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Hong Kong and the Transfer to China: Issues and Prospects
Dr Stephen Sherlock
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
23 June 1997
Contents
Major Issues Summary
Introduction
Hong Kong and China: The Legacy of History
A Free Port: The 'Gateway to China'
Imperialism, 'Unequal Treaties' and Chinese Sovereignty
Hong Kong's Economic Transition: The Golden Egg?
An Integrated Economy
'One Country, Two Systems'
Guanxi, Corruption and Cronyism
Hong Kong's Political Transition: Whither Democracy
and Human Rights?
Hong Kong's New Constitution: The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
Elected or Appointed Government?
Protection of Human Rights
Hong Kong and Australia
Trade and Investment
People-to-People Links and Migration
Hong Kong and Australia-China Relations
Conclusion
Endnotes
On 1 July 1997 sovereignty over the British colony of Hong Kong will
be formally transferred to China. The handover has raised questions about
the capacity of the territory to continue its economic success and maintain
the political freedoms and rule of law enjoyed under British rule. This
paper examines the issues involved in the transfer and the prospects of
Hong Kong's viability after 1997 and the implications for Australia.
Hong Kong was seized from China in the mid-nineteenth century and was
established as a free port. The free movement of goods and capital has
been the key to Hong Kong's success, both before and after the 1949 Chinese
Revolution. Although a separate Hong Kong has been economically important
for China, it regards the territory's occupation by a foreign power as
a national humiliation and will not countenance anything it sees as interference
in China's right to govern Hong Kong as it sees fit.
Hong Kong has been economically transformed over the last thirty years
and now has a higher GDP per capita than Australia. Its success has been
based on acting as a conduit of expertise and capital between China and
the outside world, thus playing a key role in China's recent economic
growth. For many years there were fears that when China assumed control
it would kill the goose that laid the golden egg. These fears subsided,
however, when China developed the principle of 'one country, two systems',
under which Hong Kong will maintain its separate economic and political
system under Chinese sovereignty. The main concern is not that there will
be an abrupt change of policy but that the culture of corruption and guanxi
(connections) in China will slowly undermine the open conduct of business
and legal affairs in the territory.
While a free market enclave presents few major problems for the Chinese
leadership, it is less certain that it will be able to tolerate an autonomous
region with a culture of free political expression. The British and Chinese
Governments agreed to political autonomy in the Joint Declaration of 1984
whose principles were incorporated by China into its Basic Law for the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). The two governments, however,
interpreted the principles differently and the Tiananmen Square massacre
of 1989 led the people of Hong Kong to press for guarantees of their political
freedom after the handover. The last Governor of Hong Kong, Mr Chris Patten,
introduced some political reforms in the early 1990s, most notably the
introduction of popular elections for the territory's Legislative Council
(Legco). The Chinese Government, however, has rejected these reforms as
inconsistent with the Joint Declaration and Basic Law and has established
an appointed Provisional Legislative Council which will take over from
the elected Legco on 1 July 1997. The limited British reforms have proved
too belated to make China feel obliged to accept them.
Just as Britain neglected electoral reform until the last moment, it
did not extend its generally good record on respect for civil liberties
in the territory to include Hong Kong in the international regime for
the protection of human rights. Only after the Tiananmen Square massacre
was a Bill of Rights enacted in 1991. China is not a signatory to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The new Chief Executive
of the Hong Kong SAR, Mr Tung Chee-Hwa, appointed by China, has foreshadowed
various restrictions on political activity, although he appears to have
modified his proposals in response to criticism in Hong Kong. China did
agree to an independent-minded judge becoming the new Chief Justice.
China will probably send contradictory signals about its intentions
on political and legal issues in Hong Kong, because of uncertainty about
how to deal with a unique arrangement and because of divisions between
reformers and conservatives within the Party and the Army. A lot will
depend upon the political adroitness of the Chief Executive in balancing
the demands of different factions in Beijing with those of interest groups
in Hong Kong.
Australia has a keen interest in the future of Hong Kong because the
territory is Australia's tenth largest merchandise trading partner and
important for investment and trade in services. There is also a large
movement of people between Hong Kong and Australia because of growing
migration in recent years (especially professional and business people),
including people who maintain business links in the territory, as well
as Hong Kong students in Australia and a large two-way flow of tourists.
Australia may face the problem of people from Hong Kong overstaying tourist
visas after 1997. The controversy about China's installation of an unelected
Provisional Legislative Council, and the different position on the issue
taken by Australia, Britain and the US, highlights the fact that political
problems in Hong Kong after 1997 will not only potentially be a cause
of friction between Australia and China but may also have implications
for Australia's other relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly
with the US.
There is a starkly contradictory character to opinions about the future
of Hong Kong after 1997, with most people confident about economic prospects
but few sanguine about the chances of preserving existing standards on
the rule of law and political freedoms. The best prospects for Hong Kong
lie in the fact that continued prosperity in the territory is in China's
interest and that the Chinese leadership is keen to use Hong Kong as an
example or 'trial run' in its efforts towards reunification with Taiwan
and in its general foreign relations. It is critical that Beijing acts
in the realisation that the distinct character of Hong Kong means that
it must be governed differently from the rest of China or a mass exodus
of skilled people and capital will undermine the viability of the territory.
On 1 July 1997 sovereignty over the British colony of Hong Kong will
be formally transferred to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The territory
is being returned to China on that date because the British lease on the
so-called New Territories, which make up the majority of the land area
of Hong Kong, expires after ninety-nine years. Although sovereignty over
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon was ceded to the British Crown in perpetuity
in 1841 and 1860 respectively, the British government decided that continued
possession of these small territories was not an option on either political
or economic grounds and the entire territory of Hong Kong will be handed
over to Beijing on 1 July.
The transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty has raised
questions about the capacity of the territory to maintain the economic
performance which has seen it develop from a backwater in the 1950s to
a wealthy industrialised economy today. Hong Kong has played a key role
as a bridge between China and the outside world and an important part
in promoting the rapid development of the Chinese economy since the reforms
begun in 1978. The question often posed, however, is whether integration
into China will undermine the very features, such as the rule of law and
a relatively open political system, which have made the territory attractive
as a destination for investment. The handover has also aroused fears within
Hong Kong and internationally that integration into a China ruled by an
authoritarian but increasingly uncertain post-Maoist regime will bring
to an end the political freedoms and respect for the rule of law and human
rights which the territory has enjoyed under British rule. A deteriorating
political and human rights situation in Hong Kong after 1997 could lead
to an outflow of refugees and friction between China and other countries
in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the US. Such issues are of major
importance for Australia because Hong Kong is now a major trade and investment
partner and because political problems in the territory would inevitably
affect Australia's sensitive relationship with China.
