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The Simons Report: Evaluating Australia's Aid Program
Dr Ravi Tomar
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
26 June 1997
Contents
Introduction
Overview of the Report
Volume of Aid
Aid Focus, Sectoral Priorities and Expertise
Commercial Orientation
Mixed Credits
Multilateral Assistance
Role of the Private Sector
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)
Management Issues
Observations
Endnotes
Appendix A: Terms of Reference for a Review of the Australian
Aid Program
On 2 May, the Report of the Committee to Review Australia's Overseas
Aid Program was handed over to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander
Downer, by the Chairman of the Committee, Paul Simons. With a total of
79 recommendations, the Report, One Clear Objective: Poverty Reduction
Through Sustainable Development, is the most comprehensive examination
of the program since the Jackson Report of 1984. (Terms of Reference for
the Review are at Appendix A). Comprising 20 chapters and running to some
350 pages, the main Report covers virtually all aspects of Australia's
aid program ranging from its objectives to its implementation. The object
of this Current Issues Brief is not to discuss all the suggestions but
to highlight and comment on a selection of the major recommendations of
the review.
Overall, the Report argues that the 'basic arrangement of the aid program
is sound but has suffered from the lack of a clear objective, leaving
it open to being pulled in different directions'. Consequently, a 'substantial
change is ... required in the Agency's approach and direction.'(1) The
reason given for this is the multiple objectives for the program which
are a combination of humanitarian, foreign policy and commercial interests.
It further goes on to state that, at times development effectiveness has
suffered as a result of commercial orientation of the types of activities
undertaken.(2) The Report acknowledges that in November 1993 a comprehensive
statement of the Australian aid program, Poverty Reduction and Economic
Growth in Australia's Development Cooperation Program, was made by
the then Minister for Development Cooperation, Gordon Bilney, in which
he put forward a poverty reduction framework which comprised three areas:(3)
- sustainable economic growth
- investment in human resources through education, health, capacity
building and social sector development
- safety nets and poverty targeting, and which includes emergency relief.
The Ministerial Policy Paper had further stated:(4)
While humanitarian concerns are central, the aid program is also an important
instrument of foreign and trade policy. Australia's approach is a strategic
one through which it seeks to maximise both the developmental impact of
aid and the commercial returns to Australia. There is no conflict between
Australia's commercial interests and our approach to poverty reduction.
While the Report agrees with the framework set out by the Ministerial
policy paper, it is critical of AusAID in that it did not formulate poverty
reduction strategies for putting the policy into effect 'except a requirement
that country strategy papers be broadly compatible with the policy' and
goes on to recommend that AusAID devise a 'new' poverty reduction framework
and a plan for implementing it.(5) On the second point, regarding the
relationship between aid and foreign and trade policy it once again appears
that, contrary to the Report's earlier criticism, there are certain fundamentals
which have not changed. The Report mentions the necessity of
... international economic cooperation, the building of security frameworks.
In this increasingly interdependent world, development cooperation is
an investment in international stability and security, as well as an expression
of humanitarian concern.(6)
One of the most significant recommendations of the Report is that the
long held commitment to the aid volume target of 0.7 per cent of Overseas
Development Assistance (ODA) to Gross National Product (GNP) is no longer
realistic. (The ODA/GNP ratio was established by the United Nations on
the recommendation of the Pearson Commission (1969) and has become
the international measure of comparative donor performance). 'Instead,
it is suggested that achievable targets to increase the ratio over a 3-5
year period should be adopted'.(7) However only a few countries ever meet
the target. As can be seen by the diagram below only four of the twenty-one
member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
OECD met the donor target in 1995. With the exception of Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and the Netherlands, no other country met the target. Even Japan,
the largest aid donor, contributed only 0.28 per cent of its GNP towards
overseas development assistance.
Source: Australia's Overseas Aid Program 1997-98. AGPS May 1997,
p. 6.
