 |
Mandate: Australia's Current Debate in Context
J.R. Nethercote
Politics and Public Administration Group
11 May 1999
Contents
Major Issues
Introduction
The Mandate: An Elusive Concept with a Long History
Mandate Doctrine: Aspects of its History
United Kingdom
Australia
Australia's Mandate Debate 1998
The Protagonist: the Prime Minister
The Antagonists
Media Analysis
Mandate: Dictionary and Academic Analyses
Conclusion
Appendix 1: Mandate-Dictionary Definitions
Appendix 2: Dictionaries of Politics
Appendix 3: Academic Analysis
Endnotes
Major
Issues
The purposes of this paper are to provide:
- analysis of the meaning and character of mandate doctrine
- background on the part played by mandate doctrine in the evolution
of representative and responsible government in the United Kingdom and
Australia
- an explanation of why mandate debate in Australia is more frequent
and more complex than in other Westminster-based parliamentary systems,
especially since introduction of the proportional method of electing
Senators in 1948
- an authoritative account of debate about the mandate arising during
and after the 1998 national elections
- appendices include material on dictionary definitions and academic
analyses.
The principal findings of the research are:
- during and following the 1998 elections there was debate about the
Government's bid for a mandate for its tax proposals, especially the
goods and services tax component. Debate centred on both voting and
seats won in the Senate and the House of Representatives. There have
been similar debates during the Whitlam Government, 1972-75, and following
election of the Howard Government in 1996
- because of the character of Australia's bicameral Parliament, both
Houses of which are elected and have comparable powers, debate in Australia
about the mandate is more frequent, more complex and more vigorous than
in other Westminster-style parliaments, for example, in the UK and Canada,
where the lower house's preeminence over a non-elected upper house is
well-established
- mandate is a political idea in two senses. Mandate doctrine derives
from the politics of responsible government on a democratic basis. It
does not derive from constitutional, legal or parliamentary prescription.
Moreover, a mandate is not a substitute for prescribed constitutional,
legal or parliamentary procedures, though it may influence the workings
of such procedures
- second, mandate doctrine has been mainly developed by politicians
in political forums rather than by philosophers or academics
- the purpose of mandate doctrine is to accord a larger role to the
people than simply casting a vote at specified intervals. It is about
politicians declaring the philosophies, principles, policies, plans
and programs which they will support if they win office. President Eisenhower
furnished a succinct definition of what mandate is about. He entitled
the first volume of his presidential memoirs, Mandate for Change,
and the relevant chapter, 'Promises to Keep'
- there is considerable debate about what a mandate is. Does it apply
to the entire platform (or manifesto) of a winning party only to the
more important item or to matters mainly the subject of contention during
a campaign? And can others, apart from winners, claim to have a mandate?
Likewise, there is considerable debate about how a mandate may be discerned-seats
in a legislature, seats in which chamber of a legislature or the voting
strengths which lie behind respective party strengths in parliament?
And what of voting strength not translated into representation?
- in the UK, mandate ideas were related, first, to the rise of campaigning
and the need to tell the voters how power, if won, would be exercised.
They were also important in the ascendancy of the House of Commons over
the House of Lords
- in Australia, it has been a different story, especially since adoption
of the 1948 method of electing Senators. As a consequence, disputes
between the Houses are more likely than previously, but it is less likely
that they will be resolved by recourse to simultaneous dissolutions
of the Houses except with respect to the legislation on which the dissolutions
are based
- the debate in Australia during and after the 1998 elections reflected
the long history of discourse on mandate doctrine and embraced many
of the elements which have arisen during the past two centuries of democratic
responsible government
- academic analysis of mandate matters is divided. Some authors consider
it is a political idea which seeks to give meaning to elections and
that criticisms are based on overly literal definitions of the term.
Others believe that the legitimacy of democratic politics requires that,
as much as possible, commitments made on the hustings should be honoured
once the election result is settled (recognising that there are circumstances
where a mandate will lose its relevance or be overtaken by events),
and
- critics of mandate doctrine portray it as a device for nullifying
or circumventing due processes of government and legislation. The conception
of mandate doctrine which they criticise is the product of rhetoric
rather than more considered expositions.
Introduction
During the 1998 elections for the House of Representatives
and the Senate the Prime Minister, John Howard, sought a mandate for the
Government's tax package, especially the goods and services tax component.
Once the Government had been returned to office-that is, had a majority
of seats in the House of Representatives-the Prime Minister claimed a
mandate. The claim was subsequently contested by the Opposition and by
the Australian Democrats, a cross-bench party represented only in the
Senate. Until new Senate terms commence on 1 July 1999, the Government
can secure Senate consent to legislation providing it has the support
of either the Australian Democrats or independent Senators Harradine and
Colston. After the new terms commence, Democrat support will be essential
for any Government measures to which the Opposition is opposed.
The Prime Minister's claim to a mandate in these circumstances
is based on the Government's support in the House of Representatives where
it has a majority of 12 over all others. The Opposition legitimises its
argument by reference to relative voting strengths behind representation
in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Australian Democrats'
claim likewise turns on relative voting strengths rather than results
in terms of seats; they also distinguish between outcomes for the House
of Representatives and the Senate.
Questions about mandates also arose following the first
election of the Howard Government in March 1996 and, even more prominently,
during the Whitlam Government, 1972-75. Indeed, it was Prime Minister
Whitlam who essentially placed the term mandate itself in the Australian
political lexicon.(1)
There are differences between the respective claims of
the two prime ministers. The Whitlam Government had an exceedingly comprehensive
program whereas the Howard Government has focussed its mandate claims,
on each occasion, on a small number of specific, albeit major, policies
(for example, in 1996, the partial sale of Telstra). In terms of seats
in the House of Representatives the Whitlam Government's majorities were
very small, nine after 1972 and seven after 1974 (eventually five). It
never had a majority in the Senate; indeed, there was only one Senate
election in the period, that which occurred in May 1974 following simultaneous
dissolutions of the two Houses.
After 1996 the Coalition had a majority in the House
of 40 over all other parties; this fell to 12 following the 1998 election;
its voting base likewise fell in terms of two-party preferred voting from
47.2 to 39.5 per cent (House of Representatives), though the Opposition
made only limited headway as nearly eight per cent went to the new Pauline
Hanson One Nation Party. The Government's Senate strength was initially
just two short of a majority; when Senators elected in 1998 take their
seats on 1 July 1999 the Coalition will be four short of a majority.
In Britain, the term mandate historically was bound up,
first, with the growth of campaigning for office and the view that party
leaders should make declarations to the voters about their principles
and policies. It was, second, and probably more significantly, central
to adaptation of the respective roles of the Lords and Commons following
the Reform Act of 1832, and, more especially, extension of the franchise
in 1867. The mandate question has been of reduced significance since the
Commons established its pre-eminence through the Parliament Act 1911.
This history is outlined in greater detail later in this paper.
Nor is the mandate a doctrine of great consequence in
other countries with Westminster-style governments where the parliamentary
arrangements are similar, that is, where the lower house has a clear pre-eminence
as in Canada or where the parliament is unicameral as in New Zealand.
In these cases, the principal import of mandate doctrine is that major
measures, circumstances permitting, should be open to scrutiny in an electoral
context before implementation. In the late 1980s in Canada the Progressive
Conservative Government headed by Brian Mulroney was criticised because
it was claimed there was no mandate to introduce a goods and services
tax. A majority in the House of Commons was enough even though it was
eventually necessary to resort to special constitutional measures to ensure
the legislation passed the Senate in the face of the then Liberal majority
in that chamber.(2) Similarly, in New Zealand, the Lange Labor Government
has been criticised on the basis that it lacked a sufficient mandate for
the sweeping economic changes it introduced.
In these cases the governments in question were able
to proceed with their programs without conclusive resistance from parliament.
For legislative purposes, a majority in the lower house was enough. Whether
to proceed or not because of criticism about want of a mandate or any
other reason was a political judgment for the ministry itself to decide.
At the national level in Australia it is a different
story because of the character of the bicameralism of the Parliament.
As a result, mandate debate is more frequent, more complex and more vigorous.
In Australia, a government must have the support of the
Senate as well as the House of Representatives for legislation. Where
there is a disagreement between the Houses it is a contest between two
parliamentary bodies elected on a similar franchise (if not necessarily
at the same time except following simultaneous dissolutions). The Senate
is not vulnerable to attack on democratic grounds as are the non-elected
upper houses of Britain and Canada. Moreover, since adoption of the present
method of electing Senators in 1948 the constitutional procedure (section
57) for resolving disputes between the two Houses has proven to be very
limited, and largely retrospective, in scope. The difficulty in resolving
problems in relations between the Houses helps to account for the fervour
with which Australian parliamentarians address the mandate question-a
government in seeking to win over Senate opposition, inter alia, through
public pressure if not other means; opponents of the government seeking
to be seen as representing popular interests against an insensitive ministry.
Australia's national situation is more analogous to mandate
contests which sometimes mark relations between presidents of the United
States, elected on a nation-wide basis, and either or both Houses of the
Congress. Unlike the Australian Constitution, the US Constitution does
not include any formal provisions for resolving disputes between a president
and the Congress, or between the two Houses of Congress. If the matter
of who has the mandate is to be resolved it has to be at the constitutionally
scheduled elections.
