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Touch-and-go for a Comprehensive Test Ban: the 28 June Deadline
David Anderson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
Contents
Major Issues
Introduction
Highlights Of Negotiations In The CD, Late 1995
And 1996
- 1995 Negotiations
- 1996 Negotiations: 1st Session
- 1996 Negotiations: 2nd Session
China's Position on a CTBT
India's Position on a CTBT
Pakistan's Position on a CTBT
The Non-Aligned Movement
Other Undecided Issues: The Entry Into Force Provisions
Australia's Role
- In the United Nations
- At the Conference on Disarmament
- Internationally
- In Australia
Conclusion
Endnotes
Appendix: Chronology of Major Events Relevant
to Nuclear Testing Moratoriums and CTBT Negotiations
Glossary
For the last two and a half years, negotiations have been proceeding
in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva with the aim of producing
a total ban on nuclear testing. As this paper is being written, proceedings
are at a critical stage. The current round of negotiations finishes on
28 June, and the aim is to have an agreed treaty text by this date.
Certainly there is provision for another negotiating session, beginning
on 29 July, but it must be acknowledged that if the present intense negotiations
cannot produce satisfactory compromises in entrenched positions on the
few remaining key issues, it may well be that the parties are too far
apart for even another round of negotiations to make much difference.
Certainly negotiations in the CD over the last twelve months have seen
some major breakthroughs:
- On 11 August 1995, President Clinton announced that the US would pursue
a zero-yield comprehensive test ban (CTB), not allowing even hydronuclear
tests.
- On 29 January 1996, President Chirac announced that France had ended
its controversial testing programme and would begin taking new initiatives
aimed at world disarmament.
- On 20 April 1996, President Yeltsin promised to support a treaty
that would prohibit all tests.
- More recently, in June, China first agreed to abandon its demands
for peaceful nuclear explosions to be exempted from a test ban and,
second, announced that it would end all testing after one more test
in September.
While these commitments to a comprehensive ban on testing largely resolve
what had been the most serious issue of the negotiations, the scope of
the treaty, several significant issues remain unresolved. With most of
the 38 member countries in the CD united on these matters, the most serious
opposition is coming from China and India.
China continues to hold to its position on on-site inspections, which
form a vital part of the verification regime for the treaty. Most other
countries are prepared to regard data collected by spy satellites or other
technical means as adequate to trigger an inspection. But China wants
to strictly limit data acceptable for an inspection request to that obtained
by the International Monitoring System, which covers only the four sources:
seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound data.
India's problems at the CD stem from its distinctive view of the objectives
of a CTB treaty. Whereas the US regards the treaty as an important contribution
to its non-proliferation policy, India wants the test ban to operate as
an instrument of disarmament by linking the treaty to a definite timetable
for eliminating nuclear weapons. India sees both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which came into force in 1970, and the CTB treaty as discriminatory,
part of an attempt by the five nuclear powers to legitimise and secure
their monopoly of nuclear weapons. While the nuclear powers acknowledge
that the ultimate goal is nuclear disarmament, they firmly oppose any
linking of the treaty with a disarmament timetable.
Hopefully the Indian position can be accommodated in the treaty by means
of a statement in the preamble, similar to the preamble to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, but offering much firmer commitments. But there is no possibility
of the nuclear powers committing themselves to a firm target date for
the elimination of nuclear weapons.
As Indian policy has hardened during the last year, Pakistan has tended
to follow suit, demanding, for example, that the nuclear powers should
endorse a timetable for nuclear disarmament. However, Pakistan has little
interest in carrying out a nuclear test, realising it would cost more
in international condemnation that would be gained in technical or strategic
benefits, and generally supports the CTB. Its main concern is to prevent
India from gaining any advantage; it is most unlikely that Pakistan would
sign the CTB treaty if India does not.
The one remaining disagreement over the scope of the treaty stems from
the criticism of the US by India and Pakistan for its planned series of
'sub-critical' experiments, i.e. experiments with plutonium which stop
short of creating a nuclear reaction. India and Pakistan argue that allowing
sub-critical underground experiments would pave the way for nuclear weapon
states to improve their arsenals.
One significant issue which is still causing problems at the negotiations
is the provisions for the treaty's entry into force. If, as a number of
states believe, ratification of the treaty by both India and Pakistan,
as threshold states, is regarded as essential for the treaty's operation,
there is a real danger that the treaty will never come into force because
both states are unlikely to sign, let alone ratify. In the model treaty
text presented to the conference in January this year, the solution to
this dilemma was achieved by means of a waiver. This Australian text provides
that, in the event of a deadlock, a conference of the states which have
ratified the treaty can decide, by a two-thirds majority, to waive other
ratification requirements. A similar formula will be necessary in the
completed treaty document .
