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Conflict and Reconciliation in Central Africa: a Possible Role for Australia
Dr Samuel M. Makinda
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
The author of this paper, Dr Samuel M. Makinda, holds a PhD in International
Relations from the Australian National University and is Senior Lecturer
in International Politics at Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia.
He has recently been a Senior Associate Member at St Anthony's College,
University of Oxford (1995) and a Visiting Fellow in the Global Security
Programme, University of Cambridge (1992). He has also been Assistant
Managing Editor of the Daily Nation and Political Correspondent
of the Weekly Review (Nairobi, Kenya). His publications include
Seeking Peace From Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia
(1993), Security in the Horn of Africa (1992), Superpower Diplomacy
in the Horn of Africa (1987) and numerous articles.
Maps
Maps of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire are available from the Perry-Castañeda
Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. They are
produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
Burundi
and Rwanda 1975 (318K)
Zaire
1:14,000,000 1983 CIA (256K)
Contents
Major Issues
Introduction
Background to the Crisis
Ethnicity as a Cover for Political and Economic
Motives
Why Democracy has Faltered
The Regional Dimensions
What the International Community Can Do
A Possible Role for Australia
Immediate Outlook
Endnotes
The crises in Central Africa are partly humanitarian and partly political.
They have caused millions of refugees to flee from Burundi, Rwanda and
Zaire to the neighbouring states. They have also led to the displacement
of thousands of people in these three countries who are now without food,
shelter and other basic needs such as health care and clean running water.
However, this humanitarian tragedy stems from political and economic mismanagement
in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. Indeed, the problem in eastern Zaire is,
in part, a result of the Rwandan and Burundian ethnic conflicts which
have spilled over the borders. An appropriate way to approach these crises,
therefore, is to see them as both interrelated and separate phenomena
which have four dimensions: the unresolved Rwandan genocide of 1994; the
continuing political uncertainty in Burundi; the political and economic
malaise in Zaire; and efforts by the neighbouring states to try to influence
internal political developments in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire.
At the heart of the Rwandan and Burundian conflicts is the relationship
between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. The Tutsis now rule
both Rwanda and Burundi. The media has frequently referred to 'tribal'
differences between Tutsis and Hutus, but there are no cultural, linguistic,
racial or physical differences of any kind between the two ethnic communities.
They speak the same language, share one culture and have intermarried
for centuries. Prior to colonialism, the two communities were differentiated
by their specialisations, ie Hutus were agriculturalists while Tutsis
were pastoralists. However, since the colonial times, and especially after
independence in the early 1960s, Hutus and Tutsis have defined their identities
in terms of political and economic power. Hence, in Rwanda and Burundi
(and Zaire) ethnicity has often been used to camouflage economic and political
motives.
A democratic system of government and the rule of law would be important
factors in the reconciliation process in the three countries, but Western-style
political structures have been opposed by corrupt and authoritarian leaders
who fear open and accountable systems of government. The three states
are currently ruled by military or quasi-military regimes which are not
accountable to the people. In all of them, governments and public institutions
have become extensions of particular ethnic communities and their interests,
and political competition is defined in terms of 'winner takes all'. This
zero-sum character of politics has meant that the losers of political
competition have no political role, no right to question or criticise,
and no security from harassment. It is for this reason that opponents
of regimes in the Central African region have often sought refuge in neighbouring
countries, thereby heightening tension between neighbours.
Political reconciliation in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire needs to be understood
in the regional context for a number of reasons. First, these three countries
have been the sources of numerous refugees to their neighbours. Second,
some regional states have taken sides and tried to exploit the conflicts
to their advantage. And third, these problems have been the subject of
continuing regional diplomatic efforts. For example, some of the perpetrators
of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Hutu Interahamwe militias and
former Rwandan government soldiers, went to live in Zaire where they have
been acquiring arms with a view to toppling the Rwandan government. The
Rwandan leaders believe that the Zairean government helps and protects
these militias. Unless these people are apprehended, and as long as the
Rwandan government believes that Zairean authorities protect them, relations
between Rwanda and Zaire will remain tense. Many of the Burundian Hutu
militias who seek to bring about political change in their homeland also
live in Zaire and have sometimes been aided by Zairean authorities. Rwandan
and Burundian governments have also supported political dissidents in
Zaire. And some of the neighbouring states, especially Kenya and Uganda,
have also tried to exploit internal divisions in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire,
to their own advantages.
These complex and interlocked crises cannot be managed and resolved by
the Central African states on their own. They call for international intervention.
It is in this context that the UN Security Council adopted a resolution
on 15 November 1996 authorising a multinational intervention force to
assist with the provision of humanitarian supplies. However, providing
humanitarian assistance alone would be like treating the symptoms, not
the causes, of the problem. There is, therefore, a need for the international
community to help the local states address political issues in order to
remove the conditions that created the current humanitarian disasters.
This paper argues that the international community should support efforts
by the parties in the countries concerned, with assistance from the Organisation
of African Unity, to effect political reform and develop good governance.
The Australian government has already offered $2.6 million in humanitarian
assistance and indicated a willingness to do more as the situation unfolds.
Given the fact that we participated effectively in the reconstruction
of Cambodia after the civil war and in Somalia, given the necessary political
will, Australia is particularly well-equipped to help the Central African
countries establish the necessary conditions for reconciliation and development.
For example, Australia could help revamp the Rwandan criminal justice
system, reconstruct hospitals and schools, and build houses for the returning
refugees.
Only a few years after the debacle in Somalia, the international community
is poised to embark on another multifaceted, but less ambitious, military
mission in Central Africa. Canada, France, Britain, Brazil, the United
States, some African and several non-African countries have agreed to
participate in a UN-authorised military force for eastern Zaire.(1) The
political landscape here is vastly different from Somalia, but the decision
to intervene has raised important questions. What does the multinational
force plan to achieve? How effective is this force likely to be? What
connection does the crisis in eastern Zaire have with instability in Burundi
and Rwanda? Can the international community help resolve the interrelated
security and political difficulties in the three countries? To what extend
are the neighbouring states involved in this imbroglio? This paper will
attempt to answer these questions.
The crisis in Zaire, in addition to the July 1996 military coup in Burundi,
and the continuing political problems in Rwanda since the 1994 genocide,
is a reminder of how unstable the Central African region has become. On
the surface, the eastern Zairean situation appears to be primarily a humanitarian
one, but underneath it is a political and economic conflict which is linked
to instability in Burundi and Rwanda. Indeed, there are four dimensions
to this conflict: the political and economic malaise in Zaire; the unresolved
1994 Rwandan genocide; continuing political uncertainty in Burundi; and
attempts by other states in the region to influence these developments.
