Bills Digest No. 142 1997-98
Charter of Budget Honesty Bill 1996 [No.2]
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as introduced
and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest does not have
any official legal status. Other sources should be consulted to determine
the subsequent official status of the Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History Re-introduction
Purpose Background Contentious
Provisions Concluding Comments Endnotes
Contact Officer and Copyright Details
Charter of Budget Honesty Bill 1996 [No.2]
Date Introduced: 5 December 1997
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Treasury
Commencement: Royal
Assent
Note: For detailed commentary on the Bill as first
presented, readers are referred to Bills Digest No. 85 of 1996-97.
This is the same Bill as that introduced into the House
of Representatives on 11 December 1996 and passed by it on 10 February
1997.
On 28 October 1997 the Senate passed the Bill with ten
amendments. On 30 October 1997, the House informed the Senate that it
would not agree to the proposed changes. On 10 November 1997, the Senate
insisted on its amendments and a message was reported to the House of
Representatives on 17 November 1997. The House was unmoved and on 19 November
1997 laid the Bill aside.
Section 57 of the Australian Constitution provides, in
part, that:
If the House of Representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate
rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the
House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of
three months the House of Representatives in the same or the next session,
again passes the proposed law with or without any amendments which have
been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects
or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House
of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve
the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously. But such
dissolution shall not take place within six months before the date of
the expiry of the House of Representatives by effluxion of time.
The clear refusal of the House to accept the Senate's
10 amendments constitutes a disagreement between the two Chambers for
the purposes of section 57.
Priming a possible trigger for a double dissolution,
the Bill was re-introduced on 5 December 1997 in its original form.
The House did not consider the Bill prior to the summer
recess but it has been scheduled for debate on 3 March 1998. By then 3
months will have elapsed from the date that the disagreement arose between
the two Houses over the amendments.
If, on or after 3 March 1998, the House passes the Bill
with or without any of the Senate's 10 amendments, the Senate will have
to decide whether to pass the Bill or face the possibility of a section
57 election to break the deadlock.
In short, the Bill represents a potential trigger for
a double dissolution election.
Charter
of Budget Honesty
Economic
and Fiscal outlook reports as well as intergenerational reports
The main purpose of the Charter of Budget Honesty Bill
1996 (the Bill) is to provide for a Charter of Budget Honesty (the Charter)
to improve fiscal policy outcomes by providing a framework for the conduct
of Government fiscal policy. It seeks to achieve this objective by requiring
the Government's fiscal strategy to be based on sound fiscal management
and provides for the publication of regular reports setting out such fiscal
strategy. The Bill also provides for the publication of an intergenerational
report, at least once every 5 years, which will assess the long term sustainability
of current Government policies over the 40 years following the release
of the report.
Pre-election
reports and policy costings
The Bill requires the publication of a pre-election report
setting out the fiscal and economic outlook once a general election is
called. The Bill also provides that the Government, or the Opposition,
may request the Secretaries of the Departments of the Treasury and Finance
to prepare a costing of any of their publicly announced policies once
a general election has been called and for the publication of such costings.
The request from the Opposition must be made through the Prime Minister
and is subject to the agreement of the Prime Minister.
Enforceable
rights and duties not created by the Charter of Budget Honesty
The Bill provides that nothing in the Charter of Budget
Honesty creates rights and duties that are enforceable in judicial or
other proceedings. To this extent the Charter of Budget Honesty is treated
in the same manner as parliamentary machinery provisions which are generally
not justiciable. The Charter of Budget Honesty will for the first time
set out in a formal manner what Parliament and the public could expect
of the Government in managing and reporting on the economy. This will
facilitate informed decisions being made by the public based on the state
and projected progress of the economy. Further, informed judgments could
be made by the electorate on the performance of the Government and whether
the economy could sustain the promises made by the Government and the
Opposition before each Federal election. However, there is scope for arguing
that the Bill has not gone far enough in creating enforceable rights and
duties as in the case of New Zealand where the Fiscal Responsibility
Act 1994 is binding on the Crown. (1)
Commitment
to a Charter of Budget Honesty
In his first Headland Speech,(2) the then Leader of the
Opposition, spelt out the commitment of a future Coalition Government
to a Charter of Budget Honesty with a view to 'Rebuilding Trust In Government'.