In view of Australia's long record of commitment to a CTB treaty, including
very significant diplomatic effort in its pursuit, it is understandable
that the Australian delegation at the CD has been among the most active
of those involved in the negotiations. Its significant contributions include:
- Its presentation, in March 1994, of a draft treaty text. This document
together with a draft treaty text presented by Sweden, formed the foundation
for the 'rolling text' which has been the negotiating text for most
of the conference.
- Its presentation, in February 1996, of the model treaty text mentioned
above. This was an attempt to give new momentum to the negotiations.
- Its chairing of the drafting group on the International Monitoring
System, the key component of the treaty's verification regime. As part
of the CD Chairman's recent attempt to expedite proceedings, Australia
was appointed as 'moderator' for both the International Monitoring System
and the International Data Centre.
Australia has provided technical experts in the development of the International
Monitoring System. Australian facilities will be crucial to the effective
functioning of this System; only Russia and the US will host more monitoring
stations than Australia.
Hopefully the issues still in dispute can be resolved. Failure to complete
the treaty will be a major setback to the arms control and disarmament
regime.
For the last two and a half years, negotiations have been proceeding
in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva with the aim of producing
a total ban on nuclear testing. As this paper is being written, proceedings
are at a critical stage. The current round of negotiations finishes on
28 June, and the aim is to have an agreed treaty text by this date.
Despite the intense focus on 28 June, it can be argued that this deadline
is somewhat artificial. As part of the agreement to indefinitely extend
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Conference in New York in
April 1995, participating nations called for the completion of a test
ban treaty no later than 1996. Then at the UN General Assembly in December
1995 the international community adopted a resolution calling for the
conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) 'as soon as possible
in 1996'. An agreement reached by 28 June would give time for the text
to be translated and sent back to capitals, and then be presented to a
special session of the 50th UN General Assembly in early September. That
would allow for scheduling a signing ceremony during the regular 51st
assembly, which begins later in September.
But if, for example, there was still disagreement over the text on 28
June, and it was agreed to extend the negotiating session by a week of
so in an effort to resolve differences, an agreement reached in early
July would still fit in with the present timetable. And if agreement cannot
be reached, the treaty could be carried over to another negotiating session,
scheduled to run from 29 July to 13 September, with the signing of an
eventual treaty put off until early 1997.
However, the 28 June deadline does have symbolic and psychological importance.
Nearly all the 38 nations at the Conference on Disarmament are eager to
reach agreement by this date. And, most important, if the present intense
negotiations cannot produce satisfactory compromises in entrenched positions
on the few remaining key issues, it may well be that the parties are too
far apart for even another round of negotiations to make much difference.
------------
This paper will first outline highlights of the last six months or so
of negotiations. Then there will be a discussion of the attitudes of several
of the major participants with emphasis on the remaining obstacles to
completion of the treaty. Readers desiring more background on the value
of a comprehensive test ban and on the early negotiations should read
the Parliamentary Research Service Current Issues Brief No.2, 'Are we
finally on track for a Comprehensive Test Ban', issued in August 1995.
1995 Negotiations
Proceedings in the CD suffered several setbacks in 1995. First there
was the Chinese nuclear test in May 1995, just three days after the NPT
extension conference in New York had issued, by consensus, a document
which stipulated that:
Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,
the nuclear-weapon states should exercise utmost restraint(1) (i.e. refrain
from testing nuclear weapons)
A month later, on 13 June, President Chirac announced that France would
resume the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific, with a series of
eight tests. Soon after there were reports that the US Pentagon favoured
a low-threshold test ban, permitting tests equal to several hundred tons
of TNT, rather than a comprehensive test ban. Then in August, India introduced
a new obstacle to progress with a demand that any test ban treaty should
be linked with a program for attaining total nuclear disarmament.
A major breakthrough came on 11 August with an announcement by President
Clinton that the US would pursue a zero-yield CTB with even hydronuclear
tests being excluded. This declaration by the major nuclear power gave
a new lease of life to the negotiations.
1996 Negotiations: 1st Session
The negotiations recommenced on 22 January 1996 with some optimism but
also a real consciousness that time was running out. The first month was
not promising, and it was obvious that the existing negotiating process,
working from the 'rolling text' with its many bracketed parts denoting
areas of disagreement, would not deliver a treaty by mid-year. On 29 February,
Australia tabled at the Conference a 'model text' of a CTB treaty, with
explanatory notes. This text was produced after consideration of the various
national positions, and offered resolution of the bracketed sections in
the rolling text. The aim of this model treaty text was, according to
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to 'assist in...refocussing
the negotiations, and giving an upward shift in their style and pace'.(2)
Notable during the first session was the new enthusiasm of the French
delegation following the announcement by President Chirac on 29 January
that France had ended its controversial testing program in the South Pacific,
and would embark on a fresh campaign in favour of disarmament. On the
final day of this session, 29 March, the Chairman of the CD, the Dutch
diplomat Jaap Ramaker, took the Australian model text a step further by
tabling his own edited version of the rolling text. Although Ramaker's
working paper still included many sections of bracketed texts, it helped
focus activity on the key areas of disagreement.
