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Bills Digest 45 1996-97
Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996
WARNING:
This Digest is prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as introduced
and does not canvass subsequent amendments.
This Digest was available from 17 October 1996.
CONTENTS
Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996
Date Introduced: 9 September 1996
House: House of Representatives
Presented by: Mr Kevin Andrews MP
Commencement: On Royal Assent
To prevent the Northern Territory, the Australian Capital Territory
and Norfolk Island from passing certain laws permitting euthanasia.
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT)
On 22 February 1995, the then Chief Minister of the Northern Territory
introduced the Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill into the Northern Territory
Legislative Assembly as a Private Member's Bill. The Bill was immediately
referred to a Select Committee which reported on 16 May 1995. The Committee
received over 1,000 submissions, took oral evidence and conducted hearings
in Darwin, in regional centres and in a number of Aboriginal communities.(1)
Its report contained recommendations in relation to the Bill but made
no recommendation on euthanasia per se.(2)
In the Legislative Assembly, the vote was 13 to 12 that the Bill be
read a second time. In the Committee stage of debate, 50 amendments were
introduced. On 25 May 1995, the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly
passed the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (the Act) by 15
votes to 10. The Act provides a statutory regime which makes lawful, in
certain circumstances, physician-assisted suicide and active voluntary
euthanasia. The Northern Territory Administrator assented to the Act on
16 June 1995.
Physician-assisted suicide occurs when a patient wants to die and asks
their doctor for assistance in ending their life. While the doctor may
provide the means of ending the patient's life - for example, by providing
drugs, advice or a mechanism, the lethal act is performed by the patient
rather than the doctor.(3)
Active voluntary euthanasia can be described as medical intervention,
at a patient's request, in order to end the patient's life(4) or hasten
their death.(5)
The Act has survived a number of attempts at repeal. On 20 February
1996, the Member for MacDonnell in the Northern Territory Legislative
Assembly sought leave to have standing orders suspended in order to move
and debate the Respect for Human Life Bill. The Bill would have repealed
the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995. The motion was negatived.
A proposal to insert a sunset clause into the Act on 20 February 1996
also failed.
The Rights of the Terminally Ill Amendment Act 1996 was passed
on February 1996. Among other things, the amending Act increased the number
of doctors required to examine and certify that a patient meets the statutory
criteria under the Act was increased from two to three. The amending Act
also clarified the qualifications that the doctors have to possess and
amended the interpreter provisions in the legislation.
It was reported that on 27 June 1996 Mr Kevin Andrews MP foreshadowed
that he would introduce a Private Member's Bill into Federal Parliament
to override the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995.(6)
On 28 June 1996, Regulations were made under the Rights of the Terminally
Act 1995. The Regulations came into effect on 1 July 1996. Among other
things, they prescribe the qualifications to be held by two of the doctors
and any interpreters used under the Act, provide guidelines for a doctor
assisting a patient under the Act and provide a checklist for a doctor
assisting a patient under the Act.
The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 commenced operation
on 1 July 1996.
In June 1996, the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 was challenged
in the Northern Territory Supreme Court. The plaintiffs were the President
of the Northern Territory Branch of the Australian Medical Association,
Dr Chris Wake, and an Aboriginal leader, the Reverend Dr Djiniyini Gondarra.
On 24 July 1996, in Wake v. Northern Territory, the Full Court
of the Supreme Court rejected the challenge by a majority of 2:1. An application
for special leave to appeal to the High Court against this decision has
been lodged.
In August 1996, amending legislation was introduced into the Northern
Territory Legislative Assembly. The Rights of the Terminally Ill Amendment
Bill 1996 would have prohibited the performance of physician-assisted
suicide or active voluntary euthanasia in a public hospital or health
clinic. This Bill was introduced in order to address concerns expressed
about the Act by indigenous people. The Bill's second reading was negatived
15:10. The Respect for Human Life Bill 1996 was introduced on 15 May 1996.
It would have repealed the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995.
The Bill's second reading was negatived 14:11 in August 1996.
On 26 September 1996, the media carried stories that the first person
had died using the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995. The man,
in his mid-60s, had been suffering from prostate cancer. The Age
reported that the man had died on 22 September after '... using lethal
drugs administered by a so-called "Death Machine," a computer-operated
device which releases the drugs after the patient pushes the required
buttons.'(7)
Further Reading
Readers who are interested in further discussion of euthanasia, the
law and the Northern Territory legislation should refer to two Parliamentary
Research Service Research Papers - Euthanasia - the Australian Law
in an International Context. Part 1: Passive Voluntary Euthanasia and
Part 2: Active Voluntary Euthanasia.
Withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment
In certain circumstances the common law permits and in others requires
life sustaining medical treatment to be withdrawn or withheld from a patient.
It permits such treatment to be withdrawn or withheld from an incompetent
or competent patient where the treatment is no longer medically indicated
for that patient because it is futile or burdensome to the patient - here
it is argued that health care professionals do not have a duty to use
all the means available to them to prolong life. The common law requires
the withdrawal or withholding of life sustaining medical treatment from
a competent patient if that patient refuses to consent to that treatment.
In some Australian jurisdictions, legislation has been enacted to establish
a statutory regime under which adults may issue valid and binding directions
about the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment. In some jurisdictions,
legislative recognition has also been given to medical powers of attorney
- which enable adults to appoint a person to make medical decisions for
them in the event that they are unable to do so. Australian jurisdictions
with refusal of medical treatment statutes are the Northern Territory,
the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and South Australia.
In the Northern Territory, the Natural Death Act 1988 enables
a competent adult to make an advance directive refusing the application
of extraordinary measures in the event that he or she suffers from a terminal
illness. The Natural Death Act 1988 does not include provision
for medical powers of attorney.
In the ACT, the Medical Treatment Act 1994 enables a competent
adult to make a direction refusing, or for the withdrawal of, medical
treatment in relation to a current condition. A competent adult can also
execute a power of attorney appointing an agent who can authorise the
withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment if he or she (the principal)
becomes incompetent.
Refusal of medical treatment statutes generally contain a provision
to the effect that a health care professional who withdraws or withholds
treatment in accordance with the statutory regime is immune from civil
and criminal liability and from professional disciplinary action.(8)
The double effect doctrine
There is English case law indicating that a health care professional
whose patient is terminally ill may lawfully administer pain killing drugs
that hasten the patient's death, even if the health care professional
knows this is likely to be a result of administering the drugs, provided
his or her 'primary' intention can be described as an intention to relieve
pain rather than an intention to end the patient's life. The philosophical
doctrine of double effect is often said to underpin this legal rule. (9)
It is far from clear whether the legal position in England also represents
the law in Australia. It has been suggested that in Australia a doctor
could be criminally liable for murder for administering pain killing drugs
in these circumstances.(10)
Commonwealth Territories and the Commonwealth Constitution
Under section 122 of the Commonwealth Constitution, the Commonwealth
has the power to make laws for the government of any territory. This is
a plenary power, unlimited by subject matter. In their Annotated Commonwealth
Constitution, Lumb & Moens write:
Under this head of power [section 122], the Commonwealth has a
general power of legislating for a Territory. It may do so by means of
paramount legislation passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, or by setting
up a Territorial legislature with its own legislative power, although
these will always be subject to the overriding authority of the Commonwealth
Parliament.(11)
Lumb and Moens also add:
In this respect, recognition must be given to the development
of any convention which may affect the Commonwealth's power to legislate
for a self-governing Territory.(12)
The Commonwealth may acquire territories:
- as a result of surrender by a State Parliament - this occurred when
South Australia surrendered the Northern Territory and when NSW surrendered
the ACT (then called the Federal Capital Territory);
- by the Queen placing the Territory under the Commonwealth's authority
and the Commonwealth accepting the placement - this occurred in the
case of Norfolk Island(13);
- by other means - for example, by cession or transfer.
The ACT, the Northern Territory and Norfolk Island are all Commonwealth
territories. All three have been granted self-government by the Commonwealth,
although self-government legislation in each case contains certain limitations
- for example, empowering the Governor-General to disallow legislation(14)
or providing that the Territory executive or legislature cannot exercise
power in respect of certain subject matters.(15)
On 18 September 1996, the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny
of Bills released its Alert Digest No.7 of 1996. The report expressed
concerns about the Euthanasia Laws Bill overriding the ability of democratically
elected legislative assemblies to enact laws and affecting the residents
of territories in a discriminatory fashion.
Item 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bill amends the Northern Territory
(Self-Government) Act 1978. The amendment provides that the Territory's
Legislative Assembly cannot make laws that permit euthanasia or mercy
killing, or which permit a person to be assisted to terminate their own
life [new subsection 50A(1)].
