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Immigration, Social Cohesion and National Identity
Professor Robert Holton,
Consultant
Social Policy Group
1 September 1997
Contents
Immigration and multiculturalism continue to be major issues for Australians
concerned about the state of the nation and its future. Debate on these
topics is however often heated and not well informed.
The paper sets out to clarify what Australians really think about
a range of issues connected with immigration and multiculturalism,
based on evidence collected from a variety of sources. Australian attitudes
are related both to the characteristics of Government policies, and to
popular perceptions of migrants and policy objectives. Attention is also
given to the question of the future relevance of multicultural policies.
The findings clearly indicate consistent majority support for lower
immigration levels, but a mixture of positives and negatives in
relation to multiculturalism.
Australians generally support cultural tolerance and many find much
of value in a culturally mixed society. Many however express significant
concerns about the social cohesion of multicultural Australia. Many
popular stereotypes about Asians living in Australia are not born out
by the facts. There is no 'Asian' culture that is separate and alien
from Australian culture. Asia involves a variety of cultural influences,
some of which resonate with Australians, and some of which don't. Those
of Asian background usually become citizens very quickly and a number
marry those of Anglo-Australian background.
Multicultural policies have generated a mixed response. Publicly
funded support for non-English speaking migrants is often supported
when seen as part of a universal provision available to all Australians
but criticised when seen as a special program for migrants only.
Opponents of multiculturalism see it as unwarranted social engineering.
The paper adopts a broad focus in explaining popular attitudes. One
element in this is the increased impact of economic globalisation
and growing concern about unemployment and economic insecurity. Such anxieties
underlie much concern about immigration intake and social cohesion. The
groups most criticised are usually the recent arrivals who symbolise the
unknown.
Different conceptions of Australian national identity also affect attitudes
to cultural diversity. Many have an open conception of nationhood
which has a place for migrants of diverse backgrounds provided they participate
in Australian institutions. The majority believe you do not have to
be born in Australia to be a true Australian. Openness does not however
mean cosmopolitanism, in the sense of being a citizen of the world with
no special links with Australia.
The paper concludes by suggesting that multicultural policies are
in need of review and overhaul if they are to make a positive contribution
to public policy in Australia. A number of issues are canvassed for further
consideration.
One is the linking of multiculturalism with citizenship rights
within the philosophy of public policy. This however, raises difficult
questions of how the universal rights of all citizens as individuals are
to be balanced with any kind of group rights of recognition accorded to
culturally defined groups.
At a more practical level, several recommendations are made to
improve the quality of democratic communication between policy-makers
and the people in relation to policies of immigration and multiculturalism.
One is a clearer communication of the universalistic rationale of policies
that are wrongly perceived as sectional benefits unavailable to most Australians.
Another is a far higher level of accounting information to citizens, as
to how public funds are actually spent in these controversial areas.
The paper concludes that multicultural policies cannot continue in
the old way. This is not because they are necessarily unpopular, but
because they are widely misunderstood, and lack a clear rationale.
As we enter the 21st century, the impact of immigration on Australian
society continues to be a matter of public concern and political controversy.
At a time when migrant intake levels have been cut back, and major criticisms
about policies of multiculturalism have been voiced, it is timely to take
stock of the social as well as economic effects of immigration on Australian
society. While the economic impact of immigration in such areas as economic
growth, productivity, and employment, has been widely canvassed, there
has been less sustained analytical attention given to many of the social
issues at the heart of public debate and anxiety.(1) Matters such as Asian
immigration, racism, multiculturalism and social cohesion, have generated
controversy and an abundance of rhetoric. Robust debate of this kind is
certainly a healthy feature of political life in any democracy. Yet in
current circumstances, a balanced appreciation of the viewpoints held
by various sections of the community on such matters is in danger of becoming
swamped by ideology, prejudice, and adversarial rhetoric.
What effects, for example, has immigration in general, and culturally
diverse immigration in particular had on social cohesion in Australia?
Is Australia fast becoming Asianised? And is it true that multicultural
societies generally collapse into warring tribes? If so, how far is this
because different cultures don't mix, and how far a result of public policies
that are seen as unfair and discriminatory? Or has immigration-driven
cultural diversity destabilised social cohesion in Australia in less dramatic
ways, by inducing social change at a faster pace than communities can
tolerate it? Or can national identity evolve in a manner capable of combining
older national traditions with newer elements? Can Australia have both
unity and cohesion as well as cultural difference and diversity? And is
multiculturalism part of an evolutionary process that will lead to cohesion
along with diversity, or is it an unpopular, divisive, and incoherent
policy that is more of a hindrance than a help to Australia's social cohesion
in the future?
A major part of this paper is directed to establishing what Australians
think about such matters. How far, for example do Australians support
or oppose current immigration levels, the cultural diversity that has
been created by post-war immigration, and policies of multiculturalism?
Is there a clear majority view on these matters around which community
consensus has formed? Is opinion polarised between monoculturalists and
multiculturalists, or do many Australians remain pragmatic and uncommitted?
And whatever opinion is held, how important are such issues compared with
other political questions of the day? Are immigration and multiculturalism
at the forefront of public concerns, or are they matters of secondary
importance compared with issues such as unemployment or taxation?
It is straightforward enough to address these questions from a purely
Australian perspective. Yet to do so would omit the insights that derive
from comparisons and contrasts with countries overseas. International
comparisons allow us to establish how well Australia has managed the cultural
diversity that has arisen from the immigration program.
The contours of Australia's post-war immigration program are well-documented.
Australia's intake of migrants has been proportionately greater per head
of population than any other country bar Israel. Approximately 23% of
the current population were born overseas.(2) In relation to composition,
the predominantly Anglo-Celtic mix originally conceived has given way
to successive components of Northern, Eastern and Southern Europeans,
and from the late 1960s onwards, increasing numbers of Asians. The Australian
Bureau of Statistics currently defines Asians as those from the Indian
sub-continent, South-East Asian countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia,
and North-East Asia including Hong Kong and China. While Asian-born, on
this definition make up around 40% of the current intake, they comprise
only about 5% of the total population.(3) If those from the Middle East
including Lebanon and Turkey are also included the total of first generation
Asians in Australia in 1996 rises to 5.6%. Assuming immigration levels
set at a net increase of 70,000 per year, and no change in the composition
by place of birth, the Asian-born would rise to between 7.5 and 8% by
2031.(4) It is hard to see these aggregate trends as 'swamping' the existing
population, or amounting to the Asianisation of Australia.
Popular concerns about Asian immigration, are however, not simply based
on perceptions about actual levels of intake. In addition, they draw on
a sense of visible difference between 'Asians' and others, and upon beliefs
about Asian social behaviour in Australia. Such beliefs include a sense
of undue levels of Asian concentration in 'ghettoes', and upon the argument
that Asians are socially exclusive and culturally alien. Such sentiments
are typified in Pauline Hanson's first Parliamentary speech in which she
argued that Asians 'have their own culture and religion, form ghettoes,
and do not assimilate'.(5) In a 1994 poll conducted in Victoria for the
Sunday Age, 53% of respondents also felt Asian migrants had not mixed
well with the wider community.(6) The impact of immigration on Australian
society is then not simply a matter of numbers, but also an issue of perceptions,
community values and inter-cultural relations.
