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North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Proliferation and Regional Security
Professor James Cotton
Consultant, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
31 August 1999
Contents
Introduction
Managing North Korea's Nuclear Program
North Korea's Missile Program
International Reactions and Responses
Significance for Regional Stability
Principles for Managing the North Korean Situation
Conclusions
Bibliographical Notes
Endnote
Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency, Map
no. 802191(R00141)7-98
Note: This Current Issues Brief is a supplement to an
earlier paper by the author-'The Koreas in 1999: Between Confrontation
and Engagement' (Research Paper No. 14, 1998-99, March 1999)-which provides
a detailed background to the issues discussed here.
North Korea's announced intention to test launch a multi-stage
missile has prompted the most serious crisis on the Korean peninsula since
the nuclear confrontation of 1993. If the test is conducted, the US, Japan
and South Korea have threatened unspecified sanctions. If these include
a freeze on funding to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation,
the future of the 'Agreed Framework' which resolved the 1993 nuclear crisis
will be at risk. In both Japan and the US an intense debate is raging
on whether to continue to offer Pyongyang further inducements in the hope
that its behaviour will improve, or whether the time has come to punish
a regime that shows no inclination to alter its policy in the light of
the concerns of its neighbours.
The three powers have agreed on the outlines of
a 'package deal', prepared by former Defense Secretary and Korean policy
coordinator William Perry. Even though Perry himself has discussed the
package with the North Korean authorities, the details have yet to be
made public. The United States and South Korea were waiting for the conclusion
of the August round of the 'Four Party Talks' (involving the two Koreas,
the US, and China) which recently concluded. It is reported that North
Korea will be offered new and broader incentives, possibly even including
diplomatic relations, in exchange for security reassurances and restraint
in the development of offensive technologies. But the Perry package may
not be offered if North Korea continues with its missile program. This
paper argues that if a quarantine is placed on North Korea, any chance
to change the North Korean system-which would be the only step that would
defuse the Korean issue permanently-would be lost.
Since October 1994 North Korea's nuclear program has
been constrained by the conditions of the 'Agreed Framework'. Up to that
time and in breach of its multi-lateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) obligations, North Korea was developing a clandestine weapons capability.
This is now frozen under an agreement that has required the United States
to establish a multi-lateral agency-Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organisation (KEDO)-to construct two reactors of an international standard
inside North Korea. The European Union (EU) and other countries have donated
funds towards the operating costs of KEDO; so far, Australia, in the interests
of encouraging regional non-proliferation, has contributed A$11 million.
Aside from their much greater safety characteristics, the reactors to
be constructed are regarded as less weapons applicable because they will
depend upon imported fuel and thus upon an external fuel cycle which can
be interdicted if required.
This agreement defused the 1993 crisis but is less than
ideal. North Korea, so far, has evaded the obligation of transparency
that it owes to all other NPT signatories. Indeed, North Korea will only
be required to comply with full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections no earlier than 2003 when the reactors are completed. The
deal, however, was thought to be worth the cost at the time, heading off
a possible war on the peninsula and helping to create the conditions that
allowed the NPT to be extended.
The operations of KEDO have been dogged by a series of
disputes-from nomenclature of the reactor type to difficulties in raising
the US$4.6 billion required under current estimates-but at present an
international team, the bulk of whom are from South Korea, are in residence
in the North constructing the reactors. This in itself is an important
confidence building initiative. In August South Korea approved a contribution
of US$3.4 billion to the final KEDO budget. Meanwhile, activity at the
indigenous North Korean nuclear facility has been halted, and nuclear
fuel there is under international supervision. United States suspicions
that an underground construction site might be a new clandestine reactor
were assuaged earlier this year as a result of an on-site inspection.
