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A DIFFerence of Opinion: Cancellation of the Development Import Finance
Facility
Dr Ravi Tomar
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
Contents
Introduction
Background
Changes in DIFF Rules
The DIFF Debate
Nature of DIFF Allocations
Effectiveness of DIFF
The Cancellation of DIFF
Conclusion
Endnotes
Appendix
The Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF) has proved to be one
of the most controversial elements of the Australian aid program, attracting
strong criticism and equally strong support. It is a 'mixed credit' or
'associated financing' scheme which enables Australian companies to tender
competitive contracts for the supply of Australian goods and services
for projects in developing countries. The DIFF grant, usually equal to
35 per cent of the value of a contract, is combined with export credit
from the Export Finance Insurance Commission (EFIC) of Austrade to provide
a concessional loan to recipient country.
The DIFF scheme was cancelled following the change of government in
March. Although no formal announcement appears to have been made, its
cancellation was foreshadowed in a pre-election media release by the then
Shadow Treasurer, Peter Costello.(1) Reaction from various groups with
an interest in the aid budget, including the Australian Council for Overseas
Aid (ACFOA),(2) has been largely negative. Given the concern that has
been generated by the discontinuation of DIFF, it is likely to remain
an issue for some time.
It can be seen from table one that there has been a steady decline in
Australia's Official Development Assistance (ODA) over the last decade
and that it is currently below the United Nations target of 0.7 per cent
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
In 1995-96, Australia's aid expenditure is forecast to be $1563.2 million,
an increase of about $83 million over the 1994-95 outlay. In real terms
this represents a growth of 1.8 per cent or $28 million. However, due
to the growth of the Australian economy, the ratio of the volume of Official
Development Assistance to the Gross National Product (the ODA/GNP ratio)
will actually decline from 0.34 per cent in 1994-95 to 0.33 in 1995-96.
While Australia's GNP per capita in real terms has increased from $19
800 in 1983-84 to an expected $25 500 in 1995-96, aid expenditure over
the same period has declined from $99 to about $82 per capita.(3)
In 1988-89 there was a one-off forward of multilateral development bank
(MDB) payments. This had the effect of increasing 1988-89 expenditure
but decreasing 1989-90 expenditure.
Source: Australia's Overseas aid Program 1995-96, Budget Related Paper
No. 2.
The decline in the aid budget has also had an impact on its commercial
aspects. According to ACFOA:(4)
The Government defends the increasing commercial elements in the program
by pointing to the declining political commitment to aid and arguing that
a broader base of support needs to be developed for the aid program.
Nonetheless, Australia's contribution at over $1.56 billion is by no
means among the lowest in the donors list. It ranks 9th in terms of ODA/GNP
ratio among the 21 countries that form the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
In contrast, Japan, which has an aid budget of over $15 billion, ranks
16th.(5)
The Australian budget is split into country (bilateral) programs and
global programs which include funding for international organisations,
(multilateral aid), emergencies, aid to Non Government Organisations (NGOs)
and for commercial activity. In 1995-96, country programs accounted for
about 56 per cent of the total budget while 35 per cent was allocated
to global programs. Other development activities absorb about 3 per cent
and the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR)
receives another 3 per cent.
In what could be described as a tacit spheres-of-influence arrangement
among Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, Australia has for
long had a regional focus on its aid program. This concentration makes
for greater cost-effectiveness and impact per aid dollar by reducing the
administrative overheads of a wider spread. As a relatively small donor,
Australia, for example, leaves Africa and Latin America largely to the
big donors with traditional interests in those areas.
In 1995-96, more than 77 per cent of the expenditure will be directed
towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific. While at first glance this figure
might look impressive, it is also deceptive. Of the total country program
budget of nearly $876 million, Papua New Guinea alone receives over $312
million, or over 35 per cent.
Countries in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific account for 29 per
cent and 13 per cent of the country program budget respectively. Some
$38.5 million, or less than 5 per cent of the program development aid,
is destined for Africa although the continent remains a major recipient
of Australia's humanitarian assistance.
