 |
The War Over Kosovo
Gary Brown
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
30 March 1999
Introduction
Once again there is war in the Balkan peninsula, Europe's perennially
unstable southeastern region. Since early morning Thursday 25 March (Canberra
time) NATO has been undertaking significant military action against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)(1). Australia has supported the action
but is not taking an active part, though joint US-Australian facilities
here may be involved.
The NATO action arises from the breakdown of talks designed to broker
a peaceful solution to the problem of Kosovo, a part of Serbia now, however,
populated by a 90 per cent Albanian majority.
As former Yugoslavia began to break up after the end of the Cold War,
Slobodan Milosevic established himself as ruler of the Serbian Republic
which, with its long-established ally Montenegro, now constitute all that
remains of Yugoslavia. President Milosevic was quick to revoke (1989)
a substantial degree of autonomy held by the ethnically Albanian Kosovo
region of Serbia under Yugoslav President Tito's rule, instead bringing
it under direct control from the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade.
Deceptively quiet during the Serbian conflicts with Croatia and then
the war in Bosnia, Albanian-populated Kosovo nonetheless resented the
increasingly arbitrary and discriminatory rule from Belgrade. Inevitably,
separatist movements (initially peaceful) sprang up. In a familiar pattern
of escalation, repression led to resistance and so to more repression,
until Kosovo eventually became a battleground between armed Albanian separatists
and the FRY armed forces. The typical Balkan pattern of broken truces
and promises, punctuated by occasional atrocities (the human costs of
which remain unknown) mostly against Albanians, began inexorably to repeat
itself. NATO a nd the west appeared to be making only ineffectual complaints
and empty threats. It is to halt this vicious cycle of violence that NATO,
after negotiations finally collapsed, has (as in Bosnia, reluctantly)
turned to military action.
The Kosovo problem is no simple one. Though now largely populated by
Albanians, it is beyond dispute that Kosovo is part of Serbia's ancient
heartland. In the Middle Ages it was the site of two significant battles.
The first in 1389 resulted in the decisive defeat of the Orthodox Christian
Serbs under Prince Lazar of Rascia by the Muslim Turks, then in the process
of conquering the Balkan peninsula. The second, in 1448, saw the Turks
defeat a mixed Christian army (including both Serbs and Albanians) attempting
to reverse the tide of Muslim conquest.(2)
The Serbian population of Kosovo gradually moved away, into Hungary,
to escape the Turkish domination, which lasted for five centuries. Just
as gradually they were replaced by ethnic Albanians, and so in modern
times formerly Serbian-populated Kosovo now has a 90 per cent Albanian
majority.(3) For this reason the Tito regime granted Kosovo a degree of
autonomy in 1974, though it always remained a part of the Serbian Republic,
which was in turn the largest of the then Yugoslav republics. It is this
disparity between Kosovo's modern ethnic Albanian composition, its political
situation as part of Serbia and its still-remembered status as part of
the original Serbian heartland which makes the problem so intractable
and the issue so difficult for the FRY regime to address.
The NATO Military Operation
Political Objective
NATO has not been very forthcoming about the nature or specific objectives
of its operations against the FRY. But the political objective is clear
enough: to force the FRY to accept a peace settlement for Kosovo which
includes both renewed (and genuine) autonomy and enforcement of the deal
by NATO troops. It was on these points that negotiations prior to the
outbreak of hostilities foundered. The FRY was particularly reluctant
to admit NATO troops to Kosovo, and threatened to fire on any which entered
the country.
Strategic concept
Insofar as it is possible to divine from public statements and the reported
operations thus far, NATO's military strategy seems to be directed at
severely damaging the FRY's ability to make war. This is being done by
means of cruise missile and air attacks. This may be followed (no indication
yet exists, though NATO will probably hestitate to directly fight FRY
army regulars) by ground operations. Certainly at some point, unless political
objectives are changed, NATO troops will at least have to enter Kosovo-whether
militarily opposed or unopposed is impossible to predict.
Tactical execution
NATO has begun by seeking to suppress the FRY air defence system so as
to achieve air superiority. Thus early targets include air defence command
centres and surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites. The FRY has an extensive
air defence force which is, however, mostly Soviet in origin and as such
has proven (in the 1991 Gulf War) vulnerabilities to the advanced capabilities
of NATO air power. Initial attacks aimed at crippling any co-ordination
of FRY air defence. This, plus extensive cruise missile strikes on predetermined
targets, is designed to make Serbian skies safe for more conventional
NATO air attacks. These in turn target the FRY Air Force, particularly
its bases, so as to eliminate all significant air power, leaving the country
and its still considerable ground forces completely vulnerable to attack.(4)
In particular FRY ground forces would be unable to concentrate (e.g. to
resist a NATO push into Kosovo)-even assuming bridges remain intact-without
exposing themselves to massive air assault.
Differences in terrain (as compared with Iraq), however, suggest that
FRY air defence-especially artillery-may have some limited success against
NATO air power though the latter should finally prevail. The loss of an
F-117 'Stealth' fighter shows that this is not going to be a cost-free
campaign for NATO.
Further air attacks have been directed against FRY ground force bases,
barracks and installations, including fuel and ammunition dumps where
located by NATO intelligence. These attacks are intended to erode the
ability of the 90 000 strong Soviet-style FRY army to resist NATO
ground forces if they enter the country.(5) (This, of course, need not
happen, because at any point an FRY concession of defeat on acceptable
terms would remove any requirement for further action.) This operational
concept would be somewhat similar to that used by the Coalition against
Iraq to wear down the Iraqi army prior to the launching of the ground
war which freed Kuwait. At the far end of this process one could foresee
a situation in which FRY military options could be reduced to conducting
guerrilla warfare against occupying NATO forces.
The limits of force
This last projection (which, it should again be emphasised, may never
come to pass) sounds a warning about the limited utility of force. Though
it would represent a military victory for NATO, and probably free Kosovo
from Serb control, an outcome in which Serbian irregulars take to the
hills is still potentially disastrous. Its legacy might be years of counter-guerrilla
war with little prospect of NATO being able to disengage. While the ethnic
killing in Kosovo would probably be halted, the Serbian region could become
a running sore extremely difficult to treat.
It is important, therefore, that the present operations not be allowed
to gain a momentum of their own, and that the political objectives be
kept firmly in view. In particular, if at the end of the day it proves
necessary to detach Kosovo from Serbia (as another 'former Yugoslav Republic
of...') or to allow the region to join Albania, measures to protect the
Serb minority still resident will be necessary if any enduring settlement
is to be reached with Belgrade.
Military action like that now underway has good prospects of providing
the population of Kosovo with better security than it has had under Yugoslav
rule. It does not, however, offer a comprehensive solution to the problems
of former Yugoslavia. When the shooting stops there will be an urgent
need for effective diplomacy and carefully thought-out policies by NATO,
the several European leaders, the US and above all the Belgrade regime
and the representatives of the people of Kosovo. Lacking effective contributions
from all of these, the present military conflict may presage nothing but
a new phase of the Balkan tragedy.
- The FRY now consists of Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia is the preponderant
partner in this federation.
- George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, revised
English edition, Rutgers 1969, pp. 546 and 567.
- Jaroslav Krejci and Viteslav Velimsky, Ethnic and Political Nations
in Europe, Croom Helm, London, 1981, p. 142.
- The Serb Air Force has 241 combat aircraft, 56 armed helicopters,
8 SAM battalions and 15 air defence regiments with anti-aircraft artillery.
The Military Balance 1997/98, IISS, London, 1997, p. 100.
- ibid., p. 99.
|
 |
