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Research Note no. 12 2004–05
In the shadow of the corporate veil: James Hardie and asbestos compensation
Peter Prince, Jerome
Davidson and Susan Dudley
Law and Bills Digest Section
10 August 2004
Significant fallout is likely from the NSW inquiry
into the treatment of Australian asbestos victims by James Hardie Industries
('the Hardie Group'). The NSW Special Commission will not report until
21 September this year but federal and state governments are already considering
legislation to access the Hardie Group's overseas assets.(1)
Construction unions in Victoria have banned James Hardie materials,(2)
and the NSW Government may do likewise for state projects.(3)
And there are growing calls to 'lift the corporate veil'– fundamental
to corporations law for 140 years – by restricting 'limited liability'
in cases of physical injury.
The asbestos problem(4)
The Hardie Group manufactured asbestos products (cement,
piping, insulation and brake linings) for over 70 years in NSW, Queensland
and Western Australia.(5) It is not alone in facing asbestos
compensation claims. Estimates of Australia's total liability for future
asbestos claims start around $6 billion.(6) Fellow corporate
heavy weights CSR and BHP Billiton are targets, and federal and state
governments also have substantial asbestos liabilities. Claims are not
limited to those who worked in asbestos mines and factories. Former power
station, shipyard and dock workers, railway labourers and members of the
defence force, especially the Navy, are at significant risk from asbestos-related
diseases. These diseases can take decades to develop—a major difficulty
for compensation planning. Mesothelioma (cancer of the chest cavity)
can emerge 40 years after exposure. Since 1945 about 7000 Australians
have died from this disease, estimated to rise to 18 000 by 2020. Other
asbestos related cancers may be around 30—40 000 by the same time.
A major problem for the Hardie Group is the range of
products it made with asbestos. It faces growing claims from users of
these products. Over half the claims made to the NSW Dust Diseases Tribunal
in 2002 were against the Hardie Group.
The James Hardie restructure
As the Weekend Australian noted recently:
While rival manufacturer CSR capitulated to legal and
public pressure in the '90s and opted to meet victims' claims as they
arose, Hardie pursued a different route.(7)
Between 1937 and 1986 asbestos products were manufactured
by two subsidiaries of James Hardie Industries Limited (JHIL): now known
as Amaca (building and construction products) and Amaba (brake linings).(8)
Between 1996 and 2001 the assets of Amaca and Amaba were transferred to
JHIL (now 'ABN 60'), then to a Netherlands based company - James Hardie
Industries NV (JHI NV). In February 2001 ownership of Amaca and Amaba
was transferred to a new body, the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation
('the Foundation'), which was given $293 million to fund asbestos injury
claims.(9) In July 2004 counsel assisting the NSW inquiry
estimated the total claim against the Hardie Group could amount to $2.24
billion.(10)
In October 2001 the Hardie Group assured the NSW Supreme
Court that ABN 60 could call on $1.9 billion owed by JHI NV for partly
paid shares to meet future asbestos claims. This assurance was 'pivotal
to the court giving approval for the transfer of ABN 60's assets' to JHI
NV in the Netherlands.(11) But in March 2003 ABN 60 cancelled
the partly paid shares 'without informing the court or the stock exchange'.(12)
According to the Secretary of the ACTU, Greg Combet,
the movement of the Hardie Group's assets overseas —out of reach of asbestos
victims in this country—is 'one of the most morally and legally repugnant
acts in Australian corporate history'.(13)
The Jackson Inquiry
In December 2003 the Foundation warned that it faced
a serious funding shortfall. Within a few years it would be unable to
pay asbestos compensation claims.(14) In February 2004 NSW
Premier Bob Carr appointed David Jackson QC to investigate the relationship
between the funding shortfall and the Hardie Group restructure, including
whether changes to corporations law were needed to ensure future claims
were met.
The Hardie Group and its advisers deny any wrongdoing
in relation to these events. Moreover, according to The Age:
… the legal structure Hardie created appears to be solid.