However this first negotiating session of 1996 ended with the major
issues - the scope of the treaty, the nature of on-site inspections and
the provisions by which the treaty would enter into force - still unresolved.
One positive step came on 20 April, three weeks before the second session
began, when President Yeltsin, opening an eight-nation summit on nuclear
safety and security, promised to support a treaty that would prohibit
all nuclear tests and explosions. For most of 1994 and 1995, Russia had
favoured a test ban with a threshold yield as high as 80kt, although in
October 1995, President Yeltsin had indicated Russia's support in principle
for a zero-yield test ban.
On 25 April, Stephen Ledogar, the chief US negotiator, described the
state of the negotiations as 'depressing' and 'shameful', and warned that
'the window of opportunity to accomplish this long-sought objective could
close very suddenly.' He also presaged a tougher attitude by the USA at
the Conference, claiming that 'US goodwill in this negotiation is being
taken for granted', and warning that 'the United States will not sign
a document that does not meet fundamental requirements'.(3)
1996 Negotiations: 2nd Session
The CD resumed on 13 May for a seven-week session, the conclusion of
which marked the deadline for producing an agreed text. Chairman Ramaker
immediately introduced a series of steps to expedite proceedings:
- meetings were now to take place at night as well as during the day
- a new negotiating method was introduced to replace the former method,
which had relied on two Working Groups, one dealing with verification
and one with legal and institutional issues. The Chairman now appointed
a series of 'moderators', each dealing with an area of the treaty containing
unresolved issues. Thus Australia serves as moderator for the International
Monitoring System and the International Data Centre, and there are other
moderators for such matters as the entry into force provisions and on-site
inspection.
- on 29 May, the Chairman presented a further document, 'A draft comprehensive
nuclear test ban'. This document is the result of consultation with
all parties, and attempts to capture a 'middle ground' position on the
disputed sections of the treaty. On most issues it resembles Australia's
model text, and is serving as the new negotiating text.
There is a sense of urgency at the Conference as a series of intense
consultations take place between delegations. The focus, of course, is
particularly on the five nuclear weapon states (the US, the UK, France,
Russia and China) and the three 'threshold states' (India, Pakistan and
Israel), as they reconsider their negotiating positions.
China's policies have caused some concern during the negotiations. Its
most troublesome positions have been on the issues of peaceful nuclear
explosions and on-site inspection.
Alone among the Conference members, China has insisted from the start
that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) be exempted from the test ban.
Although it claims to have no plans to conduct PNEs at present, it says
it cannot rule out forever the option of conducting PNEs for excavation
or other purposes. The problem with a PNE is that it is virtually impossible
to determine whether it is being used as a weapons test. A major breakthrough
came on 6 June when China's ambassador to the Conference announced that
China was abandoning its demand to be allowed to carry out PNEs. This
has largely resolved what has been the most fundamental and contentious
negotiating issue, namely the scope of the treaty, what activities the
treaty will ban. Certainly this concession was conditional on the issue
of PNEs being reconsidered in ten years at a treaty review conference.
However, insofar as China agreed that inclusion of PNEs in the treaty
would require consensus at any review conference, it does seem this condition
is to serve as a face-saving provision. Two days later, on 8 June, China
announced that after one more nuclear test in September, it would commence
a moratorium.
Some commentators have argued that China's hardline attitude on nuclear
tests has reflected an increasingly influential military anxious to develop
a missile capable of carrying more than one warhead. Its recent concessions
could indicate some success with this aim, but probably also show that
China is feeling the pressure of isolation as the treaty's deadline draws
near. To be known as the state that caused the failure of the CTBT would
be a harsh label for any government.
Another factor in China's backdown on PNEs could be its wish to concentrate
on other segments of the treaty which it considers more important. A key
issue here is the type of information which may be used as the basis of
a request for an on-site inspection. In Australia's model text - the on-site
inspection provisions of which are generally supported by a majority at
the Conference - data collected by any element in the treaty's verification
regime can be adequate to trigger an inspection request. Thus information
provided by spy satellites, which are included in the category of 'associated
measures' in the verification regime in the model text, would be sufficient.
China wants to strictly limit data acceptable for an inspection request
to that obtained by the International Monitoring System, thus excluding
the use of intelligence. This would greatly weaken the 'challenge' inspection
provision, the aim of which is to deter any secret testing.