Debates about the social impact of immigration have often been conducted
in terms of the idea of challenges to social cohesion. This is a concept
that is hard to define in any precise sense. At its most general it refers
to the ties that bind a society together and prevent it falling apart.
The principles of social cohesion are easiest to determine when all citizens
share the same values and standards, but far harder to identify when individuals
interpret 'cohesion' and 'disorder' in different ways. For some, any kind
of change, including a change in the cultural composition of the country
they live in may seem like an unwanted threat, whereas for others change
may be welcomed for the new opportunities or richer experiences it brings
with it. In the former case Asian immigration is interpreted as a threat
to social cohesion, whereas in the latter it appears as an enrichment
of social life. In contemporary Australia, as we shall see below, both
viewpoints are widely held, making it very hard to resolve debates about
immigration and social cohesion to the satisfaction of all concerned.
It is also worth mentioning that social cohesion in a free society requires
a degree of mutual accommodation, or 'give and take', between different
social groups and individuals. Put another way, social cohesion within
a liberal democratic society is a two-way street, rather than a one-way
process of authoritarian control by a dominant group over others.
As we have seen, concerns over migrant ghetto formation are at the heart
of many contemporary discussions of immigration and social cohesion. This
concern arose in post-war Australia on the assumption that US patterns
of social segregation, social division and racial violence would be replicated
in Australia. In this respect, however, the Australian record is one of
lower levels of ethnic and racial concentration, and lesser levels of
overt collective violence than in the US.
Many of the reasons for this are to do with real differences in the
history of the two countries.(7) The poor European migrants able to get
to the US in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were part of a largely
unplanned immigration process. Australia's migration process has by contrast
been more highly regulated to avoid undue concentrations of particular
groups, while distance and cost made it a less preferred destination for
poorer Europeans prior to World War Two. The American inner city ghettoes
also drew in poor Blacks for whom the historic experience of slavery and
racism acted as major obstacles to social cohesion. In this way, the American
ghettoes gained a reputation for extremes of poverty and social disorder,
features which became linked to the ethnic and racial characteristics
of the populations who lived in them, rather than to the low wages, unemployment
and slums in which they lived.
Australia has never seen ghettoes in the strict American sense of the
term, that is inner urban neighbourhoods dominated by particular ethnic
or racial groups living in high levels of poverty and social pathology.
Yet it has undoubtedly seen concentrations of migrant groups, whether
English, southern European or Asian, in specific urban areas. These are
often outer urban suburbs where housing is cheap and where industrial
employment is available. Jupp and his associates in a 1990 study located
around seventeen municipalities where non-English speakers exceeded one
quarter of the population. These included Marrickville and Fairfield in
Sydney, Footscray and Brunswick in Melbourne, and Thebarton in Adelaide.(8)
When such concentrations are looked at more closely, however, many turn
out to have a mixed ethnic population, rather than one dominated by a
single group. Thus Canterbury and Marrickville in Sydney and Footscray
and Sunshine in Melbourne, contain concentrations of both Southern Europeans
and South-East Asians. Such areas may be regarded as multicultural in
a demographic sense rather than as ethnic ghettoes. Another issue, obscured
when emphasis is placed on concentration alone, is that many ethnic group
members, and sometimes the majority live outside major areas of concentration.
This reflects availability of cheap land for much of the post-war period,
and a degree of upward occupational mobility for many migrants.
The most controversial issues with regard to the debates about ghettoes
concern Asian migrants. While it can be shown that few areas in Australia
have high concentrations of migrants from a single background, among those
that do the Cabramatta area of Fairfield looms large in many public perceptions
as an area of Indo-Chinese concentration, unemployment and crime. In Fairfield,
as a whole, for example, the concentration of South-East Asians has been
around five times their proportion in the general population.
Whether Asians as a whole are more likely to form concentrations seems
dubious. The evidence suggests that while the Vietnamese are most highly
concentrated, others are far less so. The Indian, Sri Lankan and Philippine
born, for example, are much more scattered, while the existence of Chinatowns
in a number of cities is more to do with concentrations of business than
residence. The Chinese-born are then widely spread, while 'Muslims in
Sydney and Melbourne are more widely scattered than Jews'.(9) The scattering
of Islamic populations is in part a reflection of their ethnic diversity,
with origins primarily in Turkey, the Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia.
Concentration is one issue, but what are the consequences of concentration
for social cohesion? This question may be pursued with respect to a number
of issues, such as levels of violence and communal conflict, and levels
of participation in Australian life.
In terms of overt violence, it is very clear that Australia has experienced
far lower levels of conflict than the USA, the UK, and many other culturally
diverse societies.(10) Research into the impact of Asian immigration on
levels of collective violence in Australia, designed to test the theory
of breakdown in social cohesion, found no discernible increase in the
years of expanding Asian intake and recession in the early to mid 1980s.(11)
At the same time community relations between Anglo-Australians and various
ethnic groups have not been entirely trouble free. The Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Report on Racial Violence in Australia, for example,
notes sporadic individual level violence against groups such as Indo-Chinese
or Middle Eastern groups, especially at moments of increased social tension
such as the Gulf War.(12) Other violent conflicts between ethnic groups
have occurred at soccer matches, usually involving young people, but these
have not in general spilled over into residential communities.
Concerns about Asianisation are not however easy to dispel with reference
to social and demographic data of this kind. This is because it is perceptions
and emotive symbols rather than research findings and facts that seem
to count the most. As already pointed out, the existence and extent of
social cohesion is a very difficult question to resolve. Some Australians
feel a threat to social cohesion when hearing individuals speaking another
unfamiliar language, or seeing them eating unfamiliar food. Incidents
such as the outrage felt in a Melbourne suburb, when Vietnamese neighbours
prepared to barbecue a dog, are symptomatic of these concerns.(13)
Negative perceptions may be especially acute for older Australians brought
up in a primarily Anglo-Australian environment before and during the post-war
waves of culturally diverse immigration. Geoffrey Blainey evokes such
sentiments, in All for Australia, recalling the monocultural experience
of being brought up in a part of Australia where cultural difference was
absent.(14) Yet for others, including those who have themselves been migrants
or worked overseas, change in the direction of greater cultural diversity
may be seen as enriching and strengthening Australian life, rather than
challenging its cohesion. Variety, it is said is 'the spice of life'.
Consistent with this, opinion polls suggest a degree of tolerance of cultural
difference. Australians then have had widely different levels of exposure
to cultural diversity in the formative years of their lives, and also
make very different interpretations of the level of social cohesion or
division that exists around us. This makes it unlikely that complete consensus
about immigration and social cohesion is achievable.
While debates about social cohesion are therefore hard to resolve in
general terms, it is possible to say something about the accuracy of claims
that certain ethnic groups such as 'Asians' do not assimilate. Three points
may be made here. The first concerns the reasons why ethnic concentrations
have formed among certain groups. How far do these represent a socially
divisive preference to remain isolated from other Australians? There is
no doubt that many new settlers, if given a choice, prefer to live amongst
people with whom they have affinities of kinship, culture, and language.