Under the corporate law concept of the corporate veil, companies and
not their shareholders are individually responsible for liabilities,
even if they are part of a larger group. This means that Hardie's new,
Netherlands-based, Australian-listed parent company and the old Australian
parent are protected from claims against Amaca and Amaba.(15)
Nevertheless, counsel assisting the Jackson Inquiry
identified a string of possible offences against the Corporations Act
2001, the Trade Practices Act 1974 and the common law in relation
to the setting up and funding of the Foundation, and the cancellation
of the partly paid shares.(16)
It has been suggested to the inquiry that:
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the managing director of the Hardie Group could be prosecuted over
a 2001 statement that the Foundation could meet all future claims
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legal adviser to the Hardie Group, Allens Arthur Robinson, may have
breached its 'duty of care' in relation to the restructure and the
cancellation of partly paid shares, and
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actuarial adviser Trowbridge may have been negligent in underestimating
the Foundation's future funding needs(17)
Counsel assisting the inquiry also suggested that the
cancellation of partly paid shares was 'unconscionable', and that the
Supreme Court's approval for the transfer of Hardie Group assets to the
Netherlands could be rescinded because the court was misled.(18)
Recovering overseas assets
Given the shortfall facing the Foundation, an important
issue is the extent to which liability from any prosecutions could be
traceable to the Hardie Group's overseas assets, including those of Netherlands-based
parent JHI NV. Despite the above view in The Age about the solidity
of the restructure, counsel assisting the inquiry suggested that JHI NV
was a 'shadow director' of Australian company ABN 60.(19) So
successful claims in Australia against ABN 60 may be enforceable against
JHI NV. If, for example, JHI NV and/or its directors contravened the
Corporations Act in relation to the cancellation of partly paid shares:
a court may order the contravenor to compensate ABN 60
for damage suffered by reason of the contravention … Damage would arise,
for instance, if a claim were made against ABN 60 which it could not
meet, but would have been able to meet had the partly paid shares not
been cancelled. In such a case, it would be arguable that ABN 60 could
seek to recover from the contravenor the amount of the liability it
is unable to meet.(20)
Even if an Australian court found JHI NV or its directors
liable, however, gaining access to James Hardie's Netherlands based assets
would be difficult. Under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991,
'money judgments' of Australian courts can be enforced overseas if Australia
has a reciprocal agreement with a particular country.(21)
Australia has no agreement with the Netherlands. After a request from
the ACTU to the Prime Minister,(22) the Federal Government
announced that new approaches had been made to the Dutch government. As
a spokesman for the Attorney-General said, however, 'we aren't expecting
an answer quickly'. Referring to the Netherlands' obligations to the European
Union, he noted that negotiations could take years.(23)
However JHI NV also has substantial assets in other
countries. Its operational head office is in California, it is registered
in Delaware and most of its revenue is generated in the United States,
where 'business is booming'.(24) While Australia also has
no agreement with the United States for reciprocal enforcement of judgments,(25)
negotiating agreements with the US would not appear to involve the same
obstacles as with the Netherlands.
If 'statutory' action under the Foreign Judgments Act
is not available, action could also be taken overseas at 'common law'
against JHI NV. But as a Government spokesman said:
What in effect would have to happen is that if there
was a judgment here, they would virtually have to part-hear it again
to make sure it complied with their laws … Either way you are talking
many years.(26)
In addition, in the case of the United States, foreign
plaintiffs seeking damages from US-based defendants for personal injuries
face a restrictive forum non conveniens doctrine, under which a
US court will refuse to hear a matter if most of the circumstances of
the case involve a foreign country.(27)
If the current inquiry leads to successful criminal
prosecutions, the Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters Act 1987 could be
used to access overseas property and other assets. Australia has agreements
with both the Netherlands and the United States in relation to this Act.
Lifting the corporate veil
The term 'corporate veil' refers to the protection
given by the principle of 'limited liability'. Under this principle, companies
are legal entities separate and distinct from their individual members.
Hence liability to a company's creditors is limited to the company's
assets and does not extend to the personal assets of company members.