Given current government expenditure trends, it appears unlikely that
this recommendation would be accepted. In fact, there has been a decline
in the aid budget (in real terms) of over 12 per cent during 1996-98.
Table 1 gives details of Australia's ODA/GNP ratio since 1990-91.
Table 1: Australia's Official Development Assistance 1990-91 to 1997-98
Current Prices Constant Prices Real Change over Real Change ODA/GNP Ratio
($m) (1996/97) ($m) Previous Year over Previous (%)
($m) Year (%)
1990-91 1261.0 1407.6 55.4 4.1 0.35
1991-92 1330.3 1459.5 51.9 3.7 0.36
1992-93 1386.1 1500.7 41.2 2.8 0.36
1993-94 1410.8 1510.4 9.7 0.6 0.34
1994-95 1483.7 1559.5 49.1 3.2 0.34
1995-96 1567.2 1602.0 42.5 2.7 0.31
1996-97 (est.) 1445.8 1445.8 -156.2 -9.7 0.29
1997-98 (est.) 1429.9 1399.4 -46.4 -3.2 0.27
Source: Australia's Overseas Aid Program 1997-98, AGPS, May 1997,
p. 77.
The annual budget process also comes under criticism. Development programs
cannot be carried out on a financial year basis because, due to their
very nature, they usually require several years to complete. The short
term yearly budget cycle, unpredicted budget cuts and changes in the focus
of the aid program all serve to undermine the effectiveness of the aid
process.
In addition, delays can also be caused by actions of recipient governments,
over which AusAID has no control. In the past, AusAID's response to this
has been to over-program or use fast disbursing forms of aid such as commodities
assistance, e.g. the supply of food grains. This has led to a situation
where AusAID's performance has been equated with its ability to meet annual
expenditure targets, a situation hardly conducive to efficient development
assistance. Further, the Report acknowledges that for positive results,
engagement with a recipient country has to be on the long term with predictable
levels of support which are not dependent on short term political and
budget cycles.
Development activities do not lend themselves to a 'stop/start' approach.
It would be desirable for there to be a greater predicability in future
aid budgets... The aid budget is more like a capital works than a recurrent
budget and effective management of the program requires that the aid budget
should be on a multi-year rolling basis.(8)
Consequently, to overcome such distortions, the Report suggests that
financial carry-over mechanisms such as a three-year rolling program or
a trust fund arrangement would be a better mechanism for the delivery
of aid.
It is only with this type of sustained commitment that long-term positive
foreign policy benefits of the aid program will also be realised.
(emphasis added)(9)
In its overview, the Report stresses the need for Australia's aid program
to 'sharpen its geographical focus:'(10)
Over sixty countries are currently receiving some sort of bilaterally
programmed development assistance. Australia needs to limit the number
of countries that we assist and develop a transparent and vigorous approach
to graduating the more advanced developing countries from the aid program.
Later, the Report recommends that the geographical priorities for the
aid program should be(11)
- PNG and the Pacific Island nations
- (South) East Asia, including China
- South Asia and Africa
It should be pointed out that Australia has long had a geographical
focus on the lines mentioned in the Report. As is clear from Table 2 below,
over 60 per cent of the total aid budget is devoted to country programs
in the three geographic regions.
Table 2: Australia's Aid Program: Estimated Expenditure by Sub-Program
1996-97 ($m)
Expenditure (est.) %
Papua New Guinea 313.5 21.7
South Pacific 110.7 7.7
South East Asia 252.9 17.5
Other Regions (including China, South Asia And Africa) 125.2 8.7
Cross Regional Programs 66.6 4.6
TOTAL COUNTRY PROGRAMS 868.8 60.1
GLOBAL PROGRAMS 430.9 29.8
CORPORATE SERVICES 53.8 3.7
ACIAR 40.0 2.8
OTHER ODA* 52.3 3.6
* The amount included as the estimate for expenditure by other
government bodies. This covers ODA-eligible activities undertaken by Commonwealth
Agencies other than AusAID/ACIAR and by State Governments. This expenditure
is classified as ODA but is not funded from AusAID/ACIAR appropriations.