At present it appears positions are polarised on this and other aspects
of the on-site inspection provision, which has become probably the major
unresolved issue. On 25 April 1996, speaking on the question of the information
source which can be used to trigger an on-site inspection, Stephen Ledogar
warned:
For the United States, the answer to that will determine whether we agree
to participation in this treaty or not.(4)
It is interesting to look at the way Australia's model text handles
the problem of on-site inspection requests, with its attempt to bridge
differences by requiring different decision-making processes depending
on the information source providing the basis for the request. Thus if
an on-site inspection request is based on International Monitoring System
data, a majority vote by the CTBT implementing organisation is necessary
to block the request, whereas if the request is based solely on non-International
Monitoring System data, a majority vote is needed to approve the request.
Right up to the late 1970s, on-site inspection was one of the chief
issues dividing the US and the Soviets in their negotiations towards a
comprehensive test ban. But since the mid-1980s a number of treaties have
come into force containing detailed and intrusive 'inspection on demand'
provisions. It would be most unfortunate if this issue emerged as a treaty-breaker
in 1996.
India, together with Pakistan and Israel, is categorised as one of the
'threshold nuclear states', i.e. states which have the capability to assemble
nuclear weapons at short notice. In Israel's case there is also an unacknowledged
nuclear arsenal.
Unlike most countries in the world, India has a strong element in its
population which believe that nuclear weapons will confer upon the country
the status of a great power, regardless of its economic development. More
specifically, it is felt that India needs nuclear weapons to deter nuclear
threats from Pakistan and China. An India-wide opinion poll in December
1995 found that 62 per cent of respondents wanted India to develop nuclear
weapons to counter the nuclear threat posed by its neighbours. And the
last 12 months have seen a vigorous intellectual debate taking place in
the Indian media on the advantages and disadvantages to India of a CTBT.
Because of its strategic views, India's traditional attitude to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970, has
been that it is discriminatory, allowing the five nuclear weapon powers
to proliferate vertically while denying horizontal proliferation. The
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 1995 was seen
by India as a first step by the nuclear powers towards legitimising their
possession of nuclear weapons, with the CTBT being merely a follow-up
'ploy' to cement this monopoly. The test ban is thus being portrayed as
a check on India's ability to develop its nuclear capability and achieve
status as a nuclear power. Signing the treaty in its present form is thus
seen as constituting a weakening of its sovereignty.
India rejects a test ban which would operate only as an instrument of
non-proliferation, serving only to maintain the nuclear status quo. Instead
it advocates a test ban which would operate as an instrument of disarmament,
thus binding the nuclear states to make real reductions in their stockpiles
in return for the constraints which the treaty would necessarily place
on the threshold states. This position first emerged during the latter
half of 1995, as it sought to link the treaty to a definite timetable
for eliminating nuclear weapons. It has been difficult to say whether
this is a firm policy, for which India was prepared to sabotage the treaty,
or a bargaining ploy, aimed at extracting whatever tangible concessions
it could from countries such as the USA. It is known that India wants
to upgrade its own nuclear weapons potential to a point where an advantage
is reached in relation to Pakistan and China, and technical help from
the existing nuclear powers might be welcome.
On 20 June 1996, Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, the head of India's delegation,
made an ominously hardline statement on the matter, saying it could not
go along with the CTBT in its present form. However, it was not clear
from Ambassador Ghose's remarks whether India would exercise its veto
to block the treaty, or simply refuse to sign it. It was reported that
Ambassador Ghose also said: 'We're still in the negotiations....There's
still hope for compromise.' Two factors which probably contributed to
this hardline statement were China's nuclear test on 8 June and recent
reports in The Washington Times that Pakistan has deployed the M-11 missile
received from China.
There is general opposition to India's proposal in the CD, mainly because
of fear it would seriously delay or block the conclusion of the CTBT,
but also because there is as yet little agreement on the forum, timing
and conditions for advancing disarmament beyond the CTBT and the START
agreements.
While firmly opposing any linking of the treaty with a disarmament timetable,
the nuclear states have made slight concessions. On 12 March this year,
John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, acknowledged:
The CTBT itself will also amount to an indispensable step relating to
nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal...(5)
At present it seems possible that the Indian position can be accommodated
in the treaty by means of a statement in the preamble, along the lines
of the preamble to the NPT, but offering much firmer commitment. A minimum
requirement would seem to be some mention of the need for a target date
for eliminating nuclear arsenals, without necessarily specifying a date.
It is ironic that two countries which generally regard each other as
their worst enemies should be so closely aligned in policy at the CTB
negotiations. As India's policy has hardened during the last year, Pakistan
has tended to follow suit, demanding, for example, that the nuclear powers
should endorse a timetable for nuclear disarmament.