The Headland Speech prefaced this commitment by a reference to what is
now called the L-A-W (law) tax cuts which were not delivered in the form
legislated before the 1993 Federal Elections but were subsequently amended
to defer an instalment of these tax cuts with the promise that it would
be delivered in the form of a co-payment for superannuation contributions.
Apart from the commitment to a Charter of Budget Honesty there were measures
promised in the Headland Speech to enhance the position of the Auditor-General
and the role of Parliament. The independence of the Auditor-General was
to be enhanced by elevating the position to that of an officer of the
Parliament who could act without intimidation by the Executive and achieve
a fearless and authoritative surveillance of government departments. The
independence of the Auditor-General would be further strengthened by funding
from the Appropriation for the Parliament.(3) The Auditor-General Act
1997, enhances the independence of the Auditor-General by drawing
heavily on the recommendations in the report of the Joint Committee of
Public Accounts (JCPA) titled Guarding the Independence of the Auditor-General(4)
and its previous reports.(5) The Headland Speech also promised the
appointment of a Commission of Audit to report on measures to rebuild
confidence in the annual accounting process with the goal of Rebuilding
Trust in Government.
The
Report of the National Commission of Audit (NCOA Report)
The National Commission of Audit was established in March
1996 and reported 3 months later. The key recommendations of the National
Commission of Audit in relation to a Charter of Budget Honesty(6) were
based on the finding that requiring governments to state objectives and
assessing fiscal policy outcomes against established benchmarks will contribute
towards enhancing fiscal policy transparency and accountability. There
was a clear intention that legislation should make it mandatory for the
Executive Government to comply with fiscal reporting standards.
There seem to be few disadvantages associated with adopting comprehensive
fiscal reporting standards, even if the need to comply with such standards
is enshrined in legislation. Indeed, because compliance with such standards
is likely to enhance a government's ability to govern, compliance should
be legislated for so that it cannot be ignored by governments.(7)
The NCOA Report appropriately drew a distinction between
fiscal reporting in the sense of financial reporting and reporting which
is concerned with the internal management of Commonwealth agencies, and
fiscal reporting which is concerned with the macroeconomic effects of
government fiscal actions. Fiscal responsibility legislation in the form
of a Charter of Budget Honesty would deal with the latter. It further
pointed out that fiscal responsibility legislation could set specific
fiscal targets or establish certain reporting standards or involve some
combination of both approaches. In Recommendation 11.2 the NCOA opted
for the setting of clear fiscal strategy, which would require the Government
of the day to set its own specific targets but not identify such targets
in legislation, in the interest of fiscal policy flexibility required
by a National Government.
Loss of fiscal policy flexibility, which is the main disadvantage of
setting a medium term fiscal target, can be overcome to a large extent
by not identifying the target in legislation and by giving governments
room to manoeuvre should economic circumstances change.
For these reasons, the Commission favours legislation to require governments
to state clearly their fiscal strategy. This would include the setting
of specific targets, but not legislating such targets. The Commission
also supports legislation to require governments to report on progress
in achieving their stated fiscal strategy.
Recommendation 11.2: Setting
of and reporting on fiscal strategy
Governments should be required to set and report
against a clear fiscal strategy, which would include the setting of
specific targets.(8)
The NCOA expressed concerns that unless fiscal reporting
requirements were legislated governments may ignore them.
The
Budget Speech of 20 August 1996
The background to the introduction of the Bill was summarised
by the Treasurer in his 1996 Budget Speech in the following terms:
Before its election defeat on 2 March, the previous Government maintained
that the budget would now be in underlying balance. The truth was nearly
$10 Billion to the contrary.
Financial dishonesty of that magnitude undermines public confidence
in our political system. We will ensure it never occurs again.
Our Government will enact a Charter of Budget Honesty that will require
the government of the day - ours or any other - to publish a budget
update signed off by the Secretaries to the Treasury and the Department
of Finance at the commencement of each Federal Election campaign. The
public will be given updated financial information before the election,
not after it. The public will know the state of the books before they
vote.
The Charter will require any future government to set out its fiscal
strategy and report against it - just as this Government is doing.