To a certain extent, these crises are Rwandan and Burundian problems which
are being played out in eastern Zaire.
The main features of the crises have included armed conflict between
Zairean government troops and the Banyamulenge, a Zairean people of Tutsi
origin. Zairean troops also exchanged fire with Rwandan and Ugandan forces
on different occasions in November 1996. This problem needs to be addressed
if much more serious incidents between Rwanda and Zaire are to be avoided.
Increased border tension has forced the Rwandan and Burundian Hutu refugees,
who had been camping in eastern Zaire, to disperse in different directions.
Aid agencies and media reports have claimed that by the end of November
1996, more than 600 000 refugees had returned to Rwanda, while an equal
number had fled into the interior of Zaire. If the refugees who have fled
into Zaire are not reached by relief agencies soon, there is a great danger
of many of them dying from starvation and disease. Moreover, most of the
Rwandans who have returned home have no houses or food. It is these issues
that the international community, including Australia, need to bear in
mind when contemplating efforts to help the region avoid war and to rescue
the people from starvation and disease.
Media reports have been extremely effective in publicising the tragedy
and thereby galvanising the international community, but they have not
sufficiently explained the depth of these crises. To explain the background
and different dimensions of these crises, this paper is divided into six
parts. The first part discusses the background to the conflicts, while
the second explains how ethnicity has been employed to camouflage political
and economic motives. The third part explains the failure of democratic
rule, while the fourth analyses the involvement of regional states. Parts
five and six explain the possible roles of the international community
and Australia, respectively.
Although the international spotlight has been on Zaire since September
1996, the origin of instability and uncertainty in Central Africa are
the political and ethnic conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi. Indeed, the
Zairean government has repeatedly accused Rwanda and Burundi of fomenting
trouble in eastern Zaire. It claimed in September 1996 that Rwanda had
enrolled 3000 Banyamulenge in its army and was using them to destabilise
eastern Zaire.(2)
Few observers of political developments in the Central African region
would be surprised by the Zairean claim that Rwanda has armed the Banyamulenge
rebels. In the past two years, Rwanda has claimed that Zaire has been
arming the Hutu Interahamwe (i.e. those who have a common cause)
militias and soldiers of the former Rwandan Army with a view to destabilising
it. The Rwandan government, dominated by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF),
decided to hit back by arming those opposed to Zairean President Mobutu
Sese Seko. Rwandan leaders have also said that they would not stand aloof
while the Banyamulenge were being exterminated by Zairean authorities.
Rwanda, like Burundi, is populated by Hutus, Tutsis and the Twa,(3) and
the proportion of Hutus to Tutsis in both states is 84:14. Theoretically,
Rwanda's population is about eight million, but nearly two million Rwandans
have been living as refugees in neighbouring states in the past few years.
Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, and for
this reason land is highly valued. Both during Belgian colonial rule and
after independence, Rwanda's armed forces have been dominated by one ethnic
group at the expense of the other. For example, the colonial army was
basically a Tutsi force with Belgian commanders. However, between 1962
and 1994, the French-trained Rwandan Armed Forces were dominated by the
Hutus, while the Tutsis formed their own militias abroad. Since 1994,
this situation has been reversed, with a Tutsi-controlled army at home
and the Hutu refugee-warriors abroad. Military dominance is seen by both
sides as extremely important because it confers political and economic
privileges. The Rwandan Patriotic Army is dominated by Tutsis, and it
is not surprising that the Hutus who have been excluded from key military
positions, have established their own armed militias in Zaire through
which they hope to regain political power.(4)
Burundi, with a population of six million, is also densely populated.
Since the 1960s, Burundi's political developments have mirrored those
of Rwanda. The Tutsis have dominated the Burundian armed forces since
the colonial era, and except for a short period in late 1993, the Tutsis
have exercised political power and formed the economic elite throughout
Burundi's post-independence history. The Burundian Hutus, who have been
excluded from power, have formed their own militias which have operated
within and outside the country. Some of these have their bases in Zaire
and have been supported by the Zairean authorities. The concept of refugee-warriors
is well-known in the region and has been consolidated by the zero-sum
character of the region's politics.
Rwanda and Burundi have experienced cycles of ethnic and political violence
since independence in the early 1960s, but their problems have been exacerbated
by rapid political change in the Central African region since the Cold
War ended. Some media reports have explained the Rwandan and Burundian
problems primarily in terms of primordial or 'tribal' differences between
Tutsis and Hutus, but this is misleading because there are no cultural,
linguistic, racial or physical differences of any kind between the two
communities. Hutus and Tutsis have one culture, speak the same language
and share the same life-style. However, in both countries ethnicity has
often been used to camouflage economic, political, and historical factors.
It is the Hutu-Tutsi conflict, coupled with misguided Zairean policies,
that form the basis of the crisis in eastern Zaire. With a population
of over 45 million and more than 200 ethnic groups, Zaire has had a turbulent
history since independence from Belgium in 1960. Formerly called the Belgian
Congo, Zaire is the largest sub-Saharan African country, bordering nine
other states.(5) Its first civil war in 1960-61 resulted in the death
of the then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, in a plane crash.
The Zairean leader, President Mobutu, came to power through a CIA-supported
military coup in 1965 and has maintained what has been widely considered
to be one of the most corrupt, exploitative and brutal regimes in Africa.(6)
When Mobutu faced a serious political crisis in the mineral-rich Shaba
province in 1977-78 and his army proved ineffective, he was rescued by
Belgian, French and Moroccan military intervention.(7) In the past two
decades, Mobutu has successfully played one region or ethnic group against
another. Through these tactics, the Zairean government has succeeded in
using ethnicity as a political tool. It was against this background that
in 1981, Zaire enacted a new citizenship law, nullifying the 1972 legislation
under which all people of Rwandan-origin who had lived in Kivu province
before 1 January 1950 had been granted Zairean nationality at independence.
With this new law, the Banyamulenge were stripped of their citizenship.
The media has recently referred to all Tutsis in Zaire as Banyamulenge,
but this name applies only to descendants of the Tutsis who settled near
the Mulenge hills of eastern Zaire about three hundred years ago.