Another topic on which Pakistan and India agree is their criticism of
the US for its planned series of 'sub-critical' experiments, i.e. experiments
with plutonium which stop short of creating a nuclear reaction. This issue
constitutes the one remaining disagreement over the scope of the treaty,
with India and Pakistan arguing that allowing sub-critical underground
experiments would pave the way for nuclear weapon states to improve their
arsenals. The US insists that such tests are not aimed at developing new
nuclear weapons, but are needed to help maintain the safety and reliability
of its existing nuclear stockpile. The attitude of Eric Arnett, researcher
with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, to such experiments
is that banning them 'is unworkable because it would be impossible to
verify and unnecessary because of the small contribution these activities
make to modernisation'.(6)
It appears Pakistan's main concern with the CTB is to prevent India
from gaining any advantage. Since the Indian nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan's
nuclear policy has aimed at providing an effective deterrent to India.
It admits to having the capability to produce nuclear weapons but denies
any intention of doing so. Because a nuclear test would cause Pakistan
to lose more than it gained - arousing international condemnation and
probably inciting India to expand its nuclear arsenal - Pakistan generally
supports the CTB. As Eric Arnett comments:
India will be more affected by the CTB, since its bigger and more ambitious
nuclear programme is more in need of nuclear tests.(7)
However, just as Pakistan did not sign the NPT following the Indian
refusal to do so, it is most unlikely it will sign the CTBT if India does
not sign.
Early in the CD's first session this year, it did seem that the non-aligned
movement(8) was going to start playing a significant part as a bloc in
the Conference. In January, when India insisted it would accept the CTBT
only if it was linked with a timetable to eliminate nuclear weapons, 21
other non-aligned countries also criticised the nuclear powers for failing
to move towards total disarmament. However, they did stop short of demanding
the linking of disarmament with the test ban, and since then the nations
concerned seemed to have realised the need to resolve the remaining contentious
issues if they want a completed treaty.
A number of major issues which were in dispute for most of 1994 and
1995 have now been resolved. For example, it has been decided that the
organisation to implement the treaty will be based in Vienna, separate
from, but closely coordinated with, the International Atomic Energy Agency.
And there are other issues which, although not yet decided, are unlikely
to delay completion of the treaty, e.g. the composition of the treaty's
governing council.
However, one significant issue which has been causing problems is the
provisions for the treaty's entry into force. There are three main requirements
which most countries participating at the CD consider it important to
meet:
- the number and composition of states parties at entry into force should
be adequate to enable effective financing of the CTBT Organisation and
effective implementation of the International Monitoring System;
- all 'key' states should ratify the treaty before it enters into force.
States differ in their definition of what should constitute a 'key'
state for this purpose, e.g. some states, including China, Russia, Pakistan
and the United Kingdom, believe this should include both the five nuclear
weapon states and the three threshold states; others, including the
USA and France, regard ratification by only the five nuclear weapon
states as necessary for the treaty's entry into force.
- it is necessary to prevent entry into force being blocked by a delay
in ratification by any individual state.
It is obvious that if ratification by India and Pakistan, as threshold
states, is regarded as essential for the treaty's operation, there is
a danger that the treaty will never come into force because both states
are unlikely to sign, let alone ratify. Thus a formula must be found which
can resolve the dilemma if such a situation arose. In Australia's model
text, the solution is introduced in the form of a waiver. In the event
of a deadlock, the model text provides that a conference of the states
which have ratified the treaty can decide, by a two-thirds majority, to
waive other ratification requirements.
In the CD chairman's compromise text, presented on 29 May 1996, and
now serving as the negotiating text, the ratifications must include all
the countries housing the primary seismic facilities and all the countries
housing radionuclide facilities. As well as the five nuclear weapon states,
this includes both India and Pakistan, thus opening the way for a deadlock
to occur. There is need for inclusion of some provision similar to the
waiver provision to allow the treaty to come into force.
Some states, including Australia, would prefer not to nominate any 'key'
states, allowing the treaty to come into force when a minimum number of
unspecified ratifications, perhaps 65, have been received.
In the United Nations
The Australian delegation at the CD has been among the most active of
those involved in the negotiations. This is understandable in view of
Australia's long record of bipartisan commitment to a CTBT dating from
the 1970s. Australia has traditionally sponsored, together with New Zealand,
a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for the negotiation
of a CTBT, and in August 1993, in collaboration with Nigeria and Mexico,
Australia brokered the original negotiating mandate setting in train the
CTBT negotiations in the CD.
At the Conference on Disarmament
At the Conference, Australia's chief contribution has been in taking
initiatives to give new momentum to the negotiations or to resolve long-standing
contentious issues. Early in the negotiations, in March 1994, Australia
presented a draft of the text of the treaty, entitled 'Australian Resource
Paper on Draft Treaty Elements'. This document, together with a draft
treaty text presented by Sweden, formed the foundation for the 'rolling
text', created in September 1994, which has been the negotiating text
for most of the conference. Australia has also tabled a large number of
working papers designed to clarify outstanding issues and promote Australian
priorities.