Included in this amount, for example, are capital contributions to multilateral
development banks, which are carried in Treasury appropriations. Minor
adjustments are also made for revenue items and some expenditure by AusAID
which is not ODA-eligible.
Source: Australia's Overseas Aid Program 1997-98, AGPS, May
1997. pp. 80-81.
It would appear that the country numbers tend to get inflated because
of AusAID's support to NGO programs in countries where there is no AusAID
presence. This is especially true in the case of Africa.
Adopting the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) definitions on sectoral
aid, the Report comments that Australia spends more than the 'DAC average
on education, health and transport and communications, and less than the
average on energy, agriculture and industry, mining and construction'.(12)
It concludes that Australia's aid program will become even more concentrated
than other DAC donors once the shift to program aid in PNG is complete.
According to DAC, education, health, transport and communication are also
the sectors in which aid is most effective in poverty alleviation.
However, the Report calls for improvements in AusAID's sectoral expertise
and the 'ambiguous' role of the Sectoral Policy and Review Branch is also
noted. In order for AusAID to have ready access and the ability to effectively
use expert sectoral advice the Report also suggests the amalgamation of
the Pacific Regional Team and the Advisory Services Group-Asia and Africa,
as well as its sectoral policy units, as part of a process to upgrade
and expand its specialist services. It also recommends that AusAID re-examine
its policy of recruiting generalists in favour of specialists in priority
areas of AusAID.
The Australian aid program also comes under criticism regarding the
extent to which major components are tied to the purchase of Australian
goods and services. These include consultancy work, the provision of most
food aid, aid funded Australian tertiary scholarships and the now cancelled
Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF). In 1994, the last year for
which data is available from DAC, these amounted to 44.8 per cent of Australia's
total aid, compared with the DAC average of 22.1 per cent. Nonetheless,
such comparisons can be misleading. There can be large annual variations
in the proportion of aid which is tied. Also
... the tied category picks up only what is explicitly tied and what countries
report to the DAC. There is no mechanism to verify reported tied-aid levels.
The veracity of reporting depends on how DAC definitions are interpreted,
the integrity of individual agencies' data collection processes and how
forthright they are prepared to be.(13)
The perceived advantages of tying aid to Australian procurement include
the creation of Australian jobs, an increase in business for Australian
companies and improvement in Australia's export performance. It also helps
give Australian companies international exposure and provides a showcase
for Australian goods and services. The negative aspect of tying aid is
that it reduces the value of such aid. A recent study of the effects of
tying British aid concluded that the prices of tied aid goods were, on
an average, 20 per cent higher than the lowest available international
prices. The OECD has concluded that tied aid reduces its value by about
10-15 per cent.(14) Further, tied aid could also be influenced by what
the donor could supply rather than what the recipient needs.
In order to get a clearer picture of the inherent inefficiencies of
tied aid, the Report recommends that a 'thorough, independent study of
the economic impact of tying Australian aid should be conducted.' This
would determine the cost premium being paid as well as the net economic
benefit or cost of having a tied aid program.(15)
It further suggests that Australia work with the Netherlands, UK, Japan
and other donors to encourage the untying of aid. The Netherlands, for
example, has a tied aid component of 2.2 per cent of its ODA while Japan
has 13.9 per cent. Ideal as this proposal may sound, it should be approached
with caution given the fact that most DAC countries have 'agreed that
the need to maintain the national identity of aid programs and demonstrate
commercial returns is crucial to maintain commercial support'. In the
Australian context, in a recent (1994) survey on aid issues conducted
for AusAID, 81 per cent of respondents reported that it was either very
important (22 per cent) or fairly important (59 per cent) that Australian
aid be used to promote employment and the use of Australian made goods.
