Bills Digest No. 116 2001-02
Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action)
Bill 2002
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as introduced
and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest does not have
any official legal status. Other sources should be consulted to determine
the subsequent official status of the Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret
Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2002
Date Introduced:
20 February 2002
House: House
of Representatives
Portfolio: Employment
and Workplace Relations
Commencement: The amendments
set out in Schedule 1 will commence on a day to be fixed by proclamation,
subject to subsection 2(3), which specifies that the Bill commences after
6 months of it receiving Royal Assent unless an earlier date is fixed
by proclamation. The amendments set out in Schedule 2, which are contingent
upon amendments proposed by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Genuine
Bargaining) Bill 2002, would commence on the later date of the commencement
of the amendments made by that Bill or the commencement of Item 24 of
Schedule 1 to this Act.
The Workplace
Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2002 will
amend the Workplace
Relations Act 1996 (the WR Act). The amendments will require the
conduct of a secret ballot by union members or non-union members, as the
case may be, as a prerequisite for gaining authorisation from the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to take subsequent 'protected'
industrial action against the employer during enterprise bargaining negotiations.
This is to ensure that those participating in the action have decided
upon the action and have not been misled by union officials.
Recent legislative initiatives
A provision to require a secret ballot before employees
took protected industrial action was proposed as Schedule 12 of the Workplace
Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999,
(the 'More Jobs Better Pay Bill). Also at that time, the 1999 Commonwealth
Budget introduced funding for the partial costs of conducting these ballots
(contained in the 1999 Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business
Portfolio
Budget Statement).
The 'More Jobs, Better Pay' Bill was referred to the
Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education Legislation
Committee. A report on the 'More Jobs Better Pay' Bill was made in November
1999(1) (see Senate
Report 1999). The Bill failed to pass the Senate on 29 November 1999.
The Government decided to reintroduce schedules of the
'More Jobs Better Pay' Bill as separate Bills. Thus, the Workplace
Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2000
(the 2000 Bill) was introduced to the House of Representatives on 26 June
2000. Bills
Digest 18, 2000-2001 addressed that Bill and provides useful background
to the issue of ballots prior to industrial action. That Bill was referred
to the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education
Legislation Committee on 16 August 2000.
The Senate Committee reported on that Bill along with
three other Bills on 7 September 2000 (see Senate
Report 2000).(2) Debate on this Bill was adjourned in the
Senate on 7 August 2000, thus the Bill failed to pass the Senate.
Current provisions
for secret ballots and industrial action
There are currently certain sections of the WR Act dealing,
separately, with secret ballots for industrial action and notices to initiate
bargaining which may involve industrial action. In the case of secret
ballots, there are also separate ballot provisions dealing with the election
of officials of registered organisations (unions and employers). Ballots
are also used for voting on amalgamations of registered organisations
and for approving certified agreements. The provisions below only address
the use of a ballot in the context of resolving an industrial dispute.
Provisions providing access to protected industrial action are discussed
later.
Secret ballots: rationale
Minister Abbott reflected on his proposals to amend the current secret
ballot provisions by stating in his Second
Reading Speech to the current Bill that:
A secret ballot is a fair, effective
and simple process for determining whether a group of employees at
a workplace want to take industrial action. It will ensure that the
right to protected industrial action is not abused by union officials
pushing agendas unrelated to the workers at the workplace concerned.
Secret ballots on industrial action have been a feature
of federal labour legislation since the late 1920s. The current provisions
allowing the ordering of a secret ballot by the AIRC under the WR Act
(under Division 4 of Part V1) reads:
Section
135: Commission may order secret ballot
(1) Where:
- (a) an organisation is concerned in an industrial dispute with
which the Commission or another tribunal acting under a law of the
Commonwealth is empowered to deal (whether or not proceedings in
relation to the dispute are before the Commission or other tribunal);
and
- (b) the Commission considers that the prevention or settlement
of the industrial dispute might be helped by finding out the attitudes
of the members, or the members of a section or class of the members,
of the organisation or a branch of the organisation in relation
to a matter;
the Commission may order that a vote of the members
be taken by secret ballot (with or without provision for absent voting),
in accordance with directions given by the Commission, for the purpose
of finding out their attitudes to the matter.
Also in certain situations, the members of an organisation
(union members) may make an application for the AIRC to conduct a ballot:
Section
136: Application by members of organisation for secret ballot
- (1) Where:
- (a) the members, or the members of a section or class of the members,
of an organisation or branch of an organisation are directed or requested
by the organisation or branch to engage in industrial action; and
- (b) the members directed or requested are, or include, members
(in this section called the relevant affected members) who are employed
by a particular employer at a particular place of work;
application may be made to the Commission, by at least
the prescribed number of relevant affected members, for an order under
subsection (2).
The current Bill repeals this provision and its subsequent
subsections.
History of ballots and industrial action provisions
A legislative background to ballot provisions relating
to industrial disputation in the Commonwealth jurisdiction has been outlined
in an AIRC decision by Senior Deputy Harrison on secret ballots, collective
bargaining and Australian Workplace Agreements. It can be seen that aspirations
to learn true rank and file feelings have been at the heart of both past
(and current) amendments to secret ballot provisions:
In 1928 the then Conciliation and
Arbitration Act 1904 (CA Act) was amended to insert a new section
which was s.56D. That section allowed the then Commonwealth Court
of Conciliation and Arbitration to make an order for the views of
members of an organisation or parties to a dispute be submitted to
a vote of members of the organisation by secret ballot in accordance
with directions given by the Court.