The contribution of NGOs was also recognised in this year's budget.
Total funding for NGOs is expected to be over $100 million compared to
about $97.6 million in 1994-95. The outlay for humanitarian assistance
too has been increased by $10.5 million to $84 million.
By contrast the expenditure of DIFF would have been reduced to $120
million from $130 million in 1994-95.
The decision to introduce DIFF was taken in 1980, with the first project
being approved in 1982, as a response to the mixed credit programs of
other OECD donors. These programs had been initiated by many countries
in the late 1960s, and by 1982 they accounted for about 6 per cent of
total OECD bilateral Overseas Development Assistance. Initially, the Australian
scheme was directed at ASEAN countries and was to be used to support those
industries which were already internationally competitive. The main objective
was to match concessional financing being provided by other countries
and thus to help Australian firms compete for aid projects.
A secondary objective was to help develop new markets for Australian
exporters. While the original intention was not to subsidise manufacturers,
benefits to Australian industry being seen as ancillary to this objective,
there was a concern that Australia aid would be good for Australia too.
For example, where Australian goods and services could be used in Australian
aid projects, they should be used for this purpose as long as the result
was not to reduce their quality as good aid. Some questions about this
remaining the case, however, emerged with the changes in the administration
of DIFF which could be seen to have resulted in the commercial aspects
rivalling the development intent.
Source: AIDAB/AusAID, Australia's Overseas Aid Program: Statistical
Summary, 1989/90 to 1994/95 (various issues).
The first DIFF project was approved in 1982 and, during the same year,
the eligibility criteria was broadened from just the ASEAN region to all
countries receiving Australian aid. In 1983, the conditions attached to
DIFF grants were relaxed further. The requirement for applicants to demonstrate
aid-supported competition for specific projects was dropped; all that
was now required was sufficient evidence of foreign donor competition
in the country concerned. By 1987 it had been decided that the DIFF/EFIC
financing package could be tailored to suit the needs of the recipients.
Also, Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines,
Sri Lanka and Thailand were declared by AIDAB to be 'spoiled markets'.
(The markets were considered to be 'spoiled' by the volume of aid-supported
financial packages available from other donors). This meant that DIFF
was available without the need of evidence of aid-supported competition
for capital goods. Such evidence was, however, required for services and
non-capital goods.
Another review in 1989 led to further changes with the aim of increasing
the effectiveness of the scheme. Feasibility studies had to be carried
out, which were then appraised by AusAID using the same criteria as that
used for bilateral grant aid projects. DIFF funding could be denied in
cases where assistance had been provided in the same sector and, in some
cases, the same region of a recipient country. Further, 90 per cent of
each year's funding would be used to support activities in Australia's
region with a maximum of 40 per cent of DIFF funds to be allocated to
any one country.
In February 1992, a new set of international guidelines established
by the OECD, the 'Helsinki rules' came into effect. The aim of these guidelines
was to direct mixed credit financing away from commercially viable projects
toward projects and countries that had little chance of access to private
funds. The guidelines also have a provision that allows any OECD member
to call for consultations and 'challenge' another member to prove that
their project conforms to the revised rules. The effectiveness of these
rules is apparent by the fact that by June 1994, about 20 per cent of
the total notifications regarding mixed credit financing to the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD had resulted in consultations.
Under current Australian guidelines, to be eligible for DIFF funding,
a project must:(6)
- be accorded priority under the recipient government's development
plan
- demonstrably contribute to the recipient government's economic and
social development objectives
- be consistent with Australia's development assistance objectives,
including environmental, social, cultural and gender specific objectives
- be financially and economically viable
- goods and services being provided must be wholly or mainly of Australian
origin.
In addition, funding must be proven to be necessary and justifiable
to match officially aid-supported competition and for projects involving
mainly services.