This paper mainly focusses on mandate doctrine in the
workings of parliament and elections but it is well to remember that it
is utilised in other forums, mainly as a rhetorical weapon. Clear statements
of policies during elections are an aid to party leaders afterwards establishing
and maintaining unity and cohesion among their followers, outside as well
as within Parliament.(3) Mandate might also be invoked in relations with
the courts,(4) public sector agencies,(5) and international financial
institutions.(6)
This paper primarily seeks to assist in understanding
the debate about mandate which occurred in Australia during and after
the 1998 national elections by providing:
- analysis of the meaning and character of mandate doctrine, an elusive
concept with a long history
- background on the significance of mandate doctrine in the evolution
of representative and responsible government in the United Kingdom,
particularly in adaptation of the role and eventually the powers of
the House of Lords as the franchise of the Commons was increasingly
democratised
- an account of the place of the mandate idea in Australia's parliamentary
politics and especially the interconnection between increasing rhetorical
resort to mandate doctrine and the 1948 method of electing Senators
- an authoritative account of the terms of the mandate debate during
and following the 1998 national elections, and
- appendices which include material on dictionary definitions and academic
analysis.
The
Mandate: An Elusive Concept with a Long History
The term mandate, and certainly the ideas lying behind
it, has been central to the evolution of responsible parliamentary government
on a democratic basis throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
In Australia, it has from the start been prominent in debates about relations
between the Senate and the House of Representatives. These debates have
had particular edge since adoption in 1948 of a proportional method of
electing Senators, for, thereafter, it became both more likely that there
would be deadlocks between the two Houses and less likely that such deadlocks
could be resolved except in respect of specified contested legislation.
This feature of Australia's parliamentary arrangements is explained more
fully below.
The mandate idea is quintessentially a political doctrine
in two important senses. In the first instance, it exists in the realms
of political debate and competition. It is not a term which is, in the
sense addressed in this paper, to be found in constitutions or laws.
Acknowledgment, or disavowal, of a mandate may have a
bearing on the workings of constitutional or legal processes. A mandate,
however, is a supplementary force, not a substitute for prescribed constitutional,
parliamentary or legal processes or procedures. It is part of the physiology
of the body politic rather than the anatomy. It is a doctrine which seeks
to reinforce the legal basis on which election winners take the reins
of government with a claim to legitimacy in so doing; the winners take
office as agents of popular will as well as in their own right.
Mandate can often be a program adjunct of a leader seen
(not necessarily by everyone) to have charisma. This sentiment may be
strengthened if the margin of victory is substantial. (But there is no
inevitability in this: charisma may characterise narrow wins and ambitious
leadership just as large wins may be secured by uncharismatic leaders
with limited programs).
A second sense in which mandate is a political doctrine
is its provenance. It has been developed by politicians themselves in
the context of electoral and parliamentary activity. Hence, although analytical
and academic expositions of mandate ideas are relatively few, the idea,
on the other hand, has a long case history.
The idea of mandate derives from the view that elections
are about more than periodically casting a vote for particular individuals.
The idea embraces candidates and/or parties telling the voters what they
stand for in terms of philosophies, principles, plans and programs; what
they stand against; and what they propose to do should their campaign
be successful. An early expression of the mandate idea was the view that,
circumstances permitting, major new policies or programs should be submitted
to the people before being enacted. The mandate idea applied both to legislation
and to policy which might be implemented on the basis of executive power.
President Eisenhower provided a succinct definition in the first volume
of his presidential memoirs, Mandate for Change, when he headed
the relevant chapter 'The Platform: Promises to Keep'.(7)
In these senses, the mandate idea is as applicable in
a unicameral parliament, or a parliament in which one chamber is constitutionally
pre-eminent, as it is to parliaments which are effectively bicameral,
or systems with competing sources of popular power, as in the United States
and France.
In the United States, the mandate is most frequently
invoked by presidents trying to persuade either or both houses to pass
the administration's legislation. Both the president and the Congress
may lay claim to a mandate on the basis that each is elected.(8) Comparable
if not identical contests periodically occur in France when a government
of a different political complexion to the president secures support in
the Assemblée Nationale. The bifurcation in this instance stems
in part from different terms: the president is elected for seven years
whilst the term of the Assemblée Nationale is four years. Presidents
normally dissolve the Assemblée upon election (which has normally
brought a friendly majority). However, at the next elections, midway through
the President's term, an Assemblée with an opposition disposition
has been elected on three occasions (1985, 1992 and 1998). The consequential
political accommodation is known as cohabitation and the president perforce
assumes a less active role, especially in domestic matters.
Whilst the mandate idea has a long history in the context
of responsible government on a democratic foundation, it has never been
constitutionally or legally entrenched. Its meaning as well as the means
whereby its existence may be divined are continuing subjects of debate
in politics.
Mandates may be challenged where parliamentary majorities
are at best insecure; where the outcome in one forum is not reflected
in others (as in Australia when a substantial majority in the House of
Representatives is not matched by even a small majority in the Senate);
where they are not supported by voting majorities, or unambiguous pluralities;
where party manifestos are so long and complex that the significance of
particular items is unclear; and where a policy to which a government
subsequently attaches great weight attracted little or no attention in
the relevant campaign. A mandate also has greater force immediately following
an election; the legitimacy it confers wanes as a new poll approaches.
Practical problems aside, the mandate has been roundly
criticised on general grounds as a means for avoiding, circumventing,
short circuiting or nullifying parliamentary process in the making of
legislation. In this view, the mandate is portrayed as a bludgeon in the
hands of a majority party for imposing its views on others; behind this
lies a fear that the view of the majority party is only that of a majority
within it and therefore a minority within the whole.
Critics of mandate doctrine usually focus on its rhetorical
rather than philosophical expositions. Few if any defenders of the mandate
eschew the need for parliamentary process in law making. For them the
mandate is about the significance of commitments to the electorate before
and during elections; the need subsequently to realise obligations made
during campaigns; and the importance of these for maintaining the legitimacy
of democratic parliamentary politics.
In the debate about the mandate these apologia are critical
for they demonstrate that such authority as is conferred by a mandate
has its source in undertakings given by a winning side during a campaign.
Authority thus flows from obligation and commitment. The integrity of
politics will be diminished if promises made on the hustings can be readily
discarded once victory has been achieved.
Recent debates centre on incumbent governments seeking
to honour obligations made during campaigns in the face of continuing
resistance from opponents with a footing in the parliament and, thereby,
also able to claim electoral support for their position.
There are occasions, however, where it is the victors
who wish to turn away from undertakings made in the course of a campaign.
That the main sanction against their doing so is their likely fate at
the next election underlines the political character of mandate doctrine,
and, in illustration, the fact that the penalties, such as they are, are
themselves political, not constitutional nor legal.
Mandate
Doctrine: Aspects of its History
Mandate doctrine has been developed in the forums of
electoral and parliamentary politics themselves. The aim of this part
of the paper is to provide information on this development in British
and Australian national politics.
United Kingdom
In the UK, mandate doctrine has been integral to development
of responsible government on a democratic basis, in particular, linking
the campaign activities of parties to their activities if they win office.
A second, and derivative, dimension of its importance emerged in its role
in resolving conflicts, or potential conflicts, between the House of Commons
and the House of Lords. It was contended that providing it was feasible
to do so, major measures, especially any measures affecting the institutions
of the country, should be put before the country before enacting legislation
Mandate as statement of principles
Perhaps the most significant illustration of the mandate
idea in the first of the above senses was Sir Robert Peel's Tamworth manifesto
of 1834 in which he announced Conservative acceptance of the Reform settlement
of 1832. The need for the manifesto arose, according to Peel himself,
from an abrupt change of government, the fact that Parliament was not
sitting, the policy of aiding friends at the election and the aim of winning
'the adhesion of moderate men, not professing adherence to our politics'.(9)
Mandate as prior notice
Mandate doctrine played a key role in shaping relations
between the two Houses as the franchise for the House of Commons was increasingly
democratised. Thus, in 1867, Disraeli, prime minister without majority
support, challenged Gladstone's attempt to introduce legislation to disestablish
the Church of Ireland on the basis that it was beyond the:
... moral competence [of Parliament] to do that without
an appeal to the nation ... . You cannot come, on a sudden, and without
the country being the least informed of your intention, to a decision
that will alter the character of England and her institutions ...