This applies as much to the English-speakers who settled in Para Hills,
South Australia, as much as Vietnamese in Springvale, Victoria, though
English-speaking concentrations are usually not seen as undesirable. The
existence of ethnic concentrations is not solely a product of this kind
of preference, however. Concentrations have often formed around the vicinity
of the migrant hostels where groups first settled, where cheap affordable
public housing was made available, or where suitable employment was more
likely to be found. These factors, have little to do with cultural preference
or refusal to mix, and a great deal to do with the realities of adapting
to life in a new environment. And as already indicated, many migrants
have moved out of initial concentrations of settlement as opportunities
arose.
Two further points may be made about readiness to participate in Australian
society. The first concerns preparedness to take out Australian citizenship.
Here Asian groups such as Vietnamese (78%), and Chinese (75%), have higher
than average uptake rates alongside Greeks (81%) and migrants from the
former Yugoslavia (80%).(15) From these data it cannot be concluded that
Asian migrants resist assimilation in a political sense, a point reinforced
by recent electoral success for Chinese and Vietnamese candidates in a
number of locations.
A second index of participation or mixing is provided by data on inter-marriage.
The marriage patterns of first generation migrants are not all that useful
as indicators of social participation because many were married prior
to entry into Australia. A more helpful way of looking at the long term
issue of social mixing is to consider the marriage patterns of second
generation migrants. Based on 1991 census figures, there is no evidence
that Asians as such are more likely to continue to marry within their
own groups than those from other regions.(16) Nonetheless some individual
Asian groups have very high in-marriage rates. Using those of British-origin
as a standard, who marry others of the same origin at a rate of 18.2%
for women and 18.9% for men, comparable rates for Asians range from high
levels for Lebanese (72.5% and 52.0%) and Turks (66.2% and 41.9%), to
low rates for Indians (5.2% and 5.4%) and Malaysians (5.5% and 9.6%).
Chinese-born appear closer to the lower than the higher end of the spectrum
at 21.9% and 28.4%, but these data under-estimate marriage between ethnic
Chinese from different national backgrounds. Asians of different backgrounds
vary considerably therefore in their marriage patterns. In this respect
they exhibit the same patterns of divergence that Charles Price has found
for European migrants.
The citizenship and inter-marriage data suggest that social and ethnic
mixing varies considerably. While some groups mix or participate far more
than others, there is no distinctively Asian pattern of separatism compared
with other groups. This reflects the diversity of Asian immigration,(17)
which comprises the highly educated as well as those of peasant background,
those of middle class as well as working class background, English-speakers
as well as non-English speakers, Catholics as well as Muslims and Buddhists,
and those who play cricket and gamble on horses, as well as those adept
at mah jong or kick boxing. There is no 'Asian' culture that is separate
and alien from Australian culture, rather a variety of cultural influences
involving a mix of ethnic, religious, secular, and class-based differences.
Levels of difference, and levels of mixing, as measured by inter-marriage
vary between groups. The stereotype of Asians as inherently different
and by virtue of that threatening to the Australian way of life, appears
to be grossly misleading.
This does not mean that every public anxiety about cultural practices
labelled as 'Asian' is groundless. This point may be made with respect
to the issue of criminality and, in particular organised crime. Asian-based
organised crime certainly exists on both a local and global basis, but
it is concentrated among particular groups. There is no evidence that
Asian communities as a whole have higher levels of criminality than any
other part of the Australian community.(18) Broad brush criticisms of
Asians as such are therefore very misleading, and may contribute to social
anxiety through exaggeration and unwarranted stigmatisation of law-abiding
citizens.
We have analysed the issue of migration and social cohesion thus far
in terms of the impact of immigration levels and ethnic composition upon
Australian society. The problem of social cohesion does however raise
even broader issues. Two particular questions stand out. The first of
these is the connection between migration, globalization and social cohesion.
The second is the cumulative impact made by all such trends upon the Australian
identity.
Globalization has been defined as 'the intensification of economic,
political, social, and cultural relations across borders.'(19) Instead
of a world where nations conduct their own affairs, and regulate relations
with other nations according to national objectives, globalization refers
to a world where cross-border activities assume such a scale and intensity
that nation-states cannot hope to regulate them fully. The migration of
people occurs alongside movements of capital, finance, technology, information
and cultural practices across political boundaries. To a significant extent,
such movements involve formal institutions such as multi-national companies
and trans-national regulatory bodies like the World Trade Organisation,
and various UN agencies. But they also involve a myriad of more informal
inter-personal electronic linkages between individuals, families, and
friends, dependent on chain migration, international travel, the telephone,
and the Internet.
Migration then is only one aspect of the far broader and more complex
impact of globalization upon Australian society. Just as many Australians
feel anxious about immigration and the cultural diversity it has engendered,
so they also feel concern about other aspects of globalization, such as
foreign ownership of economic resources and challenges to Australian sovereignty.
Recent research by Clive Bean(20) has investigated the views of a sample
of over 2000 Australians on both immigration and economic sovereignty.
One of his main findings is that Australians are even more concerned about
what they see as the negative impact of the world economy than that of
immigration. Thus over 75% of the sample agreed with the view that Australia
should limit the import of foreign products, as against 60% who supported
cuts to current immigration levels.
We shall explore attitudes to immigration in more depth below, merely
noting at this stage that his findings are consistent with the vast bulk
of surveys conducted over the last 30 years. The matter of more immediate
interest is the even greater negativity expressed towards the impact of
the global economy. This is found not simply in relation to industry protection,
but also high levels of support for the propositions that multi-nationals
have too much power in Australia, and that foreigners should not be allowed
to buy land. Concerns about these aspects of economic globalization generally
correlate with concerns about the impact of immigration. And not surprisingly
it is those who are Australian-born, older, and with lower incomes who
are more likely to be concerned about economic globalization and immigration
than those overseas-born and with higher incomes. Surprisingly levels
of education have no independent effect on economic sovereignty issues,
although the more highly educated are less likely to oppose immigration.
These data have interesting implications for the analysis of social
cohesion in Australia. They suggest that certain aspects of the globalization
process, such as foreign ownership and global penetration of Australian
markets, are, along with immigration, especially worrying to many of those
most vulnerable to economic change, and those whose formative experiences
were set prior to the recently intensified cross-border processes of globalization.
In this sense it may also be argued that it is globalization which represents
the greatest challenge to social cohesion. If immigration is regarded
as a sub-set of globalization, then resistance to immigration may have
as much to do with economic insecurity in a world of permeable boundaries,
than any immigration-specific cause.
Where then does globalization leave nation-states like Australia?(21)
Three main theoretical positions may be adopted on this question. The
first is what might be termed the theory of sovereign complacency. This
claims that globalization can be defied, to the extent that nations may
claim absolute sovereignty over what goes on within their borders. Accordingly
foreign investment, commodity imports, immigration, and global regulatory
arrangements can all be ignored in pursuit of national interests. This
approach relies on the formal legal sovereignty of nations to determine
their own affairs. The difficulty with it is that national sovereignty
in Australia and elsewhere has always been conditional on power relations
and co-operative arrangements with other major players in the world arena,
be they other Governments such as the UK or USA, or multi-national companies.