Counsel assisting the Jackson Inquiry explains that:
Applied to corporate groups, the principle means that
they can determine the size and choose the limits of their legal responsibilities
by the relatively simple mechanism of making one company (the 'parent'
or 'holding' company) a member of another company or companies (the
'subsidiary'/ 'subsidiaries') in the group. In economic terms, companies
may by this technique externalise the risk of their operations by exposing
third parties to the risk of compensated losses where the subsidiary's
assets are insufficient to satisfy its liabilities.(28)
The principle has a number of benefits, not least promoting
'entrepreneurial risk taking which encourages economic growth'.(29)
Its downside, however—highlighted starkly by the James Hardie imbroglio—is
that in some cases creditors will be unable to recover the amount they
are owed. This is the prospect facing Australian asbestos victims seeking
compensation from the Foundation – despite its association with the 'booming'
James Hardie business. Some exceptions to the limited liability principle
already exist, but they 'do not provide adequate protection for victims
of torts committed by insolvent subsidiaries of wealthy holding companies'.(30)
John Gordon from the Australian Plaintiff Lawyers Association says it
is clear that the principle of limited liability needs to be reconsidered,
and he is blunt about who is to blame. In his view, the concept:
needs a very thorough review and corporate Australia
will have James Hardie to thank if that protection is lost in the future.(31)
Counsel assisting the Jackson Inquiry suggests that
where death or personal injury is caused by a company that is part of
a larger corporate group, the limited liability principle should be restricted
to members of the ultimate holding company.(32) If applied
to the James Hardie case, this would mean the personal assets of JHI NV
members would still be protected, but the company's assets would be available
to asbestos compensation claimants.
Such a proposal is controversial. The Law Council of
Australia is opposed to the idea:
The Law Council does not believe that a response by the
Commonwealth to permit 'lifting the corporate veil' is an appropriate
response to the issues raised by this inquiry, particularly given the
uncertainty and risk of claimants successfully recovering compensation
against James Hardie group companies outside Australian jurisdictions.(33)
In 2000 the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee
(CASAC) rejected proposals for the imposition of general liability for
parent companies in corporate groups for personal injuries and other legal
'torts'. CASAC did however recommend that:
…this area could be dealt with by specific legislation
where the extension of liability beyond the tortfeasor company is desirable
in the public interest.(34)
Even if the Corporations Act was amended to 'lift the
corporate veil' in cases of personal injury—requiring JHI NV to compensate
Australian asbestos victims – there would remain the problem discussed
above of accessing the foreign assets held by the company.
Statutory compensation
JHI NV has offered to provide an unspecified amount
of money for compensating Australian asbestos victims if the NSW Government
establishes a statutory compensation scheme. Details of how that scheme
would work are not yet available. However it is likely to involve caps
on award payouts and a cap on JHI NV's own liability under the scheme.
The ACTU has rejected the proposal, calling it 'an attempt to blackmail
the dying'.(35)
A similar scheme was established in France in 2002,
financed by the employment and social security ministries.(36)
A proposal for a statutory scheme is also being debated in the United
States. The US proposal is for a 'privately funded, publicly run' process
for compensating asbestos victims. Asbestos defendants and insurance companies
would contribute to a compensation fund, with assets from existing asbestos
compensation trusts being transferred to the fund. Defendants would pay
either a proportion of their revenue or a flat dollar amount to the fund
each year, with the amount depending on the defendant's size and past
liabilities. For insurers, a commission would determine individual companies'
contributions depending on past exposure to asbestos liabilities.(37)
The US proposal has stalled over disagreements about
the amount of contributions, the level of compensation, and the adequacy
of the fund.(38)
A statutory scheme would 'cut out the lawyers'.(39)
The Hardie Group has calculated that this could reduce its future asbestos
compensation bill by $430 million.(40) John Gordon, on the
other hand, says that:
there is no evidence that a statutory scheme would be
quicker than what's currently available and certainly the benefits would
be less. Today someone could be diagnosed one day, see a lawyer the
next day and the next day they ought to be able to receive compensation
for an amount that the courts have determined is equitable. There's
no reason why that should be changed just because James Hardie has taken
their assets offshore.(41)
ANU Reader in Law and corporate liability specialist
Peta Spender states that:
The case studies reveal that the creation of a limited
fund generally results in the under-compensation of tort victims, particularly
future claimants. This may be acceptable upon a genuine insolvency,
but not by unilateral acts of the corporate defendant.(42)
Other proposals
The Law Council of Australia has proposed the
creation under State legislation of a 'nominal defendant' to handle asbestos
claims, funded by levies on relevant insurance policies such as workers
compensation and occupiers' liability. The nominal defendant would be
able to pursue claims against other entities, and would add any recovered
amounts to the compensation fund. The claims work could be outsourced
to an insurance company.(43)
Alternatively, the Law Council proposes amending Commonwealth
legislation to allow 'anticipated but as yet unascertained claims' to
be brought against an insolvent company. As the Council notes:
Unascertained future claims [are] a particularly acute
problem in relation to asbestos liabilities given the long latency periods
and short life expectancies of sufferers …(44)
If the Foundation or other James Hardie entities went
into liquidation because of insufficient funds, 'many potential claimants
could be left with no compensation at all'.(45)
The Law Council proposes a quasi-judicial tribunal
to assess unascertained future claims, together with amendments to the
Corporations Act and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 concerning the liability
of holding companies and individuals for the debts of insolvent corporations.