The Charter will entrench this Government's commitment to responsible
and accountable fiscal policy.(9)
The 1996-97 Budget Papers stated that the Government
would introduce legislation in the Budget Sittings to establish a new
fiscal framework to implement the Government's Charter of Budget Honesty
election commitment. The Government also indicated that the proposed legislation
would incorporate many of the recommendations of the National Commission
of Audit.(10)
Report
by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts on Fiscal Responsibility Legislation
Discussion of the immediate background to the Bill is
not complete without a reference to the report of the Joint Committee
of Public Accounts (JCPA) on Financial Reporting for the Commonwealth:
Towards Greater Transparency and Accountability which was issued in
November 1995.(11) The JCPA examined whether it was necessary or appropriate
to legislate for fiscal responsibility at the Commonwealth level, with
particular reference to the success of attempts to legislate for fiscal
responsibility in other jurisdictions. It also examined the relevance
to the Commonwealth of the type of public reporting provisions contained
in fiscal responsibility legislation in other jurisdictions.
The JCPA did not support fiscal responsibility legislation
for the Commonwealth which attempts to define 'prudent' fiscal behaviour
or which requires governments to adopt fiscal strategies in conformity
with pre-determined fiscal targets or principles.(12) Nevertheless, the
JCPA considered that there was a strong case for specifying in any fiscal
reporting legislation the key indicators against which governments must
report and against which the performance of government is best assessed.(13)
The JCPA did, however, conclude that there is a compelling
case for fiscal reporting legislation, as it provides a framework for
governments to be accountable to the public for their management of the
nation's finances. It envisaged that fiscal reporting legislation would
be the vehicle in which parliament sets down the form, content and frequency
of reporting that it considers necessary.
Recommendations 12 to 20 of the JCPA dealt with the framework,
form, content, periodicity of reports and provision for parliamentary
scrutiny of fiscal reports.(14) A notable observation of the JCPA was
that during the period of its examination of these issues in 1995, very
few people or organisations in Australia had turned their minds to fiscal
reporting. It therefore recommended that the Bill introducing measures
for fiscal reporting should be referred to the JCPA prior to debate in
the House of Representatives, for inquiry and report.(15)
A recommendation of the Committee which might ensure
that governments comply with the fiscal reporting measures which the Bill
proposes is that it should provide for establishing a joint committee
of Parliament to examine and report on fiscal reports produced pursuant
to the legislation. It further recommended that all fiscal reports should
stand referred to the proposed committee for inquiry and report, with
specific provision for the proposed committee to call relevant Ministers
of State to give evidence(16). This measure may give the public a forum
to express its views on a government's fiscal performance, as the Bill
does not create rights and duties enforceable in judicial or other proceedings.
Such a measure may also enhance the credibility of the fiscal reporting
measures in the Charter of Budget Honesty. However, this forum may be
of no avail to the public in relation to non compliance with the pre-election
economic and fiscal outlook reports and costing of election commitments,
as there are doubts as to whether a Joint Committee of Parliament comprised
of Senators and Members can meet during the caretaker period after a dissolution
of the House of Representatives. Even were such a meeting to be convened,
there would be further concerns as to whether the committee can while
so meeting enjoy the powers, privileges and protections normally available.(17)
In relation to the pre-election reports and costings, there may be a role
for an independent Auditor-General to certify the reports prepared by
the Secretary to the Treasury and the Secretary to the Department of Finance,
in the absence of effective parliamentary scrutiny in the caretaker period.
Joint Committee of Public Accounts Advisory Report
on the Charter of Budget Honesty Bill 1996
After the Bill was passed by the House of Representatives
on 3 March 1997, the Senate referred it to the JCPA for further consideration.