Japan, on the other hand, which has progressively untied its aid, has
reported 'a loss of aid visibility and waning public support ...'(16)
Only recently it was reported that the Industrial Structure Council of
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) would propose
tying official development assistance to purchases from Japanese manufacturers
again, with the aim of supporting the domestic economy at a time of budget
austerity.(17)
Consequently, while the untying proposal of the Report might have some
theoretical merits, given the vested interests of various DAC countries
(including Australia) as well as the need to ensure domestic support for
the aid program, the prospects for untied aid, at least in the medium
term, would appear remote. On the other hand, the emphasis should shift
to ensuring that tied aid is good aid and primarily in the interests of
the recipient rather than that of the donor.
The Report contends that both grants as well as concessional finance/mixed
credits have a role to play in development assistance. (18) However, since
the cancellation of the Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF) in
July 1996, Australia has not had a concessional finance element in its
aid program, a situation it considers to be 'unduly restrictive'. Nonetheless,
the DIFF program comes in for criticism.
It was created as a tied aid mixed credit scheme in 1982 as an attempt
to assist Australian suppliers win contracts in (mainly) Asian countries:
...in the face of aid-supported foreign competition. Though it was progressively
reformed over time, DIFF's standing as a development assistance tool was
irretrievably tarnished by its origins and much of its history.(19)
DIFF went through many reforms during its 14 years of operations(20)
and, at the time of its cancellation, the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade References Committee produced a detailed report on its operations
and abolition(21) which was generally supportive of the program as it
then existed. Even the Simons Report concedes that, increasingly, projects
were being initiated by recipient governments although, at the time of
its termination, supplier initiated projects accounted for about 15 per
cent of all projects.(22) It further goes on to state that many problems
associated with DIFF could be addressed in a revised scheme, but adds
that most significant improvements to DIFF came about 'as a result of
external pressure, for example, as a result of the Helsinki Guidelines'.(23)
This does not take into account the fact that Australia, as a member of
the DAC, has been an active participant in the formulation and implementation
of the Helsinki Guidelines. The aim of these guidelines was to direct
mixed credit financing away from commercially viable projects towards
projects and countries which had little chance of access to private funds.
While supporting the cancellation of DIFF, the Report argues in favour
of a new mixed credit scheme the guidelines for which are not substantially
different than those for DIFF. In its view the mixed credit scheme would:(24)
- allow greater access to larger volumes of development finance
- help direct private finance into areas it would not otherwise go
- involve more risk sharing in and closer scrutiny of development projects
- be used to harden terms on which aid is provided to countries 'graduating
from the aid program'.
The recommendation, however, is for an untied soft loans scheme which
would inter alia be:(25)
- discretionary
- located within bilateral aid programs of countries not likely to experience
debt management problems; and
- based on internationally open competitive bidding
- contracted out to the commercial banking sector, since specific expertise
is required to administer loans and AusAID lacks experience in international
lending
- broadly comparable with loans offered by other donors with basic conditions
tailored to suit different country circumstances.
While these suggestions are unobjectionable by themselves, it could
be argued that there would be practical problems if they were to be implemented.
These would include:
- the staffing and cost implications if such a scheme were to be implemented
and contracted out to the private sector
- practical difficulties of untying aid and inviting international tenders,
for as Professor Helen Hughes has observed: 'the costs of such tendering
is very high, only the very large multilateral banks can afford them'(26)
- among other things, the need to tailored aid to suit individual recipients,
be comparable to loans by other donors, would not only encounter the
problems mentioned above, but also face the difficulties due to the
secrecy that accompanies tied aid, a fact acknowledged by the Report
itself (p. 182).
The Report argues in favour of Australian support for multilateral development
banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank Group and the IMF, as well as certain
UN Agencies including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World
Health Organisation (WHO) and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). Australia
has provided multilateral aid not only to support a common effort but
also in areas where it is more efficient than bilateral assistance.