In or about 1947 and as a part of
other variations to the CA Act, s.56D became s.72. Further amendments
were made in 1951. The second reading speeches at the time these amendments
were introduced each made some reference to them forming part of a
campaign which the Government and its supporters were directing against
what was described as the sinister challenge of communism. It was
said that the amendments would allow the Court itself to order the
views of members be ascertained by secret ballot and hence allow the
"rank and file" views to be known.
In or about 1956 the section was again
amended and it then became section 45. One particular reason for this
amendment was the decision in the case known as the "Boilermaker's
case" necessitating a reconsideration of the extent to which a Court
could exercise certain powers. The amendments made resulted in the
establishment of the Commonwealth Industrial Court and the Commonwealth
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission.
In 1972 a new section 45 was inserted.
In the second reading speech at the time the then Bill was described
as including new provisions in relation to the holding of court controlled
ballots in relation to industrial disputes. Again it was said to be
motivated by a belief that many industrial stoppages did not have
the support of rank and file trade unionists.
Further amendments were made in 1977
and 1981. Each amendment was said to be justified as being a practical
way of giving effect to the principle that an opportunity should be
available for employees to express their personal views on industrial
activity. The act would now also allow employees themselves to apply
for a secret ballot to ascertain whether they approved of or wanted
to participate in industrial action (this power is similar to that
now in s.136 of the Act) …
Further amendments appear to have
been made in 1983 which are not necessary to be described. In the
amendments made to the Act in 1988 which resulted in the repeal of
the C&A Act and the introduction of the Industrial Relations
Act 1988, section 45 became section 135. Further amendments were
made in 1996 by the Workplace Relations and Other Amendments Act
1996 when the present subsections (2A) and (2B) were introduced.(3)
Ballots and bargaining
The case which elicited the AIRC's review of ballot provisions
concerned the Rail Bus and Tram Union and the operators of Great Southern
Railways (previously an operation of Australian National Railways) now
owned by the company Serco Australia Pty Ltd. The case highlighted the
usefulness of the current secret ballot provisions in resolving industrial
disputes over Australian Workplace Agreements. The RBTU put to the AIRC,
in the context of bargaining for a certified agreement and utilising the
AIRC's conciliation role, that the AIRC conduct a ballot of employees
of Great Southern Railways under section 135 around the following question:
When your current Australian Workplace Agreement
reaches its nominal expiry date, would you prefer to have your terms
and conditions of employment thereafter regulated by a collective
agreement certified under the Workplace Relations Act to which the
RBTU is a party or to continue under another Australian Workplace
Agreement [Please tick your preference]
The AIRC determined that the general dispute resolution
powers under subsections
111(1)(d) and (t) and the conciliation role afforded to it for conciliating
EBA impasses under section
170NA were available for this purpose. The outcome of this ballot
indicated a preference for a collective agreement.(4) It shows
the usefulness of the current secret ballot provisions in outlining the
views of employees for bargaining options when the legislation is generally
silent on the expression of employee preference in their choice of bargaining
modes.
Protected industrial action
Protected industrial action is available under the WR
Act to employers, unions and employees but only where the parties are
negotiating an enterprise bargaining agreement (referred to as a certified
agreement under the WR Act). Until 1994 industrial action was not protected,
but legislation in the form of the Industrial
Relations Reform Act 1993 introduced the concept in the
context of these negotiations.
The Department of Employment Workplace Relations and
Small Business (DEWRSB, now DEWR) explained the concept of protected industrial
action in its submission to the Senate Committee's review of the 2000
Bill.
The Workplace Relations Act 1996
(WR Act) provides significant protections for employees and unions
organising industrial action in order to advance their claims in respect
of a single business certified agreement. This protection is subject
to certain procedural requirements and limited to situations where
there has been a genuine attempt to reach agreement. Unions and employees
complying with these requirements gain immunity from most forms of
civil liability that may arise from the industrial action (section
170MT). In addition, employers are prohibited
from dismissing or injuring an employee in his or her employment wholly
or partly because the employee has taken protected action (section
170MU).(5)
Note that in a significant development, the Federal Court
in its Emwest
decision(6) (as well as the AIRC) has entertained the notion
that a union may take industrial action during the course of the operation
of a certified agreement. This is in a circumstance where the union is
seeking resolution of a matter not included in the first agreement.
The current Bill will alter the provisions available
for the taking of protected industrial action. These are currently:
Section
170MI - Initiation of bargaining period
- (1) If:
- (a) an employer; or
- (b) an organisation of employees; or
- (c) an employee acting on his or her own behalf and on behalf of
other employees;
wants to negotiate an agreement under Division 2 or
3 in relation to employees who are employed in a single business or a
part of a single business, the employer, organisation or employee (the
initiating party) may initiate a period (the bargaining period) for negotiating
the proposed agreement.
Note: This subsection has effect subject
to subsections 170MW(10) and 170MZ(7).