On the other hand, DIFF grants are not available for projects where
DIFF has previously provided assistance in the same sector of a recipient
country. Grants are also not available for:
- defence equipment or defence related projects
- luxury goods
- consumer durables; and
- raw bulk commodities.
Interestingly, the new guidelines did not reduce the popularity of the
DIFF scheme despite the fact that about 50 per cent of the proposed projects
in the energy sector and 60 per cent of telecommunication projects seeking
funding were found to be commercially viable, and therefore ineligible.
In 1994-95, DIFF funds were oversubscribed by a factor of thirteen, with
projects worth over $1.7 billion seeking DIFF grants worth $123 million.
The 1995-96 figure was over $2 billion.
As a result of the changes, the main focus of DIFF funding over the
past few years has been on infrastructure projects such as education,
water supply and treatment, waste disposal, transport, and rural telecommunications
and power. In the 1994-95 budget the Government introduced a new Green
DIFF initiative to 'provide expanded opportunities for Australian
business to supply developmentally important goods and services with an
environmental focus to developing countries'. The objective of the Green
DIFF is to transfer 'environmentally friendly technology and the provision
of vital environmental infrastructure...'(7) This initiative could perhaps
be viewed as a response to an earlier recommendation by the ACFOA, a critic
of the DIFF program, to phase out the DIFF component of aid and establish
a Green Technology Transfer Fund (GTTF).(8)
It can be argued that the early years of the DIFF program were thus
not just an exercise in helping Australian industry find new export markets;
DIFF funds were used to develop the export capability of a select
few Australian manufacturers. For example, of a total of some $118.5 million
in DIFF grants provided between 1982-83 and 1988-89, almost all were for
projects in Indonesia and China. During this period, one company alone,
Transfield Construction, was provided with DIFF funds amounting to $64.6
million for the Steel Bridges Projects No I and II in Indonesia.(9) Transfield
is also a company that did extremely well out of the scheme in its early
years between 1984 and 1993 receiving $153.4 million in DIFF funds, or
nearly 30 per cent of all DIFF expenditure during this period (see Appendix).
By 1991-92 as well, DIFF expenditure in Indonesia exceeded project aid
expenditure and in 1992-93 it was about $50 million. Over the period 1982-83
to 1992-93, about 46 per cent of total DIFF expenditure was in Indonesia.(10)
These apparent distortions or imbalances contributed to the questioning
of DIFF as 'good aid'. While that questioning often neglected to take
account of both the enormous developmental needs of Indonesia and China
and their significance to Australia in the region, AusAID's own review
has questioned the viability and developmental relevance of the early
programs (especially in Indonesia): 'concerns were expressed both about
the lack of scrutiny applied to DIFF proposals and the developmental effectiveness
of some of the activities supported.'(11)
These criticisms were more valid for the first few years after its inception
when projects in sectors such as manufacturing and mining absorbed a considerable
amount of DIFF outlay. Also, as AusAID has argued in its Review,(12) it
was not until 1992 that the effect of the changes made in 1989 became
obvious. The reason for the delay was a substantial backlog of projects
which had been approved under the old guidelines, an indication of the
popularity of the scheme among Australian businesses during a period when
oversight was lax and there was little competition for available funds.
As DIFF has developed, however, with a tightening of the rules and greater
scrutiny, the original objectives are more likely to be met.
Throughout its life, the DIFF program has come under sustained criticism,
especially from the NGOs. The linkages between aid and Australian business
were seen as simply a subsidy for Australian business It was argued that
mixed credit schemes distort development cooperation. Debate has also
continued over whether DIFF is developmental or commercial by nature.
Critics have argued interalia:(13)
- DIFF diverts scarce aid resources to better off countries which have
access to commercial funding. This is done at the expense of projects
which would directly assist the poor and disadvantaged.
- It is a trade promotion subsidy for Australian industry; that if this
is the aim then the funds would be better used in other, more cost-effective
trade and industry promotion programs.