. Technically, no doubt, Parliament has power to do so ... . But,
... it is most wise that you should hold your hand unless you have
assured yourselves of such an amount of popular sympathy and support
as will make your legislation permanent and beneficial.(10)
Gladstone, for his part, found this view 'ultra-democratic'
and 'anarchical'. Nevertheless, having won the 1868 election, he proceeded
with his plan. Lord Salisbury urged the Lords to accept the legislation
on the basis that they should give way 'when the House of Commons is at
one with the nation'.(11)
Another aspect of the same approach arose in 1886. Following
an election Gladstone again became prime minister and introduced legislation
to grant Home Rule to Ireland. It was defeated, not least because of Liberal
Party defections. These were justified on the basis that the matter had
not been canvassed at the recent general election. Lord Hartington told
the House of Commons that:
The constituents of Great Britain are the source
of power, at all events in this branch of Parliament; and I maintain
that, in the presence of an emergency which could not have been foreseen,
the House of Commons has no more right to initiate legislation, especially
immediately upon its first meeting, of which the constituencies were
not informed, and as to which, if they had been so informed, there
is, at all events, the very greatest doubt as to what their decision
might be.(12)
Hartington was at pains to deny the existence of a mandate-'there
exists in our Constitution no principle of the mandate'. But, as one author
has observed, 'it would be difficult to find any other single term by
which to describe the obligations which he mentioned as being due to the
electorate'.(13)
Management of relations between the Commons and the Lords
according to practice and convention based largely on mandate doctrine
broke down during the Liberal governments of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith
especially over the so-called People's Budget of 1909. Even then the tactic
of the Conservative opposition was to delay passage until there had been
a general election (four years ahead of schedule). However, when, following
the first election of 1910, the House of Lords still resisted, the matters
at issue at the second election later that year were not only the financial
and taxation measures but also the powers of the upper house itself.
Under the Parliament Act 1911 the Lords
lost their powers over finance legislation and kept only a suspensive
veto of two years over other legislation, providing the bill was passed
again by the Commons at intervening sessions. In recognition of the augmented
power of the Commons as a consequence of this legislation, the maximum
interval between elections was reduced from seven years to five in order
that it should be accountable to the people more frequently.
The 1911 settlement was tested when the first Labour
Government with a majority-a considerable majority at that-in the Commons
was elected in 1945. The mandate idea was crucial to the formula devised
by the Conservative peers to determine their attitude to the Government's
legislation. The Leader in the Lords at the time, Lord Salisbury (grandson
of Victoria's prime minister), has stated:
... our broad guiding rule [was] that what had been
on the Labour Party programme at the preceding General Election should
be regarded as having been approved by the British people ... . When
however measures were introduced which had not been in the Labour
Party manifesto at the preceding election, we reserved full liberty
of action.
In Salisbury's view, it was more difficult to apply the
rule when a government had only a small majority in the Commons and when,
as was the case in 1964, there was a substantial vote for minor opposition
parties.(14)
During the period of Labour governments with small or
no majorities, 1974-79, the Conservative leader in the Lords, Lord Carrington,
stated that 'the will of the elected House must in the end prevail' but
there were occasions when there might be 'a delay in which there can be
reassessment by Government, by parties and by the people of this country
of the rights or wrongs of an issue'.(15)
Even as the preeminence of the House of Commons was settled,
the view remained alive that major changes generally should be exposed
at general elections before implementation. This has been so throughout
the twentieth century especially on tariff matters and, later, British
entry to the European Economic Community. Another famous instance of a
different kind was the National Government's successful call for a 'doctor's
mandate' during the 1931 general elections.
Australia
As in the United Kingdom, mandate debate in Australia
has reached its greatest intensity during periods of dispute between the
two Houses of Parliament. The source of the intensity lies in the effective
equality of the two Houses in terms of legislative power, the fact that
both are elected on a similar franchise, and the limitations of the deadlock
provision in the Constitution (section 57), especially under the method
of electing Senators adopted in 1948.
Mandate Disputes-Inherent in the Constitutional
Framework
That there was a possibility of inter-cameral mandate
disputes under the Constitution was recognised by Alfred Deakin at the
Constitutional Conventions. He observed in 1897 that:
One chamber represents the people, and acts under
the impression that it has a mandate to do certain work in a certain
way, while the other chamber, also claiming that it has a mandate
from the people, resists that policy, or its expression in a particular
measure.(16)
Deakin considered that mandate disputes would be 'abnormal'.(17)
One reason lying behind this view of Deakin's was the fact that, unlike
in the colonial legislatures, the two Houses would essentially be elected
on the same franchise:
Receiving their mandate, deriving their authority
from the same franchise, although not exactly in the same numerical
proportion, the two chambers, it appears to me, must necessarily,
on all major questions, be brought into line in a shorter period of
time than we can expect our houses of legislature in the different
colonies to be brought into line.(18)
Mandate Disputes, 1910-1949
Inter-house disputes were indeed abnormal until the present
method of electing Senators was introduced in 1948. From 1910, the first
occasion when the governing party had a majority in its own right in the
House of Representatives, until 1949, governments had Senate majorities
most of the time. However, the Cook Government, 1913-14, had to deal with
a Senate in which the Labor Party had 29 of the 36 seats. In seeking to
resolve the situation it was necessary for Cook to establish that section
57 should be activated immediately, once the formal prescriptions had
been met, and that a fresh election for the House alone, following British
practice, would not resolve anything from the Government's perspective.
The legislation on which the simultaneous dissolutions were based concerned
union preference in public service employment. Cook's advice to the Governor-General
seeking simultaneous dissolutions stated:
The present Government, on assuming office, decided
that its mandate from the country would not be fulfilled by simply
ceasing to apply the obnoxious principle, and that it was necessary
to make it impossible for any Government again to resort to it without
the express authority of Parliament.(19)
The Labor Party secured control of both Houses as a result
of the 1914 simultaneous dissolutions. However, uncertain of support within
his own party led Prime Minister Hughes in 1916 to seek authorisation
for his conscription policy by means of a plebiscite. Following the subsequent
split in the Labor Party, neither the Hughes National Labour nor the Hughes
Nationalist governments had majorities in the Senate. Nevertheless, even
with clear majorities in both the Senate and the House following the 1917
elections, the Nationalist Government again resorted to a plebiscite in
a second attempt, also unsuccessful, to introduce conscription.
The next Labor Government, led by J. H. Scullin, came
to office following the first ever sole House of Representatives election.
It faced a hostile Senate-29 Opposition to seven Government-but, notwithstanding
the Opposition's aggressiveness, it did not seek to resolve the deadlock
by the only means possible, simultaneous dissolutions. It was defeated
in the House of Representatives itself after two years.
In the unstable politics which followed the death of
Prime Minister Lyons in 1939 the Menzies Government's nominal minority
in the Senate was buttressed from Opposition attack by four Country Party
Senators who subsequently returned to the government benches when the
Country Party returned to coalition with the United Australia Party (UAP).
The Curtin Government, however, faced a Senate in which it was two short
of a majority when it assumed office in October 1941. Also in a minority
in the House, it nevertheless survived without great discomfort until
the 1943 elections when it secured comfortable majorities in both Houses.
In this period, 1910 to 1946, it was as unusual for a
government to lack a majority in the Senate as it has subsequently been
for it to have one. Hence there was little need for party leaders to invoke
mandate doctrine in the bid to win parliamentary approval of legislation.
Moreover, on three of the five occasions between 1910 and 1946 when there
was a change of government as a direct result of an election, the incoming
government also had a Senate majority (1910, 1914 and 1932). The simultaneous
dissolutions procedure was activated on the first occasion that an incoming
government found itself without a majority in the Senate (1914); on the
other occasion the new government acquiesced in the situation it inherited
(1929-31).
Mandate Disputes: the Story under Proportional
Representation in the Senate
The story is very different after the 1948 changes to
the method of electing Senators. First, on only one occasion has an incoming
government secured a majority in the Senate when it was elected (Fraser
in the unusual circumstances of 1975). Second, it has been relatively
rare for governments to have majorities in the Senate (only after the
elections of 1951, 1953, 1958, 1975 and 1977). Third, while it is less
likely now than previously that a government will have a majority in the
Senate, the section 57 mechanism is less viable under the 1948 voting
method as a means of settling a deadlock one way or the other, except
on the specific bills giving rise to the simultaneous dissolutions.
Menzies comprehended this at the time. In his speech
on the 1948 legislation, on which he observed that the Chifley Government
was acting 'without any mandate', he explained his basic philosophy: the
House of Representatives was the pre-eminent chamber but the Senate had
a legitimate if 'subordinate role'; in the event of disagreement, resolution
was then possible by means of double dissolution:
... in the last analysis a measure which has passed
through this House-perhaps by a government fresh from an election-may
be sent to the Senate again in the next session, so that if that body
again rejects it there will be a double dissolution. In that way the
will of the people can prevail ... . It is this House which, after
all, makes and unmakes governments, and represents in its most recent
form the public opinion of the country ... . [W]hen proportional representation
is introduced into the system of election for the Senate, the threat,
spoken or unspoken, of a double dissolution will be much less formidable
than it has been to date.(20)
Menzies' focus on the unworkability of the Parliament
as a whole, and the need to find a way of ensuring that the 1948 voting
system for Senators did not mean continuing, unresolvable deadlock between
the Houses, lay behind the constitutional amendment legislation he introduced
in 1950 shortly after resuming the prime ministership. The aim of the
proposed amendment, with which he did not persevere, was to ensure that:
If there is a double dissolution, the Parliament
thereafter will be able to get to work and that, whatever government
emerges, it will know it has not only a mandate from the people and
majority in this House, but also a majority in the Upper House.(21)
His deeper view foreshadowed much of the subsequent rhetoric
about the impact of the 1948 method of electing Senators on Parliament
and government:
If proportional representation can produce an equality
of voting strength in the Senate out of inequality of voting strength
in the electorates; in other words, if a majority of the electors
can do no more than produce equality of strength in the Senate, then
proportional representation is defective indeed. Worse still, it is
a denial of popular self-government, and we shall not leave a position
like that untouched. The claimed purposes of proportional representation
are two in number. The first is that, like any other system of voting,
it purports to reflect in the Parliament the will of a majority of
electors, expressed through a majority of their representatives. Secondly,
proportional representation aims at giving effective representation,
but not equal representation, in the Parliament to minorities. Once
a minority is given equal representation with a majority in the Parliament,
the validity of the majority is denied, government becomes impossible,
and the whole purpose of the institution of Parliament is defeated
... . Nothing could be more exasperating to a community that wants
clear administration and a firm course of legislation, than to have
the prospect of a double dissolution that will leave matters exactly
where they were.(22)
It has also been exasperating to prime ministers and
it is this feature of Australia's current constitutional and parliamentary
arrangements which partly explains the fervour with which newly elected
prime ministers have advocated observance of mandate doctrine in Australia's
national parliamentary politics.
