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Bills Digest No. 155 2003-04
Marriage Legislation Amendment Bill 2004
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as introduced
and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest does not have
any official legal status. Other sources should be consulted to determine
the subsequent official status of the Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Appendix
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage
History
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to define ‘marriage’ in the Marriage Act 1961, and
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to prevent same sex couples adopting children from overseas countries
under arrangements involving multilateral or bilateral treaties.
Background
This short Bill raises complex and controversial issues relating to:
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the definition of ‘marriage’
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the recognition of validly contracted foreign marriages for the
purposes of Australian domestic law, and
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adoption and same sex couples.
This Digest provides some background material on each of these issues
before describing the Bill’s main provisions.
At present, there is no definition of ‘marriage’ in the Marriage Act.(1)
Until 1961, marriage in Australia was governed by State and Territory
law. A Marriage Bill was first introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament
in 1960. It did not define marriage. Delivering the second reading speech,
Attorney-General Barwick said:
… it will be observed that there is no attempt to define
marriage in this bill. None of the marriage laws to which I have referred
contains any such definition. But insistence on monogamous quality is
indicated by, on the one hand, the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes
Act, which render a marriage void where one of the parties is already
married, and by a provision in this bill making bigamy an offence.(2)
The Bill was not dealt with in 1960 and was re-introduced in 1961 with
some amendments. The question of the meaning of ‘marriage’ was raised
in relation to both the 1960(3) and 1961 Bills. For instance,
when the 1961 Bill was being debated in the Senate, a Country Party
Senator unsuccessfully proposed that marriage should be defined and
made a number of suggestions including:
‘marriage’ means the union of one man with one woman for
life to the exclusion of all others, such union being contracted in
the manner provided in this Act
‘Marriage’ means the voluntary union of one man with one
woman, for life to the exclusion of all others(4)
The last amendment was put to the vote and defeated by 40 votes to
8. Senator Gorton, who had carriage of the Bill in the Senate, had earlier
commented:
… in our view it is best to leave to the common law the
definition or the evolution of the meaning of ‘marriage’ as it relates
to marriages in foreign countries and to use this bill to stipulate
the conditions with which marriage in Australia has to comply if it
is to be a valid marriage.(5)
While the Marriage Act does not define ‘marriage’, section 46 of the
Act incorporates the substance of the 19th century English
case law definition of marriage found in Hyde v. Hyde &
Woodmansee.(6) Section 46 says that celebrants should
explain the nature of the marriage relationship with words that include:
Marriage, according to the law of Australia, is the union
of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered
into for life [or words to that effect].
As indicated above, these words are a description or exhortation rather
than a definition.
While it can be argued that for the purposes of Australian law ‘marriage’
does not include unions between persons of the same sex, it is also
true that our understanding of who can contract a valid marriage under
Australian domestic law is changing/being elucidated. For example, the
Family Court was recently asked to make a declaration that a marriage
between a post-operative transsexual person who had been born female
(‘Kevin’) and a woman (‘Jennifer’) was a valid marriage. Both a single
Family Court judge(7) and, later, the Full Family Court(8)
declared the marriage valid. The Commonwealth had opposed the application.
It intervened in the first proceedings(9) and then appealed
the single judge decision to the Full Family Court (it has not appealed
the Full Family Court decision to the High Court).
It is also worth noting that marriages that could not be validly celebrated
in Australia are recognised for certain purposes by Commonwealth law.
Thus, section 6 of the Family Law Act 1975 deems foreign polygamous
marriages to be marriages for the purposes of that Act (such as children’s
matters or property alteration). And subsection 88E of the Marriage
Act (inserted in 1986) preserves section 6 of the Family Law Act.(10)
Item 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bill provides that ‘marriage
means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others,
voluntarily entered into for life.’ This definition will apply to all
marriages covered by the Marriage Act, including marriages celebrated
in Australia.
It is arguable that inserting the proposed definition of ‘marriage’
into the Marriage Act does no more than incorporate the common law understanding
of the term. Whether this common law understanding equates with or limits
the constitutional meaning of ‘marriage’ is another question. In this
regard, it should be noted that the High Court has never been called
upon to define ‘marriage’ for the purposes of the marriage power [section
51(xxi)].
Some High Court dicta indicate that the constitutional meaning of ‘marriage’
in section 51(xxi) is confined to the definition found in Hyde.(11)
There are also more liberal opinions that suggest that the label, ‘marriage’,
could apply in an extended range of circumstances prescribed by Parliament.(12)
Extracts from some High Court cases follow:
In The Queen v. L, Brennan J said:
In Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee, Lord Penzance defined
marriage as ‘the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman,
to the exclusion of all others’ and that definition has been followed
in this country and by this Court.(13)
And in Fisher v. Fisher, Brennan J said:
Although the nature and incidents of a legal institution
would ordinarily be susceptible to change by legislation, constitutional
interpretation of the marriage power would be an exercise in hopeless
circularity if the Parliament could itself define the nature and incidents
of marriage by laws enacted in purported pursuance of the power.