- DIFF distorts the domestic economy and has an adverse impact on exporters
by creating a dependency effect
In defence of the DIFF program, it is maintained that:
- The restrictions introduced under the Helsinki rules have effectively
directed mixed credits towards projects and countries which have little
or no access to market financing. Since these restrictions do not apply
to countries recognised as 'least developed' by the UN, mixed credits
are now more freely available to such recipients than to relatively
more developed ones. In the Australian context, the two largest recipients
of DIFF grants, Indonesia and China, are also, with the exception of
PNG, the two largest recipients of bilateral aid. Also, sustainable
development, the primary objective of Australia's aid, requires a long-term
perspective rather than an attempt to meet the immediate needs of the
poor. Hence, investments in areas such as water supply, sanitation and
communication facilities can play a significant role in addressing the
causes of poverty.
- If DIFF were a trade subsidy, then other elements of the aid program
could also be classified as such. Food aid would have to be considered
to be a very inefficient subsidy as it is provided on a 100 per cent
grant basis, compared to the 35 per cent AusAID contributes to DIFF
project costs. The latter not only provides a mechanism for stretching
the aid dollar but also encourages the involvement of the private sector
in the Australian aid program.
- With a DIFF expenditure of about $120 million or about 0.03 per cent
of GNP, any distortion effects are likely to be rather small and, compared
to exports, not measurable. A similar rationale applies to the dependency
argument. DIFF is too small to have any significant effect on the industry
sector.
As funding for the DIFF scheme has grown rapidly over the past decade,
it has developed into a well focused program. From $12.5 million in 1984-85,
outlays on DIFF have grown to $130 million in 1994-95, about 8 per cent
of the aid budget. As figure one shows, over this period, Indonesia and
China have been the main recipients of DIFF grants, accounting for 46
per cent and 30 per cent of the expenditure respectively. The 9 per cent
of total DIFF disbursements of $61.5 million to India are for the only
DIFF related project in the country, the Piparwar Coal Mining project.
These three countries thus account for 85 per cent of the total DIFF funding.
However, from the scheme's inception until June 1994, 90 projects with
a total value of $643 million were undertaken in 15 countries. Another
$123 million was committed on 13 projects during 1994-95.(14)
In terms of the sectoral allocation of DIFF grants, most of the funding
has been to the transport (46 per cent) and communication (11 per cent)
sectors.
A report on a review of the DIFF program carried out by AusAID, (A
Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import Finance Facility,
January 1996) concluded that:
47 of the 51 projects surveyed had been effective in delivering the specific
development benefits which had been intended. Overall, two-thirds of the
project were rated as having delivered 75 per cent or more of their intended
development benefits.(15)
The report also concluded that substantial benefits had been generated
for Australia. Involving $285 million of AusAID funds, the 51 projects
initiated between 1988 and 1993, generated $709 million expenditure on
goods and services in Australia. Follow-on business directly related to
these DIFF projects already realised by companies was estimated at $263
million and it was anticipated that another $397 million worth of follow-on
business was likely to be achieved. Thus, excluding the follow-on business,
it has been estimated that $1 of DIFF expenditure generated about $3.50
of business for Australia. Table three illustrates the direct commercial
benefits from DIFF by country and region.
The highest rate of commercial returns from DIFF projects by table four
includes the communication, manufacturing and agriculture sectors. However,
it must be pointed out that several of the agricultural projects were
in fact processing activities which could be classified as manufacturing.
Other benefits identified in the review include:
- companies achieving economies of scale with repeat orders making them
more competitive on a commercial basis for further work of a similar
type. This is especially true in the field of high technology.
- companies gained practical experience in working overseas and establishing
contacts. For example, Transfield Construction changed from a company
with less than 5 per cent of its total income derived from international
activities in the mid-1980s to one where about 26 per cent of its income
is now derived from its overseas operations. It won $4 million worth
of bridge work in Laos without aid support. In China, Thailand and Taiwan
it had, by the mid 1990s, won $100 million worth of business 'not involving
Australian aid, but which was partially linked to the original AIDAB
(as AusAID then was) support in Indonesia'.(16) Amongst the participating
companies there also developed a greater awareness about overseas market
opportunities, as is shown in table five.