Menzies himself was the first to do so, drawing attention
to the Government's 'new mandate from the people'. In his advice to the
Governor-General of 16 March 1951 he observed:
... the Government, with a new mandate from the people,
has been in major affairs, constantly delayed and frustrated by the
facts that the two Houses are of opposite political complexions and
that in consequence the legislative machine, except in respect of
relatively minor matters, has been materially slowed down and rendered
extremely uncertain in its operation.
Under these circumstances, if the only condition
upon which a Double Dissolution could be granted was, broadly expressed,
that a serious conflict between the two Houses ought to be ended by
the votes of the electors, then I would have no doubt whatever that
as Prime Minister I should be more than justified in asking you to
take the necessary steps to have determined by those electors a disagreement
which tends so strongly against the giving of prompt expression to
the public will.(23)
After 1951 Menzies himself did not make any further attempt
to address what he saw as the deficiencies of the 1948 method of electing
Senators for the workings of the bicameral Parliament and there is little
evidence of any action by others even when, from 1967, the Senate became
an increasingly active chamber. Prime Minister Whitlam, who as Opposition
Leader had exploited avenues in the Senate for holding governments to
account, relied from the earliest days after the 1972 election win on
the mandate, not only in disputes with the Senate but as a general source
of authority. The mandate was basically seen to be embodied in the policy
speech with which he had opened the campaign. Thus, for example, when
recommending that the Governor-General exercise the prerogative of mercy
and release several youths who had refused national service, Whitlam wrote:
It may be assumed that this was endorsed by the electors
and that Your Excellency's Government has a mandate to take these
steps.(24)
But as the Opposition mounted a resistance in the Senate
to legislation embodying Labor promises, the Prime Minister increasingly
looked to the mandate as a self-sufficient justification for the policies
the government was seeking to implement. As one of his biographers wrote:
'The more obstructive the Senate became, the more Whitlam insisted on
the principle that the mandate was, indeed, mandatory';(25) note, however,
Harold Macmillan's view that '[a] mandate is permissive and not compulsory.
You are not compelled to commit a folly'.(26)
Whitlam's most extended exposition of his view of the
mandate is to be found in the August 1975 Chifley Memorial Lecture:
So the debate about the meaning of the mandate has
centred on the question of whether in 1972 and again in 1974 the Australian
Labor Party was given only a general mandate to govern or a specific
mandate to implement each part of its programme.
Is the mandate merely general or is it specific?
Is it a grant of permission to preside or a command to perform? Our
opponents naturally interpret it in the weakest sense as a general
and highly-qualified mandate to govern-on their terms and indeed by
their grace and favour. I interpret the mandate as being both general
and specific-a general mandate to govern for the term for which we
were elected and a specific mandate to implement the undertakings
we made, within that term. But even when I speak of a general mandate
I cannot accept the conservative definition of a mere mandate to govern,
a permit to preside over the administration of government and, hopefully,
to administer the existing system in a sufficiently acceptable way
to give reasonable prospects of re-election-for a further renewal
of the mere mandate to preside. The mandate as I interpret it is to
move by specific programmes toward the general goals and the general
objectives accepted by the people at elections.(27)
The Opposition of the time was more circumspect about
the Prime Minister's wide-ranging view of the mandate. Its Leader, B.
M. Snedden, said 'we will not obstruct policies which we believe Australians
want and for which a mandate exists'; the Opposition Leader in the Senate
thought that later election results-by-elections and State elections-had
invalidated the claim to a mandate; and an Opposition backbencher said
quite simply that:
...when in the course of an election campaign a political
leader makes what he is pleased to call a policy speech and a number
of other speeches and issues supplementary statements and so on there
may be 199 different matters that he has mentioned. To claim that
he has a mandate for every one of these is of course on the face of
it obviously absurd.(28)
Two political scientists, Gordon Reid and Clem Lloyd,
wrote in 1974:
The theory of mandate applied by Mr Whitlam was often
naïve and obscure. Inherent in it were very real dangers of inflexibility
in the composition of policy, and confrontation with the Senate on
the wrong political issues. Undoubtedly, the Whitlam mandate also
gave expression to a strong strain of idealism and a remarkable fidelity
to the performance of electoral promises.(29)
From 1975 until 1996 the mandate idea lost some of its
prominence though related issues periodically came to the fore. When Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser sought simultaneous dissolutions in 1983 it was
on the basis that 'there is a need for the Government, in the critical
period we face, to have decisive control over both Houses of Parliament'.(30)
He was seeking a result which, as Menzies had argued more than three decades
earlier, was very difficult to achieve under the 1948 method of electing
Senators.
Four years later the Hawke Government secured a double
dissolution on a single measure, the Australia Card Bill, which it said
was 'a fundamental part of the Government's legislative program both in
terms of its economic impact and in terms of the principle of equity it
represents'. The advice referred also to Senate 'obstruction' of other
measures.(31)
The Government won a significant majority in the House
(86 to 62) but had only 32 of the 76 seats in the Senate-enough to secure
passage of the Australia Card legislation at a joint sitting but by no
means sufficient to remedy its general problem in the Senate. Notwithstanding
the strength of its position in electoral and parliamentary terms, the
Government abandoned the legislation when the Opposition announced that
it would disallow in the Senate regulations made under the Act needed
to implement it. This case again illustrated the very limited scope of
section 57 for resolving inter-cameral differences.
Immediately following the 1993 elections, the Keating
Government introduced a number of taxation measures which ran counter
to statements made during the campaign. The Opposition opposed these moves
on the basis that they were at odds with statements made prior to the
elections and during the campaign.
The 1996 elections brought a new government to office
with a number of policies hotly debated during the campaign. It had a
large majority in the House of Representatives but fell short by two of
a majority in the Senate. In claiming victory on election night the Prime
Minister-elect, John Howard, declared:
... we have been elected with a mandate, a very powerful
mandate. And whilst I will seek at all times unity and a common point
of view, we have not been elected to be just a pale imitation of the
government that we have replaced. We have been given this emphatic
mandate tonight because there have been many things that have been
left undone that need to be attended to and addressed.(32)
Two analysts at the time considered that the Coalition's
mandate was 'enormously broad', 'several hundred specific commitments',
any one of which 'might legitimately be advanced ... as part of [the]
mandate, just as the failure to meet any such undertaking is always likely
to be presented with similar legitimacy by the opposition as a broken
promise'. They concluded:
The concepts of mandate and 'broken promise' are
the opposite sides of the same coin in the Australian political game,
but all players know that policy commitments are always open to various
interpretations and that some must be adjusted or abandoned as circumstances
in the political, legal, economic, social and technological environment
change or as new information becomes available.(33)
In the course of the 1996-98 Parliament the Government
achieved many of the goals it had set itself but not infrequently in the
context of negotiation with cross-bench Senators. On a number of key matters
such as unfair dismissal laws it was not successful.
The Howard Government is the first to win office since
introduction of the 1948 method of electing Senators which was neither
elected following simultaneous dissolutions nor which endeavoured to improve
its parliamentary position subsequently by seeking simultaneous dissolutions.
However, like all newly-elected governments since the Second World War,
it went to the polls again well before expiry of the Parliament, with
a wide-ranging set of tax proposals, of which a goods and services tax
was a major feature. This provided the context for vigorous debate about
the mandate both during the campaign and subsequently. The following section
provides an account of that debate.
Australia's
Mandate Debate 1998
Australia's mandate debate in 1998 occurred in the context
of re-election of the Howard Government with a reduced but sufficient
majority in the House of Representatives and needing Australian Democrat
votes to secure Senate support for legislation to which the Opposition
is opposed once the new Senate terms commence on 1 July 1999.
It is in this situation that, in the context of discussion
and debate about the Government's plans for tax reform, there has been
a concurrent debate about the concept of mandate and its application in
contemporary Australian national politics. It has been a debate which
extensively if implicitly draws upon nearly two centuries of political
discourse on the mandate-the term and the idea-and the powers, roles and
responsibilities of government and democratically elected legislative
bodies.
The Protagonist: the Prime
Minister
The Prime Minister, John Howard, has been the leading
protagonist in this concurrent debate. In a speech delivered within a
week of the general election he stated:
There has been a lot of debate about mandates. There's
been a lot of debate about what we are now entitled to do ... we made
taxation reform a central issue of this election campaign. We were
up front, we were unashamed, we were forthright, we were open, we
were honest, and we didn't hide anything about it. And having won
that election it is our intention to press ahead with all of the resources
at our disposal to implement the program on which we were elected.