This paper outlines the background to the issues involved in the handover
of Hong Kong to China and why it is such an emotive national issue for
China. It discusses the importance of Hong Kong in China's economic transformation
and the likelihood that the territory will continue to prosper after 1997.
It also examines the controversy between Britain and China over the reform
of Hong Kong's Legislature and the prospects for the protection of civil
liberties and human rights after 1997. It details the importance of Hong
Kong for Australia and the implications of any deterioration in the political
situation in the territory for Australia and the region.
Hong Kong has played a central role in the history of China's relations
with the outside world and two particular aspects of that history are
crucial for an understanding of the issues surrounding the transfer of
the territory to China. The first is that the colony was established as
a free trading port, chosen for its deep water harbour and designed not
for territorial conquest but to open up trade with the previously closed
Chinese hinterland. The second is that Hong Kong was ceded to Britain
by force, against the wishes of the then Chinese Empire.
A Free Port: The 'Gateway to China'
The character of Hong Kong as a free trade port was the impetus for
British activities in the territory from the very beginning and defined
its later roles as an entrepot port, manufacturing site and financial
centre. Before the 1840s, British merchants traded in textiles and tea
under strict control by Chinese imperial authorities. But since the Chinese
Government's ban on opium-smoking made opium a very profitable trading
commodity, there was bound to be conflict when the Chinese attempted to
suppress its import. Chinese objections were overcome by the British Navy
in the 'Opium Wars' of the 1840s and 1850s when the British established
Hong Kong as a permanent presence on the Chinese coast. Hong Kong remained
a significant trading port for British and other foreign interests well
into the twentieth century, but by the 1920s and 1930s was overtaken in
importance by Shanghai.
The Chinese Revolution of 1949 confronted Hong Kong with a potential
crisis, but when the new Communist government decided, on strategic grounds,
not to take back what they regarded as rightfully part of China, the territory
underwent a new surge of growth. An influx of wealthy Chinese refugees,
especially from Shanghai, provided the capital and expertise for new investment
in manufacturing industry. This development was based on exploitation
of the continuing stream of cheap Chinese labour and was encouraged by
the permissive policies of the British administration, which maintained
the free port tradition and imposed no tariffs on the import or export
of goods. Hong Kong also became the principal gateway through which Communist
China conducted its (limited) financial and trade relations with the outside
world. When China began liberalising its economy after 1978, Hong Kong
as a free entry point for trade and finance became even more important
to China, providing a source of investment capital, technology and marketing
skills to help fuel China's rapid economic development and growing foreign
trade. In the 1990s, Hong Kong has been the source of between 60 and 80
per cent of total direct foreign investment in China.(1)
Imperialism, 'Unequal Treaties' and Chinese Sovereignty
Whatever its role as a conduit between China and the rest of the world,
the continued existence of Hong Kong as a separate territory was regarded
by successive Chinese governments, whether Imperial, Nationalist or Communist,
as a humiliating imposition forced upon China at a time of weakness and
tolerated only because of political and/or economic necessity. The treaties
on which British rule was based were, in China's eyes, 'unequal' treaties
which had no basis in law or justice.(2) The Nationalist government made
Hong Kong the target of anti-British demonstrations during the 1920s and
the territory was the scene of mass unrest during China's Cultural Revolution
in the 1960s. For diplomatic and commercial reasons, the Communist Government
accepted the reality of the British occupation of the territory, but always
looked upon Hong Kong as a temporarily separated part of China which would
be returned to the motherland at such time as the Chinese people decided
to take it back.
The abiding sense of historical injustice which is part of the official
Chinese position on Hong Kong helps explain the continuing disagreement
and misunderstanding which has marked Sino-British negotiations over the
territory in recent years. Many Chinese officials have long distrusted
British intentions, in particular harbouring fears that the British would
leave Hong Kong stripped of its wealth on their departure or that they
were using the territory to subvert the People's Republic and its values.
These undercurrents became especially evident when, in 1992, the last
British Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, began reforms to introduce
a degree of popular representation into the colony's governmental institutions.
To the Chinese authorities these changes were, at best, a breach of previous
agreements between the two sides to allow a smooth transition to Chinese
rule or, at worst, an attempt to provide subversive elements with an entry
point into post-1997 Chinese politics. The Chinese government's determination
not to allow the reforms to stand after 1997 are a reflection of the fact
that it feels no obligation to respect any unacceptable political arrangements
established by illegitimate foreign occupiers of what was always rightfully
Chinese soil.
The legacy of Hong Kong's history as a free port established by the
British against China's will is thus at the heart of the issues which
surround transfer of the territory to Chinese sovereignty today. Hong
Kong was able to survive as a viable entity separate from China (without
financial support from Britain) because its people successfully capitalised
upon the needs of the People's Republic for a gateway to the outside world
and as a source of capital and expertise. Notwithstanding this role, the
affront to Chinese sovereignty implicit in Hong Kong's existence has meant
that the political issues involved in the transfer have been difficult
to resolve.
Hong Kong until the 1950s was something of an economic backwater, but
has since grown into a major manufacturing, trade and services centre
and was one of the first four 'newly industrialising countries' or 'Asian
tigers'(3) which set the standards to which most other Asian developing
countries now aspire. In 1995 it had a GDP of over $US150 billion and
a GDP per capita of over $US24,000, which is even higher than Australia's.
In the last five years annual economic growth in Hong Kong has been around
5 to 6 per cent.(4)
For many years there was concern in Hong Kong and amongst international
investors that China, with its languishing command economy, was casting
envious eyes on Hong Kong's continuing economic success. The fear was
that when Beijing assumed control, its policies would destroy the very
features which made the territory so attractive for investment-that it
would kill the goose that laid the golden egg.
An Integrated Economy
As July 1997 drew closer, however, anxieties about the economic effects
of the Chinese takeover diminished. Just as Hong Kong survived the formation
of the People's Republic by becoming its gateway to the world, so the
territory has become even more important to China since the economic reforms
instituted by Deng Xiaoping from 1978. From the early 1980s Hong Kong
manufacturers began to take advantage of China's new openness to establish
factories across the border in Guangdong province, making use of China's
cheap labour and land. For their part, the Chinese authorities established
four Special Economic Zones which provided concessional tax and regulatory
regimes aimed at attracting capital, technology and expertise, particularly
from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and other 'overseas Chinese' communities.