The JCPA reported in March 1997 and generally supported
the Bill.(18)
The JCPA declined to make specific recommendations but
suggested a number of refinements which it argued would '1/4 enhance the
Bill and augment the Government's objective of greater fiscal honesty,
transparency and accountability.(19)
Amongst the suggestions and observations made by the
JCPA were :
- as clauses 12(3)(b), 16(30)(b), 19(2)(b) and 24(3)(b) of the
Bill allow for variations from standard reporting requirements, that
there be an obligation to give reasons for such departures(20)
- as some Charter reports are prospective in nature (economic and fiscal
outlook reports and intergenerational reports), that the Public Sector
Accounting Standards Board develop new benchmarks for these reports(21)
- that information on underlying parameters and assumptions of fiscal
forecasts and strategies be included in public reports required by the
Charter(22)
- that the reports produced would probably have only a limited impact
on limiting deficit spending(23)
- that pre-election economic and fiscal outlook reports be available
for release sooner, ie within 10 days of the calling of a general election,
not 10 days within the issuing of the election writs(24)
- (Opposition members canvassed the possibility) that the requirement
that pre-election economic and fiscal outlook reports be signed by Ministers
and responsible Departmental Secretaries be extended to all other economic
and fiscal reports(25)
- questioned the capacity of the Prime Minister to act as 'gatekeeper'
in relation to Opposition requests for costing of Opposition election
commitments during the caretaker period (clauses 29-31)(26)
- that where information is suppressed for commercial in-confidence
or similar reasons, a statement providing a general description of the
information being suppressed be provided(27)
- as clauses 13, 17 28 and 32 enable Commonwealth agencies to
withhold information, the Bill might provide that a statement be issued
where information is withheld showing the effect of this omission(28)
- that the Bill include provision for review of the Charter and ongoing
reports on its operation.
Senate Amendments
A total of 26 committee stage amendments to the Bill
were moved in the Senate. Of these, 7 Opposition amendments and 3 Australian
Democrat amendments were incorporated in the Bill as passed by the Senate
on 28 October 1997.
All 10 amendments were rejected by the House of Representatives
on 30 October 1997.(29)
A general survey of the main provisions of the Bill
as introduced appears in Bills Digest No. 85 of 1996-97.
The following summarises the 10 Senate amendments and
the Government's reasons for rejecting them.
Amendment 1
The Senate proposed that paragraph 5(1)(b) be
amended to expand the list of objectives of fiscal policy to include:
- the achievement of full employment
- the overall prosperity and welfare of the Australian people
- the maintenance or improvement of real wages and conditions and welfare
of workers.
The Government's response is that this amendment is unnecessary
as the matters raised by the Senate are already dealt with in clause
4.(30)
Amendment 2
The Senate proposed that clause 12 be amended
to include in the proposed budget economic and fiscal outlook report,
a report prepared by the Commissioner of Taxation and the Secretary to
the Treasury detailing 'any material threats to the integrity of the tax
system 1/4 '. This report would assess the fiscal impact of these threats
and identify the means to address them.
The Government argues that this requirement would unnecessarily
add to the length and complexity of the outlook statement. The Government
also argues that the amendment would identify weaknesses and loopholes
in the tax system before they could be remedied, ie the statement would
itself constitute a threat to the integrity of the tax system.(31)
Amendment 3
The Senate proposes that clause 20 be amended
to provide that intergenerational reports be provided within 3 years of
the Act commencing and every 3 years thereafter. The Bill presently provides
that such reports be prepared every 5 years.
The Government argues that this amendment is unnecessary
and that such reports are about longer term trends which do not require
more frequent reporting than every 5 years. It also argues reports can
be provided more frequently than every 5 years under the Bill as introduced.(32)
Amendment 4
The Senate amendment proposes two changes to clause
22. The first requires the responsible Departmental Secretaries
to release a joint pre-election economic and fiscal outlook report two
years and nine months after the first sitting day of the House of Representatives
following the previous election. The second states that if an election
is called before two years and nine months of the parliamentary term having
elapsed, the pre-election report must be issued 5 days before the issuing
of the writs for the general election.
The Government argues that the former proposal would
result, in some instances, in out of date information appearing in the
pre-election report. The second proposed change is seen as impractical,
with the government arguing that it will take a minimum of 10 days to
produce pre-election outlook reports.(33)
Amendment 5
The Senate proposes that clause 27 be amended
to limit the involvement of Ministers in the preparation of pre-election
economic and fiscal outlook reports.
The Government argues that this provision is unnecessary
as the integrity of such reports is protected by the requirement that
the Secretaries of Finance and Treasury must sign off on the report stating
that it reflects the best professional judgment of the officers of their
department.(34)
Amendments 6, 7, 8 and 9
These amendments relate to clause 29 dealing with
requests for the costing of election commitments.