Also, where the employees engaging in industrial action
are members of a registered organisation, the action must be authorised
by officials of the union and under its rules.
Section
170MR - Industrial action must be duly authorised
(1) Engaging in industrial action by members of an organisation
of employees that is a negotiating party is not protected action unless,
before the industrial action begins:
- (a) the industrial action is duly authorised
by a committee of management of the organisation or by someone authorised
by such a committee to authorise the industrial action; and
- (b) if the rules of the organisation provide for the way in
which the industrial action is to be authorised—the industrial action
is duly authorised under those rules; and
- (c) written notice of the giving of the authorisation is given
to a Registrar.
Section
170MQ - What happens if Commission orders a ballot
(1) If, under subsection 135(2), the Commission has ordered that
a vote of members of an industrial organisation be taken by secret ballot
in relation to the proposed agreement, the organising of, or engaging
in, industrial action by:
- (a) the organisation; or
- (b) a member of the organisation; or
- (c) an officer or employee of the organisation acting in that
capacity;
after the making of the order is not protected action
unless:
(d) such a ballot has been taken; and
(e) the industrial action has been approved by a majority of
the valid votes cast in the ballot.
- (2) If, under subsection 135(2B), the Commission
has ordered that a vote of employees be taken by secret ballot in respect
of a proposed agreement, the organising of, or engaging in, industrial
action by the employees after the making of the order is not protected
action unless:
(a) such a ballot has been taken; and
(b) the industrial action has been approved by a majority of
the valid votes cast in the ballot.
Statistics on ballots and protected
action
The question arises as to how these provisions for secret
ballots and notices to initiate bargaining periods are utilised in practice.
From the statistics on ballots and bargaining period available in annual
reports of the AIRC, the following data in the table can be compiled.
However, there are a number of caveats. It is assumed that the bulk of
applications to initiate bargaining periods come from unions but applications
can be made by employers to instigate lock-outs against their employees.
Also, while there are thousands of applications annually to initiate bargaining,
these not necessarily result in prolonged action.(7)
Table: Orders for secret ballots and applications
to AIRC to initiate bargaining period
|
Year
|
96/97
|
97/98
|
98/99
|
99/00
|
00/01
|
|
No. of orders for secret ballot
|
2
|
6
|
1
|
2
|
1
|
|
No. of applications for bargaining period
|
4,300
|
6,613
|
5,779
|
9640
|
6,625
|
(Source: annual reports of the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission 1997- 2001)
The data on requests for secret ballots prior to 1997
has been reported in the Ministerial Discussion Paper, Pre-industrial
action secret ballots .(8) It notes the provisions
have been accessed sparingly, with some 27 AIRC decisions up to 1997 making
reference to both 'secret ballot' and 'industrial action'.(9)
As for bargaining periods, applications to initiate a
bargaining period do not equate to industrial action taken. Indeed, Australia
has witnessed a very low period of disputation with 50 working days lost
per 1,000 employees in the 12 months to December 2001.(10)
By contrast, a decade earlier about 200 working days were lost per 1,000
employees, and this itself was a decline from 1980s data.(11)
Also the data on industrial disputes do not clearly show
enterprise bargaining as the main area of disputation. Australian Bureau
of Statistics data on industrial disputes show for the 12 months to November
2001 that disputes over wages only accounted for 14 000 days lost, while
disputes against managerial policy accounted for 224 600 days lost.(12)
It is true that managerial policy disputes can include those over enterprise
bargaining but managerial policy disputes also include other matters such
disputes over discipline, rosters, retrenchment, victimisation of unionists
and so-on. Falling disputation data can be partly explained by the formalities
required to actually engage in protected action. As well as complying
with the provisions detailed above re authorisation, the parties are required
under section
170MO of the WR Act to provide notice of action to be taken to the
employer (and vice versa).
It is assumed that where employee decisions are made
to take action, they are made within the registered rules of the relevant
organisation. While it is feasible for non-unionists to take industrial
action in enterprise negotiations, Bills
Digest 18, 2000-2001 showed that in only one case to 2001 had a group
of employees been successful at making an application under the WR Act's
bargaining provisions.
Overall, it can be contended that the perceived need
for rank and file unionists to specifically express their views on industrial
action has not materialised under the avenues which are available under
the WR Act. Industrial action has thus declined as bargainers have become
'bargained out', and the bargaining provisions discourage industrial action,
a point noted by the senior research fellow at the National Institute
of Labour Studies, Mr Mark Cully:
'In Australia, the move to individual
and enterprise-based employment agreements meant less scope for collective
action, and legislation strictly defining 'legal' industrial action
also discouraged strikes'(13).
Policy Commitment
The Government outlined its policy for protected action
ballots in its 1998 federal election workplace relations policy More
Jobs Better Pay. However, the proposal had also been covered earlier
in the Ministerial Discussion Paper Pre-industrial
action secret ballots (August 1998). The policy was subsequently
elaborated in a ministerial discussion paper by the Hon. Peter Reith The
Continuing Reform of Workplace Relations: Implementation of More Jobs,
Better Pay (May 1999), which proposed:
Protected action will be preceded
by a secret ballot process overseen by the AIRC. Ballots will normally
be conducted by post, although applications may be made for attendance
ballots in appropriate circumstances. An application for a secret
ballot will only be able to be made during a bargaining period and
will be required to include a range of information, such as the proposed
certified agreement to which a secret ballot relates, the group of
employees or members who are to be balloted, and the question or questions
to be asked in the ballot. The AIRC will be empowered to determine
whether a ballot should or should not proceed. Before ordering a ballot
the AIRC would need to be satisfied that, among other things, the
parties have been genuinely bargaining.