For most if not all countries, the legal ideal of absolute sovereignty
has never existed in practice. The recent intensification of globalization
renders the ideal even more of a myth. The best that can be hoped for
is to negotiate or bargain on the terms upon which dealings with others
take place, whether in matters of trade, military security, or access
to capital.
A second alternative theory of globalization claims that the nation-state
is either dead or has become significantly weakened as a result of economic
globalization. Stephen Castles and his associates have utilised what might
be called the theory of the global Juggernaut, to claim that nationalism
is thereby rendered outmoded.(22) While the nation-state may persist,
the likely form of identity in a global world of cross-border movement
will switch from nationalist to multicultural. Nationalism is therefore
a mistaken identity.
This second theory has the virtue of drawing attention to global inequalities
of power, and the potentially de-stabilising effects of economic globalization
upon nations. Yet it is by no means clear that the global Juggernaut will
sweep all before it. Multi-national companies need nation-states to provide
economic and political stability where they operate, and governments are
not without bargaining power in negotiating the terms upon which access
to national markets is granted, as the Japanese example amongst others
indicates. More relevant to the issue of immigration, is the persistence
of nationalism and national identity around the world as well as in Australia.
Rather than being rendered outmoded by globalization, the advent of an
economic and technological world without borders seems to have stimulated
a nationalist reaction. The appeal of Australian identity remains, even
if it is re-cast and re-invented in each generation.
A third more pragmatic theoretical position would then see globalization
and the nation-state as co-existent features of the contemporary world.
This co-existence is not without tensions and conflicts. But it does equally
mean the inter-dependency of nation-states as enduring entities rather
than their erosion by trans-national movements. At the core of this inter-dependency
are the benefits that come from cross-border exchange for nations and
individuals. Just as no individual can meet all their needs from their
immediate environment, leading in some cases to migration, so no nation
can meet all its needs from within its own resources. This applies both
to economic, technological and scientific needs, as well as cultural practices
and resources.
These theoretical considerations may be linked in a very concrete way
with questions about what it means to be an Australian. The nature of
the Australian identity is too large and complex an issue to be fully
canvassed here. It is a matter about how people act and what they do,
as much as a question of attitudes that can be canvassed by social researchers.
Song, literature, and poetry have from time to time been elements in the
expression of Australian identity, but so have sport and recreation. The
Australian identity also has a strong historical dimension to it, and
has been subject to change over time.
It has sometimes been claimed that Australia's national identity is
not as strong as the national identity of countries that have experienced
the trauma of invasion and civil war. While it is true that events of
this kind have often been major reference points in the consolidation
of a sense of national identity, they are not by any means the only processes
by which identity emerges. In the case of Australia, it has been argued
that Australian national sentiment has formed as much around social and
cultural(23) as political and military reference points. Gallipoli and
the Anzac tradition occupy a central symbolic place,(24) but so too do
popular commitments to egalitarian ideals and to a way of life free from
the status pretensions of the Old World.
As matters stand today, there is no doubt that the Australian national
identity continues to be a matter of great significance to the Australian
population. While controversies rage over how past history is evaluated,
it is clear that Australians retain a strong sense of what it means to
be Australian. Neither immigration nor globalization seem to have created
a rootless set of cosmopolitans for who nationhood means nothing. What
has happened is a certain re-casting of what it means to be an Australian
under the impact of immigration and increased cultural diversity.
Recent survey evidence from a study of over 2000 Australians, reported
in Table 1, reflects this re-casting process. It lists in rank order those
aspects of what it means to be an Australian about which respondents felt
most strongly.
Table 1: Positive Identifications of What is Truly Australian(25)
| Very Important
| Fairly Important
|
| Feeling Australian
|
|
|
| Respecting Australia's laws and political institutions
|
|
|
| Having Australian citizenship
|
|
|
| Being able to speak English
|
|
|
| Having lived in Australia for most of one's life
|
|
|
| Being born in Australia
|
|
|
| Being a Christian
|
|
|
Source: Derived from the results of the National Social Science
study reported in M.D.R. Evans, 'National Identity: What Does It Take
To Be "Truly Australian" ', Worldwide Attitudes, 18 March
1996, pp. 1-8, and F.L. Jones, 'Ethnic Diversity, Social Distance and
National Identity: Citizen Beliefs about Australian Institutions, 1996,
passim.
One of the most interesting points here is that respondents are less likely
to associate being truly Australian with being Australian-born than with
other criteria based on personal feeling and political commitment. This
provides some support for the existence among Australians of an open conception
of nationhood that has come to terms with mass migration, and has a place
for migrants. Nationhood here may not be defined in exclusive ethnic or
racial terms, but it clearly does require a personal commitment at the level
of feeling and public declaration through citizenship uptake, together with
acceptance of English as the official language of Australia.
Further analysis of these data by Frank Jones,(26) identifies three
broad categories of opinion. Nearly one quarter of respondents are labelled
Nativists (akin to Blainey's 'Old Australians'), meaning Australians
who believe that being Australian born is essential to being a true Australian.
The remaining three-quarters are equally divided between Civic Nationalists,
who retain a strong sense of national identity but are open to the inclusion
of migrants of all backgrounds provided they are committed to Australia,
and Moderate Pluralists, for whom acceptance of cultural diversity
is even more important than a strong sense of national identity.
The evidence here suggests Australian national identity has not been
eroded by any kind of global Juggernaut. The debate is rather about whether
and how it should be re-cast, and in particular how open Australia's borders,
and Australia's way of life should become. The majority of Australians
are neither cosmopolitan in the sense of rejecting national identity,
nor exclusionary in holding to strongly nativist conceptions of that identity.
These issues may be further elaborated through analysis of data on Australian
attitudes to immigration and multiculturalism.
There is a fundamental contrast between what we know about Australian
attitudes to immigration and what is known about attitudes to multiculturalism.
In the former case, it is very clear that the majority of Australians
have consistently felt since the early 1970s that existing immigration
levels are too high and should be cut.(27) This attitude applies across
gender, age, and occupational categories, although those over 50 and country
voters tend to be more opposed to immigration than others, and those with
higher incomes less opposed.
The reasons given are predominantly economic,(28) focussing on the perception
that immigration increases or threatens to increase unemployment. Such
perceptions exist even though economic research has failed to demonstrate
any clear connection between immigration levels and unemployment levels.
While economists tend to believe that immigrants create jobs as well as
filling them, this story is simply not believed by most Australians. Their
scepticism is an indicator of the extremely high levels of economic insecurity
that currently exist in an era of consistently high unemployment, corporate
downsizing, and greater exposure to the competitive pressures of the global
economy.