One of the root causes of the crisis in eastern Zaire is the denial of
citizenship to the Kinyarwanda-speaking Zaireans, coupled with efforts
to confiscate their property and expel them from Zaire. However, the Banyamulenge,
who have lived in South Kivu and North Kivu provinces since the 18th century,
would be stateless. Another wave of Kinyarwanda-speakers, mainly Hutus,
moved into the area north of Lake Kivu early in this century to serve
as labourers for Belgian plantation owners. In the early 1960s, following
the Hutu uprising and the subsequent political turmoil in Rwanda, many
Tutsis sought political asylum in Uganda and Tanzania, while others went
to live in eastern Zaire. The most recent Rwandan migrants to Zaire went
there during the 1994 genocide.
The problem with the Zairean government is that in the past few years,
it has been seeking to expel all Kinyarwanda-speakers, including the Banyamulenge,
who are native Zaireans(8). Since April 1995, Zairean troops, the local
authorities, and other local ethnic groups(9) have targeted the Banyamulenge.
By mid 1996, Zairean authorities had started to deny the Banyamulenge
access to jobs and other services, and to confiscate their property. They
also enlisted the support of the Hutu militias, the Interahamwe,
and the former Rwandan soldiers to try to expel the Banyamulenge from
eastern Zaire. It is because of Zaire's backing of the former Rwandan
soldiers and the Interahamwe that Rwanda has been deeply involved
in the crisis in eastern Zaire. The Zairean government has also been accused
of arming some of the extremist Hutu militias from Burundi.
The complexity of ethnic politics in Central Africa gives rise to a number
of questions: Are the problems in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire primarily
ethnic? Or has ethnicity been utilised to camouflage other goals? In the
Central African region, as in many other places, ethnicity appears to
have often been used as a political tool.
In Burundi and Rwanda, ethnicity has played a very significant role in
society. European explorers and colonialists, influenced heavily by prevailing
19th century anthropological attitudes on race, generated many myths about
the origins of Tutsis and Hutus. They assumed that the Tutsis, who occupied
the monarchy at the time, must have come from Egypt or Ethiopia and were,
therefore, more civilised than the Hutus.(10) However, none of these theories
had scientific validity. Before colonial rule, Tutsis and Hutus were differentiated
by their specialisations or occupations. The Tutsis were herders while
Hutus were farmers. While the King was a Tutsi, Hutus also played a role
in the monarchy. For example, under the Tutsi King there were three types
of chiefs: the chief of pastures, usually a Tutsi; the chief of men, usually
a Tutsi; and the chief of land holdings, often a Hutu. Indeed, at the
point of colonial impact, there were many cross-ethnic linkages and networks
in Rwanda and it can be argued that the Tutsi and Hutu were on the way
to becoming fused into one.(11)
This process of fusion was terminated by German(12) and Belgian colonial
authorities which favoured the Tutsis and helped them consolidate an exclusive
feudal system with a hierarchical order. In fact, Belgium's divide-and-rule
policy effectively created layered societies in Rwanda and Burundi, with
Hutus below the Tutsis, and the Twa did not feature in the equation. It
was the experience of colonialism that encouraged the Hutus and Tutsis
to redefine their identities in zero-sum terms, to think in terms of 'us'
and 'them', and to try to devalue 'them', and planted the seeds about
the radically different and exclusive 'myths' of origin.(13) As a consequence,
both Rwanda and Burundi have been plagued by cyclical violence for more
than 30 years, in which the Hutu-Tutsi relationship has been very important.
At a closer examination, this relationship is fundamentally political.
While Rwanda was dominated by a Hutu political elite from the early 1960s
to the 1990s, Burundi was controlled by a Tutsi elite during the same
period. With recent political changes in both countries, the Hutu majority
in Burundi won the June 1993 election, but they quickly realised that
they did not have enough expertise and had to rely on the Tutsis. Similarly,
the Tutsis who took power in Rwanda in July 1994 discovered that they
had a very small pool of expertise to draw from. Indeed, both Rwanda and
Burundi would find it extremely hard to function effectively without involving
both Hutus and Tutsis.
Tutsis and Hutus are normally peaceful and have lived together and intermarried
for centuries. However, their main differences have been reconstructed
and consolidated by changing economic, historical, political and psychological
factors. For example, some of the Hutus who turned against their Tutsi
neighbours in Rwanda in 1994 did so not because they hated Tutsis, but
because they had been convinced that Tutsis would take away their land,
possessions and political power. Hutu propaganda portrayed Tutsis as a
grave threat to the political, economic and social development of Hutus.
The Rwandan genocide, therefore, was partly a result of politicians and
other groups manipulating ethnicity to advance their political and economic
goals.(14) Similarly in Burundi, the Tutsi-dominated army has often turned
against Hutus with the apparent aim of intimidating them and keeping them
away from political power. The Rwandan genocide encouraged Tutsi extremists
in Burundi to become even more hostile to their Hutu neighbours.
Is there any way the two communities can be reconciled? Political reconciliation
requires the parties to forgive each other and take appropriate measures
to build institutions which can deal effectively with similar problems
in the future.(15) In both countries this would require the Hutus and
Tutsis to agree on a formula to share political and economic power, and
to develop confidence in public institutions, including the army, the
parliament and the criminal justice system. However, in Rwanda such developments
would take place only after the causes and consequences of the 1994 genocide
have been tackled. In Burundi, some Hutus feel reconciliation cannot be
achieved without addressing the past injustices, especially the Tutsi-engineered
oppression, massacre and discrimination against the Hutus.
The two countries' problems need to be understood particularly in terms
of inequities in political power and privilege, and economic access. In
both countries, class and ethnicity have merged. For example, under colonialism
Belgian authorities helped the Tutsis to become politically more powerful
and wealthier than the Hutus.(16) This policy started a process in which
the two groups have had unequal access to political and economic power
at different times. Between the early 1960s and mid 1990s, it was the
Hutus who had most access in Rwanda, while the Tutsis were the political,
military and business elite in Burundi. However, this situation has been
reversed in Rwanda since 1994, while in Burundi it has remained fluid.
While the Hutu-Tutsi relationship is very important in the reconciliation
process, the two countries' problems are more complex. For example, prior
to the death in a plane crash of former Rwandan President Juvénal
Habyarimana, there had been many murders in the Rwandan capital, Kigali,
which suggested that the conflict was driven primarily by political ambitions.
The civil war exacerbated the hatred between northern and southern Hutus.
Since the mid 1970s, the Rwandan Army's officer corps had come from the
northern Hutus, and political power was wielded predominantly by Hutus
from Gisenyi district. President Habyarimana's cohorts used ethnicity
to camouflage their desire to maintain power within a small circle of
Hutu elites. Thus Rwanda's problems have been as much between the northern
and southern Hutus, as between the Hutus and Tutsis. However, since the
genocide, attention has been on the Hutu-Tutsi relationship, while the
Hutu-Hutu differences have been virtually ignored. There are also serious
Hutu-Hutu and Tutsi-Tutsi differences in Burundi.