The Senate proposes:
- widening the proposed Prime Ministerial discretion to request the
responsible Departmental Secretaries to prepare costings of Government
policies to include unannounced as well as announced policies (amendment
6)
- allowing the Leader of the Opposition to request the responsible Departmental
Secretaries to prepare costings of all Opposition policies, including
those not publicly announced (amendment 7)
The Government's response is that this proposal has the
potential to increase enormously the workload of the Departments in preparing
costing reports as requests could be made to assess a myriad of policy
alternatives and options. Such a process would also place the Departments
in the position of advising Oppositions on the development of policy.
This, it is argued, would be inconsistent with the usual conventions of
government.(35)
The Senate further proposes that:
- the Prime Minister must agree to a request from the Opposition Leader
for Opposition policies to be costed; and
- the Bill make it plain that nothing in clause 29 requires the
Leader of the Opposition to disclose to the Prime Minister the details
of an Opposition policy. (amendment 8)
Government statements to date have not squarely addressed
these two issues, other than to suggest that the proposals would lead
to a lack of transparency in the costing process.
The Senate's ninth amendment provides:
- a mechanism for Departmental Secretaries to decline to prepare costings
of Opposition policies where they consider that the request relates
to the provision of policy advice; and
- for information provided by the Opposition to the responsible Departmental
Secretaries not to be released to third parties without the approval
of the Leader of the Opposition.
The Government appears to believe that these (and the
related) amendments will result in a loss of transparency in the costing
process. Removing the Prime Minister's discretion to refuse an Opposition
Leader's request for the costing of Opposition policies is seen as contrary
to existing conventions of government.(36)
Amendment 10
The Senate would amend clause 30 to make it clear
that policy costings must show what assumptions have been used in the
costings process and must also explain the limitations of the process
adopted and assumptions employed.
The Government sees such an amendment as unnecessary
as costing guidelines issued by the Secretaries to the Departments of
Treasury and Finance [subclause 31(1)] would deal adequately with
such processes.(37)
Note: Extensive general comment was made on the Bill
as introduced in Bills Digest No.85 of 1996-97 and is not reproduced here.
This Digest has made reference to the possibility of
the Bill triggering a double dissolution election. It is, however, only
one of a number of possible triggers and its importance should not be
overstated.
Were this Bill to be the sole basis for the Prime Minister
approaching the Governor-General to dissolve both the House of Representatives
and the Senate for a simultaneous election, a number of interesting constitutional
issues would arise. These would revolve around the Governor-General's
discretion (reserve power) to refuse a Prime Ministerial request for a
double dissolution. This is an area of continuing disagreement and uncertainty.
Four important and related issues are:
- What is the scope of the Governor-General's discretion to refuse the
Prime Minister a section 57 election;
- In what circumstances might such a discretion be exercised;
- May the Governor-General seek non-Prime Ministerial advice on the
granting of a double dissolution;
- Who may the Governor-General approach for advice and under what circumstances?
Against this somewhat uncertain background, it may be
noted that there is no suggestion that the Governor-General has an open-ended
discretion to act entirely without reference to ministerial advice. It
may also be recalled that no Governor-General has rejected a request from
an elected Prime Minister for a section 57 election.
The simple (and probably the better) view is that the
Governor-General has a discretion to reject a request for a section 57
election but should only exercise that discretion in limited or extraordinary
circumstances. 'Extraordinary circumstances' on this view may arise in
those instances where request is manifestly at odds with the requirements
of section 57.
A slightly different, but not entirely inconsistent,
view is that the Governor-General's discretion is wide enough to allow
him to refuse a Prime Ministerial request in circumstances where Parliament
has not become 'unworkable'. The existence of such a discretion, to refuse
a dissolution where the Governor-General believes that government is not
'unworkable', is supported by the custom of providing the Governor-General
with advice on the workability of Parliament when requesting a dissolution.
Whether this custom is any more than just that, a custom, is another matter.
However, the exchanges between Prime Minister Fraser and Governor-General
Stephen prior to the granting of the 1983 dissolution suggest that the
workability of Parliament is a factor that can and must be considered
by the Governor-General in responding to a request for a dissolution.