The role played by the multilaterals in policy dialogue and aid coordination
alone, is enough to warrant continued and substantial levels of assistance
from Australia(27)
In regards to the World Bank, it acknowledges that while:
...there were valid criticisms that some of the Bank's earlier loans had
negative social and environmental impacts, there is evidence that the
Bank has taken steps to address these problems. Measurement of success
in the Bank is no longer the level of money lent, but is gauged by the
impact of a project on the people it is designed to serve. (28)
The Report also cautions AusAID against spreading its resources too
thinly and emphasises the need to devote more resources to monitoring
multilateral organisations. The question of where these resources would
come from is, again, left unanswered. Further, two points need to be made
in this context. First, under the International Monetary Agreements
Act 1947 and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(General Capital Increase) Act 1989, at the end of each financial
year, the Treasurer presents a report on the operations of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, insofar as they affect Australia,
to the Parliament. The Report for 1995-96 notes that Australia strongly
supports 'plans to reduce the Bank's net administrative expenses by 12
per cent in real terms over the two years 1996 to 1997...Australia continued
to play close attention to the evaluation of Bank activities.'(29)
Secondly, the World Bank spends about 6.1 per cent of its Budget on administrative
expenses(30) compared to AusAID's outlay of about 4 per cent. Given this
emphasis on monitoring and evaluation throughout the Report, AusAID's
administrative expenditure is likely to increase significantly if the
Report's recommendations are acceptable.
In recent times it has become popular to emphasise the connection between
the private sector and development assistance. However, the private sector
is primarily concerned with the profit motive and return to shareholders.
It could also be argued that if aid were easy and profitable, the private
sector would be involved in it anyway. Consequently, it is often difficult
to pinpoint what new role could be identified for the private sector that
is not already in existence. It is also difficult to visualise how already
well directed development assistance can further enhance the role of the
private sector.
In this context, the Report makes the following recommendation:(31)
- AusAID should help in improving policy settings in recipient countries
by way of policy dialogue, capacity building and training
- assistance should be directed towards countries that do not currently
benefit from private flows
- aid should not be used to support activities that are commercially
viable.
Not only is it difficult to find fault with this recommendation, but,
on the other hand, it could be argued that these practices are already
in place. Further, the suggestion that private sector development cooperation
activities could help deliver services such as education and health in
countries where the Government is unable to do so, is a moot point, as
non-government organisations (NGO) have a history of successful operation
in these areas.
The role of NGOs as agents for development comes in for special mention
in the Report.(32)
Non-government organisations are more than convenient channels for official
assistance. Clearer recognition should be given to their broader contributions
to the development process. This includes representing community views
on aid policy and program issues, their contribution to the development
of civil society and their ability to mobilise voluntary contributions.
The role of NGOs in overseas development has certainly increased substantially
over the last decade. Distinctive characteristics of the NGOs include:
- their ability to represent community views on the direction and management
of the official aid program
- their independent, non-government status means they can foster the
development of NGOs in recipient countries
- they can act as agents for the provision of assistance in areas where
direct government-to-government assistance may not be cost-effective
or may be inappropriate.
By 1995, they raised about $170 million from the local community for
overseas development assistance. AusAID funding for NGOs has also increased,
from $20 million, or less than 2 per cent of the aid budget in 1985-86,
to $115 million or 7.4 per cent in 1995-96. The Report acknowledges that
a series of proposals to streamline administration and improve accountability
are being introduced and goes on to recommend that AusAID commission 'an
independent study of the relative cost-effectiveness of NGOs as a channel
for development cooperation.'(33)
In terms of oversight of AusAID, the Report makes two major suggestions.
These are:
- the creation of a Development Cooperation Advisory Board comprising
experts in the fields relating to development, to provide an independent
and ongoing review of the effectiveness of the aid program for the Minister(34)
- increasing the effectiveness of Australia's aid program by establishing
an independent Office of Evaluation within AusAID, headed by a senior
statutory officer and reporting directly to the Minister, the Director
General and the proposed Development Cooperation Advisory Board.(35)
Perhaps the more radical views and suggestions in the Report concern
the management structure of AusAID. It suggests four areas that need change.
