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Research Brief no. 5 2006–07
South Korea and the East Asia Summit: collective identity, balance
of power or domestic politics?
Jeffrey
Robertson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Section
4 December 2006
Contents
Introduction
Collective identity
Emergence of an East Asian collective
identity
Balance of power
Australia in South Korean strategic
calculations
Domestic politics
Australia in South Korean domestic
politics
Conclusions
Endnotes
This publication is an academic paper that was presented
at the 3rd World Congress of Korean Studies, hosted by the Academy of
Korean Studies at Cheju National University, Republic of Korea, 28 October
2006.
The author would like to thank the staff and academics
of the Academy of Korean Studies, and participants at the 3rd World Congress
of Korean Studies, who provided valuable feedback on this paper.
The author would also like to thank the management and
staff at the Korea Institute of International Economic Policy (KIEP),
where research that contributed to this paper was undertaken as part of
a Visiting Research Fellowship.
Introduction
Recent attempts to explain regionalism in East Asia have
largely centred on constructivist, realist and liberal intergovernmentalist
theories.
Constructivist theory contends that a region is a social
construct, formed through shared understandings, expectations or knowledge.(1)
If states share understanding, expectation and knowledge on a particular
issue, it is easier for them to cooperate, and further build upon the
existing consensus. Cooperation, be it political, economic, military or
even academic, reinforces the intersubjective understanding that exists
between the states, ultimately leading to the formation of a collective
identity. A region’s collective identity is in turn formed and reformed
through the process of ‘differentiation’—identifying the ‘self’ through
reflection and interaction with an ‘other’.(2)
In contrast, realist theory contends that regionalism
is based on states’ intentions to maximise power in a decentralized, anarchic
international structure. As noted by Rostow, states seek to join regional
groupings in order to maximise either: strength in the face of a threatening
hegemonic power; strength vis-à-vis a benign hegemonic power; or strength
through exploiting economies of scale in economic activity.(3)
In the case of East Asian regionalism, Ravenhill notes that opposition
to US ‘triumphalism’ in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis was
a driving factor that pushed East Asian states together.(4)
Liberal intergovernmentalist theory is influenced by
early institutionalist research on the European Union. Central to this
is the rationale for states to cooperate in order to achieve absolute
gains. As Keohane and Martin argued, states cooperate (in a decentralized,
anarchic international structure) in order to ‘reduce transaction costs,
make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination,
and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity’.(5)
It follows that absolute gains for all states are practical alternatives
to relative gains at the expense of other states. Liberal intergovernmentalism
takes this a step further to emphasise the role of domestic constituencies
in pressuring governments to facilitate (or obstruct) participation in
institutions, in order to capitalise on these potential economic, military
or political gains. Moravcsik identified a three-step process to regionalism.
Regionalism begins with national preference determination (that is, seeking
domestic support for security, economic or political cooperation), followed
by interstate bargaining and finally a choice of institutions.(6)
The December 2005 East Asia Summit presents an opportunity
to compare these competing interpretations. The lead-up to the Summit
was marked by growth of a regional East Asian collective identity. Particularly
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, an East Asian regional collective
identity crystallised both in the region and externally. However, closer
to the Summit, substantial jockeying for leadership between member states
was more than evident. The very fact that the Summit was held at an earlier
date than envisaged by its designers (see below) was a result of efforts
to maintain influence and maximise gains at the expense of other states.
It can also be argued that the less-than-spectacular results of the Summit
reflect the lack of support from domestic constituencies that were not
convinced that another regional grouping could provide tangible gains.
This paper examines whether interest in the East Asia
Summit process, from the point of view of South Korea, was focused on
strengthening an East Asian ‘collective identity’, maximising advantage
in the regional and global balance of power, or building domestic constituent
support for the process of East Asian regionalism.
Modern history dealt Korea a double blow that encouraged
insularity and contributed to the rejection of an East Asian collective
identity. The end of the Choson dynasty at the beginning of the twentieth
century resulted in a period of great-power rivalry for influence and
control of the Korean peninsula, ultimately leading to Japanese occupation.
The occupation reinforced insularity through the suppression of Korean
academic thought, as well as the suppression of external non-Japanese
influence, while at the same time enforcing Japanese learning and thought.(7)
Japan utilised, in part, ‘Asianism’ or ‘pan-Asianism’,
as justification for expansion in East Asia. Pan-Asianism as a popular
movement emerged in the early 19th century across Asia, as independence
movements sought solidarity with others under colonial rule. This marked
the nascent beginnings of an emerging Asian collective identity. Ultimately,
however, pan-Asianism as a justification for Japanese expansion found
little support, except in the more distant regions that had not suffered
the extremes of occupation. By the early 20th century, Asianism as an
intellectual force was corrupted and voided by its connection to Japanese
militarism.(8) The occupation left deep scars that, to this
day, influence South Korean and wider Asian conceptualisation of an East
Asian collective identity.