Members of organisations making agreements
(or the employees to be covered in the case of non-union agreements)
would be eligible to vote in a ballot.
The current Bill is the third legislative attempt to
give effect to this policy. The policy in favour of secret ballots prior
to industrial action was again featured in the workplace relations policy
of the Liberal Party of Australia prior to the November 2001 federal election.(14)
Views of key organisations
Below are the summaries of points made by the Department
of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB), the Australian
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and major employer organisations such as
the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) and the Australian
Industry Group (AiG) to the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small
Business and Education Legislation Committee. These submissions were made
in the context of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for
Protected Action) Bill 2000. However their views are still useful.
The extracts attributed to the ALP and the Australian
Democrats, are excerpts from their respective minority reports of September
2000 for the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and
Education Legislation Committee: Consideration of Provisions Workplace
Relations Amendment (Australian Workplace Agreements Procedures) Bill
2000, Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action)
Bill 2000, Workplace Relations Amendment (Tallies and Picnic Days) Bill
2000 Workplace Relations Amendment (Termination of Employment) Bill 2000,
September 2000.
The full text of electronic submissions to the Senate
Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education Legislation
Committee on
these Bills can be found here.
DEWRSB:
- Unions and employees complying with these requirements gain immunity
from most forms of civil liability that may arise from the industrial
action (section 170MT). In addition, employers are prohibited from dismissing
or injuring an employee in his or her employment wholly or partly because
the employee has taken protected action (section 170MU).
- At present, there is a requirement that industrial action organised
by a union must be duly authorised in accordance with the organisation’s
rules in order to attract protection (section 170MR). Their rules
may require endorsement by members of any proposed action, however,
in a matter as important as the taking of protected industrial action,
in the Government’s view, there should be an explicit requirement in
the WR Act that members formally vote to take industrial action or not
to take industrial action. (emphasis added)
- Pre-industrial action ballots are an appropriate counterpart to protected
action. Protected action is available only in respect of single business
certified agreements, reflecting the focus of the WR Act on genuine
enterprise-level bargaining, and the decision to take (or not to take)
protected action should be made at the workplace level by those employees
directly concerned.
- As recent developments indicate, protected action is being used in
support of common claims being brought across an industry or parts of
industry sectors, using the device of a common expiry date. Recourse
to broadly-based protected action through this device reinforces the
policy rationale for secret ballots prior to taking protected action.
Such provision would ensure that decisions to access protected action
were democratically taken, and that they were taken at the workplace
level. Over the longer term, normal recourse to secret ballots where
protected action was an issue would contribute to developing a culture
of employee involvement in workplace agreement-making.
- The Commission’s power to order a pre-industrial action secret ballot
(including on application by members of an organisation) is discretionary.
- In the United Kingdom, compulsory pre-strike ballots are well established,
and were retained in the Labour Government’s Employment Relations
Act 1999.
- Union leaders in the United Kingdom have acknowledged that requirements
for secret ballots for elections and for authorisation of industrial
action have assisted in improving democracy within unions. For example,
a paper commissioned by the Trade Union Congress in 1994 stated:
In recent years there have been encouraging internal
democratic reforms (stimulated it must be said in some cases by the
1984 Trade Union Act) which have ensured that leaders have to become
more sensitive and directly accountable to their own members, through
the introduction of postal ballots for their own elections and before
the calling of strikes and other forms of industrial disputation.
- Despite changes to the legislation which require that unions meet
the full cost of conducting ballots, balloting has become far more widespread
in the UK than the law requires. In addition to pre-industrial action
balloting, union positions on proposed settlements and employers’ last
offers are often determined through balloting. In addition, the introduction
of mandatory pre-strike ballots in 1984 coincided with a substantial
reduction in industrial disputation in the UK.
ACTU
- The ACTU supports the right of union members to vote on whether or
not to take industrial action, and believes such votes are generally
taken. It should be noted that a number of unions routinely use secret
ballots prior to taking industrial action. The ACTU notes that secret
pre-strike ballots are available when requested by employees under section
136 of the Act.
- In a Ministerial Discussion Paper Pre-industrial action secret
ballots published in August 1998, the authors found that very few
secret ballots had been ordered by the Commission, and that where these
had occurred they had generally been to ascertain employees’ attitudes
to particular issues, rather than their views in relation to industrial
action.
- There is no evidence in the Discussion Paper of the Commission refusing
applications by employers, or anybody else, for ballots to be conducted
in relation to the question of taking industrial action.
- In Western Australia, which has legislated for compulsory secret pre-strike
ballots, there has not been one application for a ballot since 1 January
1998, when the legislation came into effect. This is in spite of applications
being able to be made by an employer or employer organisation, as well
as by a union or union member. (Note however the legislative proposal
to repeal the WA provisions for secret pre-strike ballots.(15))
- The Bill proposes to remove the Commission’s discretion under subsection
135(2B) to order a secret ballot in the case of unprotected action;
this is part of a general thrust by the Government to create a legislative
framework in which legal action is the only possible response by employers
to unprotected industrial action, rather than encouraging the use of
Commission processes to resolve the dispute which has given rise to
the industrial action.