The nature and incidence of the legal institution which
the Constitution recognises as ‘marriage’ … are ascertained not by reference
to laws enacted in purported pursuance of the power but by reference
to the customs of our society, especially when they are reflected in
the common law, which show the content of the power as it was conferred.(14)
On the other hand, as early as 1908 in Attorney-General for NSW
v. Brewery Employees Union of NSW(15) Higgins
J said:
Under the power to make laws with respect of marriage,
I should say that the parliament could prescribe what unions are to
be regarded as marriages.
In 1962, in Attorney-General (Vic) v. Commonwealth,
McTiernan J and Windeyer J appear to have taken opposing views about
whether ‘marriage’ is limited to monogamous marriage.(16)
And more recently, McHugh J suggested:
The level of abstraction for some terms of the Constitution
is, however, much harder to identify than that of those set out above.
Thus in 1901 “marriage” was seen as meaning a voluntary union of life
between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. If that
level of abstraction were now accepted, it would deny the parliament
of the Commonwealth of power to legislate for same sex marriages, although
arguably marriage now means, or in the near future may mean, a voluntary
union for life between two people to the exclusion of others.(17)
For a view that the Commonwealth has the power to legislatively recognise
domestic same sex marriages, see Dan Meagher, ‘The times are they a-changin?—Can
the Commonwealth parliament legislate for same sex marriages?’, (2003)
17 Australian Journal of Family Law 134.
It is worth noting that limitations that may apply to the meaning of
‘marriage’ in section 51(xxi) of the Constitution will not necessarily
apply to the recognition of foreign marriages (where the external affairs
power in section 51(xxix) of the Constitution is relevant).
The amendments contained in Schedule 1 of the Bill also mean
that marriages between same sex couples validly contracted overseas
will not be recognised in Australia. A (growing) number of overseas
jurisdictions now allow same sex partners to marry or enter civil unions
(a list is provided as an Appendix to this Digest). And there have been
media reports in recent months that some Australian same sex couples
who have married overseas may seek a declaration from the Family Court
that their marriages are valid in Australia.(18)
The question of the validity of marriages contracted overseas could
arise in legal proceedings either directly (by way of an application
for a declaration of validity—as indicated above) or tangentially—for
example, the question could arise incidentally in proceedings for property
adjustment.
There are two mechanisms that may, either now or in the future, enable
a foreign same sex marriage to be recognised in Australia. These are
the Hague Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity
of Marriage and the common law rules of private international law. The
Bill would close both of these avenues.
Australia is a party to the Hague Convention on Celebration and Recognition
of the Validity of Marriage (the ‘Marriage Convention’). Some of the
reasons for the development of the Convention and its implementation
in Australia are set out in the second reading speech for the Marriage
Amendment Bill 1985:(19)
For many years it has been recognised that marriage is
such a fundamental and universal human institution that, wherever possible,
a marriage celebrated in one country should be recognised as valid all
over the world. Nevertheless, there are limits to the extent to which
the policy of one country is acceptable in another. To reconcile these
conflicting goals, a complex set of rules has developed in the common
law, governing recognition of marriages involving parties whose domicile
is not Australia, or marriage celebrated outside Australia.
In 1983 35% of all marriages taking place in Australia
involved one party who had been born overseas. The common law rules
as they now stand would refer the validity of those marriages where
one party was still domiciled outside Australia, partly to the law of
the domicile. If a marriage takes place overseas, it might be necessary
to refer to the law of a number of countries to determine its validity
in Australia. The Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1976 finalised the Convention
on the Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages ('the
Hague Convention') to facilitate the recognition in one country of marriages
solemnised in another country.(20)
Chapter II of the Convention obliges Australia to recognise marriages
validly entered into in foreign states (Article 9). For Convention purposes,
it is immaterial whether the foreign state is a party to the Convention
or not.(21)
Other important provisions in Chapter II of the Convention are:
-
Article 8, which provides that Chapter II does not apply to certain
marriages—such as proxy marriages, posthumous marriages and informal
marriages
-
Article 11, which contains an exhaustive list of exceptions to
the general obligation to recognise foreign marriages.(22)
For instance, a Contracting State can refuse to recognise a marriage
if one of the spouses is already married or the spouses are in a
prohibited relationship
-
Article 13, which provides that a Contracting State can apply ‘rules
of law more favourable to the recognition of foreign marriages’
than the Convention would allow for, and
-
Article 14, which provides that a Contracting State may refuse
to recognise the validity of a marriage where such recognition ‘is
manifestly incompatible with its public policy’.
