Summary

In early June 2004 preliminary talks concluded between United States and South Korean defence officials. The US proposed that one third of the US military force currently in South Korea would withdraw. The move is unlikely to destabilise the Korean peninsula. The political and economic dynamics between the US, China and Russia have changed since the 1950s when the last war was fought. The South Koreans are militarily stronger in 2004 than they were in 1950, and US air power constrains North Korean military capability. Provided the US and China do not fall out over tensions regarding Taiwan, it is more likely that the US drawdown will have little military significance on the Korean peninsula.⁽¹⁾

Here in Australia, the decision by the US to drawdown another of its combat brigades in South Korea is unlikely to generate significant force restructure. The US drawdown may focus attention on whether Australian military forces are strong enough to fight in a conventional war, and what role US training bases in Queensland and the Northern Territory may have if there is a North Korean attack.

The extent of the proposed US drawdown

In June 2004, during joint military discussions, the Pentagon—following on from talks by US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld in November 2003—proposed to withdraw 12 500 of the 37 000 US service personnel currently posted in South Korea.⁽²⁾ In June 2004 28 000 US army, 8700 air force and nearly 500 naval and Marine Corps personnel were stationed in South Korea.⁽³⁾

Amongst the forces to be withdrawn would be one of the two 3600 person strong US Army brigades stationed in Korea. They are part of the US 2^nd Infantry Division, which has three brigades. One brigade of the division has its garrison location in the US (though that brigade is currently deployed in Iraq), the other two brigades being stationed near Seoul. The brigade being withdrawn from Korea will also deploy to Iraq, but is likely to return to a garrison location in the US and not in South Korea. The remaining troop cuts are likely to come from support and administrative units.

At this stage it is not clear whether the US plans to reduce the 90 combat aircraft it has in South Korea. Comments by US officials in 2004 have emphasised that whilst they propose to withdraw ground combat forces, they intend to continue to contribute to South Korean defence using air and naval forces. US air power is seen as crucial to halting any North Korean advance, but there is debate regarding its likely effectiveness.⁽⁴⁾

Korean domestic opinion

Opinion in South Korea appears divided on whether Koreans are comfortable with the proposed US drawdown. South Korean Defence Minister Cho Young-kil described the proposed US drawdown as not yet finalized. South Korean National Security Adviser Kwon Chin-ho commented that the withdrawal plan was ‘nothing but a suggestion.’⁽⁶⁾

Roh Moo-hyun, President of South Korea, who has advocated less dependence on the US military, was elected in December 2002 with the help of young Korean voters disenchanted with the United States. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute observed that:

In South Korea there is a growing sense of nationalism, expressed particularly by its younger generation … younger Koreans are questioning the existing power structure in the region, and importantly, the security role played by the United States for more than half a century.⁽⁷⁾

Collectively these views suggest South Korea, whilst uncomfortable with the proposed pace of US withdrawal, will nevertheless not oppose a US drawdown.

Could there be a war?

Several factors constrain the likelihood of war in Korea. Whilst North Korean training is superior to Saddam’s Iraqi army, it is unlikely the North Koreans can win a war because their forces are largely equipped with weapons similar to those used by Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The nuclear option aside, the struggling communist state's economic problems have limited arms modernization, lowered military readiness and made it more difficult for North Korea to use a military option to reunite the Korean Peninsula by force.

Strategically the political environment in North Asia is vastly different in 2004 to what it was during the Korean War 1950-1953. China intervened in Korea in 1951 because it feared the consequences of US control of northern Korea. Russia supported North Korea as a Cold War ally. In a future war there are no Cold War alliances to consider, so it can be argued that provided other factors—such as Taiwan—do not cause diplomatic problems, China and Russia are likely either to remain neutral or perhaps even intervene against North Korea to end any fighting. Only in extreme circumstances are they likely to support North Korea. That means North Korea must look to secure its northern border in addition to fighting in the south.

Logistically, North Korea has limited resources. It is also unlikely to have access to the Russian support it enjoyed in the last war. For North Korea, winning any future conventional war is unlikely given the number and quality of South Korean combat troops and the lethality of the US armed forces. Japanese intentions are also difficult for North Korea to discern. Japan's 2004 Defence White Paper calls for the Japanese Self-Defence Force (JSDF) to be transformed to a force able to deal with a range of threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.⁽⁸⁾ What that means militarily on the peninsula is unclear.

Despite these constraints, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and its sense of political isolation mean that the prospect of any warning before a North Korean attack is likely to be short.

Australian implications

Trade with Northeast Asia consumes some 40 per cent of Australia’s exports.⁽⁹⁾ Any war in Northeast Asia would disrupt much of that trade. For this reason alone, Australia is likely to become involved militarily in a war on the Korean peninsula. A speedy resolution of conflict would be high on any Australian agenda, and this may require rapid intervention by Australian military forces.

Whether Australia’s contribution would need to be much greater than the one made in the 1950s—where Australia eventually deployed two battalions totalling some 1500 infantry troops, several naval surface combatants including an aircraft carrier, and an RAAF fighter squadron—is debatable.

American training facilities in Australia are unlikely to substantially assist US war fighting in Korea. However, they may improve the ability of Australian forces to seamlessly integrate into any future US-led coalition task force.

The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in 2000 stated many Australian army formations were hollow, implying the units were under staffed and probably lacked warfighting capability.⁽¹⁰⁾ Recent Australian mixed unit deployments to Iraq, East Timor and elsewhere and the laying up of Australian navy ships in 2004 to release crews all suggest problems with staffing levels for Australian warfighting units continue. Should the proposed US drawdown in Korea proceed, perhaps it is time for a body external to the Department of Defence to re-examine the question of hollowness in Australian combat formations.