- The Minister’s refusal to consider secret ballot requirements to call
off a strike is conclusive evidence that this proposal has nothing to
do with democratic functioning, and everything to do with restricting
the right to strike. Further evidence is provided by the lack of any
support for proposals such as compulsory secret postal shareholder votes
on issues such as takeovers, or whether or not a company should lock-out
its employees.
ACCI:
- The Bill proposes the introduction of a qualification on the current
bargaining period provisions to the effect that industrial action is
not protected unless authorised by a secret ballot and an accompanying
scheme to enable this qualification to be implemented in practice.
- The community interest is in ensuring that industrial action, when
it occurs, is not action taken lightly. It is not in the community interest
for industrial action to occur as a matter of course. Similarly, the
interest of employers is in minimising damaging industrial action and
in providing appropriate restrictions on industrial action.
- Industrial action can be extremely damaging, it is rarely if ever
an appropriate first resort, and even those who support protection for
taking industrial action do so with ambivalence. No-one believes that
the taking of industrial action is the best way to resolve disputes,
it is only ever defended as a ‘necessary evil’, as a last resort where
necessary and where discussions and negotiations have not led to a settlement.
- It is highly desirable that industrial action not occur unless due
democratic processes have been undertaken. Parliament has taken the
decision to enable employees to take ‘protected’ industrial action and
in so doing to breach the ordinary contract of employment obligations
to work as directed, and possibly to inflict substantial financial and
other damage on the business of their employer.
AiG
- Ai Group’s concern with compulsory secret ballots has been that
they tend to polarise the position of parties and may make disputes
more difficult to resolve. However, having studied the scheme of secret
ballots proposed in the Bill Ai Group believes that a secret ballot
process, overseen by the AIRC is an appropriate precondition for the
taking or organising of protected industrial action by employees and
organisations or employees.
- employees will have an opportunity to vote without fear or favour
in a fair and democratic ballot on whether they are prepared to lose
wages through protected industrial action in support of enterprise bargaining
claims.
- employees will know before voting what the precise claims are and
what the nature and duration of the industrial action they are voting
on is intended to be; no ballot will be ordered and therefore protected
action will not be available if the Commission finds that the applicant
has not genuinely tried to reach agreement with the employer prior to
the application for a ballot.
- an employer will have the opportunity to argue that the claims being
pursued by the applicant for a secret ballot are industry pattern bargaining
claims (and consequently the party has not genuinely tried to reach
agreement at the enterprise level) and therefore the ballot should not
proceed.
- Ai Group supports the legislative scheme with one important
exception, namely that employees eligible to vote in a secret ballot
should not be limited to union members. To do so would create hostility
and division within the enterprise.
ALP
The issue of compulsory secret ballots
for strike action was canvassed at length in the Committee’s inquiry
into the 'More Jobs Better Pay' Bill. No additional evidence has been
provided to this inquiry that invalidates the findings of the Labor
Senators in their minority report to that inquiry.
As the issues of quorum and the ‘electoral
role’ were addressed at length in the 1999 Minority report it is not
intended to repeat them here, except to note that these issues remain
as major concerns to the Labor Senators. Labor Senators support the
current secret ballot provisions as balanced and reasonable for the
parties to a dispute.(16)
Australian Democrats
This Inquiry has addressed four bills
introduced by the Government in June. With some variations, all four
of the bills have been drawn from provisions in the Workplace Relations
Legislation Amendment (More Jobs Better Pay) Bill 1999. That bill
was the subject of an extensive inquiry by this Committee. My report
to that Inquiry dealt with all of the schedules to that bill. The
comments that I made at that time on the merits of the various schedules
by and large continue to apply to these bills which reflect those
schedules (Senator Murray).(17)
Comparing Bills
While this Bill has similar provisions to the Workplace
Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action Bill) 2000,
there are subtle changes. For example, in respect of non-union employees
seeking to take industrial action, the Bill essentially requires a ballot
to hold a ballot, although not expressed in such terms, but the Bill seeks
evidence of a number of employees of their wish to conduct a secret ballot
on future industrial action. The number indicating this initial quorum
depends on the size of the relevant workforce. Presumably either a ballot
or signed petition would constitute evidence. The method is not spelt
out in the Bill.
While the quorum for an eligible poll under the previous
proposal was 50 per cent of persons on the roll of voters, this is reduced
now to 40 per cent of persons on the roll. The ballot authorises
industrial action if more than 50 per cent of these votes are in favour
of industrial action.
Schedule 1 -
secret ballots for protected action
Item 3 repeals and replaces subsection 135(2).
New subsection 135(2) would prevent the Commission from ordering
a secret ballot of members of an organisation under subsection 135(1)
where the organisation has initiated a bargaining period under section
170MI for an agreement.
Item 4 repeals subsection 135(2B).
Item 6 repeals existing subsections 136(1), (2),
(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7).
