later than 14 days before the voting day for the referendum'.

Typically, the NO cases are argued by informal groups of individuals often combining their efforts with the Opposition, while the YES cases are usually led by the sponsoring government. A marked departure from this norm will be seen in the pending republic referendum. Unusually, the cases will be managed by two advertising campaign committees appointed by the government, with the YES committee chaired by Malcolm Turnbull of the Australian Republican Movement, and the NO committee by Kerry Jones of Australians for a Constitutional Monarchy. The Government's role will be limited to ensuring that each committee's proposals meet the 'basic standards' set for 'the activities to be covered by the public funding', as well as accounting for the use of the funds. The two publicly-funded committees, therefore, will be 'responsible for the conduct of the campaign'.(2) Governments and Oppositions have not previously been prepared to hand over so much control to others.

The Ballot Paper

From the first ballot in 1906, the style of question was strictly uniform, voters being asked 'Do you approve of a proposed law for the alteration of the Constitution entitled [here the title of the proposed law was inserted]'. Examples from down the years included:

For the 1974 referenda, a slight change was made to the wording, so that the style of ballot paper was as follows:

For the most recent efforts in 1988, the wording changed again:

Constitutional Facts and Figures

The 42 Constitutional Referenda

An amendment ratified by referendum becomes an integral part of our Constitution. Although some referenda have had more than one part-such as the single 1944 Powers referendum which had fourteen parts-we commonly think of there being 42 separate attempts (Table 1).(3)

Table 1: Constitutional Referenda 1906-1988

Year	Proposal	Government submitting	States approving	YES votes (per cent)
1906	Senate elections	Protectionist	6	82.7
1910	Finance	Fusion	3 (Qld, WA, Tas)	49.0
	State debts	Fusion	5 (all except NSW)	54.9
1911	Legislative powers	ALP	1 (WA)	39.4
	Monopolies	ALP	1 (WA)	39.9
1913	Trade & commerce	ALP	3 (Qld, WA, SA)	49.4
	Corporations	ALP	3 (Qld, WA, SA)	49.3
	Industrial matters	ALP	3 (Qld, WA, SA)	49.3
	Railway disputes	ALP	3 (Qld, WA, SA)	49.1
	Trusts	ALP	3 (Qld, WA, SA)	49.8
	Monopolies	ALP	3 (Qld, WA, SA)	49.3
1919	Legislative powers	Nationalist	3 (Vic, Qld, WA)	49.7
	Monopolies	Nationalist	3 (Vic, Qld, WA)	48.6
1926	Industry and Commerce	Nat-CP	2 (NSW, Qld)	43.5
	Essential services	Nat-CP	2 (NSW, Qld)	42.8
1928	State debts	Nat-CP	6	74.3
1937	Aviation	UAP	2 (Vic, Qld)	53.6
	Marketing	UAP	0	36.3
1944	Post war reconstruction and democratic rights	ALP	2 (WA, SA)	46.0
1946	Social services	ALP	6	54.4
	Marketing of primary products	ALP	3 (NSW, Vic, WA)	50.6
	Industrial employment	ALP	3 (NSW, Vic, WA)	50.3
1948	Rents and prices	ALP	0	40.7
1951	Communists	Lib-CP	3 (Qld, WA, Tas)	49.4
1967	Nexus	Lib-CP	1 (NSW)	40.3
	Aborigines	Lib-CP	6	90.8
1973	Prices	ALP	0	43.8
	Incomes	ALP	0	34.4
1974	Simultaneous elections	ALP	1 (NSW)	48.3
	Amendment	ALP	1 (NSW)	48.0
	Democratic elections	ALP	1 (NSW)	47.3
	Local government	ALP	1 (NSW)	46.8
1977	Simultaneous elections	Lib-NP	3 (NSW, Vic, SA)	62.2
	Casual vacancies	Lib-NP	6	73.3
	Territorial votes	Lib-NP	6	77.7
	Retirement of judges	Lib-NP	6	80.1
1984	Simultaneous elections	ALP	2 (NSW, Vic)	50.6
	Interchange of powers	ALP	0	47.1
1988	Parliamentary terms	ALP	0	32.9
	Fair elections	ALP	0	37.6
	Local government	ALP	0	33.6
	Rights and freedoms	ALP	0	30.8

Note: Amendments to Constitution in bold.

Source: Brian Galligan and J. R. Nethercote (eds), The Constitutional Commission and the 1988 Referendums, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations and Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration, Canberra, 1989, p. 137. For the details and arguments for and against each change, as well as voting figures for each State, see House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Change. Select sources on constitutional change in Australia 1901-1997, Canberra, February 1997.

As can be seen in Table 1, there have been eight amendments to the Constitution: single changes in 1906, 1910, 1928, 1946, and 1967, and three changes in 1977.

Referenda have been held on 18 separate occasions. On five of these, voters have had to vote on just a single question. On the other 13 occasions, multiple referenda have been held, with the six questions in 1913 being the largest number considered on the same day (Table 2):

Table 2: Number of Referenda Per Polling Day

Number of referenda	Years
1	1906, 1928, 1944, 1948, 1951
2	1910, 1911, 1919, 1926, 1937, 1967, 1973, 1984
3	1946
4	1974, 1977, 1988
5	-
6	1913

Four of the 22 referenda held at the same time as a Commonwealth election were passed (1906, 1910, 1928, 1946); four of the 20 held at times other than a Commonwealth election were passed.

