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A War Not War: Policy Considerations for a Protracted Campaign Against International Terrorism
(1)
Derek Woolner
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
25 September 2001
Following the 11 September 2001 attack against buildings in the United States of America by hijacked aircraft, there has been much talk of this event opening a new 'war'-one against international terrorism.
The parallel, evoking memories of the unexpected attack against Pearl Harbour, which drew the USA into the Second World War, is understandable. It is, equally, misleading.
No War, No Peace
The individuals and governments so far nominated as the objectives of this campaign are Muslim. Already, reaction in the Islamic world may be sufficient to sustain ongoing retaliation to the American led campaign.
In any case, people are being warned of a struggle likely to be protracted.(2) The circumstances could then be very different to a conventional war, especially in terms of the psychological effects on broad civilian communities.
By definition, a campaign by international terrorists would not be restricted to one country or area of the globe. Unlike conventional war there would be no discrete areas of military operations, no single foe (individual or coalition) defeat of whom would end the conflict. There would be significant limits on the ability of military operations to achieve victory.(3)
The corollary is that there would be few parts of the world completely safe and few indicators of when the level of violence might increase. Instead, there would be a state of heightened uncertainty, the 'no war, no peace' with which citizens of Israel and Northern Ireland have become familiar.
Under these conditions, human behaviour can deteriorate. Stress, induced as much from uncertainty as from fear, can lead to intolerance, increased community division and resort to violence, particularly among the young.
Enmity towards ethnic minorities is common during conventional war. A difference in protracted terrorist campaigns appears to be the level of hostilities within communities, including assassinations of individuals thought by some to have betrayed them. These circumstances can lead to legislative restrictions on previously accepted freedoms.
Losing Control of the Agenda
Consequently, policy can be hijacked. This has occurred several times during attempts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where provocation by shooting or bombing has succeeded in sidelining peace talks, building intransigence and, in general, sustaining levels of inter-communal violence.
Policy hijack might occur in less dramatic circumstances. It may be that some countries, such as Australia, will see little if any terrorist activity. If the American campaign proves protracted or becomes controversial, public attitudes could change and perceptions of danger in less exposed countries would probably shift. Acceptance of measures that earlier seemed justified may decline. Such a change occurred in the attitude to compulsory military service during the period of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam conflict.
In conducting a campaign against international terrorism, the ability of policy makers to retain the public's focus may be as important to success as operational victories.
The Frontline Police
Unlike modern, air-mobile military forces, terrorists cannot launch their campaigns from distant territories. They need to build 'infrastructure' relatively close to their target. The classical terrorist structure is a system of 'cells', a small number of individuals absorbed into the community as ordinary citizens. Each of these is isolated and knows only as much of the rest of the organisation as is necessary to achieve operational tasks.
This is the primary security precaution for a terrorist organisation. Discovery of one cell, therefore, will not usually cause the dismemberment of the organisation. Generally, each cell can be revealed only by investigative work specific to it.
Consequently, for most countries, protection against terrorism will be a role for the police. Foiling terrorist plans will fall primarily to police, other law enforcement bodies and civilian intelligence agencies. This reality has been borne out in the current situation where the apparent progress made to date has been by the US Federal Bureau of Investigations and German police.
More significantly, law enforcement agencies may be able to undermine the long-term viability of terrorist networks. High international mobility and long-term implementation strategies, as displayed in the attack on the US, come at a price. This has, in the past, been borne by sponsoring governments, but some networks such as that of the Saudi terrorist leader, Osama bin Laden, allegedly are self-financed.
Locating, where possible, the holding and distribution of this finance so that it can be quarantined or confiscated is an effective way of reducing the reach of a terrorist organisation.
To date, the US has been preoccupied with efforts to develop a multinational military response to the terrorist attacks. Yet, links between the world's police forces and the agencies working with them will be important in overcoming terrorist networks. In Australia, as elsewhere, the protection of local communities will depend on the management of policies covering the security roles of police.
Uses of Military Force
In the current campaign the most spectacular individual events are likely to be a series of attacks on Taliban forces in Afghanistan and perhaps, on some other nations thought to sponsor terrorism.
Except for the unpredictable goal of replacing such a government, the purpose of these attacks will be to facilitate operations not dissimilar to police action. Having weakened the military apparatus of the target country, special forces can attempt to locate and, if possible, detain suspects, albeit under dangerous circumstances. Significantly, in many countries special forces have links with the police, being assigned to counter terrorism duties.
As with police work, such raids will have to be targeted on the basis of intelligence assessments that will be difficult to authenticate. Many secure hideouts constructed by the Mujhadeen during the Soviet occupation remain and are reportedly in use by the bin Laden organisation. In nearly a decade of fighting, Soviet forces were unable to locate and neutralise them. It is unlikely that American opinion would permit the occupation of Afghanistan beyond the purposes required for specific special forces operations.
Again, as with police work, it would be preferable if suspects could be brought to trial. Cadavers may assuage western passions but will create martyrs, given that many Muslims are unconvinced of the involvement of Islamic terrorists.
Moderation and Focus
Indeed, policy objectives would seem to be more attainable through a guiding principle of appropriate response. This is more akin to the policing concept of minimum applicable force rather than the overwhelming use of force that is central to military planning (and, hence, prominent in American planning to suppress Afghani defences).
There is a considerable risk that perceptions of unrestrained power could exacerbate the problem. Many Islamic countries have significant domestic radical Muslim movements, which will probably gain support over the initial stages of the American campaign. It would be counter-productive if military operations increased this reaction and led to the installation of an anti-Western government in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen or Pakistan. Conversely, the campaign would be strengthened if the nature of its conduct allowed Islamic governments to approve appropriate participation by their forces.
To date, despite the announcement of an Office of Homeland Security in President Bush's speech of 21 September, neither the Australian nor US Governments have outlined comprehensive objectives for the campaign. The circumstances are sufficiently complex to require this.
For instance, there is considerable support in Pakistan, whose territory is central to the campaign, for both the Taliban and the 'freedom' fighters in Kashmir. Its Government is probably unable to prevent support for either. Similarly, the Philippines is, despite its best efforts, unable to defeat a Muslim insurgency, which uses terrorist tactics, such as the kidnapping of foreigners, including Americans. Sri Lanka faces an equally tenacious insurgency that uses terrorism.
There seems no reason why terrorism will not exist as long as do the circumstances which breed alienation, whether through poverty, powerlessness, religious conviction or perceived Western domination. Hence it is important for governments to set objectives, concepts of operation, rules of engagement and exit strategies for the forthcoming campaign. It is important to distinguish between objectives achievable through military and police forces, those through ongoing domestic security developments and those by ameliorative actions in foreign policy and overseas development programs.
So far, governments have not addressed these areas publicly. Without sufficient focus, there is a risk that the search for terrorists could stumble on into (to modify the Prayer-Anglican version)-war without end, Amen.
- For general details about terrorism, see, 'Blackest September: the 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the United States', E-brief on the Internet, at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/fad/usterror.htm
- Malri Barton, 'War on terror could take years: Howard', West Australian, 18 September 2001.
- By definition, terrorists do not present targets that are similar to military formations or installations. Their response to conventional military operations is to disperse and hide amongst the populace. The most profitable use of conventional military forces is to deny terrorists the safety of a sanctuary from which to operate.
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