Changes to these laws would also be needed to prevent companies making
agreements intended to defeat future as well as current entitlements.(46)
An interesting idea comes from the Foundation
itself, which proposes adopting the US doctrine of 'undercapitalisation'.
It suggests a new provision in the Corporations Act imposing liability
for the debts of a company set up with inadequate funds on those
who created it where such people have engaged in misleading conduct in
relation to the firm's capitalisation.(47)
Further reading:
See endnote 42 below for Peta Spender's article discussing
appropriate legal responses to situations of 'mass tort liability'.
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Sydney Morning Herald, 30.7.04, p. 7.
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The Age, 30.7.04, p. 1.
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The Australian, 3.8.04, p. 5.
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Source: Beth Quinlaven, 'Asbestos: Powder traces', Business Review
Weekly, 2 June 2004.
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Sydney Morning Herald, 19.6.04, p. 45.
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Quinlaven, op. cit.
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Weekend Australian, 3.7.04, p. 27.
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The Age, 31.7.04, Business 1.
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Weekend Australian, 3.7.04, p. 27; The Age, 31.7.04, Business
1–2.
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The Age, 30.7.04, p. 1.
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Weekend Australian, 3.7.04, p. 27.
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The Australian, 3.8.04, p. 5.
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Transcript, 7.30 Report, 28.7.04.
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The Age, 31.7.04, Business 1.
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ibid.
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Submissions of Counsel assisting the Special Commission of Inquiry,
see e.g. pp. 1–28 and
2–58.
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The Age, 31.7.04, Business 2; Weekend Australian, 3.7.04, p. 27.
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The Age, 31.7.04, Business 2.
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Submissions of Counsel assisting, op. cit., pp. 3–16.
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ibid., pp. 3–22,23.
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Foreign Judgments Act 1991, section 5.
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Transcript, 7.30 Report, 28.7.04.
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AAP, 'Fed: Govt approaches Netherlands over reciprocal court case
deal', 4.8.04.
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Sydney Morning Herald, 19.6.04, p. 45.
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See schedule to Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992.
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AAP, op. cit., 4.8.04.
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See Peter Prince, 'Bhopal, Bougainville and Ok Tedi: Why Australia's
Forum Non Conveniens Approach is Better', 1998 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 47, 573–598
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Submissions of Counsel assisting, op. cit., 5–15.
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ibid.
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ibid., pp. 5–17.
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Transcript, Business Sunday, 1.8.04.
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ibid.
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Law Council of Australia, 'Submission to the Special Commission',
p. 2.
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Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate Groups, Final
Report, May 2000, p. 122.
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The Australian, 29 July 2004.
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Salvatore, Santino and Michaels, 'Asbestos: The current situation
in Europe', http://www.astin2003.de/img/papers/santoni.pdf
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Submissions of Counsel assisting op. cit., p. 5–14.
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ibid.
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The Age, 31.7.04, Business 1.
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ibid.
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Transcript, 7.30 Report, 28.7.04
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Peta Spender, 'Blue Asbestos and Golden Eggs: Evaluating Bankruptcy
and Class Actions as Just Responses to Mass Tort Liability', 25 Sydney
Law Review, 223 at 254.
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Law Council of Australia, op. cit., p. 2.
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ibid, p. 6.
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ibid.
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ibid, pp. 6–7.
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MCRF, Attachment A to submission to Special Commission of Inquiry.
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