There have been markedly different results in the State voting returns in the 42 referenda (Table 3):

Table 3: State Voting

	YES	NO
WA	23	19
Qld	21	21
NSW	18	24
SA	16	26
Vic	15	27
Tas	10	32

Table 3 does not reveal the changes in State voting patterns that have occurred since 1906:

New South Wales produced the lowest YES rate up to 1919 (1 YES vote - 12 NO votes), but has been the only State to return a majority of YES votes since 1946 (14 - 9).

Victoria has had a very consistent performance. In the first 21 referenda the State voted 8 - 13, and in the next 21 referenda the vote has been 7 - 14.

Queensland was very supportive of amendment attempts between 1906 and 1967 (18 - 8), but since 1973 has been disinclined to alter the Constitution (3 - 13).

Western Australia's story is similar to that of Queensland. Between 1906 and 1967 the State's tally was 20 - 6 (13 - 0 during 1906-19), but this State has also returned a 3 - 13 figure since 1973.

South Australia's record was even up to 1946 (11 - 11), but its voters have been strongly opposed to constitutional change since (5 - 15).

Tasmania was 3 - 0 after the first three referenda, but since then has voted 7 - 32, making it the State least inclined to support such referenda.

Seven of the eight successful referenda have carried in each State; on nine occasions there have been no YES majorities in any State (Table 4):

Table 4: Number of States in Favour

Number of States in favour of an amendment	Total
0	9*
1	7
2	5
3	13
4	0
5	1
6	7

Six of the successful referenda have carried comfortably. The 1910 State Debts (54.9 per cent) and the 1946 Social Services amendment (54.4 per cent) had the narrowest margins. 1910 State Debts was the only amendment not to be carried in all States. Five of the questions that received 50 per cent of the total vote or better, failed to get a majority of States in favour. In nine other cases the national YES vote was in the range of 49.0 to 49.8 per cent (Table 5):

Table 5: YES Votes

YES votes (%)	Number of referenda	Comments
60+	7	Aborigines (1967) 90.8 per cent-highest YES figure Simultaneous Elections (1977) 62.2 per cent-failed to get majority of States
55-59	-
50-54	6	Air Navigation (1937) 53.6 per cent Primary Produce Marketing (1946) 50.6 per cent Industrial Employment (1946) 50.3 per cent Simultaneous Elections (1984) 50.6 per cent -all failed to get majority of States
45-49 per cent	16
40-44 per cent	5
Under 40 per cent	8	Rights and Freedoms (1988) 30.8 per cent-lowest YES figure

Constitutional Aspects of s. 128

Section 128 in Overview

Before examining the elements of s. 128 dealing with the initiation and the ratification of proposals to alter the Constitution, three general comments about the provision are appropriate. Section 128 is durable-it has been amended only once in 98 years, to allow Territory voters to participate in referenda. Despite containing a number of textual ambiguities it has been subjected to negligible judicial attention. Finally, as the ensuing analysis suggests, it gives something to both the Commonwealth and the States, the Executive and (if only nominally) the Legislature, and the people as well as the politicians.

To take each of the last-mentioned points in turn, the Commonwealth Parliament has a monopoly on initiating referenda, through passage of a Bill to alter the Constitution. State legislatures cannot formally initiate constitutional change, in contrast for example with the United States and Canada. On the other hand, the 'double majority' requirement endows States of smaller population with a disproportionate capacity to thwart Commonwealth Government plans. Thus s. 128 is centralist on referendum initiation and federalist on referendum ratification. In its fifth paragraph (arguably never activated),(4) it offers States additional protections by raising the bar even higher for certain referenda directed at States. An amendment which changes the boundaries of a State, diminishes its representation in either House or alters constitutional provisions relating to the States must secure a majority in any State so affected.

Secondly, the 'deadlock provision' in s. 128 (see below) purports to give the Senate something it lacks under an otherwise similar provision in section 57, that is an equal status with the House of Representatives (in forcing a question onto the ballot paper). In substance, however, it appears that the Executive exercises its dominance over Parliament in this as in most other respects and that a referendum will not occur without government agreement (see below).

Thirdly, while the Government controls the use of s. 128, control of the result rests in the hands of the people voting at a referendum. This element of participatory democracy in changing the Constitution was only introduced late in the drafting process of the 1890s, replacing a more indirect method based on an American model of electing delegates to State conventions.

Initiating a Referendum

Initiation by Commonwealth Bill

The first obvious feature of s. 128 is that a proposed alteration to the Constitution begins life as a Commonwealth Bill. Ordinarily it must pass by absolute majority(5) through each House of Parliament. As noted above, this puts effective control of the agenda for constitutional amendment in the hands of the Commonwealth Government of the day. Some commentators have suggested that this monopoly generates an automatic suspicion of centralism which helps explain the low strike rate for constitutional referenda, and that were moves made to 'federalise' and/or 'democratise' the initiation of referenda, it may improve the chances of success.(6)

The Constitutional Commission appointed by the Hawke Government examined the issue of referendum initiation. By majority it recommended against popular initiation along Swiss lines (e.g. a requisite number of signatures requesting a referendum), but agreed that a referendum should be held when, within the space of 12 months, the Parliaments of at least half the States proposed a constitutional alteration in identical terms (where those States represent at least 50 per cent of the national population).(7) Similarly, after rejecting the proposal once at its Melbourne (1975) session, the Australian Constitutional Convention resolved to support State-initiated referenda at the session held in Brisbane in 1985.(8)

The Deadlock Provision

The second notable feature of referendum initiation under s. 128 is the 'deadlock provision'. This provides that if one House initiates and passes a proposed constitutional alteration once, and then again after a three month interval, and on both occasions the other House rejects it or fails to pass it, then the Governor-General may submit the proposed law to the electors. This deadlock provision strongly resembles the words of section 57 (dealing with the impasse between Houses leading to a double dissolution and if necessary a joint sitting).(9) The major difference is that s. 128 appears to put the Senate on an equal footing with the House of Representatives where constitutional alterations are concerned, while the deadlock provision over ordinary legislation in section 57 benefits only the House of Representatives (and thus the Executive). As we will see this may be more textual illusion than political fact.