... just before I left home to come here tonight I saw the Premier
of New South Wales on television saying that he supported our right
to implement the taxation program on which we were elected. And can
I say that I welcome the remarks that Mr Carr made. I welcome the
fact that he acknowledges that any government commanding support in
the Lower House of an Australian Parliament has the right to implement
the program on which that government has been elected.(34)
A month later the Prime Minister told a meeting of the
Tasmanian Liberal Party that:
I have a very simple view about the political process
in this country. And that view is that elections are opportunities
for opposing political forces to lay their plans in detail before
the Australian people and when the Australian people have made a decision
it is the obligation of the victor in that political contest to implement
the plans laid before the Australian people. There is nothing complicated
about it. All this talk about reviews and surveys and examinations
and reconsiderations seems to ignore this simple fact that we had
an election. We had a seven-week campaign, effectively, from the release
of the Government's tax plan to polling day. And we subjected ourselves
to all the scrutiny imaginable. I hear Mr Beazley complaining about
the lack of detail. There hasn't been a government in Australia's
history that has laid out more detail before an election about a fundamental
reform than my Government did before the last election.(35)
On other occasions the Prime Minister has asserted his
view in more general terms: 'We got the mandate, we got the authority,
we got the votes of the Australian people on 3 October [1998] and
we intend to press ahead'.(36)
Answering a question from a journalist also on 27 October
1998 he said:
Look, we can spend all day to-ing and fro-ing but
nothing can alter the fact ... that we went to the election with a
GST, we took our courage in our hands, we put our political bodies
on the line and we won. And on that basis, if parliamentary democracy
means anything, we're entitled to have the plan that we took to the
Australian people put through and those who would frustrate that plan
are really challenging the verdict of the Australian people.(37)
The Prime Minister's case for a mandate for the Government's
tax plan has several elements:
- the mandate attaches to a policy/plan/program which is 'a really major
issue ... right there slap bang in the middle'(38)
- the Government's tax plan 'occupied the centrality of an election
campaign ... there will be nothing like it in terms of an identifiable
mandate ...'(39)
- it is a plan about which the Australian people were, appropriately,
'given an early opportunity to express their will at the ballot box';
'on matters of such fundamental importance, it is critical that the
Government knows it has the full confidence of the Australian people'(40)
- where a Government wins in the House of Representatives but not in
the Senate, 'we should listen to the verdict of the Australian people.
I would hope ... that those who might control the numbers in the Senate
would look favourably upon that decision and would listen to the verdict
of the Australian people ... ',(41) and
- on the basis that the tax plan has won the support of the Australian
people, as expressed in the party composition of the House of Representatives,
there would be an inquiry in the Senate; ' ... it should be a sensible
inquiry but it should not be an inquiry that burns up so much time that
you don't have proper time left for sensible debate and a vote to be
taken before 30 June [1999]'.(42)
The Antagonists
The
Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives
There are, however, other views about the outcome of
the 1998 election and the implications for legislative activity in the
Parliament. Among those who have advanced different views are the Leader
of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, Kim Beazley, and the
Leader of the Australian Democrats, Senator Lees.
Several themes run through the Opposition Leader's views
on the mandate concept and its interpretation in the context of the election
results for both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Among these
themes are the importance of trust and credibility in electioneering and
subsequent political activity. Another is the relationship of these views
to the Opposition's attitude to the GST. Other elements include the nature
of the Government mandate and the connection between election results
and parliamentary process.
During the election campaign itself the Opposition Leader
raised the topics of trust and credibility on a number of occasions in
the context of honouring promises and commitments made during the campaign:
'The electorate out there now does not trust the major political parties.
That's the truth of the matter'.(43) On that occasion the point of the
statement was Coalition commitments about compensating various groups,
in particular, pensioners, for the impact of a GST. In an address to the
National Press Club in the week prior to polling day he returned to the
theme of honouring promises:
Both John Howard and I know of the cynicism abroad
in the community about politicians. That cynicism is a cautionary
note to both of us. If the Australian people are again subjected after
this election to the tired old charade of the bare cupboard, the gnashing
of teeth, and the core and non-core promises, we will have failed
perhaps our last test.(44)
The Opposition Leader claimed that during the campaign
his party had had a 'determination to keep our promises reasonable, credible,
and deliverable ... we want to keep every promise we have made in this
campaign. And we will'.(45) Whilst stating that some of the Prime Minister's
promises would be 'core' and 'non-core', the Opposition Leader asserted
that 'his GST is a core promise-expect him to keep it'.(46)
The Leader of the Opposition, recognising the particular
prominence of certain matters in the election, also stressed the larger
picture. As he said on the day following release of the Government's tax
plan:
... this coming election must not only be about taxation
or the privatisation of Telstra. This must be an election about the
entirety of the national agenda-our national investment in the skills
of our people, the future of our regions and industries, the strength
of our infrastructure, and the availability and security of Australian
jobs.(47)
On the eve of polling day the Opposition Leader, however,
told the National Press Club that '... the Australian people will not
want for a clear choice this weekend.'(48)As he saw it, two matters 'must
rank above all others'. These were sale of the remainder of Telstra ('no
subsequent government will be able to buy it back') and the GST ('no future
government will be able to remove it'). He continued: 'These are threshold
choices for the Australian people, and the alternatives could not be clearer'.(49)
In the wake of the election, the Opposition Leader's
focus was on the character of the Government's mandate in relation to
the GST and on the parliamentary process. He portrayed the Government
as having a very circumscribed mandate based on a contrast of votes for
the House of Representatives and the Senate:
John Howard has won this election. There's no question
about that. But he's won it with the lowest vote to win an election
that any of us can actually recollect ... He has a right to govern
well. And a government has a right to introduce anything that they
like ... He is entitled to put forward any piece of legislation that
he wants. And he can claim for that legislation the merits of the
arguments associated with that legislation. He can claim no more for
it than that.(50)
A month later he was more pointed: 'He cannot claim a
mandate for his GST, and he certainly cannot claim a mandate for the indecent
haste with which he wants to implement it'.(51)
The Opposition's 51.5 per cent of the two-party preferred
vote, including majorities in four of the six states, was 'a clear indication
to Mr Howard that the community does not want his Goods and Services tax
... the actual real practical evidence of the voting outcome indicates
that folk did not want a Goods and Services tax'.(52)
He later pointed to the Senate vote: 'In the Senate,
60 per cent voted for parties they assumed would stop it.'(53)The composition
of the vote in both the Senate and House elections was thus seen to legitimise
parliamentary activity concerning the GST: 'A vote for Labor is a rolled
gold vote against the GST. We will not accept it now. We will not put
it forward as our policy option and we will oppose it absolutely. Now,
we've made that amply clear'.(54)
The Opposition criticised the decision to call an election
immediately upon release of the tax package: '[John Howard] did not want
it subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. He did not want the accountability
that normally comes when you are in office ...'(55) The Opposition Leader
also underlined the institutional context in which the legislation would
be handled: 'Neither Mr Howard, nor myself, will enjoy a majority in the
Senate after this election. Whether he wins or I win, neither of us will'.(56)
And at the National Press Club:
Much as I don't like the fact ... that I'd have to,
as a Prime Minister deal with a Senate that would not be my way, that
is nevertheless the political system that the Australian people endorse.
They expect governments to get on with the Senate, and I would be
doing my level best to do that.(57)
After the election the Opposition Leader continued to
develop his case for the legitimacy of parliamentary action: '... part
of the duty of Opposition is to hold Government accountable on [the GST]'.
The Opposition would 'argue the merits of [the GST] legislation in the
House and the Senate'(58). He left no doubt that the Opposition was 'opposing
[the GST] lock, stock and barrel'.(59) On 28 October he told a media conference:
'... we will manoeuvre tactically in whatever way we can to try and procure
the defeat of this legislation.'(60) Part of the case was the argument
for parliamentary process: 'If ever there was a justification for a high
level Senate Inquiry into a matter of Government policy, this is it'.(61)
The Opposition also commented that the Senate which would
consider the legislation, especially if it were to be dealt with by 30
June 1999 as the Government desired, was an 'old Senate',(62) its members
having been elected at either the periodical elections of March 1993 or
March 1996. The Leader of the Opposition was especially critical of any
voting support for GST legislation from the former Labor senator, Senator
Colston (Queensland), on the basis that he [Senator Colston] had been
last elected in 1993 on an anti-GST platform.(63)
The Leader of the Australian Democrats
On 14 September 1998 Democrat leader Senator Meg Lees
(South Australia) entered the mandate debate, stating that 'there is also
a valid mandate in the "House of Review"'. Her view was that the outcome
in the Senate as well as that in the House of Representatives should be
respected. '"The voters' choice cuts both ways'', Senator Lees says'.(64)
In the week before polling day the Democrats 'pledged
to expand the role of the Senate as a House of Review, saying it is the
best way of forcing Government to be honest, accountable and responsive
to the public'.(65) The day after polling Senator Lees stated:
Clearly, with the combined Democrat, Labor and Green
vote exceeding the Coalition Senate vote by 11.7 per cent, and their
House vote by 8.6 per cent, John Howard has a mandate to form Government,
but no mandate to impose unfair policies on the Senate. If, as the
voting trends suggest, the Democrats regain the balance of power in
our own right in the Senate, we will treat the Coalition's legislative
program fairly and responsibly, but won't be bullied into becoming
a rubber stamp', she concluded.(66)
Four days later, in another media release:
Senator Lees said the Government should respect the
Senate's separate mandate as a House of Review. 58 per cent of people
who voted in the Senate voted for parties opposed to the Coalition's
current tax plan, while the Coalition's Senate vote of 38 per cent
was its lowest in half a century.