Same sex marriages are not listed in Article 8 as marriages to which
Chapter II does not apply. Nor are they listed as one of the exceptions
to the general obligation to recognise foreign marriages that are set
out in Article 11.
The object of Part VA of the Marriage Act, which was inserted in 1986,
is to give effect to Chapter II of the Marriage Convention.(23)
The effect of Part VA is that a marriage will be recognised in Australia
if it is valid according to the law of the place of celebration. Like
the Marriage Convention, Part VA does not explicitly exclude foreign
same sex marriages from recognition nor is ‘marriage’ defined for Part
VA purposes.
There is no definition of ‘marriage’ in the Convention. However, the
issue of same sex marriage was raised during the drafting process and
is reflected in the Convention’s travaux preparatoires.(24)
The travaux preparatoires can be used to understand the meaning
of marriage in the Convention.
At the time the Convention was drafted there were suggestions that:
‘out of an abundance of caution’ the Convention could be
limited to ‘marriages between persons of different sexes. The question
of whether such provision should be made was put to governments in a
questionnaire. Most, including Australia, saw no need to make such a
provision.’(25)
Three points can be noted here. First, governments were on notice about
gay marriages but took no action to exclude them from the terms of the
Convention. Second, gay marriages are not explicitly excluded from recognition
under the Convention. Third, the rapporteur’s report refers to marriage
in its ‘broadest, international sense’.
It is arguable that ‘broadest, international sense’ does not require
international consensus to occur before ‘gay marriage’ can be regarded
as marriage under the Convention.(26) There is thus an argument
that same sex marriage is encompassed by the ‘broadest, international
sense’ of the term ‘marriage’ because a (growing) number of overseas
jurisdictions have legislated for same sex marriage or given same sex
relationships virtually equivalent rights (though without the label
of ‘marriage’).
Can it be argued that a Contracting State can refuse to recognise foreign
same sex marriage because such recognition would be ‘manifestly incompatible
with its public policy’ under Article 14? It is unlikely that such an
argument would stand up in Australia today—consensual gay sex between
adults is no longer a criminal offence in any Australian jurisdiction,
most States and Territories have now removed most discrimination based
on sexuality from their statute books and the Commonwealth itself is
now committed to giving gay couples rights under superannuation and
income tax laws. So, in the words of Professor Peter Nygh, ‘It is difficult
to see on what basis public policy could be invoked.’(27)
Further, the Convention’s travaux preparatoires state that Contracting
States are obliged to apply the public policy exception cautiously.(28)
It can be argued that the word ‘marriage’ in the Convention does not
extend to same sex marriages. For instance, it could be said that when
deciding what ‘marriage in its broadest, international sense’ means
under the Convention it is not enough that a few countries have decided
to legislate for gay marriage. More consensus is needed than that. In
the words of one writer:(29)
Clearly … national or domestic definitions should be transcended.
This is certainly the case in Australia, where it is accepted that the
Hyde v Hyde definition only refers to marriage
under domestic law and does not define the extent to which foreign institutions
will be recognised. Thus, it has not prevented the recognition of polygamous
marriages concluded abroad between foreign parties. Nor is it necessary
that there be an international consensus on the meaning of marriage.
On the other hand, it cannot be accepted that the definition by a particular
State of any relationship whatever as a ‘marriage’ would have to be
recognised as such.
The correct position must lie somewhere between a universal
consensus and an idiosyncratic exception. There must be an acceptance
transcending a particular national system that a particular relationship
constitutes a marriage. That seems to be what is meant by a ‘broad,
international sense’. That certainly was the case with polygamy even
though it was not universally accepted. That is not yet the case with
same gender relationships which in Australia and England, and one assumes
in many other countries, is not even regarded as a ‘void’ marriage.
That consensus may come in time. But it is not yet.(30)
As stated above, there is therefore an argument that the ‘broadest,
international sense’ of the expression ‘marriage’ does not yet include
same sex marriage (although it might one day) because not enough countries
have legislated for same sex marriage or because even those that do
may not afford all the same rights to same sex couples as they do to
heterosexual married couples or they may label same sex unions in a
different way (eg call them civil unions or registered relationships,
but not marriages).
Another way that may exist now or in the future for foreign same sex
marriages to be recognised in Australia is via the common law rules
of private international law.(31) Writing in 2002, Professor
Nygh thought that this was ‘the most likely authority for a future recognition
of same gender marriages rather than the Convention.’(32)
The Bill would remove this path to recognition.
The amendments in Schedule 2 of the Bill are designed to prevent
same sex couples from adopting children from overseas under multilateral
or bilateral arrangements.
The constitutional division of power in Australia has meant that adoption
has traditionally been a matter for the States and Territories.