Hong Kong quickly became the largest source of direct foreign investment
in China and has continued to play such a role. From 1985 it became China's
largest trading partner and was only overtaken by Japan in 1993.(5)
These developments have in the process radically changed the economic
structure and role of Hong Kong. While manufacturing was the mainstay
of the Hong Kong economy during the 1960s and 1970s, since the 1980s and
the transfer of production to China, services have become the most important
sector, accounting for over 70 per cent of GDP and employment.(6) Hong
Kong is now the world's busiest port, with re-export of goods to and from
China predominating. The territory provides a wide range of other services
to China as it continues to open to the world economy. As a leading commentator,
Michael Yahuda, expressed it:
In the absence of a legal culture on the mainland ... it is hardly surprising
that Hong Kong with its internationally respected rule of law and with
reliable and efficient financial services has become the main base for
the conduct of business with China. The territory not only provides China
with the facility for myriad economic exchanges with the outside world,
but it is also a major centre of learning where China's key international
trade and investment organisations acquire expertise and invaluable experience
in dealing with the many facets of the international economy.(7)
Thus Hong Kong has been effectively integrated into the economy of China,
especially southern China, supplying services crucial for the mainland's
transformation from an inward-looking command economy to a major player
on the world market.
'One Country, Two Systems'
Given the commitment by the post-Deng Xiaoping government to continuing
economic reform and the further integration of China into the world economy,
it is highly unlikely that Beijing would take any policy actions which
it knew would jeopardise the robust economy of Hong Kong. From the time
when the issue of Hong Kong's future status was first raised during discussions
with Britain in the late 1970s, the Chinese government has affirmed that
it would follow the principle of 'one country, two systems', that is that
Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty would maintain a separate identity,
a market-oriented economic system and its distinct 'way of life'. The
preservation of the existing economic structure of Hong Kong is important
for China because of the contribution the territory makes to China's GDP
and because it provides the knowledge and institutions necessary to compete
in the world market that China currently lacks. But in addition to the
direct economic significance of Hong Kong, it is vitally important to
Beijing that integration of the territory is successful because the whole
exercise is being closely watched as a 'trial run' for the much more substantial
challenge of an eventual reunification with Taiwan. The 'one country,
two systems' idea was originally developed as a solution to the Taiwan
question and any major economic problems for Hong Kong would hardly make
unity with the mainland an attractive prospect for the people of Taiwan.
Hong Kong will also benefit from what appears to be an improving capacity
on the part of economic policy-makers in Beijing to control the cycles
of the Chinese economy. China's economy since the 1980s has been characterised
by huge boom-bust cycles - flurried investment leading to overheating,
inflation and bottlenecks, provoking the government to overly-strong corrective
measures which induced slumps and excess capacity, leading in turn to
expansionary measures which fuelled a further unsustainable boom. In response
to the overheating of 1993-94, however, the Chinese government introduced
reforms to monetary policy and brought the economy to a 'soft landing'
without adversely affecting growth. Inflation, which peaked at 24 per
cent in mid-1994, is expected to be less than 6 per cent in 1997, but
strong growth rates of around 8 per cent are forecast for the next three
years.(8)
Guanxi, Corruption and Cronyism
While the Chinese authorities' intentions appear to be to cause as little
disruption to the economic life of Hong Kong as possible, some commentators
remain concerned that the closed and often arbitrary culture of decision-making
in China will inevitably undermine the relatively open, legally-based
system in Hong Kong and that this will have an adverse effect on the territory's
economy. In China, in the absence of a clear rule of law, the wheels of
economic life are greased by guanxi, (political and family connections),
increasingly another name for corruption and cronyism as getting rich
has become the dominant credo in post-Maoist China.(9) Family linkages
and connections in government were always crucial for money-making in
Hong Kong, but the rule of law and permissive rather than prescriptive
regulations have made Hong Kong more conducive for local and international
business than the mainland. There are signs, however, that with the approach
of July 1997 the culture of guanxi and corruption is already becoming
a feature of Hong Kong. The Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC), established by the Hong Kong administration in 1972, estimated
that the cost of 'gifts' and other payments to facilitate business with
the mainland added from 3 to 5 per cent to operating costs.(10) One commentator,
pessimistic about the long term prospects for Hong Kong, argued that,
after 1997:
... China will not change, and the rule of officials rather than the rule
of law will ultimately dominate Hong Kong. As corruption becomes more
commonplace, as the 'princelings' and other relatives of the politically
powerful take positions of responsibility in [Hong Kong] ... the success
of the territory will begin to slip and the efficient, laissez-faire centre
that we know will begin to dim.(11)
One Hong Kong lawyer expressed his concern that any deterioration in
the legal system would inevitably have adverse effects on business. He
argued that if individuals or firms were unable to contest government
actions in the courts they would turn to well-connected individuals who
could, giving 'enormous employment to Mr. Fix-its' but undermining free
and open competition.(12) Thus any potential problems for Hong Kong's
currently robust economy in the transition to Chinese rule would appear
to lie not in an abrupt change in policy from Beijing or in an end to
the territory's role as an entry point for the international market, but
in a gradual erosion of the legal and institutional structures and practices
which have enabled the territory to take advantage of the opportunities
which were historically open to it. The critical issues which will confront
Hong Kong after 1997 are therefore unlikely to be strictly economic questions
but will take a political, legal and constitutional form.
We have seen that the special nature of Hong Kong as a free port on
the edge of a command economy allowed the territory to carve itself a
niche role as China's gateway to the world. Since the reforms begun in
1978, Hong Kong's continued importance to the Chinese economy has ensured
that its free market economy will be left intact after 1997. But while
the existence of a capitalist enclave presents no major problems for the
People's Republic, the government in Beijing will find it much more difficult
to tolerate recent trends in the political evolution of Hong Kong. While
China has gone through massive economic change in the last two decades,
its political structures remain relatively unchanged from the Maoist era.
Hong Kong, on the other hand, although ruled by an unelected executive-led
government, has long enjoyed a fairly open political culture and a range
of civil liberties unknown on the mainland. Contrary to the common perception
that the people of the territory are interested only in business, there
is a long tradition of grass-roots and activist politics in Hong Kong.(13)
The huge outpouring of support for the pro-democracy movement during the
events in Beijing in June 1989 was a particular indication that the people
of Hong Kong valued political freedom as well as wealth and were worried
about their future under Beijing's rule.