New subsection 50A(2) provides exceptions to this prohibition
by allowing the Legislative Assembly to make laws about:
- the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging medical or surgical
treatment - so long as those laws do not permit the intentional killing
of the patient; or
- the provision of palliative care to a dying patient - so long as those
laws do not permit the intentional killing of the patient.
Item 2 of Schedule 1 provides that the amendment does not retrospectively
invalidate or make unlawful anything done in accordance with the Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act 1995.
Item 1 of Schedule 2 amends the Australian Capital Territory
(Self-Government) Act 1988 in a similar fashion to new section
50A of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1987.
Item 1 of Schedule 3 amends the Norfolk Island Act 1979
in a similar fashion.
Definitions
The term 'euthanasia' comes from the Greek words 'eu' and 'thanatos'
and literally means an easy death. However, what is meant by 'euthanasia'
is not easy to define.(16) The Bill does not define 'euthanasia.' Instead,
it refers to 'the form of intentional killing of another called euthanasia
(which includes mercy killing).'
It is arguable whether there is one form of behaviour called 'euthanasia'.
This is because views differ concerning which acts and/or omissions are
covered by the term 'euthanasia'. For some, the withholding or withdrawal
of life sustaining medical treatment is not 'euthanasia' if it is done
pursuant to the request of a competent patient,(17) or if it is done because
the treatment is considered medically futile or burdensome to a competent
or incompetent patient.(18) Similarly, some commentators do not consider
that 'euthanasia' includes the administration of pain relieving measures
in the foreknowledge that they may or will hasten death. On these views,
the defining characteristic of 'euthanasia' is that it involves acting
with the specific and primary intention of causing the patient's death.
(19)
For others, the term 'euthanasia' covers a much broader range of actions
and omissions done in order to hasten death or end life. Such commentators
might argue that anything done for the purpose of ending life or hastening
death is 'euthanasia.' On this view, the withdrawal or withholding of
life sustaining medical treatment - pursuant to a competent patient's
request(20) or because the treatment is considered medically futile or
burdensome to an incompetent(21) or competent(22) patient - can be described
as 'euthanasia'. Similarly, it can be argued that the administration of
increasing doses of pain killers to a terminally ill patient is 'euthanasia'
because it is done for the purpose of hastening the patient's death as
well as relieving his or her pain. In a recent article, Kuhse and Singer
ask 'Is it even possible, or desirable, to distinguish between the directly
intended and foreseen consequences of the doctor's actions.'(23)
Apart from 'euthanasia', other expressions not defined in the Bill are
'mercy killing', 'intentional killing', 'palliative care', 'dying patient',
'medical or surgical measures' and 'medical treatment'. Nor does the Bill
explain what is meant by 'medical or surgical measures meant for prolonging
the life of a patient.' The meaning of all these terms will determine
the scope and effect of the Bill. As none of these terms has a fixed or
self-evident meaning - legally or ethically - the absence of any definition
of the terms in the Bill is problematic.
Does the Bill remove a Territory's power to make laws that require health
care professionals to respect a competent patient's refusal of life sustaining
medical treatment?
A mentioned above, both the Northern Territory and the ACT have refusal
of medical treatment statutes.
The Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) enables life sustaining medical
treatment to be withdrawn or withheld in accordance with the direction
of a competent patient. It makes it clear that a health care professional
who acts in accordance with such a direction is immune from any criminal
or civil liability. The Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) also enables
life sustaining medical treatment to be withdrawn or withheld either in
accordance with an advance directive of the patient or under an enduring
medical power of attorney.
The Explanatory Memorandum circulated with the Euthanasia Laws Bill
1996 states that the Bill enables territory legislatures to make laws
about the 'right to refuse medical treatment'(24) but not so as to permit
the 'intentional killing' of the patient.(25)
As the Bill does not define exactly what is meant by 'intentional killing
of the patient' it is not clear whether the Bill leaves intact power of
a territory to pass legislation along the lines of the Natural Death
Act 1988 (NT) and/ or the Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT).
One commentator notes:
The legal community seems to be engaged in a perpetual debate
over the meaning and scope of intention in the criminal law. The centre
of the controversy lies with the relationship between intention and foresight,
and in particular whether foreseen consequences are 'intended' consequences.
The courts have not applied a consistent meaning to intention ...(26)
The refusal of treatment statutes themselves do not clarify the matter.
The Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) provides that the withdrawal or
withholding of life sustaining medical treatment under that legislation
will not be regarded legally as a cause of the patient's death. However,
it does not address the question of whether a health care professional
responsible for such withdrawal or withholding can be said to have 'intended'
the patient's death. The Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) does
not state whether a health care professional may be said to have caused
the patient's death in these circumstances nor whether he or she may be
said to have intended the death.
There is no case law in Australia dealing directly with the withdrawal
or withholding of life sustaining medical treatment pursuant to the request
of a competent patient. Therefore, the question of whether this situation
can be said to involve the intentional killing of a patient has not been
explored by Australian courts. English and North American courts, however,
have held that a refusal of life sustaining medical treatment does not
amount to an attempt to commit suicide. They have held that the refusal
merely allows the patient's illness to take its natural course. This has
enabled English and North American courts to conclude that a health care
professional who respects a competent patient's refusal of life sustaining
medical treatment cannot be criminally liable for assisting a suicide.
It is arguable that Australian courts could take a similar view, and thus
conclude that a health care professional who withdraws or withholds life
sustaining medical treatment does not have an intention to kill. There
is, however, the contrary argument that the withdrawal or withholding
of life sustaining medical treatment does involve such an intention at
law.
It is, therefore, possible that the Bill would remove or limit the powers
of the territories to make laws along the lines of the Natural Death
Act 1988 (NT) and/or the Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT).
On this view, the ACT and the Northern Territory would be prevented from
improving their present statutory regimes by amending or replacing their
current legislation. It could also be argued that the Euthanasia Laws
Bill may invalidate part or all of the refusal of treatment legislation
in both jurisdictions.
If the Bill did have an adverse impact on the refusal of treatment legislation
in the Northern Territory and the ACT, patients would not thereby lose
all their legal rights to refuse life sustaining medical treatment. The
common law rules enabling competent adult patients to refuse medical treatment
in general, and life sustaining medical treatment in particular, would
continue to exist. It is important to note, however, that the refusal
of medical treatment statutes were enacted in the Northern Territory and
the ACT (and in South Australia and Victoria) partly because of inadequate
awareness in the general community and amongst the medical profession
of the common law rights of patients in this area. The enactment of these
statutes has given patients greater certainty that their wishes about
medical treatment will be respected. It has also given health care professionals
greater certainty that they will have immunity from legal or professional
disciplinary action if they comply with the relevant statutory regime.
Does the Bill remove a Territory's power to clarify whether the double
effect protects health care professionals from liability for administering
pain relief that hastens death?
As discussed above, it is not clear whether in Australia a health care
professional may lawfully administer pain relief that hastens the death
of a terminally ill patient. English case law establishes that a doctor
will be immune from criminal liability if his or her primary intention
in these circumstances can be characterised as an intention to relieve
pain, rather than an intention to hasten death.(27) In Australia, however,
a health care professional may be exposed to criminal liability for murder
for administering life-shortening pain relief to a terminally ill patient
in these circumstances - on the basis either that the professional 'intends'
the death of the patient(28) or that he or she acts knowing that death
is likely to result.
The law on this matter in both the Northern Territory and the ACT therefore
requires clarification. As stated earlier, South Australia is the only
Australian jurisdiction that has enacted clarifying legislation.(29) It
can be argued that the Bill would remove the power of the Territory Parliaments
to enact legislation similar to the South Australian statute. This claim
rests on the Bill's failure to define 'intentional killing', and on the
argument that Australian criminal law might characterise a death hastened
by pain relieving measures as involving whatever is encompassed in 'intentional
killing.'
The Bill seems to try to avoid this result by creating a palliative
care exception - allowing the territories to enact laws relating to 'medical
treatment in the provision of palliative care to a dying patient.' The
Bill does not define 'medical treatment' or 'palliative care' or 'dying
patient', however, so the scope of this exception is unclear. Moreover
the Bill attaches a proviso to this exception stating that such medical
treatment must not permit the 'intentional killing of the patient'. Thus,
if the initial argument succeeds - ie that the Bill's reference to 'intentional
killing' may encompass a hastening of death caused by pain relieving measures
- the 'palliative care' exception in the Bill does not preserve the Territories
power to make laws on this matter.
Does the Bill remove a Territory's power to make passive non-voluntary
euthanasia laws?