In 1914 the Senate passed several Bills in accordance with s.128 but the Governor-General declined to submit them to the people.(10) The precedent is ambiguous, because on present day understandings it is unlikely that sufficient time had elapsed to establish a second 'failure to pass'. Most commentators, however, regard the outcome as consistent with the constitutional convention that the Governor-General acts only on the advice of the Ministry.(11) Thus it appears the principle of responsible government overrules any textual differences between sections 57 and 128, to the dismay of some,(12) and that only Bills supported by the Government of the day will proceed to referendum.

The Constitutional Commission recommended in 1988 that the Government's effective veto over Senate use of the deadlock provision be removed,(13) but this contrasted with the recommendation of its own Advisory Committee on Executive Government(14) and the earlier Australian Constitutional Convention at its Brisbane session in 1985. Putting a referendum question to the people in the teeth of Government opposition would in any case suggest an adventurous disregard for the track record of constitutional amendment. Even an unexpected success apparently could be stymied by last-minute Executive manoeuvring-the Constitutional Commission suggested that a Government might advise the Governor-General to withhold Royal Assent from the proposed alteration.(15)

The Question Put

Related to the deadlock issue is the question of what exactly is put to the people when a referendum is initiated. Section 128 refers to a 'proposed law' for the alteration of the Constitution. Does this mean that Parliament must present on the ballot paper a positive proposition of law and not, for example, an array of legal alternatives for the people to choose from? The Constitutional Commission thought this more likely than not, and in any case recommended against the presentation of options, requiring proponents instead to make up their own minds first before sending the people to the polls. However, in line with its recommendation that no Executive veto apply to Senate or State initiated proposals, the Commission had no objection to a de facto 'preferendum'. If the States came up with one proposal and either or both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament came up with a different one on the same subject matter, voters could express a YES or NO vote on each. If more than one proposal achieved the double majority, the proposed alteration attracting the highest vote would prevail and the other proposed alteration(s) would be invalid, to the extent they were inconsistent with the winning proposal.(16)

Other Jurisdictions

On a comparative note, ordinary Canadians and Americans have no direct say over changes to their federal Constitutions. Initiating constitutional change in the United States occurs either when a two-thirds majority is secured in both Houses of Congress or when two-thirds of State legislatures request that Congress call a national constitutional convention. In Canada, since 'patriation' of the Constitution in 1982,(17) proposals for change may be initiated by either the Senate or the House of Commons at the federal level or by provincial legislatures.(18)

Ratifying a Referendum Proposal

If a referendum Bill passes both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament, s. 128 says that it shall be submitted to the public within two to six months. That is not yet the point of no return, however, as it appears (despite the word 'shall') that there is no obligation on the Governor-General to issue the referendum writ.(19) Certainly Governments in 1965 and again in 1983 relied on this view in advising the Governor-General not to issue a writ despite the passage of Bills through both Houses.(20)

If the deadlock provision is invoked, the Governor-General 'may' submit the Bill to the electors, but it appears that any discretion implied by that word is nullified by the principle that he or she must act on the advice of the Ministry. In summary, the position is the same as for referendum Bills passing both Houses: the Government advises the Governor-General whether or not to issue the writ for a referendum.

Section 128 next requires that referenda ordinarily secure what is known as the 'double majority'-a majority of the national vote in a majority of states. Canadian academic Peter Russell regards the second limb as a badge of federalism;(21) Quick and Garran saw it not only as protecting the federal system but as also encouraging careful reflection, 'to prevent change being made in haste or by stealth, to encourage public discussion and to delay change until there is strong evidence that it is desirable, irresistible, and inevitable'.(22) Others have seen it as a major impediment to necessary reform (see below). Gough Whitlam sought to reduce the requirement from a majority of States to at least half the States at the 1974 referendum but secured a majority in only one State and a national vote of 48.0 per cent. The Constitutional Commission, the Australian Constitutional Convention and the 1959 Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Review all recommended the same dilution of the double majority requirement.

In the United States, constitutional amendments must be ratified by three-quarters of State legislatures or by special conventions in three-quarters of the States. Since 1982, Canada applies different rules for ratification depending on which tier of government is affected. Many proposals require passage through both houses of the federal parliament plus at least seven out of 10 provincial legislatures where they represent 50 per cent or more of the Canadian people.

The Constitutional Commission expressed no enthusiasm for either scheme, declaring

It made one exception, by recommending that the Commonwealth Parliament be empowered to legislate in the ordinary way to remove spent or outmoded provisions from the Constitution. Two checks were proposed-a requirement for unanimous consent from the State Parliaments, and the capacity of the High Court to review whether provisions are properly categorised as spent.(24)

The Consequences of a Successful Referendum

The Constitution has little to say about Bills which secure the elusive double majority at a referendum. Section 128 requires they be presented to the Governor-General for assent. There is, however, no 's. 129' to answer some questions about the legal consequences of suddenly changing the text of the Commonwealth's foundational document.(25) As yet, the High Court has also said little about the implications of successfully changing the words of the Constitution.