In Zaire, for example, President Mobutu has frequently used the old divide-and-rule
tactics, in order to maintain an oppressive rule and weaken the efforts
to find an alternative leader.(17) He has played one ethnic group against
another in the selection of senior officials, including Prime Ministers.
He has also set ethnic groups against each other in order to divert attention
from his policies.(18) For instance, the Baluba have been expelled from
Shaba province by the Balunda, but the Mobutu regime has done nothing
to protect them.(19) In eastern Zaire, government officials have blamed
the Banyamulenge for most of the problems in the area, thereby fuelling
hostility from other ethnic groups against them. As ethnic Tutsis, the
Banyamulenge have been blamed for causing the flow of Burundian and Rwandan
Hutu refugees into eastern Zaire. Not surprisingly, other ethnic groups
in the area have been encouraged to demonstrate and to arm themselves
against all Tutsis. In recent months, the Rwandan Interahamwe and
soldiers of the former Rwandan Army have been involved in harassing the
Banyamulenge.
Some senior politicians in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire would like to establish
workable and accountable systems of government, but they have often been
outmanoeuvred by extremists or corrupt leaders who are against a liberal
democratic government. However, stability and reconciliation in the three
countries require governments which are committed to democracy and justice,
and an international community which can deliver on its promises.
Attempts to introduce Western-style democracy in Rwanda, Burundi and
Zaire, as elsewhere in Africa, have been resented by politicians who had
no previous experience of operating in open and competitive political
systems. These three states are ruled by military or quasi-military regimes
which are not accountable to the people and which barely tolerate the
Opposition. Indeed, one of the pitfalls of democracy in Africa is the
belief on the part of both the winners and the losers of elections that
the winner would assume all the powers of the state and leave the loser
with no political role, no right to question and criticise and no security
from harassment.(20) In an ethnically divided society, this makes the
government an extension of particular communities and their interests.
While this 'winner takes all' mentality stems from the fact that those
who control the state machinery very often have unlimited access to the
resources of the country, it also demonstrates the failure, on the part
of the political leaders and the public, to understand the essence of
a multiparty system.(21) Under these conditions, various groups find it
hard to see the government as an impartial arbiter in the society's conflicts.
Major Pierre Buyoya, the first Burundian leader to organise democratic
elections in June 1993, was rejected by the voters, but he resumed power
in July 1996 through military force. When Buyoya organised free elections,
he thought he would win. However, his party, Union pour le Progrès
National (UPRONA), won only 22 percent of the vote, while the opposition
Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), won over
71 per cent. The two parties formed a coalition government, with FRODEBU
leader, Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, as president, and Sylvie Kinigi, a Tutsi,
as Prime Minister. The significance of Ndadaye's victory lay in the fact
that for the first time in history, Hutus controlled governments in both
Rwanda and Burundi, and the Tutsis saw this as extremely ominous. After
nearly three decades of Tutsi military dictatorship, some soldiers refused
to accept a peaceful transfer of power, and on 21 October 1993 they staged
an unsuccessful coup, killing President Ndadaye and six senior ministers.
Ndadaye's death unleashed a storm of violence and led to the massacre
of more than 150 000 Hutus and Tutsis, with over 300 000 internally displaced
persons, and about 700 000 refugees in neighbouring states. Although another
Burundian President, Cyprien Nyaryamira, also a Hutu, was elected by the
National Assembly in January 1994, he commanded no respect from extremist
Tutsis. Three months later, Nyaryamira died in a plane crash with Rwandan
President Habyarimana. Burundi was ruled by an Acting President until
October 1994, when Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, a Hutu, was formally elected.
Prior to the election of Ntibantunganya, FRODEBU, UPRONA and other political
parties in Burundi signed on 10 September 1994 a Convention of Government
whose primary objective was to restore peace and security. The Convention
also stipulated the terms of a power-sharing government and was incorporated
into Burundi's constitution. However, extremists on both sides could not
give the Convention a chance. In an attempt to destabilise the government,
UPRONA campaigned against the Convention and looked to the army to stage
a 'creeping' coup.(22)
President Ntibantunganya depended on the Tutsi-dominated army and civil
service to govern, and while respecting the power-sharing part of the
Convention, he virtually ignored the people's security. Isolated from
his fellow Hutus and hated by the Tutsis, President Ntibantunganya became
hostage to the Tutsi-dominated army, but in mid 1996 the army leaders
started to signal that they could not guarantee his protection indefinitely.
The Burundian government's failure to halt communal killings in 1995-96
was widely regarded as a betrayal of democracy and stemmed from several
factors: the coalition partners could not agree on major policies; the
international community was unwilling to respond to President Ntibantunganya's
pleas for help; and the army refused to protect the President. It was
then that President Ntibantunganya was compelled to seek refuge in the
American embassy in Bujumbura in late July 1996.(23)
Rwanda's experiment with democracy also met with dismal failure. A one-party
state until June 1991, Rwanda introduced a multiparty constitution after
President Habyarimana had come under pressure from outside. Compared to
the present Rwandan leaders, President Habyarimana had a far better chance
of establishing democracy. He was a Hutu with well-established instruments
of power-the ruling party, MRND; the Presidential Guard; and the Rwandan
Army. These were backed by a ruthless northern Hutu organisation, the
Coalition for the Defence of the Republic. However, he could not establish
democratic rule because his supporters were afraid of losing their privileges.
Indeed, the Presidential Guard was strongly against democracy and power-sharing
because they meant permitting southern Hutus and Tutsis to occupy senior
government positions. It is generally assumed that it was members of this
group that shot down President Habyarimana's plane after he had agreed
to power-sharing with the Opposition, and to implement the 1993 Arusha
agreement on power-sharing (see Section 5 for more details on the Arusha
accord). The main challenge to the ruling MRND was the Rwanda Patriotic
Front (RPF), which was based in Uganda, and the Presidential Guard was
determined to prevent it from returning to Kigali.(24)
It is against this background that one can understand the reluctance
and fear of the Tutsi-dominated RPF to establish democratic rule. The
current Rwandan President, Pasteur Bizimungu, is a Hutu, but political
power lies with the Tutsi Vice-President and Defence Minister, Major-General
Paul Kagame. The RPF assumed power in July 1994 after defeating its opponents
militarily and has no interest in negotiating away its advantages. Theoretically
the RPF government is committed to the implementation of the Arusha agreement,
but from mid-1994, Major-General Kagame and his supporters have felt that
majority rule would bring back the Hutu oppression which led to the genocide.