- a number of companies said that during the time the Australian economy
was in recession (which included the period covered by the survey),
they might not have remained viable. Some stated that they would have
gone out of business. Westinghouse Brake and Signal, for example, reported
that had it not been for the DIFF financed Rail Signalling project in
Thailand in 1989, it would have been forced to substantially reduce
its numbers.(17)
- while it was difficult for the AusAID review team to arrive at an
accurate assessment of the impact of DIFF-supported activities on employment,
a conservative estimate of the employment generated by DIFF financed
contracts and direct follow-on business, was of the order of 1500 staff
years for the prime contractors only. This figure does not take into
account employment generated through sub-contractors or for any multiplier
effect. To cite Transfield's experience again, as a result of the Steel
Bridges Project, it invested $15 million in its Seven Hills fabrication
facility, which would otherwise have closed down, and created an extra
350 to 450 jobs. BHP which supplied the steel for the project, was estimated
to have created about 500 extra jobs.(18)
According to AusAID, 'It is fair, therefore, to conclude that DIFF helped
in a modest way to ameliorate the adverse employment effects of the recession.'(19)
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the review was based on an
analysis of the DIFF scheme as it was (1988-89 to 1992-93), rather than
it is today. In other words, the review covered projects approved before
the revised Helsinki guidelines of the OECD took effect. Some of the projects
would not be approved under current guidelines. This is especially true
of the mining and manufacturing sectors. Public sector infrastructure
projects in the water supply, sanitation and transport sectors, energy
and telecommunication projects in remote areas would still be eligible.
When the cancellation of the DIFF scheme was announced, according to
media estimates, there were about 52 projects with a combined value of
around $1.2 billion in the pipeline. Australian companies are reported
to have spent about $70 million on their development. They range from
large firms like Transfield aiming for a $60 million contract to provide
search and rescue vessels to the Philippines(20) to various high-tech
small businesses aiming to enter the Asian market.
Internationally, it was expected that the revised Helsinki guidelines
might lead to a reduction in mixed credit financing. This appears not
to have been the case. Notifications of Helsinki type mixed credits rose
from about $5.92 billion in 1993 to $7.14 billion in 1994. $4.2 billion
of projects were notified in the first half of 1995.
Pending a review, the DIFF scheme was cancelled in April 1996. The scrapping
of the scheme has also been the subject of criticism from various quarters,
including some of the recipient countries
The former head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard
Woolcott, urged the Government to reverse its election commitment to abolish
the DIFF because it contradicted the Government's larger commitment of
making closer ties to the region a foreign policy priority. In a confidential
letter to Andrew Thomson, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Foreign Minister,
leaked to the Australian, he said:(21)
As things stand, Mr Howard's and Mr Downer's rhetoric about closer engagement
with Asia has been eroded by this action and our credibility and reputation
for reliability in the region will suffer, especially in the Philippines,
following understandings reached during President Ramos's visit last August...
...I am sorry to have to write in these terms, especially as I have
done my best to assist the new Government establish its credentials
in Malaysia and in Indonesia and in a series of meetings with other
ASEAN ambassadors in Canberra, but I believe this decision really will
damage Australia's wider national interests in Asia.
Interestingly, given its earlier position, ACFOA issued a statement
saying that the decision would 'send all the wrong signals to Asian neighbours
and, in the end, act against Australia's national interest'.(22)
One of the largest recipient of DIFF-supported projects, China, also
expressed concern about the decision to abolish the scheme. Some 19 projects
worth about $140 million are said to be involved. The Chinese Ambassador
to Australia, Hua Junduo said in a statement:(23)
Should those projects be scrapped off, it would not only cause financial
losses on the Chinese side, but also do no good to the Australian side
in terms of its credibility and business interests in China...
...We hope that the Australian Government will follow internationally
accepted practices and continue to support the projects in the pipeline
and implement these projects on time.