The majority of those who have consistently opposed immigration levels,
have opposed immigration from any source region. There has however been
some increase over time in the proportion of those who have expressed
specific concern about Asian immigration. This may possibly suggest a
growth in racially targeted feeling on the immigration issue. When expressly
asked about concern over regions from which too many migrants originate,
respondents overwhelmingly cite Asia.(29) Nonetheless, when respondents
are asked about the reasons for wanting immigration restriction the overwhelming
reason given remains one of concern for employment levels. This is reflected
in the relatively low salience of immigration compared with other policy
areas of greater concern to the electorate. The Newspoll organisation,
for example, over the period 1991 to 1996, found that unemployment and
health consistently ranked first or second in the list of issues electors
felt were most important in affecting their voting intentions. Immigration
and Aboriginal issues always ranked last or second last out of a list
of 14 issues.(30) In this sense we may say that immigration is an issue
primarily because unemployment is an issue.
Attitudes to multiculturalism, by contrast, are far harder to interpret.
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that confusion and contradiction
reigns. Some polls appear to show support for multiculturalism, while
others do not. The findings of the major 1988 study of multiculturalism
commissioned by the then Office of Multicultural Affairs, have been interpreted
both as evidence of support for multiculturalism, and as evidence of public
hostility.(31) However, in the absence of any agreement about what the
term means, it is very hard to know what exactly people mean when they
are for or against it.
Part of the problem here is that the terms multicultural and multiculturalism
have served both as a description for a culturally mixed population, and
a label for certain kinds of Government policy involving migrants. Some
may approve the former, while being sceptical about the latter. A useful
starting point in clarifying attitudes to multiculturalism then is to
distinguish between attitudes towards people and practices defined as
multicultural, and attitudes towards multicultural policies.
Attitudes to the multicultural nature of the Australian population tend
to focus on two main issues. The first involve community relations and
social cohesion, the second concerns the multicultural contribution to
Australian society. As far as community and cohesion are concerned, attitudes
are very mixed. On the one hand, there is evidence to suggest that many
Australians dislike the idea that sections of the population may live
in different ways. A 1994 Saulwick poll, for example found that 61% of
respondents felt that migrants 'should live like the majority', with only
35% supporting that we should 'respect different ways of living'.(32)
This accords with the hostility to perceived ghetto formation and the
Asian presence noted earlier. The same poll, however, found that the overwhelming
majority (71.8%) believed Australia was a better place to live in 'now
that people from so many countries live here', while a clear majority
(61.4%), believed that 'if people from a particular ethnic background
want to mix mainly with themselves, they should not be criticised for
doing so'.
Is there a contradiction in attitudes here? Or does the wording of questions
have a good deal to do with the way they are answered, as Murray Goot
among others believes?(33) While both these possibilities have merit,
it is also possible that contradictions of attitude are more apparent
than real. In the case of the Saulwick poll, for example, it is possible
that many would simultaneously oppose cultural separatism, and prefer
greater levels of cultural mixing, while also resisting the idea of heavy-handed
public criticism of groups who are prepared to mix a bit. In this way
there is no real contradiction. What this means for attitudes to Australia
as a multicultural society does however depend on how multiculturalism
is defined. If it is taken to mean cultural separatism then it appears
that most Australians are against it. Alternatively if it means tolerance
of diversity, providing means for different groups to interact with the
remainder of society, then the majority seem to be for it.
There are, nonetheless limits to tolerance, set by the distinctions
many Australians make about the desirability of migrants from different
backgrounds. Although we have argued that most opposition to immigration
is based on employment concerns rather than racism, there is evidence
that perceived Asian migrant levels and settlement patterns have been
singled out as of particular concern to a significant number of Australians.
This follows through into measures of feeling towards different groups
reported in the major 1988 survey of several thousand Australians commissioned
by the Office of Multicultural Affairs.(34) Whereas low levels of negative
feelings were felt toward those of British (4.2%), Italian (6.7%), and
Greek background (8.6%), much higher levels of negative feelings were
expressed against the Vietnamese (32.2%), Muslim people (31.8%), and Lebanese
(27.5%). Whether such varying levels of hostility are to be explained
by racism as such is not altogether clear, since the groups most criticised
are the more recent arrivals who symbolise the unknown, especially for
elderly Australians and country people who are less likely to meet them
or work alongside them. Having said this racism, in the sense of a belief
in the cultural superiority of one group over another clearly exists,
as does racial discrimination, and a certain level of racial violence
and abuse. Around 15% of respondents to a recent survey admitted acting
in a racist manner towards migrants.(35) In another poll, 18% of respondents
felt Australian-born applicants for jobs should be given preferential
treatment over migrants.(36)
Is Australia becoming more or less tolerant of cultural diversity? There
is room for caution here to avoid over-estimating the significance of
intolerance and hostility towards cultural diversity and especially Asian
migration. Notwithstanding the recent upsurge in support for Pauline Hanson,
there is evidence that Australia is becoming more tolerant. A Newspoll
taken in early May 1997 indicated that an overwhelming majority of Australians
(78%) felt that multiculturalism had been good for Australia.(37) This
finding surprised some commentators, who may perhaps have missed a quieter
trend towards tolerance, obscured by a focus on debates among politicians
and ideologues. A shift toward tolerance has nonetheless been clearly
identified by Mariah Evans, in a comparison of attitudes towards migrants
of different backgrounds conducted in 1984 and again in 1995.(38) This
research found a gradual shift towards warmer feelings and lower prejudice.
Those with negative feelings toward Vietnamese, for example, declined
from 48% to 31% over this 11 year period, while those willing to discriminate
in favour of Australian-born and against migrants in job applications
halved from 36% to 18% over the same period. These data suggest a growing
tolerance towards migrants already here, even if a majority want fewer
migrants to enter in the future.
If we turn from attitudes toward the people who make up the multicultural
society to multiculturalism as public policy, a complex pattern of evidence
is revealed. In the first place there is nowhere near the level of opposition
to multicultural policy as there is to current immigration levels. Indeed
70% of Australians in an AGB-McNair poll of November 1996, opposed the
abolition of multicultural policy, while agreeing with a short-term freeze
on immigration, and a reduction in Asian immigration.(39) Multiculturalism
is by no means as unpopular as many imagine, while certain aspects of
multiculturalism have majority support.
Having said this Australians are more equivocal about multicultural
policies, supporting some parts and opposing others. This emerges from
a 1988 survey commissioned by the Office of Multicultural Affairs. The
survey findings were announced by Senator Robert Ray, the then Minister
for Immigration, in a news release declaring 'Australians support Multiculturalism'.(40)
These findings were subsequently echoed in some academic commentary. Critics
of multiculturalism, by contrast, found evidence within the survey to
suggest that Australians dislike multicultural policies aimed at cultural
pluralism, though there was a good deal of support for access and equity
policy.(41) A more balanced commentary on the survey by Murray Goot, suggests
that Australians like some parts of multicultural policy while being strongly
opposed to others.(42)
As far as general policy directions are concerned the vast majority
of respondents supported the propositions that 'no-one should be disadvantaged
due to race, religion or culture' (95%), that 'Australians should be allowed
to enjoy their own cultural heritage and share it with others' (91%),
and that 'Government and community organisations need to take more account
of the diversity of the Australian population' (90%). When translated
into specific policies, however, the position was more mixed. A range
of programs geared to assist migrants to function effectively in Australia
were clearly supported, such as English courses for migrant children (91%),
and adults (77%), information centres (93%), and interpreters in hospitals
and courts (94%). On the other hand, a majority of respondents opposed
programs which provided special assistance for ethnic organisations alone,
such as 'money to ethnic organisations for cultural activities' (58%),
or 'nursing homes specifically for aged immigrants speaking the same language'
(56%).