The RPF has appointed a Cabinet in which the majority of the ministers
are Hutus, but it is determined not to give up political and military
control. The RPF's first priority is to consolidate political and military
control. The second is to find and punish those responsible for the 1994
genocide. However, the country's criminal justice system is in disarray.
An irony of the Rwandan situation is that reconciliation requires a rapid
move towards democracy, but genuine democratisation would put the Hutus
in control. Given the background of the 1994 genocide, this could undo
reconciliation.(25)
In Zaire, President Mobutu has tried to liberalise the political system
since the early 1990s, but he has always ensured that no change is drastic
enough to weaken his autocratic hold on power. Political change in Zaire
has been due to pressure from the US, France and Belgium, but Mobutu has
been so hostile to genuine reform that the country has been locked in
bitter struggles between the President and the Opposition since 1991.
These struggles have occasionally witnessed violent army mutinies, but
President Mobutu has ensured that the only section of the army which can
act decisively is the Israeli-trained and well-equipped Presidential Guard.
The rest of the army is undisciplined, poorly equipped, and often goes
without pay for months.
Domestic pressure for political reform in Zaire was particularly strong
in 1991 when the national conference of Opposition parties, government
delegates, interest groups and church organisations was convened. The
conference's aim was to draft a new constitution, but from the beginning
it was in conflict with President Mobutu. The conference, now renamed
the High Council of the Republic, was initially dominated by a coalition
of parties known as the Sacred Union, led by Etienne Tshisekedi, a former
government minister who had been detained and repeatedly harassed by the
Mobutu regime. Tshisekedi, from the Baluba ethnic group of Kasai province,
advocated liberal democracy. However, President Mobutu ensured that he
was challenged by a former Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I Bond, who had also
been disgraced and detained by the Mobutu regime. Nguza belongs to the
Balunda ethnic group of Shaba province.
The struggle between the Opposition and President Mobutu has had a deleterious
effect on democratic reform.(26) Since 1991, the President has replaced
Prime Ministers four times, used the Presidential Guard to harass his
political opponents, and repeatedly tried to play one ethnic group against
another. The current Zairean Prime Minister, Kengo wa Dondo, whose mother
is a Tutsi, has virtually no influence in the High Council and is openly
despised by military leaders. In a showdown with the High Council, President
Mobutu introduced a new currency a few years ago, but it caused riots
and has not been accepted in some provinces. By the time President Mobutu
left for cancer treatment in Switzerland in September 1996, he was extremely
unpopular. However, the crisis in eastern Zaire is likely to strengthen
his political stature in at least two ways: the prospect of secession
might help unite the rest of the country and President Mobutu might be
seen as the only person capable of holding Zaire together.
In a symbolic effort to address the Zairean crisis, the leaders of Cameroon,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda met in Nairobi in November
1996 and called for a neutral multinational force. However, Zaire refused
to attend, insisting that foreign troops had to leave its territory first.
Following the Burundian coup of July 1996, regional states also met and
cut communications links and imposed an economic embargo on Burundi, but
this measure has not been successful due to a lack of international support.
Problems in Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire are of significance to their neighbours
because of their regional implications. First, these countries have been
the sources of refugees to the neighbours. Second, some regional states
have taken sides and tried to exploit the conflicts to their advantage.
And third, these problems have been the subject of continuing regional
diplomatic efforts. It is, therefore, important that prospects for conflict
resolution are understood in the wider regional context.
The fact that more than one million Rwandans (out of an estimated total
of eight million) still live as refugees in Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda
and Zaire gives these countries an important role in Rwanda's future.
Until recently, Zaire had more than one million refugees from Rwanda and
Burundi. Partly because of the close association between former Rwandan
President Habyarimana and Kenyan President Moi, some former Rwandan officials
fled to Kenya in 1994. Tanzania, one of the poorest countries in the world,
hosts about 500 000 Rwandan refugees. These refugees have put enormous
pressure on the social, economic and ecological systems of the host states,
but their repatriation in large numbers could also have a deleterious
effect on the democratic process, political stability and reconciliation.
For example, just before the 1996 coup, the Burundian army had started
to forcibly repatriate Rwandan refugees, most of them Hutus. However,
the refugees were a boon for President Mobutu in 1994. President Mobutu's
soldiers, who had not been paid for months, made a living by looting and
extorting international relief agencies in eastern Zaire. The presence
of many refugees in Zaire also meant that the international community
had to negotiate with President Mobutu, thereby giving him some of the
international legitimacy he desperately sought.(27)
The regional dimension of these conflicts also partly stems from the
fact that some states have supported rebels in neighbouring states. It
was partly for this reason that the Presidents of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda
and Zaire, and a presidential envoy from Tanzania, met in Cairo, Egypt,
in November 1995 and agreed to disarm refugees within their states and
demilitarise their border regions. However, none of the participating
states has carried out the measures agreed in Cairo. Indeed, Zaire has
accused Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda of aiding the Banyamulenge rebels.
There is little doubt that the Banyamulenge have received arms and training
from neighbouring states, and most probably from the three named by Zaire.
However, since 1994, Rwanda also has accused Zaire of arming the former
Rwandan soldiers. The documents left behind in eastern Zaire by the fleeing
Hutu militias in November 1996 indicated that the former Rwandan soldiers
were preparing to invade Rwanda, and it is possible that Zairean authorities
knew this. Unlike Zaire, Uganda has given the Rwandan government considerable
support. Without Ugandan assistance, the RPF would not be in power. Some
of the RPF founders had fought in Uganda's National Resistance Army of
President Yoweri Museveni, helping him take power in January 1986. President
Museveni, who is said to be a Tutsi, helped the Rwandan Tutsis form the
RPF in 1987 and assisted them with arms and troops in their fight against
the Habyarimana regime.
The Kenyan government, which has had very poor relations with Uganda
since 1986, was happy to host RPF opponents, and has remained hostile
to the Rwandan government. Kenya closed its diplomatic mission in Kigali
at the onset of the genocide and in 1995 it expelled two senior Rwandan
diplomats. Following an attempt to assassinate a former RPF minister in
Nairobi, Kenya requested the closure of the Rwandan embassy in Nairobi
in early 1996. In October 1995 Kenya's President Moi threatened to refuse
to cooperate with the international tribunal charged with prosecuting
those responsible for the Rwandan genocide, but he later withdrew the
threat. In November 1996 a UN report accused Kenya of arming the Hutus
opposed to the Rwandan government.