Item 8 to Item 15 repeal existing subsections
136(8B), (9) and (10), 138(2) and 138(6), and section 140, and also remove
references in subsections 137(1), 138(1), 138(5) and 139 to existing secret
ballot provisions.
Item 16 introduces new section 170MJA to
provide that an employee or employees who wish to initiate a bargaining
period under section 170MI, or who wish to give an employer notice of
intention to take industrial action under section 170MO may appoint an
agent to initiate the bargaining period or to issue the notice on their
behalf. New subsection 170MJB(1) would protect the identity of
employees who appoint agents under new section 170MJA by prohibiting the
Commission from disclosing information that would identify persons who
have appointed an agent.
Item 17 amends existing subsection 170ML(7) by
inserting a reference to new Division 8A. This amendment would ensure
that industrial action would only be protected if both the existing provisions
in Division 8 and the new provisions regarding protected action ballots
in new Division 8A have been complied with.
Item 20 repeals and replaces the existing subsection
170MO(6). The proposed replacement subsection 170MO(6) will provide
that notice of proposed action cannot be given until a ballot result has
been declared.
Item 21 repeals and replaces existing subsections
170MP(1) and (2) with new provisions which no longer require that industrial
action is not protected unless the organisation or employees taking action
have genuinely tried to reach agreement.
Item 22 is a crucial amendment. It repeals
and replaces section 170MQ. The proposed replacement section 170MQ
provides that industrial action taken by an organisation of employees,
its members or employees, or by employees who are negotiating parties,
would not be protected action unless the action is taken in response to
a lockout of employees, or the action has been authorised by a protected
action ballot conducted in accordance with new Division 8A.
Item 24 inserts new section 170MWE which would
regulate how protected action by unions or employees may be recommenced
after the suspension of a bargaining period has ended. Protected action
that has been authorised by a protected action ballot may commence at
any time within the 30 day period following the declaration of the ballot
or the nominal expiry date of the existing agreement or agreements
Item 25 inserts a new Division into Part VIB of
the Act: New Division 8A – Secret ballots on proposed protected action
New Subdivision A – General
New section 170NBA establishes the object
of the new Division: to provide access to employees to a ballot, in order
to determine whether protected industrial action should be taken.
New Subdivision B - Application for order for protected
action ballot to be held
Under new subsection 170NBB(1) an application
for a protected action ballot could only be made once a bargaining period
has commenced. The application cannot be made more than 30 days before
the nominal expiry date of the agreement.
Under new subsection 170NBB(2) either a union
or a group of employees can make an application depending which group
initiated the bargaining period under section 170MI.
New subsection 170NBB(3) proposes that an employee
or employees acting jointly could not make an application to the Commission
for a ballot order unless the application has the support of a prescribed
number of employees. If there is less than 80 employees, 4 employees would
be required to support a ballot proposal. Workforces of between 80 and
5,000, at least 5 per cent of the employees. More than 5000 employees,
at least 250 employees. Unionised workforces must obtain a resolution
from their committee of management.
New subsection 170NBB(4) would provide that where
an employee or employees have initiated a bargaining period for a non–union
agreement and industrial action is proposed, an employee or employees
acting jointly may appoint an agent to represent them.
New section 170NBBA proposes mandatory requirements
for a ballot application under section 170NBB. Applications would be required
to include the following information:
- the question or questions to put to the relevant employees in the
ballot, including the nature of the proposed industrial action;
- details of the types of employees who are to be balloted; and
- any details required by rules of the Commission made for the purpose
of this section.
New section 170NBBB requires the applicant
to provide certain material to the Commission with the ballot application,
including:
- a copy of the notice initiating the bargaining period and the particulars
accompanying that notice;
- a declaration by the applicant that the industrial action to which
the application relates is not for the purpose of advancing or supporting
claims to include an objectionable provision (as defined in subsection
298Z(5) of the Act);
- if the applicant is an organisation of employees, a written notice
showing that the application has been duly authorised in accordance
with the organisation’s rules; and
- if the applicant is represented by an agent, a document containing
the name of the employee applicant or applicants.
New section 170NBBC requires the applicant
to give a copy of the application to the relevant employer and any person
nominated in the application to conduct the ballot within 24 hours of
the application being lodged with the Commission.
New Subdivision C – Determination of application and
order for ballot to be held
New subsection 170NBCA(1) would provide that in
exercising its powers under Division 8A, the Commission must act as quickly
as practicable and would be required, as far as is reasonably possible,
to determine an application for a ballot order within 2 working days of
the application being made.
New subsection 170NBCA(2) provides that paragraph
111(1)(g) of the Act is not to apply to ballot proceedings under Division
8A. (in other words the AIRC cannot decline to deal with the matter on
the grounds prescribed in the paragraph 111 (1)(g)).
Under new section 170NBCB parties and relevant
employees may make submissions and apply for directions. Under new
section 170NBCC the Commission is empowered to make directions regarding
an application for a ballot order or about any aspect of the conduct of
a protected action ballot. Any such directions would be orders of the
Commission.
New section 170NBCE seeks to ensure that any disruption
that may be caused to an employer’s operations by the conduct of more
than one protected action ballot proposed to be held within a short space
of time can be minimised (especially, for example, attendance ballots).