North Korea's missile program is under no comparable
restraints. North Korea acquired 'SCUD B' technology through collaboration
with China and Iran, as well as Egypt (which supplied missile prototypes)
in the early 1980s. With the help of financing from Iran, North Korea
extended the payload and range of the type, producing a very much enhanced
model powered by multiple engines-designated the No-dong-which was test
flown in May 1993. This missile, which has an estimated range of 1350
kms (bringing all of Japan and much of North and East China within its
range) may now be deployed. North Korea possesses mobile launchers for
these missiles, and may be adapting 'GOLF' class submarines, acquired
from Russia in 1994, as an alternative launch platform.
The two missile variants were then used as the basis
for a multi-stage rocket-designated the Taep'o-dong-which was used, according
to the North Koreans, to launch a satellite in August 1998. The second
stage of the vehicle overflew Japan, splashing down about 1500 kms from
the launchsite. At the time, US specialists could find no trace of the
alleged satellite; later some reports claimed that a third (and solid
fuelled) stage, though unsuccessful if its payload was a satellite, nevertheless
traversed much of the Pacific before crashing into waters off Alaska.
US specialists maintain that North Korea is developing a longer range
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) version of the Taep'o-dong
which could strike targets in the continental US and much of Asia by around
2003. This missile appears to be a further development of SCUD technology
using multiple engines. According to some sources, certain of its features
may also be copied from the CSS-2 missile type developed by China.
North Korea's missile program also has an export dimension.
It has been claimed that North Korea has exported as many as 400 SCUD
type missiles to Iran and Syria. Iranian testing and production of SCUD
type missiles was the result of the transfer of technology and components
from North Korea. The 'war of the cities' waged between Iran and Iraq
during their eight-year conflict was largely fuelled by North Korean missiles
and technology. And North Korean expertise seems to have played a part
in more recent destabilising missile proliferation in West Asia. In 1998
both Pakistan and Iran tested missiles that would seem to have been derived,
at least in part, from No-Dong technology. In the past three years North
Korea has participated in talks on joining the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). However, Pyongyang has claimed that it would lose a significant
export market by so doing, and has sought US$500 million as compensation.
What is the connection between the nuclear and missile
issues, apart from providing some substance to the claim that North Korea
is a 'rogue state'? At present North Korea's nuclear program is on hold;
its missile production and exports though they labour under various export
control restrictions are under no such constraint. For the time being,
while North Korea has the capacity and materials to build a nuclear weapon,
it is generally regarded as not yet possessing the expertise to overcome
the considerable guidance and payload factors that obstruct the marrying
of the two technologies.
Despite the technological limitations of North Korea's
nuclear and missile programs so far, the United States, Japan and
South Korea regard these missile developments as a profound challenge
to their security and to their alliances. Japan is threatening to withdraw
its more than US$1 billion support for KEDO if North Korea tests further
missiles. South Korean domestic opinion is undermining President Kim Dae-jung's
'sunshine policy' of engagement with the North, and Seoul is considering
cutting off relief aid, tourism, and reconstruction funds. And the mood
in the US Congress and in some leading American think tanks is becoming
hostile to what is described as the repeated rewarding by the Clinton
administration of Pyongyang's 'bad behaviour'. According to the findings
of the Rumsfeld Commission (on future strategic threats to the United
States), North Korean weapons and proliferation are 'a major threat to
the US and to US interests'.
Japan may develop its own satellite surveillance technology
to counter the North Korean threat, this development being related also
to a more nationalistic mood which is emerging in the shadow of this and
other regional challenges. Already South Korea has indicated it may experiment
with missiles of its own that exceed the limitations imposed by its alliance
with the US. But if these countries go so far as to undermine the Agreed
Framework, then the North Koreans may reasonably claim that it was the
United States that failed to observe its multilateral undertakings, and
that indeed all the regional powers are conspiring to repress it. Without
this agreement, North Korea may resume its frozen indigenous nuclear program.