Each Australian State, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern
Territory have their own adoption laws. Among other things, these laws
prescribe eligibility and suitability criteria for adoption. Eligibility
criteria vary. At present, three jurisdictions enable same sex couples
to adopt (subject to their meeting other eligibility and suitability
requirements). These jurisdictions are Western Australia, the Australian
Capital Territory and Tasmania.(33) Most State and Territory
laws also enable a court to make an adoption order in favour of a single
person—usually if special or exceptional circumstances exist. Provisions
for single person adoptions may enable a gay person to adopt.
Intercountry adoption is discussed in more detail in the next section.
However, it is worth noting that eligibility of applicants for intercountry
adoption is determined both by the criteria set down in State or Territory
law and the requirements of the sending country. For example, in its
Intercountry Adoption Kit the Victorian Government states that
only one of the overseas countries it works with accepts couples living
in a de facto relationship (Ethiopia) and that only a few countries
will accept single applicants.(34) What this means in practice,
is that there may be few opportunities for same sex couples to adopt
children from overseas (other than indirectly—if both the Australian
jurisdiction and the overseas country permit a single person to adopt).
Intercountry adoption is a recent phenomenon in Australia with few
intercountry adoptions occurring before 1975:
It only became a recognised avenue of adoption following
the airlift in 1975 of Vietnamese war orphans to Western nations: the
292 children who came to Australia were adopted by Australian families.(35)
Since that time many Australians have adopted children from overseas—particularly
from Asia and Latin America.(36) However, the number of intercountry
adoptions has fluctuated from year to year. The Australian Institute
of Health and Welfare records that in 1988-89 there were 394 such adoptions.
In 2002-03, there were 278 intercountry adoptions. In 2002-03, the latest
year for which data is available, over one-third of children came from
South Korea, 17% came from China, 14% from Ethiopia and 12% from India.(37)
Intercountry adoption is also a global phenomenon. In the period 1980-1989
around 170,000-180,000 children were involved in intercountry adoption,
with 90% of children coming from 10 countries.(38) The Hague
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of
Intercountry Adoption (the ‘Intercountry Adoption Convention’) was negotiated
because of the lack of uniform standards in relation to intercountry
adoption. The Convention entered into force on 1 May 1995 and was ratified
by Australia in 1998.(39) As at 25 May 2004, 60 nations had
acceded to or ratified the Convention.(40)
The objects of the Intercountry Adoption Convention are to:
-
establish safeguards that will ensure that intercountry adoptions
take place in the best interests of the child and with respect to
his or her fundamental rights
-
establish a cooperative system among Contracting States so that
safeguards are respected and the abduction, sale of and trafficking
in children is prevented, and
-
ensure that Contracting States recognise adoptions made in accordance
with the Convention.(41)
The importance of the Intercountry Adoption Convention for Australia
was outlined in the treaty’s National Interest Analysis, which
was prepared by the Australian Government:
The importance of the Convention for Australia lies in
the benefits of having internationally agreed minimum standards for
processing intercountry adoptions. The Convention establishes legally
binding standards and safeguards to be observed by countries participating
in intercountry adoption, a system of supervision to ensure that these
standards are observed, and channels of communication between authorities
in countries of origin and countries of destination for children being
adopted. By establishing uniformity of standards and predictability
of procedures between countries, the Convention will assist parents
in Australia who wish to adopt children from other Convention countries.
The day-to-day implementation of the Intercountry Adoption Convention
is the responsibility of State and Territory adoption authorities.(42)
These State and Territory authorities are called Central Authorities
for Convention purposes. They have responsibility, under a 1998 agreement
signed by Commonwealth, State and Territory Community Service Ministers,
for ‘processing day to day adoption casework, approving adoptions and
making decisions on whether to accredit non-government organisations
to carry out functions in relation to intercountry adoption’.(43)
There is also a Commonwealth Central Authority whose functions are primarily
to facilitate co-operation between authorities in Australia and authorities
in Convention countries.
Although the States and Territories have primary
responsibility for day to day adoption matters, the Commonwealth also
plays an important role. For instance, the Department of Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs makes decisions about whether
to issue Adoption Visas.(44) To be eligible for such a visa,
the adoption must have been approved by the relevant State or Territory
welfare authority, the child must be aged under 18 (at both the time
of the application and the time of the decision) and the child must
meet health requirements.(45)
The Commonwealth Parliament also passed legislation in 1998(46)
to facilitate arrangements for the implementation of the Intercountry
Adoption Convention and to enable regulations to be made ‘to give effect
to bilateral arrangements with other countries on intercountry adoption’.(47)
Bilateral arrangements are referred to because, in addition to the Hague
Convention, there are also government-to-government agreements relating
to intercountry adoption made between a State/Territory and a foreign
country.