Firstly, it argues in favour of an increased emphasis on performance measurement
and reporting.
The effectiveness of aid may increase by spending more on project
design, monitoring and evaluation even if that is at the expense of program
funds. Trying to keep up program and project outlays by minimising management
costs may not be consistent with aid quality and effectiveness.(36)
Secondly, it suggests there should be a more consultative management
style and a team based approach. AusAID has faced the problem of the clash
between its requirement for extensive expertise and inflexible public-service
staffing practices, combined with its concerns to minimise running costs.
It has an organisational culture dominated by generalists. The suggestion
is that AusAID should re-examine its policy of recruiting generalists
in favour of identifying priority areas where it would be desirable to
recruit professional expertise at the desk level. While it may not be
easy to 'recruit and retrain such people ... reforms to public service
personnel practices should make it easier for AusAID to do so'. Improved
specialist training for existing staff would also help the process.(37)
Thirdly, a case is made for greater decentralisation and devolution
both within and outside the central office. Devolution within the central
office would motivate staff to take greater responsibility for tasks,
improve policy development and overall program effectiveness. Team based
management would be an effective instrument to achieve this goal.
Fourthly, there should be a more analytical approach towards policy
planning and analysis. There are shortcomings in the preparation, application
and review of country strategies as well as the priority accorded to them.
Part of the problem appears to be that no senior member has clear responsibility
for monitoring the production of strategy papers and for assuring their
quality.(38)
Essentially, what the Report suggests is a thorough reorganisation of
the structure of AusAID. It argues that there should be a greater emphasis
on the recruitment and retention of specialists. This would also imply
a flat organisational structure comprising specialists and management.
'Orthodoxy must be challenged and innovation promoted'.(39) Further, this
would involve the creation of forums in which aid professionals could
question AusAID's existing practices. Increased staff exchanges with other
development agencies, private sector and NGOs would also help with the
cross fertilisation of ideas.
When releasing the Simons Report on 2 May 1997, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Alexander Downer, referred to it as 'the most important contribution
in over a decade to the public policy debate in Australia on the nature
and role of our aid program'.(40)
The Report is certainly comprehensive in its scope. Besides the issues
discussed above, it also covers other aspects of development assistance
such as good governance, environment, gender, food aid and food security
and refugee and emergency relief. (These issues will be discussed by the
author in a forthcoming Background Paper, to be issued during the Spring
Sittings). However, there is nothing exceptional in its discussion of
many of the issues as it, at times, amounts to a reiteration of current
AusAID policy objectives or a rephrasing of the change that is already
in process. Perhaps the most radical proposal in the report is the suggestion
that the traditional public service hierarchical structure in AusAID be
replaced by a team model and consultative management style. How, and if,
this will be implemented remains to be seen.
The Review was widely welcomed by various NGOs such as Community Aid
Abroad, World Vision and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid. There
was universal agreement on its decision, in the title as well as its contents,
to focus on 'poverty reduction through sustainable development'.
While this approach may meet the approval of aid purists, the single
most important question that has to be asked is: Does the Report concentrate
more on what would be desirable rather than what is achievable in practical
terms? Some recommendations, especially regarding tied aid, would certainly
be relevant only in an ideal world. Secondly, in an era of substantial
cuts to outlays on development assistance, is the repeated emphasis on
assessment and evaluation even at the cost of reduction in project expenditure
a feasible proposal? Thirdly, instead of covering the entire discipline
of development assistance, would it have been more effective to concentrate
on the key issues in Australia's development assistance program?
Finally, in the words of Professor Helen Hughes:
...the commonsense view that aid has economic and political as well as
charitable objectives is rejected. Aid is thus not seen as a face of the
participatory democracy that is lauded elsewhere.