On 29 February 1996, Australia presented the model treaty text already
mentioned in this paper. The Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, John Holum, described this Australian draft text as 'a very positive
development' and 'a catalyst' to move the negotiations forward. Holum
said the Australian proposal to resolve issues 'points the way to breaking
the logjam of going bracket-by-bracket'.(9)
During 1994 and much of 1995, a senior member of the Australian Delegation
was chairing a drafting group on the International Monitoring System within
the verification Working Group. Later he was appointed 'Friend of the
Chair' for the International Monitoring System, and recently, as part
of the CD Chairman's attempt to expedite proceedings, Australia was appointed
as 'moderator' for both the International Monitoring System and the International
Data Centre.
On the critical issue of scope, Australia's approach has always been
that the Treaty must be truly comprehensive, and this position was made
known to the nuclear weapon states repeatedly and emphatically. Australia
has been at the forefront of non-nuclear weapon states' opposition to
any suggestion for a threshold to allow for even very low-yield nuclear
explosions, arguing this would be totally incompatible with the intended
comprehensive nature of the CTBT.
Internationally
It could be argued that the most significant contribution by Australia
has been in its regular high-level consultations with key states. Australian
officials have regularly visited the capitals of the five nuclear weapon
states and of other key countries involved in the negotiations, to explain
such matters as our model text initiative and to seek support for the
intensification of the negotiating process.
In Australia
Australia has also made a significant contribution to the development
of the key component of the verification regime - the International Monitoring
System - by providing technical experts in the seismic, hydroacoustic,
infrasound and radionuclide technologies. These Australian experts, in
addition to participating in CTBT-related conferences internationally
and in the negotiations in Geneva, act as a consultative panel for the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to assist in the development of
Australian policy in the area of verification. By virtue of our geography
and our existing expertise and infrastructure, Australian facilities will
be crucial to the effective functioning of the International Monitoring
System: only Russia and the US will host more monitoring stations than
Australia.(10)
With the 28 June deadline less than two weeks away, there are still
several issues in contention, with China and India presenting the major
obstacles to the majority point of view. The dispute over on-site inspection
appears to offer the greatest threat to completion of the treaty. On-site
inspection is an important aspect of the verification regime, and an effective
treaty cannot allow much compromise in this area. At the time of writing,
it appears the opposing sides on the issue are poles apart, and if China
maintains its present position it is difficult to see any agreement.
Until recently it seemed India's demand, that the treaty be linked with
a timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons, could be resolved,
but time is running out, and concessions are needed on both sides. The
differences stem from opposing views of the objective of a CTBT; the US
sees the treaty only as a contribution to its anti-proliferation policy,
while India wants it to have a disarmament impact.
The value of a CTBT has been discussed in the Parliamentary Research
Service Current Issues Brief No.2, 'Are we finally on track for a comprehensive
test ban?, issued in August 1995. Perhaps the major value of a treaty
will be in preventing the modernisation of existing nuclear arsenals.
As Eric Arnett recently pointed out:
It is popularly believed that US simulation technology is so advanced
that it can practically replace testing. In fact, simulation technology
is not that advanced, even for modeling new weapons.(11)
What we can say is that a CTBT will have definite symbolic value, and
that failure to complete a treaty will be a major setback to the arms
control and disarmament regime.
- 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Principles and Objectives
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. 9 May 1995. NPT/CONF.1995/L.5.
- Australian Permanent Mission to Conference on Disarmament. Statement
by Michael Costello, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations'. 29 February 1996.
- Judy Alta. Ledogar warns CTBT negotiations may fail. USIS Wireless
File, EPF 411. 25 April 1996.
- Ibid.
- Ledogar on progress toward comprehensive test ban treaty. Wireless
File. EPF207. 12 March 1996.
- E. Arnett (ed). Nuclear weapons after the comprehensive test ban.
Oxford, SIPRI/OUP, 1996: 130.
- Ibid: 81.
- Formed in 1961, the non-aligned movement consists of countries which
do not adhere to the main East-West military and political blocks. The
current membership is around 109 countries.
- J.S.Porth. Holum sees agreed CTBT draft possible by June. Wireless
File. EPF512. 8 March 1996.
- Australia will host 20 stations in all (4 Primary Seismological Stations;
3 Auxiliary Seismological Stations; 7 Radionuclide Stations; 1 Hydroacoustic
Station; 5 Infrasound Stations).
The US will host 38 stations; Russia 31 stations; Canada 15 stations.