Following the passage of the 1998 Act two regulations were made by
the Commonwealth:
-
the Family Law (Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption) Regulations
1998 give effect to the Intercountry Adoption Convention by providing
for the appointment of Central Authorities to carry out Convention
obligations, by providing that adoption decisions made in other
countries will be recognised by Australian law, and by conferring
jurisdiction on courts to make adoption orders under the Convention(48)
-
the Family Law (Bilateral Arrangements—Intercountry Adoption)
Regulations 1998 provided that adoptions carried out in prescribed
countries are recognised for the purposes of Australian law. So
far, China is the only country that is a prescribed country.
According to one author:
Before the … [Convention] came into being, the Special
Commission (on intercountry adoption) and the Diplomatic Conference
considered whether de facto couples, same sex couples, lesbian or homosexual
individuals could be covered by the … Convention and, ultimately, delegates
opted to limit themselves to the issue of ‘spouses’ male and female
and ‘a person’, married or single’. The issue of homosexuals or lesbians
being able to adopt was considered too sensitive and not within the
scope of the Hague Convention.(49)
This is reflected in the drafting of the Intercountry Adoption Convention,
which does not deal with the eligibility of prospective parents but
leaves this as a matter for Contracting States.(50)
The Opposition, Democrats and Greens have all made public statements
about the Bill.
On 28 May 2004 Green MP, Michael Organ, wrote to members of the ALP
asking them to oppose the Bill.(51)
Australian Democrats spokesperson on law and justice, Senator Brian
Greig has called for a Senate inquiry into the Bill. Senator Greig said:
The Howard Government’s plans to block marriage rights
for gay and lesbian couples wrongly sends the message that same-sex
couples are not socially valid, significantly caring or worthy of legal
protections. …
The proposed ban on overseas adoptions sends the message
that gay and lesbian couples are not capable of offering a caring, stable
family environment in which to raise children. This is absolutely appalling.
(52)
In a press release issued on 1 June 2004, the ALP’s Shadow Attorney-General,
Nicola Roxon MP, said:
The Labor Party will not oppose the PM's measures
to confirm in the Marriage Act the common law understanding
that marriage is “a union between a man and a woman to the exclusion
of all others”. Consistent with this, Labor will also not
oppose a prohibition on recognising foreign same sex
marriages.
While Labor questions the PM's motives and reasons for
bringing on this issue for debate now, and questions whether it is necessary
– Labor does not oppose these parts of the Bill which merely confirm
existing law and our previous commitments to keeping marriage as
a heterosexual institution.
However Labor does not support the Government’s attempts
to interfere in adoption issues.
Ms Roxon also said the ALP would seek to refer the Bill to a Senate
Committee.(53)
Greens Senator, Bob Brown, says that the Greens will oppose the Bill
and also seek to refer it to a Senate Committee.(54)
Item 1 of Schedule 1 defines ‘marriage’ as ‘the union
of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered
into for life.’ In substance, this is the common law definition contained
in Hyde (minus the reference to ‘Christendom’).
The definition has a number of components. These include:
-
‘for life’. These words sit uneasily with modern divorce laws which
enable a marriage to be terminated if the parties have lived separately
and apart for 12 months.(55) Under the Marriage Act as
it presently stands, lack of intention to wed for life at the time
of the ceremony will not mean that a marriage is invalid—unless
the facts in a case show lack of real consent.(56) A
question that may arise if a definition is inserted that
contains the words, ‘for life’, is whether a lack of intention to
wed for life at the time of the ceremony means that there is no
marriage at all. Another way of looking at this question is to ask
whether it is only the words, ‘a man and a woman’, in the definition
that will have any substantive operation and, if so, why.
-
‘a man and a woman’. The meaning of these words remains an open
question—do they enable a pre-operative transsexual person or an
intersex person to contract a valid marriage?
Item 2 ensures that this definition applies to Part VA of the
Marriage Act (the Part that deals with the recognition of foreign marriages)
as well as to rest of the Act.
Item 2 also makes particular reference to section 88E of the
Marriage Act. As stated earlier, the purpose of Part VA is to implement
the Marriage Convention etc. However, the Marriage Convention is not
the only way marriages contracted overseas can be recognised by Australian
law. The rules of private international law provide another avenue.
Existing section 88E preserves the common law rules of private international
law. So the reference to section 88E in item 2 is designed to
ensure that foreign same sex marriages cannot be recognised in Australia
either under the Marriage Convention or under the common law rules of
private international law.
As stated earlier, section 88E also preserves section 6 of the Family
Law Act (deeming polygamous marriages celebrated outside Australia to
be marriages for Family Law Act purposes). Subsection 88E(4) may also
preserve the operation of other Australian laws—such as any Australian
laws that recognise indigenous tribal marriages.(57) It is
not clear whether the insertion of a definition of ‘marriage’ that will
be applied to section 88E will affect section 6 of the Family Law Act
or any laws currently preserved by subsection 88E(4).