As a further counter-measure, the US may continue to pursue the introduction
of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in Northeast Asia. Already funds have
been designated to establish a joint US-Japan study into the feasibility
of TMD. Such a system is regarded by China as destabilising, yet China's
cooperation in relation to North Korea is required given its influence
in Pyongyang, and its continuing role in the 'Four Party Talks'.
At the present time the administrations in Tokyo and
Washington have indicated that they intend to 'quarantine' the funding
for the Agreed Framework and KEDO from possible sanctions against North
Korea. But in this regard, the US is dependent upon Congressional approval,
which may well be withheld. Even before the missile crisis Congress was
most reluctant to grant monies to finance Washington's responsibilities,
which include the delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. These funds,
though delayed, were eventually approved, but President Clinton was obliged
to certify North Korea's continued observance of its side of the agreement
before they could be expended. Similarly, opinion in Japan's Diet is hard
to predict, especially in the light of repeated North Korean statements
to the effect that Japan is regarded as a hostile state.
It is the intention of Washington to pressure or to induce
Pyongyang to join the MTCR. But the MTCR is basically a supply-side anti-proliferation
regime. It is unlike the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and
other regimes where restraint on the part of the members in developing
weapons technologies is required. In particular, it is a weapons regime
that places no limits on the domestic activities of those who possess
the weapons technology. The North Koreans are thus accurate when they
point out its partiality. Nor has it been an especially successful regime,
even where impartially applied. In other theatres its existence has slowed
but not stopped missile proliferation.
Against these developments, and even given that it can
be argued that the regime in Pyongyang must rate as among the
world's most recalcitrant, four points need to be kept in mind.
First, North Korea's nuclear program cannot be
compared with those of Israel, India or Pakistan. All three, and particularly
the first two, have benefited from United States assistance, training,
supplies and prototypes. North Korean existing reactors are 1950s
technology. If North Korea does possess fissile material, it is a very
small amount, enough perhaps to make two or three nuclear devices as compared
to perhaps two hundred in the case of Israel. At the moment, the biggest
threat posed by North Korea's nuclear activities relates to poor safety
standards and lack of technologies to deal with spills and other accidents.
Second, North Korea's missile technology is similarly
extremely dated. This is presently technology that is thirty years old.
Information sharing with other states may improve North Korea's missiles
further, but the capabilities of the SCUD type that North Korea has extended
and improved have just about reached their limit. The one real innovation
in the 1998 Taep'o-dong launching was the fact that the final stage was
solid fuelled, but this apparently did not function. Moreover, the reliability
of the whole of North Korea's missile effort is evidently not good. Around
half of the missile tests conducted from 1984 have failed; some reports
have claimed that as many as eight of the SCUD missiles exported to Iran
for use against Iraq exploded on launch.
Third, even if it succeeds in assembling a nuclear
weapon, North Korea could never employ such a weapon for offensive purposes.
So long as the US remains engaged in Korea, its actual use would result
in the abandonment of any restraint on the part of Washington, and the
swift demise of the North Korean state. North Korean nuclear weapons are
therefore for deterrent purposes. They may also be a bargaining chip:
if the indigenous program really has been frozen as is required by the
Agreed Framework, then it is a chip that has already been cashed.
Fourth, North Korea does not need missiles to
attack South Korea or Japan, or US installations in the region. North
Korea possesses aircraft that are more effective and accurate means of
delivering a larger payload. Missiles of this type are principally psychological
and political weapons. Even if North Korea were to develop an ICBM, any
use of it would spell the immediate end of the regime.
If North Korea is to be punished and quarantined for
these activities, the partiality of such action would be patent. The moral
would be drawn that proliferators (providing they are not US allies) must
actually assemble and test their weapons in order to be taken seriously.
And if the 'Agreed Framework' were to be scuttled in the process, the
North Koreans could reasonably claim that it was the United States that
failed to honour its commitments. Further, if North Korea cannot be induced
to join the MTCR, the deficiencies in that regime must be held partly
to blame. Nor should any action be taken without securing China's acquiescence.