Later, the Cold War also shackled the South Korean conceptualisation
of an East Asian collective identity.
In Western Europe, the Cold War had a positive influence
on regionalism. Western Europe enjoyed a relatively even distribution
of power among member states and a collective desire to increase negotiating
capacity vis-à-vis the two much larger, great-power influences of the
Soviet Union and the United States. In comparison, in East Asia, the United
States was positioned at the centre of a series of economic and security
relationships with individual countries, in what has become known as ‘hub-and-spoke’
relationships.
In East Asia, the smaller number of states, the much
wider disparity in levels of development, dependence upon extra-regional
markets (in particular the United States market) in export-led development,
as well as historical differences, reinforced these hub-and-spoke relationships,
and weakened any attempts to form an East Asian collective identity.
The South Korean concept of its place in the East Asian
region was particularly influenced by the Cold War. As a divided state
in a potentially hostile region, South Korea had to look towards the United
States both for security and for recognition of its role as the legitimate
government on the Korean peninsula. Consequently, South Korea identified
more closely with its role in the United States alliance structure than
it did with the immediate and largely hostile region.(9)
The end of the Cold War released South Korea and the
rest of East Asia from this conceptualisation. Economic relationships
were no longer intricately tied to the wider security relationship which
dominated the Cold War years.(10) In 1992, South Korea established
diplomatic relations with China and in 1998 South Korea lifted a half-century-old
ban on Japanese popular culture. The vestiges of the Cold War that saw
South Korea deal with the world through the United States had ended. The
end of the Cold War also coincided with the rise of East Asian capitalism—notably
the export-led development models of Japan and South Korea—and their emulation
in Southeast Asia.
Facing greater competition and an ever-increasing trade
deficit during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States sought
redress in both protective trade measures and a retreat from multilateral
liberalisation. This effectively bundled South Korea with Japan, Taiwan
and the newly industrialising economies of Southeast Asia in the same
boat. The modern South Korean conceptualisation of itself as part of a
distinct East Asian region began to emerge.
The realisation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1994 proved to be a critical turning point. A shared sense
of fear emerged in East Asian states that they would be left out of key
markets, or at least would be unable to match the diplomatic strength
of the European Union and NAFTA (and ultimately the Free Trade Area of
the Americas).
In the 1990s, a collective identity began to form in
the East Asian region based upon their unique models of capitalism (labelled
by some as ‘Confucian capitalism’) and their exclusion from regionalism
in Europe and the Americas. This movement sought to identify East Asia
through exploration of the ‘other’, or ‘the West’. (11)The
ability to differentiate the ‘self’ from the ‘other’ is fundamental to
the formation of identity.
The advent of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 reinforced
and strengthened this trend. With the exception of China, the financial
crisis bundled the countries of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia together.
Key regional players, including South Korea, faced severe unemployment
and financial instability along with the associated devastating social
upheavals. Further, the response of the international community, in particular
the initial response of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), proved
inadequate. Initial IMF measures to tighten monetary policy and curtail
government budgets exacerbated the crisis and resulted in economic decline.(12)
To this day, what is widely called the ‘Asian financial crisis’, in western
countries, is called the ‘IMF crisis’ in South Korea.
The absence of a credible regional institution to deal
with the Asian economic crisis led to an exclusively Asian attempt to
increase financial and monetary cooperation with the aim of preventing
the occurrence of a similar crisis. At the May 2000 Asian Development
Bank annual meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, ASEAN Plus Three (APT)(13)
finance ministers signed an in-principle agreement to pool hard currency
resources—one of several endeavours included in what became known as the
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The CMI established the foundations of a
cohesive East Asian body.
The CMI resulted in a series of bilateral currency swap
arrangements among member states, helping economies move out of the currency
crisis and avoid future crises. Also in the interest of avoiding a future
crisis, the CMI arranged for information exchanges on the movement of
short term capital, in effect creating an early warning system for regional
governments. The CMI undertakes initiatives in regular finance meetings,
joint training and utilisation of shared expertise.(14) Financial
integration has continued to make substantial progress and remains a key
driver in strengthening East Asian regionalism.
The Asian economic crisis and the resultant initiatives
to solve the problems reinforced the identification of East Asia through
exploration of the ‘other’.(15) This continues to play an important
role in contemporary East Asian regionalism. The pride in the success
of the East Asian economies that drove regionalism prior to the Asian
financial crisis has re-emerged and now figures prominently in studies
on regionalism. As stated by Cheong and Ahn:
…it is well known, East Asia has risen to become one
of the three axes of the world economy, accompanied by Europe and North
America. An East Asian FTA should be pursued in consideration of East
Asian regional economic integration of equal footing with Europe and
America.(16)
Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of ‘East Asia’
has been continually formed and reformed. Shared understanding, expectation,
and knowledge has been built successfully through repetitive interaction
among South Korea, Japan, and China, as well as ASEAN.
It could be argued that ten years ago, few South Koreans
could place Southeast Asian countries on a map, let alone conceive of
some sense of shared regional community. For most South Koreans ‘overseas’
meant only one thing—the United States. Today, an ever increasing number
of South Koreans choose Southeast Asia as a tourist destination. There
is an increased level of inward immigration, both legal and illegal, from
Southeast Asia. Finally, Southeast Asia appears frequently in the popular
media due to its repeated relevance at the forefront of East Asian regionalism.
For South Koreans, Southeast Asia is today increasingly recognised as
‘part of the same region’.(17)
However, the 2005 East Asia Summit added three new states—Australia,
New Zealand and India—to the membership of East Asia. These states did
not have the same level of interaction with South Korea during the formative
period that followed the Cold War, nor have they been part of the institution-building
process of APT.
It is tempting to argue that ethnic or cultural similarities
explain the collective identity that has formed in East Asia. However,
the states of Southeast Asia are just as different from South Korea in
terms of ethnicity and culture as Australia, New Zealand and India. The
central theme that binds the collective identity of the emerging East
Asian region is the shared understanding, expectation and knowledge, based
upon continued interaction.
The East Asia Summit was preceded by a series of tit-for-tat
free trade agreement negotiations between Japan and China on one side
and the ASEAN states on the other. With the free trade agreements being
less than comprehensive, and arguably, of little real economic value,
these negotiations were less than obvious attempts to attain strategic
leadership within the region. As noted by the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute:
While trade promotion may be the official rationale
for FTAs, especially for China, they are important means of asserting
political leadership, as Beijing's FTA overtures towards ASEAN demonstrate.(18)
The inaugural East Asia Summit continued the trend of
strategic manoeuvre between China, Japan and ASEAN. This is evidenced
by the fact that the East Asia Summit did not reflect the composition
or intention of its original designers. The East Asia Summit was meant
to naturally emerge at a gradual pace from closer integration through
APT processes, as outlined by the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and the
subsequent East Asia Study Group (EASG).(19)
The EAVG, proposed by then South Korean President Kim
Dae-Jung in December 1998, provided academic guidance towards the realisation
of an East Asian regional community. It was comprised of eminent intellectuals
from each of the APT states. The subsequent EASG, which was comprised
of government officials from each of the APT states, was mandated to assess
the recommendations of the EAVG and to assess the implications of an East
Asia Summit.
The EAVG and EASG recommended that the path towards an
East Asia Summit should be incremental. Specifically, the EAVG recommended
‘the evolution of the annual summit meetings of APT into the East Asia
Summit’.(20) The EASG further found that certain ASEAN states
feared the marginalisation of ASEAN if the East Asia Summit process emerged
too rapidly. Above all, the EASG stressed that evolution towards an East
Asia Summit should be ‘part of an evolutionary and step-by-step process’.
(21)
Despite the findings of the EAVG and EASG, a decision
was made at the 8th annual APT meeting in Vientiane, November 2004, to
hold an East Asia Summit alongside the annual APT meeting in 2005.(22)
The decision was strongly influenced by Chinese petitioning
for the next APT Summit to be held in Beijing. If the inaugural East Asia
Summit process had been held in Beijing, China would have conceivably
gained greater control over the process. Malaysia responded with a diplomatic
endeavour to gain support for holding the inaugural East Asia Summit in
Kuala Lumpur, thereby maintaining ASEAN, and specifically Malaysian, control
over the process.
As an evolution of the annual APT Summit, membership
of the East Asia Summit was naturally determined to consist only of those
members who were part of the APT. Thus, the attendance of Australia, New
Zealand, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States, nations which
had either shown interest in participation, and/or were supported by states
already participating, was never considered. However, in order to gain
diplomatic support for holding the inaugural East Asia Summit (much earlier
than anticipated in the original conception), Malaysia had to concede
to Japanese, Singaporean and Indonesian demands for a widening of the
membership.
In April 2005, an informal meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers
in Cebu determined that membership would be restricted to those countries
that (1) are full dialogue partners of ASEAN, (2) are willing to accede
to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and (3)
have substantive relations with ASEAN.(23) This would allow
the participation of India, as well as Australia and New Zealand, provided
they acceded to the TAC, but would exclude the United States.
Unlike China, Japan and ASEAN, South Korea did not accord
strategic considerations great value in its approach to East Asian regionalism.
It did not seek a leadership role nor did it attempt to exploit differences
between the leadership aspirants. Effectively, South Korea failed to place
itself in a position of strategic advantage. There are several reasons
that may explain this.
Firstly, the South Korean political system is not as
stable or as predictable as that in democracies with an established two-party
system.(24) Consequently, electoral politics are given much
greater credence than long-term strategic considerations. China has the
benefit of being in a position to plan strategic moves, with less regard
to constituent concerns. Similarly, democracies with an established party
system, such as in the United States or Australia, can manoeuvre with
less regard to constituent concerns between electoral cycles. However,
the shifting sands of the South Korean party-system do not provide its
politicians the same level of liberty.
Secondly, the South Korean position as the sole middle-power
in East Asia means that it has not sought a leadership role in East Asia.
Unlike China or Japan, there is no ‘grand strategy’ to achieve leadership
in the region. Regardless of which power assumes the leadership role,
a middle-power can still potentially benefit in economic, strategic and
political terms. Accordingly, the desire to seek a leadership role, or
to react to other states seeking a leadership role, is absent.
Thirdly, the ‘new regionalism’ that has emerged since
the 1990s is largely benign. Today, regionalism does not present a threat
to economic dependence, as it did in previous periods of regionalism.(25)
With the safety of multilateral institutions to fall back on, and the
relatively open global trading system, regionalism today presents opportunity
to a middle-power rather than threat.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the security situation
on the Korean peninsula plays a dominant role in South Korean strategic
thought. The strategic implications of any potential (and potentially
distant) East Asian economic agreement pale in comparison to the very
real threat of a nuclear armed or rapidly deteriorating North Korea. Bae
Geung Chan of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security notes
that South Korean capacity to pursue strategic goals in economic agreements
with ASEAN states, as undertaken by China and Japan, is hampered by more
pressing issues:
…all of Korea’s diplomatic resources are pooled toward
resolving the North Korean nuclear issue or strengthening the ROK-US
alliance, leaving Seoul with very little means to show the least appreciation
for or reciprocate Southeast Asian countries’ interest.(26)
The strategic issues regarding the security situation
on the Korean peninsula have advanced to a new level that further occupies
South Korean diplomatic resources. South Korea now plays a major role
in aiding economic reform of the North Korean economy. Further, it does
this at a time when national interests between it and its long time ally,
the United States, have begun to diverge.
The lack of interest in strategic considerations regarding
East Asian regionalism is evidenced by the slow response of South Korea
to ASEAN overtures to negotiate a bilateral FTA, and the failure of South
Korea to take a position on the expansion or limitation of membership
in the East Asia Summit.
South Korea was particularly slow to respond to ASEAN
overtures to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and to agree
to negotiate a bilateral FTA. While China and Japan reacted quickly to
ASEAN requests for consultations, and actively sought negotiations, the
South Korean approach has been ‘stagnant by comparison’.(27)
Similarly, South Korea made little effort to take a position
on the expansion or limitation of membership in the East Asia Summit.
Changes in the membership composition of a regional grouping
fundamentally change the balance of power among the participating countries.(28)
Accordingly, changing the membership of an East Asian regional grouping
from China, South Korea and Japan to include ASEAN, or even extending
it further to include Australia, New Zealand and India, is likely to fundamentally
change the balance of power between participating countries.
This is particularly relevant for South Korea. South
Korea has less diplomatic strength than China and Japan. Positioned alone
between China and Japan, South Korea has no capability to achieve national
aims through coalition building. Accordingly, South Korea can only play
the wedge role, siding with either one powerful player or another. Ultimately,
this will become a more difficult position to play as China grows. South
Korea may find itself having to move diplomatically closer to Japan in
order to avoid being subsumed by the diplomatic power of China—a difficult
thing to do given the sometimes difficult relationship between the two
states.
The greatest imbalance in regionalism in East Asia is
between the size and growth potential of China, and that of other states.
The Chinese Government estimates that by 2020 its economy will attain
a GDP in the vicinity of US$4.0 trillion.(29) Chinese GDP on
a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis already exceeds that of other APT
members states, and is second globally only to the United States. In strategic
terms, it is likely that China will become a regional paramount power
or even a regionally dominant power. Strategic manoeuvring to date, by
ASEAN, Japan and in certain aspects the United States, has been directed
at averting China’s potential dominance in East Asian regionalism.
However, South Korea also faces the prospect of competing
with a resurgent Japan. Despite the overwhelming sensational media coverage
of the Chinese economy and its enormous growth potential, in conventional
measures (that is not using a PPP basis), Japan remains the second largest
economy in the world by a substantial margin. As it sheds its post-war
diplomatic and political restraints, it will emerge as a more effective
and potentially more determined diplomatic force.
The South Korean position between the economic might
of Japan on one side, and China on the other brings new meaning to the
traditional Korean saying ‘a shrimp between two whales will get its back
broken’. With the potential benefits comes strategic challenge. South
Korea is in the unenviable position of potentially becoming the most vulnerable
state within the APT grouping. As noted by Mansfield and Milner:
States that derive the greatest economic gains from
a PTA [preferential trade agreement] are more vulnerable to disruptions
of commercial relations within the arrangement than other participants,
the political leverage of the latter is likely to grow.(30)
The inclusion of states external to the current APT grouping
in the East Asia Summit was primarily aimed at averting Chinese dominance
of the grouping. India, Australia, and New Zealand serve as a counter-balance
to the economic and diplomatic might of China. As noted by Rostow, states
seek to join regional groupings in order to either maximise strength in
the face of a threatening hegemonic power, maximise strength vis-à-vis
a benign hegemonic power, or to maximise strength through exploiting economies
of scale in economic activity.(31) Arguably, South Korea faces
all three situations.
Despite the strategic benefits of including external
states to balance China, such an approach is not widely supported in South
Korea. The level of threat perception vis-à-vis China is considerably
lower in South Korea than in Japan or the ASEAN Five states (Indonesia,
Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia).(32)
In the lead up to the East Asia Summit, South Korea delicately
balanced tacit diplomatic support for extending membership to include
non-East Asian states, with more pragmatic policy. When Australian Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer visited South Korea in November 2005, South
Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon congratulated Australia on its invitation
to attend the inaugural East Asia Summit.(33) Yet at the same
time, South Korean policy remained focused on first achieving closer links
between South Korea, Japan and China.
Australia in South Korean strategic calculations
The inclusion of Australia in East Asian regionalism
is not accorded significant strategic value by South Korea, despite Australia
being well placed to weaken external opposition to the formation of a
regional body and having demonstrated a capacity to act as a capable diplomatic
administrator.
The attempt to form a coherent East Asian regional grouping
in the early 1990s, the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), resulted in
failure due to strong opposition from parties external to the agreement.
The United States and Australia consistently opposed
the formation of an exclusive economic bloc. The EAEC was strongly supported
by Malaysia, but United States opposition resulted in the idea gaining
only lukewarm support from its ASEAN partners, and outright opposition
from South Korea, China and Japan.
Australian opposition was less obvious. Australia made
vigorous efforts to garner political support for the creation of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. APEC brought together the economies
of the two most dynamic economic regions in the world, East Asia and the
Americas, but for Australia also served another, more important purpose.
The strength of APEC greatly weakened support within Asia for the exclusive
regionalism of the EAEC.(34)
As stated by then Prime Minister Keating, if it were
not for APEC, the region may have seen ‘the growth of a self-confident
but inward-looking Asian grouping, building on East Asian trade and investment
flows and excluding Australia’.(35) The EAEC, promulgated by
former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad, was the antithesis of
Australian aims to integrate with, or at least not be excluded from, the
East Asian region.
The United States remains a key player in the East Asian
region and ultimately any form of regionalism will be hampered by its
opposition. The United States already demonstrated its apprehension to
the exclusive nature of the East Asia Summit. The inclusion of Australia,
New Zealand and India in the Summit served to allay these fears.(36)
Finally, Australia may also represent a strategic asset
in its ability to project diplomatic power. Australia has traditionally
‘punched above its weight’ diplomatically, particularly in international
trade. Despite the relatively small size of its economy, it has managed
to maintain a presence in ‘the green room’ at World Trade Organization
(WTO) negotiations, through its leadership of the Cairns Group of agricultural
trading nations. It also continues to maintain a strong presence in international
organisations such as the World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), as well as the IMF.
Australia has also demonstrated a strong capacity for
diplomatic administration. It contributed consistent behind the scenes
diplomacy to gain support from key decision makers including South Korea,
Indonesia and the United States for the formation of APEC.(37)
More recently, it was instrumental in the formation of the Asia Pacific
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. Australia worked closely
with the United States to win the support of South Korea, China and India
to develop an alternative to the Kyoto Pact, which both the United States
and Australia have not signed. Australia could prove to be the engine
of diplomatic administration that turns an East Asian regional body into
a formal working institution rather than another ASEAN talk fest.
The well known weaknesses in South Korean democracy—the
fluid party system and personality politics—indirectly serve as strong
influences on the South Korean approach to regionalism.
The South Korean political party system is fluid. Parties
tend to be centred on charismatic leaders with little regard for ideological
or political identity. Ordinary party members have little opportunity
to participate in internal party decision making in key issues, including
the selection of candidates for public office, the formulation of party
policy, or the development of election strategy.(38) Such centralised
top-down control, has in the past encouraged nepotism and cronyism. Another
result of this is the power accorded to influential lobby groups. One
of these, the powerful agricultural lobby in its various organisational
forms, has already exerted great influence on South Korea’s foreign economic
policy.
Agricultural protectionism is widely considered to be
the biggest obstacle in gaining South Korean support for Australian participation
in East Asian regionalism, just as it has been in Australian efforts to
garner support for the negotiation of an FTA.(39)
In South Korean politics, the agricultural sector wields
power disproportionate to its contribution to the economy. This was aptly
demonstrated in opposition to the ROK-Chile FTA. Due to the opposition
of the agricultural sector, negotiations were slow and difficult, and
the final agreement underwent substantial debate in the National Assembly.
Rivano and Rhee note:
During the final vote for the ratification of FTA
with Chile, 71 members of the National Assembly out of 271 opposed the
trade pact…more than a quarter of the legislative members are allied
with the rural area or agricultural sector, more than five times the
share of that sector in the economy. (40)
In 2003, when the final vote was undertaken, agriculture
accounted for only 3.6 per cent of GDP and rural workers represented less
than 8.8 per cent of the workforce. (41)
Australia in South Korean domestic politics
The inclusion or exclusion of Australia from East Asian
regionalism would have little or no impact on the South Korean agricultural
sector. In recent campaigns to start negotiations towards an FTA, the
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) conducted research,
which indicates that 95 percent of Australian agricultural exports to
South Korea do not threaten South Korean agricultural producers. Australian
rice production is a meagre 0.2 percent of global production, much smaller
than other APT states. Three of Australia’s four largest agricultural
exports (wheat, sugar and cotton) already have tariff rates of 3 percent
or less.(42) Further, the impact on sensitive sectors, including
fruit and dairy, are ameliorated by seasonal differences and product differentiation.
Despite this, the perception remains that Australia, as an efficient agricultural
producer, is a threat to South Korean farmers.
The importance of political lobby groups has also been
demonstrated by the overwhelmingly conservative FTA policy pursued by
South Korea. South Korea has not vigorously pursued agreements with other
regional states despite academic and government sponsored studies having
been undertaken (which is usually an indicator that negotiations will
follow). The fact that such studies have been undertaken, without follow
through to negotiations, indicates that the FTA strategy has stalled at
the political level, rather than at the policy research level.
The nature of regionalism also reinforces the role that
politics plays in the domestic scene. Regionalism is overwhelmingly an
elitist phenomenon. It is pursued doggedly by a small collection of academics,
industry leaders and government officials. However, the wider population
is largely indifferent to the pursuit, except in the intermittent media
frenzies that accompany major conferences. This allows regionalism to
become an exploitable wedge issue in domestic politics. Agriculture has
proven to be one such issue.
Another political issue that is closely tied to the issue
of agriculture is the perception of Australia as external to the region.
Firstly, the extension of membership in East Asian regionalism has to
date, held negative connotations when covered in the South Korean media.
Extension of membership has been associated with the Japanese desire to
counter Chinese influence. The Korea Broadcasting Service (KBS) reported
in December 2005 that:
Japan has managed to include "U.S.-friendly"
nations, like India, Australia, and New Zealand into the membership
of the bloc and has even made an attempt, albeit a failed one, to bring
in the U.S. as an observer. (43)
Due to the intermittent strains in South Korean-Japanese
ties, and the association of Japanese aims with the extension of membership,
the inclusion of Australia is often reported negatively in the South Korean
press.
Secondly, many South Koreans simply believe Australia
is not an ‘East Asian’ country. This was cited as the primary reason by
a majority of respondents as to why Australia should not be in an East
Asian regional community. (44)Commonly-held perceptions of
‘East Asia’ in South Korea include only China, South Korea and Japan,
and occasionally also include the ASEAN states. (45)
For many South Koreans, the notion that Australia is
part of the East Asian region invokes humour and bewilderment at best.(46)
A minority recognise that Australia could one day become part of East
Asia, noting the fact that Australia has transferred from the Oceania
Football Confederation to the Asian Football Confederation, and is recognised
by the Fédération Internationale de Football Associations (FIFA) as being
part of Asia.(47) But to most South Koreans, Australia is still
considered part of the ‘Oceania’ region—a region that is ironically often
bundled together with Southeast Asia in research institutions’ organisational
settings.
However, an even more troubling perception of Australia
in South Korea is its near obscurity in the minds of most South Koreans.
Australia is popularly perceived as an idyllic holiday destination, a
relatively inexpensive location to study English, and a highly efficient
agricultural producer. However, there is little knowledge of Australia
or the potential of the Australian economy beyond these perceptions.(48)
This can largely be attributed to the nature of the economic, strategic
and political relationship. Natural trade complementarity and Cold War
links to the United States ensured that few disagreements divide South
Korea and Australia and that common interest on the international scene
saw them stand side by side more often than not.
The strength of the Australia–South Korea economic relationship
is disproportionate to the effort invested in it by both governments.
Australia and South Korea have enjoyed a highly successful and complementary
trade relationship for over 30 years. Australian raw materials exported
to South Korea return in the form of elaborately transformed manufactures,
including passenger motor vehicles, telecommunications equipment and televisions.
In 2004-05, South Korea was Australia’s third largest goods export market
and Australia’s ninth largest source of goods imports.
Principal Australian exports to the ROK are raw commodities.
Coal, crude petroleum, iron ore, non-monetary gold, and aluminium make
up the top five export items in terms of value. The nature of these exports
necessitates economies of scale that are achievable only by the largest
of multinational corporations. Accordingly, the actual number of Australian
exporters to South Korea is relatively small when compared to other markets
in which exports are considerably more diversified.
South Korean exports to Australia suffer a similar, albeit
different problem. The market is dominated by multinationals due to the
small size of the market for South Korean exporters. The dominance of
Chinese low-end manufactures has also squeezed out smaller exporters that
previously operated in the Australian market.
In short, supporting closer relations with a country
that is perceived as a non-East Asian, unimportant economic partner that
threatens South Korean farmers, is not going to win votes for any South
Korean politician. While there are a small number of National Assembly
members that support closer economic relations with Australia, there is
a much larger and more powerful group that remain opposed.(49)
Further, the lobby groups that support closer economic relations with
Australia are small and dominated by businessmen with alternative connections
to Australia, such as family or alumni ties. Such groups pale in comparison
to the well-funded, strongly supported, agricultural lobby groups.
Accordingly, there is very little domestic political
support for the East Asia Summit process, with Australia as one of its
new members. The potential economic gains are vastly outweighed by the
perceived political threat of including Australia and New Zealand.
Constructivism, realism and liberal intergovernmentalism
each provide useful explanations of the South Korean approach to East
Asian regionalism, although none by itself is adequate. The weaknesses
of each theory are balanced by their ability to provide particularly powerful
insight into specific aspects of the South Korean approach to East Asian
regionalism.
Constructivism provides useful insight into the South
Korean preference for limited regionalism. The South Korean perception
of an East Asian collective identity extends to closer relations between
China, Japan and South Korea, perhaps the APT process, but not the East
Asia Summit process. The significant shared understanding, expectations
and knowledge that have been built up between those in the APT process
since the Asian Financial Crisis should not be underestimated.
To policy makers this would indicate that to be successful,
the East Asia Summit process needs vehicles to promote shared understanding,
expectations and knowledge. One method could be greater institutionalisation.
Alternatively, the East Asia Summit process needs to be provided with
adequate time to ensure the formation of a durable collective identity
which includes the three new members.
Finally, the East Asia Summit process also needs to interact
with other regional groupings. This could be achieved through alignment
of East Asia Summit membership with participation in the Asia Europe Meeting
(ASEM) process, or by instigating an Asia-Americas meeting process.
Realism provides a useful explanation of state preferences
within the East Asia Summit process. The aggressive bilateralism that
preceded the Summit, the jockeying for position and the addition of three
new members can all be explained by states’ desires to maximise power.
However, using realism alone to understand the process fails to account
for the South Korean decision not to overtly support the entrance of the
three new members, or to overtly support the membership of Australia.
For policy makers, this could indicate the need to better
demonstrate the potential strategic advantages that the addition of the
three new members could bring to South Korea. Greater bilateral coordination,
such as occurred between Australia and South Korea prior to the establishment
of APEC, would serve this purpose. Similarly, reinvigorating the Australia-South
Korea relationship, and firmly establishing it in a post-Cold War context
as is occurring between Australia and Japan could further this aim.
Liberal intergovernmentalism provides a good explanation
of South Korean preferences for limited and practical economic regionalism.
There is no domestic desire for an East Asia Summit that is difficult
to manage, or for an East Asian Free Trade Area that would be extremely
difficult to negotiate. Understandably, there is much greater preference
for limited, politically feasible bilateral FTAs. Liberal intergovernmentalism
also gives insight into the failure of widespread public support for the
inclusion of the three new members, given the perceived threat to agricultural
interests and to the political careers of those who support their entry.
For policy makers this would indicate the need to dedicate
substantial focus on institutionalising the East Asia Summit process,
creating a manageable multiparty process that achieves distinct, measurable
goals for member states. Policy makers should also look to further educate
and involve the public in the process—particularly in relation to the
three new members.
- A. Wendt, ‘Constructing international politics’, International
Security, vol. 20, no. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 77–81.
- J. Gilson, ‘New interregionalism? The EU and East Asia’, European
Integration, vol. 27, no. 3, September 2005, pp. 307–26.
- N. W. Rostow, The US and the regional organization
ofAsia and the Pacific, 1965-1985, Austin, University
of Texas, 1985, p. 87.
- J. Ravenhill, ‘A three bloc world? The new East Asian regionalism’,
International relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 2, 2002, pp.
167–95.
- R. Keohane and L. Martin, ‘The promise of institutionalist theory’,
International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, Summer 1995, pp.
39–51.
- A. Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A
Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market
Studies vol. 31, no. 4, December 1993, pp. 473–524.
- B. Cummings, Korea’s place in the sun: A modern history,
New York 1997, p. 156.
- He, Baogang, ‘East Asian ideas of regionalism: a normative critique’,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 58, no. 1,
March 2004, pp. 105–25.
- B. Cummings, Korea’s place in the sun: A modern history,
New York 1997, p. 458.
- R. Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: emerging East Asian regionalism?’, Asian
Survey, vol. 42, no.3, June 2002.
- I. S. Jang, ‘Discourse on East Asia in Korea and Asian identity’,
Paper given at the 1st International Symposium What are Asian Identities
under globalization?, Waseda University, 8 December 2003.
- R. Ferguson, ‘Tale of two continents: a comparison of Asia and Latin
American experiences during recent financial turmoil’, Speech by the
Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board at the National Economic
Association, Boston, Massachusetts, 7 January, 2000.
- ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) Plus Three (China, Japan, Republic of
Korea).
- J. Robertson, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Towards the world’s largest FTA’,
Research Note No. 19, Parliamentary Library, 2002–03.
- P. J. Katzenstein, ‘Regionalism and Asia’, New Political Economy,
Vol. 5, Issue 3, November 2000.
- I. Cheong and C. Y. Ahn, ‘East Asian economic integration: Korea’s
perspectives’, Mimeo, KIEP 2004.
- Interviews, Seoul National University (SNU), Seoul, 3 January 2006–1
February 2006.
- W. Tow and R. Trood, ‘Power shift: Challenges for Australia in Northeast
Asia’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2004.
- ‘Final Report of the East Asia Study Group’, ASEAN+3 Summit, November
2002.
- ibid.
- ibid.
- A. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Philippines,
‘Briefing for the ambassadors and representatives of ASEAN and ASEAN
dialogue partners on the ASEAN Ministerial retreat’, Press Statement,
15 April 2005.
- ibid.
- A. Croissant, ‘Electoral politics in South Korea’, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
(FES) Information Series, 2002.
- E. Manfield and H. Milner, ‘The new wave of regionalism’, International
Organization, vol. 53, no. 3, 1999.
- Bae Geung Chan, ‘Northeast Asian cooperation initiative and Korea’s
diplomatic tasks: A strategy for regional cooperation’, Institute for
Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) Policy Brief, No.
2004–04, November 2004.
- ibid.
- Bae Geung-Chan, ‘Prospects for an East Asia Summit’, Institute for
Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) Policy Brief, No
2005-5/Sep 2005.
- ‘China sets 2020 growth goal’, China Daily, 17 May 2005 (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/17/content_443098.htm),
accessed 20 January 2006.
- E. Manfield and H. Milner, ‘The new wave of regionalism’, International
Organization, vol.;53, no.3, 1999.
- N. W. Rostow, The US and the regional organization
of Asia and the Pacific, 1965–1985, Austin, University
of Texas, 1985.
- South Korean threat perceptions have increased since 2004, due to
the emergence of economic rivalry with China, as well as the emergence
of what is known as the China’s northeast history project. The history
project effectively seeks to lay claim to what Koreans perceive as their
ethnic history by labelling the ancient Koguryo kingdom, which ruled
much of modern day Manchuria, as Chinese history. Many in South Korea
see this as part of a Chinese attempt to justify future claims on North
Korean territory.[1]
- MOFAT, Press Briefing, ‘Outcomes of the ROK-Australia foreign ministers’
talks’, 14 November 2005.
- J. Frankel and S. J. Wei, ‘The new regionalism and Asia: impacts and
options’, paper delivered at the Conference on the Emerging Global Trading
Environment and Developing Asia, held at the Asian Development Bank,
Manila, 29–31May, 1995.
- As quoted in L. Wright, ‘APEC – Australia’s pragmatic Asia policy’,
Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper, No.8, April 1995.
- Yeo Lay Hwee, ‘Realism and reactive regionalism: Where is East Asian
regionalism heading?’, Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation,
University of Madrid (UNISCI) Discussion Papers, May 2005.
- Paul Keating, Engagement: Australia faces the Asia-Pacific,
McMillan 2000, p. 85–87.
- However, it must be noted that this is changing rapidly. The April
2004 National assembly elections resulted in a rough ideological divide
between progressive and conservative forces. For insight into these
changes see Sook Jong Lee, ‘The transformation of South Korean politics:
Implications for US-Korea relations’, Brookings Institution, Sept 2004.
- Interviews conducted by author with Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (DFAT) Seoul Embassy, Australian Trade Commission (Austrade),
and Korea Institute of International Economic Policy (KIEP), Seoul,
3 January 2006–1 February 2006.
- N. Saavedra-Rivano and H. Y. Rhee, ‘The political economy of economic
integration in Korea and Japan’, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting
of the International Consortium of APEC Study Centers, Viña del Mar,
29 May, 2004.
- World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003.
- Australian Embassy Seoul, ‘Australian agriculture – Food for thought’,
Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement, 2005.
- KBS Global, ‘The implications of the Kuala Lumpur decision’, Issues,
15 December 2005.
- op cit., Interviews.
- op cit., Interviews.
- op cit., Interviews.
- op cit., Interviews.
- M. Porter, S. Doszpot, and R. Maxwell, ‘Australia-Korea: Strengthened
economic partnership’, Report prepared for the Australia-Korea Foundation,
August 2001.
- op. cit., Interviews.
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