Item 3 provides that a union between two persons of the same
sex contracted in a foreign country cannot be recognised as a marriage
in Australia.
The amendments in Schedule 2 do not affect Australian laws that
enable same sex couples to adopt a child in Australia.
Item 1 of Schedule 2 prevents regulations to facilitate
same sex couples adopting a child from overseas being made either under
the Hague Convention or bilateral agreements.
Item 2 provides that it is unlawful for any person (including
a State or Territory officer) to facilitate or provide for the adoption
of a child from overseas by a same sex couple under the Intercountry
Adoption Convention or a bilateral agreement made between a State/Territory
and a foreign country. The expression, ‘same sex couple’ is not defined.
Further, item 2 may not necessarily prevent one person in a same
sex couple from adopting a child from overseas or prevent a single gay
person adopting (assuming single person adoption is permitted by the
Australian jurisdiction and the foreign country).
One purpose of the amendments defining ‘marriage’ is to reflect ‘the
understanding of marriage held by the vast majority of Australians’.(58)
The Government says that:
It is time that those words form the formal definition
of marriage in the Marriage Act.
The bill will achieve that result.
Including this definition will remove any lingering concerns
that people may have that the legal definition of marriage may become
eroded over time.(59)
It may, of course, be that the Hyde definition represents the
constitutional meaning of ‘marriage’ in section 51(xxi) now and for
the future. However, as Blackshield and Williams point out:
The Commonwealth Parliament cannot control the limits of
its own power. Its ‘source’ of power is the Constitution. Whether an
enactment falls within an area of power granted to the Parliament by
the Constitution must ultimately be determined not by the Parliament
but by the High Court.(60)
This a reference to the ‘stream and source’ doctrine referred to by
Fullagar J in Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth.(61)
In this case His Honour said:
The validity of a law or of an administrative act done
under a law cannot be made to depend on the opinion of the law-maker,
or the person who is to do the act, that the law or the consequence
of the act is within the constitutional power upon which the law in
question itself depends for its validity.(62)
Item 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bill says that marriage ‘means
the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily
entered into for life.’(63) On ‘stream and source’ principles
there may be a question of how far Parliament can go in determining
or limiting the scope and extent of the ‘marriage’ power in section
51(xxi) of the Constitution.
The Government is fundamentally opposed to same sex couples adopting
children.(64) It takes the view that ‘the majority of Australians
[think that], children, including adopted children, should have the
opportunity, all other things being equal, to be raised by a mother
and a father.’(65)
On the other hand it can be argued, that matters of eligibility and
suitability have been and should remain matters for the States and Territories(66)—decided
in accordance with their laws and policies, based on individual assessments
and on the best interests of the child. It might also be said that while
the Commonwealth may have the constitutional power to make its amendments,(67)
they are not matters that fall within the scope of the Intercountry
Adoption Convention.(68)
Some would also take the view that ‘there is no positive or negative
correlation between parenting ability and sexual orientation’ and that
‘the focus should be on whether the person is suitable to meet and promote
the child’s best interests and not on stereotypes and assumptions about
homosexuality and marital status.’(69)
-
Nor is there a definition in the Family Law Act 1975—although
the Hyde definition is referred to in section 43 of that
Act.
-
House of Representatives, Hansard, 19 May 1960 , p. 2006.
-
See, for example, EG Whitlam MP, House of Representatives, Hansard,
17 August 1960, p. 117.
-
Senate, Hansard, 18 April 1961, p. 549.
-
Senate, Hansard, 18 April 1961, p. 554.
-
(1866) LR 1 P&D 130 per Lord Penzance who said, ‘marriage,
as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as
the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion
of all others.’ The words, ‘as understood in Christendom’ are not
included in section 46 of the Marriage Act or section 43 of the
Family Law Act.
-
Re Kevin: Validity of a Marriage of a Transsexual
(2001) 28 Fam LR 158.
-
See Attorney-General v. ‘Kevin & Jennifer’
(2003) 30 Fam LR 1. The Full Family Court (Nicholson CJ, Ellis &
Brown JJ) said, ‘For the purposes of these proceedings it was common
ground that marriage is a union between a man and a woman signified
by certain formalities and carrying with it a status recognised
by the law. The issue of whether a marriage can occur between people
of the same sex is not at issue in this case. Similarly, the status
of pre-operative transsexual persons is not directly in issue.’
[at 17]
-
The Commonwealth had argued that the 1971 English case of Corbett
[1971] P 83 represented the law in Australia and thus that ‘Kevin’
was not a man for the purpose of the Marriage Act. Had the Commonwealth’s
arguments been accepted the marriage of ‘Kevin’ and ‘Jennifer’ would
not have been recognised by the Court.
-
Peter Nygh, ‘The consequences for Australia of the new Netherlands
law permitting same gender marriages’, (2002) 16 Australian Journal
of Family Law, pp. 139-45.