Despite this charged regional climate, neighbouring states have made
efforts to find peaceful solutions to the problems in the three countries.
From 1991 to 1993, the Tanzanian city of Arusha was the venue for negotiations
between the RPF and President Habyarimana's government and the Arusha
agreement of August 1993 provided a formula for reconciliation and power-sharing,
but it was ignored by the then Rwandan government.(28) After the genocide,
the international tribunal, which was established in November 1994, was
based in Arusha. The OAU also has supported efforts by Zaire, Uganda,
Tanzania, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Kenya to try to find a solution to the
Burundian conflict, but their team, headed by former Tanzanian President
Julius Nyerere, has frequently been let down by the main protagonists.
Some African states would be willing to send peacekeeping forces to the
region, but they would need financial, logistical and training assistance
from the West. Indeed, regional initiatives would need international backing
to succeed.
After the problems in Somalia and Bosnia Herzegovina, most countries
would understandably be concerned about providing troops to serve in peace
enforcement operations. Unlike the traditional peacekeeping forces which
are lightly armed, require the consent of the parties, and refrain from
the use of force except in extreme circumstances, enforcement operations
are war-fighting units.(29) The Canadian-led multinational force for eastern
Zaire which was authorised by the Security Council Resolution 1080 of
15 November 1996, is to be an enforcement operation under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter. It has been authorised to use 'all necessary
means' to achieve the UN mandate, namely to facilitate a humanitarian
operation in eastern Zaire. The cost of the operation is to be borne primarily
by the participating member states, but the Security Council has also
recommended the establishment of a voluntary trust fund to facilitate
African participation in the force.
The operation, whose mandate expires on 31 March 1997, has been preceded
by controversy over what it is going to achieve. Earlier, on 9 November
1996, the Security Council had adopted Resolution 1078 calling on all
the parties to the conflicts in Central Africa to 'create favourable and
safe conditions to facilitate the delivery of international humanitarian
assistance', but it had refrained from authorising a military intervention.
One of the obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance has been
the armed Hutu militias who have been using refugees as a form of protection,
but Resolution 1080 does not authorise the UN troops to disarm these militias.
Documents left at the Mugunga and Goma refugee camps by the fleeing Hutu
militias in November 1996 indicate that they obtained arms from firms
in the UK, Italy and Spain, and that many of these weapons were bought
from eastern Europe and transported to Goma in eastern Zaire via Israel.
However, the US, whose contributions-financial, logistical and troops-would
determine the effectiveness of the multinational force, has made it a
condition of participation that it would not attempt disarmament. Some
commentators who remember the Congo operation of the early 1960s have
warned that this force should not repeat the past mistakes, but it could
also be argued that the Congo operation was a victim of Cold War politics.(30)
Others have argued that the goals set for the force must be achievable,
and indeed, facilitating humanitarian supplies is a very achievable, albeit
short-term, objective. It is also true that for a peacekeeping or enforcement
operation to succeed, it should have a clear mandate, achievable goals,
the political will, and the necessary resources. However, the most important
thing is not whether the goals are achievable, but whether such goals
have been framed in terms of what is desirable on the ground. There is
always the need to narrow the gap between what is desirable on the ground
and what the countries contributing troops are willing to do. A military
operation which deals with the symptoms of the problem while leaving the
causes untouched is of very limited value indeed.
The Central African region has seen three UN-authorised military deployments
in the past three years(31): the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR)
from October 1993; France's 'Operation Turquoise' in June 1994 (which
involved operation in Southwest Rwanda); and another UNAMIR which was
deployed from August 1994 to March 1996. Each of these deployments had
clear objectives, but their mandates were so limited that they created
the impression that a UN military presence is likely to be ineffective.
For instance, the UNAMIR which was deployed in October 1993 was authorised
by Security Council Resolution 872 to: contribute to the security of the
capital, Kigali; monitor the observance of the Arusha ceasefire agreement;
and monitor the repatriation of refugees. These were clear and achievable
objectives, but they were not framed with the volatility of the Rwandan
situation in mind. Indeed, when the genocide started in April 1994, the
UN troops looked on as Rwandans slaughtered each other, and this gave
the UN a bad name because it could not prevent the atrocities.(32)
In late June 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 929 authorising
the deployment of French troops under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for
a two-month period. The Security Council had determined that 'the magnitude
of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda' constituted 'a threat to peace and
security in the region' and gave the French contingent the authority to
use 'all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives'. 'Operation
Turquoise' saved some lives, but because it did nothing to apprehend the
Interahamwe and the other people who had committed the genocide,
it was perceived as partisan. It was partly because of the limited mandates
of these earlier operations that the RPF government refused to cooperate
with the second UNAMIR operation which lasted from August 1994 to March
1996. The lessons from these three missions to Rwanda are that to maintain
the UN's credibility, the objectives of the force must be attuned to the
conditions on the ground; ie, the UN-sponsored force must have a mandate
which enables it to try to deal with the main challenges which the force
is likely to encounter.
The Canadian-led UN force to eastern Zaire has been designated a humanitarian
operation; its primary goal is to establish secure conditions for the
delivery of relief supplies. Humanitarian needs in eastern Zaire, as elsewhere,
are very important, but they are also the easiest to realise. Indeed,
even before the UN force was assembled, refugees started crossing back
into Rwanda in huge numbers, and this meant that more humanitarian resources
would be needed inside Rwanda than in eastern Zaire. The problem in eastern
Zaire, as already explained, is primarily political and only secondarily
humanitarian. It also has four dimensions, involving Rwanda, Burundi and
other countries in the region, including Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. This
multinational force can, therefore, provide a long-term solution to the
conflict only if it goes beyond the humanitarian goal.
In addition to establishing humanitarian corridors, the UN, and the prominent
players in this force, especially the US, Canada, France, Britain and
the other countries with the requisite financial and administrative resources
should seek to alleviate the political situation through conflict mediation
and preventive diplomacy. The UN has called for an international conference
on peace, security and development in the Central African region. This
forum should be used to facilitate democratisation and confidence-building,
without which security and development would be hard to attain. The international
community should put pressure on the countries in the region, especially
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire to desist from supporting rebels
in other countries. Rebels generally justify their claims on the basis
of political or economic marginalisation, and the most effective way to
deal with rebel activity in such cases is to liberalise the political
system. The international community, therefore, should support efforts
by the parties in the countries concerned, with assistance from the OAU,
to effect political reform and the development of good governance. Without
strong public institutions and democratic rule in these countries, conflicts
will not go away and the international community will be faced with another
catastrophe before long.