New subsection 170NBCF(1) provides that the Commission
must grant an application for a ballot order if it is satisfied that the
applicant has, during the bargaining period, genuinely bargained with
the employer and is continuing to do so. Conversely, the Commission must
not grant an application for a ballot order unless it is satisfied of
these conditions. New subsection 170NBCF(2) provides the Commission
with discretion to refuse an application.
New subsection 170NBCI(1) sets out the information
that would be required to be contained in a ballot order made by the Commission,
including the name of the applicant or the applicant’s agent, the type
of employees to be balloted, the voting method, the timetable for the
ballot and the names of the person authorised by the Commission to conduct
the ballot.
New subsection 170NBCI(2) would require that the
order must specify a postal ballot as the voting method unless the Commission
is satisfied that the other voting method proposed in the application
is more efficient and expeditious than a postal ballot.
New section 170NBCJ allows the President of the
Commission to develop guidelines concerning timetables for the conduct
of ballots under Division 8A.
New subsection 170NBCK(1) allows the Commission
to order the applicant or the employer of the employees (or both) to provide
the Commission with a list of employees who might be eligible to vote
in a proposed ballot.
New section 170NBCL would provide for the compilation
of the roll of voters by the Commission, who must provide the roll to
the authorised ballot agent.
New subsection 170NBCM(1) would establish that
a person is only eligible to vote in a protected action ballot if the
person
- was employed by the relevant employer on the day the ballot order
was made; and
- would be subject to the proposed agreement in respect of which the
relevant bargaining period was initiated. If the applicant for the ballot
order was an organisation of employees, the person would be required
to have been a member of the organisation on the day the ballot order
was made by the Commission.
Under new subsection 170NBCM(2) a person whose
employment is subject to an Australian Workplace Agreement whose nominal
expiry date has not passed would not be eligible to vote in a ballot,
even if the person meets the other requirements for eligibility.
Under new subsection 170NBCN(1), the ballot agent
would be required to add a person's name to the roll of voters for a ballot
at any time before voting in the ballot is finished, if the person requests
that their name be added to the roll. A process for removing a person’s
name from the roll of voters is proposed in subsection 170NBCN(3).
New subsection 170NBCO(1) would allow an applicant
for a ballot order to apply to the Commission, at any time before the
expiry of the ballot order, to have the ballot order varied.
New section 170NBCP would provide that where a
ballot has not been held within the period specified in the ballot order,
the order expires at the end of that period.
New Subdivision D – Conduct and results of protected
action ballot
New section 170NBD provides that a ballot will
not be a protected action ballot unless it is conducted by the authorised
ballot agent. Any ballot not so conducted will not authorise protected
action.
New section 170NBDA requires the ballot paper
for a protected action ballot to be in the prescribed form, and contain
the following information:
- the name of the applicant or applicant’s agent (as the case requires);
- the types of employees who are to be balloted;
- the name of the ballot agent authorised to conduct the ballot;
- the question or questions to be put to voters, including the nature
of the proposed action;
- a statement that the voter’s vote is secret and that the voter is
free to choose whether or not to support the proposed industrial action;
and
- instructions to the voter on how to complete the ballot paper.
New section 170NBDC requires the authorised ballot
agent to make a declaration of the results of the ballot in writing, and
inform the applicant, the affected employer and the Industrial Registrar,
in writing, of the results as soon as practicable after the end of voting.
Under new section 170NBDD, industrial action would
only be authorised by a protected action ballot if:
- the action was the subject of a ballot conducted in accordance with
the provisions of new Division 8A;
- at least 40% of persons on the roll of voters for the ballot established
under new section 170NBCL voted in the ballot
- more than 50% of the votes cast in the ballot approved the industrial
action; and
- the action commences within a 30 day period after the later of the
date of the declaration of the results of the ballot or the nominal
expiry date of the existing agreement (or the last occurring nominal
expiry date if there is more than one existing agreement). The Commission
could extend this 30 day period by up to 30 days if both the employer
and applicant for the ballot order jointly apply for such an extension.
There may only be one such extension [new subsections 170NBDD(2A)
and (2B)].
New section 170NBDE would require the Industrial
Registrar to keep, for each ballot held under Division 8A, a record of
questions put to the voters and the results of the ballot.
New Subdivision E – Authorised ballot agents and authorised
independent advisers
Under new subsection 170NBE(1), the Commission
may name either the Australian Electoral Commission or another person
as the authorised ballot agent.
New subsection 170NBEA(1) sets out who may be
appointed as an authorised independent adviser [the appointment of an
authorised independent adviser may be required by new subsections 170NBE(3)
and (4)].
New Subdivision F – Funding of ballots
New section 170NBF would provide that the applicant
for a ballot order is liable for the cost of holding the ballot. Under
new subsection 170NBFA(1), the Industrial Registrar is required
to determine the reasonable ballot cost. New subsection 170NBFA(2)
provides that the Commonwealth will be liable to pay to the authorised
ballot agent 80% of the reasonable ballot costs.
New Subdivision G – Miscellaneous
New subsection 170NBG(1) would provide that the
Commission must not disclose information that would identify a person
involved with ballot processes. New subsection 170NBG(2) would
establish exceptions to the prohibition.