A final aspect of multicultural policy development of concern to significant
numbers of Australians is the process by which policy determination has
taken place. In the focus group discussions, conducted by Mackay Research
in 1994,(43) a number of respondents expressed the view that they had
never been consulted about multiculturalism, and that critical voices
have been ignored in its implementation. Typical statements include the
following:-
'Nobody asked me whether I wanted a multicultural Australia.'
'You've got two classifications of people: those who make the rules
and think they work-or just want them to work-and those who live with
the situation and very often find that the rules don't work.'
Such comments relate as much to the quality of Australia's democratic
processes and channels of communication between voters and politicians,
as to the substance of multicultural policies.
Taken overall the findings reported here are very much a mixed bag.
Australians support multicultural policy if it is seen as integrating
migrants into Australian society, as a reflection of principles of equal
opportunity for all. However they reject multiculturalism if it is seen
as providing special privileges or programs for particular groups, not
available to others. In addition, multiculturalism is not supported when
the processes by which policy has been determined and implemented are
remote from the mass of the Australian people.
Is there, then, any kind of consistent pattern in attitudes to multiculturalism?
Is there, for example, a mainstream Australian position on multiculturalism,
or is opinion divided into multiculturalists and monoculturalists? Or
are Australians, as we have suggested, more pragmatic accepting some parts
of multiculturalism, while criticising other parts? Murray Goot, who has
re-analysed the 1988 survey data, concludes that 'Australians are neither
pro-multicultural nor anti-multicultural' in any consistent sense.(44)
To be sure, there is a large minority of consistent multiculturalists
and a smaller minority of consistent monoculturalists, but neither of
these predominate. Large numbers of Australians refuse to fit into either
camp, seeing weaknesses as well as strengths within Government policies.
This ambivalence needs to be recognised in public policy debates if multicultural
policies are to have any kind of legitimate future.
Australia's population is already culturally diverse, and in that sense
multicultural. This is a fact. It will not go away if the term multicultural
is abandoned by Governments, or removed from the political vocabulary.
The more difficult question is to determine whether multicultural policies
are necessary to the continuing social cohesion and achievement of equality
of opportunity for all Australians. Is a strong public policy initiative
necessary to produce a stable and prosperous future, or can we do without
it?
In one sense, post-war Australia has achieved what few other nations
have managed, namely the absorption of large numbers of culturally diverse
migrants without overt social unrest or a major threat to the social fabric.
This achievement has persisted even in the face of increased unemployment
and growing economic uncertainty during the last two decades. Economic
insecurity, fuelled by intensified processes of economic globalisation
has nonetheless been the major reason for popular demands for a cut back
in immigration. Even allowing for low immigration levels for the foreseeable
future, Australia will still be a multicultural country, as a result of
past decisions.
Multicultural policies, in the broadest sense, may be regarded as attempts
to manage migrant settlement under conditions of cultural diversity. They
are part of the set of social policies that countries like Australia have
developed to deal with issues that cannot be resolved by the spontaneous
operation of markets. If markets alone could guarantee social cohesion
and equality of opportunity for different groups, then there would be
no need for social policies, and no need for multiculturalism. The problem
is that economic mechanisms cannot by themselves address all such objectives,
and may sometimes make social cohesion and equality harder rather than
easier to attain. The globalization of markets, has certainly increased
social unease in Australia, and it is arguable that much of the opposition
to immigration, including Asian immigration is a product of anxiety about
Australia's capacity to determine its own future and protect the jobs
of its people, in an increasingly uncertain world. 'Asians' are perceived
by many to be different and hence symbolise the threat of the unknown,
as well as an immediate threat to employment.
Multicultural policies have also arisen because of perceived deficiencies
in earlier assimilationist policies. The justification for having multicultural
policies over those of assimilation is partly symbolic, providing public
recognition of the inclusion of many culturally diverse groups within
the Australian community, and partly to do with universalising the outreach
of equality of opportunity to all Australians, who may need access to
assistance. The large numbers of Australians who support multiculturalism,
would also appear to favour public support for tolerance, and to social
policies that are perceived to be genuinely universalistic. If these policy
goals are worth continuing, then multicultural policies are a publicly
acceptable way of achieving them.
Yet there are also many problems with multicultural policies. One weakness
is the misleading nature of the term 'multiculturalism' itself. Jerzy
Zubrzycki, a strong advocate of multiculturalism for more than 20 years,
refers to the term as a 'clumsy, pompous polysyllabic noun'.(45) It is
relatively easy to grasp that Multiculturalism means many cultures, but
far harder to discern what Multiculturalism has to say about the relationship
between such cultures.(46) Does it mean cultural separatism, and policies
that magnify social division, or does it mean inter-cultural tolerance
within some set of general rights and obligations that apply to all groups?
A second related weakness, identified by Zubrzycki, is that politicians
of all parties have seen multicultural programs as a way of wooing the
ethnic vote. This has helped to associate the policy with sectional advantage
and social engineering.
Zubrzycki, now calls for a new way of framing the policy objectives
of social cohesion-unity in difference-and equality of opportunity, in
policy discourse. The implication here is that the cohesive egalitarian
side of multiculturalism be retained, while other sectional themes be
abandoned, along with the name. But what alternatives are there?
One of the difficulties faced by Western societies seeking to manage
cultural diversity is the dilemma of difference.(47) This stems from an
apparent tension between conventional liberal-democratic principles and
principles that emphasise differences between citizens. The principles
of democracy, the rule of law and egalitarianism, demand that all citizens
be treated equally, in the sense of having the same rights and obligations
to the national community. Yet individuals may find themselves in very
different social situations often connected with membership of particular
groups-men and women, black and white, Asian migrant and Anglo-Australian.
The dilemma this creates is as follows. Social cohesion requires that
all Australians are treated according to the same standards of fairness
and equity, but the targeting of social justice and welfare policies to
particular groups, serves to emphasise social difference, and raises the
perception of different and therefore unfair treatment.
One way out of the dilemma is to argue that the dilemma is often apparent
rather than real, a problem of mistaken perception rather than genuine
inequity. It is perfectly possible to reconcile universal principles with
differences in their application, for example, wherever members of different
groups are disproportionately represented in the category of those entitled
to universal benefits. To take the example of public health policy, few
would want to argue that the disproportionate amount of services received
by the elderly is unfair and a threat to social cohesion because they
are being treated differently to other Australians. On the contrary the
elderly would be seen as having different needs as a group and therefore
different entitlements.
Applying the same logic to multiculturalism, it is possible to reconcile
much though not all public spending on non-English speaking background
migrants with universal principles, insofar as NESB migrants are on average
disproportionately represented in certain categories, such as the unemployed.
In cases such as this, the principles of equal rights and entitlement
continue to apply, providing that individual cases are always scrutinised
to determine whether the fall under the universal rights of entitlement.