These issues are therefore of very serious regional concern.
Possible action by the US and its allies may also impact upon international
weapons control regimes.
With these points in view, the author suggests that two
principles should guide policy towards North Korea.
First, although many in the region and in the US have
come to expect the demise of the North Korean state (and its unification
with South Korea), it continues to exist as a sovereign entity despite
its tribulations. A more formal recognition of its sovereign status would
generate no more costs to the international community than are borne at
present, and may bring potential benefits. The clearest consequence of
treating it as a pariah is to feed the undoubted paranoia of its leadership.
Neither Japan nor the US has diplomatic relations with North Korea. Since
1990 Japan has conducted talks with North Korea with the intention of
negotiating full diplomatic relations, but these have never been realised.
The United States maintains a wide range of sanctions against North Korea
and its government, including trade and aid restrictions. The US Executive
Directors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
are also directed to refrain from approving loans or financial assistance
to North Korea. Under the 'Agreed Framework' the US is pledged to improve
relations, but talks to open reciprocal diplomatic offices in each country
have not made much progress. A more pragmatic approach to North Korea
might contribute to easing the sense of isolation felt in Pyongyang, and
would undoubtedly improve communications.
Second, policy towards North Korea should be framed in
order to encourage internal change. The present regime will probably never
willingly change its fundamentals. Therefore, engaging the social
and economic dynamics of the country may present the only prospects for
improving the behaviour of the country in the longer term. As the result
of famine and the decay of the former socialist economy, sizeable tracts
of the country are being left to their own devices. The proto-market relations
that are developing there should be encouraged by aid programs provided
in the name of multi-lateral agencies and the United Nations. North Korea
will depend for some time to come on international relief and food supplies.
At the very least, these should be delivered in such a way as to foster
local civil society and individual enterprise. An international quarantine,
apart from imposing extraordinary suffering on the ordinary people, would
obstruct the exercise of such leverage.
North Korea's nuclear and missile programs remain one
of the most serious sources of tension in the Asia-Pacific region. As
has been argued, North Korea does not have technologically sophisticated
nuclear or missile capacities and their use would be likely to lead very
quickly to the end of the North Korean regime and to widespread destruction
of the country. Nonetheless, the isolationist and bellicose stance of
the North Korean regime and its continuing confrontation of South Korea
are a continuing source of suspicion both among its immediate neighbours
and internationally. Because of this, opinion in the US and Japan, and
especially in the US Congress, is not likely to lead those countries to
resile from some form of sanctions against North Korea, if the North Koreans
persist in their missile program.
- For reports on the GOLF class submarines see the entries for 18 January
1994 in Greg J. Gerardi and James A. Plotts, 'An Annotated Chronology
of DPRK Missile Trade and Developments', http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/gerplo21.htm
On the future of North Korea:
Byung-joon Ahn, 'The Man who would be Kim', Foreign
Affairs 73(1994), no. 6, 94-108.
Stephen W. Linton, 'North Korea under the son', The
Washington Quarterly 19(1996), no. 2, 3-17.
Marcus Noland, 'Why North Korea will muddle through',
Foreign Affairs 76(1997), no. 4, 105-18.
Young Whan Kihl, 'Why the Cold War Persists in Korea:
Inter-Korean and Foreign Relations', in David R. McCann, ed., Korea
Briefing: Toward Reunification, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 49-69.
Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, 'North Korea Between Collapse
and Reform', Asian Survey 39(1999), no 2, 287-309.
On proliferation issues:
William E. Barrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass.
The dangerous race for superweapons in a fragmenting world (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1994).
On the North Korean missile program:
James Oberg, 'Missiles for All: more missiles flood the
world and reach farther than ever', IEE Spectrum, March 1999, 20-28.
Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk.missile
Greg J Gerardi and James A. Plotts, 'An Annotated Chronology
of DPRK Missile Trade and Developments', http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/gerplo21.htm
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