The withdrawal or withholding of life sustaining medical treatment from
an incompetent patient is described by some as passive non-voluntary euthanasia.
A patient is not competent if he or she lacks legal capacity. Those without
legal capacity include people who have never been competent to consent
to or refuse medical treatment, such as young children and adults with
severe intellectual disabilities. They also include people who were competent
but are no longer so due to accident, illness or old age.
At common law in Australia, it appears that life sustaining medical
treatment can be withdrawn from an incompetent patient in certain limited
circumstances.(30)
The Bill seems to remove the territories' power to enact laws allowing
passive non-voluntary euthanasia to the extent that it can be characterised
as involving 'intentional killing.' This would prevent the territories
from enacting a statutory regime to clarify, regulate and/or modify the
common law position.
Passive involuntary euthanasia
Passive involuntary euthanasia might be described as the withdrawing
or withholding of medical treatment from a competent patient, without
that patient's consent, in order to end the patient's life or hasten death.
It should be noted that at common law a health care professional is
under no obligation to provide any form of medical treatment simply because
the patient requests that treatment. A health care professional will not
be forced to provide treatment 'which in the bona fide clinical judgment
of the practitioner concerned is contraindicated as not being in the best
interests of the patient.'(31)
The Bill seems to remove the territories' power to enact laws allowing
passive involuntary euthanasia, to the extent that it can be characterised
as involving 'intentional killing.' This would prevent the territories
from enacting a statutory regime to clarify, regulate and/or modify the
common law position.
Abortion
Questions have been raised about whether the Euthanasia Laws Bill could
impact on the capacity of a territory to enact laws that decriminalise
or legalise abortion. Laws that criminalise abortion provide that it involves
behaviour performed with the intention of unlawfully procuring a miscarriage.
It is, therefore, extremely unlikely that abortion is encompassed by the
expressions 'euthanasia' or 'mercy killing.' At common law a foetus is
not considered to have a legal personality and cannot be a victim of homicide
regardless of its gestation age unless it is born alive.(32)
Mercy Killing
Mercy killing(33) has been defined by one writer as 'an intentional
killing which is prima facie murder but which is carried out for compassionate
motives, often by a member of the family or a friend of the victim.'(34)
'Mercy killing' is not defined in the Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996. Its
inclusion arguably extends the ambit of the legislation beyond the doctor-patient
context to the actions of friends or family of victims who may or may
not be suffering from a terminal illness.
A study of mercy killing cases dealt with by the Australian criminal
justice system found that many perpetrators were treated leniently - through
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, acquittal, findings of guilt
on a lesser charge, lenient sentencing, favourable parole determinations
or executive clemency. (35) Reform of the law relating to mercy killing
is sometimes raised and has included suggestions for the creation of a
separate offence of mercy killing with a lesser penalty than for murder
or continuing to treat mercy killing as murder but allowing the courts
a sentencing discretion to reduce or set aside penalties.(36)
The Euthanasia Laws Bill prohibits a territory from making laws which
'permit or have the effect of permitting (whether subject to conditions
or not) the form of intentional killing of another called euthanasia (which
includes mercy killing).'(37) Does the Euthanasia Laws Bill prevent a
territory legislature from reforming the law in relation to mercy killing?
Could such reform, depending of course on its nature, be regarded as having
the effect of permitting mercy killing?
- See Northern Territory. Legislative Assembly. Select Committee on
Euthanasia, The Right of the Individual or the Common Good? Volume
One. Report of the Inquiry by the Select Committee on Euthanasia,
Darwin, May 1995.
- Ibid, p.x.
- Cica, N Euthanasia - the Australian Law in an International Context.
Part 2: Active Voluntary Euthanasia, Research Paper No.4 1996-97,
Parliamentary Research Service, Department of the Parliamentary Library,
Canberra, 1996.
- Ibid, p.v.
- Otlowski, M Active Voluntary Euthanasia. A Timely Reappraisal,
University of Tasmania Law School Occasional Paper 1, 1992.
- See, for example, 'Commonwealth may veto Territory's euthanasia laws,'
Financial Review, 28 June 1996.
- 'First death under NT mercy law,' The Age [Melbourne], 26
September 1996, p.1.
- See, for example, section 22 of the Medical Treatment Act 1994
(ACT).
- R v. (Bodkin) Adams [1957] Crim LR 365; Airedale NHST v.
Bland [1993] AC 789.