As John Howard himself acknowledged on 1987, the
mandate theory that says people approve every piece of Government
policy at election time has always been phony(sic).(67)
Media Analysis
Within a week of polling Paul Kelly, international editor
of The Australian, took issue with 'efforts to delegitimise [John
Howard's] victory typified by the misuse of the mandate theory'. Kelly's
core argument was that '[m]andates, under the classical theory, relate
to governments. The mandate is the link, the trust, the bond between the
ruler and the people'. And later:
If the mandate is killed, then you kill the central
means of keeping governments honest. The government has a right to
implement its policies; but it has a responsibility to honour its
promises. A government that breaks its promises is abusing its mandate.
An Opposition that denies a government a mandate denies any expectation
that its promises will be kept ... (68)
Kelly buttressed his argument by locating the mandate-a
polemical device-among those 'other conventions, rules or theories [needed]
to make our democracy work' for, 'the Constitution, as law, can render
Australia ungovernable'. Kelly especially concentrated his defence of
the mandate on its challengers in the Senate:
The entire Senate wasn't even elected last Saturday.
The Senate can't claim a mandate on a GST because this was a half-Senate
poll. The arrogance for the people held by some senators who claim
mandates when half their numbers didn't even face the voters is as
breathtaking as it is contempuous.
The mandate-the trust between the elected government
and the people-can't apply to the Senate because the Senate doesn't
determine the government and the Senate as a whole didn't go to the
election.
In Kelly's analysis, the mandate concept is essential
for Australia's system of government to work:
... our system can't function with equal and competing
mandates given the Senate's powers.
The system can work only if the Senate discharges
its house of review functions recognising the legitimacy of the Government's
program.
If the Democrats have a mandate, then One Nation
has a mandate ... This is the crazy logic we have created for ourselves.
A leading article in the Financial Review on the
same day adopted a similar view: '... Mr Howard won on Saturday ... Australia
made its choice with its eyes open and the Government should now be allowed
to deliver'. It considered the argument that different voting for the
Senate meant 'the intention of excising key elements of the package is
also flawed'.(69) It continued:
With an Upper House in which it is virtually impossible
to secure a majority, this is to suggest that the Australian people
want governments which aren't able to govern. The Senate is a house
of review and a check on government excesses and duplicities, not
a vehicle to stop them enacting clearly stated programs.
Peter Cole-Adams in the Canberra Times endeavoured
to locate the mandate idea in the institutional context of Australia's
bicameral national parliament:
To question the usefulness of the mandate idea is
not to undermine the authority of governments, or to say that political
parties should not make commitments, or to suggest that they should
not do their damnedest to honour them. The electorate will punish
them if they do not. It is simply to acknowledge the reality
that what the Australian electorate gives a winning party is a parliament
with which it must live.
Our system, the way it has evolved, gives governments
the power to rule but, when it comes to change, it usually guarantees
them little more than the right to negotiate from a position of strength
with minor parties.(70)
Others were less sanguine about the case for the mandate.
In The Age of 6 October 1998 Tim Colebatch wrote:
The Government has every right to govern. It has
no right to make unconstitutional demands on the Senate, such as insisting
that it rubber stamp legislation. Senators are elected to form a house
of review over legislation; that is their purpose; it is their constitutional
duty, and there is no reason why that right should be abandoned.(71)
Peter O'Connor, a Canberra-based journalist, wrote in
like terms in the Financial Review of 16 December 1998:
In our system, as in all democracies, the Parliament
legislates, the executive governs.
The mandate theorists would have us believe Parliament
should function as an electoral college for the executive and then
hibernate between polls, while Cabinet seizes legislative power.(72)
Mandate:
Dictionary and Academic Analyses
Because in Australia and elsewhere mandate doctrine is
at the heart of debate and contention among active politicians, it is
not surprising that dictionaries, either general or political, do not
provide unequivocal definitions. Most hesitate to vest the term in its
political application with definitive meaning. Appendix 1 contains a brief
survey of relevant entries in Australian, British and American dictionaries.
Compilers of dictionaries of politics do not have any
hesitation about including an entry on mandate in their lexicons but they,
too, have considerable reservation about whether any precise or binding
meaning can be attached to the term.
The dictionaries of politics refer to the usual range
of matters-mandates are claimed even when winning margins are small and
for policies which hardly figured at all during the campaign. Indeed,
there is a view that the comprehensivity of modern manifestos dilutes
any particular claim for a mandate. Dictionaries from American sources
write mainly in terms of the significance of mandates in presidential
strategies for securing congressional support for administration programs,
but some see the concept as more applicable to British than American politics.
Appendix 2 contains a more extended review of entries in a selected range
of dictionaries of politics.
Academic analysis of mandate doctrine falls broadly into
two categories. Authors in the first category believe that the term has
substance and is important for the integrity and democratic qualities
of politics and government. Authors in the second category question both
the doctrine and its adverse implications for considered government and
proper conduct of the legislative process. Relevant academic analyses
are surveyed in Appendix 3.
Conclusion
The many questions to which the term, mandate, and the
related ideas give rise are firmly located in the centre of politics.
They concern not only the interpretation of election results for purposes
of legislation and policy, but also who, if anyone, is able to impose
an interpretation on the results of a particular election or, indeed,
if anyone should do so.
What distinguishes Australia's situation in comparison
to other Westminster-style systems is that the Government itself, whose
claim to office is based on the House of Representatives, is only in a
position to impose its view of the mandate on those rare occasions when
it also has a majority in the Senate. Otherwise the question is decided
by whether and on what terms a government can build a majority in the
Senate, finding support from beyond the ranks of its own party supporters.
In this sense, an Australian Government has a good deal less latitude
than various counterparts.
It is not only that Australian governments have less
latitude in interpreting election results in terms of legislation and
policies, the constitutional framework for bicameralism in the Commonwealth
Parliament and the 1948 method of electing Senators mean that attempts
to resolve a dispute about mandate by resort to section 57 is only of
limited and, in most cases, retrospective, value. For some analysts this
is not an unsatisfactory situation and, indeed, an assurance of at least
a measure of parliamentary control of the Executive. On most matters Australian
governments win parliamentary support for most of what they want; they
certainly fare better with the Senate than US presidents do with the Congress.
They also preside over a House of Representatives which is more tightly
controlled than many other lower houses in Westminster-based parliaments,
including the Houses of Commons at Westminster and Ottawa.
The other view is that of Sir Robert Menzies. If there
is some dispute between the Senate and the House of Representatives, and
it is remitted to the people under section 57 of the Constitution, there
should be a reasonable prospect of decisive resolution in favour of one
side or the other. Such decisive resolution is unlikely under the 1948
method of electing Senators.
Appendix 1: Mandate-Dictionary
Definitions
In a dictionary sense, the political usage of the term
is neither primary nor prominent. In the 1989 edition of the Oxford
English Dictionary political usage is fourth of five meanings: 'The
instruction or commission as to policy supposed to be given by the electors
to parliament or one of its members' (vol. IX, p. 301).
Its first use in this sense dates from the late eighteenth
century in France and in form has a decidedly Burkean resonance: 'The
members of the legislative body are not the representation of the department
which has chosen them, but of the whole nation, and no mandate instructions
can be given them'.
Other dictionaries likewise give a low rating to the
political usage of the word. For Webster's it ranks third: 'the
wishes of constituents expressed to a representative, legislature, etc.
as an order, or regarded as an order' (p. 1093). The third edition of
the Macquarie Dictionary includes the following under its entry
for mandate: '3. Politics the instruction as to policy given or supposed
to be given by electors to a legislative body or to one or more of its
members' (p. 1308).
There is thus an equivocal quality to the entries in
the OED and Macquarie; both hesitate to vest the term in
its political application with definitive meaning.
Appendix
2: Dictionaries of Politics
Authors of dictionaries of politics do not have any doubt
that mandate has a place in their lexicons but they, too, share the hesitations
of the general dictionaries about whether definitive meaning can be attached
to the term. A typical such entry is to be found in David Robertson's
A Dictionary of Modern Politics (1993):
Mandates are typically claimed by successful parties
in national elections even when they have actually gained only a smallish
plurality of votes. If a party, or a candidate, has stood for election
on a particular set of policies, then, having won election, a mandate
from the people has been granted to implement those policies. Thus
governments often claim that they are 'mandated' to carry out some
action even if there is no good reason to believe that the policy
in question had very much to do with their victory ...
