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Research Note no. 15 2002-03
Members of Parliament (Staff) Act: Employment Issues
Dr Ian Holland
Politics and Public Administration Group
15 October 2002
The Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (the
MoPS Act) governs employment of staff (MoPS staff)
by members, senators and ministers. This Research Note complements two
others, on MoPS
Act Background, and MoPS
Act Accountability Issues.
Remuneration of MoPS staff
Remuneration of MoPS staff has two main components: salary,
and an extra duties allowance. When the Act first came into operation,
salaries were tied to Public Service (APS) salaries and they remain closely
related to that structure. MoPS staff range through administrative assistants,
executive assistants, electorate officers and assistant advisers, holding
positions equivalent to administrative service officers in the APS, to
advisers who hold positions equivalent to senior officers in the APS,
to principal advisers, senior advisers and ministerial media advisers,
whose salaries match those of the APS Senior Executive Service (SES).
Using the salary level at the top of the adviser range as an indicator
it can be seen that, despite some volatility, salary levels have not risen
greatly in real terms since the mid 1980s (Figure 1).(1) They
have risen more slowly than Average Weekly Earnings. Most MoPS staff earn
less than advisers, and their earnings have risen no more quickly.
The value of Parliamentary Staff Allowances (Figure 2) has been falling
ever since the introduction of the MoPS Act.
MoPS Act salaries have long been flexible, particularly
for senior ministerial staff. Prior to the passage of the Workplace
Relations Act 1996 flexibility was achieved chiefly
in two ways: by setting a wide salary bandwidth for senior advisers using
APS SES salary ranges; and by employing staff as consultants.
The pay of consultants, however, was generally within the
range of senior advisers' salaries. This suggests that the engagement
of consultants was not a device to raise salaries, but rather a means
to vary other employment conditions, such as early termination provisions,
and to contract advisers for specific purposes.(2) Since the
late 1990s, individual contracts (AWAs) have provided much of the salary
and conditions flexibility earlier mechanisms sought to achieve.
Limited information is available on appointment levels for MoPS staff
as a whole and available data are difficult to interpret. It seems that
ministerial staff are being appointed at comparable levels of seniority
now as in the early 1980s (Figure 3).(3) Although there are
more senior advisers, this has been the result of an increase in the number
of all staff, not an increase in the proportion of senior
staff.
Conditions of Employment
A MoPS staffer is readily dismissed, though like most employees
they can seek the protection of the Workplace Relations Act against
dismissal that is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. It is rare for staff
to successfully claim unfair treatment when the dismissal provisions in
the MoPS Act are very straightforward and the conditions known to be highly
demanding.(4)
Easy dismissal, it is argued, is necessary to the political
nature of MoPS staff employment. If a staff member does not have the full
confidence of their minister or MP, they can be of little use to their
employer. In this respect, however, their situation is little different
to that of Departmental Secretaries, as the Barratt case demonstrated.(5)
The first question this raises is whether there is adequate
compensation to balance the ease of dismissal. The salaries of MoPS staff
are generally no greater than those received in the APS. The severance
benefits in the Certified Agreement covering MoPS staff are no more generous
than those offered by many other employers, including employers with whom
employment would be regarded as much more secure. Most personal staff
other than electorate staff receive an allowance of around $12 000 per
annum, while junior personal staff receive $7879. However, as shown above,
the value of this allowance is declining, and electorate staff receive
an optional allowance of even less ($3677) in lieu of overtime.(6)
Institutional Arrangements
The ratio of government to opposition staff is set in terms
of staff numbers. It may make more sense to set the ratio in terms of
total salary cost, allowing both greater fairness and more flexibility
in staffing arrangements.
There are broader institutional questions. Should MoPS staff
be recruited by individual MPs (as is currently the case), or should a
greater role be given to parliamentary parties? Given that party loyalty
is a key attribute of MoPS staff, having them recruited by the party rather
than the individual MP might provide greater staffing flexibility and
create a more forgiving mechanism for dealing with personality clashes.
It might also ensure more consistent recruitment practices. The downside
could be that staff could become instruments of the party leader or their
faction, rather than of the MP for whom they work.
A second question is whether the Act confers the appropriate
level of discretion on the Prime Minister. The discretion extends, for
example, to influencing conditions of employment of all staff, including
electorate officers and the staff of the non-government party leaders.
It also extends to being able to vary numbers and ratios of staff. Not
only are these powers concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister,
the arrangements are not transparent. Prime Ministerial determinations
are not publicly available in the same way, for example, as the Public
Service Commissioner's Directions. A parliamentary committee should perhaps
have a role in making these MoPS staffing determinations.
Finally, electorate staff in a Constitutional sense serve
the Parliament rather than the government or opposition. It might be better
that there be parliamentary rather than executive administration of their
employment arrangements.
Endnotes
- Data drawn from Parliamentary Debates and MoPS staff
Certified Agreements. For full details, contact the author. Data series
for Figures 1 and 2 deflated using the CPI and expressed in 200102
dollars.
- See, e.g. data provided at Senate, Debates, 31
August 1993, pp. 6902.
- Senate, Debates, 13
September 1983; House of Representatives, Debates,
17
February 2000. Comparable information for the
period 1984 to 1995, and on opposition staffing, is not available.
- See, e.g. Catherine McGovern v. Department of Finance
and Administration, Australian Industrial Relations Commission,
Melbourne, 14 March 2002, U2001/5582 and U2001/6433.
- Max Spry, 'The Appointment, Removal and Responsibilities
of Public Sector Chief Executives in Australia', Australian Journal
of Public Administration, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 3949.
- Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee, Additional
Estimates 200001, Additional Information Received, vol. 3, August
2001, p. 662.
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