Research Note no. 26 2002-03
Australia's F/A-18 Hornet AircraftImplications of Use in Iraq
Alex Tewes
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
18 March 2003
Introduction
In January 2003, the Australian government commenced
the pre-deployment of ADF forces to the Persian Gulf in preparation for
a likely military conflict in Iraq. Unexpectedly, the Australian contingent
includes 14 F/A-18 Hornet aircraft from the RAAF's
75th Squadron based in Tindal.
The decision to deploy fighter aircraft to Iraq was
surprising given the historical reluctance of Australian governments to
send these expensive military capabilities in harm's way. Indeed, not
a single Australian fighter aircraft, of any type, has been used in anger
since the 195053 Korean War.(1)
Furthermore, these aircraft suffer from a number of
shortcomings that makes their participation in high-intensity operations
an expensive and dangerous enterprise. These will be discussed later in
this brief.
The Australian F/A-18
The F/A-18 had it origins on 13 January 1975 when
the US Secretary of the Air Force announced that the F-16 had been accepted
as the new US lightweight fighter. The losing design by Northrop (then
known as the YF-17) was transformed by McDonnell-Douglas into a capable
and lightweight alternative to the US Navy's F-14 Tomcat. This new F/A‑18
had its first flight on 18 November 1978.(2)
At about the same time, Australia was in the process
of selecting a replacement for its Mirage fighter aircraft which were
rapidly running out of serviceable life. Three US options were considered
which included the F-15A Eagle, the F-16 Falcon, and the then brand new
F/A-18 Hornet. The F-15 was discounted because the version offered did
not have a ground-attack capability. The F-16 was deemed unsuitable largely
on the basis of its having only one engine. Consequently, Australia signed
a contract in October 1981 for the provision of 75 F/A-18 aircraft, of
which 18 were two-seater versions. The first two aircraft were produced
in the US, with the remainder being assembled in Australia. Delivery took
place between February 1985 and May 1990.
The main original differences between the Australian
and US Navy's standard F/A-18 are:
- the deletion of the nose wheel tie bar (used to engage the steam
catapults on aircraft carriers)
- the addition of a high frequency radio
- an Australian fatigue data analysis system
- an improved video and voice recorder
- a different seat harness, and
- the use of ILS/VOR (Instrument Landing
System/Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range) instead of the carrier
landing system.
Also, 23 of the Australian Hornets have wiring for
a reconnaissance pod that replaces the gun pack in the front fuselage
of the plane. Since delivery, ongoing upgrades have brought them up to
the operational equivalent of the more modern F/A‑18 C/D models.
These
include:
- the capability to fire the AIM‑120
AMRAAM air-to-air missile
- the ability to integrate a Northrop
AN/ALQ-162 radar jammer, and
- to carry the new Loral AN/AAS‑38
Nite Hawk FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) Pod equipped with laser target
designator/ranging equipment, thus making it possible for the Hornets
to do their own target marking for precision delivery of laser-guided
weapons.
Some of the Australian two-seater Hornets were provided
with night-attack capability, quite similar to the US Marine Corps night
attack aircraft.
Four Hornets were lost in crashes in the period 1987
to 1992.
Current and Planned Upgrades
Upgrades to the Australian F/A-18 have been taking
place through Project AIR5376 (Hornet Upgrade Program, or HUG).(3)
Relevant phases (and sub-phases) of the HUG Program are:
- Phase 1. Improve the aircraft's communications anti-jamming capability,
provide an interim upgrade to its radar warning receiver, improve navigation
and situational awareness as well as target identification. Delivery
of these upgrades is complete.
- Phase 2.1. Improve fire control
radar (APG-73).
- Phase 2.2. Install a secure and
jamming-resistant LINK-16 data-link; a colour upgrade for the cockpit
displays; a helmet-mounted cueing system; and an upgrade to the Counter
Measures Dispensing System.
- Phase 2.3. Install a new Electronic Warfare Self Protection (EWSP)
System, including replacement of the Radio Frequency Jammers and Radar Warning Receivers. This phase has been deferred
to later in the decade.
- Phase 3. Incorporate some major
structural refurbishment to the Hornet. This phase is planned for the
closing years of this decade.
Implications for Operations in Iraq
Electronic Warfare Self Protection (EWSP). While
the capabilities of the aircraft in this regard were adequate when first
acquired, they have not been maintained. Consequently, there is now a
concern that they do not provide the required protection in high-threat
environments such as that likely to prevail in Iraq. This perceived shortcoming
will influence how and whereand maybe even ifthe aircraft is used in
combat operations.
LINK-16. This is a secure, jamming resistant
datalink, intended to be a communications, navigation,
and identification system. It is designed to exchange surveillance and
command and control (C2) information among various C2 platforms (like
the AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft) and weapons
platforms such as the F/A-18. Current plans are to incorporate this system
into the Hornet fleet in 200506. Without this system, the aircraft will
only have a restricted capacity to exchange data with other aircraft,
in particular with any electronic warfare aircraft escorting the F/A‑18
on their missions. This restricts the roles and missions that the aircraft
can undertake to ground-attack missions in peripheral areas with low threat
levels.
Airframe Lifespan. This is an issue that may
become critical over the next five years. The major area of concern is
the middle part of the aircraftknown as the 'centre barrel'which serves
as the attachment point for the wings and main landing gear. The US Navy
has been forced to put roughly half its fleet of F/A-18 aircraft through
a centre barrel replacement program so as to enable the aircraft to reach
its planned life of type in 201920. This is both expensive and time consuming
(a minimum of 10 000 hours of work per aircraft). At this stage,
the ADF has decided not to undertake this modification, choosing instead
to manage its fleet in ways that reduce airframe fatigue and minimise
excessive G-force manoeuvres. It is likely that the use of F/A-18 in combat
operations over Iraq could exacerbate this problem and reduce the lifespan
of the aircraft. As around one-quarter of the operational fleet is involved,
it may compromise the ability of the RAAF to keep this aircraft operational
until the introduction of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in the period
201520.
- During the 196366 Confrontation with
Indonesia, F-86 Sabre aircraft from the RAAF 77th Squadron were deployed
to Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia. From August 1964 onwards these
aircraft responded several times to incursions by Indonesian MIG-21
fighter jets. However, the Indonesian aircraft always turned back before
crossing the international boundary. See Air Vice Marshal R.V. Richardson
'Confrontation in Malaysia 19631966' in South-East Asian Commitments
195065: The Proceedings of the 1997 RAAF History Conference, ed., J. Mordike,
Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997.
- http://www.csd.uwo.ca/
~pettypi/elevon/baugher_us/ f018.html
- Defence Capability Plan 20012010, pp.
2330.
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