The persistent current of independent political activity in Hong Kong,
together with belated efforts by Governor Patten to increase popular representation
in the Hong Kong legislature, have ignited fears in the authoritarian
political establishment in Beijing that the territory is a conduit for
dangerous ideas. Hong Kong as a base for subversion has been a longstanding
feature of Chinese official attitudes, but the return of Hong Kong is
occurring at a time when the debunking of Maoism and popular resentment
about corruption and nepotism has left the legitimacy of the Communist
Party at its lowest ebb and its leadership fearful of any additional element
putting pressure on the brittle and potentially unstable political situation
in China.(14)
Hong Kong's New Constitution: The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
When negotiations between Britain and China on the political future
of Hong Kong began in 1982, the British government's initial proposal
was that it should retain an administrative role in the territory even
after 1997. Such a position outraged the nationalist sensibilities of
the Chinese government and its outright rejection caused widespread consternation
within the territory about possible unilateral action by the Chinese.
During a series of tense negotiations, however, the British conceded to
the Chinese position and, in September 1984, an agreement for the transfer
of sovereignty was signed in the form of a Joint Declaration. According
to the Declaration, China was to draft a Basic Law embodying certain basic
policies. These were that on 1 July 1997 Hong Kong would become a Special
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China with a government
'composed of local inhabitants'. The SAR would have 'a high degree of
autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs' and its 'current social
and economic systems' and 'life-style', including civil liberties, would
be as at present. The SAR would retain its status as a free port, a separate
customs territory and monetary system and the right to conduct its own
economic relations with other countries and with international organisations.
Such arrangements were to remain unchanged for fifty years.(15)
From the very beginning, however, the two sides had different ideas
about how the process would evolve. The British side saw the drafting
of the Basic Law as entirely a Chinese responsibility but did not expect
Beijing to begin the task immediately. The British apparently assumed
that there would be time between 1984 and 1997 for actual constitutional
arrangements in the territory to 'converge' with the provisions of the
Basic Law, including any reforms the British government might have introduced.
In the Chinese view, on the other hand, the Basic Law should largely reflect
the state of political arrangements prevailing in the territory in 1984.
A further powerful element was introduced when the negotiations came under
intense pressure from the people of Hong Kong following the mass anti-Beijing
feeling generated by the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. By the
time the National People's Congress of the PRC adopted the Basic Law in
1990, its provisions on the structure of government and on political rights
had become the subject of controversy within the territory and disagreement
between the Chinese and British governments.(16)
Elected or Appointed Government?
In the first years following the signing of the Joint Declaration in
1984 there were few points of disagreement between Beijing and London.
While there were likely to be differences over the amount of popular representation
in the Legislative Council, both governments shared the view that an executive-led
government of appointed officials would prevail in the territory after
1997 as it had under colonial rule. Both sides also worked with the understanding
that the people of Hong Kong were to be largely excluded from negotiations
over the transfer of sovereignty.
The British administration in Hong Kong has been based on the effective
exclusion of democratic participation in the government of the territory.
Supreme executive power is vested in the Governor, advised by an Executive
Council (Exco), wholly appointed by the Governor himself, and most policy
making is carried out by the powerful civil service. Bills are submitted
to a Legislative Council (Legco) which, before 1985, was entirely appointed
and contained a majority of civil servants. In the wake of the signing
of the Joint Declaration, however, the British administration was concerned
to shore up its authority and legitimacy in the final years of its rule
and began to introduce an element of elected representation in the Legco.
In 1985 indirect elections through an electoral college and functional
constituencies (such as business and professional groups) were held for
24 of the 56 seats in the Legco, with the majority remaining official
and appointed members. In response to pressure for direct elections for
the 1988 Legco elections, the government conducted a review into the issue
which revealed a sharp division of opinion between business interests
who supported the status quo and liberal professional groups, led by Martin
Lee, who argued for at least 50 per cent direct representation. The government's
decision, in 1988, to postpone any changes until the 1991 election was,
in the view of many commentators, largely swayed by strong pressure from
China to desist from further reform.(17)
In the meantime, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 greatly politicised
the people of Hong Kong, leading to a collapse in popular confidence about
Beijing's intentions towards the territory and increasing pressure on
the government to bring about democratic reform and measures to protect
civil liberties and human rights. In May 1989 one million people (one
sixth of the entire population) took part in a demonstration in support
of the pro-democracy movement in China and in June another million-strong
demonstration attacked the bloody crackdown and called for an end to the
government of Premier Li Peng. These events led to the formation of Hong
Kong's first formal political party, the liberal United Democrats of Hong
Kong led by Martin Lee.
The Hong Kong administration responded to the rise of popular feeling
in ways designed, on the one hand, to boost confidence that the British
government was defending the interests of the people of the territory
and, on the other, to maintain good relations with the Chinese government.
In December 1989, a British government representative paid a secret visit
to Beijing where he reassured the Chinese authorities of Britain's commitment
to the Joint Declaration and promised that Hong Kong would not be allowed
to become a base for anti-Chinese subversion. In 1990 the Hong Kong administration
arrested and fined pro-democracy activists for petty offences, invoking
authoritarian colonial public order ordinances aimed at quashing independent
political activity. At the same time, following secret negotiations between
the British and Chinese governments, it was announced that popular representation
in the Legco would be increased to 18 directly elected seats in the 1991
election, 20 in 1997, 24 in 1999 and 30 in 2003.(18) A clause reflecting
this agreement was incorporated into the Basic Law in 1990.(19) No change,
however, was proposed for the executive arm of government. The Executive
Council continued as a fully appointed body and the Governor maintained
his supreme executive position.