The recent Hindmarsh Bridge decision(26) by the High Court highlighted some of the legal complexities which amendment by referendum can attract. The Constitution originally granted the Commonwealth Parliament the power to make special laws it deemed necessary for dealing with people of any race other than the Aboriginal race in any State.(27) Convention debates suggest there was a clear intent to authorise racially discriminatory laws. In 1967 90.8 per cent of the electorate voted to remove the words quoted above in italics. The alteration was underpinned by a strong anti-discrimination ethic. The Hindmarsh Bridge case raised amongst other things the question whether the 'races' power (as amended) authorised a Commonwealth law which removed legal protections designed to benefit Aboriginal people.

Ordinary statutes are frequently amended over time from quite different political standpoints, and the courts must make sense of the intention of the Act as a whole. Judicial interpretation becomes more complex, however, when the statute in question is the fundamental law of the polity. A constitution purports to provide a coherent blueprint for governance and define powers which will underpin the validity of perhaps hundreds of subsequent statutes. In teasing out the implications of the 1967 referendum, the litigants in the Hindmarsh Bridge case posed a number of questions which illustrate the ambiguous and potent consequences of s. 128.

How does the Court divine the 'intent' of the electorate at a referendum? Should it try to? Can resort be had to the official YES and NO cases? What about other historical material surrounding the referendum? If international standards and community values at the time the amendment was passed were radically different to those operating in the 1890s, can that be taken into account when interpreting the constitutional provision? Can a constitutional amendment, by deleting a few words, turn a provision on its head-effectively converting a detrimental power into a purely beneficial one, generally or in relation to a racial group nominated in a referendum proposal? The Court fractured four ways in coming to a 5:1 decision on the key issue in the case,(28) and not all of the judges addressed the questions set out above. Justice Kirby wrote:

The disparate reasoning in the Hindmarsh Bridge decision means that such a theory remains to be written.

The Impact of Constitutional Amendment-the Eight Successes

What impact have the eight alterations had upon Australian society? Despite the lack of enthusiasm of many commentators-according to former Commonwealth Ombudsman, Professor Jack Richardson, s. 128 has 'failed to achieve much purpose'(30)-it is possible to detect important national consequences that have flowed from the passage of at least six of the eight.

Amendment 1: 1906 Senate elections

This amendment altered s. 13 of the Constitution.(31)

The Constitution (s. 13) provided for Senate terms to begin on 1 January. By 1906 it was felt to be unlikely that Senate terms would generally coincide with House of Representatives terms, and that a change would be beneficial. The proposed amendment provided for Senate terms to begin on 1 July. Odgers noted that the main reason for the change was to enable simultaneous elections to be held in March.(32) The amendment was uncontroversial, dealing with the mechanical matter of how to rotate Senate terms, and R. G. Menzies later observed that, 'as the average voter ... does not care how frequently a Senator rotates, the amendment was carried'.(33) All States were in favour, with a YES vote of 82.7 per cent being registered.

Ironically, although the amendment has not hindered the holding of simultaneous elections, it has had one unintended consequence. Because two-thirds of Commonwealth elections have been held in the months of September-December, there have been numerous instances of incoming Senators being required to wait many months before taking their seats. Those elected on 3 October 1998, for instance, were required to wait 270 days before doing so.

Amendment 2: 1910 State Debts

This amendment altered s. 105 of the Constitution.

Ensuring the future financial good health of the States was a matter of great importance to the Constitution-writers, and they worked hard to produce a workable Finance and Trade chapter (ch. IV). Two important sections were s. 87, which required the return of surplus tariff funds to the States, and s. 105, which provided for the Commonwealth to take over State debts that existed at the time of Federation. By the end of the first decade it was clear that ch. IV had serious flaws, and in 1910 attempts were made to amend these two sections of the Constitution. The State Debts proposal dealt with a perceived need to expand the operation of s. 105 to allow the Commonwealth to take over State debts whenever they were incurred.

This amendment was carried by a YES vote of 54.9 per cent, with only New South Wales in opposition. According to a history of the Loan Council, this indicated that the nation had 'decisively favoured a scheme on the basis of s. 105 to relieve the States of some of their financial burden'.(34) Although it was over a decade before the power was used, this amendment was important in giving greater potential flexibility to ch. IV of the Constitution.(35)

Amendment 3: 1928 State Debts

This amendment inserted s. 105A into the Constitution.

The financial relations between Commonwealth and States worsened during the 1920s. A financial settlement between the governments in 1910 had introduced what were called per capita grants, whereby each State received annual grants from the Commonwealth of £1.25 per head of its population. By the mid-1920s, inflation had made serious inroads into this sum but no new formula had been found.

In 1927 the Commonwealth and States signed the Financial Agreement. Apart from establishing a new grants regime, this provided for Commonwealth assistance in State debt reduction and, most importantly, established the Loan Council. Henceforth all governmental borrowing, except for purposes of defence, was to be under Loan Council control. Due to doubts concerning the constitutionality of this new body, it was agreed that a constitutional amendment would be put to the people. When this was done on 17 November 1928, 74.3 per cent of the voters supported the change.

The Loan Council, described as 'a unique institution among federations',(36) attracted overseas attention from the moment of its birth:

There is no doubt about the enormous impact that this body has had on Commonwealth-State financial relations, particularly in helping the Commonwealth Government to oversee the national economy.

Amendment 4: 1946 Social Services

This amendment inserted s. 51 (xxiiiA) into the Constitution.