-
See endnote 2.
-
For excerpts from relevant High Court judgements see Ian Ireland,
‘The High Court and the meaning of ‘marriage’ in section 51(xxi)
of the Constitution’, Research
Note 17, 2001-02.
-
(1991) 174 CLR 379 at 392.
-
(1986) 161 CLR 376 at 456.
-
(1908) 6 CLR 469 at 610.
-
See (1962) 107 CLR 529 at 549 per McTiernan J & at 576-7 per
Windeyer J.
-
Re Wakim, ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR
511 at 553.
-
Under section 113 of the Family Law Act. For media reports see,
for example, ‘Gay “husbands” to test their marriage in court’, The
Age, 4 February 2004; ‘Gay marriage loophole to be axed’, Courier-Mail,
26 May 2004.
-
Part VA of the Marriage Act (the Part dealing with the recognition
of foreign marriages) was inserted following the passage of the
Marriage Amendment Bill 1985.
-
Senator Gareth Evans, Second Reading Speech, ‘Marriage Amendment
Bill 1985’, Senate, Hansard, 22 February 1985, p. 58.
-
There are few Contracting States—Australia, Egypt, Finland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and Portugal.
-
Article 11 commences, ‘A Contracting State may refuse to recognize
the validity of a marriage only where, at the time of the marriage,
under the law of that State—.’
-
Section 88A.
-
Nygh, op. cit.
-
ibid, p. 142.
-
Although this proposition is put by Nygh, op. cit.
-
ibid, p. 143.
-
See Marcia Neave, ‘New rules on recognition of foreign marriages
– insomnia for lawyers’, Australian Journal of Family Law,
4(3), November 1990, pp. 190-210.
-
Note that the number of foreign jurisdictions where same sex marriages
or civil unions can celebrated has increased since the article was
written in 2002.
-
Nygh, op. cit.
-
As was pointed out in the second reading speech for the Marriage
Amendment Bill 1985:
Chapter II of the Hague Convention imposes upon
countries that are parties to the Convention an obligation to recognise
marriages that are validly celebrated under the law of the place
of celebration, subject to certain basic exceptions. This obligation
will involve recognition being given to some marriages which would
not be considered valid under the common law rules of private international
law.
In implementing the Convention the Bill also provides,
in new section 88E, that these common law rules will remain in operation
to a limited extent, so that even if a marriage would not be recognised
as valid under the Convention, it will nevertheless be recognised
as valid if the common law rules so provide. Essentially, the Convention
operates as a gloss upon the common law, as it will provide an additional
basis upon which the recognition of validity of foreign marriages
may be afforded. (Senator Gareth Evans, Senate, Hansard, 22 February
1985, p. 58).
-
Nygh, op. cit., p. 143.
-
In order to adopt in Tasmania a gay couple must be in a registered
relationship.
-
See Victorian Department of Human Services, Intercountry Adoption
Kit – Introduction to the Service.
-
NSW Law Reform Commission, Review of the Adoption of Children
Act 1965 (NSW), Report 81, 1997, p. 374.
-
ibid.
-
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Adoptions
Australia 2002-03.
-
Celica Bojorge, ‘Intercountry adoptions: in the best interests
of the child?’, (2002) 2(2) Queensland University
of Technology Law Journal, pp. 266-91 citing N Cantwell,
‘Intercountry Adoption’ (1998) 4 Innocenti Digest 2 at http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/digest4e.pdf
-
Australia’s instrument of ratification contains a number of declarations:
see http://www.hcch.net/e/status/stat33e.html
-
See: http://www.hcch.net/e/status/adoshte.html
-
Article 1.
-
National Interest Analysis, Convention on Protection
of Children and CO-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption,
done at the Hague on 29 May 1993. Note
also that the Government
Response to recommendations dealing with the Intercountry Adoption
Convention in the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
Report No. 15 that ‘… policy development and administration
in adoption matters in Australia has traditionally been the responsibility
of State and Territory Governments. The Commonwealth Government
does not consider that Australia’s ratification of the Hague Convention
should be the occasion for a substantial change in responsibilities
in this area.
-
National Interest Analysis, Convention on Protection of Children
and CO-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption, done at the
Hague on 29 May 1993.
-
See: Australian Immigration Fact Sheet, Adopting Children from
Overseas, http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/36adopting.htm
-
ibid.
-
Family Law Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998.
-
Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill (No. 1) 1998.
-
Explanatory Statement issued with the Regulations.
-
Borjorge, op. cit, pp. 277-8.
-
Articles 5(a) and 15(a).
-
Michael Organ MP, Media Release, ‘Organ asks the ALP to
cross the floor on same sex laws’, 28 May 2004.