Questions of whether a mandate does or could exist,
how much anyone is bound by it, and when an election result would
certify such a mandate are hotly-contested matters of modern arguments
about democracy both in parliaments and parties.(73)
The conservative philosopher, Roger Scruton, wrote in
A Dictionary of Political Thought that:
The doctrine of the mandate is highly influential
in democratic politics, although it is extremely difficult to see
quite what it means, the problem here being inextricably bound up
with the general problems of collective choice. It is sometimes said
that when a political party stands for election, it makes certain
promises, and by virtue of this secures the vote of the electorate.
In return for the voluntary act of the electorate, it therefore stands
under a contractual or quasi-contractual obligation to fulfil its
promises, and has a 'mandate from the electorate' so to do. In other
words, the relation between a party in office and the electorate is
one of mandation. The mandate is held to be a sufficient (some say
also necessary) condition for the legitimacy of acts performed in
fulfilment of it. The whole structure of obligation stems therefore
from the fundamental act of consent whereby democracies establish
their claims to legitimacy.(74)
Scruton, however, enumerated several problems: the diversity
of policies in a party program; the range of reasons lying behind the
voting preferences of electors; the likelihood that for reasons, for example,
of necessity it may be desirable or expedient to change a policy. On the
other side of the ledger Scruton posited that a
... party programme seems to express some kind of
commitment. It may be that the correct response is to say that there
is a mandate after election, but that its basis is not to be found
in contract, or promise-keeping; alternatively, that there is no such
thing as a mandate, in which case, with what authority does the ruling
party act?
The Oxford scholar S. E. Finer perceived the positive
and negative dimensions of the term: positively it implied that 'a government
is bound to follow instructions given by the electorate in a general election;
or, negatively, that a government ought not, in a democracy, to adopt
some new policy unless it has first been put before the electorate'. Like
other writers Finer considered that the range of modern party manifestos
makes it 'difficult to maintain the doctrine'.(75)
In American political science protagonists of the presidency
tend to be strong advocates of the mandate (for the president) whilst
others who place more weight on 'checks and balances', and the importance
of the Congress, are more sceptical. President Eisenhower entitled the
first volume of his presidential memoirs, Mandate for Change; the
title of the relevant chapter (8) is: 'The Platform: Promises to Keep'.(76)
Eisenhower initially won office by a significant majority,
supported by majorities in both the Senate and the House (though it was
a frequent irritation to him that Republicans in the Congress did not
feel it a duty to support Administration policies and programs).
The New York Times columnist William Safire, in
Safire's New Political Dictionary defined the term simply as 'the
authority to carry out a program conferred on an elected official; especially
strong after a landslide victory'.(77) He pointed out that in 1960, Eisenhower's
successor, President John F. Kennedy, had a wafer-thin win in the popular
vote-barely 0.1 per cent; but, as one of his leading acolytes wrote:
The fact remains that he won, and on the day after
the election, and every day thereafter, he rejected the argument that
the country had given him no mandate. Every election has a winner
and a loser, he said in effect. The margin is narrow, but the responsibility
is clear. There may be difficulties with the Congress, but a margin
of only one vote would still be a mandate.
Another acolyte, the noted historian Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr, observed:
Kennedy had very little leverage ... [He had been
elected] by the slimmest of margins; no one could possibly claim his
victory as a mandate for change.(78)
The American Political Dictionary combines a general
definition:
Mandate
Popular support for a political program. A mandate
is assumed to emerge from an election as a result of popular support
given to a political party or to elected officials who ran on a set
of pledges to the voters. A mandate may be vague or specific, depending
upon the clarity with which alternatives are presented to the voters,
with a deprecatory assessment of its significance in
American politics:
The mandate concept is best implemented where a responsible,
well-disciplined party, ready and able to carry out its promised program,
exists. The American party system, unlike the British, lacks these
qualities, and the mandate is consequently weakened.
The authors observe, however, some signs of a trend 'in
which voter action produces change'; for example, Ross Perot's bids for
the presidency and the 1994 Republican 'Contract with America'.(79)
Andrew Heywood in Political Ideas and Concepts-An
Introduction (1994) presents a view of the mandate doctrine which
underlines its two-way character where many analysts perceive only a one-way
bid for power by winning politicians. He writes that the 'winning party
or candidate not only enjoys a popular mandate to carry out its manifesto
pledges but has a duty to do so'. 'The great merit of the mandate doctrine
is that it seems to impose some kind of meaning upon an election, and
so offers popular guidance to those who exercise government power'.
Whilst Heywood highlights the constructive characteristics
of the mandate doctrine in its enhancement of democracy by giving a measure
of substance to its meaning as government by the people, he is
similarly concerned by the notion of a 'mandate to rule', not only because
it is 'hopelessly vague' but because it 'comes close to investing politicians
with unrestricted authority simply because they have won an election'.(80)
Appendix
3: Academic Analysis
Important evidence that the mandate doctrine enjoys a
lively existence in democratic life is illustrated by the attention it
has received in general texts on politics. Most of these reflect the scepticism
and hesitancy of the dictionary documentation and analysis of the term
but there are some notable exceptions which attempt to discern the importance
of the doctrine for democratic polities and, among other things, reasons
for its durability. After all, the term was sufficiently prominent during
the latter half of the nineteenth century to support a London University
doctoral dissertation on the doctrine as it applied to British politics
from the Second Reform Act 1867 to the passage of the Parliament
Act 1911.(81)
In the academic literature of the past generation there
have been two important expositions of the significance and substance
of mandate theory, and its importance for the integrity and democratic
qualities of politics and government. Two other major essays have questioned
the doctrine both in its own terms and in terms of its adverse implications
for considered government and proper conduct of the legislative process.
Richard Mulgan, then of the University of Otago and now
in the Public Policy Program at The Australian National University, was
attracted to a study of the mandate doctrine in late 1978 for a number
of reasons including the significance attached to it by ministers and
Opposition parliamentarians in New Zealand, in contrast to the tendency
of academics either to dismiss the term or, as he expressed it, to take
'the notion ... too literally'.(82)
He briefly traversed various incidents in New Zealand
where the mandate was seen to be a central justification for some action
of government. One such incident involved termination of a royal commission,
an intention which attracted little attention during the campaign. Mulgan
concluded that:
Inclusion in the election policy is sufficient, as
well as necessary, for the existence of a mandate. If the public is
unaware of or not interested in the policy, the mandate may be weakened
but not destroyed.(83)
A more significant incident entailed suspension of a
superannuation scheme on the basis of the election mandate, to be validated
retrospectively by legislation: 'the mandate ... provided the moral and
political justification for the Government to announce, without summoning
Parliament, that existing legislation was no longer effective'.
In the subsequent court case, however, it was held that
the Prime Minister [Muldoon] had acted illegally, on the basis that under
the Bill of Rights the Crown may not suspend laws without the consent
of Parliament.(84)
Mulgan was prepared to concede certain criticisms of
mandate doctrine, for example, that 'most voters are unaware of most issues',
or that mandates do not cover all policies advocated by a particular party,
but his fundamental conclusion was that:
The theory of the mandate may thus be taken to justify
governments in enacting their election policy and to oblige them not
to introduce major measures which are outside that policy. As such
it seems an intelligible convention which is vital to our political
system; without it both the authority and the accountability of elected
governments would be seriously limited.(85)
Nearly two decades later, on the basis of debate about
the mandate which followed election of the Howard Government in 1996,
Professor Hugh Emy of Monash University supported a broad formulation
of the doctrine on the basis that it contains 'ideas of substance for
organising representative democracy'.(86) His formulation, which he characterised
as 'a descendant of the delegate theory of representation', is as follows:
In the context of Australian national government,
mandate is usually taken to mean that a party which fights an election
on the basis of policies clearly stated in its manifesto or the leader's
policy speech, is entitled to pursue those policies if it wins a majority
of seats in the House of Representatives. The mandate is a commission
to govern. This includes a general right to govern and a particular
right to pursue stated policies. Conversely, the public has a right
to expect that the new government will abide 'by the terms of its
mandate', i.e. as far as possible it should honour its promises and
commitments. If it reneges on the terms of the implied contract with
the people through which it gained power, it may be accused of ' dishonouring
its mandate'.(87)
Emy also recognised that the mandate has a practical
as well as rhetorical dimension. As manifestos became long and detailed
documents, they placed certain limits on the winning party's scope for
action. He traced evidence in Britain that the parties take their manifestos
seriously and, citing a 1992 study, 'what governments do "relates broadly
either to their manifesto emphases or to their long-standing ideological
commitments"'.(88)
In a key observation Emy contended that 'the mandate
has two faces which are two aspects of one relationship'. He continued:
An elected government does enjoy a right to govern
and to legislate in pursuit of policies it announced either during
or prior to the election campaign. However, the citizens also have
a right to expect that the government will govern in line with its
stated intentions or promises; and, that faced with the unexpected,
it will at least try to respond consistently with established policy
and/or its political principles.(89)
Emy sees the vitality of mandate doctrine as having important
implications for the reputation of government and politics. Among the
sources of low esteem of politics,
... one is certainly the growing practice among modern
parties of seeking power by concealing their real intentions from
the voters, making promises they have no intention of keeping, in
effect seeking power on a program of 'plausible lies'.(90)
Emy thus sees in the mandate doctrine a mechanism for
upholding 'the ethic of responsible party government itself'.(91)
Like Mulgan, Emy's analysis recognises most (if not all)
of the various criticisms of the mandate doctrine; his own position, again
like Mulgan's, is especially sustainable because he does not interpret
the doctrine as a carte blanche for the winner, however defined:
... the right to govern does not give an executive
an automatic right to convert its policy into law. It must explain
itself fully. It is obliged to defend itself against charges of inconsistency:
that a Bill departs noticeably from what was foreshadowed, or confers
too much discretion on minister and public servants. With controversial
policies, the government cannot necessarily invoke its own mandate
as a trump card.(92)
In the context of responsible government in Australia,
Emy posits an important role for the Senate to scrutinise claims made
by a government to exercise 'a trustee's discretion to vary or create
new policies'.(93)
One of the major challenges to mandate doctrine came
from America's leading theorist on democracy, Robert A. Dahl of Yale University,
during the Reagan presidency:
... Reagan's lofty mandate was provided by 50.9 per
cent of the voters ... what was widely interpreted as Reagan's mandate,
not only by supporters but by opponents, was more myth than reality.(94)
The mandate, according to Dahl, who was in turn relying
on a 1983 study, Interpreting Elections, by Stanley Kelley, has
four supports: that elections carry messages about problems, policies
and programs; certain of those messages must be treated as authoritative
concerns; to qualify as mandates, the messages must reflect the stable
views of voters and the electorate; and, finally, a negative imperative
that, except in emergencies, governments should not undertake major innovations
in policy or procedure unless the electorate has had an opportunity to
consider them in an election.(95)
Dahl found little difficulty in negating these stipulations
and concluding that:
Beyond revealing the first preferences of a plurality
of voters, do presidential elections also reveal the additional information
that a plurality (or a majority) of voters prefer the policies of
the winner and wish the winner to pursue those policies.(96)
In empirical analysis, Dahl pointed out that while in
1984 Reagan had a landslide, Democratic candidates in the House of Representatives
secured 52 per cent of the vote, down from 55 per cent at the 1982 mid-term
elections.