- Cica, op.cit, Active Voluntary Euthanasia. Otlowski, op.cit,
pp.19-20 writes:
Under existing criminal law principles for murder, liability will
be established for acts which cause death if they are performed with
an intention to cause death or in the knowledge that
death will result. Provided the necessary mens rea and actus
reus can be established, the doctor's motive or the fact that
the patient consented to the administration of pain relieving drugs
would be irrelevant to the issue of liability. ...
Notwithstanding the clear application of criminal law principles,
it is widely assumed that doctors are not acting unlawfully
if they administer pain relieving drugs which hasten the death of
a patient, provided that the doctor's intention was to alleviate pain
and not to bring about the patient's death.
- Lumb, RD & Moens, GA The Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Australia. Annotated, 5th ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1995.
- Ibid.
- Norfolk Island was the first external territory acquired by the Commonwealth.
It became a territory of Australia after the Queen placed the Island
under the Commonwealth's authority and the Commonwealth enacted the
Norfolk Island Act 1913.
- See, for example, section 35(2), Australian Capital Territory
(Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cwlth).
- See, for example, section 23(1) Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government)
Act 1988; regulation 4(2) Northern Territory (Self-Government) Regulations,
sections 49 & 50 Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978.
- Thompson, P 'The law and active euthanasia: whose life is it anyway?'
Journal of Law and Medicine, 2(3), February 1995, pp. 233-46.
- Recall that the common law throughout Australia requires health care
professionals to respect a competent refusal of life sustaining medical
treatment: see above.
- Recall that the common law permits this.
- See, for example, Tobin, B 'Foreward,' in B Tobin (ed) Euthanasia.
Proceedings of s Seminar Held at the Metcalfe Auditorium, State Library
of New South Wales, 7 November 1994; Pollard, B 'Euthanasia,' Medical
Journal of Australia, 1987, vol.146, p.179.
- Sometimes called passive voluntary euthanasia.
- Sometimes called passive non-voluntary euthanasia.
- If this occurs without patient's consent, it is sometimes called
passive involuntary euthanasia.
- Kuhse, H & Singer, P 'Active voluntary euthanasia, morality and
the law,' Journal of Law and Medicine, 3(2) November 1995, pp.129-35
at p.133.
- Explanatory Memorandum, Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996, p.3.
- Ibid.
- Bronitt, S 'Defending Giorgianni - Part One: The fault required for
complicity,' Criminal Law Journal, 17(4) August 1993, pp.242-63
at p.248.
- R v. (Bodkin) Adams [1957] Crim LR 365; R v. Cox (1992)
BMLR 38.
- Bronitt, op.cit; & Otlowski, op.cit.
- Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995
(SA).
- See Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789; Re B
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] WLR 1421; Re C
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1989] 2 All ER 782; Re J
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1990] All ER 930; Re Superintendent
of Family and Child Services and Dawson (1983) 145 DLR (3d) 610.
- Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 All
ER 614; See also R v. Cambridge District HA, ex parte B [1995]
2 All ER 129.
- Cica, N 'The inadequacies of Australian abortion law,' Australian
Journal of Family Law, 5(1), March 1991, pp.37-68. For recent Australian
decisions confirming that a foetus cannot be a victim of homicide unless
it is born alive, see Attorney-General's Reference No.3 of 1994; Crown
v. Martin, Western Australia, unreported, 4 April 1996.
- Under Australian criminal law, the motive of a person who has killed
another is irrelevant, as are the circumstances of the victim or the
victim's desire to die. Such a person may be guilty of murder or assisting
a suicide.
- Otlowski, M 'Mercy killing cases in the Australian criminal justice
system,' Criminal Law Journal, 17(1), February 1993, pp.10-39
at p.10.
- Ibid. Otlowski examined 19 mercy killing cases dealt with by the
Australian criminal justice system over a period of 30 years.
- Ibid.
- For example, new section 50A(1), Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996.
Jennifer Norberry Ph. 06 277 2476
Natasha Cica
15 October 1996
Bills Digest Service
Parliamentary Research Service
This Digest does not have any official legal status. Other sources should
be consulted to determine whether the Bill has been enacted and, if so,
whether the subsequent Act reflects further amendments.
PRS staff are available to discuss the paper's contents with Senators
and Members and their staff but not with members of the public.
ISSN 1323-9031
© Commonwealth of Australia 1996
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Published by the Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1996.
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Last updated: 18 October 1996
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