The Philippines Ambassador to Australia, Delia Domingo-Albert, was also
critical of the decision to abolish DIFF. Appearing in the Nine Network's
Nightline program, she said:(24)
It is a business transaction where there is a lot of competition, so if
you are not in the market, then someone else will come in.
There will be a feeling in the region that Australia is not serious
in promoting its capabilities in terms of its products in the market.
Other countries support their companies in making an inroad into markets,
and the DIFF scheme is definitely a way to help Australian companies
into the market.
On 26 June, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer informed
Parliament that he had received written or oral representations at the
ministerial level from Indonesia, China and the Philippines regarding
the cancellation of DIFF.(25)
The Queensland Minister for Economic Development and Trade, Don Slack
and the Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennett had also written to the Government
about the adverse effects of this decision.(26)
Nonetheless the decision to abolish DIFF continues to be defended as
one of those regrettable decisions required to bring the budget into surplus.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, replying to a question
in Parliament on 17 June 1996 said:(27)
The fact is that if we did not abolish this program we would otherwise
have to reduce spending on humanitarian programs within the aid budget...we
were not prepared to do that. If we had to make a reduction in the aid
budget, we were prepared to do that in the area of business subsidies.
A day later, on 18 June 1996, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Thomson indicated that the cancellation of
DIFF may not be permanent. Speaking during a debate on DIFF he said:(28)
....if there is room and if budgetary circumstances permit....down the
track, in the financial year after next, we may be able to reintroduce
a form of mixed credit scheme and resume some of the projects that were
in the pipeline. If it was the case that after the election we had been
left with a budget that was in a reasonable shape, I have no doubt that
there would be no abolition of a scheme like DIFF.
The Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF), a mixed credit funding
scheme, has had its share of controversy. Supporters maintain that it
provides them with a level playing field in the growing markets of Asia
where other countries have traditionally provided such funding to their
exporters. Critics maintain that the scheme distorts aid priorities and
is a trade promotion subsidy for Australian industry.
From its inception in the early 1980s to its demise in 1996, DIFF has
been the subject of many reviews, revisions and changes in guidelines.
The 1990s saw the program deliver what it was designed to do - development
projects in recipient countries while helping Australian industry develop
an export outlook.
It should perhaps be noted that aid, by definition as an operation in
underdeveloped, overseas environments, is difficult. If it were not, it
can be argued that the private sector rather than the government, would
do it. Reviews of forms of aid have been an ongoing part of the international
aid debate since aid became a significant aspect of international relations
with the de-colonisation process that followed World War II and this will
quite probably continue to be the case. DIFF has been no exception. But,
as only 8 per cent of the total aid budget as at 1994-95, and moreover
that part of the budget particularly encouraging the involvement of the
private sector, it is paradoxical that it has been unilaterally rejected
by a Coalition Government which has stated its intention to involve the
private sector in its aid program.
While the DIFF scheme in its present incarnation appears to be dead,
there may be a distinct possibility that the program could be revived.
Sections of the Australian business community and other organisations
involved in the aid program have strongly defended the scheme. Currently,
a review of the aid program is being conducted by Paul Simons, former
Executive Chairman of Woolworths. The report is due by the beginning of
1997. It is possible that the findings of this review might lead to the
reincarnation of a mixed credit scheme in 1997-98.
- Meeting Our Commitments, Media Release, 15 February 1996.
- Financial Review, 12 May 1996.
- Australia's Overseas Aid Program 1995-96. Budget Related Paper
No, 2, p. 15.
- Actionaid, The Reality of Aid 94, London, May 1994, p. 37.
- OECD, Development Assistance Committee Report 1995, Paris,
1996, p. 92.
- AIDAB, Development Import Finance Facility: Explanatory Brochure,
Canberra, 1994.
- Australian Development Cooperation Program 1994-95, Budget
Related Paper No. 2, p. 48.
- Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Aid For Change, May 1992,
p. 91-92.