Prior to 1946, the payment of such social service benefits as were authorised by Commonwealth legislation, relied on the spending power (s. 81). The Pharmaceutical Benefits Case (1945)(38) underscored doubts about the constitutionality of this procedure, doubts which raised the possibility of various social services being invalidated. The Chifley Government (ALP) and the Opposition agreed that the constitutionality of such services should be confirmed by means of constitutional amendment.

The amendment proposal, which was put with two other questions, sought to give power to the Commonwealth to provide for 'maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription), benefits to students and family allowances'. According to British political scientist, A. H. Birch, a YES vote was a foregone conclusion, for voters 'would otherwise have faced the risk of losing the many social benefits which were already provided'.(39) This and the two other 1946 proposals (Marketing and Industrial Employment) met some opposition based on a disinclination to see the Commonwealth gaining any more power, but the social services amendment was carried narrowly, with 54.4 per cent voting YES.

Although this amendment recognised a position in which the Commonwealth had become the prime mover in the area of social services, it was important in giving the Commonwealth power in the area of medical and dental services which it did not have before.(40) Writing in 1984, prominent health administrator Sidney Sax described the amendment as being 'of great significance', enabling the Commonwealth to legislate for the administration of many welfare schemes and potentially allowing for the provision of medical and dental services and hospital care. Sax has surmised that the Commonwealth's reach is now potentially so extensive that in the future the national government 'might well be able to establish its own hospitals in the states'. Further, the word 'benefits' in the amendment has authorised 'not only the payments of money, but benefits in kind or by way of services'. This was seen to be particularly important during the Labor Government of 1972-75 in enabling the government to make changes in health services.(41) At the same time, the High Court has indicated clear limits to this power over social welfare and it has been noted that the Whitlam Government's social welfare programme was put together with a 'keen awareness' of the limits.(42)

Education administration has also been affected by this change. Although s. 96 has been the main instrument of Commonwealth activity in education, it has been noted of this part of the Constitution that 'it would appear to give the Commonwealth very far-reaching powers with regard to education within the States'.(43) As such it increases the strength of the cards in the Commonwealth's hands in this area of policy-making.

Amendment 5: 1967 Aborigines

This amendment altered s. 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution and deleted s. 127.

Until 1967 the Constitution specifically denied the Commonwealth the power to legislate for Aboriginal people in the States or to include them in national censuses. For many years, these provisions had been regarded as an affront to Aboriginal people, as well as a barrier to effective policy-making and administration. An attempt to alter this situation had failed with the defeat of the Powers referendum of 1944.

The 1967 alteration sought to remove these barriers from the Constitution. Despite being held at the same time as the controversial-and unsuccessful-Nexus referendum, the Aborigines amendment was carried with the highest YES vote to date, 90.8 per cent. This vote was said to have reflected a general community view that this was 'a chance to make some sort of amends'.(44)

Although the Commonwealth did little in this policy area for the first five years after the amendment was passed, in time the constitutional alteration came to be seen as extremely important for Aboriginal people. Eventually there was a realisation that direct Commonwealth participation in this policy area meant much higher levels of government spending being directed towards Aboriginal affairs, as well as the possibility of overarching national legislation, such as the Native Title Act 1993.(45) A recent judgement is that the referendum was 'vitally necessary to the process of change', especially as it

Amendment 6: 1977 Casual Vacancies

This amendment altered s. 15 of the Constitution.

Four amendments recommended by sessions of the Australian Constitutional Convention were put to the people in 1977. The Casual Vacancies proposal arose out of the 1975 controversy over the appointment of non-party Senators Cleaver Bunton (NSW) and Albert Field (Qld) to fill Senate seats formerly held by ALP Senators. The change aimed to ensure that a replacement Senator would be required to be a member of the party of which the previous Senator was a member at the time of his or her election. Essentially, the purpose of the amendment was to preserve the party balance from one Senate election to the next, and to that end it also abolished Senate by-elections. It received 73.3 per cent of the vote.

Despite the clear intention of the amendment's supporters to ensure that the party balance in the Senate should not be altered by a casual vacancy, the aftermath indicates that the best of intentions can be thwarted. Following the resignation of a Tasmanian ALP Senator in April 1987, the nominee of the party, John Devereux, was rejected by a tied vote in the Tasmanian Parliament. As a Tasmanian Minister put it, 'we can choose only a person who is a member of the same party ... but we are not bound to accept the nomination of the party concerned'.(47) Tasmania therefore had only 11 Senators between 2 April and the double dissolution election of 11 July 1987.

Amendment 7: 1977 Territorial Votes

This amendment altered s. 128 of the Constitution.

At the time of Federation the very few people who lived in the Northern Territory voted as residents of South Australia. Territorians could therefore vote in constitutional referenda. When the Territory was surrendered to the Commonwealth in 1911, however, its citizens lost the vote in such referenda, due to the failure to refer to Territory voters in s. 128. Residents of the Australian Capital Territory were similarly restricted. In 1967 demonstrations against this restriction upon civil rights occurred in Alice Springs, as Territorians expressed their resentment at not being able to vote in the Aborigines referendum.

In 1974 the Whitlam Government attempted to amend s. 128 in a double-pronged proposal. Territorial voting rights in referenda were sought, but the Government also proposed that constitutional amendments could be carried with just half of the States-instead of a majority of States-voting in favour. Only New South Wales supported the proposal, but it is likely that had the Territories section been a separate question, it would have been ratified.