If this is all that is at stake, however, why do we still need multiculturalism?
All that is required is a commitment to social citizenship rights for
all.
The case for going further is built on the assumption that citizens
are not just individual atoms, unconnected to each other, but live as
part of groups, with group as well as individual needs. The need for recognition
as a group may be especially important for minorities subject to discrimination
on the basis of their ethnicity or race. But how far should this recognition
go, beyond a general social commitment to tolerance and mutual respect?
An alternative approach, developed by Stephen Castles and others,(48)
suggests that multiculturalism should be reformulated in terms of multicultural
citizenship. The key to this idea is that citizens are not only equal
individuals, but are also people with different needs and wants, and that
these often arise as members of groups. The conventional citizenship rights
of individuals should therefore be supplemented by recognition of group
interests and mechanisms for group participation in the political process.
This model has not as yet been taken up as a serious option in Australian
politics, and many questions about its viability remain unresolved. It
is not clear, for example, exactly how the balance of individual and group
rights would be struck. Nor is it apparent what forms group representation
might take. Recent Australian political history has plenty of examples
of interest groups and lobbies seeking to maximise public support for
their particular activities, but few examples of political parties representing
particular ethnic groups. The claims of would-be group leaders and organisations
to represent large constituencies are also potentially problematic. Finally
it seems unlikely that greater emphasis on groups would overcome problems
of social division and lack of cohesion. For the moment then, the principles
of multicultural citizenship remain untested.
Whether or not multiculturalism survives as a specific policy label,
there are a number of other initiatives that might be adopted so as to
maximise social cohesion by achieving a more effective dialogue between
Australians, and by minimising public misperceptions and anxieties. Three
issues may be identified here.
The first symbolic issue involves the way Australia's contemporary cultural
diversity is linked with Australian history in the representation of Australia
as a nation. One of the failures of existing multicultural policy-making
is that the slogan 'Multiculturalism for all Australians' was grafted
onto Australian life, with too little concern for prior traditions and
experiences. A number of multiculturalists treated that prior history
with disdain as if it were simply a matter of the racist White Australia
policy and racist treatment of Aboriginal population. Such legacies are
fundamental, but so are other traditions linked with egalitarianism, rejection
of Old World status distinctions, and republicanism.(49)
If a multicultural element is to be included within the evolving conception
of what it is to be an Australian, then a greater degree of dialogue between
older traditions and newer developments is necessary.
Two further more practical issues concern measures to address misconceptions
of multicultural policy to do with sectionalism and special advantages.
The first of these concerns misperceptions of the true nature of public
policies affecting migrants and ethnic groups. Much public disquiet exists
when particular groups are perceived to get special privileges not available
to others. Yet the programs concerned may often be on a par with funding
available to other non-ethnic bodies, such as community organisations,
educational bodies, or age care facilities. Greater public awareness of
these matters would assist in sifting out particular applications of universalistic
policies from more truly sectional policies. The rationale for such policies
could then be scrutinised in a more fine-grained and better informed manner.
A second more practical issue concerns the cost of government programs
and benefits to migrants and ethnic groups. One of the reasons for sometimes
quite wild estimates of the sums involved is that very little digestible
material is presented by governments to citizens on patterns of government
expenditures. Shareholders in private businesses expect and generally
get a far higher level of accounting information, than citizens of Australia
get from any government. There seems no reason why this should continue
especially where lack of information creates stresses on social cohesion
that are avoidable.
Multiculturalism as public policy cannot go on in the old way if it
is to be an effective source of social cohesion and equality of opportunity.
This is not because public support has entirely disappeared. On the contrary,
there are many aspects of multiculturalism that remain popular. The need
for change stems rather from confusions about what multiculturalism is,
and what multicultural policies actually do. Whether or not the term multiculturalism
is a casualty of the need for change is immaterial, since the underlying
issues that multicultural policies seek to address will not go away. Piety
towards past policies and attitudes is no longer good enough. The underlying
case for renewal in this area, is ultimately to do with upgrading the
quality of Australian democracy, including the dialogue and co-operation
between Australians of all backgrounds, as well as between Australians
and government.
- M. Wooden, R. Holton, G. Hugo, and J. Sloan, Australian Immigration:
A Survey of the Issues, revised edition (Canberra: AGPS 1994).
- Australian Bureau of Statistics, Migration, Cat. no. 3412.0,
1995-6.
- Ibid.
- These projections using ABS data were made in The Weekend Australian,
3-4 May 1997.
- P. Hanson, first speech, 10th September 1996, Hansard, House of Representatives,
1996.
- Saulwick poll for The Sunday Age, 13 November 1994.
- Comparisons between the USA and Australia are discussed in G. Freeman
and J. Jupp, (eds.) Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United
States and International Migration, Melbourne: Oxford University
Press, 1992, and in J. Jupp, A. McRobbie and B. York, 'Metropolitan
Ghettoes and Ethnic Concentrations', Working Papers on Multiculturalism,
no 1, Centre for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong, 1990,
2 vols. Much of the data on ghettoes reported here is drawn form the
analyses of Jupp and his associates.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- The historical basis of this claim is based on T. Gurr, 'Comparative
Study of Civic Strife', in H.D. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.), The History
of Violence in America, New York: Praeger, 1969, and T. Gurr, P.
Grabosky, and R. Hula (eds.), The Politics of Crime and Conflict,
London: Sage, 1977.
- R. Holton, 'Public Disorder in Australia between 1985 and 1989 with
particular reference to Immigration and Multiculturalism', unpublished
report to the Office for Multicultural Affairs, Centre for Multicultural
Studies, Flinders University of South Australia, 1990.
- Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence:
Report of the National Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia,
Canberra: AGPS, 1991.
- Incident reported in The Age, 5 and 8 March 1983.
- G. Blainey, All for Australia, North Ryde: Methuen 1994.
- Citizenship rates reported in The Weekend Australian, 3-4 May
1991.
- The inter-marriage rates reported here derive from the 1991 census,
as cited in The Weekend Australian, 3-4 May 1991. Price's analysis
is available in C.A. Price, 'Ethnic Intermixture in Australia', People
and Place, vol 1, no 6, pp. 6-8.
- R. Hassan and G. Tan, Asian Migrants in Australia, Discussion
Paper no 12, Centre for Development Studies, Flinders University,
1986.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics, Queensland, The Social Characteristics
of Immigrants in Australia, Bureau of Immigration and Population
Research, 1994.
- H-H. Holm and G. Sorenson, 'Introduction', H-H. Holm and G. Sorenson
(eds.) Whose World Order, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 4.
- C. Bean, 'Open or Closed Boundaries: Attitudes Towards Sovereignty',
paper prepared for a workshop on Immigration and Australia's Population
in the 21st Century, Australian National University, 20-21 May 1996.
- For a more general discussion of these issues see R. Holton, 'Four
Myths about Globalization' Flinders Journal of History and Politics,
vol 19, 1997, pp. 141-156 and R. Holton, Globalization, Nation-State,
and Ethnicity, London: MacMillan, 1997 (forthcoming).
- S. Castles, M. Kalantzis, B. Cope, and M. Morrissey, Mistaken Identity:
Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia, Sydney:
Pluto Press, 1988.