-
Senator Brian Greig, Press Release, ‘Gay marriage ban needs
Senate inquiry’, 28 May
-
Shadow Attorney-General, Media Statement, ‘Labor position
on Government Bill’, 1 June 2004.
-
Senator Bob Brown, Media Release, ‘Labor’s decision on gay
marriage ban entrenches discrimination,’ 1 June 2004.
-
In contrast, see Hutley JA who said that the reference to the common
law definition of ‘marriage’ in the Family Law Act ‘can only be
regarded as propaganda contradicted by the substantial provisions
of the Act which, except for the creation of counselling facilities,
are directed to the speedy termination of the married state’ Seidler
v. Schallhofer [1982] FLC 91-273 at 77, 551-2. See also Watson
J who said of the same provision, ‘It is a statement of the traditional
concept of marriage in Australia—a voluntary monogamous heterosexual
relationship entered into for an indefinite period, hopefully for
life’ In the Marriage of S (1980) FLC ¶90-820 at 75,177.
-
See Stephen Parker, Patrick Parkinson & Juliet Behrens, Australian
Family Law in Context. Commentary and Materials, 2nd
ed, 1999.
-
Discussing the effect of subsection 88E(4), Professor Marcia Neave
commented, ‘… some Commonwealth and Northern Territory legislation
recognises Aboriginal tribal marriages … Section 88E(4) preserves
the operation of provisions in this form.’ Neave, op.cit, p. 207.
-
Attorney-General, Second Reading Speech, ‘Marriage Legislation
Amendment Bill 2004’, House of Representatives, Hansard,
27 May 2004, p. 29161.
-
Attorney-General, Second Reading Speech, ‘Marriage Legislation
Amendment Bill 2004’, House of Representatives, Hansard,
27 May 2004, p. 29161.
-
Tony Blackshield & George Williams, Australian Constitutional
Law and Theory. 3rd ed, p. 758.
-
(1951) 83 CLR 1 at 258.
-
(1951) 83 CLR 1 at 258.
-
Emphasis added.
-
Parker et al, op. cit.
-
Attorney-General, Second Reading Speech, ‘Marriage Legislation
Amendment Bill 2004’, House of Representatives, Hansard,
27 May 2004, p. 29161.
-
And the country of origin.
-
For instance, if not under the treaties aspect of the external
affairs power, then under the ‘matters external to Australia’ aspect
of the power, the territories power and the migration power.
-
The Hague Convention is primarily concerned with the processes
associated with intercountry adoption. It does not deal with the
eligibility of prospective parents of adopted children but leaves
this as a matter for contracting States [see for example, articles
5(a) and 15(a)].Indeed, on one reading, the Convention does not
apply until after both parties to the prospective adoption have
been identified [article 2].
-
Borjorge, op. cit., p. 278.
This list indicates where gay marriage is allowed and where registered
partnerships or civil unions are granted. Countries or jurisdictions
considering laws which allow gay marriage and civil unions are also
listed. The list reflects the law at 1 June 2004.1
Gay or Same-Sex
Marriage
Netherlands
Belgium
Canada – provinces of Ontario and British Columbia
USA – Massachusetts (from 17 May 2004) : the first USA State to allow
gay marriage
Countries Considering Gay
Marriage Legislation
Spain
France
Sweden
USA States Considering Gay
Marriage Legislation
California
New York
Rhode Island
Vermont
Note: 39 USA States have passed
laws prohibiting or refusing to recognise same-sex marriage.
Registered Partnerships
Registered partnerships grant homosexual
couples the same (or substantially the same) legal rights as married
heterosexuals.
France
Germany
Finland
Iceland
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Portugal – more limited civil union
laws
Canada – Quebec : civil unions recognised
USA States
Vermont
Hawaii
New Jersey
Countries Considering Civil
Unions/Partnerships
Switzerland
Britain
Ireland
Czech Republic
New Zealand
-
Information provided by Catherine Lorimer,
Parliamentary Library. Readers are also referred to New Zealand, Parliamentary
Library, ‘Civil unions and same-sex marriage—an international perspective’,
i-brief, 2003/20, 3 March 2004.
Jennifer Norberry
4 June 2004
Bills Digest Service
Information and Research Services
This paper has been prepared for general distribution to Senators and
Members of the Australian Parliament. While great care is taken to ensure
that the paper is accurate and balanced, the paper is written using information
publicly available at the time of production. The views expressed are
those of the author and should not be attributed to the Information and
Research Services (IRS). Advice on legislation or legal policy issues
contained in this paper is provided for use in parliamentary debate and
for related parliamentary purposes. This paper is not professional legal
opinion. Readers are reminded that the paper is not an official parliamentary
or Australian government document.
IRS staff are available to discuss the paper's contents
with Senators and Members and their staff but not with members of the
public.
ISSN 1328-8091
© Commonwealth of Australia 2004
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1968, no part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted
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