- E. Arnett. Nuclear club gets clubbier. The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists. May/June 1996: 12.
- 31 Oct. 1958
- Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, between
USSR, USA and UK, begins in Geneva. Each nation begins a moratorium
on nuclear testing soon after.
- main contentious issue of negotiation: verification, especially
obligatory on-site inspections.
- 13 Feb. 1960
- First French nuclear test.
- 29 Jan. 1962
- Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests formally
ends, in deadlock.
- breakdown in negotiations mainly due to the deteriorating political
climate, especially over the Berlin situation
- 25 April 1962
- The USA resumes atmospheric testing.
- 31 Aug. 1962
- Russia resumes testing.
- 1962-1963
- Negotiations on the creation of a comprehensive test ban continue
in UN, especially in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (which
later became the Conference on Disarmament).
- 5 Aug. 1963
- Partial (or Limited) Test Ban Treaty, banning nuclear weapon tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed (entered into
force 10 Oct. 1963). The preamble states that the parties are 'seeking
to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons
for all time' and are determined to continue 'negotiations' to this
end.
- 16 Oct. 1964
- First Chinese nuclear test.
- 1 July 1968
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed (entered into force 5 March
1970). The preamble reaffirms the statement in the preamble to the 1963
Partial Test Ban Treaty (see above).
- 9 May 1973
- Australia and New Zealand institute proceedings against France in
the International Court of Justice in connection with the French nuclear
tests in the Pacific
- 8 May 1974
- First and only Indian nuclear test.
- 8 June 1974
- France announces it will move to underground testing after its next
series of tests.
- 3 July 1974
- Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), agreeing to cease underground nuclear
weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, signed by USSR and
USA. (This Treaty did not enter into force until December 1990. See
this chronology 1 June 1990).
- 20 Dec. 1974
- The International Court of Justice finds that, since France has announced
its intention to cease atmospheric testing, the objective of Australia
and New Zealand in instituting proceedings against France has been achieved
and the claim of the applicants no longer has any objective.
- 28 May 1976
- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) signed. (This Treaty did
not enter into force until December 1990. See this chronology 1 June
1990).
- 3 Oct. 1977
- Negotiations on nuclear test ban begin in Geneva between USSR, USA
and UK (France and China refuse to take part).
- Main contentious issue: stockpile reliability.
- 12 Nov. 1980
- Geneva talks suspended following Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
(negotiations formally broken off by the US on 20 July 1982).
- 21 April 1982
- Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban established to discuss and define
issues of verification and compliance relating to a CTB.
- 6 Aug. 1985
- USSR begins unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, aimed at encouraging
resumption of negotiations on nuclear testing (this moratorium ceased
after 19 months; no other nation had ceased testing).
- 9 Nov. 1987
- US-Soviet negotiations begin on nuclear test limitations, initially
to agree upon verification measures towards ratification of the 1974
TTBT and the 1976 PNET.
- 8 Dec. 1987
- The US and USSR sign the INF Treaty (entered into force 1 June 1988),
covering the elimination of their intermediate-range and short-range
missiles.
- 1 June 1990
- New Protocols signed for the TTBT and PNET. The two Treaties finally
entered into force on 11 December 1990.
- 17 July 1990
- The Conference on Disarmament agrees on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee
on a Nuclear Test Ban.
- 24 Oct. 1990
- Last Soviet test.
- 19 Nov. 1990
- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) signed
(entered into force 9 November 1992).
- 15 July 1991
- Last French test until resumption in September 1995.
- 31 July 1991
- The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) signed (entered into
force 5 December 1994).
- 5 Oct. 1991
- Soviet President Gorbachev announces a one year moratorium on testing.
- 26 Oct. 1991
- Russian President Yeltsin endorses the moratorium announced on 5 October
1991 (the moratorium still continues).
- 26 Nov. 1991
- Last UK test.
- 8 April 1992
- French President Mitterand announces a suspension of French testing
until the end of 1992 (the moratorium continued until Sept. 1995).
- 23 Sept. 1992
- Last US test.
- 25 Sept. 1992
- Chinese test.
- 2 Oct. 1992
- US President Bush signs into law the Hatfield amendment, attached
to Water and Energy Legislation, imposing a testing moratorium until
1 July 1993 and limiting US tests to 15 before a permanent cessation
in 1996.
- 15 Nov. 1992
- The Aust.-NZ-Mexican CTBT resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly
136 in favour, 1 opposed (US) and 4 abstentions (UK, France, China,
Israel).
- 3 Jan. 1993
- The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) signed.
- 13 Jan. 1993
- President Mitterand extends the French moratorium indefinitely.
- 23 April 1993
- President Clinton announces that the US will begin consultations with
Russia, US allies and other states aimed at beginning negotiations towards
a multilateral test ban treaty.