- S. Alomes, A Nation At Last? The Changing Character of Australian
Nationalism 1880-1988, North Ryde: Angus and Robertson, 1988.
- B. Kapferer, Legends of People: Myths of State, Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988.
- Derived from the results of the National Social Science study reported
in M.D.R. Evans, 'National Identity: What Does It Take To Be "Truly
Australian" ', Worldwide Attitudes, 18 March 1996, pp. 1-8,
and F.L. Jones, 'Ethnic Diversity, Social Distance and National Identity:
Citizen Beliefs about Australian Institutions, 1996, passim.
- F.L. Jones, 'National Identity and Ethnic Group Prejudice' paper presented
to the Australian Sociological Association Conference, University of
Tasmania, 1996.
- K. Betts, 'Immigration and Public Opinion in Australia', People
and Place vol 4 no 3, 1996, pp. 9-20.
- See, for example, AGB-McNair poll, reported in The Age, 5 November
1996, and Bulletin Morgan poll, reported in The Bulletin,
28 November 1995.
- Ibid.
- Newspoll rankings reported, The Australian, 2 November 1996.
- They are discussed in M. Goot, 'Multiculturalists, Monoculturalists
and the Many In Between: Attitudes to Cultural Diversity and their Correlates',
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol 29 no 2,
1993, pp. 226-253.
- .Saulwick poll for The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June 1994.
- M. Goot, 'Question of words, not numbers', The Sydney Morning Herald,
25 November 1996.
- News Release, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Multicultural
Affairs, 'Australians Support Multiculturalism', 19 April 1989.
- M.D.R. Evans, 'Ethnic Prejudice and Discriminatory Intent: Australia,
1984-1995', paper delivered to seminar on Citizens' beliefs and Attitudes,
Australian National University, 12 December 1995.
- Saulwick poll for The Sunday Age, 13 November 1994.
- Newspoll survey for The Weekend Australian, 3 May 1997.
- M.D.R. Evans, op. cit.
- AGB-McNair poll, reported in The Age, 5 November 1996.
- News release, op. cit.
- K. Betts, 'Australia's Distorted Immigration Policy', in D. Goodman,
D.J. O'Hearn and C. Wallace-Crabbe (eds.), Multicultural Australia:
the Challenges of Change, Newham: Scribe, 1991.
- M. Goot, 'Multiculturalists...' op. cit.
- Mackay Research, The Mackay Report: Multiculturalism, Mackay
Research Pty Ltd, 1995.
- M. Goot, op. cit. p. 251.
- J. Zubrzycki, 'Cynics Woo the Ethnic Vote', The Australian,
15 October 1996.
- This problem is raised in J. Hirst, 'Unity in a Tolerant Diversity',
The Australian, 16 October 1996.
- This is used here in a somewhat different sense to that proposed in
M. Minow, 'Learning to live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual
and Special Education' Law and Contemporary Problems, no. 48,
(1985), pp. 157-211 and I.M. Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A
Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', Ethics, vol
99, (1989), pp. 157-211.
- S. Castles, 'Multicultural Citizenship', Parliamentary Research
Service, Research Paper, no 16, Department of the Parliamentary
Library, 1995-6.
- See, for example, R. Birrell, A Nation of Our Own: Citizenship
and Nation-Building in Federation Australia, Melbourne: Longman
Cheshire, 1995.
AGB-McNair poll, reported in The Age, 5 November 1996.
Alomes, S., A Nation At Last? The Changing Character of Australian
Nationalism 1880-1988, North Ryde: Angus and Robertson, 1988.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Migration, Cat. no. 3412:0.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Queensland, The Social Characteristics
of Immigrants in Australia, Bureau of Immigration and Population Research,
1994.
Bean, C., 'Open or Closed Boundaries: Attitudes Towards Sovereignty',
paper prepared for a workshop on Immigration and Australia's Population
in the 21st Century, Australian National University, 20-21 May 1996.
Betts, K., 'Australia's Distorted Immigration Policy', in D. Goodman,
D.J. O'Hearn and C. Wallace-Crabbe (eds.) Multicultural Australia:
the Challenges of Change, Newham: Scribe, 1991.
Betts, K., 'Immigration and Public Opinion in Australia', People
and Place vol 4 no 3, 1996, pp. 9-20.
Birrell, R., A Nation of Our Own: Citizenship and Nation-Building
in Federation Australia, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1995.
Blainey, G., All for Australia, North Ryde: Methuen 1994.
Bulletin Morgan poll, reported in The Bulletin, 28 November
1995.
Castles, S., Kalantzis, M., Cope, B. and Morrissey, M., Mistaken
Identity: Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia,
Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988.
Castles, S., 'Multicultural Citizenship', Parliamentary Research
Service, Research Paper, no 16, Department of the Parliamentary Library,
1995-6.
Cope, B., Castles, S., and Kalantzis, M. Immigration, Ethnic Conflicts
and Social Cohesion, Bureau for Immigration Research, AGPS 1991.
Evans, M.D.R., 'Ethnic Prejudice and Discriminatory Intent: Australia,
1984-1995', paper delivered to seminar on Citizens' beliefs and Attitudes,
Australian National University, 12 December 1995.
Evans, M.D.R., 'National Identity: What Does It Take To Be "Truly
Australian" ', Worldwide Attitudes, 18 March 1996, pp. 1-8.
Freeman, G., and Jupp, J., (eds.) Nations of Immigrants: Australia,
the United States and International Migration, Melbourne: Oxford University
Press, 1992.
Goot, M., 'Multiculturalists, Monoculturalists and the Many In Between:
Attitudes to Cultural Diversity and their Correlates', Australian and
New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol 29 no 2, 1993, pp. 226-253.
Goot, M., 'Question of words, not numbers', The Sydney Morning Herald,
25 November 1996.
Gurr, T., 'Comparative Study of Civic Strife', in H.D. Graham and T.
Gurr (eds.), The History of Violence in America, New York: Praeger,
1969.
T. Gurr, P. Grabosky, and R. Hula, (eds.) The Politics of Crime and
Conflict, London: Sage, 1977.
Hanson, P., first speech, 10th September 1996, Hansard, House of Representatives,
1996.
Hassan, R., and Tan, G., Asian Migrants in Australia, Discussion
Paper no 12, Centre for Development Studies, Flinders University,
1986.
Hirst, J., 'Unity in a Tolerant Diversity', The Australian, 16
October 1996.
Holm, H-H., and Sorenson, G., 'Introduction', H-H. Holm and G. Sorenson
(eds.) Whose World Order, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 1-18.
Holton, R., 'Public Disorder in Australia between 1985 and 1989 with
particular reference to Immigration and multiculturalism', unpublished
report to the Office for Multicultural Affairs, Centre for Multicultural
Studies, Flinders University of South Australia, 1990.
Holton, R.J., 'Four Myths about Globalization', Flinders Journal
of History and Politics, vol 19, 1997, pp. 141-156.
Holton, R.J., Globalization, Nation State and Ethnicity, London:
MacMillan, forthcoming.
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence: Report
of the National Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia, Canberra:
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