Given the fact that Central Africa is far away from our shores and we
have no clear strategic or economic interests in this region, is there
any need for our involvement in this crisis? And, what role can Australia
play? Many of the countries which have agreed to participate in the multinational
force have done so presumably to help humanity, not to advance their strategic
or economic interests. Given that one of the five goals in the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade's 1994 mission statement is to advance Australia's
standing as a good international citizen and that the duties of a good
international citizen include the provision of humanitarian assistance,
the promotion of good governance and support for human rights regimes,(33)
it can be argued that Australia should make a contribution.
The Howard Government has already taken a positive attitude towards the
situation in Rwanda and eastern Zaire. On 14 November 1996, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Downer, offered $2.6 million of development assistance
to the relief agencies involved in the region. This money was intended
to provide logistic support for Community Aid Abroad, World Vision, Medecins
Sans Frontieres, Care Australia, Adventist Development Relief Agency,
Australian Catholic Relief, Austcare and UNICEF Australia. In response
to questions in Parliament on 18 November, both the Foreign Minister and
Mr. Howard emphasised that this was an initial contribution and that the
government would commit more funds if the circumstances changed. Mr. Howard
said: 'At this moment it is a situation which is too fluid and too unpredictable
for Australia to make a definite decision'. By early December 1996, however,
the situation in Central Africa had escalated and required more attention
from the international community. Is the Government now ready to go beyond
the $2.6 million? If so, in what ways should Australia assist?
In the wake of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Australia sent a contingent
of 308 defence personnel to serve under UNAMIR 1994. It is generally acknowledged
that the Australian military medical team which worked under UNAMIR from
1994 was very successful in reconstructing the Kigali hospital. Unlike
other countries which are sending forces to Central Africa for the first
time, Australia has already served there and gained valuable experience
of the region.(34) However, this time our role could be wider than it
was two years ago because the new UN mandate is broader. For example,
Security Council Resolution 1080 calls for efforts to enhance peace, security
and development in the region, and this means that the support we provide
should go beyond peace enforcement and traditional peacekeeping. Earlier,
Australia had participated in a multifaceted military operation in Somalia,
where Australian personnel were effective in training a Somali police
force in Baidoa. Australian personnel also participated in the reconstruction
of Cambodia after the civil war. Through these earlier operations, Australia
has acquired the experience needed in the Central African conditions.
Australia can participate in political reconciliation, peace making and
preventive diplomacy at several levels: through troop contribution to
the multinational force; financial assistance to facilitate African participation
in the force; relief supplies for refugees in the camps and those who
have recently returned to Rwanda; and post-conflict support to help Rwanda,
Burundi and Zaire strengthen civil society and public institutions.
Troop contributions to the multinational force would be more visible
than other forms of assistance, and the Prime Minister has indicated that
Australia would contribute troops if invited to do so, but this is not
something to which we should give high priority. Several Western countries
have already pledged to send in troops, and since the military threat
does not appear to be enormous, Australia should consider other tasks.
For instance, Australia could help to train and finance some African troops
to be used in the military operation.
There are other tasks in which Australia can participate and through
them contribute effectively to long-term peace, security and development
in the region. Recently, the Rwandan President, Pasteur Bizimungu, invited
the international community to help with what he called 'reconstruction'
assistance. Rwanda needs at least $1 billion (US$700 million) to provide
housing for the returning refugees. Australia could respond positively
to these non-military needs and help the Rwandans reconstruct their society.
Over 500 000 Rwandan refugees returned from the camps in eastern Zaire
in the first three weeks of November 1996, and some of these have no homes,
hospitals or schools for their children. Australia could also join the
rest of the international community to help these people have shelter
and the other basic needs such as health care, running water and food.
We are well-equipped to help build hospitals and schools. Moreover, the
Rwandan justice system has totally broken down, with few available magistrates
and judges, and overcrowded jails. Taking account of the different judicial
systems, Australia could provide legal assistance and help build jails
to ease the overcrowding.
The civil wars and humanitarian disasters in the Central African region
and other parts of Africa have resulted from dictatorial regimes, poor
macro-economic policies and corruption. To reduce the chances of these
disasters recurring, help is needed to establish grassroots organisations
that can articulate the goals and interests of the people of this region.
The Australian government (and other interested governments) should keep
in mind the fact that the ultimate requirement for a long-term solution
to conflicts in Central Africa include institutional reform and good governance.
As of 2 December 1996, the Central African region was still politically
unstable and humanitarian needs were increasing, but the multinational
force had not arrived. The head of the proposed military operation, Canadian
Lt.-Gen. Maurice Baril, visited Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire on November 27
and 28 to assess further the military situation, and in early December
1996 there were reports that the force had been scaled down considerably.
Instead of the 12 000 troops estimated for the operation in mid November,
it was likely that only 2000 soldiers would be sent in. The proposed headquarters
of the multinational force had also been moved from Kigali in Rwanda to
Entebbe in Uganda, where an advance team of more than 550 British, Canadian
and US military personnel has been based since early in November. The
military operation's immediate task would be to parachute food to the
refugees in eastern Zaire. Several parties within and outside the Central
African region were still opposed to the initial mandate of the multinational
force for completely different reasons. For example, Rwanda and the Banyamulenge
rebels did not want the UN troops because of the fear that they would
enable Zairean authorities to resume control of eastern Zaire. On the
other hand, some of the 20 countries which were expected to contribute
troops were reluctant because of the likely danger the soldiers would
face.
In the meantime, the refugee situation has been continually deteriorating.
Aerial surveys by Britain on 27 November revealed that there were numerous
refugee camps scattered throughout the mountainous and forested areas
of eastern Zaire. While the number of Rwandans returning home has decreased,
there were still many Zairean and Burundian refugees fleeing to Rwanda,
Tanzania and Uganda. There were also more than 10 000 displaced Zaireans
near Bukavu. Indeed, all the signs are that while the humanitarian situation
in the Central African region is worsening by the day, no one has yet
started to take appropriate measures to address its underlying political
and economic causes.
- See UN Security Council Resolution 1080 of 15 November 1996. For initial
conflicting reports on possible US participation in the operation, see
Alison Mitchell, 'Clinton offers US troops to help refugees in Zaire',
New York Times, 14 November 1996; and Jeffrey Smith, 'US military
role may be scaled down', Washington Post, 18 November 1996.