In 1977 the question of Territory votes was relatively uncontroversial, being carried in every State, gaining a national YES vote of 77.7 per cent, though Queensland (40.4 per cent) and Tasmania (37.8 per cent) had quite large NO votes. It has been claimed that the high vote of approval was a reminder of Australia's honourable record of electoral reform-that the amendment had 'Australian political tradition behind it'.(48) Despite John Paul of the University of New South Wales dismissing the change as the granting of a 'hollow privilege', the Canberra Times stated that people in both Territories should be grateful, 'for the universal acknowledgment that their natural right to vote in future referendums will now be given the force of law'.(49)

Amendment 8: 1977 Retirement of Judges

This amendment altered s. 72 of the Constitution.

In October 1976 the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs recommended a retiring age for all federal judges. This recommendation was based on

• a perceived need 'to maintain vigorous and dynamic courts'
• a need to open up avenues for 'able legal practitioners' to achieve judicial positions
• a growing community belief in a compulsory retiring age for judges, and
• avoiding 'the unfortunate necessity' of removing a judge made unfit for office by declining health.

The committee's view was accepted by the Australian Constitutional Convention soon after.(50)

The amendment introduced in the following year sought to provide for a retiring age of seventy for all federal court judges, including those on the High Court-though not judges appointed before the approval of the referendum. The issue was not controversial, despite Sir Robert Menzies' description of the change as 'superficial and ill-considered'.(51) Over 80 per cent of voters supported the amendment:

Accounting for Constitutional Referenda Failures

Interestingly, although a great deal has been written and spoken about Australian constitutional referenda, remarkably little research has been conducted into Australians' voting behaviour on these occasions. What follows, then, is a brief discussion of the most commonly cited factors that might help us understand the outcomes of s. 128 referenda, but with a marked absence of behavioural data. Among the commentators, the debate is split between those who believe the results reflect Australians' general awareness and good sense about constitutional matters, opposed by those who speak of voter ignorance and unnecessarily cautious voting behaviour. The truth may lie somewhere between these two points of view.

The Provisions of s. 128 and the Referendum Legislation

Some writers have criticised the constitutional and legislative arrangements for the holding of constitutional referenda.(53) The 'double majority' has been said to create too high a hurdle, though the figures do not really bear this out. If the double majority had required just half the States-as proposed in 1974-the tally of successes would have been increased by three (1946 Primary Produce Marketing and Industrial Employment, plus 1977 Simultaneous Elections). If only a national majority had been necessary, to these three would have been added the Air Navigation attempt of 1937 (the 1984 Simultaneous Elections attempt would have been unnecessary, as this change would have been made in 1977).

Against this, however, it seems that a more significant factor has been the difficulty in securing 50 per cent of the national vote for the YES case. It has been pointed out that almost 60 per cent of the proposed changes stood a good chance of passage, but on no less than nine occasions the national vote has been in the range 49.0 to 49.8, while seven votes have been in the range 45-48 per cent, a possible consequence of so many being opposed by the Opposition of the day.(54) With more efforts to achieve bipartisan support, it is quite likely that more campaigns would have been able to secure a national YES majority, and thus the double majority would probably have also been achieved in more cases. It does not seem, therefore, that the double majority, of itself, has had a major effect upon constitutional referenda results.

Saunders and others have focussed on the 'party political character of constitutional change', which is the direct consequence of an amendment procedure which allows only the Commonwealth Government to initiate proposals. Jeffrey Goldsworthy of Monash University has suggested that this partisanship could be lessened if the States had a formal role in the amendment process.(55)

Other writers have focussed on the sending of both the YES and a NO arguments to the voters. Professor Richardson has suggested that the printing of the two cases, of equal length, in the same pamphlet, gives the NO case a status it might not have if the votes in parliament are taken as a guide. He noted that an amendment proposal passed by the Parliament is the legal expression of the will of the people, yet this provision does not recognise that legal fact.(56) Professors Colin Howard and Cheryl Saunders have asked whether the totals of the votes in the two houses of parliament ought to be included in the information sent to voters, to make clear the strength of parliamentary support for any measure.(57) Professor Howard has also commented critically about the lack of criteria required to write the two cases. He noted that the YES case has usually been presented simply, bearing some close resemblance to what is being proposed. The NO case, on the other hand often seems designed to confuse, and 'is usually a totally unreliable guide to what the amendment is all about'.(58)

Voter Attitudes: Ignorance? Conservatism? Discriminating Judgment?

Professor L. F. Crisp is one writer who has criticised the voters for their 'ignorance' and their 'conservatism':

This view portrays the voters as puzzled by the wording of referenda, often confused by the complexity of the issue under discussion, and unable to make sense of the loud argument and counter-argument that swirls about them. It is possible, continue the critics, that even the form of the ballot paper used in constitutional referenda may be off-putting for voters because the wording of the questions seems to require knowledge of a particular Act of Parliament (see above). Is it any wonder, asks Professor Don Aitkin, that many 'shrug their shoulders and vote no'?(60)

For writers with a different perspective, such criticisms tell us more about the views of those who see the Constitution as out-of-date and in need of major reform, than of the voters they criticise. For Mark Cooray of Macquarie University, it indicates that those he calls the constitutional 'reformists', possess an elitist perspective-'that they, and they alone, know what is best'.(61)

The Australian Constitution is undoubtedly a complex document about which there are conflicting views, and presumably there are some voters who behave as Crisp and Aitkin claim. Having said this, the experience of certain referenda suggests that it may be simplistic-as well as patronising-to claim that most voters do not understand what they are passing judgment upon. In 1967, for instance, over half of the voters rejected the Nexus question, while nine voters out of every ten supported the Aborigines amendment.

In addition, it may be misleading to consider only the total YES and NO results across the 42 national votes. If the 42 cases are categorised, in fact, then a different picture emerges.