New section 170NBGB proposes that where
the results of a protected action ballot, as declared by the authorised
ballot agent, purport to authorise particular industrial action, and an
organisation or person goes ahead and organises or participates in industrial
action acting in good faith on the results of the ballot, no legal action
is able to be taken against that organisation or those persons if it turns
out that the action was not in fact authorised by the ballot.
New sections 170NBGBA, 170NBGBB and 170NBGBC are
designed to protect the integrity of the conduct of ballots and ballot
results, by limiting the circumstances in which ballot orders, the conduct
of ballots and ballot results may be challenged.
Item 29 proposes amending sections 287 and 288
(rights of members re ballots) to specify that neither section applies
to protected action ballots conducted under new Division 8A.
Application and Saving
Item 35: Subitem (1) would provide that the amendments
in this Bill would apply to industrial action taken on or after the day
on which the amendments commence.
Subitem (2) would provide that the amendments would not
apply to industrial action taken after the commencing day if:
- the action is protected action under subsection 170ML(2) of the Act;
- the requirements of existing sections 170MO and 170MR – to provide
written notice of the intended industrial and, if an organisation is
a negotiating party, that the action was properly authorised – were
met before the commencement day; and
- the action is taken within 14 days after the commencing day.
Item 36 deals with secret ballots ordered by the
Commission under existing subsections 135(2) and (2B). The order for the
ballot would continue to have effect and the existing elements of Division
4 of Part VI of the Act would continue to apply. Existing section 170MQ
would also apply.
Schedule 2 - section 170MWB
(Section 170MWB is proposed to be inserted in the Workplace
Relations Act 1996 by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Genuine Bargaining)
Bill 2002).
Item 1 introduces new subsection 170MWB(8) allowing
the Commission under exceptional circumstances to specify a longer period
of notice of 3 days, up to 7 days, without the need for a further ballot.
This Bill is designed to make access to protected industrial
action under the Workplace
Relations Act 1996 , contingent on there being a ballot of employees
involved. The Bill reflects long-standing Coalition policy on secret ballots
being a requirement for strike action in particular. While the emphasis
is on a speedy conduct of a ballot and limiting the circumstances under
which a result might be challenged, the new provisions appear to allow
the potential for intervention into the conduct of the proposed ballots
by arguing that 'a person acted fraudulently' in aspects of the ballot
process.
It would be envisaged that measures such as ballots prior
to industrial action being taken would be designed to curb industrial
activity, yet the official data on industrial disputes shows that disputes
are resulting in few days lost per employee. This suggests that the main
role of the amendments will be to act as an influence for unions in particular
to re-assess their industrial action options, allowing a shift of negotiating
power to employers. Note however the retention of subsection 135(1) would
allow the Commission to retain a role in assessing whether union members
wish to be employed under AWAs or a certified agreement as evidenced above
in respect of the RBTU case.
- Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education
Legislation Committee: Consideration of the Provisions of the Workplace
Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999,
(November 1999)
- Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education
Legislation Committee: Consideration of Provisions Workplace Relations
Amendment (Australian Workplace Agreements Procedures) Bill 2000, Workplace
Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2000,
Workplace Relations Amendment (Tallies and Picnic Days) Bill 2000 Workplace
Relations Amendment (Termination of Employment) Bill 2000, September
2000.
- Australian Industrial Relations Commission in PR908235, 28
August 2001.
- Rail Tram and Bus Worker, v.9,n.3, 2001.
- Submission by the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and
Small Business on the Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots
for Protected Action) Bill 2000, Workplace Relations Amendment (Termination
of Employment) Bill 2000, Workplace Relations Amendment (Australian
Workplace Agreements Procedures) Bill 2000 and the Workplace Relations
Amendment (Tallies and Picnic Days) Bill 2000 to the
Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education
Legislation Committee (August 2000).
- Emwest Products Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food,
Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union [2002]
FCA 61 (6 February 2002).
- Note 'Fear of losing jobs puts workers off strike option' in The
Australian, 16 April 2002.
- The Hon. Peter Reith, Ministerial Discussion Paper, Pre-industrial
action secret ballots, (August 1998).
- Ibid, Appendix A, p.11.
- 'Strike rate is lowest on record', The Australian Financial Review,
15 March 2002.
- Alison Preston, 'The changing Australian labour market: developments
during the last decade' in Australian Bulletin of Labour, v.27(3),
September 2001, p. 173. See also Bruce Chapman 'The Accord: background
changes and aggregate outcomes', Journal of Industrial Relations
v.40(4), 1998.
- ABS Industrial Disputes, Cat. No. 6321, 13 February 2001.
- 'Fear of losing jobs puts workers off strike option' in The Australian,
16 April 2002
- Liberal Party of Australia, Choice and Reward in a Changing Australia,
2001.
- Western Australian Government: Outline
of the Labour Relations Reform Bill 2002.
- ALP Minority Report in the Senate Committee Report 2000, referenced
in Endnote 1.
- Australian Democrat Minority Report in the Senate Committee Report
2000, referenced in Endnote 1. Senator Murray's comments on the secret
ballots proposal of the 'More Jobs Better Pay' Bill noted that the then
proposals did little for industrial democracy and add greatly to impediments
to unions taking industrial action, and should be opposed.
Steve O'Neill
22 April 2002
Bills Digest Service
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