Pressure for political reform increased after the 1991 Legco elections
when 18 of the 20 directly elected seats were won by the United Democrats
and other liberal candidates. The new (and last) Governor of Hong Kong,
Chris Patten, therefore sought to increase popular involvement in the
political process while remaining within the framework of the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law. In October 1992 Patten proposed that in addition to
20 directly elected seats, the functional constituencies would be elected
by the entire Hong Kong workforce of 2.7 million and there would be direct
elections to the territory's municipal bodies. Despite, or perhaps because,
the proposals were well-received in liberal political circles in Hong
Kong, the Chinese reacted extremely negatively and accused the Governor
of breaching the agreement that any new arrangements should 'converge'
with the Basic Law and of attempting to magnify British influence and
undermine Chinese control after 1997. In a demonstrative move designed
to highlight its capacity to determine events in Hong Kong even before
1997, Beijing stalled on arrangements for a huge new airport project by
refusing to honour certain contracts, thereby effectively delaying its
completion until after the handover. In a further assertion of authority,
the Chinese government, in June 1993, established the Preliminary Working
Committee (PWC) for the Preparatory Committee of the SAR to be responsible
for transitional political, governmental and legal arrangements before
and after 1997, the so-called 'second stove'.(20)
Negotiations between Britain and China continued through 1993 but Beijing
refused to countenance Patten's plans and abandoned its original agreement
for a 'through train' Legco which would remain in place for 2 years after
1997. It declared that the reformed Legco elected in the 1995 elections,
where the Democrats emerged as the largest party (including 16 of the
20 directly-elected seats), would not continue after the transfer to Chinese
sovereignty. The Chinese government has in fact appointed a parallel Provisional
Legislature which will take over on 1 July 1997. Some commentators have
suggested that some members of the Legco may be included in a post-1997
Legislature, but it is certain that none of the Democrats or other liberal
members would be amongst them, even though such candidates won the highest
votes in the poll.(21) Hong Kong will thus revert to the old arrangement
of a fully appointed Legislature after July 1997.
The much-publicised efforts by the British administration in Hong Kong
to increase democratic participation in the government of the territory
therefore seem to be have been too little, too late. Negotiations with
China over the transfer of sovereignty began at a time when non-official
representation in the Legco was merely token and confined to selected
elite individuals. Once agreement had been reached in 1984 to allow the
Chinese government to draw up a Basic Law, there was little that could
be done to reform the system outside the framework of the Law. The Provisional
Legislature will remain in place until 1998 or 1999 and although China
is committed to introducing, in two stages, a Legco with half its members
directly elected, it remains to be seen how such an arrangement will actually
operate in practice. The Chinese Foreign Minister has said that elections
would 'embody democratic, free and open principles' and that anyone who
met China's criteria would be allowed to stand.(22) Eligibility could
be restricted to a number of specific parties or, more likely, candidates
could be required to swear allegiance to a restrictive pledge which would
rule out anyone likely to be critical of the SAR or Beijing authorities.
The future of genuinely elected government in Hong Kong is very much an
open question.
Protection of Human Rights
Most commentators have placed considerable stress on the rule of law
as one of the key advantages offered by Hong Kong for business investment
and thus an important element in its economic success. The codification
of laws to protect commercial activity from arbitrary intervention has,
however, not been matched by the entrenchment of human rights in Hong
Kong's legal framework. Although the Hong Kong government has a good practical
record in the application of common law and protecting basic civil liberties,
efforts to guarantee these rights by placing the territory within the
emerging international human rights regime were, until recent years, deliberately
neglected so as to avoid offending Beijing.(23) Unlike its other colonies,
Britain excluded Hong Kong from the 1953 European Convention on Human
Rights and from access to the European Court of Human Rights. When Britain
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
in 1976 it reserved the right to restrict the application of the Covenant
in Hong Kong on matters such as imprisonment and deportation, freedom
of movement and residence, freedom of speech, association and assembly,
universal suffrage, elected legislatures and, significantly, the right
of self-determination for non-self governing territories.
Mounting domestic and international concern about the need for safeguards
against human rights abuses after 1997 led the British government to have
the ICCPR included as an annex to the Joint Declaration of 1984. But it
was not until the upsurge of politicisation in Hong Kong after the Tiananmen
massacre of 1989 that the British government responded to demands to embody
human rights protection in domestic Hong Kong law by passing the Bill
of Rights Ordinance of 1991 (BORO). In order to prevent fears about political
repression in a future Hong Kong causing a flight of professional people
and capital from the territory, BORO, which reflects the provisions of
the ICCPR, was made justiciable before Hong Kong's courts and was accorded
primacy over other legislation. The Hong Kong administration also appealed
or amended colonial emergency powers ordinances which conflicted with
BORO.
It is uncertain, however, what practical effect these measures, like
the changes to Legco, will have after the transfer to Chinese sovereignty.
Any obligation on China's part to respect the provisions of domestic Hong
Kong law or international treaties entered into on the territory's behalf
by Britain is a matter of interpretation. The British government, for
example, considers that the PRC will be obliged by Article 40 of the ICCPR
to submit reports to the UN Human Rights Committee on its efforts to protect
human rights in Hong Kong. China, however, is not a signatory to the ICCPR
and has not confirmed whether it will apply the Covenant in Hong Kong
or respect the reporting obligations. Chinese government representatives
argued that the introduction of a Bill of Rights was unnecessary because
the ICCPR was incorporated in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
and that therefore the PRC might not recognise the primacy of BORO after
1997.
The possibility of a clampdown on civil liberties after July was strengthened
when China's National People's Congress voted, in February 1997, that
BORO would not have the power to override legislation inconsistent with
the ICCPR. The Congress also voted to modify or repeal recent Public Order
and Security ordinances introduced by Governor Patten which liberalised
Hong Kong's previously draconian controls on political activity. Following
this decision, China's Chief Executive designate for Hong Kong, Tung Chee-Hwa,
circulated a paper on proposed legal changes under which police permission
would be required to hold demonstrations and which would make it illegal
for political organisations to accept overseas funding or support. Tung
was reported as saying that the reforms introduced by Governor Patten
had been 'very unfortunate'.(24) The justification given for what represented
a reversion to colonial controls was that they were necessary to make
Hong Kong's post-1997 legislation consistent with the Basic Law. In the
face of a strong negative reaction in Hong Kong, Tung later issued a revised
draft law which eased some restrictions on demonstrations but which retained
the ban on foreign support for parties, although allowing individuals
to make contributions. One of the first actions of the Provisional Legislative
Council on 1 July will be to pass legislation which will make illegal
any demonstration deemed to be a threat to 'national security'.