The Constitution is a federal document, drawn up by regional politicians determined to protect the position of the States in their federal scheme. Voters in the Federation referenda were spoken to incessantly about the need to protect the place of their colony in the future union, and in the years since, Premiers have often warned voters of the need to protect their State's rights from Commonwealth incursion. Voters have often been asked to show support for their State, most notably in regard to constitutional amendments proposing to increase central government power. Their response has been spectacular-all 17 attempts to increase Commonwealth economic power have been rejected, as have four others dealing with non-economic powers. Two referenda suggesting Commonwealth involvement with local government (1974, 1988) have also failed. Constitutional amendment can thus be difficult if it strays outside the federal parameters that seem to apply as much today as they did in the late 1890s.

In their criticism of voter performance, writers such as Crisp have especially focussed on the 17 economic powers referenda, for they see national legislation and the setting of national benchmarks as essential to the development of the nation. This is particularly the case in a nation with a constitution that has been seen by former Prime Minister Whitlam and others as 'a political structure that is outdated, reactionary and resistant to change'.(62)

If we look at different categories of amendment, however, the picture alters. There have been other questions dealing with the federal system, not just the type seeking to give more power to the Commonwealth. Two of three referenda trying to tidy up Commonwealth-State financial relations have been passed (1910, 1928), though a proposal to alter arrangements for the interchange of powers was defeated in 1984. The only amendments seeking to increase Commonwealth power that have been passed were not typical of such questions. If we classify the Social Services (1946) and Aborigines (1967) referenda as 'social', then we note that together with the 1977 Judges example that dealt with retirement ages, then three of five such 'social' referenda have been carried. The two that missed out were Communism (1951) and Rights and Freedoms (1988).

The other major type of alteration has dealt with what might be called 'machinery' amendments. Just one of four dealing with electoral or referenda arrangements has passed-that giving Territorians the right to vote in constitutional referenda. The Senate has been the focus of seven attempts, six of them occurring in the past three decades. The Rotation of Terms amendment (1906) and the Casual Vacancies amendment (1977), were both passed comfortably. By contrast, five proposals that seemed to have been designed 'to reduce the unpredictability of the Senate in the affairs of the Government' (1967, 1974, 1977, 1984, 1988) have been defeated.(63)

In summary, amendments perceived to weaken the federal system are likely to receive short shrift, whereas attempts to repair the perennially-flawed finance chapter have been received sympathetically. Perceived attacks on the Senate are likely to be repelled but matters dealing with societal relations are considered closely. Such outcomes are a possible reminder that voters go to a referendum polling place 'with some consciousness of Australian history and politics'.(64)

Apart from the different responses of voters to different categories of amendment, voters have also indicated an awareness of the issues (if not necessarily the words) surrounding particular questions. Examples illustrating this include:

• 1910, 1928 State Debts
• It has been argued that these referenda showed that people 'understood the intention' of these 'adjustments to fiscal relations'. In 1910 they voted clearly in favour of widening the Commonwealth's power to assist the States, and 18 years later they again voted solidly on the same theme. Gilbert has asserted that voters may not have known the detail but were well aware of the principles behind the two changes.(65)
• 1946 Social Services
• We have seen that most proposals to increase the power of the Commonwealth have been rejected. In regard to the Social Services referendum, however, voters seem to have been able to ascertain that the proposed amendment had more to do with social matters than with Commonwealth power. Richardson is one who has criticised the 'impressively conservative' referendum voting record of Australians, yet he also noted that voters were alert enough to support this amendment because it offered Australians some financial benefits.(66)
• 1967 Nexus, 1967 Aborigines
• It has been suggested that the Holt Government held these two referenda on the same day in the hope that voters' support for the one, would rub off on the other.(67) If this was the government's thinking, then it must have been disappointed. As already noted, the Aborigines referendum produced the largest YES vote on record (90.8 per cent), whereas the 40.3 per cent for the nexus alteration was the fourth-lowest YES vote to that time. Clearly, voters were able to distinguish between the two questions.

Voter awareness can also be assumed in referendum votes that suggest different perceptions have been held in different parts of the nation. Examples include:

• 1910 Surplus Revenue
• The votes in this referendum suggested that voters appreciated the amendment's impact was likely to be different from State to State. The 4 smallest States were to benefit from the amendment, and it was probably significant that their combined YES vote was 55.4 per cent. New South Wales and Victoria, though, were to provide the funds to help the States cope with the ending of s. 87, and their voters rejected the measure with a combined NO vote of 53.7 per cent.
• 1967 Aborigines
• Regional Australians showed what they thought of this proposed amendment, for the NO votes were largest in those States with the largest Aboriginal populations. Within these States, the voters nearest the largest populations of Aboriginal people tended to return high NO votes. Such voters probably rejected the call to give Aboriginal people their civil rights, and although they seem to have remained silent during the campaign, indicated by their votes their feelings of resentment.(68)
• 1974, 1977, 1984 Simultaneous Elections
• Tasmanians have long spoken of the importance of the Senate for the smaller States, and its voters have invariably opposed questions that seemed to threaten the place of the upper house. In the three Simultaneous Elections referenda, the Tasmanian NO vote was far higher than in the other States. In 1977, for instance, although the national NO vote was just 37.8 per cent, the NO vote in the island State was a massive 65.7 per cent.
• 1988 Fair Elections
• The federal Coalition parties opposed this amendment, which would have required equality of electorates in State as well as Commonwealth elections (though not for the Senate). Despite this, the Queensland division of the Liberal Party, which had experienced many difficult years under the Bjelke-Petersen malapportionment operating in that State, was very sympathetic to the change. Although all States rejected the proposal, the 44.8 per cent Queensland YES vote was clearly the highest State return and was well ahead of the national total of 37.6 per cent.