- The conflict in South Kivu, Zaire and its regional implications',
Integrated Regional Information Network, UN Department of Humanitarian
Affairs, 7 October 1996.
- The Twa people, often referred to as 'Pygmies', form about 1-2 percent
of the populations of Rwanda and Burundi. The survival of these hunter-gatherers
has been severely threatened by the clearing of forests and the destruction
of the environment in which they have lived for centuries.
- For an excellent analysis of these issues, see, for example, J. Bayo
Adekanye, 'Rwanda/Burundi: "Uni-ethnic" dominance and the cycle of armed
ethnic formations', Social Identities, vol. 2, no. 1, 1996, pp.
37-71.
- Zaire's neighbours, in alphabetical order, are: Angola, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
- See, for example, John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story,
(New York, 1978); and Keith Somerville, 'The Failure of Democratic Reform
in Angola and Zaire', Survival, vol 35, no 3, Autumn 1993, pp.
51-77.
- See, for example, Peter Mangold, 'Shaba I and Shaba II', Survival,
vol. 21, May-June 1979, pp. 107-112; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente
and Confrontation (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985),
pp. 623-630.
- I refer to the Banyamulenge as 'native Zaireans' because they settled
in the area where they now ive long before Zaire's boundaries were drawn
up by King Leopold of Belgium in the 19th century.
- The main ethnic groups in eastern Zaire include: Babemba, Bafulero,
Bahavu (of Bukavu), Bahunde, Banande, Banyabwisha, Banyamulenge, Banyindu,
Barega, Barundi, Bashi, Batembo, Bavira (of Uvira) and Manyema. Some
of these are very small groups which belong to major ethnic communities.
For example, the Batembo are part of the larger Banande community.
- For an example of these myths, see, for example, Gerard Prunier, The
Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London, Hirst &
Co., 1995), pp. 5-23.
- See Adekanye, 'Rwanda/Burundi', p. 41.
- Germany ruled Rwanda and Burundi as part of German East Africa (which
included mainland Tanzania) from the mid-1890s until World War I. After
the war Britain took over Tanzania (then called Tanganyika) while Belgium
took over Rwanda and Burundi, and ruled them as one entity called Ruanda-Urundi.
- For differing perspectives on this issue, see Adekanye, 'Rwanda/Burundi'
and Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994.
- For an interesting discussion of the background to the genocide, see,
for example, Prunier, The Rwanda crisis 1959-1994; and Catherine
Newbury, The cohesion of oppression: clientship and ethnicity in
Rwanda, 1860-1960 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1988).
- For a useful discussion of some of these issues, see Samuel M. Makinda,
'Revisiting Rwanda: reconciliation postponed', The World Today,
vol. 52, no. 5, May 1996, pp. 125-128.
- For a concise discussion of some of these issues, see David Dorward,
'Rwanda and Burundi: The politics of ethnicity and the psychology of
victimisation', Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 71, no. 1, June-July
1994, pp. 31-38.
- See, for example, 'Zaire: Mobutu manipulates at home and abroad',
Africa Confidential, vol 34, no 22, 5 November 1993; and 'Zaire:
Whose man in Kinshasa?' Africa Confidential, vol 35 no 25, 16
December 1994.
- Zaire's major ethnic groups are the Baluba, Bakongo, Balunda and Bangala,
which are divided into smaller groups. For instance, among the Baluba,
which is the largest Zairean ethnic community, here are smaller groups
such as Bachoke, Bakuba, Benalulua, Bashilele and Batetela. President
Mobutu has ensured that all these ethnic communities remain bitterly
divided.
- The Baluba are found in the diamond-rich Eastern and Western Kasai
provinces and extend into Zambia. (Zambian President Frederick Chiluba
belongs to the Baluba ethnic group). Since early in he 20th century,
a large number of the Baluba people have lived and worked in the copper-rich
Shaba province (formerly Katanga region). In recent years, many Balubas
have been expelled from Shaba by the Balunda. (The Balunda also extend
into Zambia and Angola).
- Strategic Survey 1993-1994, (London, International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 202.
- For a detailed analysis of the problems of multiparty politics in
Africa, see Samuel M. Makinda, Democracy and Multiparty Politics in
Africa', Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 34, no. 4, December
1996.
- For a useful analysis of some of these issues, see 'Burundi: more
violence, but not genocide', Strategic Comments, vol. 2, no.
3, April 1996.
- For a preliminary assessment of the 1996 Burundian coup, see, for
example, J. 'Bayo Adekanye, Why Buyoya's most recent coup cannot of
itself solve the Burundian cycle of armed ethnic conflict', International
Peace Research Institute, Oslo, August 1996 (unpublished paper). See
also Africa Confidential, vol. 37, no. 18, 6 September 1996.
- For a useful background to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, see Frank Frost,
The Rwanda Crisis: Communal Conflict and International Responses,
Parliamentary Research Service, Current Issues Brief, no. 17, 1994;
and Dorward, 'Rwanda and Burundi'.
- See Makinda, 'Revisiting Rwanda'.
- For an interesting discussion of these issues, see, for example, Somerville.
- See, for example, Strategic Survey: 1995/96, (London, International
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 221-227; and 'Les grosses
legumes', Africa Confidential, vol 36, no 25, 15 December 1995.
- For details of the Arusha agreement, see UN Security Council, Document
S/26915, 23 December 1993.
- For different perspectives on peacekeeping and enforcement operations,
see, for example, Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), Crisis
of expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1995); Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking peace from chaos: humanitarian
intervention in Somalia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993); and
Mats Berdal, Whither Peacekeeping?, Adelphi Paper No. 281 (London,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993).
- See, for instance, Martin Woollacott, 'Danger lies waiting for UN
in Zaire', The Age, 13 November 1996.
- For a useful discussion of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, see,
for instance, Bruce D. Jones, "Intervention without Borders": Humanitarian
Intervention in Rwanda', Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 225-249.
- For the most detailed information on the UN involvement in Rwanda,
see The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996 (New York, United
Nations, 1996).
- For some useful discussions of the concept of good international citizenship,
see, for instance, David Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International
Citizenship', in Stephanie Lawson (ed.), The New Agenda for Global
Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond (Sydney, Allen &
Unwin, 1995), pp. 171-188; Insight, vol. 2, no. 16, 13 September
1993, p. 13; and Andrew Linklater, What is a Good International Citizen?',
in Paul Keal (ed.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Sydney, Allen
& Unwin, 1992), pp. 21-43.
- For a useful discussion of Australian contributions to Rwanda in 1994,
see Frost, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 18-20.
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