Many leading political figures in Hong Kong, including members of the
elected Legco, fear that there will be little to prevent a gradual erosion
of civil liberties and access to legal redress, both because of Chinese
intentions and because of an unwillingness to resist on the part of powerful
business interests in Hong Kong. Key Chinese leaders have indicated their
uneasiness about an environment of free criticism, including Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen, who said, in October 1996, that the media could 'put forward
criticism, but not rumours or lies. Nor can they put forward personal
attacks on the Chinese leaders.'(25) Confronted with such attitudes, many
business people have been reluctant to risk the investment climate in
Hong Kong by antagonising China over human rights issues. The Chairman
of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, for example, was reported
as observing that business cared about 'rule of law for foreign disputes,
not for protests and students demonstrating'.(26) Some argue that signs
of decline can already be seen in a slow infusion of self-censorship in
the territory's media as major media proprietors appoint pro-Beijing consultants
to advise on likely official reactions to reports on sensitive issues
and previously strident critics of China have fallen silent.(27) In a
widely-noted case, a satirical comic strip in the South China Morning
Post, 'The World of Lily Wong', which commented on China and its leaders,
was removed from the paper in 1995.(28) The issue is whether these developments
indicate simply a transitional uncertainty on both sides or are the beginnings
of serious and permanent change.
There are factors which may mitigate against a heavy-handed intervention
by the Chinese authorities. The first of these depends on the degree of
awareness amongst the Chinese leadership that Hong Kong's economic success
has been underpinned by political stability and predictability. A nuanced
understanding of the operation of a relatively open political and legal
environment would allow Beijing to understand that free debate and criticism,
along with judicial limits to government action, need not be a threat
to the Communist Party's rule and has actually been part of the formula
which has made the territory an asset for China. Some commentators have
seen the appointment of an independent-minded judge, Andrew Li Kwok-Nang,
as the territory's new Chief Justice, rather than a more pro-Beijing candidate,
as an encouraging sign. An optimistic view would say that, faced with
the possibility that widespread popular discontent with Chinese actions
in Hong Kong might jeopardise this asset, Beijing will keep its intervention
in the territory's political life to a minimum. Once again, a successful
transition in Hong Kong, as seen by the international community and the
people of Taiwan, will be important for China in its relations with the
Western world, especially the US, and in developing its economic links
and political relationship with Taiwan.
Many of China's actions, particularly in the early months and years
after the handover, may be uncertain and send contradictory signals about
the intentions of the Communist Party leadership. This is partly because
Beijing will be dealing with an entirely new political environment, one
which confronts few if any other government in the world: exercising authority
over a major economic region which is autonomous in most respects and
has developed its own political and economic system after a hundred years
of separation. Secondly, a degree of inconsistency can also be anticipated
as ideological and regional divisions within the Communist Party and the
Army lead to policy reversals and differing approaches by various arms
of the Chinese state. While reformers and modernisers in the Chinese political
establishment can be expected to see the political integration of Hong
Kong as an opportunity to strengthen the process of change in China, more
conservative elements look upon the territory as a symbol of the subversion
of traditional Chinese and Maoist values and as a conduit for ideas undermining
the leading role of the Party.
A great deal will depend on the capacity of the Chief Executive of the
Hong Kong SAR, Mr Tung Chee-Hwa, to balance the competing demands of the
various factions in the Party and the Army against those of Hong Kong's
business interests and the popular pressure within the territory for maximum
autonomy and the protection of the rule of law and human rights. Tung
will be faced with a number of key decisions in the near future which
will test his personal strength in asserting the autonomy of the SAR and
the extent to which the Chinese authorities are willing to give it real
meaning. Decisions on the economy will include fixing the exchange rate
of the Hong Kong dollar, relations between Chinese and Hong Kong financial
institutions and drawing up a Budget without interference from Beijing.
Important political issues will include the independence of the civil
service, the suppression of corruption, controls on the press and public
demonstrations and elections to the Legislative Council.
Australia has immediate and broadbased interests in a successful transfer
of sovereignty in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's importance in Australia's trade
and investment flows gives Australia a direct stake in the maintenance
of healthy economic growth in the territory. Australia cannot afford political
unrest during or after the handover or a collapse in confidence in the
local or international business community. The issue of Hong Kong is of
course intimately connected with Australia's relations with China, one
of the country's most important but often difficult relationships and
one which inevitably has implications for key regional connections such
as the US and Japan.
Trade and Investment
Hong Kong in 1995 was Australia's tenth largest trading partner, accounting
for 2.6 per cent of Australia's total merchandise trade, while Australia,
as Hong Kong's fourteenth largest partner, accounted for 1.1 per cent
of the territory's merchandise trade. Two-way trade has grown substantially
in recent years (reaching over $4 billion in 1995) and become more diversified,
with a gradual shift away from the predominance of primary products in
Australia's exports. Testimony to the economic integration of Hong Kong
with China is provided by the fact that an estimated one quarter of Australia's
merchandise exports are re-exported to China.(29) An especially important
development has been the growth in the trade in services, especially in
education and tourism but also in insurance, consultancy, legal services,
finance and banking. Estimates of the value of this trade reach as high
as $1 billion. In 1996 it was estimated that there were over 12,000 students
from Hong Kong in Australian educational institutions. Around 280,000
Australians visited Hong Kong as tourists in 1995 and about 167,000 tourists
visited Australia from Hong Kong.(30)
Australian investment in Hong Kong stood at around $3.22 billion in
1995, while Hong Kong investment in Australia had reached $14.5 billion.
Hong Kong is Australia's sixth largest destination for overseas investment,
with interests in manufacturing, insurance, banking, telecommunications,
construction and industrial processing. Hong Kong was the fourth largest
source of foreign investment in Australia in 1995, with 90 per cent in
portfolio investment and 10 per cent in the form of direct investment.
People-to-People Links and Migration
A key aspect of the relationship which has developed between Australia
and Hong Kong in recent years is the two-way movement of people between
the territory and Australia. Each year about half a million people travel
between Australia and Hong Kong.(31) In addition to tourist visits and
the numbers of student who have been coming to Australia for many years,
there is a large community in Hong Kong with Australian connections. There
are around 30,000 Australian citizens resident in Hong Kong, together
with at least 2000 holders of Australian permanent residency.
The question of emigration has become an increasingly prominent topic
of discussion in Hong Kong as the time for the handover to China has approached
and many people in the territory have acted to secure residence rights
in other countries. Australia, along with the US, UK and Canada, has been
one of the sought-after destinations for resettlement from Hong Kong.