- 3 July 1993
- President Clinton announces that the US will extend its current moratorium
on nuclear testing at least until September 1994, provided that no other
nation tests before that time.
- 5 July 1993
- President Yeltsin signs a decree extending the Russian testing moratorium
as long as no other country conducts a nuclear test. He also instructs
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to begin consultations with
the other nuclear powers as soon as possible about negotiating a CTBT.
- July 1993
- US commences consultations with the other nuclear weapon states plus
Germany, Japan and India concerning a CTBT.
- 10 Aug. 1993
- The Conference on Disarmament agrees to the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc
Committee beginning negotiations on a CTBT from the start of the 1994
session. The decision was modelled on a draft decision submitted by
Australia, Mexico and Nigeria.
- 5 Oct. 1993
- Chinese test.
- 16 Dec. 1993
- UN General Assembly adopts by consensus a resolution, sponsored by
Australia, New Zealand and Mexico, calling for negotiation of a CTBT.
- 25 Jan. 1994
- CTBT negotiations begin in the Conference on Disarmament.
- 3 Feb. 1994
- CTBT negotiations begin in the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc
Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.
- 14 March 1994
- President Clinton extends the US moratorium until at least September
1995.
- 30 March 1994
- Australia presents draft treaty text to the Ad Hoc Committee on a
Nuclear Test Ban.
- 10 June 1994
- Chinese test.
- 5 Sept. 1994
- Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban,
in its report to the Conference on Disarmament, produces CTBT rolling
text.
- 7 Oct. 1994
- Chinese test. China says it will end tests when negotiations on a
CTBT are completed.
- 15 Dec. 1994
- For the second year running, UN General Assembly adopts (with the
P5 among the co-sponsors for the first time) a consensus resolution
calling on the 'conclusion without delay' of CTBT negotiations in the
Conference on Disarmament.
- 30 Jan. 1995
- US extends its moratorium until the CTBT enters into force, on the
assumption that the Treaty will be signed before 30 September 1996;
and withdraws its proposal for a right to special withdrawal from the
CTBT after ten years.
- 2 Feb. 1995
- Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban
resumes negotiations on a CTBT.
- 17 April 1995
- NPT Review and Extension Conference begins in New York.
- 11 May 1995
- NPT Extension Conference's consensus document 'Principles and Objectives'
includes a commitment to complete a CTBT 'no later than 1996', plus
a direction that:
'Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban
Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint.'
- 15 May 1995
- Chinese test.
- 13 June 1995
- President Chirac announces a series of eight tests to be carried out
between September 1995 and May 1996 at Mururoa Atoll (in face six tests
were held).
- 11 August 1995
- President Clinton announces that the USA will pursue a zero-yield
CTB, with even Hydronuclear Tests being excluded.
- 17 August 1995
- Chinese test.
- 21 August 1995
- New Zealand requests the International Court of Justice reactivate
the 1973 case on French testing.
- 22 Sept. 1995
- The International Court of Justice rejects the New Zealand request
to reopen the 1973 case.
- Sept. 1995 to Jan. 1996
- Six French tests:
5 Sept. 1995
1 Oct. 1995
27 Oct. 1995
21 Nov. 1995
27 Dec. 1995
27 Jan. 1996
- 29 Feb. 1996
- Australia tables 'model treaty text' in Conference on Disarmament.
- 8 June 1996
- China's 44th test. Announcement that after one more test in September,
China would commence a moratorium.
- Hydronuclear Experiment
- A test in which part of the plutonium or highly enriched uranium in
a nuclear device is replaced by passive material i.e. natural uranium
or depleted uranium. A small number of atoms fission, and the resulting
yield is extremely small, around two kilograms of TNT equivalent.
- Nuclear Weapon States
- Refers to the five declared nuclear weapon powers, the USA, Russia,
the UK, France and China.
- Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
- Application of a nuclear explosion for non-military purposes such
as digging canals or harbours or creating underground cavities. The
USA terminated its PNE programme in the 1970s. The USSR conducted its
last PNE in 1988.
- Threshold Nuclear States
- States which are not declared nuclear powers but which have the capacity
to assemble nuclear weapons on short notice.
The following four verification technologies form the International
Monitoring System:
- Seismic monitoring
- Operates through a network of seismic stations and arrays detecting
low-frequency seismic waves. An international seismic network is the
core of the verification regime. Explosions as low as one kiloton yield
can be detected reliably.
- Hydroacoustic monitoring
- A method of detecting nuclear explosions detonated at sea by means
of a network of acoustic sensors.
- Infrasound monitoring
- Utilises sensitive barometric arrays to pick up pressure waves in
the atmosphere.
- Radionuclide monitoring
- Involves the extraction of the products of nuclear tests from the
atmosphere by large volume air sampling.
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