Prior to granting the 1914 double dissolution, the then
Governor-General, with approval of his Prime Minister, approached the
Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia on his powers under section
57. Griffith CJ advised that the Governor-General was an 'independent
arbiter' who should dissolve both Houses only where he is:
1/4 personally satisfied, after independent consideration of the case,
either that the proposed law as to which the houses have differed in
opinion is one of such public importance that it should be referred
to the electors of the Commonwealth for immediate decision by means
of a complete renewal of both houses, or that there exists such a state
of practical deadlock in legislation as can only be ended in that way.(38)
In 1914, however, the Senate having twice rejected a
relatively minor Bill making amendments to public service employment conditions,(39)
the Governor-General acceded to a request by Prime Minister Joseph Cook
for both Houses to be dissolved. This appears to have established the
principle that disagreement over any Bill, not just an appropriation Bill
or other significant piece of legislation, can constitute the basis for
a deadlock under section 57. The 1914 'precedent' does not, however, put
beyond doubt the issue of how Governors-General will exercise their judgment
in deciding whether a proposed law 'is one of such importance that it
should be referred to the electors for immediate decision by means of
a complete renewal of both houses 1/4 '.
The Charter of Budget Honesty Bill could provide a particularly
interesting test of some of the arguments recited above.
Arguably the legislation is in most respects unnecessary.
What is to be achieved under the Bill can be achieved administratively
for the life of the present Parliament, ie within existing executive discretions.
Not even regulations are required to allow the government to provide the
electorate with the sort of information that the Bill seeks to guarantee.
Hence, it may be argued that the Bill, of itself, is a relatively poor
indicator of the Government's capacity to govern and the workability of
the Parliament. As a test of the Government's capacity to maintain parliamentary
support or compliance, the defeat of the Charter of Budget Honesty Bill
would not self-evidently present itself as 'as a 'failure to pass a legislative
proposal vital to the execution of a major policy of the Ministry'.(40)
Even if one accepts that the legislation is important
because it ensures that future governments must also provide the same
information that the present Government has committed itself to making
available now, the Governor-General may have some concerns about granting
a dissolution of both House on the strength of this Bill alone. If Griffith
CJ's view still holds, in exercising his 'independent discretion', the
Governor-General must turn his mind to whether the fate of this Bill presents
a sufficiently compelling reason for 'seeking the complete renewal of
both Houses'.
- New Zealand Statutes (1994), Vol 1; 177.
- The Role of Government : A Modern Liberal Approach, 6 June
1995, 5 and 6; The Menzies Research Centre - The 1995 National Lecture
Series.
- Ibid., 23.
- Report 346 of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) Guarding
the Independence of the Auditor-General (October 1996) (AGPS).
- JCPA Reports 296 and 331.
- National Commission of Audit - Report to the Commonwealth Government,
June 1996, AGPS; 273 to 300.
- Ibid., 277.
- Op cit., 279.
- Budget Speech 1996-97, 3.
- Budget Statements 1996-97; Budget Paper No. 1; 1-15 and 1-26
to 1-28.
- Report 341 of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts (November 1995);
Financial Reporting for the Commonwealth: Towards Greater Transparency
and Accountability.
- Ibid., para. 3.252; 126.
- Ibid., para. 3.263; 129.
- Ibid., paras. 3.306 to 3.314; 136 to 141.
- Ibid., Recommendation 19; para. 3.313; 141.
- Ibid., Recommendation 18; para. 3.312;. 140.
- Odgers' Australian Senate Practice ,7th edition; 52 and 522.
House of Representatives Practice, 2nd Edition; 268.
- JCPA, Report No.351, March 1997.
- Ibid., 3.
- Ibid., 8.
- Ibid., 8.
- Ibid., 10.
- Ibid., 12.
- Ibid., 15-16.
- Ibid., 16.
- Ibid., 17.
- Ibid., 18.
- Ibid., 19.
- Parliamentary Debates, 30 October 1997, 10306-10319.
- Ibid., 10307 and 10317.
- Ibid., 10307 and 10317-18.
- Ibid., 10307-08 and 10318.
- Ibid., 10308 and 10318.
- Ibid., 10308 and 10318.
- Ibid., 10308 and 10318.
- Ibid., 10308 and 10318.
- Ibid., 10308-09 and 10318-19.
- Cited in Odgers' Australian Senate Practice, 8th
edition, 1997, 82.
- Government Preference Prohibition Bill.
- A phrase borrowed from another context but rather apposite here. Refer
to Sir Garfield Barwick, A Radical Tory, 1995, 284.
Bob Bennett and Bernard Pulle
3 March 1998
Bills Digest Service
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