There are at present nearly 90,000 Hong Kong-born Australian citizens
and permanent residents in Australia. Numbers steadily increased from
28,000 in 1986, with the peak of arrivals (16,000) occurring from 1990-91
to 1991-92.(32) The majority of migrants from Hong Kong are well-educated
and in professional, managerial or business occupations and some of whom
have brought substantial amounts of capital for investment in Australia.(33)
Some migrants from Hong Kong have settled their family in Australia but
continue to work in the territory or maintain close business links there
- the so-called 'astronauts'.
Hong Kong and Australia-China Relations
Australia has major interests in the viability of Hong Kong as a special
economic and political entity within China, but even greater interests
in maintaining and developing close relations with China itself. Balancing
the demands of the Australia-China relationship against the interests
of the people of Hong Kong will present unique problems for Australian
foreign policy.
From the late 1980s, as the economic relationship between Australia
and Hong Kong began to enlarge rapidly, Australia developed a policy on
Hong Kong which emphasised its separateness from both Britain and China.
Australia supported Hong Kong's accession to the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a separate contracting party in 1985 and its
membership of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1990.
Most importantly, Australia played an important role in having Hong Kong,
along with Taiwan, granted entry into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum (APEC) on the basis that APEC was a group of 'economies' rather
than states. Membership of these international organisation was important
for establishing a practical framework for Hong Kong's operation as a
separate economic region after 1997, as well as bolstering confidence
that other aspects of Hong Kong's separateness, notably the rule of law
and political freedoms, might also be respected. Australia's closeness
to the Hong Kong issue was highlighted when Governor Patten visited Australia
in 1994 as part of his tour of a number of Asia-Pacific countries to build
regional support for his political reforms in the territory.
Although it appears that maintaining a separate economic relationship
with the Hong Kong SAR will not present problems for Australia's relations
with China, there is potential for controversy over political and human
rights issues which may well emerge after 1997. This has already been
made clear over the issue of the China's installation of an appointed
Provisional Legislative Council and Australia's attendance at its opening
ceremony on 1 July 1997. The British Government criticised China's action
in creating the new Council as contrary to the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law and the US State Department called the move 'unjustified and
unnecessary'.(34) Australia's response was, however, subdued, with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Alexander Downer, stating that it was
'disappointing that China and Britain were unable to agree' on arrangements
enabling the elected Legco to continue over the handover period.(35) The
US and Britain have also announced that they will not be officially represented
at the ceremony while the Australian Government has decided to attend.
There are no indications that other countries in the region, such as Japan
or ASEAN members, or any European countries will boycott the ceremony.
Critics have argued that the Australian Government's position is contrary
to its stated commitment to promote human rights internationally and that
the observance of human rights in China would assist its integration into
the region.(36) This criticism was given weight by the fact that the leader
of the most widely-supported party in Hong Kong, Mr Martin Lee, condemned
the decision to appoint a Provisional Legislative Council and after appealing
to the Australian Government to join a boycott of the opening ceremony,
said that the decision to attend had 'sacrificed Hong Kong for trade with
China'.(37) A public opinion poll taken in Hong Kong in mid-June found
that only 7 per cent of respondents thought that the appointed Council
would serve their interests better than the elected Legco.(38) Other commentators
have contended that the Australian Government was pushed into such a position
because some ill-considered policy actions affecting China during 1996
jeopardised the relationship with the Chinese Government.(39) They argue
that the Government has been forced to go to extreme lengths to placate
China, thus reducing the space for a flexible response on sensitive issues
relating to Hong Kong.(40) The Government's stance on the issue, according
to Mr Downer, is that it was 'not in Australia's interest or in Hong Kong's
interest' for the handover ceremonies to be affected by such a controversy
and that China was more effectively engaged by a cooperative approach.(41)
The Chinese Government has agreed to an Australian proposal to conduct
a regular dialogue on human rights between the two countries, the first
meeting of which is planned for August.
The controversy about the opening of the Provisional Legislative Council,
although arguably not a major issue in itself, is symbolic of the kind
of difficulties which may develop if there are significant political problems
in Hong Kong after the handover. If major unrest grows in the territory
and Beijing reacts by arresting pro-democracy campaigners or suppressing
demonstrations and other protests, severe strains might be placed on Australia's
policy of not directly criticising China on human rights. As the Provisional
Legislative Council question showed, such matters have the capacity not
only to affect relations with China but also to reveal differences with
the US, Australia's other key partner in the region. President Clinton's
emphasis on human rights issues has been moderated in his second term,
but stills stands in contrast to the Australian Government's more low-key
approach.(42)
The possibility that political repression or violence might cause a
flood of refugees from Hong Kong has haunted discussions about the territory
for many years. For many Hong Kongers, the prospect that they might have
to flee the territory is clearly still in their minds. The June opinion
poll found that 4 out of 10 respondents would seek to leave if conditions
in the territory deteriorated. The number of people in a position to emigrate
is uncertain, with between 300,000 and 500,000 having valid travel documents.
Surveys have shown that up to 20 per cent of the territory's population
of over 6 million have overseas family connections which could allow them
entry into other countries.(43) Australia would be a preferred destinations
for many emigrants and a problem for the Australian Government could develop
if significant numbers of Hong Kong residents were to enter Australia
on tourist visas and remain in the country illegally after their visas
expired. A large outflow of people from the territory could potentially
become a major regional problem, with implications for China's integration
into the region and its relations with Australia, the US and other countries
in the Asia-Pacific and Europe.
There is a starkly contradictory character to opinions about the future
of Hong Kong after 1997. Business people and economists, looking at Hong
Kong's continuing integration into a booming Chinese economy and all the
signs that Beijing will not tamper with the territory's market economy,
are optimistic about future growth and prosperity. On the political front,
however, there are few people who are sanguine about the prospects for
preserving the same standards on freedom of speech, rule of law and general
respect for human rights that Hong Kong enjoyed under British rule. Given
recent Chinese moves, many people are also pessimistic about the chances
of maintaining the limited democratisation which was introduced by the
British Government in its final years of authority. Even leading business
people, who speak confidently about the future so long as Beijing's ground
rules are observed, are said to keep their foreign passports close at
hand. The June opinion poll found that 92 per cent of respondents thought
that corruption would adversely affect Hong Kong's economic performance
after the handover.(44)
The strongest argument in favour of a successful economic and political
transition is that it is in the interests of the Chinese Government for
Hong Kong to remain prosperous and politically stable. Hong Kong is still
very important for the Chinese economy and demonstrated success in the
Hong Kong example is crucial for China's plans to effect an eventual reunification
with Taiwan and Macau. China is also aware that the eyes of regional countries
such as Japan, the US and the international community as a whole will
be focused closely on the new Hong Kong SAR after July 1997. The provisions
in the Basic Law which guarantee Hong Kong's separate identity under the
'one country, two systems' formula indicate that the Chinese leadership
understands the importance of protecting the territory's institutions
in maintaining its viability.
The principal source of concern about the future of Hong Kong relates
not to the immediate prospects for the maintenance of economic growth
but to the protection of political freedoms and respect for legal institutions
such as an independent judiciary and the rule of law. Such arrangements
are foreign to the political culture of Beijing and are regarded in many
quarters as dangerous and subversive. This applies not only to conservatives
who resent the displacement of pure Maoist ideology with the worship of
wealth and consumerism, but also to reformers who fear that the leading
role of the Party (including the privileged position of themselves and
their families) is coming under threat from the liberal ideas championed
in Hong Kong.
There is clearly an awareness within ruling circles in China that the
political distinctiveness of Hong Kong must be recognised for symbolic
reasons and because of perceptions in Taiwan, the US and elsewhere. On
the other hand, the idea that the legal and political institutions and
culture in the territory have been genuinely important in underpinning
Hong Kong's economic achievements does not appear to be universally accepted,
particularly given China's recent economic growth under an authoritarian
regime. Hong Kong, however, has been separated from China for over a century
and cannot be governed as if were just another Chinese city. An upsurge
in unrest in the territory due to political repression would unsettle
its image as a secure place for investment and any major instability would
see a flood of emigration and a loss of the skills, expertise and capital
which is the territory's main resource. Integrating Hong Kong will be
one of the key tasks facing the Chinese state as it attempts to deal with
the social and political effects of the country's continuing economic
transformation and will challenge the political will of the reformers
who may find the issue being used by conservative elements in the Party
and the Army to regain political ascendancy.
The coming months and years will be a critical time for Hong Kong and
will call for close attention from policy-makers in the countries of the
Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In Australia's case, it has significant
interests in the Hong Kong's viability and relations with China are becoming
a increasingly central part of the country's foreign policy, at both the
bilateral and regional level. Hong Kong will be one of the major tests
for the Australian Government's efforts to develop an independent diplomatic
position in Asia, balancing demands created by issues in trade, human
rights and security.
- Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China's Challenge, London, 1996,
p.24.
- According to a recent Chinese account, the handover of Hong Kong was
'a scene of humiliation and agony inflicted by foreigners that has seared
into the hearts of all 1.2 billion Chinese people'. See Liu Shuyong,
'History of Hong Kong: A completely objective account of how Hong Kong
was stolen from China', China Today, Feb. 1997, pp.29-32.
- Along with South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.
- DFAT, Country Economic Brief. Hong Kong: November 1995, pp.8-11.
- Yahuda, op. cit., p.24.
- Clyde Haulman, 'Asia-Pacific Economic Links and the Future of Hong
Kong', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
no.547, Sep 1996, pp.154-55.
- Yahuda, op. cit., p.25.
- East Asia Analytical Unit, China Embraces the Market: Achievements,
Constraints, Opportunities, Canberra, 1997, pp.128-31. Sydney
Morning Herald, 11 April 1997.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, Alvin Rabushka, Red Flag
Over Hong Kong, Chatham NJ, 1996, pp.137-38.
- Yahuda, op. cit., p.129.
- Haulman, op. cit., pp.160-61.
- Business Week, 9 June 1997, p.51.
- Michael Degolyer & Janet Lee Scott, The Myth of Political Apathy
in Hong Kong, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 547, Sep 1996, pp.68-78.
- Lo Shui Hing, 'Democracy Movement in Hong Kong and Its Implications
for South China', Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 27, No.
2, 1997, pp.198-216.
- Paul Bowers, Hong Kong: The Final Stages, Research Paper 96/104,
House of Commons Library, 1996, Text of the Joint Declaration, reproduced
as Appendix 1
- Frank Ching, 'Toward Colonial Sunset: The Wilson Regime, 1987-92',
in Ming Chan (ed.), Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and
Britain 1842-1992, New York, 1994, pp.176-182.
- Brian Martin, Hong Kong in Transition, Parliamentary Research
Service Research Paper No. 9, 1994, pp.13-14.
- ibid., pp.16-17.
- Annex II to The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China, in International Legal
Materials, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, Nov. 1990.
- The 'second stove' referred to a metaphorical tale in which a newly-married
young couple set up a second stove in the parental kitchen as a way
of asserting their independence.
- Bowers, op. cit., p.20.
- Dow Jones News/Retrieval World Report, 23 May 1997.
- Nihal Jayawickrama, 'The Bill of Rights', in Raymond Wacks (ed.),
Human Rights in Hong Kong, Oxford, 1992, pp.63-65.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May 1997, p.21.
- Bowers, op. cit., p.14.
- Business Week, 9 June 1997, p.51.
- Business Week, 9 June 1997, pp.50-53.
- Khergamvala, 'Media, asked to bend, chose to crawl', The Hindu
(Madras), 10 June 1997.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Hong
Kong: The Transfer of Sovereignty, Canberra, 1997, p.104.
- ibid., p.105.
- Canberra Times, 23 May 1997, p.7.
- Figures supplied by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Hong
Kong: The Transfer overeignty, Canberra, 1997, p.113.
- The Age, 23 December 1996, p.4.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 23 December 1996.
- Age, 17 June 1997, p.15. Australian, 17 June 1997, p.14.
- Australian, 13 June 1997, p.1. Weekend Australian, 14
June, 1997, p.10.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1997, p.8.
- For an account of the friction in Australia-China relations during
1996 see Stephen Sherlock, Australia's Relations with China: What's
the Problem, Parliamentary Information and Research Services Current
Issues Brief, No. 23, 1996-97.
- See for example, Ian McPhedran, 'Policy now rests on kowtowing', Canberra
Times, 16 June 1997.
- Age, 14 June 1997, p.2.
- For a discussion of US-China relations see Frank Frost, The United
States and East Asia: Containment or Engagement?, Parliamentary
Research Service Current Issues Brief No. 5, 1996-97.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Hong
Kong: The Transfer of Sovereignty, Canberra, 1997, pp.111-112. Florence
Chong, 'Passports proliferate as HK residents ponder 1997', Australian,
7 May 1997, p.66.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1997, p.8.
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