![]() ![]() ![]() |
|||
|
|
Iraq |
North Korea |
|
|
Navy Personnel |
2500 |
60 000 |
|
Total Naval Craft |
19 |
820 |
|
Air Force Personnel |
30 000 |
110 000 |
|
Fighters |
180 |
870 |
|
Ground Force Personnel |
400 000 |
1 000 000 |
|
Tanks |
2500 |
3 800 |
|
Field Guns |
2100 |
12 500 |
|
Ballistic Missiles |
||
|
|
unknown |
500600 |
|
|
unknown |
unknown |
Source: ROK National Intelligence Service and Israeli Defence Forces Website
In June 1981 Israeli air force jets flew 1100 kms across Jordan and Saudi Arabia to successfully destroy the French built 'Osirak' nuclear facilities in Iraq, which had been identified by Israeli intelligence as nearing a nuclear weapon capable stage. The pre-emptive strike was defended by Israel as legitimate self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The strike has since been considered as a strong precedent for the legitimacy of preemption.
The elements essential for success in the Osirak strike in Iraq do not exist in the case of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities in North Korea.
Firstly, the Iraqi regime was not considered to be in possession of any nuclear weapons. US intelligence estimates indicate North Korea may already be in possession of one or two nuclear devices. In addition, the Yongbyong facilities are not the only known nuclear facilities in North Korea. A successful military strike on Yongbyong would not destroy nuclear material at facilities at unknown locations.(8)
Secondly, the Osirak nuclear facilities were not 'hot', that is, the strike took place prior to the loading of nuclear fuel into the reactor. North Korea restarted its 5 MW nuclear reactor at the Yongbyong facilities on 26 February 2003. This dramatically increases the potential threat to the region of adverse environmental radiation effects as a result of a strike.
Finally, Iraq had not stated its objective of massive retaliation in the event of a strike. There was no build up of tension, the two states were in a state of 'permanent hostility' as a result of Iraq's failure to sign an armistice agreement after the 1948 ArabIsareli War. Further, Iraq had no prior indication of a strike on its Osirak facilities. In comparison, North Korea has repeatedly stated its intent of massive retaliation in the event of a strike. Its bellicosity has even extended to the statement that sanctions alone would be a pretext for war.
With its focus on Iraq, the Bush administration has followed a policy of 'strategic neglect' in relation to the escalation tactics of North Korea. It has stated negotiations should only take place within a multilateral setting. At the same time it has stated 'all options remain on the table' to deal with North Korea.(9) With the resolution of the Iraq conflict, greater attention is likely to turn to North Korea.
Despite the overwhelming arguments against a military option highlighted above, there exists in the US, near equivalent domestic opposition to negotiations that could be perceived as rewarding North Korea for its errant behaviour. Senator McCain, an opponent of renegotiating the Agreed Framework, stated 'those who counsel a return to the status quo fail to grasp the danger of rewarding threats with retreat and concession'.(10)
One option is to continue the policy of strategic neglect with its inherent danger of allowing North Korea to obtain further nuclear devices. (11)This could lead to increased international pressure on North Korea, particularly from influential neighbours, China and Russia.
Another option already widely canvassed is the return to bilateral USNorth Korea negotiations. A task force of prominent academics on the North Korean nuclear crisis at the Centre for International Policy at the University of Chicago stated in its key finding that the US should offer to negotiate directly with North Korea on all issues of concern to both sides.(12)
The current nuclear crisis is of vital interest to Australia for at least two reasons: