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Research Note no. 4 2006–07
North Korea: diplomatic efforts
Jeffrey
Robertson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Section
14 August 2006
The 5 July 2006 missile tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (hereafter North Korea) heightened tension in what is now a long-running
diplomatic impasse over North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear-weapons capability.
The current impasse commenced in October 2002, when the United States
(US) alleged North Korea had admitted to a nuclear-weapons program during
a visit to the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, by US Assistant Secretary
of State, James Kelly.(1) The situation rapidly deteriorated
with North Korea’s withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
(NPT) and the recommencement of nuclear programs.(2)
This Research Note looks at North Korea’s aims, its
methods of achieving these aims and the ongoing efforts at further diplomacy
with North Korea.
Australian interest
Australia is a stakeholder in the peace and prosperity
of Northeast Asia. In 2005, the Northeast Asian region accounted for over
38 per cent of total Australian merchandise trade and over 45 per cent
of Australian merchandise exports.(3) Further, the economies
of Australian trade partners—and consequently, demand for Australian goods—outside
the immediate Northeast Asian region are, to a certain extent, dependent
on stability within the region. Any conflict in the region would present
a considerable challenge to the Australian economy.
The devastation of a conflict on the Korean peninsula
would be unparalleled in the modern era. It would also require Australian
participation, both as an ally of the US and as a signatory to the Joint
Declaration on the Korean Armistice (1953), which confirmed the resolve
of signatories to the defence of South Korea.
Australia also has an interest in the maintenance of
strong non-proliferation regimes. The spread of nuclear weapons and missile
technology threatens security and stability, both in Australia’s immediate
region and across the globe.
Australia previously contributed approximately $22
million to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) set up under
the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework sought the freezing of
North Korea’s nuclear program in return for the construction of two light-water
reactors and interim energy supplies in the form of heavy fuel oil.
Background
The Korean War (1950–53) ended in an armistice, leaving
the Korean peninsula in a de jure state of war, and in a de facto state
of extreme war readiness. North Korea made considerable early progress,
with economic growth rates surpassing those of South Korea until the mid-1970s.
The economy has been in steady decline ever since due to military overspending,
economic mismanagement and self-imposed isolation. A high level of enmity
and distrust, at times extending to armed border clashes, characterised
the relationship between North Korea and US-influenced South Korea throughout
the Cold War.
Since 1997, the South Korean Government has sought
reconciliation with the North through the ‘Sunshine Policy’. Relations
between North Korea and the United States have remained strained due to
US concerns regarding North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs,
the potential for WMD technology and/or material transfers, alleged illicit
activities including counterfeiting and narcotics, and human rights abuses.
In 2002, US President George W. Bush labelled North Korea as a member
of the ‘axis of evil’, alongside Iran and Iraq.(4)
Current leader Kim Jong-Il has been in power since
the death of his father, Kim Il-Sung, in 1994. The present leadership
has been under considerably more pressure than under Kim Il-Sung for several
reasons, including:
Lack of legitimacy. Kim Il-Sung held considerable
‘legitimacy’ as a competent guerrilla campaign leader against the Japanese
occupation during World War II, and as a ruler who made considerable early
achievements in post-war reconstruction, the spread of literacy, education
and health care. In comparison, Kim Jong-Il was installed as Chairman
of the National Defence Commission without any significant military training,
and since coming to power has ruled over a steady, and at times cataclysmic,
decline in living standards. Reports from defectors show that many continue
to admire Kim Il-Sung, but blame Kim Jong-Il for the country’s woes.(5)
Failed economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union
reduced the proportion of North Korean trade at ‘friendship prices’. This
was followed by a reduction in Chinese aid, as competition for influence
in North Korea became a one-horse race. Self-imposed isolation, sanctions
and the failure to repay international debt cut North Korea’s links to
international trade and investment. The economy, which verges on the brink
of collapse, is supported by remittances from the North Korean community
in Japan, alleged illegal activities, and aid from China and South Korea.(6)
Described by economist and North Korea analyst, Marcus Noland, it is an
economy that ‘may muddle through for years before turning toward reform
or chaos’.(7)
Famine. Declining inputs to agriculture as a
result of economic mismanagement and adverse weather conditions resulted
in famine from 1994 to 1998. Estimates of famine-related deaths range
from 220 000 by the North Korean Government to 2.5 million by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).(8)
The famine also resulted in an upsurge in unsanctioned activity including
corruption, black market activity and defection.
International pressure. International pressure
on North Korea has increased since October 2002. However, it is not just
pressure from the US and Japan that affects the North Korean leadership.
Pressure to undertake economic reform or to adhere to certain directions
also originates from China. In March 2003, prior to the North Korean agreement
to participate in three-party talks to resolve the nuclear issue, Chinese
oil pipelines to North Korea were shut down due to ‘technical difficulties’
and in September 2003, Public Security Police on the border were replaced
by People’s Liberation Army troops.(9) However, Chinese sincerity
in applying pressure to push North Korean reform could be questioned,
given possible Chinese strategic interests in sustaining North Korea.(10)
The situation to date
Efforts to resolve the diplomatic impasse have included:
Three-Party Talks. The initial refusal of North
Korea to commit to multilateral talks, and the refusal of the US to commit
to bilateral talks was resolved by the establishment of a process in which
the US and North Korea could undertake bilateral negotiations within a
three-party framework, hosted by China in Beijing. During the 23–25 April
2003 Three-Party Talks, the US insisted upon the complete, verifiable
dismantlement of the North’s nuclear programs prior to more substantive
negotiations. The North, in return, sought the end to what it perceived
as the US’s ‘hostile policy’ towards North Korea. Subsequently, both parties
agreed to meet again in a multilateral setting.
Six-Party Talks. The Three-Party talks were
expanded to include South Korea, Japan and Russia, meeting in Beijing
on 27–29 August 2003. The first round of talks resulted in no concrete
achievements, except for the promise to meet again. The second round of
talks (25–28 February 2004) discussed a framework that would require North
Korea to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear programs in return
for a security guarantee and economic aid. All parties agreed to meet
again to confirm timeframes and definitions. The third round of talks
(23–25 June 2004) resulted in clarification of timeframes and verification
steps as well as agreement to further talks.(11)
The fourth round of talks (26 July–7 August 2005) resulted
in the most positive development to date. The talks were preceded by a
significant softening of the US stance and involved bilateral sessions
between the US and North Korea. Participants disagreed on North Korea’s
right to a nuclear program for ‘peaceful uses’. In a second session (13–19
September 2005) a Joint Declaration was issued, in which the parties agreed
to the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons programs and the
return of North Korea to the NPT; the right of North Korea to a peaceful
nuclear program under the NPT; a formal declaration by the US and South
Korea on the absence of nuclear weapons on the peninsula; the US and Japan
eventually normalising relations with North Korea; and mutually coordinated
measures to implement the declaration. However, the following day (20
September 2005) both the US and North Korea clarified their interpretation
of the declaration. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated
that the US ‘should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement
of its nuclear deterrent before providing Light Water Reactors’—as was
required under the 1994 Agreed Framework.(12)
The fifth round of talks (9–11 November 2005) was a
relative disappointment. Parties agreed on minor changes to the Joint
Declaration, specifically enforcing mutual measures. However, protests
against financial sanctions imposed by the US in response to alleged counterfeiting
of US currency dominated the round.
Second-track diplomacy. Second-track diplomatic
efforts have also been undertaken, which serve to build confidence and
clarify intentions. The most effective of these have been US congressional
delegations and academic visits to North Korea.
Representatives of the Six-Party Talks also met informally
at the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialog (NEACD) conference (10–11 April
2006) in Tokyo. The main point of contention remained financial
sanctions, which the US insists are separate to the nuclear issue.
Bilateral contact. Limited bilateral meetings
have occurred between the US and North Korea through the North Korean
representative at the United Nations and on the side of multilateral talks.
North Korea has also undertaken bilateral talks with
South Korea, Japan, Russia and China. The North Korea–Japan Normalization
Talks addressed issues pertinent to Japan, including the abduction of
its nationals by North Korean Special Forces in the 1970s and 1980s, and
the North Korean missile program. As a result of these bilateral talks,
North Korea reaffirmed a self-imposed missile test moratorium in September
2002.(13)
Multilateral talks. The North Korean nuclear
issue, in various guises, has been addressed at the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) and at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as
well as in other multilateral settings including the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the G8 Leaders
Summit.
Most recently, the UNSC discussed the 5 July missile
tests, adopting resolution UNSC 1695 unanimously on 15 July 2006.
It condemns the missile tests; calls on North Korea to suspend its missile
program; requires member states to prevent North Korea from importing
or exporting missile or missile-related components, or transferring finances
in relation to the North Korean missile and WMD programs; urges
North Korea to show restraint and avoid actions that would further aggravate
the situation; and urges North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.
The resolution does not cite Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, contained in the Japanese draft resolution, which allows measures
to be enforced through armed action if necessary. However, importantly,
the resolution is not limited to the missile tests, but goes to the root
of the problem, namely the North Korean WMD program.(14)
North Korea stated that it reserves the right to test
missiles and ‘vehemently denounced’ the resolution.(15)
North Korean diplomatic aims and methods
North Korea’s aim of reunifying the Korean peninsula
under its leadership, which drove its actions throughout the Cold War,
has today all but faded. Today, North Korea has one aim—survival. However,
in the North Korean context, this means survival of the leadership and
the ruling elite.
The primary threat to the survival of the North Korean
leadership and ruling elite is the imposition of regime change—through
internal revolt, external interference, or a combination of the two.
Attaining WMD capability partially addresses these
threats. It provides a deterrent to external interference. It also provides
a bargaining chip to gain economic concessions that can be redistributed
amongst the ruling elite—and to a certain extent amongst the population
at large— to keep the regime in power.
North Korea pursues its strategic aims through a diplomatic
method that has been refined during more than 50 years of strained relations
with the US. Distinct traits of its diplomatic method include:
Preference for bilateralism. North Korea prefers
bilateral negotiations for two key reasons. Firstly, it allows greater
freedom to manipulate negotiations. In bilateral talks there is more leeway
for North Korea to play one party off against another, whereas in multilateral
talks, it can be exposed to greater international pressure (although this
has not been the case in the current talks).
Secondly, bilateral negotiations are interpreted by
North Korea as increasing its prestige.(16) This dates back
to the Cold War objective of negotiating with the US rather than South
Korea in all contexts, thereby reducing the latter to a lower level ‘client
state’.
Negotiations under stress. North Korea likes
to impose an atmosphere of stress through brinksmanship, initiating international
crises and manufactured deadlines. Since October 2002 there has been a
long list of devices to impose stress on negotiations—removing IAEA seals
and cameras, withdrawing from the NPT, restarting nuclear reactors, reprocessing
fuel rods, freezing certain cooperation projects with South Korea, and
test-launching missiles. This leads to situations where the immediate
aim of any negotiations is to reduce the crisis, rather than solve more
fundamental issues.
Appearance of unpredictability. International
opinion is divided as to whether Kim Jong-Il is an ‘irrational madman’
or a ‘master manipulator’.(17) In negotiations, like in a game
of high-stakes poker, unpredictability increases a player’s ability to
bluff. As noted by North Korea analyst, Chuck Downs: ‘despite the prevalent
characteristics of lunacy in its negotiating style, North Korea has been
extraordinarily consistent in how it accomplishes its objectives’.(18)
The leadership has refined its diplomacy to suit current
conditions in North Korea. Significant traits include:
Expansion of the role of the military. North
Korea has always had a dominant military culture, given the size of the
armed forces and their role in society. This has increased in recent years
due to the stronger emphasis on the ‘military first’ policy that places
the provision and advancement of the armed forces above all other national
goals. It may also reflect concessions to the military elite that Kim
Jong-Il may have made to strengthen his position. The military affects
diplomacy through its control over economic resources, its interaction
with key dialogue partners and its central role in the WMD and missile
programs. A more influential military could have contributed to the decision
to conduct missile tests, sparking the latest diplomatic crisis.
Limited and targeted reform. North Korea has
attempted economic reforms, including market reforms, free-trade zones
and cooperation with the South. However, the North is careful to ensure
that reforms only go far enough to serve its purpose of strengthening
the regime, and not so far as to weaken control. Accordingly, diplomatic
engagement, such as economic ties with South Korea, is constrained by
the desire to ensure that reform does not weaken regime control.
Exploiting regional fears. Conflict on the Korean
peninsula would severely disrupt regional trade and investment. However,
the region fears not only war with North Korea, but also the country’s
unexpected collapse. This could result in numerous problems including
uncontrolled refugee flows to China, Russia, South Korea and Japan; civil
war within North Korea, including the potential use of WMD; and possible
long-term foreign intervention (China or the US) upsetting the regional
balance of power. Regional powers have a lot to fear, which exposes them
to manipulation by the North.
Exploiting differences among allies. North Korea
has been very successful in exploiting differences between all participants
in the now long-stalled Six-Party Talks. Predominantly, this has meant
exploiting growing differences between South Korea and the US. South Korea
views the collapse of North Korea, which would wreak havoc on its own
economy, as the primary concern. In contrast, the US considers WMD and
WMD proliferation as the primary concern. Accordingly, South Korea is
seeking to engage the North, while the US is seeking to isolate it. The
North Korean strategy is to exploit these fundamental differences between
negotiating partners.
The 5 July 2006 missile tests conform to these patterns
in North Korean diplomacy. To date, the tests have:
- Increased domestic political pressure for the US to commence bilateral
negotiations.
- Created a high-stress environment for future negotiations and added
another issue to the agenda. This clouds the international community’s
ultimate goal of dismantling the WMD program and potentially provides
another opportunity for North Korea to seek compensation for compliance
with international requests.
- Reaffirmed the impression in key negotiating partners that North Korea
is unpredictable.
- Widened the rift between the US and Japan on one side and South Korea,
China and Russia on the other. In particular, the missile tests have
substantially widened the rift between Seoul and Tokyo.
Accordingly, despite the reported failure of the missile
tests of 5 July 2006, it could be argued that diplomatically, North Korea
may have achieved its strategic objectives.
North Korea still faces potential fallout from the
missile tests. The tests could ultimately result in: increased pressure
from China; a weakening of North Korea’s influence in South Korea—and
subsequent closer policy coordination between the US and South Korea;
moves towards rearmament in Japan; and greater willingness of the international
community to support sanctions in response to future transgressions.
Diplomatic efforts
North Korea has stated that it will not return to the
Six-Party Talks until the US removes financial sanctions. With the pressure
for a return to talks mounting after the 5 July missile tests, the options
include:
Five-Party Talks. The five remaining participants
of the Six-Party Talks may meet in order to agree on measures to entice
North Korea back to the talks. China and Russia remain wary of this option.
Importantly, South Korea has agreed with the US on the need for continuing
talks regardless of North Korea’s attendance.(19)
Unofficial dialogue. The ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) met in Kuala Lumpur on 28 July 2006 with all Six-Party Talks representatives
in attendance, presenting an opportunity for discussions on North Korea’s
return to the talks.(20) North Korea refused to participate
in dialogue on the situation.
Strategic neglect. The missile tests conform
to the North Korean diplomatic strategy of using pressure and brinksmanship
prior to requesting talks. This indicates that it seeks talks, albeit
on its own terms and for reasons which analysts can only speculate about.
Strategic neglect could place the onus on North Korea to initiate dialogue
without the benefit of pressure or brinksmanship. However, this is a dangerous
option: neglecting North Korean WMD and missile programs potentially allows
further time for their development. It may also encourage further escalation
by the North as it again seeks talks on its own terms.
Direct talks. High-level direct bilateral talks
proved successful in the earlier nuclear crisis, when a US Special Envoy,
former President Jimmy Carter, visited North Korea. This ultimately resulted
in the 1994 Agreed Framework. As noted by the Northeast Asia Project Director
for the International Crisis Group, Peter Beck, Kim Jong-Il is ‘the only
man in the country who can make a deal anyway’.(21) Direct
talks could also strengthen US influence with the other partners in the
Six-Party Talks by demonstrating its willingness to diplomatically engage
North Korea. Currently, the US is opposed to direct talks.