- AusAID, Commercial Benefits from Development Cooperation with
Indonesia, Canberra, 1995, p. 136-137.
- ibid. p 27.
- ibid. p. 31.
- A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import Finance
Facility, loc cit. p. 16.
- See for example Actionaid, The Reality of Aid 94, London,
May 1994, p. 25, 37. 'Corporate Hijacking of Australian aid' AidWatch
No. 6, June 1995, p. 8-9, Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Aid
For Change, May 1992, p. 90-91.
- Minister for Development Cooperation, Media Release, 21 July
1995.
- A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import Finance
Facility, op cit., p.7.
- Commercial Benefits from Development Cooperation with Indonesia,
op.cit., p.137.
- Vivienne Filling, 'The Role of DIFF in Industry Strategies' in AIDAB,
Development with a DIFFerence, 1993, p.102.
- AIDAB, Focus, June 1992, p.26.
- A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import Finance
Facility, op cit.,p. 37
- Financial Review, 15 May 1996.
- 14 June 1996.
- News Fax 16 May 1996.
- Financial Review, 17 May 1996.
- ibid.
- Current House Hansard, 26 June 1996, p. 2777.
- Financial Review, 17 May 1996, also 6 June 1996.
- Current House Hansard, 17 June 1996, p.1956.
- Current House Hansard, 18 June 1996, p.2076.
Top 10 Development Import Finance Facility Contractors 1984-85 To 1994-95
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Company and Project DIFF Grant ($m)
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Transfield Construction Pty Ltd
Steel Bridges Project I (Indonesia) 21.7
Steel Bridges Project II 42.9
Steel Bridges Project III 67.6
Steel Bridges Project IV 10.1
Sarawak Transmission Grid (Malaysia) 11.1
Total 153.4
Westinghouse Brake and Signal Co
Cirebon-Kroya-Jogjakarta Rail Signal Project (Indonesia) 40.4
Tasikmalaya-Kroya Rail Signal Project (Indonesia) 24.5
Rail Signalling Equipment (Thailand) 18.4
Total 83.3
White Industries Ltd
Piparwar Coal Mining Project (India) 61.5
Total 61.5
GEC Alsthom Australia Ltd
Jakarta Electricity Substations (Indonesia) 24.3
Bekasi-Bandung Railway Signal Project (Indonesia) 27.5
Penang Port Commission Project (Malaysia) 9.3
Total 61.1
Olex Ltd
Xian-Chendu-Zengshou Telecommunications Project (China) 10.6
Lanxin Rail Communications Project (China) 7.3
Lanzhow-Urumqi Telecommunications Project (China) 25
Outer Islands Telecom Project (Cook Islands) 0.1
Total 43
Energy Equipment PtyLtd/CMPS & F
Henan Coal Gasification Project (China) 29.9
Luoyang Mining Machinery Plant (China) 2.6
Total 32.5
John Holland Construction Pty Ltd
Main Line South Railway Upgrade Project (Philippines) 18.1
Aircraft Hangar Complex (Bangladesh) 11.5
Total 29.6
Alcatel Australia
Gansu, Ningxia, Tibet Rural Telecommunications Project ( 21.2
Qinghai Telecommunications Project (China) 5.1
Digital Telephone Exchanges (PNG) 1.4
Total 27.7
ABB/EPT Pty Ltd
Jakarta Powerline Upgrade (Indonesia) 20.1
Total 20.1
Kirby Engineering Pty Ltd
Refrigerator Compressor Plant (China) 16.4
Vehicle Body Plastic Tooling (China) 3
Total 17.6
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Note: While facts on the recipients of DIFF grants are available in AusAID
publications, the dispersed nature of the information meant that this table
had to be compiled from various sources.
Sources: AusAID, Commercial Benefits from Development Cooperation with Indonesia,
Canberra, 1995.
AusAID, Business Participation in AusAID's Aid Programs 1994-95,
August 1995.
AIDAB, Business Participation in AIDAB's Aid Programs 1993-94,
September 1994.
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