Dahl cast the claims for a presidential mandate in terms
of what he characterised as the pseudo-democratisation of the presidency
and an attempt to elevate it above the Congress. In contrast to Emy, who
seems to hold that only governments have mandates,(97) Dahl considered
that members of the Congress opposing presidential measures 'in effect
also claim a mandate for their policies'.(98)
(It is of interest that Dahl's inspiration for his essay
was Reagan's comparatively comfortable victories rather than Kennedy's
much more questionable victory, decisive though it was in the electoral
college).
The scheme in the United States Constitution for election
of presidents was, according to Dahl, designed to improve the chances
of victory for a national figure rather than a faction leader or a demagogue-the
president was not to be a tribune of the people.(99)
This philosophy was challenged by the eighth president
of the United States, Andrew Jackson, in 1828 (when he lost in the electoral
college having led the vote) and 1832.
Jackson conceived the president as 'an immediate and
direct representative of the people'. Little more than a decade later
James Polk was justifying his use of the veto on legislation on the basis
that the President was responsible to the people of the whole Union, as
the representatives in the legislative branches were responsible to the
people of particular States and districts.(100)
According to Dahl, it was Woodrow Wilson who elevated
the doctrine of presidential mandate to 'what ... appears to be its canonical
form'. In an essay of 1908 on Constitutional Government in the United
States, Wilson wrote that the earlier Whig theory of the presidency
was 'far from being a democratic theory ... It [was] particularly intended
to prevent the will of the people as a whole from having at any moment
an unobstructed sweep and ascendancy'.(101)
Of the president, Wilson wrote: 'No-one else represents
the people as a whole, exercising a national choice ... His is the only
national voice in affairs ... . He is the representative of no constituency,
but of the whole people.'(102)
Not the least of Dahl's objections to presidential mandates
is its use as a device to circumvent the due processes of policy formulation
and legislation provided for in the Constitution. Emphasizing the 'crucial
importance of opportunities for understanding' and 'deliberation',
he observed: '... deliberation is surely central to the idea of a democratic
decision-making'.(103)
By far the most trenchant attack on mandate theory came
from Professor Campbell Sharman of the University of Western Australia
in the December 1998 Senate Department Lecture. Sharman pointed up the
importance of mandate debate in Australia because of the bicameralism
of the Commonwealth Parliament. The institutional and electoral situation:
... requires governments to compromise so that a
larger group than the governing party, perhaps even a body of parliamentarians
representing a real majority of voters, supports a proposed measure.
This means that, quite apart from any amendments that may be required,
legislation is closely scrutinised, and the government of the day
and its supporting bureaucracy must publicly justify every proposed
law to a legislative body whose support cannot be taken for granted.(104)
Like Dahl, Sharman stressed the importance of public
deliberation, and deprecated employment of mandate theory when it is used
as a means of circumscribing, or even subverting, the constitutional processes
of government and legislation. Sharman's argument focused heavily on features
of mandate doctrine which would be seen as abuses by those who take a
more benign view of the doctrine.
Sharman asserted:
[The mandate] does not mean that the government can
make any new law it wants by the stroke of the prime minister's pen.
Governing is not the same as legislating ... the only body that can
make laws is the Parliament ... the whole point of parliamentary democracy
is that governments are forced to submit new legislation to a representative
assembly to gain consent for it.(105)
He saw mandate claims as pre-empting discussion of the
merits of particular policy or amendments to legislation. In Australia's
current debate he disputed the existence of a mandate on the basis of
votes: 'The coalition parties won just under 40 per cent of the vote for
the House of Representatives at the last election, but gained a fraction
over 54 per cent of the seats'.
Murray Goot of Macquarie University provided another
commentary on the current debate in Australia. Goot followed Dahl in seeking
to use public opinion polling as a means of probing beyond election results
to ascertain the voters' minds on questions at issue.
He believed a claim to a mandate is difficult to sustain
in a bicameral parliament in which each house has comparable powers. In
Australia, he pointed out, 'the Senate turns out to be a better-not a
worse-mirror of the nation's mind than the House of Representatives'.(106)
Goot traced growing criticism of mandate theory but believed
that opinion polling provided a means to ascertain whether or not there
is substantial support for particular policies. On the basis of the polls
he found, in the case of Australia, that there is often popular support
for Senate actions and, moreover, cases where the public does not have
any objection to a Government failing to honour a promise.
Whilst polls and kindred methods of appraising public
opinion are no doubt used by governments and other party leaders in settling
their strategies and tactics, it is unlikely that they could be invoked
authoritatively to settle a constitutional or even a political point.
Nor will all analysts, let alone parliamentarians, accept
Goot's view that 'in politics, promise-keeping is a political act; it
is neither a question of morality nor a question of logic';(107) this
view is certainly at odds with Emy's interest in the mandate and the connections
between meeting commitments made during elections and the general reputation
of politics.
Most analysis of the mandate question focuses on a simple
set of circumstances-a party makes promises during an election campaign
which it is expected to implement in the event of victory.
Politics is, nevertheless, a dynamic process; today's
promise may simply be irrelevant tomorrow. The question of realising a
mandate may be as much a question of the party's prospects at a succeeding
election as one of keeping promises made during a recent contest. Public
opinion about a policy or program may change and there is no impediment
to an incumbent government responding to that change; indeed, in a democracy
it would be wholly appropriate for it to do so. Opinion polls may inform
decisions of this character but they cannot, of themselves, legitimate
decisions having this effect.
The circumstances giving rise to a particular policy
may likewise change necessitating change to the policy or even its abandonment.
Endnotes
- Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975, Viking, 1985,
esp. chapter 1; Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam
in Politics, Macmillan, 1977, pp. 243-5; G. S. Reid and C.
J. Lloyd, Out of the Wilderness, Cassell Australia, 1974, pp.
197-210.
- David Leyton-Brown, Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public
Affairs 1989, University of Toronto Press, 1995, p.p. 23-5; David
Leyton-Brown, Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs
1990, University of Toronto Press, 1997, pp. 26-31.
- G. S. Reid and C. J. Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 208-9.
- As in the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt's attempt to increase the
number of justices of the United States Supreme Court following various
decisions which declared New Deal legislation to be unconstitutional.
See Kermit L. Hall (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court
of the United States, New York, 1992, p. 743.
- R. H. S. Crossman, Inside View, Jonathan Cape, 1972, chapters
2 and 3.
- Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70. A Personal Record,
Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971, pp. 37-8; James
Callaghan, Time and Change, Collins, 1987, pp. 174-5.
- Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, Heinemann, 1963,
ch. 4.
- Robert A. Dahl, 'The Myth of the Presidential Mandate', Political
Science Quarterly, vol. 105 (3), November 1990, pp. 355-72.
- As quoted by Norman Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction in English
Politics 1832-1852, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965, p. 142.
- As quoted by Vernon Bogdanor, The People and the Party System,
Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 17.
- ibid., p. 17.
- As quoted by Cecil S. Emden, The People and the Constitution,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956, p. 220.
- Cecil S. Emden, op. cit., p. 220.
- As quoted in M. A. J. Wheeler-Booth, 'The House of Lords', J. A. G.
Griffith and Michael Ryle, Parliament, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989,
pp. 504-5.
- As quoted ibid., p. 505.
- Alfred Deakin, Official Record of the Debates of the Austral
|