According to Denis Altman of Latrobe University, 'the greatest single obstacle to constitutional change in Australia is the conservative nature of the society itself'.(69) Such claims are common but they remain to be proven. It may be equally accurate to describe Australia's record in constitutional amendment as being merely a reflection of various Commonwealth Governments being out of step with public sentiment in a large, federated country.

It may also reflect a growing acceptance of the Constitution over the years, and a suspicion of efforts to alter it. If we look at the eleven referenda that were held before 1914, we find that in the 66 separate State votes there were 34 (51.5 per cent) that were YES votes. In the seven between-wars referenda the YES tally fell to 42.9 per cent of the whole. In the 24 referenda held since 1944, barely one-third (35.4 per cent) of the State totals have registered YES votes.

Party Attitudes: the Battle for the Constitution

The Labor Urge to Reform the Constitution

Although all major parties have had an influence upon the way in which the Constitution is viewed, it has been the Labor Party's luke-warm attitude which has been particularly significant in the politics of the Commonwealth Constitution.

The Labor Party was uncertain of the Constitution even before it became law. Federalism was seen as a barrier to social change, hindering central governmental intervention, and making uniform solutions to social problems difficult to achieve. Many Labor people thus would have preferred the creation of a unitary system.(70) The rough treatment of Chifley Government (ALP) legislation by the High Court in the 1940s seemed to suggest that there was an actual constitutional barrier to the implementation of key Labor policies. Such attitudes were important in influencing the way Labor politicians once regarded the Constitution. Former federal leader, Arthur Calwell (1960-67), summed up the party's long-time feeling of frustration with the document:

From the first years of Federation, then, Labor politicians saw constitutional amendment as an important priority. ALP Governments have rarely been prepared to leave the Constitution as they found it. The Fisher Government's eight attempts, in April 1911 and May 1913, indicated the party's clear determination to reshape the Constitution, the Curtin and Chifley Governments sponsored five attempts between 1944 and 1948, and 12 of the party's 25 attempts were proposed by the Whitlam and Hawke Governments. Labor has been in power for about one-third of the time since 1901, yet has sponsored 59 per cent of the constitutional referenda.

Significantly, Labor efforts to amend the Constitution have generally sought to bring about major changes, leading their opponents to portray the party as Constitution wreckers:

The consequence of this has been Labor's near-failure to institute constitutional change: just a single success in 25 attempts (four per cent), compared with the conservative parties' successes in 7 of 17 attempts (41 per cent).

Many Labor people have shared the frustrations of Professor Crisp of the Australian National University (himself a life-long party member), when he lamented the dashing of many people's hopes of 'necessary progressive amendment'.(73) The response of Crisp and others, therefore, has been to blame the voters:

A major part of the constitutional referenda story, then, has been Labor's determination to change the Constitution, clashing with a popular resistance to the further centralisation of legislative power (albeit sometimes by very narrow margins). With the Labor Government of 1983-96 having been so important in altering the party's attitudes to the importance of central government power to the achievement of the party platform, perhaps future Labor governments will not see constitutional change as being so fundamental. The views of Calwell and Whitlam, cited above, may come to be seen as simply an early stage of the party's evolution within the modern Australian nation.

Liberal Protection of the Constitution

By contrast, the Liberal Party has projected itself as the protector of a fundamental document that 'has maintained our liberties, national unity in war and depression, the federation and our national independence'.(75) Within this, there has been a determination to preserve the federal system, the British connection and the basic principles of responsible government:

Naturally enough, then, the Liberals have often been opposed to Labor's efforts to amend the Constitution, particularly if such efforts threatened what R. G. Menzies called 'the nature and significance of federalism as the dominant factor in the Constitution'.(77)

But despite Menzies' own criticism of Labor efforts to mix politics and law during constitutional referendum campaigns, he and other Liberal spokespeople have not failed to see that protection of federalism and the Constitution could be used as 'a useful stick with which to beat the socialists'.(78) This approach has coloured the tactics used in constitutional referenda. During the 1940s, for instance, Menzies spoke of Labor's 'contempt for the basic Constitutional instrument', and portrayed the Rents and Prices amendment (1948) as one part of Labor's plan of complete socialisation of government and the undermining of the Australian way of life.(79)

Such an approach also coloured the Liberal Party's response to the Whitlam Government's reforming urge. The Constitution was described as an historical compact and charter which formed a fundamental law that ought not lightly be altered.(80) This was not to say that it could not be altered, but changes ought not be rushed, a failing common on the Labor side.(81) In keeping with this view, Labor attempts to alter the Constitution have often been described as a 'grab' for power. As former MHR, Peter Shack, put it when criticising the 1988 proposals, 'The hidden agenda ... is a grab for power by the Federal Government for more power to interfere with our democratic rights, the rights of State and Local Governments and with our rights as individuals'.(82)

A referendum is an exercise in participatory democracy and the temptations of partisan advantage have often proved too hard to resist at campaign time. With both major parties, therefore, ideological and political considerations have tended to outweigh any chance of a proper and careful consideration of the place of the Constitution in the Australian system of government.

Party Attitudes: Tactical Difficulties

The parties have also seemed to assume a high level of voter ignorance with regard to constitutional referenda. This can be illustrated in various ways.

The Short-Term View

At various times the parties have seemed to assume that voters have no memories of previous amendment attempts. This has been well-illustrated in the way that a party might be keen to introduce a particular amendment while in