The report would have been twice as effective if it had been half
as long and if the main report had been more closely synchronised with
its summary. The report fails to recognise that, except for the Pacific
Islands, Australia is a very small, often negligible, donor.(41)
The government has decided to organise a series of public seminars and
carry out consultations before it prepares its final response to the Report
by the end of 1997.
- One Clear Objective: Poverty Reduction Through Sustainable Development.
Report of the Committee of Review, 1997, p. 1. Hereafter referred to
as the Report.
- ibid. p.3.
- Ministerial Policy Paper and Fourth Annual Report to Parliament on
Australia's Overseas Development Cooperation Program, November 1993,
p.5.
- ibid. p.6.
- Report pp. 77-81.
- ibid. p. 49.
- ibid. p. 82.
- ibid. p. 310-311.
- ibid. pp. 310-311.
- ibid. p. 4.
- ibid. p. 96.
- ibid. p. 121.
- ibid. p. 182.
- ibid. p. 187.
- ibid. p. 188.
- ibid. p. 184-185.
- Asia Pulse/Nikkei, 12 June 1995.
- Mixed credits are a combination of a grant and export credit which
together provide a concessional loan to the recipient country.
- Report, p. 200.
- For a brief history of DIFF see Ravi Tomar, A DIFFerence of Opinion:
Cancellation of the Development Import Finance Facility, Parliamentary
Research Service, Current Issues Brief No. 20 1995-96.
- Inquiry into the Abolition of the Development Import Finance Faculty,
October 1996.
- Report. p. 201.
- ibid. p. 205.
- ibid. p. 198.
- ibid. p. 207-209.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 1997.
- Report, p. 216.
- ibid. pp. 22-23.
- Australia and the World Bank 1995-96, AGPS 1996, p.2.
- AusAID estimate.
- ibid. p. 149.
- ibid. p. 261.
- ibid. p. 269.
- ibid. p. 313.
- ibid. p. 195.
- ibid. p. 319
- ibid. p. 120-121.
- ibid. p. 166.
- ibid. p. 167.
- Media release, 2 May 1997.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May 1997.
Objective
The objective of the review is to present a report to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs on the overall priorities, objectives and focus of the
aid program. It will examine how the aid program can best contribute to
lasting poverty reduction, while also serving Australia's interests.
Issues to be addressed
Policy Context
The review will need to take into account current international trends
which are influencing the nature of development cooperation. It will need
to pay attention to overall government directions to ensure coherence
between aid and foreign, trade and domestic policies. More particularly,
the review will need to consider:
- the appropriate role for the aid program, particularly in the Asia-Pacific
region
- how the aid program should respond to economic globalisation and the
opportunities and challenges that trend provides for developing countries
- the instabilities generated by the post cold war period which have
increased the demand for humanitarian and emergency assistance and international
peace-keeping and placed additional pressure on aid budgets
- the role of other donors, including multilateral institutions, and
the impact on Australia's aid program of their changing priorities,
for example, the withdrawal of many donors from the South Pacific
- the role of the aid program in addressing global issues such as environmental
degradation and climate change, refugees and the spread of preventable
diseases.
Geographic focus
Australia's aid program will continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific region.
The review should:
- assess Australia's aid priorities within this region
- consider the nature of the future aid relationship with PNG and the
South Pacific Island states
- consider the scope for Australian assistance outside the Asia-Pacific
region, in particular in Africa and in the Central Asian Republics.
Program Focus
The review should examine the appropriate program focus and balance
between sectors within the aid program. This will require consideration
of:
- good governance and policy dialogue issues (including economic reform,
human rights and equity concerns)
- the appropriate balance of sectoral activities between, for example,
education, health, agriculture and infrastructure
- the appropriate focus on cross-cutting issues such as gender and the
environment.
Aid delivery
The review will need to consider the most appropriate aid delivery mechanisms
- bilateral, multilateral and NGOs.
Review process
It will be important for the review to take account of the views of
those involved in Australia's development cooperation, including:
- recipient governments
- Australian firms
- Australian tertiary and research institutions
- government departments
- non-government organisations.
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