Ultimately, the diplomatic options depend upon North
Korea. It has achieved its immediate diplomatic objectives and may now
wait for suitable terms before returning to negotiations—which may mean
waiting until after the Bush Administration. Alternatively, it may once
again increase the pressure for direct talks through further missile tests,
a threatened nuclear test or military provocations.
Australian efforts. Australia maintains diplomatic
relations with North Korea, with the latter having an embassy in Canberra,
and Australia represented through a non-resident ambassador based in Beijing.
The Australian media reported that Australia could play a role in enticing
North Korea back to negotiations through the contribution of coal to alleviate
energy shortages.(22) To date, the Australian Government has
been active, both bilaterally and with key allies and partners, in communicating
its concerns regarding the missile tests and its desire for North Korea
to return to the Six-Party Talks.(23)
-
R. Boucher, ‘US seeks peaceful resolution of North Korean nuclear
issue’, State Department Press Release, 16 October 2002.
-
For background on the current impasse, see James Cotton, ‘The second
North Korean nuclear crisis’, Australian Journal of International
Affairs vol. 57, no. 2, 2003, pp. 261–79.
-
DFAT, Composition of Trade 2005, May 2006.
-
George W. Bush, State of the Union address, 29 January 2002.
-
Scobell, Kim Jong-il and North Korea:
the Leader and the System, Strategic Studies Institute, March
2006.
-
In April 2003, a North Korean freighter, the MV Pong Su, and
its crew, were detained by Australian authorities for alleged illegal
importation of narcotics. Four senior crew members were charged, tried
and later found not guilty of aiding and abetting the importation
of heroin. For more information on alleged involvement of North Korean
authorities in illegal activities see: Marcus Noland, ‘How
North Korea funds its regime’, Testimony before the Subcommittee
on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International
Security, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
United States Senate, 25 April 2006.
-
M. Noland, ‘Why North Korea will muddle through’, Foreign Affairs,
vol. 76, no. 4, July/August 1997.
-
Reuters AlertNet Foundation, ‘North Korea famine at a glance’, http://www.alertnet.org/,
accessed on 18 July 2006.
-
Zhu Feng, ‘China’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue’, China
Strategy, vol. 3, 20 July 2004.
-
Andrei Lankov, Correspondence with author, 24 July 2006.
-
D. Pinkston, ‘North Korea’s nuclear weapons
program and the Six-party Talks’, Issue Brief, NTI, April
2006.
-
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), ‘Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry
on Six-Party Talks’, 20 September 2005.
-
P. Kerr, ‘North Korea extends missile test moratorium’, Arms Control
Today, October 2002.
-
R. Cossa, ‘UNSC passes the test
… so far!’, PacNet Newsletter, CSIS, 18 July 2006.
-
KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry refutes resolution of UN Security Council’,
16 July 2006.
-
Y.S. Han, ‘North Korean behaviour in nuclear negotiations’, The
Non-proliferation Review, Spring, 2000.
-
BBC News, ‘Profile: Kim Jong-Il’, 31 July 2003.
-
C. Downs, ‘North Korea’s negotiating behavior’, Written statement
presented to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 23 May 2001
.
-
G.H. Lee and J.D. Ha, ‘Han-mi, 5ja hwoe-dam chu-jin hap-ui’ (Korea-US
agree on 5-party talks), Dong-a Ilbo, 19 July 2006.
-
Reuters, ‘N. Korea talks may resume next week’, 20 July 2006.
-
P. Beck, ‘Direct negotiations remain the only path’, International
Crisis Group, media release, 7 July 2006.
-
D. Shanahan and M. Dodd, ‘Howard in secret N Korea mission’, The
Australian, 8 July 2006, p. 1.
-
The Hon. Alexander Downer, ‘DPRK long range missile test’, media
release, 5 July 2006.
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